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BORYS KRUPNYTSKY

(1894–1956)
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PYLYP ORLYK*

BORYS KRUPNYTSKY

We shall try to characterize Pylyp Orlyk as a person and as a statesman.

Upon close observation, it will become clear that we do not have here a figure with a simple nature, uncomplicated, or hewed from one block of stone. His is entirely a baroque figure, of uneven, meandering lines. By nature, Orlyk was part sanguine, part melancholy, with many shifts from the greatest optimism to the deepest despair. The lyricism and melancholy of his nature have a Ukrainian tint. A sensitive and passionate person with a sincere heart, he experienced intensely the good and the bad vicissitudes in his many-sided life. He was spirited, interested in everything, did not like solitude and sought companionship. *Nulla societas, nulla conversatio*—this was a state which could lead him to boredom and despair. He needed confidants to whom he could ease his heart and enthusiastically confide his secrets. It must be admitted that at times this was not done without a cunning, shrewd, purely Ukrainian speculativeness. Accompanied by warm feeling and sincerity, it often operated (especially with foreigners) as a means of attaining certain political objectives. The desire for tranquility, for pure golden science was alien to his whole nature. His was that which the Germans call *Kampfnatur*—restless, impatient, eager for new impressions. No wonder his many-years sojourn in Salonika seemed to him a misery, “a prison.” With all his strength he tried to return from this prison in order to have the chance to busy himself with vital and fruitful work. Perhaps he liked those moments of his journey best when it came to casting off from the old shore to start a new unknown life. And how he profited from the journey’s

* This is a reprint from *Het’man Pylyp Orlyk* (1672-1742), Ohlyad yoho politychnoyi diyaVnosty (Warsaw, 1987), presenting the book’s last chapter, “Zahal’na kharakterystyka,” pp. 173-181.

impressions, and with what interest he closely observed the churches, historical monuments, customs, people! This was not a Muscovite traveller, who with lamentation and sadness, as if sent to his death, goes forth into a distant, terrible Europe, thrust forth in pursuit of knowledge by the heavy fist of Peter I. For Pylyp Orlyk, Europe was his very own, closely related to him and interesting in all its aspects.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Hetman was destined to lead a very hard life and sometimes to make certain compromises, we must acknowledge that his spirit was and remained honest and sincere, capable of the greatest restraint and self-sacrifice. The pleasures of life had no great influence on him; personal enrichment was not a driving force in his life and in his political activities. True, the hard material circumstances, in which he found himself while in emigration, oppressed him, burdened him with many troubles, forced him to search for means of support, and to apply to various European governments with memorials and petitions. Yet he did not have himself alone in mind, but rather either his large family and associates whom he had to support, or the Ukrainian cause, which became the true interest of his life. A model family man and tender father, the Hetman deeply felt the misery in which his wife and children found themselves, and bitterly mourned the death of his son Jacob and, later, of his daughter Anastasia. In general his relations with people were characteristic of his natural tenderheartedness and humanity.2 Perhaps, the most beautiful feature of his nature is that devotion with which he acted towards the people who greatly influenced his fate: toward his teacher Stefan Yavorsky, toward Hetman Mazepa and Charles XII. It was Mazepa who thrust him on to the path which brought him to emigration, to wandering about the world without means of support, with almost unattainable political tasks on his shoulders. Yet we never hear words of reproach from him. The memory of

2 Aleksandr Lazarevsky, “Malorossiiskie pospolitye krest’yane (1648-1788),” Zapiski Chernigovskago Statisticheskago Komiteta, 1866, I, p. 35.
Mazepa was pure in his eyes because he saw in him a sincere Ukrainian patriot, and so thought of him in his diary, which evidently was not meant for strangers' eyes. When he sharply criticized Danylo Apostol, it was not only from motives of competitive-political or purely personal character. The "treason" of Apostol is the argument he uses, reminding himself of the circumstances with caused Apostol to run away from Mazepa to Tsar Peter. Above all, Orlyk's deep religiosity is apparent, especially when one reads his diary, where this feature stands out with extraordinary clarity. His whole Weltanschauung was influenced by piousness: in him it was simple, strong, organic and, at the same time, theoretically well-founded. When in Kraków (May, 1721) he learned of the death of his beloved son Jacob, there spontaneously burst forth from his long-suffering breast: *Dominus dedit, Dominus acceptit, Sit nomen Domini benedictum in saecula...* During his travels in Europe, he never failed to look for a church where he could pray to God. He always fulfilled church practises zealously even when ill (for example, in 1722 in Khotyn, when he overexerted himself in order not to miss the Orthodox divine liturgy). Religious questions interested him extremely. With a lively interest and eagerness he entered theological discussions with the Jesuit fathers, with Catholic priests, and Orthodox priests, including the Metropolitan, bringing up the matter of the schism, the Church Union, profound dogmas of the church, etc. The ritualistic side of religion also drew his attention. With what disgust he speaks in his diary of the custom of public meals in Greek churches in the Balkans. He noticed these because people not only ate but also drank "blessed whiskey" in God's very sanctuary. Perhaps, this was one of the motives which, in the well-known memorial of

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3 It must not be forgotten that Orlyk's letter to Stefan Yavorsky of 1721, from which most can be learned about Mazepa, was an ordinary political maneuver.


1727, led him to mention the evil condition, unknown in the Ukraine, of Orthodoxy in the Greek Church, and on the basis of that to propose to the Vatican the conversion of the Ukraine to Catholicism, which would be easy as soon as the eyes of Ukrainians were open to the true condition of the Greek Church. Certainly it was no more than an ordinary political maneuver for achieving aid from the Pope in the matter of acquiring the Hetman's mace in the Ukraine. But, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Hetman treated the Catholic Church very favorably and maintained close ties with the Catholic clergy. However, his relations with Protestantism were cool and, with the Church Union, even unfavorable. With outright disgust, he looked upon the Mohammedans as representatives of paganism. Here a Christian conscience made his many steps on Turkish soil difficult and contradictory to his religious convictions.

For his time, the Hetman was an unusually enlightened person, and that according to European standards. He knew several European languages and had mastery of the Latin tongue. The beginning of his education was, without doubt, established in the Kievan Academy. In his letters and memorials, written in Latin and other languages, he stands out as a rhetorician and a poet of the Academy, with that special pathos in style which so well characterizes him and his alma mater. Classical authors such as Herodotus, Strabo, Pliny, Vergil, etc., were very well known to him. During his wanderings in Macedonia he was never without Fénélon's Telemachus. His scholarly interests lay more or less in the realm of theology, history and politics. He eagerly read works by famous French preachers. He was interested in legal problems as presented by contemporary authors. As a politician he derived his knowledge of world events from French, Italian and Dutch newspapers (especially the latter) which, at that time, were the most informative publications. But the books from which Orlyk was almost never separated were the Psalter, Ecclesiastes
and St. Augustine because he always sought joy in religion.\textsuperscript{6}

Orlyk’s diligence and energy were very great. Not one of the Ukrainian Hetmans left so many letters, statements, petitions, and such a giant diary as he did. He was industrious, accurate and almost pedantic, as is seen clearly from the notes in his diary made while travelling—for the most part the dates were noted in both new and old styles. He had a brilliant mind—logical and rich in inventiveness. All these were qualities in an assistant-co-worker, in a “right hand.” No wonder Mazepa took him while still a young person to be a general scribe. Indeed, he was a prolific scribe, who could compose statements and petitions very well, select suitable facts and present them in a clear, finished style. Also he did not lack knowledge of people—he had the qualities of a good observer, the ability of finding necessary information and of orienting to a given political situation. He undertook his political tasks with a pure Ukrainian stubborness: many times he saw his plans destroyed, he experienced many failures in his lifetime, and yet he raised himself again, took on new energy, searched for other paths—and, thus, to the end of his life. Stubborn, yet responsive and flexible, he lacked in his disposition only one quality, indispensable for a statesman of great stature. His willpower was not as tough as iron and did not persist long enough after making a decision to enable him to follow it through to its ultimate consequences. In his letters or memorials, Orlyk frequently used the expression, \textit{Scylla and Charybdis,}\textsuperscript{7} drawing attention by this to the danger which threatened him upon acceptance of one of two opposite political orientations. In the opinion of this author the above expres-


sion characterizes the very nature of the Hetman. Some kind of uncertainty, indecision, unwillingness to make an opposing stand seized him sometimes in moments when it was necessary to choose one definite direction from several paths and to take a resolute step in order to get out of the situation of serving two masters. This is seen especially clearly in the analysis of the relations between the Ukrainian Hetman and the king of Sweden. Orlyk never dared to outrightly come out from under the will of Charles XII, even though he estimated entirely realistically the king's chances in Turkey and did not (at least after the Prut events) have much hope for him. In 1711 (after Prut), placed between the orientation to Turkey or to Charles XII and supported by the Zaporozhian Host, he finally decided on opposition to the Swedish king. He rode out at the head of the Cossack delegation to Constantinople, but in the Turkish city of Baba he found waiting for him a categorical order from Charles XII to turn back. He did not persist, and returned, giving his delegation the necessary instructions. In general his diplomatic maneuvers pursued an uneven pattern. His political activities for the period 1725-1728 were characterized by seeking the favor of two opposing coalitions—Hanover and Vienna; this could be called an orientation to both sides, or, more accurately, an orientation to all sides: to Stanislaw Leszczyński, August II, Austria, and Russia, on one side, to France and England on the other; also to the Pope, the Jesuits, Duke of Holdstein, etc. He also manifested the desire to take simultaneously the Right-Bank Ukraine from the Poles and the Left-Bank Ukraine from the Muscovites. All this completes a picture of diplomatic attempts which can hardly be viewed as consistently transacted politics. To this, elements of pure fantasy mix in, as perceived in the project for converting the Right-Bank Ukraine to Catholicism through appeals to the intelligence of the Ukrainians, for whom it supposedly would be enough to be just shown the faults of the Greek Church to make them Catholics. Even in religious convictions, Orlyk did not hold fast to the end. It was some kind of middle course between Orthodoxy and Catholicism,
even though not in the meaning of an official Church Union. Similar swaying is found in the sphere of his legitimate thoughts and actions with respect to state affairs. With its limitation of the Hetman's rights and the establishment of the Cossack parliament, Orlyk's famous constitution of 1710 reflected a definite democratic tendency, which went along the line desired by the Zaporozhians and the ordinary Cossack masses, and was a reaction to Mazepa's autocratic regime. But in the Sultan's privilege, bestowed upon Orlyk in May, 1712, there is not even a trace of this tendency. This privilege speaks of the "despotic" law over the Ukrainian Cossacks of the Hetman and his successors, an expression which could not have been accidentally formulated by the Sultan and his Turkish advisors, and which cannot be understood simply in the sense of external relations with the Turkish state. Orlyk himself comments in his later memorial of August 5, 1727 on the Sultan's privilege in this way: "...la Porte Ottomane qui pretendoit par le droit de la guerre retenir sous sa domination l'Ukraine Citerieure me l'offrit avec sa protection comme une province heriditaire des Cosaques, et m'en accorda la possession despotique par le Privilege Imperial..." Nevertheless, even the constitution of 1710 and the certificate of 1712 have their limitations in Orlyk's memorial to Charles XII in the beginning of 1713, which was the result of the Hetman's definite desire to be rid of Turkey's special protection. Here appears as the first plan, the right of all the Ukrainian people to decide their own fate as a prerogative. Neither the Hetman nor the Zaporozhian Host subordinated to him have any rights in matters concerning "de publica universae Ukrainae integritate" to accept Turkish protection "sine consensu omnium tam spiritualium quam saecularium Universae Ukrainae ordinum ac statuum," because the entire Ukrainian nation ("universus populus") could later say: "Non de-

8 See "Translatio Privilegii," an appendix to Orlyk's letter to Glemming of July 24, 1721, Dresd. H. St. Ar. loc 698.
9 See Lettre du Duc Philippe Orlik, Dresd. H. St. Ar. loc 3306.
10 Al'fred Yensen, op. cit., p. 114.
buistis tractare de nobis sine nobis.” In connection with the person of the Hetman this means: “Dux e (x) tra Patriam de Patria protegenda nullo modo potest, privata activitate cum Porta Othomanica tractare.”¹¹ These astonishingly modern ideas for the beginning of the eighteenth century were usually merely arguments in Orlyk’s hands, because later he negotiated matters concerning the Ukraine, without closely examining his full authorization and without asking about the legally expressed will of the Ukrainian people. But still it must be stated that there was no definite line followed here. The Hetman’s ideas had an unusually wide range—from the constitution for the Cossack’s advantage to the despotic rights of the Hetman, together with an interesting remark about the all-national sovereign right of the Ukrainian people.

Undoubtedly, Orlyk was one of the most eminent Ukrainian statesmen. On his banner was written the independence of the Ukraine as far as possible in its ethnographic boundaries, with the exception of the Western Ukrainian lands, to which B. Khmelnytsky and, at certain times in their careers I. Vyhovsky and P. Doroshenko, attached much importance. Orlyk’s objective was the union of Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine (as much as possible together with the Slobidska Ukraine) into a strong Ukrainian state under one Hetman’s regimen. This was the inheritance which Mazepa left him and to which he remained loyal all his life. But in the beginning of his activity in Bendery, he undoubtedly went further than Mazepa. In Orlyk the independence of a united Ukraine was emphasized more strongly. The constitution of 1710 and the union agreement with the Khan recognized neither Polish nor Muscovite authority. In the meantime, Mazepa united the Ukraine as a separate principate with the Polish state of Stanislaw Leszczyński.¹² Therefore Orlyk retained the protection and

¹¹ Ibid., p. 115.
guarantees of the Swedish king. Also in the conferences with Turkey in the summer of 1711 (after the Prut events), he clearly safeguarded the idea of the union of Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine under his Hetman's rule and strongly emphasized the independence of the Ukrainian State, interpreting Turkish protection as a type of union treaty with the Sultan. Therefore the Sultan's privilege, which gave Orlyk the disposition only of the Right-Bank Ukraine and the Sich, made a discouraging impression on him and was the cause of the Hetman's definitely turning away from the Turks. Now began a period of compromises and the conduct of secret conferences with August II. The Hetman renounced the idea of independence in exchange for a modest Right-Bank Hetmanate (with protection of autonomous rights for the gentry) within the borders of the Polish state. But still he did not forget Kiev and the Left-Bank Ukraine. At least the propositions with which he tried to tempt the Polish statesmen concerned the union of the Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine under Poland's authority by settling Cossacks in the Right-Bank Ukraine and utilizing their claims to the Left-Bank Ukraine.\textsuperscript{13} As is known, Orlyk's compromising policies ended without results. Therefore, he advanced them again in 1719-1721, in agreement with Sweden, proposing to Poland the idea of freeing Kiev and the Left-Bank Ukraine from Muscovite authority and from its union with Poland, apparently with an outlook for union of both halves of Ukraine under his Hetman regimen. The Right- and the Left-Bank Ukraine again figure in Orlyk's projects of 1725-1728, but this time each of them is dealt with separately. The impression is left that the Hetman now saw two chances in the Polish and the Muscovite Ukraine, which he dealt with together, in hopes of getting one of them in his hands. In the last period of Pylyp Orlyk's political activity of 1729-1742, there first appeared the matter of liberating the Left-Bank Ukraine from Russia through an understanding with the Turks and with Poland. And here there was no lack of

\textsuperscript{13} Al'fred Yensen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 164.
timely projects involving the advantage of uniting the Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine into one whole in the interests of European equilibrium. With these, Hryhor Orlyk, evidently in full agreement with his father, turned chiefly to the French government. When all this is taken into account, it must be acknowledged that Orlyk's political action assumed its greatest swing at the beginning of his hetmanship; later, it was lost in compromises. The Hetman was not an extremist par excellence. In time, he more and more adapted to circumstances, but when he saw some kind of possibility, he always returned to the course of fulfillment of the ideal of the union of the Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine.

Moscow played a particular role in his political concepts. The line of his politics was fundamentally anti-Muscovite, even though he sometimes made attempts to be reconciled with it through various mediators. Steadily and consistently his politics revealed themselves as anti-Muscovite in the last period of his life—in the years 1729-1742. He felt Moscow's threat in general to European and especially to East European standards. Russia's aspiration for conquest in the West he imagined as some kind of advance of barbarians against European culture. Under certain conditions all Europe, in his opinion, remained under the threat of Muscovite expansion. Even more dangerous was she for her immediate neighbors, Sweden, Poland and Turkey. For this reason, he turned to them first of all with his numerous proposals (particularly after the Bendery period) for establishing Eastern coalitions against Moscow. In his projects, not only Poland, Sweden and Turkey appear as active forces and chief contracting parties of anti-Muscovite action, but also the Crimea, the Budzhatsky horde, the Sich, the Hetmanate, the Don Cossacks, the Astrakhan and Volga Tatars, etc. As ideas for joining all possible powers that were worthy of notice and that were interested, above all, in Moscow's defeat, Orlyk's plans seem very interesting. Thinking in such broad terms, he also treated the Ukraine's role responsibly. The Ukraine
was closest to Moscow and was most threatened from that side. Orlyk foresaw that the Hetmanate and the Sich could not stand up against Moscow and would be victims of Moscow's imperialistic policies. After that, it would be Poland's turn, and so on. In the meantime, the existence of a strong, united Ukraine was necessary for European equilibrium which was threatened by Moscow's expansion. On the other hand, the Ukrainian state could become a protective bulwark against Moscow, as for example—in the general and in the special Eastern European sense—for Poland or Turkey.

In conclusion, we ask ourselves what drove Pylyp Orlyk to the sacrifices which he made for the Ukrainian idea by his incessant work of more than thirty years in emigration? Was this for ambition, for the good of the Ukraine or for other motives? Undoubtedly, Orlyk was an ambitious person, but in a higher sense which entirely characterizes statesmen who are aware of their work and responsibility. With dignity he faced the task which he took over from Mazepa and his Hetman government. For him to be chief of the nation was not a matter of empty words or an objective for mere speculation. It was an obligation—and all the harder since it meant working in exile and under impoverished conditions to represent the Ukraine—not as a nation under the yoke (as she actually was) but as a nation that was free, about which desires could be expressed and attempts made to realize them. Unquestionably, Pylyp Orlyk had a sincere and warm feeling for the Ukraine and her fate. Without a doubt, he was a Ukrainian patriot, although some people might have doubts upon examination of his statements in certain letters to Polish politicians and noblemen. In these, he calls Poland “das betrübte Vaterland,” he feels “candorem” for the Polish republic, he desires nothing else “but to be joined to

14 Letter of P. Orlyk to Sapieha (German copy) of January 4, 1739. Dresd. H. St. Ar. loc 3278.
15 Al'fred Yensen, *op. cit.*, p. 162.
the body of his fatherland," etc. From this we must not draw the conclusion that Orlyk was a person who was a stranger to Ukrainians. Whoever seriously observes the situation in which these statements were made will note that there is much political calculation in them. Neither in the diary nor in the letters to his son does the Ukrainian Hetman give evidence of his Polish patriotism, but only in the correspondence with Polish or even non-Polish leaders, from whom he expected one or another kind of support for the Ukrainian or his own cause. In the very places where he could express himself more freely, without regard to definite political tasks, altogether different dispositions ruled. In the letter to his son of August 27, 1730, his chief care is "our poor Ukraine." His devotion to Mazepa (in emigration) has no other source but love for the fatherland. Also, his son knew the "Cossack" language (according to Nyeplyuyev) and worked a great deal for the good of the Ukraine.

Some call Orlyk a person of Polish culture, as, for example, S. Tomashivsky: Orlyk... "is culturally a Pole of Polish political orientation." This cannot be completely contradicted, but it also must be noted that, in time, Orlyk became a person who, it can be said, reached higher degrees of European culture. His long sojourn in Europe, beginning in Sweden and ending in his long wanderings in central Europe, tended toward this development. Orlyk's Polishness became apparent in his respect for his origin and in the interest with which he approached the history of his ancestors in Bohemia and Poland, which so clearly appears in the diary of his journeyings. He always stressed his belonging to the gentry class. He felt at home in the atmosphere of gentry-magnate life. But along with that, there is nothing else about him of any kind of specific feature of seventeenth-eighteenth century gentry

16 Letter of P. Lamar to Count Wertern from Lviv, November 28 (new style), 1713. Dresd. H. St. Ar. loc 3278.
18 Stepan Tomashivsky, Pro ideyi, heroyiv i polityku, Lviv, 1929, p. 59.
ideology. It must be admitted that Orlyk's personal attitude to the Poles was never negative. However, he faced Moscow and the Muscovites quite differently. To him everything Muscovite was alien, wild, Asiatic, hostile. Such was Moscow not only in Orlyk's eyes, but also generally in the eyes of enlightened Ukrainians of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century—even in the eyes of the simple Ukrainian people, who instinctively shunned all contacts with the Muscovites. It also must be noted that in Orlyk's spiritual mien, many features of a purely Ukrainian national nature are evident.

Pylyp Orlyk's activity has considerable significance in the history of Ukrainian independence movements. He was the eminent spokesman of the first Ukrainian emigration. Some of his political ideas even today maintain their relevance. In him, the Ukraine gained an extraordinarily active representative of its interests in the international forum—a representative who, at least for thirty years, maintained the Ukrainian cause in an active state. Even though as a statesman he had faults—he did not complete his tasks, he did not achieve an independent and united Ukraine—his energetic, stubborn and indefatigable work has left its traces. It left traditions, created certain ties with Europe, and gave reality to the Ukrainian problem for Europe in the first half of the eighteenth century. This is significant not only for the past of the Ukraine, but also for its future life as a state, in which the preparations made by Orlyk could be useful for strengthening Ukrainian ties with Europe on the basis of definite historical tradition.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PYLYP ORLYK*

MYKOLA VASYLENKO

The decision reached by Hetman Mazepa along with certain high-ranking Ukrainian officers and Cossack-Zaporozhians in 1708 to ally themselves with the Swedish King, is one of the episodes of Ukrainian history that is neither clearly understood nor thoroughly studied. Because conditions have been unfavorable, much of the background is still unknown and no research has been done. The most important documents are probably lost. Some may have been destroyed immediately by Hetman Mazepa himself as a quite understandable precaution. His negotiations with Poland and Sweden had evidently been carried on in utmost secrecy; at any moment they could have been detected by the Russian Government and have caused an official inquiry. Under such conditions no written documents that could serve as evidence would have been kept. Very important secret documents had been burnt by Piper, First Secretary of State of Charles XII, near Poltava on the eve of the day he gave himself up as a prisoner to the Russians.¹ One may guess that among these papers were the documents referring to the negotiations between the Swedish Government and the Ukraine. Piper naturally did not want these documents to fall into the hands of the Russian government and thus reveal other more important plans and intents, as well as disclose a wider circle of the officers who had participated in this plot.

* This is a reprint from Uchenye Zapiski Instituta istorii RANION, Moscow 1929, Vol. IV, pp. 153-171, and is printed as one in the series of translations of Ukrainian source material (cf. The Annals, No. 1).

¹ Sergei Solov'yov, Istoriya Rossii, Obshchestvennaya PoFza, Vol. XV, p. 1553. Pylyp Orlyk, "Vyvid prav Ukrayiny" (Deduction des droits de l'Ukraine), a manuscript found in the archives of the Dinteville family in France was published with preface and footnotes by Elie Borschack, Stara Ukrayina, I-II, pp. 1-10 (see English translation of Borschak's comments and the reprint of Deduction... in this issue).
The interests of many European states were involved in the Northern War, and the Western countries were, in consequence, greatly concerned. Mazepa's decision to join forces with Charles XII was for them the most significant event of this war, since it could help them realize their hopes of tearing the Ukraine from Russia. Many documents referring to this period of Ukrainian history have been kept in different archives, notably the Turkish, Swedish and Polish-Saxonian. Thus far, however, the Turkish archives have been almost inaccessible for research work. The studies of the Swedish archives by N. V. Molchanovsky and Dr. Alfred Jensen, and of those in Dresden by Professor N. N. Aleksandrenko, have yielded poor results. They shed light only upon the less important facts of the movement of Mazepa's followers, particularly on material relating to the fate of Pylyp Orlyk.

But this information became even less important, since the Ukrainians' plans to join Charles XII were not realized; Mazepa's followers lost their political importance and became ordinary émigrés.

The Ukrainian scholar Elie Borschak recently became interested in the fate of this first Ukrainian emigration and has made plans to write an extensive work entitled *Europe and the Ukraine*. The author says that the purpose of the work is the study of political and cultural relations between the Ukraine and the separate states of Europe. Borschak first turned his attention to France where he happened to be at the time of writing. He reports that an extensive six-volume work entitled *France and the Ukraine* is ready for publication. In studying the relations between European countries and the Ukraine, Borschak naturally had to be concerned with the epoch of Hetman Mazepa and his decision to join Charles XII. In this connection he became interested in the fate of the Ukrainian emigration after the battle near Poltava. He has

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2 Borschak's report of his research work in archives of Western Europe was sent to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev. A copy was printed in *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka*, CXXXIV, pp. 241-248.
published several articles of a preliminary character dealing with these problems, using for the most part diplomatic sources which add little to an understanding of the ideology of the Ukrainian emigration. Thus, even with the publication of these works by Borschak, little progress has been made in the study of the movement among the high-ranking officers, which resulted in the decision by some of them to turn to the Swedish King.

As soon as Peter I learned of Mazepa's treason he had good reason to believe that serious events would follow in its wake in the Ukraine, and he therefore immediately initiated a struggle against the traitors. The struggle was waged on two fronts: through terror, with all the cruelty of those times (destruction of Baturyn and extermination of its population by Menshikov), and through the published word. The Tsar issued manifestoes and appeals to the Ukrainian people. These proclamations were usually lengthy, incomprehensible and obscure. One point of view persisted throughout, however, and was imposed upon the people: Mazepa and his followers were pictured as entirely ambitious persons, who out of personal interest had betrayed the Tsar and sold their own people and their orthodox faith to foreigners, for the glory of which the Cossacks had always struggled. The clergy backed this view and ratified it by public damnation of Mazepa. In this way an official stigma was spread about Mazepa. With appropriate variations it was transferred to historiography. The "state" point of view, so to speak, predominated, and the events of 1708-1709 were looked upon and judged from the standpoint of "high treason" against the Russian Tsar, and the harm it might have caused the Russian State.

As for the officers who joined Mazepa, it would be wrong to view them simply as ambitious men. They had, after all, jeopardized their entire welfare for their fatherland in return for a dark and uncertain future. Judging from their deeds,

it cannot be denied that they were concerned with the fate of their people. In the time of Peter I the problems of Russia as a state were undoubtedly great, but the Ukrainian people and their interests should not have been ignored. The Ukraine was a living social organism. In their time the Ukrainian people had carried on an unyielding struggle against the Polish Government. To free themselves from Polish domination, the Ukrainian people had entered into an agreement with Moscow, guaranteeing their rights by means of a treaty with the Moscow Government. Then, due to special developments of their economy, they worked out a social-economic order entirely different from that of Moscow, and, quite naturally, strove to guard its principles and foundations. Meanwhile, the Muscovite government tried to impose its will upon the Ukrainian people. Just as the clash of interests of the Cossacks and the Polish nobility has brought about Bohdan Khmelnytsky's treason against Poland, so similar clashes of the Ukraine's interests against those of Moscow brought about Mazepa's treason. However, the character and extent of these events were different. During Khmelnytsky's period the social economic pressures stimulated a real national revolution, which later entirely changed the social order and economy of the country. At the time of Mazepa, however, the people as a whole—the Cossacks and the general populace—did not take part in the movement, and as a consequence Mazepa's plan failed. The reasons for this failure are to be found in the social-economic relations within the Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. By that time the pattern of the social groups had become quite distinct. A class of economically powerful officers had come into prominence in the government, exploiting the Cossacks and the populace. Since this exploitation caused serious conflicts of interest, the ways of the high-ranking officers and those of the populace and the Cossacks diverged. Therefore, when the officers tried to strengthen their position by joining Charles XII, they found no support among
other classes. Thus Mazepa’s attempt to direct Ukrainian life into another channel failed. Still the failure does not diminish the great social significance of this attempt, and it stimulates interest in the study of the ideology of the officers who joined Charles XII.

In this connection, it is important to pay special attention to the treaty signed in Bendery on April 5, 1710, by Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, and the officers, Cossacks and Zaporozhians who had elected him. This agreement can be regarded as a kind of Ukrainian constitution which clarifies the political mood of the Ukrainian emigration at that time. This mood and these ideas had not come into being abroad, or all at once. They were brought by the emigration from the Ukraine where they had been born of the realities and conditions of life that obtained there. We can take for granted, then, that the ideas which Orlyk used as a basis for the treaty were held not only by the emigrés, but also by those conscientious officers who did not break their allegiance to the Moscow Government to join Mazepa.

Mazepa’s historical role was ended soon after the battle near Poltava. He died on August 22, 1709, and was entombed in the Church of St. George in Galats.5

For more than a half year his followers were without a leader. Finally, an assembly of the General Council was called on April 5 near Bendery. Officers, Cossacks and Zaporozhians took part in this assembly and according to the ancient Cossack traditions they unanimously elected as Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, Orlyk writes in his Diary that he went to the Church of St. George to visit Mazepa’s tomb immediately upon his arrival in Galats, June 14th, 1721; see Elie Borschak, “Z mynuloho,” Khliborobs’ka Ukrayina, 1922-1923, Book IV, reprint, p. 7. About Orlyk’s Diary, see the above-mentioned Borschak article, as well as F. Rawita-Gawroński, Studya i szkice historyczne, Series II, Lviv, 1900, pp. 29-70; reprinted from Biblioteka Warszawska, 1899, Book III, pp. 389-419. Using the article by Rawita-Gawroński, V. P. Horlenko wrote a short essay, “Zapiski Filippa Orlika,” Otbleski, St. Petersburg, no date, pp. 155-164.
THE CONSTITUTION OF PYLYP ORLYK

who had been a *heneral’nyi pysar’* (Secretary General of the Host).

Among all the high-ranking officers who followed Mazepa Pylyp Orlyk was without doubt one of the most interesting and distinguished. The Orlyks were Czechs (Bohemians) by origin. At one time they had lived in Silesia, near the Bohemian border. They were wealthy people of noble origin. Up to the eighteenth century the Orlyks had been titled barons in Silesia. At the time of the Hussite Wars one of Pylyp Orlyk’s ancestors moved to Kraków in Poland. It is not known how the Orlyks proceeded later to Lithuania and became landlords there. In Lithuania they owned a village, Kossuta, in Oszmiana County, Vilno Province. In this village Pylyp Orlyk was born on October 11, 1672 (Julian calendar).

His parents evidently belonged to the Greek-Orthodox Church and Pylyp Orlyk was baptized according to those rites. That explains why, after being taught at home or, perhaps, in a local school, he entered the Kiev-Mohyla College (Collegium). Evidently he was graduated very young from there, early in 1690. In 1692, according to O. M. Bodyansky, Orlyk was a student of philosophy. It can be supposed that Orlyk was one of the promising students in the Collegium. There was a booklet known to Bodyansky entitled in Latin *Ars Poetica ab institutionem neovatum Kijovo-Mohileanorum exposita anno militantis in carne Dei* 1709. It was in the handwriting of Mykola Danylovych Khanenko, the author of the well-known *Diariush*, the diary of Hetman Skoropadsky’s last journey to Moscow in 1722. And this booklet included as samples poems in Latin, Polish and Slavonic by Teofan Prokopovych, Stefan Yavorsky and Pylyp Orlyk.

The well-known Stefan Yavorsky was Orlyk’s professor of

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7 O. M. Bodyansky, Preface to Nikolai Khanenko, *Diariush*, Moscow, reprint from *Chteniya v obshchestve istorii i drevnostei*, 1859, p. VII.
rhetoric and philosophy in this Collegium. Orlyk highly esteemed him as a teacher, and always had great respect for him. This explains why Orlyk in 1721, in one of the hard moments of his life when apparently he thought of returning to the Ukraine, wrote a letter to Yavorsky. He tried to mitigate the bad impression of his personal participation in Mazepa's plot. The development of the plot was recounted in this letter, and the active role of high-ranking officers was stressed. Counteracting long-established opinion, Orlyk defined his role as a secondary one, the role of a man whose habit it was to obey the demands of his duty.

While in the Kiev Mohyla Collegium, Orlyk had made his first connections with the Ukraine. He did not return home, but at first maintained his relations with his native country. It is known at least that in 1695 he published in Vilno his eulogy to Mazepa. It must be said that Orlyk never considered himself a Ukrainian, but a foreigner. It is not known when he began his career in the Ukraine. In the second half of the 1690's he was a pysar' (secretary) in the consistory of the Kiev Metropolitan. It shows that his first connections were made in clerical circles. Later on he was in Poltava. In 1698 the daughter of the heneral'nyi pysar' Vasyl' Kochubey married one Colonel Obidovsky from Nizhen, and in connection with this wedding celebration Orlyk wrote a eulogy published in the printing house of the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery. Rawita-Gawroński thinks that Orlyk pushed his way up to the highest ranks by means of these panegyrics. But when Orlyk wrote the latter panegyric he had already entered into lasting

9 Orlyk's letter to Stefan Yavorsky, Osnova, October 1862, section "Istoricheskie akty," pp. 1-29.
11 Orlyk's letter to Stefan Yavorsky, op. cit.
12 M. A. Maksimowich, op. cit., p. 713.
13 Ibid., p. 714; F. Rawita-Gawroński, op. cit., p. 40. The eulogy was entitled Hippomcnes Sarmaticus.
14 F. Rawita-Gawroński, op. cit., p. 40.
relations with the Poltava officers. On October 23, 1698, he married the daughter of Colonel Hertsyk in Poltava. Hertsyk, wealthy and influential, later became one of the outstanding participants in Mazepa’s plot. A year later, on November 6, 1699, Orlyk’s first daughter had been born. Her baptism was attended by prominent high-ranking officers of Poltava. Apparently Orlyk, now related to them, joined their circle, and their class interests, naturally, became his own.

Then Orlyk moved from Poltava to Baturyn. It could be suggested that close relations with Kochubey helped him. As a *heneral’nyi pysar’,* Vasyl Kochubey engaged Orlyk as the manager of his office. The Kochubeys may possibly have given Orlyk references to the Hetman. Therefore it was not accidental that at his son’s baptism in Baturyn in 1702 the godparents were the Hetman himself and Lyubov Kochubey, the wife of the same Kochubey, who later became a judge and who was to be so cruelly executed by Mazepa.\(^\text{15}\) Moving to Baturyn at the beginning of the year 1700, Orlyk swiftly advanced his career in the Hetman’s court, and finally, as we know, became a *heneral’nyi pysar’,* trusted by Mazepa. It is impossible to trace his career chronologically. Orlyk achieved it not by wriggling in, or through patronage, as Rawita-Gawroński thinks, but through his cleverness, energy, talents and education. In these he had always been distinguished, and these created a basis for his election as a Hetman. It should be noted that Orlyk, in building his career, continued to consider himself a foreigner. In his letter to Stefan Yavorsky he emphasized the fact that, as a foreigner and a newcomer to the Ukraine, he had never sworn to get his citizenship, nor taken an oath of allegiance to the Russian Tsar, but only to Mazepa who was his Hetman and his lord.\(^\text{16}\) Therefore he, Orlyk, never had broken his oath.

Orlyk’s role in the Mazepa plot is known only from his letter to Stefan Yavorsky. His sincerity cannot be accepted.

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\(^{15}\) *Ibid.*, p. 41; written on the basis of Orlyk’s *Diary.*

\(^{16}\) Orlyk’s letter to Stefan Yavorsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.
Orlyk's role was certainly underplayed because the purpose of his letter was to prepare the ground for his possible lawful return to the Ukraine. Orlyk was too energetic to limit himself to the passive role of a simple executor, without involving himself personally. Most likely Orlyk had played an active role in Mazepa's plot, since the old Hetman used to consult him alone on many problems. In his letter, however, Orlyk attributes great importance to the high-ranking officers with whom he belonged, and thinks Mazepa would not have decided on such a daring and hazardous step if he had not been urged to it by his officers as well as by the colonels of Myrhorod, Pryluka, and Lubni.\textsuperscript{17}

The role of the officers (\textit{Starshyna}) in Mazepa's plot had not been a casual one.

This group of high-ranking officers had been formed in the Ukraine by the end of the seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries as a strong and economically-influential class. Legally this class did not differ from other Cossacks, but in fact all the power and influence was concentrated in their hands. The \textit{Starshyna}, naturally, tended to secure their influence legally, too. However, the authority of the Hetman, who had a great many prerogatives, stood in their way. The officers tried to limit this power. Not all the \textit{Starshyna} from the lowest ranks to the highest were involved in these plans and aspirations; they were for the most part those counselors closest to the Hetman, officers of the highest ranks and colonels who supervised the separate Ukrainian regiments and administrative units. Their class interests required that the Hetman's authority be limited and subordinated to their influence. These tendencies were disclosed at the time when the Hetman Mnohohrishnyi and the Hetman Samoylovych were deprived of their authority. In order to further their own interests, the officers strove to limit the Hetman's power. In the third paragraph of the

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 27.
Konotop Statutes, adopted at the time of Hetman Samoylovych’s election in 1672, it was specified that the Hetman was not allowed to pass judgement or to dismiss a high-ranking officer without consulting them. This measure had been taken to protect the officers from such “bondage and cruelty” as were exercised during Hetman Mnohohrishnyi’s rule. Paragraph four forbade the Hetman to correspond with foreign rulers, particularly with Doroshenko. Decisions of the third paragraph of the Konotop Statutes became the principles of the twelfth paragraph of the Pereyaslav Statutes in 1674. Violation of these decisions turned out to be one of the reasons why the officers were dissatisfied with Hetman Samoylovych and deprived him of the Hetman authority, although the main charge against him was “treachery.” The petition with the complaints against Hetman Samoylovych was imbued with the class interests of the officers. They had accused the Hetman of acting independently without taking counsel with them, and further, of arbitrary and wilful dismissals and nominations decided without the officers, which violated the requirements of the Konotop and Pereyaslav Statutes. He had dishonored the officers without making fair charges. Estimable and noble people had been treated highhandedly by the Hetman, who at the same time was on familiar terms with low-born people, those who had no merits. In short: “for the Heneral’na Starshyna he (the Hetman) has no proper respect and they are not safe. His wrath or his praise make them feel more dead than death itself.”

The officers were displeased with Samoylovych because he did not belong to the nobility; he was “low-born,” yet he considered himself so much higher than everybody else that he did not want his daughter to be married to any of the officers’

19 Ibid., p. 255.
20 Ibid., p. 302.
sons. The officers took this as an insult against their feelings and class dignity.

Thus by the last quarter of the seventeenth century the class aspirations of the officers began to take shape. They certainly desired the Hetman to be one of them and wanted themselves to be counselors controlling people's destinies along with him. Legally the officers' participation in the national life of the Ukraine was conceived as strengthening the importance of the Council of Officers and its influence in government. It seems the officers did not think much about the more detailed forms of their participation. At any rate we have no indication that before Orlyk's constitution the Starshyna fought for a definite form of legal participation in the governmental life of the Ukraine.

Some guarantees of the official position of the Starshyna were determined by the eleventh paragraph of the statutes adopted at the time of Mazepa's election. While the officers had no right to change their Hetman, they were obliged to report to Moscow on his activities. On the other hand, the Hetman was forbidden to dismiss high-ranking officers from their duties without the approval and consent of the Muscovite Government. Had one of the officers performed any criminal act it would also have been necessary to inform Moscow and to have waited until the appropriate orders came before taking action. Such a decree placed the Ukrainian Government in a position of great dependence on Moscow, but for the officers, without any doubt, it meant a definite guarantee as regards their relations with their Hetman, because it could make them independent of the Hetman and lend them a certain feeling of being their own masters. And yet at the time of Mazepa's election the Heneral'na Starshyna did not introduce the question of its form of participation in the government.

The statutes of Hetman Mazepa placed the relation be-

21 Ibid., p. 304.
22 Ibid., p. 315.
between the Hetman and the Starshyna in a precarious position. Those relations were regulated not by firm legal norms but by the political interests of the Moscow Government, which decided, clause by clause, all questions connected with the conflicts between the Hetman and the Starshyna with respect to possession of authority. Naturally, the Muscovite Government supported the side which could bring it profit at the moment. Only on the basis of such relations could the case of Kochubey, the heneral'nyi suddy (judge), have taken place. On the other hand, the Hetman also had to maneuver and maintain a balance between the Starshyna and the Moscow Government. Two aspects of Mazepa's activity as a Hetman may be considered. On the one hand, he was a leader of high-ranking officers and a defender of their interests. On the other, the Moscow Government considered him its loyal subject and faithful follower. Mazepa, profiting from Moscow's strength, had a strong hold over the officers. Under normal conditions, Mazepa would have succeeded in maintaining the balance between Moscow and the Heneral'na Starshyna. But this balance was inevitably shaken by such an extraordinary circumstance as the war in the interests of the Russian Empire. Subsequently the imperialistic aspiration of Russia and the interests of the Heneral'na Starshyna not only diverged, but became contradictory. Mazepa could not reconcile them. Circumstances were forcing him to take the side of one party or the other, and the old Hetman decided to cast his lot with the interests of the Heneral'na Starshyna, who had been closer to him than the alien interests of Moscow imperialism.

As we have learned from Orlyk's letter to Stefan Yavorsky, Mazepa was not alone in breaking his allegiance with Moscow. The Hetman would not have dared to undertake such a hazardous action had he not been urged to it by the heneral'nyi oboznyi Lomykovsky and the colonels of Myrhorod, Pryluka and Lubni. 23 The above-mentioned highest officers

23 Orlyk's letter to Stefan Yavorsky, Osnova, October 1862, section "Istoricheskie akty," p. 27.
had not made their decision suddenly. As may be assumed from Orlyk’s letter, political discontent had existed among them before and, presumably, the question at stake was one of more precise legal forms for the political status of the Ukraine. As early as 1707 the Starshyna used to gather in the home of the heneral’nyi oboznyi Lomykovsky or of Danylo Apostol, the Colonel of Myrhorod, and read the pacta hadziaczka, the well-known treaty between the Ukraine and the Government of Poland, concluded in 1659, when Vyhovsky was the Hetman. According to this treaty the Ukraine, which had been under Polish domination at that time, got a more independent status. The officers would take these documents from the library of Kiev-Pechersk Monastery, where they had been kept. We do not know exactly which officers took part in reading and discussing these papers. Orlyk particularly emphasized in his letter that this used to be done in Mazepa’s absence. The reading of the treaty is evidence of the political discontent and the aspirations among the officers who had begun to think about the legal status of their native country. We cannot estimate the number of officers who had participated in the reading of these pacts, but it could not have been great because of the danger and secrecy connected with meetings of this kind. But beyond question the most conscientious and energetic statesman had been involved.

If the influence of the Starshyna in Mazepa’s plot is unquestionable, then its position had to become still stronger after Mazepa’s death when all his followers were left without a leader. It is known that for more than half a year their situation did not change. This occurred, presumably, because of their protracted consultations before Orlyk’s election with the Cossacks who had remained on the Dnieper. The emigres, followers of Mazepa, had not recognized Skoropadsky as the Hetman. They tried, therefore, to attach an

24 Ibid., p. 11.
all-Ukrainian meaning to the election of Orlyk. We should not omit the fact that up to the armistice on the Prut in 1711, these officers had been acting on their firm conviction that the time was near when they would all return to their native country and that the Swedish King would conquer Peter and free the Ukraine from his domination. This is mentioned more than once in the treaty signed by Orlyk.²⁶

The treaty had been drawn up with the firm conviction of an early return to the fatherland, where it would gain juridical status for the whole Ukraine. This treaty seemed to be very real at the moment of its composition, not the theoretical project it turned out to be later after it had become impossible for its authors to return to the Ukraine. The treaty is interesting not only because it expressed the desires and aspirations of the highest Ukrainian officers, but also because it was the first constitutional act in the Ukraine, with the help of which the ruling class independently made its only attempt to establish a legal foundation for the political system of the Ukraine.²⁷

The working out of the treaty was connected with Orlyk’s election. As noted earlier, Orlyk had been elected unanimously as an outstanding, energetic statesman, just the kind needed at that uncertain time. “We elected freely and at a single vote His Excellence our lord Pylyp Orlyk as our Hetman,” it is said in the introduction to the treaty, “who is worthy of the honor to be a Hetman and who, through his great wisdom and skill, is powerful enough to fulfill these responsible and

²⁶ Ibid., p. 245.
²⁷ The treaty with Orlyk and the documents referring to it were printed in ibid., pp. 242-257 in Russian; in Latin it was published in Perepiska i drugiya bumagi shvedskago korolya Karla XII, pol’skago Stanislava Leshchinskago, tatarskago khana, turetskago sultana, general’nago pisarya F. Orlika i kievskago voevody Iosifa Pototskago (Correspondence and Other Papers of the Swedish King, Charles XII, the Polish King, Stanislaw Leszczynski, the Tatar Khan, the Turkish Sultan, the Secretary General, Pylyp Orlyk, and the Kiev Voyevoda, I. Pototsky), Chteniya v Obshchestve istorii i drevnosti rossiiskikh, 1847, No. 1, pp. 1-19.
burdensome duties, at this hard time to rule and to tend carefully the interests of Little Russia, our Fatherland, with the help of Our Lord Almighty and the protection of His Majesty His Serene Highness the King of Sweden."28 The election of Orlyk was conducted, of course, by the Heneral'na Starshyna, and the Hetman, naturally, had to obey their requirements and directions. For the first time since Bohdan Khmelnytsky's rule the officers held a free election of their Hetman without participation or influence of any foreign authority, as had obtained at the time of Moscow domination. The Swedish King did not interfere at all; he only approved the election. Although masters of the situation and highly esteeming Orlyk's personal qualities, the officers had good reasons to fear lest he should go the way of his predecessors and try to get absolute power. This caused them to demand that the newly-elected Hetman fulfill certain obligations to them. That is presumably why the treaty came to be made.

The treaty was confirmed by the written oath of the new Hetman. It says in part: "Being elected, proclaimed and raised to the highest authority of a Hetman [I pledge] by all means at my command to fulfill completely... this Agreement and its decisions written here, decreed and confirmed in all points, commas and periods, by me and the Zaporozhian Host in the act of election; [I pledge] to love my native country, Little Russia our Mother, to be loyal and to take care of her; to strive as far as my energy, wisdom and means suffice to achieve the welfare of her population, the commonalty, the extension of the rights and liberties of the military forces; [I pledge] never to have any relations with foreign rulers or people who could cause destruction or harm to our Fatherland; to inform the appropriate Heneral'na Starshyna, colonels and others of attempts to bring any harm to the native country or to the rights and liberties of the military forces; to honor the eminent

and worthy persons among the Zaporozhian Host, to love all the comrades old and young, and to give justice to those who have violated the law." Only the Hetman took the oath; the officers did not.

The form of the oath and the treaty reminds one of the pacta conventa, signed by the Polish Kings. Probably the treaty with Orlyk had been influenced by that act. On the other hand, the form of the treaty is so simple that it could have been worked out without any precedent.

There is a system in the arrangement of the material. The treaty begins with a religious formula characteristic of certain solemn juridical acts—wills, for instance: "In the name of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, in the name of the Holy Trinity glorified." Further on there is an interesting sentence indicating the everlasting significance of the treaty as a fundamental act, nothing temporary or transient: "Let it be for the eternal glory and memory of the Zaporozhian Host and the entire Little Russian people." Immediately after that there is an extensive introduction, and later the sixteen articles of the treaty. First are the articles of general significance: about religion (article 1), about territory and borders (article 2), about relations with the Crimea, which at that time had particular significance for the Ukraine and her plans for the future (article 3); two articles (4 and 5) were specifically related to the interests of the Zaporozhian Host. Subsequent articles, beginning with the sixth, are concerned exclusively with the Ukraine, her administration, the solution of problems that had arisen at the time of other Hetmans. These were chiefly financial and economic problems that were painfully felt by everyone in everyday life—rent, obligatory furnishing of horses and vehicles, different kinds of taxes, etc.

On its face value, the treaty is not an act containing strictly formulated norms. In some cases they could be interpreted only after long consideration (for example, article 1, on

29 Ibid., pp. 254-255.
religion); in others, the question of norms was only raised for consideration, and it was left for the Hetman to decide the formulations, as for instance, in article 13, where the inviolability of the Magdeburg right of the towns had been established: the Hetman had to confirm this right and, consequently, to define its legal extents.

Therefore, from the juridical standpoint, the treaty with Orlyk was an incomplete act. Apparently, at that time the juridical thinking of the Heneral'na Starshyna was not sufficiently crystallized to be expressed in precise, defined statements. All the same the significance of the treaty is not lessened by this lack of clarity. The formulas of the treaty, although vague and merely descriptive, give a definite impression of the ideological aspirations of the Starshyna, which strove as a ruling class to play the leading role in the national life of the Ukraine after the liberation from the domination of the Muscovite Tsar.

Orlyk’s election as a Hetman and the treaty were confirmed by the Swedish King in his capacity as protector of the Ukraine. He says in the act of confirmation:

The conditions, or agreements and decrees, as to the rights and liberties of the military forces, between the newly-elected Hetman, and the Heneral'na Starshyna, first in the ranks of Little Russian people, together with the Zaporozhian Host, approved mutually, equally by both sides, and at the time of the free election confirmed by the same Hetman on April 5, 1710,— We have seen and praised and found right; and because there is also no other purpose for us but safety and welfare of all citizens, by this writ We confirm them [conditions, agreements, etc.], think them reliable and pledge Our King's word to protect them always and to guard them from any violation.

Sweden’s protectorate of the Ukraine had been established by an agreement of Charles XII with Mazepa. This is evidenced by an interesting document which Ellie Borschak found in the archives of the Dinteville family in France.

30 Ibid., pp. 255-257.
The wife of the eldest son of Pylyp Orlyk (Hryhoriy) came from this family. The document had been written in French and titled *Deduction des droits*. It was a pamphlet written by Pylyp Orlyk around 1712 with the purpose of clarifying before Europe the rights of the Ukraine and his rights as a Hetman. This *Deduction des droits* mentions some of the points of Mazepa’s agreement with Charles XII which give some idea of the juridical relations between Sweden and the Ukraine, created after the Ukrainian Hetman joined the Swedes. Charles XII had to defend the Ukraine and to send arms when demanded by the Hetman and the *Starshyna*. He guaranteed the security of the entire territory of the Ukraine. The trophies of war taken by the Swedes in the Ukraine belonged to them according to the rules of war, with exception of those possessions which had formerly been the properties of the Ukraine. The latter had to be returned to the Ukraine. The rights of the Hetman could not be violated. After the Hetman’s death the *Starshyna* would preserve all their rights and liberties including, of course, the right to elect a new Hetman. The Swedish King had no right to use the title and arms of the Ukrainian Hetman. In this way, according to the agreement Orlyk refers to in the *Deduction des droits*, the Ukraine kept her independence and retained the defense and support of Sweden. This was not subjection but simply protection and meant nothing which could contradict the interests of Sweden. Thus it is quite understandable that all the most important laws of the life of the Ukraine as a state had to be approved by the Swedish Government. Such approval was essential to Orlyk’s election and his treaty; it was granted because, as it is stated, they “have no other purpose but the security and welfare of the people.”

Several mentions are made in Orlyk’s treaty of the protection given the Ukraine by the Swedish King. These give

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32 The introduction to the treaty, also articles 1, 2, and 4.
an opportunity to define more exactly the juridical nature of this protection. The introduction to the treaty says:

The Zaparozhian Host made the decision to put themselves under the protection of His Imperial Most Serene Majesty, the King of Sweden, and are now keeping to it truly and firmly with no other purpose but the restoration and development of their violated rights and liberties.\(^3\)

The protection, at first temporary, had to develop into a permanent one. In connection with this, Hetman Orlyk was obliged to achieve an agreement with the Swedish King by which the kings of Sweden were obliged to be real protectors, to help by deed, not only by word. This was needed “to increase the strength of the Ukraine,” “to maintain the rights granted her and to guard her borders.”\(^4\) The Ukraine was not acknowledged as an independent State and could not carry on international relations in her own name. Therefore her protector had to be concerned with the integrity of her territory, her rights and interests.\(^5\) It was assumed that, at the time of peace negotiations with Moscow, the Swedish King would try to get the Ukrainian prisoners back from Moscow, would strive to persuade the people of Moscow to clear the lower Dnieper and to force them to destroy their fortifications there, and so on.\(^6\) So we see that the Swedish protectorate did not make the Ukrainian people its subjects. It only secured external independance of a free Ukraine and the stability of her domestic life, as expressed by Pylyp Orlyk’s election and the conclusion of a treaty with him.

The treaty with Orlyk was composed by the Heneral’na Starshyna and Zaporozhians, freely and voluntarily, without outside influence. That is why it has special interest in the history of the development of constitutional thought in the Ukraine.

\(^3\) The last part of the introduction.

\(^4\) Article 2 of the treaty.

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Articles 2 and 4 of the treaty.
We shall examine it in its component articles. They are organized in a special system which should be followed in order to comprehend the essence of the treaty.

There is a rather extensive introduction to the treaty which stresses two ideas: on the one hand, the idea of an independent, unconquered Ukrainian people whose life with all its vicissitudes is described in a short account; on the other hand, an entirely negative response to the idea of absolute power is expressed. Originally the Ukrainian people had been called the Khozars and had been a vigorous and powerful people. The Khozar princes were related to the emperors of Byzantium. But later the Ukrainians lost their independence and were conquered by the Polish kings. This was a punishment sent by Almighty God who, however, later had pity on the Ukrainians and raised among them Bohdan Khmelnytsky, who liberated the Ukrainian people from the Polish yoke. Then the Ukrainian people came under the power of the Moscow Tsar, but not having the freedom they longed for they broke their allegiance to Moscow at the time of Hetman Mazepa. However, Mazepa did not succeed in bringing his cause to fulfilment. He died. At that difficult time the Rada (Council) in Bendery elected Pylyp Orlyk as Hetman. But, because the previous Hetmans, being under authority of an absolute monarch, were themselves infected by absolutism and thus violated the "ancient laws, the rights and liberties of the Host" and imposed burdens upon their people, the Heneral'na Starshyna and the Koshevoy, together with the Cossack-Zaporozhians, in order to guard themselves for the future, concluded a treaty with Hetman Orlyk, which was binding also for the Hetmans after Orlyk. In this way the treaty was not a temporary one, not a personal agreement by Orlyk with the Zaporozhian Host and the Heneral'na Starshyna, but acquired the significance of a constitution, regulating the relations between the Hetman's authority, the Ukrainian Heneral'na Starshyna, and the Zaporozhian Host.
The first obligation of the Hetman according to the treaty was to defend the Greek-Orthodox faith and not to let any heterodoxies, especially Hebraism, spread in the Ukraine. After the break with Moscow the Hetman had to apply to the Constantinople Church in order to secure the restoration of the Ezarkhat, which had existed earlier in the Ukraine. It is natural that the religious question was the first in the treaty. At the time when it had been composed questions on religion attracted special attention and were considered most essential. The struggle for their religion was of great importance in Cossack history. “Whereas,” it is said at the beginning of the first article, “among the three virtues, theological faith is the first, therefore, this first article should deal with the sacred Orthodox faith of the Eastern religion.” With respect to its constitutional meaning, the first article is important because it broke the bond with the Muscovite Church and stimulated the beginning of connections with Constantinople. Thus, with the establishment of the Ekzarkhat the Ukrainian Church could gain more independance.

The Hetman had to protect the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Ukraine. It was deemed that the borders should reach the River Sluch, as it had been established at the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and confirmed by the agreements with Poland and Moscow. As for the Crimea, whose support was so important for the Ukrainians at the time they broke their allegiance to Moscow, the relations of brotherhood, military alliance and steady friendship had to be maintained. With the coming of peace and the establishment of the Hetman at his permanent residence, he would have to assume the obligation “not to let a break occur in the relations of friendship and brotherhood with the nobility of the Crimea—as might be done by some head-

strong Ukrainians who in the past had not only broken the concord and good relations with their neighbors but had even destroyed peaceful alliances.

The Zaporozhian Host played a prominent role in the break between the Ukraine and Moscow. Its interests, therefore, assumed special importance in the treaty. The treaty says that the Muscovite State in different ways tried to prevent the development of the "military nest," i.e., Zaporozhian Sich. The Muscovites built their fortresses on the grounds and estates belonging to the Host. This disturbed the Zaporozhians' fishing and hunting. It caused property damage and in different ways violated the Cossack rights. It was the duty of the Hetman to try, with the help of the Swedish King, to stop all these violations and to rid the Zaporozhian territory of the Moscow fortifications. It was the Hetman's concern to combat all such harmful activity and to help the Cossack-Zaporozhians in every possible way in the future. It must be admitted that military help was meant also. The Hetman was obliged to return the town of Terekhtemyriv to the Host, also to build a home there for the aged, the indigent and the Zaporozhian invalids. A long strip of ground along the banks of the Dnieper, down from Perevolochna to Ochakiv, with fishing rights and water-mills, as well as the mills along the river Vorskla in the Regiment of Poltava, became the property of the Zaporozhian Host. All these properties were proclaimed as belonging to the Cossacks in perpetuity. The order of domestic life in Zaporozhzhya was not to be changed in any way. Not one word about any change was mentioned in the treaty, whereas the sixth article of the treaty introduces new principles for the organization of all of the rest of the Ukraine, which in the opinion of the drafters of the treaty had to be reunited very soon under the authority of the one Hetman, Pylyp Orlyk, whom they considered legitimately elected, without outside force or pressure.

The sixth article of the treaty represents an interesting
attempt to give form to the *Heneral’na Starshyna’s* political aspirations which had been initiated and matured during the second half of the seventeenth century.

The basic principle of this paragraph of the treaty was the negative, even hostile, attitude of the *Heneral’na Starshyna* toward the idea of an absolute monarch’s authority. In the introduction to the treaty it is stated:

The former Hetmans, being under the absolute monarchy of Moscow, became so impudent as to take for themselves absolute power against right and justice, thus bringing great harm to the ancient customs, rights and liberties of the Host... to prevent, especially at such a time as we now have, the kind of violation of rights in the future... [the Cossacks concluded the treaty with the newly-elected Hetman].

Almost the same wording is repeated in the sixth article:

Some Hetmans of the Zaporozhian Host quite unjustly and without any right grasped absolute power, later legalizing the act themselves thus: “I wish so, and so I order.” Out of this absolute power, indecent in the authority of a Hetman, there arose in our fatherland and in the Zaporozhian Host many disorders, the collapse of rights, liberties, much stress and strain, violence and bribery in military administration, and lack of respect for the *Heneral’na Starshyna*, for the colonels and other prominent personalities.

The sixth article of the treaty was established to make the Hetman’s aspirations to absolutism impossible in the future. This article further says:

In states dominated by rulers with absolute power a system worthy of praise and useful for the community is kept: to call in wartime as well as in peace private and public councils when there are problems important for the welfare of the whole country. The rulers are to be present and preside at these meetings. They must not avoid presenting their own proposals for discussion and decision by their masters and councilors. Why, then, is there no such safeguard system maintained by free people although there is no doubt that such system had been maintained by the Zaporozhian Host under the rule of previous Hetmans until now?
The purpose of the treaty was to re-establish this order and to maintain it in the future: "Such rights as this... is to be preserved in Zaporizhzhya forever."

The essence of this "right" was as follows: a council would have to function together with the Hetman in order to prevent the development of his absolute authority. The Hetman could not undertake any serious step without the consent and approval of such council. The General Council would consist of the councilors. The first place in the Council would be occupied by the high-ranking officers (Heneral'na Starshyna) because of their high official positions and also because of their permanence in the residence of the Hetman. Then would follow the colonels who supervised the separate town regiments, to whom the agreement with Orlyk also imparted the functions of Hetman's councilors. In addition, special general councilors were to be elected, one from each regiment, from among the most outstanding, intelligent and worthy elders, if the Hetman approved them as members of the Council. The councilors would have to take a special oath according to established custom. The Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host had their deputies as special representatives in the Council.

The periods for holding the general meetings of the Council were strictly stipulated by the treaty. There were three terms: the first one at Christmas, the second at Easter, the third on October 1st, the day of the Pokrova of the Holy Mother of God. All the members of the Council—the Heneral'na Starshyna, the colonels and the general councilors from the regiments would be obliged to come to these assemblies. The representatives from the Zaporozhian Host were to be summoned by special ordinances and were to arrive at the specified times. The Hetman, of course, was to take part in the assembly, as this was the meeting of his Council. The functions of the Council were defined only in general outline by the treaty—the councilors had to confer "on matters involving the entirety of their fatherland, the welfare of her citizens, and all the matters of public concern." The Hetman's activity
was to be subjected to control and criticism, and he was not supposed to make reprisals because of this. In general, all matters before the Council were to be decided conscientiously, not in any private interest, without hostility, and without the Hetman's authority.

In addition to these general assemblies of the Council, there were also to be meetings of the Hetman and the Heneral'na Starshyna. These should take place in the periods between the terms appointed for the general assemblies, when it would be necessary to decide important matters without delay or to correspond with foreign countries. The Hetman would be obliged to present all foreign correspondence to the Heneral'na Starshyna who thus would control foreign relations.

The Heneral'na Starshyna, colonels and general councilors would be obliged to treat the Hetman with full respect. Similarly, on his part, the Hetman would treat the councilors as his comrades, not as his servants and workers, not to humiliate them publicly, and not to compel them to remain standing without necessity, etc.

The general councilors elected by the regiments would be also important in the local administration. Together with the colonels they were to have the right to keep an eye on the entire order of the regiment and to govern it in mutual agreement, remove injustices and alleviate the burdens of the people. In this way too, though somewhat vague in form, a sort of public control would be created over the colonels in the regiments.

The legal authority of the Hetman would also be limited. When offended he had no right to pass judgment himself but had to turn the case over for judgment to the general court. The Heneral'na Starshyna would now take a relatively more independent position with respect to their Hetman. They also would have the right to report to the Hetman on their respective responsibilities.

Still further restrictions of the Hetman's authority were
planned in the financial domain. The Hetman was completely side-stepped in disposing of the Host’s treasury. He had to be satisfied once and for all with the income stipulated for him, and the same applied to the colonels. To supervise the treasury and all the incomes and expenses of the Zaporozhian Host, the special post of General Podskarbiy (Treasurer) was established, independent of the Hetman. It was to be filled by election from among the prominent, estimable, well-to-do and trustworthy people. The general treasurer took a special oath and was obliged to live wherever the Hetman made his residence. The regiment treasurers, two in each regiment, were subordinated to the general treasurer. They also were elected from among worthy people of means, and had to take the oath, too. Evidently, being well-to-do was demanded as a condition for election of treasurer in order that losses and embezzlements, if they occurred, would be paid out of the treasurer’s property. The regiment treasurers collected income and sent it to the general treasurer. They were obliged to render an account to him. The colonels as well as the Hetman were not to have any connection with finances in any way and had to be satisfied, as has already been noted, with the incomes and estates strictly fixed as their allowances.

The Hetman still had charge of general surveillance over the administration. He was obliged not to tolerate any abuse or oppression of the people, of the Cossacks and the deputies. In consideration of the Hetman’s previous practise of making the highest appointments attainable through bribery, the treaty with Orlyk specifically forbade bribery, and established official positions as elective. “Military as well as civil officers, especially colonels,” we read in the tenth article of the treaty, “should be elected by free vote.” However, the election could take place only when approved by the Hetman and confirmed by him. The same rules applied to the regiment posts. The colonels were forbidden, too, to appoint the sotnyks (captains) and other officers without a free election
by the whole *sotnya* (a unit of Cossacks). Dismissal from duty by the Hetmans of colonels at their personal discretion was also limited, though there were no precise rules in the treaty as to this question.

Rightly speaking, there are all the treaty decisions relating to international relations and internal regime of the Ukraine. Articles eleven-sixteen dealt with those details which were dictated by living conditions and therefore were important for the way of life itself. The eleventh article confirms the old principle of the Ukrainian common law, according to which widows and wives of Cossacks, as well as their orphans, were exempted from general taxes and obligations in token of respect for the military service of their husbands and fathers. Article twelve dealt with control of rights of landlords who were granted estates with populations, as well as with establishment of regulations concerning such grants. Of course, all questions connected with this were to be decided not by the Hetman's authority, but by the General Council. Further in the treaty there was a confirmation of the rights and privileges of Kiev; also a prohibition of abuse of the obligation to furnish horses and vehicles. The question of leases had to be referred to the General Council, but the Hetman through administrative orders regulated the question of excessive levies at the fairs.

Such is the general outline of the treaty with Orlyk. We see the Ukraine, although under the protectorate of the Swedish King, entirely independent in her domestic affairs. The Zaporozhian Host maintains its organization and its internal administration, and is bound to the Ukraine politically, having a common agency with her in the general council, to which it sends its deputies in order to act in concert with it—for "listening and complaining," as it is put in the treaty. The Hetman's authority is greatly limited. He has to carry out international agreements confirmed by the Council as, for example, the agreements with the Crimea (which are the subject of the third article of the treaty). His
political activity is under the control of the General Council which decides all the most important matters. The Hetman is obliged to obey unconditionally the decisions of the Council.

Was the General Council a legislative organ? It is not directly referred to as such. At that time there had not yet been the theory of separation of authority. The Hetman was not forbidden to issue Universaly, but since the General Council was charged with matters concerning the common welfare, it must be surmised that the Council also was considered a legislative body, not merely an organ for control of the authority of the Hetman. If we accept it as so, then the Hetman's authority was considerably limited in this respect. The strict carrying into effect of the principle of elections, although with the consent of the Hetman, unquestionably limited his authority to a great degree and constricted his influence, while exclusion from his office of financial administration and revision of the right of possession of estates further placed the Hetman in the position of just the highest executive officer—and that only. Thus the important basic idea of the treaty with Orlyk becomes clear as a struggle with the arbitrariness and the absolute power of the Hetmans, who more than once put into practise the principle: "I wish it so, and I command it!" The primary purpose of the treaty was, without doubt, subordination of the Hetman to the authority of the Heneral'na Starshyna and its main body, the General Council, which was comprised of representatives of the most influential and wealthy class of that time.

Unfortunately, Orlyk's treaty was not put into practise. Circumstances at that time prevented it. The victor of the war was not the protector of the Ukraine, the Swedish King Charles XII, but Peter I—the enemy of Orlyk and the Zaporozhians. From the time of the Peace at Prut in 1711, all hope of the émigrés for return to their fatherland was lost. Their situation became still more hopeless after the Nystad Peace had been concluded in 1721. Orlyk himself thought then about returning to his native country, not as a Hetman, of
course, but as a repentant émigré. Under the above circumstances, the agreement with him could not have had real meaning. It remained only as an interesting memorial of the constitutional thinking of the Ukrainian officers at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a product of their class consciousness.

The *Starshyna* still strove to subjugate the Hetman’s authority at that time but the circumstances were not favorable for it. The authority of the Hetman met in Peter I and the Russian Government in general an enemy stronger than the *Starshyna*. They were the enemies of the entire Ukrainian national order, including the *Starshyna* who desired to be the stronghold of this order. By the beginning of the 1720’s, due to measures taken by the Russian Government, the Hetman’s authority no longer existed. The *Starshyna* was weakened by the introduction of such alien elements as foreigners and Great-Russians into their midst. The weak opposition of the Ukrainian officers against the new course of Russian Government policies brought, we know, very sad results for the oppositionists—Polubotok and others. After the most energetic elements emigrated, the Starshyna, disorganized by the treachery of Mazepa, could not have been strong enough to support the opposition. True, in a short time political consideration forced the Russian Government to re-establish the authority of the Hetman, but greatly reduced. Danylo Pavlovych Apostol, a decrepit colonel of Myrhorod who, according to Orlyk, had been one of the outstanding participants in Mazepa’s plot, was elected as Hetman in 1728. We know that the officers had often come together in Apostol’s home to read and discuss the *Hadyats’ki pakty*. More recently, at the time of Polubotok, the name of Apostol had been involved in the composition of the so-called *kolomats’ki chelobytni* (Kolomak petitions). But Apostol achieved the authority of a Hetman when he was very old and incapable of leading political movements even if they had arisen. But such movements were not manifested outwardly, though the
ideas expressed in Orlyk's treaty were kept alive by the Starshyna class during the entire eighteenth century.

L. A. Okinshevich, a young Ukrainian law historian, while doing his research work in the Moscow Archive, succeeded in finding among papers referring to the rule of the Hetman Skoropadsky and Apostol a rough copy, unsigned and undated, of a very interesting document concerning, in this author's opinion, the last years of Skoropadsky. This can be inferred because in the document there is repeated reference to the Hetman's misuse of his authority for the sake of his relatives. And this was well known to be characteristic of Hetman Skoropadsky's rule. Mention is also made in this document of the necessity for establishing the post of treasurer (podskarbiy) which could also refer to Skoropadsky's time, because treasurers already existed at the time of Apostol.

This document introduces the subject of the importance of the high ranking officers (Heneral'na Starshyna) to the Hetman's court. They were to be properly respected, to carry weight in various affairs, to be free to vote at conferences and to possess real power. The same position was to be held by the colonels. If the Starshyna and the colonels were to notice the Hetman acting improperly, contrary to military orders, they should point it out to him. The Hetman had to appreciate such comments and not to construe them as irritation or hostillity, because everyone doing his duty was obliged to observe that there be order and well-being among the "people of Little Russia." If we compare these ideas with those in Orlyk's treaty we find them very similar, with some changes, of course, according to the time and new po-

38 The original, without signature or date, written in Ukrainian, is kept in the book No. 79-1806 of the Malor. Eksped. Senat in the Moscow Archive (among the documents of Skoropadsky-Apostol's time), pp. 193-195. A copy in Russian writing is kept with it (pp. 196-199), but it is extremely inaccurate. This document was published in the supplement to the Report about L. A. Okinshevich's mission in Pratsi Komisiyi dlya vyuchuvannya zakhidno-rus'koho ta ukrayins'koho prava pry Ukraїns'kiy Akademiyi Nauk, 1927 Vol. III, pp. 361-362.
itical circumstances. In Orlyk's treaty it was thought, for instance, that the Heneral'na Starshyna should be elected, with the consent of the Hetman. Yet this document speaks of the appointment of the officers, after the election, by the decree of His Imperial Majesty, and so on.

The appointment of the Starshyna and sotnyks (captains) was to be made only by the Hetman together with the Heneral'na Starshyna on the recommendation of candidates for the regiments. They could be dismissed or their estates could be confiscated only after abuses had been investigated by the general court. These juridical guarantees were assumed for the Starshyna. The Heneral'na Starshyna had to play a special role in the appointment of a Hetman's relatives to certain posts or in granting them estates. This could be carried on only after proper attestations and with the approval of the Heneral'na Starshyna. It was necessary to control the rights to possession of estates so that there would be enough for the officials. The Hetman had to be satisfied with the amount of goods allotted to him and dared not collect more than was allowed, or to exploit the labor of the citizens for his own profit. We met similar determinations in Orlyk's treaty, as well as the limitation of the legal authority of the Hetman. This document provided for application to the highest authority for a special decree prohibiting the Hetman from imposing any punishment upon nobles, respected persons, "Little-Russians," and officers, without trial or inquest. All cases had to be tried in court "according to the just Little-Russian laws, acting without severity or anger. The Hetman had no right to alter the court's decision. This right belonged to the general court only. The legal procedure of appeals had to be strictly followed.

Special attention, as in Orlyk's treaty, was paid to financial problems in this document. To collect taxes and to keep accounts, special treasurers (podskarbiyi) were to be established in the residence of the Hetman as well as in the regiments. Expenses were permitted only upon the request of
the Hetman and the *Heneral'na Starshyna* submitted in writing. The regimental treasurers had to render an account to the general treasurers. In this way the Hetman’s authority over financial matters was supposed to be limited.

The similarity of some decisions in Orlyk’s treaty to the ideas expressed in this anonymous document, probably written either at the end of the 1720’s or early in the 1730’s, is beyond all doubt. That contrary to Orlyk’s treaty this anonymous document does not concern itself with the basic questions of governmental structure of the Ukraine, the Hetman’s authority, and that of the Council, is quite understandable. This was impossible to do officially at the time of the reign of Peter I, with the policy of the Russian Government being already determined as regards Little Russia. The fate of Polubotok who insisted upon election of the Hetman is well known. The similarities between the treaty and this anonymous document are, of course, not accidental. It is evidence of the wider currency of the ideas and the proposed measures advocated by the whole *Starshyna* class, both those who joined Mazepa and those who remained loyal to the Russian Government. It is impossible to determine more precisely the interrelations of the ideas of the treaty and the document from the standpoint of just how much influence one exerted over the other. But the possibility of such influence cannot be excluded. Orlyk’s treaty as well as all the documents connected with it were, without doubt, known in the circles of the *Heneral’na Starshyna* of the Left-Bank Ukraine. Publishing them in the first book of *Chteniya v Obshchestve istorii i drevnosti rossiskikh* in the year 1847, O. M. Bodyansky emphasizes in his introduction that these documents had been written in the fine handwriting of Mykola Khanenko, who had been employed at the office of Hetman Skoropadsky and had accompanied him on his last journey to Moscow in 1722; Khanenko left a very interesting diary of this journey.

Having been conceived and even taken definite form,
the idea expressed in Orlyk’s treaty of the limitation of the Hetman’s authority by the authority of the Starshyna did not disappear among the Ukrainian officers in the course of the whole eighteenth century. It did not even disappear with the transformation of the Starshyna into the shlyakhetstvo (gentry) when the former governmental structure of the Left-Bank Ukraine was replaced by the Russian order, during which the absolutist principles, it seemed, could not give way to republican ideas. Hryhoriy Andriyevych Poletyka, the well-known publicist of the Ukrainian nobility in the second half of the eighteenth century, had a negative attitude toward the Hetman’s authority as it had been developed in the Ukraine. He wrote in one of his notes:

I do not know if any one of the noble Little-Russians, well-intentioned and understanding his rights, would ever desire to have a Hetman, because everybody knows that they (Hetmans) have misappropriated and stolen all the authority and rights of the nobility, and kept them for themselves by bribery of persons in high positions. But had the Hetman been held within bounds, as had been requested more than once by the Little-Russian officials, they might have been harmless for Russia and not burdensome for Little Russia.39

In the opinion of Poletyka expressed in one of his notes, Little Russia had had a republican form of government under Polish rule. The Little-Russian nobility, including its clergy, enjoyed even more rights than the Polish; they had the rights to make the laws at their seymiks and had only to pass them on to the General Sejm for confirmation by the King. “In short, the Little-Russian nobility took part in both the ranks of the senators and the knights, which together with the King governed the Polish Republic.”40

40 G. A. Poletika, “Istoricheskoe izvestie na kakom osnovanii Malaya Rossiya byla pod respublikoyu pol’skoyu, i na kakikh dogovorakh otdalas’ rossiiskim gosudaryam, i patrioticheskoe rassuzhdenie kakim obrazom mozhno by onuyu
When the Ukraine joined Moscow all the "rights, privileges and customs" they had had under the Polish rule were confirmed by the charters (hramoty) granted to the Hetman and to the various social classes. But the Hetmans "subjugated the whole of Little Russia, governed her in unauthorized and unlawful ways according only to their own will and whim, and had no limit to their power." Thrusting the nobility aside, they even appropriated a monarch's authority, disposed of the national treasury, made arbitrary grants and confiscated estates. There was only one way to keep them in check. This was through the General Military Council, which convened when something important happened and was composed of the Heneral'na Starshyna, the colonels, other officers and deserving persons. To decide less important matters, the Hetmans were obliged to convene the Heneral'na Starshyna and the colonels. All the Host came together to elect their Hetman. The councils usually made decisions concerning the whole community—imposed taxes, granted villages in reward or conferred some rank according to general selection, demanded that tax-collectors render them accounts, etc.41

It is regrettable that here the fragment of this interesting note by H. A. Poletyka is interrupted and it is not known what direction and what form his thoughts would have taken. But even from this fragment it is evident that Poletyka endorsed the government of the Ukraine headed by a Hetman, and considered it necessary only that his authority be "held within limits," in other words, limited by the authority of the Starshyna which had already become a gentry at the time of Poletyka. This idea, as we know, was not a new one. It had been in Orlyk's treaty. Poletyka only imparted a new formulation to it, borrowing from the Polish constitution, taking into consideration the changes in the social life of the Ukraine which had taken place in the past half-century. In

nyne uchredit' chtoby ona polezna mogla byt' rossiiskomu gosudarstvu bez narusheniya prav ee i vol'nostei; "ibid., pp. 147-161.

41 Ibid., pp. 151, 158-161.
this connection he already understood the word *Starshyna* to mean not a class but a nobility, an hereditary group which had certain rights in the State. Poletyka's essential point was that before joining Russia the Ukraine had been a republic with the nobility at the head. This thought could not be expressed openly because of the circumstances of that time. It appeared only in the aforementioned document, but it was emphasized in all Poletyka's speeches at the Catherine Commission. In his written opinion, in which Poletyka presented his objection to the project of the rights of the nobility,\(^{42}\) he considered that in addition to the Tsar's authority, the Ukraine should be administered by the nobility. The nobility would have the right to issue, cancel or correct their laws and to ask the monarch's confirmation of them; imposition and abolition of taxes as well as of different kinds of assessments was to depend on the nobility; and that only Ukrainians by origin would be elected as officials by a free vote. The person of a nobleman was to be defended by law. He had the right to try and to punish his peasants, the right to go freely to foreign countries, etc.

Thus, according to Poletyka, the legislative and executive authority had to be in the hands of the nobility, as a matter of course. The judicial authority belonged to them too. This prerogative had been established by the Lithuanian Statute applied in the Ukrainian courts. Poletyka must have found his ideas, borrowed from the Polish law, useful in his projects and opinions about the Ukraine because, apparently, he found suitable grounds for it in the Ukrainian society of the time. These grounds unquestionably existed and had developed not from simple imitation of Poland, as might be understood from Poletyka's notes, but out of the natural process of state consciousness in Ukrainian society; as early as the seventeenth century, the *Heneraľna Starshyna* became a ruling class in whose hands extensive land properties had been concentrated, which served as a material base for pow-

er. Such was the Starshyna when the treaty with Orlyk was composed; they started to become the nobility in Poletyka's time.

In acknowledging the existence of traces of republican ideas in Ukrainian officer circles throughout the eighteenth century, it is necessary to note the difference in the character of the approach at the beginning and at the end of the century. Orlyk's treaty appeared as a result of the struggle for authority between an economically-strong class of the Starshyna, newly-formed in the Ukraine, and the Hetman's power. The treaty is the result, so to speak, of a victory won by this class over the Hetman. The republican ideas of this class acquired an active character and, had political circumstances been favorable, they might have seriously influenced the character of the further development of the Ukraine's governmental structure. What we see at the end of the eighteenth century is quite different. No struggle existed then. The republican ideas were based not upon struggle but upon historical recollections misunderstood and misinterpreted. Thus they were more theoretical, and are interesting not as a banner for the struggle for reorganization of the Ukraine, but as material for study of the development of the political thought of Ukrainian society at the end of the eighteenth century; this was material of purely theoretical character. The republican ideas in the Ukraine by the end of the eighteenth century were not translated into a practical program. The Polish state based on the authority of the gentry, referred to by Poletyka, could not command serious attention. It was the eve of its downfall.
PYLYP ORLYK’S DEVOLOUTION
OF THE UKRAINE’S RIGHTS*

Presentation and Introduction
by
ELIE BORSCHAK

In 1922 I succeeded in tracking down the progeny of Hryhor Pylyprovych Orlyk’s1 wife. They are the Marquises de la Ville Baugé and are the direct descendants of the sister of Countess Olena Orlyk, nee Dinteville,2 now residing in the chateau Dinteville near Chaumont, Department of Haute Marne, i.e., in the same chateau where Hryhor Orlyk once lived.

The Dintevilles are a very ancient family3 dating back to the twelfth century, which accounts for the considerable family archives (partially destroyed during the Great Revolution) that have been accumulated in the chateau. The archives are not catalogued and the documents are in a state of disorder without regard for text, date or form. Among them I found papers belonging to both the Orlyks, father and son. For purely technical reasons beyond my control, I was unable to examine all the documents available at Dinteville. From what I have seen, however, the following two facts are obvious: 1. These are parts of the documents which in 1759, following the death of Hryhor Orlyk, were confiscated from his widow by the French government and returned to her possession at a later date. 2. These are not the important documents that had

* This is a reprint from Stara Ukrayina, Lviv, 1925, I-II, pp. 1-10; Borschak’s “Introduction” is presented here in English translation; Orlyk’s “Devolution” is reprinted in its original French form.

1 Older son of the Hetman, godson of Mazepa, and the closest adviser to his father in his work. Died in 1759 with the rank of lieutenant general in the French army. See Elie Borschak’s article “Orlikiana” in Khliborobs’ka Ukrayina, Vienna, 1923, Vol. IV.

2 Died on December 12, 1775, in Paris.

3 They are related to the historically known families Rochemaure and Courtenay.
belonged to Mazepa, which according to the statement of the Orlyk family were in their possession.\(^4\)

The *Devolution*, the text of which is presented further on, is undoubtedly the most important document in the archives. This is a manuscript consisting of two sheets in folio; the text on the first page begins at some distance from the top, the second page is covered with writing starting from the very top; the first sheet is filled on all four sides, the second on three sides; the entire manuscript consists of seven pages in folio. It is written in Orlyk's splendid penmanship, which at that time was still regular and firm,\(^5\) unlike his writing during the "Conference of Solun." The manuscript is on thick hard paper and had been well preserved.

Pylyp Orlyk himself is doubtless the author of the manuscript, although it does not bear his signature. It is probable that the manuscript was never signed, since it was intended for printing, and, for some unknown reason, was to appear anonymously. Such anonymous documents of "evidence," analogous to the currently popular "white," "red," etc. papers, were rather widespread in Western Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The following facts confirm Orlyk's authorship of the said manuscripts:

1. During the negotiations with Chauvelin and Fleury,\(^6\) Hryhor Orlyk, while enumerating the documents of international political character concerning the Ukraine (such as the Constitution of April 5, 1710, the Decree of 1710 of Charles XII, the Treaty of Prut, the Decree of Seret and the Treaty

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\(^5\) The handwriting strongly resembles that in "Puncta qua Ucrainam citeriorem concernunt olim a me Ser (enissi) mo Regi Sveciae porrecta et mandata ..." written by Orlyk. Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, Suède. cor. pol. vol. 148, fo. 150 et sq.

\(^6\) See Elie Borschak, "Het'man Pylyp Orlyk i Frantsiya," *Zapysky Naukovoho Tovaristva imeny Shevchenka*, Lviv, 1924, Vols. CXXXIV-CXXXV.
with Khan) repeatedly mentioned a certain "father's Devolution of the Ukraine's rights."

2. On March 6, 1730, Hryhor wrote to his father: "I received all your instructions; as regards your Devolution, I have handed it over to the Chancellor (Chauvelin)."

3. In the letter to Louis XV of December 13, 1736, Hryhor also mentioned the Devolution.

4. In his letter to Vergennes of July 4, 1756, the following is written: "The Devolution of the Ukraine's rights by my father . . ."

Initially I believed that the word "devolution" was merely a term describing some evidence of the rights of the Ukraine to which Orlyk usually referred in all his letters. This theory seemed to me the more probable since Hryhor frequently wrote "devolution," with a small "d." It is now obvious, however, that he referred to a special manuscript (écrit), to which both Orlyks, father and son, justly attributed great importance.

That the manuscript has been prepared for print may be seen from its text and form. It is not a diplomatic note—as, for example, the Manifesto written by Orlyk on April 4, 1712—but has been designed for publication in the form of a book or, more correctly, a pamphlet. Therefore Hryhor Orlyk referred to the "Devolution" as an écrit; this explains the accuracy in capitalization and underlining of passages in the original text. In consideration of the fact that widespread European opinion could only be influenced through argumentation, the manuscript was written in a calm, dogmatic style that must have demanded great restraint on the part of Orlyk, who

7 Letter to Vergennes in the archives of Dinteville.
8 Apart from Orlyk, I can think of no one among the émigrés who would have been able to write the "Devolution" or participate in its composition. Voynarovsky was certainly a well-educated man, but not sufficiently enlightened to be able to draw up such a political-legal treatise. Moreover, the text of the "Devolution" contains ideas and expressions which are also encountered in other letters and memoirs of Orlyk.
9 Elie Borschak, "Orlikiana," Khliborobs'ka Ukrayina, Vienna, 1923, Vol. IV.
by nature was an expansive and impulsive man. It is possible that the "Devolution" was supposed to have been printed in Hamburg, which at that time was the main center of propaganda in Europe for both the Russians and the Swedes, and it may even be that it had actually been printed. In such case, the "Devolution" would have rapidly attracted the attention of the Böttigers, the Dolgorukys, Matveevs, Yaguzhinskys, Shafirovs, all of whom were stationed in Hamburg, Copenhagen, Vienna and Constantinopile and would have diligently pounced upon every printed word concerning the Ukraine. It is obvious that they would have rapidly bought up and destroyed all copies of this publication. However, thus far it has not been mentioned anywhere that the "Devolution" by Orlyk did appear in print in any form.10

10 "The treason of Mazepa" induced tortures and persecution in the Ukraine. Also, because of the deep resentment among the Ukrainian population, the tsar was compelled to enter into posthumous polemics with Charles XII and Mazepa. (See the noteworthy essay on this subject by Oleksander Hrushevsky in Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva imeny Shevchenka, Vol. XCII). On the other hand, the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance provoked vivid interest in Europe, where public opinion was influenced in its favor by Sweden and France. It is mainly as a counteraction against this propaganda that the tsarist government appointed Böttiger, a German in Hamburg (see Borschak's essay "Andriy Voynarovsky" in Yuvileynyi Zbirnyk Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka). The assumption (I repeat, this is merely a hypothesis) that the "Devolution" of Orlyk was designed for publication but was destroyed by tsarist agents, is strengthened by the fact that the following two pamphlets have been written by Orlyk and published by Swedes (with the assistance of Voynarovsky, who in 1711 resided in Hamburg):

A) Ausführliche Relation von der Eroberung unterschiedener Städte in der Ukraine durch den Cossackischen Feldherrn Orlick. Hamburg, 1711.4°;

B) Les particularités de ce qui s'est passé entre les Cossiques du général Orlik et Moscovites en l'Ukraine après la défaite du Roy de Suède. S.I.1711.4°.

These titles repeatedly appear in Orlyk's documents; in a letter to his son he complained that a Russian resident in Hamburg (Böttiger) "destroyed the evidence of the past" by lawful and unlawful means (this letter was written many years later). He destroyed it so effectively that for the last several years I searched in vain in all the main European libraries for publications by Orlyk. Perhaps someone among the Ukrainian scholars possesses information on this subject?
The composition of the "Devolution" must date back to the summer of 1712 or early 1713; the former date is more probable. The armistice of Prut left the Ukrainian political emigrants dissatisfied and destroyed their hopes for the formation of an Independent Unified Ukrainian State. Taking advantage of the complicated wording of the articles of the Prut Treaty concerning the Ukraine, and, what was more important, being aware of the instability of Turkish politics, the tsar refused to evacuate the Ukraine in conformity with the treaty of 1711 (as interpreted by Orlyk and all of Europe). Thereupon, Orlyk, in cooperation with the French and Swedish diplomats, began agitating in Constantinople for the dissolution of the Prut treaty and for a new war with the tsar. Aware of the important role played by European opinion, Orlyk endeavored to win its support for the Ukrainian cause. The early Ukrainian émigrés always conducted Ukrainian politics on a wide international scale without, as was the case with some of the more recent epigones, confining it to the narrow frame of the Russian, Polish, or Turkish problem. The first step in this direction was the acts of 1710 written in Latin with a view of propagating them all over Europe where, however, they arrived in very limited number due to the efforts of tsarist diplomats. Another such step was the manifesto of April 4, 1712, "To the Sovereigns and Republics," and, lastly, the "Devolution."

The Northern War in Eastern Europe was closely related to the war of the Spanish succession, the latter lasting for 15 years, embracing all Western Europe and nearing its end during the Congress of Utrecht, which was probably the event mentioned by Orlyk in the "Devolution."

The "Devolution" by Orlyk is a vitally important document from the viewpoint of the history of the development of the Ukrainian national idea. From this document we learned for

11 Compare the newspapers Gazette de France and "Le Clef du Cabinet" of 1711, as well as the Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de Charles XII... par W. Theyes...Leyde 1722,8°.
the first time (though unfortunately the information is not complete) of the existence of a separate agreement of international character between Charles XII and Mazepa. The Ukrainian-Swedish alliance was based on this particular agreement and the fact that it existed, particularly in the form in which Orlyk presents it, clearly illustrated the character of the Swedish period, which thus far has been interpreted by Russian and Ukrainian historians of the Russian school as a purely personal adventure of Mazepa, an action inspired by his excessively ambitious nature. This point of view was adopted by the government of Peter in an endeavor to convince the Ukrainian people of the Polish-Catholic sympathies of the Hetman, his intentions to sell out the Ukraine, etc.

The detailed nature of the negotiations between Charles XII and Mazepa remains obscure since, on the one hand, the negotiations were conducted, for obvious reasons, in strictest secrecy and, on the other hand—and this is the most important factor—because all state documents were personally burned near Poltava by Count Piper, the Prime Minister of Charles XII in order to prevent them from falling into Muscovite hands. Naturally, the papers concerning Mazepa were among those considered strictly confidential and had to be the first to be destroyed by Piper. The Swedes were not the only party to regard these documents as most important; the Russians, too, were of the same opinion. The first interrogation of Piper in captivity was on the subject of relations between Charles and Mazepa.

The treaty of Charles XII and Mazepa was, according to the “Devolution,” a two-sided agreement of international character. On one side it was concluded by the King of Sweden, and on the other by the “Hetman and Estates of the Ukraine.” The Russian and the Ukrainian historians of the Russian school attributed a personal, conspiratory character to Mazepa’s action, implying that it was not known not only to the wider strata of the population, but even to his closest officer corps. Academician Hrushevsky was the first Ukrainian histo-
rian to point out clearly that such a theory was erroneous. He also proved that Mazepa concluded the treaty of 1708 in agreement with the officer corps of the Cossacks. As Academician Hrushevsky has indicated, should Mazepa have hesitated to take the action, the officers would have deprived him of the Hetmanate and elected in his place a new Hetman, who would be more decisive in his orientation toward Sweden. The documents which thus far have been at the disposal of Ukrainian historiography provide little data on the nature of the preparatory actions for the Swedish-Ukrainian alliance. Nevertheless, these documents confirm the correctness of the theory emphasized by Academician Hrushevsky. It suffices, for example, to read the letter of Orlyk to Stefan Yavorsky.

Both parties to the treaty agreed not to sign a separate peace treaty with the tsar of Muscovy. The Swedish King guaranteed the Ukraine its free Cossack order and all the lands which in the past formed Rus’ in its historical and national sense. We may thus see that Mazepa and his officer corps clarified in detail the problem of the unification of all the Ukrainian lands, with the Right-Bank Ukraine being first. During the last ten years of his rule Mazepa persistently endeavored to take possession of the right bank of the Dnieper, but this project was opposed by the tsar, then an ally of Polish magnates. In unifying the Ukrainian lands, Mazepa and Charles XII followed in the footsteps of their predecessors, Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Charles-Gustave X. Sweden guaranteed to Khmelnytsky “Jus totius Ukrainae antiquae vel Roxolaniam, da der griechische Glaube gewesen und die Sprache noch ist...” as far back as 1657.

The text of the treaty emphasized that the Swedish King should, under no circumstances, claim the coat of arms and title of the Hetman of the Ukraine. Both these elements played an important part in international and state law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, being the symbol and external sign of the sovereign status of the country. Basing themselves on the experience with the Pereyaslav Treaty, in
which later all factors not sufficiently clarified were interpreted freely and used by Moscow to its advantage (as clearly dem-onstrated by the tsar immediately assuming the title “Tsars of Little Russia”), the Ukrainian community at the beginning of the eighteenth century dwelt in detail upon these problems in negotiations with Sweden. The coat of arms and the title of the Ukraine which were usurped by the tsar of Muscovy, were usually safeguarded in all the Swedish-Ukrainian documents of the epoch of Charles X and Khmelnytsky. The articles referring to the fortresses, wages of Cossacks, etc. are of a temporary nature and were introduced as a result of the state of war existing at that time, which is emphasized accord-ingly in the treaty.

On the whole, the articles of the treaty between Mazepa and Charles XII were quoted by Orlyk with the intention of “proving the rights of the Ukraine to sovereignty,” and that from the viewpoint of state and international law of that epoch—the treaty had to be considered from this particular viewpoint only—they fully correspond to the usual type of treaties of alliance between two sovereign states.

12 Instruction to Törnskjöld and Welling of November 25, 1656: “The ambas-sadors must clearly explain to the Cossacks that the Great Duke (of Moscovy) confirms by the present war his designs expressed in the title: of Volynia, Podillya...” V. Lypynsky Ukrayina na переломи, page 283. I wish to express my sincere appreciation to V. Lypynsky for his valuable remarks and suggestions concerning the affinity of the ideas revealed in the “Devolution” and those upon which the first Swedish-Ukrainian union has rested.

13 It is interesting to note that Charles XII contented himself with the fortresses at Starodub, Mhlyn, Baturyn, Poltava and Hadyach, whereas his predecessor, Charles X, demanded in the early stages of negotiations with Khmelnytsky the main Ukrainian tracts. Lypynsky, op. cit., page 270-271, re-mark 113a.

14 Compare the agreement of Louis XIV with Mecklenburg of December 16, 1663; with Hamburg, of the same date (Leonard: Recueill des Traités, III); of Sultan Mohammed IV with Count Tekeli (or Thoekoeli) in 1683 (Merc. Hol. 1683, page 157); of Transylvania with the Emperor, of April 9, 1682 (Du Mont. cor. Dipl. VII, part II No. 68). I provided a detailed comparative analysis of these treaties from the legal point of view in the article “The Ukraine and International Law,” which awaits publication.
The idea of the Sovereign Independent and Unified Ukraine runs throughout the entire text of the “Devolution” and contributes to the importance of this document from the viewpoint of the history of development of the idea of the Ukrainian statehood. It reveals the conceptions and political ideals of the most enlightened strata of Ukrainians two hundred years ago. In the opinion of this part of the Ukrainian population, the free Ukraine had been usurped by Poland, from which it was subsequently liberated by Khmelnytsky who founded a sovereign Ukrainian state which was recognized as such by Europe. The treaty of Pereyaslav was the most striking proof of Ukrainian sovereignty, since this was an alliance of two independent states signed by plenipotentiaries delegated especially for this purpose. However, Muscovy treacherously violated the treaty of Pereyaslav, in view of which, and in conformity with international and natural law, the Ukraine was justified in forming an alliance with Sweden in order to realize in practice its sovereign right to reconstruct the independent state.

It matters little that certain facts in this concept do not fully correspond to historical truth, and that facts and dates have been somewhat confused, because Orlyk wrote this document while in exile and unable to procure authentic data and to question old people, etc. In this case the significance does not lie in the agreement of facts quoted in the “Devolution” with the data of modern historiography, but rather in the interpretation of these facts by the followers of Mazepa. This concept is strongly reminiscent of another political monument, i.e., the Istoriya Rusov, which confirms the hereditary continuity of the statehood idea of the politically conscious Ukrainian community during the entire eighteenth century.

15 “Hetman Khmelnytsky signed these most favorable conditions” (Hryhor Orlyk to Louis XV on February 12, 1741, with regard to the Treaty of Pereyaslav).

16 D. Doroshenko, “Istoriya Rusov, yak pamyatka ukrayins’koyi politychnoyi dumky druhoyi polovyny XVIII stol’tya,” Khliborobs’ka Ukrayina, Vienna, 1921, III.
Orlyk appeals to European opinion, basing himself upon the principles of Christianity, justice and humanity. Being a realistic politician, Orlyk is aware of the fact that these arguments alone do not suffice and, therefore, emphasizes that it is in the vital interest of European states to prevent the Muscovite expansion from threatening the European balance of power, which at that time was the very beginning and end of international politics.

The “Devolution” also provides an intellectual portrait of the author; it reveals an enlightened man, a good lawyer and an excellent stylist, who mastered all the flowery eloquence popular during that epoch (i.e., periods, rhetorical expressions, long silences, praeteritio etc.).

Such were the political ideals of the foremost representatives of the Ukrainian population at the beginning of the eighteenth century. For the realization of these ideals they “risked their lives, sacrificed their own and their relatives’ health, wealth, peace and welfare, exchanged the prosperity and prestige of representatives of the ruling class for the bitter gall of emigration, tortures, and exile in Siberian wastes. They let their names be dishonored and defiled among their own people.”

The Ukrainian nation as a whole did not follow its leaders but, terrorized by the tsarist hangmen and its own church, accepted all the demagogical lies and inventions of Tsar Peter with regard to the action of Mazepa and his followers. Now, when the Ukrainian people have risen and, having broken the chains, are creating under new conditions their free national and social life, the time has arrived to remember and honor in word and deed all those who sacrificed everything for the sake of the freedom of their country, those who were the first

17 We must admit that the French language used in the “Devolution” suffers by comparison with more recent documents in French left by Orlyk. Probably Orlyk had little opportunity to write in French; in certain instances it seems as if the author thought in Latin, then translated the idea into French. The orthography is also more faulty than in documents written at a later date.

in Eastern Europe to rise against despotism. And among these famous Mazepa followers we should first of all remember the most prominent and most inveterate of them all—Pylyp Orlyk, who “following the honorable principles—to be faithful to one’s fatherland and obligations to the Cossack nation . . . has firmly . . . endured to the end of his days the severest misfortunes, the bitterest disappointments and the whimsies of a merciless fate . . .”

19 Hryhor Orlyk to Louis XV on April 2, 1743.
DEDUCTION DES DROITS DE L'UKRAINE

Après une longue et sanglante guerre le très valheureux Duc Chmielnicki d'immortelle mémoire libera du Joug Polonois la Nation Cosaque fort opprimée. Celui-ci érigea l'Ukraine en Principauté indépendante et se contenta du Titre de Général des Cosaques Zaporoviens et son fils lui succéda et les Etats de La Dite Principauté continuèrent après sa mort d'élir leurs Princes sans que aucune Puissance prétendit être en droit de s'y opposer. L'Ukraine était en quelque manière dépendue des Czars de Moscovie.

Je ne m'étendrai pas davantage sur l'Histoire de l'Ukraine, mon but m'étant que de faire voir qu'Elle est une Principauté libre et que les Etats ont eu la liberté de s'élir des Ducs, comme bon leur sembloit. C'est un fait établi et une vérité généralement attestée que la Nation Cosaque et l'Ukraine étoit libre. Elle a été comprise avec son Duc comme telle dans le Traité de la Paix Perpétuelle conclue près de la rivière en Moldavie Pruth ou Elle est traitée d'Alliée du Grand Seigneur, dans le Traité avec le Khan des Tartares et dans le Traité que le Prince Chmielnicki a fait avec le Roy de Suède Charles X, ce que l'on peut voir dans les archives de la Couronne Suèdoise.

Mais l'argument et la preuve la plus forte et la plus invincible de la Souveraineté de l'Ukraine est le Traité d'Alliance solennel conclu entre le Czar Alexei Mikailovstch et le Duc Chmielnicki et les Etats de l'Ukraine. Ce Traité fut arrêté en 1654 et signé par les Plénipotentionaires nommez de part et d'autre pour cet effet.

Un Traité si solennel et si précis qui étoit appelé Traité Perpétuel semblait devoir suffire pour établir à jamais le repos les libertez et la tranquillité de l'Ukraine. Il auroit suffi en effet s'il eût été observé par le Czar avec autant de bonne foi que les Cosaques y avaient de confiance. Ils livrèrent aux armées Moscovites les forteresses et joignèrent leurs Troupes à celles du Czar pour l'avancement de la Cause commune, mais les Généraux du Czar se prévalant de la bonne foi de la dite Nation s'em-
parèrent par artifice d'un grand nombre d'autres. Places et en-
suite se mirent à commander en maîtres dans tout le Pays.

Toutefois on laissa l'ombre de la Souveraineté aux Cosaques
et même après la mort du Duc Chmielnicki le Czar en délivra
l'an 1658 un Diplôme aux Etats de l'Ukraine.

Le Duc Brukevizk ayant fait un voyage à Moscou sous prétexte
du bien de l'Ukraine fit en sorte qu'on prêta l'Hommage au Czar
comme Protecteur des Cosaques. Ce fut le fondement des mal-
heurs de l'Ukraine. On l'obligea de renoncer de Droits de Sou-
veraineté des Cosaques. Le public ignore encore s'il a été por-
té à cette démarche indigne par des menaces ou par des moyens
doux. Mais il est certain que cette Renonciation ne deroge rien
aux Droits de l'Ukraine, le Duc n'ayant pas pu donner ce qui
appartenait aux Etats. Les Cosaques se plaignoient inutilement:
on leur envoya des Troupes qui par la force des Armes les te-
noient en Esclaves et les faisoient souffrir tout le poids d'une
Domination Despotique.

Ce que je viens de dire fera connaître à toute personne qui
voudra juger sans prévention le Droit incontestable des Etats
de l'Ukraine et l'injustice criante qu'on leur a fait en les sub-
juguant, en les dépouillant de leurs Droits et Libertez sous pré-
texte d'une Alliance Sainte et d'un Traité solennel qui leur en
assuroit la jouissance. Mais quelques grandes que sont les vio-
lences qu'on leur fait souffrir, ces violences ne donnent aucun
Droit Légitime sur eux aux Moscovites. Les Cosaques au con-
traire ont pour eux le Droit des Gens et celui de la Nature dont
une des Principales maximes est: Que le Peuple est toujours
en droit de réclamer contre une pareille oppression et de ren-
trer dans la jouissance de ses Anciens Droits quand il en trouve
l'occasion favorable.

Cette occasion s'est offerte à l'Ukraine, car le Roy de Suède
ayant paru au secours de l'Ukraine opprimé, les Cosaques ré-
prirent courage, et ne songerent qu'à profiter de cette conjoncture
pour se tirer de l'Esclavage. Le Prince Mazepa et les Etats de
l'Ukraine usèrent ainsi l'an 1708 de leur pouvoir pour se mettre
en Possession de ce qui leur appartenait. Pour s'assurer d'avan-
tage leurs Libertez ils s’associèrent avec le Roy de Suède et convinrent de ne pas traiter séparément.

En voici quelques Articles qui sont à mon sujet


2. Tout ce qui sera Conquis sur l’ancien Domaine de la Moscovie appartiendra par le Droit des Armes à celui qui s’en sera rendre maître, mais tout ce qu’on découvrira avoir été autrefois au Peuple Ruthène sera remis et conservé à la Principauté de l’Ukraine.


5. L’on n’innovera rien à ce qui a été observé jusques à présent au sujet des Armes et du Titre de Prince de l’Ukraine. S. M. R. ne pourra jamais s’arroger ce Titre ni les Armes.

6. Pour plus grande sûreté tant par rapport à ce Traité qu’à l’Ukraine, le Prince et les États remettront à S. M. R. pour autant de temps que cette Guerre et le péril dureron quelques de leurs Places à savoir, Starodube, Mline, Batyryn, Poltava, Hadiasz.

Les Plénipotentiaires de S. M. Cz. repondent

1° Que l’Ukraine n’avait jadis été indépendante qu’Elle avait
été délivrée du Joug des infidèles par les Armes victorieuses de S. M. Cz.

2° Que si l’on apporteroit quelque changement on donneroit Atteinte au Traité de Carlowitz.

Sur le Premier Article, qu’il importe que l’Ukraine eut jadis été une Province de Pologne vue que depuis l’an 1649 jusqu’à nos jours Elle ait été reconnaissante pour Principauté par toute l’Europe et par l’Empereur même. Par quel Principe de Religion et de Piété la Cour de Moscou, en affranchissant les Cosaques d’une espèce de Protection des Polonois pour leur imposer, comme l’expérience l’a fait voir, un Joug infiniment plus dur que celui dont les Infidèles accablent des peuples conquis.

Finalement on soutient que supposée, ce qui est néanmoins très faux, que S. M. Cz. ait acquis des Polonois quelque Droit sur l’Ukraine, ce ne peut être tout au plus que le Droit de Protection, puisque ils n’en ont jamais eu d’autre, et qu’ainsi le Polonois n’a pas pu donner plus de Droit qu’il n’avait et plus qu’il n’a jamais prétendu et que par conséquent S. M. Cz. ne peut pas sur aucun fondement ôter à l’Ukraine ses Libertés et Privilèges.

Ainsi on conclut avec beaucoup de justice et d’équité qu’on n’enfreindra pas la Paix de Carlovitz en déclarant l’Ukraine libre comme Elle a été jadis dans ses Limites et Frontières, avant qu’Elle fut subjuguée frauduleusement. Je demande à quel fin le Czar avoit dans ses instructions touchant la Paix qui se devoit faire par la Médiation de l’Angleterre et des États Généraux, compris l’Ukraine si l’on ne vouloit pas qu’Elle fut jointe dans la Negociation.

On peut raisonnementment conclure de tout ceci que la Cour Moscovite doit être regardé comme Usurpatrice de l’Ukraine et on a lieu de s’attendre de l’Equité et de Justice de ceux qui liront cet écrit qu’ils seront persuadéz du Droit incontestable que les États de l’Ukraine ont eu d’élire le Sr Philippe Orlik pour leur Duc et que ce Duc a lieu d’insister sur la Possession de ce Païs et d’en esperer la Restitution de l’équité des Puissances de l’Europe qui sont en état de la lui faire rendre.
Il est de l'intérêt de toutes les Puissances de l'Europe de faire en sorte que l'Ukraine soit rendue au Duc Orlik qui a été librement élu et proclamé par les États de l'Ukraine. Leur intérêt dis-je les y engage, pour ne pas authoriser et donner lieu à des conséquences dangereuses pour eux-mêmes des Usurpations qu'une Puissance supérieure pourroit faire sur le plus faible, sous le seul prétexte de bienséance.

Le Droit des Gens veut qu'on donne du secours dans des cas extrêmes à des Sujet oppriméz, à plus forte raison est-il juste et conforme au devoir du Christianisme et de l'Humanité même de faire rétablir des Principautéz oppriméez sous la foi d'une Alliance.

L'histoire ancienne me meneroit trop loin si j'en voulois citer des exemples pour prouver que les Puissances de ces temps ont pris toujours le parti des Princes ou des Républiques oppriméez. Nous ne manquons pas d'exemples modernes et on a vu rendre depuis plus d'un siècle par des traitéz de Paix dans tout l'Empire, en Italie, en Lorraine, en Pomeranie, en Suède et en plusieurs autres Lieux des Principautéz en pleine Souveraineté sur lesquelles des Puissances prétendoient des Droits sous plusieurs Titres et quelquefois simplement par celui de Conquête. L'Ukraine est à peu près dans le même cas. Elle a les mêmes Droits, ne feroit on pas en sa faveur ce qu'on est accoutûmé de faire pour les autres depuis tant de siècles.

L'Empereur ayant offert au Duc Chmielnicki la Garantie, le Roy de Suède en qualité d'Allié, le Général et les États de l'Ukraine ont lieu d'être persuadéz que les Garanties de ces Traités d'Oliva (Les Cosaques ayant été compris dans la Traité de la Paix d'Oliva en qualité d'Alliés du Roy de Suède) conviendront, qu'on n'a pas pu dépouiller l'Ukraine de ses Libertéz. Et puisque toutes les Puissances de l'Europe ont le dessein de maintenir ce Traité qui serve de fondement à la tranquilité de l'Europe, les trouveront par là facilement des motifs et des moyens de rétablir le Duc Orlik en Ukraine et de le comprendre dans ce nouveau Traité.

Je dis que cette Paix Générale ne sera jamais stable tandis
que les Prétentions justes du Général Orlik sur l’Ukraine n’y seront pas ajustez et que la Cour de Moscou ne satisfera point aux justes griefs de la confédération dont il est le Duc.

On ne doit pas craindre qu’en faisant rendre cette Principauté, la Moscovie s’affaiblira à l’égard des Forces requises à la conservation de la Balance de l’Europe. Tout au contraire à l’exemple des Etats Généraux lesquels n’auraient jamais tant servi à la Cause commune depuis qu’ils avoient été érigée en une République si puissante.

Mais comme on pourroit s’imaginer que cette dernière raison n’est pas assez convaincante et que le Czar après cette Paix pourra employer toutes ses Forces à réduire et subjuguer sans aucun retour l’Ukraine, je ne m’arrêterai pas à en faire voir la difficulté, les inconvénients et les extrémités auxquelles un tel dessein pourrait porter ce Peuple à se jeter à corps perdu sous la Domination des Turcs. Je n’alléguerai pas non plus les motifs de la Justice et de la Gloire qui devouer porter les Puissances d’Europe à faire rendre l’Ukraine à son Duc. Tout cela a été montré et deduit. Je dirai seulement que si tous les motifs allezuez ne sont pas suffisants, les Intérêts dont on a déjà touché quelques uns, engagent les Puissances de l’Europe à faire rendre l’Ukraine et par là borner une Puissance qui pourroit bientôt tendre au renversement de la Liberté de l’Europe.

Ceux qui surveillent les intérêts de l’Europe et de chaque Puissance, comprendront aisément le danger que la Liberté de l’Europe couroit d’une Puissance si excessive; ils en sauroient mieux juquer que moi, non seulement par des exemples des histoires mais aussi de la profonde expérience et sagesse consommé, qu’ils ont de ce qui convient aux biens de leurs Etats et aux intérêts de l’Europe.

Il faut espérer, qu’ils seront persuadez que tout ce qu’on a dit est fondé sur la raison et sur l’expérience del passé et que la sureté et la solidité de la Paix à faire dépend en quelque manière de la Restitution de l’Ukraine.
Modern Ukrainian historiography is wont to regard the figure of Field Marshal Count Peter Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky (1725-1796) rather unfavorably, and even negatively. This is quite understandable. Indeed, the name of Rumyantsev was too closely associated with Ukrainian history of the second half of the eighteenth century, a time of the complex and painful process of ruination of the Ukrainian Cossack-Hetman State. Rumyantsev’s leading part, as Governor-General of the Left-Bank Ukraine (appointed in 1764), in liquidating the Hetmanate and in subsequent Russian reforms in the Ukraine, could not but contribute to a negative attitude toward him on the part of Ukrainian historiography.

Earlier Ukrainian historiography, however, appraised Rumyantsev quite differently, and its influence was noticeable almost to the end of the nineteenth century (particularly in the works of O. Lazarevsky). Actually, Istoriya Rusov, the perennial monument of Ukrainian national-state ideas of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, contains a statement that Rumyantsev “really fulfilled the people’s hopes by his patriotic attitude in behalf of their welfare.”¹ Favorable treatment of Rumyantsev is also found in the Ukrainian literature of memoirs. This earlier tradition continued in the Ukraine for some time.

We should not be surprised at the way Istoriya Rusov evaluated Rumyantsev. But though this response was characteristic of the period of the 1780s and 1790s, it was not so in the 1760s, the latter being a time when Rumyantsev’s name was odious to all. After the passions incited by the liquidation of the Hetmanate in 1764 had subsided, however, the bad

feelings against Rumyantsev died down, too. Out of the ter-
ritory of the former Hetmanate, the establishment of three
governorships (Kiev, Chernihiv and Novhorod-Siversky) in
1781-1782 with its concomitant opportunities for service ca-
reers, security of social-economic interests of Ukrainian land-
owners (particularly by the ukase of Catherine II of May 3,
1783), excellent prospects for colonization which opened to
the Left-Bank Ukrainian nobles in the Southern Ukraine,
and somewhat later, in the 1790s, in the Right-Bank Ukraine,
were in, and of, themselves sufficiently conciliatory factors.
If we add to this Rumyantsev's favorable attitude toward the
nobilitation demands of a host of Ukrainian nobles,2 and
finally, the very person of Rumyantsev, a renowned military
leader and talented administrator, a long-serving and fairly
tactful imperial Viceroy in the Ukraine (especially as Chair-
man of the Little Russian Collegium), a person of high
culture3 who was moreover connected with Ukraine since his
childhood4—all impressed the Ukrainian nobility of the 1780s

2 Rumyantsev stood for the rights of nobility, also in behalf of znachkovi tovaryshi
(flag comrades), military clerks, staff of sotnya, and clergy of noble ancestry

3 Among other languages, Rumyantsev knew German well, and was an avid
reader of German literature (cf. Kieuskaya Starina, 1897, Vols. VII-VIII,
p. 62: account of V. Ya. Lomykovsky; also Zapiski S. A. Tuchkova, St. Pe-
tersburg, 1908, p. 12).

4 Rumyantsev's childhood was spent in the Ukraine (his father, General-en-
Chef A. I. Rumyantsev, was in charge of the Hetmanate between 1738 and
1740). Here he studied under Tymofiy Senyutovych (subsequently Regi-
mental Judge of Chernihiv), a relative of the Archimandrite of Kiev Lavra
Monastery (1715-1729) Ioannikiy Senyutovych, and a graduate of foreign
"Latin schools"; cf. A. Lazarevsky, "Uchitel' grafa P. A. Rumyantseva-Zadunaiska-
go, T. M. Senyutovich" (Count P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky's teacher, T. M.

Rumyantsev retained good command of the Ukrainian language even at
a later age and, according to testimony of his contemporaries, "he could
never completely rid himself of his Little Russian accent," Anekdoty, obyasnyayu-
shchiya dukh fel'dmarshala P. A. Rumyantseva-Zadunaiskago (Anecdotes illustrating
the personality of Field Marshal P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky), St. Petersburg,
1811, p. 63. An unknown author of that time (probably a Ukrainian), wrote:
and 1790s. A whole generation of leaders who came out of Rumyantsev's milieu came to occupy positions of leadership in Ukrainian life of the late eighteenth century. Rumyantsev's name was especially popular among the large number of Left-Bank nobles who were descended from Cossacks, and also among the so-called "Rumyantsev's kornets" (warrant officers) who were indebted to him for their noble status. Rumyantsev, once the stern Russian Viceroy of the Ukraine, gradually turned into a benevolent Ukrainian landlord (he was granted huge estates in the Ukraine), and the Ukrainian citizenry, both old and young, many among whom had at one time fought under his glory-covered banners, gave him his due respect.

"Count Rumyantsev, who had been raised in Little Russia, was so much attached to his homeland, that every time he met a countryman he used all his powers to captivate him. He became so famous for his love of Little Russia that every native of that land who found himself in St. Petersburg considered Count Zadunaysky to be his best protector...." (Ibid., p. 63). This tradition continued in the Ukraine until the end of the nineteenth century. Count H. O. Myloradovych, a well-known historian and genealogist of Chernihiv, noted in his (as yet unpublished) diary on December 8, 1896: "The one-hundredth anniversary of Count Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky, 1796-1896, who loved and governed Little Russia for a long time." (Chernihiv State Historical Archive; fund of Count Myloradovych).

5 Rumyantsev had the authority to commission kornets—the lowest officer rank (warrant officer) which carried with it privileges of nobility at the time. Petty landowners in the Hetmanate took advantage of this on a large scale. Cf. M. Lazarevsky, "Pamyati moi" (My Memoirs), Ukrayins'kyi Arkheohrafichnyi Zbirnyk, Kiev, 1927, Vol. II pp. 26-27.


7 On the subject of Rumyantsev's activities in the Ukraine, cf., in addition to general works, also: A. Lazarevsky, "Materiyaly dlya biografii gr. P. A. Rumyantseva-Zadunaiskago" (Material for a Biography of Count P. A. Rumyantsev-Zadunaysky), Kievskaya Starina, 1895, Vol. III, pp. 385-404; the same author's, "Po povodu sta let ot smerti grafa P. A. Rumyantseva" (On the Occasion of 100 Years Since the Death of Count P. A. Rumyantsev),
This had its repercussions upon the appraisal of the person and activities of Rumayantsev in *Istoriya Rusov*.

It is therefore not surprising that Rumyantsev was on fairly good personal terms with Ukrainian autonomists. As early as 1771, Hryhoriy A. Poletyka sent Rumyantsev greetings on the occasion of the latter's victory over the Turks, and this was, in all likelihood, not merely an expression of courtesy. Answering Poletyka with an interesting letter (December 20, 1771), Rumyantsev wrote that it was a pleasure to hear "praise from a co-citizen, decorated with this and other honors."  

Later, Rumyantsev was also on good terms with the well-known Ukrainian autonomist leaders, the brothers Skoropadsky, Hryhoriy K. Dolynsky, Pavlo H. Koropchevsky, Opanas K. Lobysevych, General Andriy V. Hudovych, and others. It was well known that the Field Marshal's relations with many other noble Ukrainian families were friendly and almost familial through God-parentage. There was a definite preponderance of Ukrainians on his staff, among the officials of his estates and in his personal entourage (V. V. Hudovych, P. H. Dubovyk, A. H. Ivanenko, P. I. Myklashevsky, M. K. Mostsipanov, M. R. Polytkovsky, V. I. Skoropadsky, M. M. Kievskaya Starina, 1896, Vol. XII, p. 374-390; G. Maksimovich, *Deyatel'nost' gr. Rumyantseva-Zadunaiskago po upravleniyu Malorossiei* (Activities of Count Rumyantzev-Zadunaysky in Governing Little Russia), I, Nizhen, 1912; P. Maikov, "P. A. Rumyantsov" in *Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar*, Petrograd, 1918, Vol. Romanova-Ryasovsky, pp. 521-573; bibliography, *ibid.*  


9 This is apparent from I. M. Skoropadsky's letter to Rumyantsev of February 10, 1778, Kiev Central Archive of Old Documents, Fund of the Little Russian Collegium, Chernihiv Division, 1778. I. M. Skoropadsky's son, V. I. Skoropadsky, was Rumyantsev's wing-aide-de-camp.


Storozhenko, I. M. Khanenko, O. H. Podluzky, I. Ya. Seletsky, O. H. Tumansky, A. I. Chepa and others).\textsuperscript{12} There were close ties of friendship between Rumyantsev and Oleksander A. Bezborod'ko, and particularly with Petro V. Zavadovsky.\textsuperscript{13} The latter had good reason for writing Rumyantsev in 1790 that people in the Ukraine "adored him."\textsuperscript{14} And so it was after Rumyantsev's death. This is what A. S. Polubotok wrote about him to his granddaughter and her husband I. S. Lashkevych in December 1796: "The Count, the benefactor of us all, Pyotr Aleksandrovich, died on December 8th."\textsuperscript{15}

Thus, Rumyantsev's relations with Ukrainian patriotic circles were quite friendly toward the end of the 1780s. Moreover, there is basis for belief that Ukrainian autonomists, who had despatched Vasyl' Kapnist abroad in 1791 to

\textsuperscript{12} Cf. V. Modzalevsky, "Malorossiiskii Rodoslovnik" (Little Russian Genealogical Dictionary), Vols. I-IV, Kiev, 1908-1914, \textit{passim}. There is a wealth of material in the archives of the Little Russian Collegium and of Rumyantsev's Military Field Chancery.

It is not surprising that Rumyantsev's mother, Countess M. A. Rumyantseva, replying to a letter from her daughter-in-law (Rumyantsev was married to Princess K. M. Golitsyn), who complained that she "was bored" in the Ukraine, wrote (July 13, 1765): "I don't think that it's so boring there. I used to live there and found no boredom. I would not like people to talk about you as they did about Katerina Ivanovna [the wife of Hetman Kyrylo Rozumovsky, nee Naryshkina] that she refused to know anybody. You yourself need their goodwill; whatever river you are sailing on, there you make your reputation," (\textit{Starina i Novizna}, St. Petersburg, 1900, Vol. III, pp. 143-144).


Rumyantsev considered Zavadovsky not merely a friend, but "true in friendship" (\textit{Russkii Biograficheskii Slovar'}, Vol. Romanova-Ryasovsky, pp. 569, 570).


\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Lyubetskii Arkhiv}, Kiev, 1898, p. 192.
seek aid against Russia, counted on Rumyantsev's support or sympathy.\textsuperscript{16} The point is that during Kapnist's negotiations with Prussian official circles in Berlin, he stressed as the motive of his mission Ukrainian dissatisfaction with Prince Potemkin and his "tyranny." This would seem surprising, at least on first appearance. For actually, Potemkin's activity directly concerned the Southern Ukraine only, and moreover, "Hryts'ko Nechosa" (the "uncombed," a name by which Potemkin was called in Zaporizhzhya) had at one time been on good terms with the Zaporozhians, and he later had plans to re-establish a South-Ukrainian Cossack Host of which he wanted to become "Grand Hetman" (of the Cossack Katerynoslav and Black Sea Armies), an office to which he was actually appointed on January 10, 1790.\textsuperscript{17} Rumors spread in Western Europe at that time that Potemkin wanted to become Hetman of the Ukraine, and, "like Mazepa," establish there an independent state.\textsuperscript{18}

Nevertheless, Kapnist's sharp action against Potemkin (obviously inspired by the initiators of Kapnist's foreign mission) is quite understandable. In the first place, the Ukrainian Left-Bank landlords were indignant at Potemkin for his policy in the matter of peasant-escapees from the Hetmanate and Slobidska area. Southern Ukrainian landlords gladly took in those escapees, and the local administration, on the direct advice of Potemkin, did not extradite them. Furthermore, Potemkin's favorable attitude toward the Zaporozhians, and even more so his plan to re-establish the Cossacks in the

\textsuperscript{16} More details on this are to be found in this author's article "Vasyl' Kapnist," part. II, Zbirnyh Ukrayins'koiy Literaturnoyi Hazety 1956, Munich, 1957, pp. 167-182.

\textsuperscript{17} B. Nolde, La formation de l'Empire Russe, Paris, 1953, V. II, pp. 232-233.

\textsuperscript{18} This report was made in 1791 in the London Annual Register or a view of history, politics and literature (V. XXXIII, p. 106). Cf. E. Borschak, L'Ukraine dans la littérature de l'Europe occidentale, Extrait du Monde Slave, 1935, p. 67.

Prince G. A. Potemkin-Tavriysky, of Smolensk nobility, was related to some Ukrainian families in the Hetmanate.
Southern Ukraine, went very much against the grain of leading Ukrainian circles in the Hetmanate toward the close of the eighteenth century: suffice it to recall the negative attitude of *Istoriya Rusov* to the Zaporozhians or their characterization in Kotlyarevsky’s *Aeneid* as robbers and killers. Finally, we must consider the attitude of the army which was under Rumyantsev’s command and Rumyantsev’s own attitude toward Potemkin. Rumyantsev’s army was much worse off than Potemkin’s, especially as regards material status. Ukrainian military units (regiments of carabineers) which were part of Rumyantsev’s army had every reason to share their commander’s dislike of his southern competitor.

Therefore, we must pay particular attention to Rumyantsev’s position in the late 1780s and early 1790s. Since the early 1780s the Field Marshal had been relegated gradually to a secondary position, overshadowed by the brilliant successes and imposing figure of the all-powerful Prince of Tauria. This was particularly noticeable during the trip of Catherine II to the Ukraine and the Crimea in 1787. The observant French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Count Ségur, who accompanied the Empress to the South, noticed that Rumyantsev had a dissatisfied look during the entire period of her stay in Kiev. This was ascribed by some to the inspection of educational establishments in Kiev by Count F. Anhalt, and even more to the matter of investigation of three Left-Bank governorships conducted in 1785 by senators Count A. R. Vorontsov and President of the Commercial Collegium A. V. Naryshkin. But this was not the gist of the matter. Similar investigations were a normal thing, Rumyantsev had been given notice about them, and results of the investigation were quite favorable.19

Neither is the problem explained by reports of Rumyan-

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19 Zapiski grafa Segyura o prebyvanii ego vRossii v tsarstvovanie Ekateriny II (1785-1789), (Notes of Count Ségu about his stay in Russia during the reign of Catherine II, 1785-1789), St. Petersburg, 1865, p. 152; P. Maikov, *op. cit.*, p. 562.

Cf. Kiev Central Archive of Old Documents, fund No. 211, case No. 233.
tsev's illness and depression, although he was really ill at the time. Count I. G. Chernyshev, Vice-President of the Admirals' Collegium who accompanied the Empress, wrote on March 21, 1787, to his friend, "ober-kamerger" (Chief Equerry) Prince A. M. Golitsyn (in Moscow) as follows: "Field Marshal Count Rumyantsev was really ill, with eruptions on his head and face, but now he is better; still he says that he is thinking about asking to be relieved of all affairs, believing himself to be extremely weak and not in a position to continue in any kind of service, particularly military."20

Even the Empress did not attach any significance to Rumyantsev's illness, when she met him in Chechersk on January 20, 1787. She wrote to Count Ya. A. Bryus that Rumyantsev "looks fresh and healthy and as vigorous as I had seen him six years ago."21 It seems therefore, that Ségur was closest to the truth when he wrote: "Field Marshal Rumyantsev received the Empress on the border of the governorship. The face of this venerable and distinguished hero was an expression of his soul; it reflected secretiveness and pride, sign of real distinction; but it showed a shade of sadness and dissatisfaction evoked by the preference for and immense power of Potemkin. Competition for power disunited those two military leaders; they went along, fighting for glory and favor, and, as usually happens, it was the Empress' favorite who won out. The Field Marshal [Rumyantsev] did not receive any wherewithal for governing the dependency; his work proceeded slowly; his soldiers wore old clothes and his officers persistently demanded promotions. All favors, all

20 Kievskaya Starina, 1891, II, p. 231. Replying to Chernyshev, Golitsyn wrote: "Count Zadunaysky has been talking about his retirement for a long time, but to talk and to act are two entirely different things, and since he has not done anything, then perhaps he will die without retiring according to the example of similar famous men. There is a saying that people accustomed to wars and command, and in love with these honors, rarely part with them voluntarily." (Ibid., p. 231).

21 Kievskaya Starina, 1890, XII, p. 405.
encouragement went to the army which the First Minister [Potemkin] commanded."

Catherine was altogether dissatisfied with the results of Rumyantsev's work in the Ukraine, especially when compared with the bright picture which Potemkin opened before the enraptured eyes of the Empress in the South. She had good reason to write N. I. Saltykov on May 3, 1787 from Kremenchug: "In three Little Russian governorships, because nothing had been set in motion, the deficit reaches a million, the cities are drab and nothing is done." And on May 19, 1787 Emperor Joseph II wrote from Koydak to Field Marshal Count Lassi: "Poor Field Marshal Rumyantsev is in disgrace." In 1789 Rumyantsev was in fact removed from the governorship of the Ukraine, and this was entrusted in 1790 to the Governor General of Tula and Kaluga, General M. N. Krechetnikov.

One might assume that all these circumstances contributed to Rumyantsev's conflict with the government and to his going over to the opposition.

In this connection, it is necessary to say a few words about Rumyantsev's relations with Crown Prince Paul Petrovich, subsequently Paul I. They were tied by kinship, old friendship, a son's deep gratitude for an aide's devotion to his father (Peter III), common political and cultural interests, especially a great liking for German culture and King Frederick II, and finally, what is probably most important, the

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22 Zapiski grafa Segyura, pp. 152-153.
23 Kievskaya Starina, 1891, VII, p. 31.
24 Ibid., p. 43.
25 Court circles almost recognized Rumyantsev (since the time of Empress Elizabeth) as the son of Peter I and Countess M. A. Rumyantzeva (nee Countess Matveeva). Paul I, grandson of Peter I, attributed some significance to these family relations.
26 "The Field Marshal [Rumyantsev] was very much attracted by Prussia" (L. Engelgardt, Zapiski, Moscow, 1868, pp. 21-22). Cf. Otchet o 27 prisuzhdenii nagrad grafa Uvarova, St. Petersburg, 1885, p. 139. According to F. Vigel', "Rumyantsev...was overflowing with the German spirit;...he
negative attitude of both toward the foreign policy of Catherine II, and personal dislike of Potemkin. It is therefore not surprising that in the 1780s, when Crimean affairs came under Potemkin’s jurisdiction in 1782, ties between Paul Petrovich and Rumyantsev grew stronger.  

Even earlier, in the 1770s, Rumyantsev went to Berlin with Paul Petrovich on two occasions, on the very delicate mission concerning the marriage (first and second) of the Grand Duke. Paul Petrovich visited the Ukraine in 1781 and met Rumyantsev. Secret contacts, undoubtedly of a political nature, were maintained between the Grand Duke, who headed the opposition against the policy of Catherine II on a wide international scale, and Rumyantsev. According to the memoirs of M. O. Kotlubytsky, aide-de-camp of the Grand Duke, Paul I once summoned him (Kotlubytsky was going to the Ukraine) and “tied a letter for Rumyantsev to the chain which held the cross around his neck. On arrival at Rumyantsev’s, Kotlubytsky was to tell the Field Marshal’s midget (these were the instructions given by Paul) that he must see the Field Marshal. After reading Paul’s note, Rumyantsev tied another note to the chain of Kotlubytsky’s cross, remarking that the secret must be kept, that he was putting his gray head into his hands and Kotlubytsky must eat the note in case of danger.” There is not the slightest doubt 

fought the great Frederick, and ... admired his art and genius; finally he had an opportunity to meet him personally, and could not talk about him without enthusiasm.... He lived always surrounded with Germans” (Vospominaniya F. F. Vigelya, part I., Moscow, 1864, p. 80).


29 V. Andreev, Predstaviteli vlasti v Rossii posle Petra I, St. Petersburg, 1870, p. 263.

Mykola Osypovych Kotlubytsky was the son of Osyp Hryhorovych Kotlubytsky—the Assessor of the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, landlord of Kono-
that at that time Paul Petrovich and Rumyantsev were closely united in their opposition to Potemkin's Austrophile policy. It was of the utmost importance to Paul, devoted to Prussia and Frederick II, to have on his side Rumyantsev, ruler of the Ukraine with full powers and commander-in-chief of the Southern Army. The Russian opposition was precisely capable of drawing Rumyantsev even closer to Ukrainian autonomists.

On the one hand, closely connected with the Russian opposition and personally with its leader, Grand Duke Paul, and on the other hand, standing close to Ukrainian autonomists, Rumyantsev realized the extent of his power and was able to bare his teeth to the government of Catherine II whenever he wished. The conflict between them became particularly strong and overt during the Second Russo-Turkish war which began in 1787. Rumyantsev was not put in charge of all armed forces on the Turkish front (the chief command was divided between him and Potemkin) and this gravely insulted the old and deserving military leader. The first years of the war were marked by a series of clashes and conflicts between the two marshals. In March 1789 Catherine II decided to recall Rumyantsev and transferred his command to Potemkin, who thus became commander-in-chief, and on April 23, 1789 Rumyantsev was recalled to St. Petersburg, where he was ordered to assemble a separate army for possible action against Prussia, then opposed to Russia and to Russia's ally, Austria. This was a great blow to Rumyantsev, obviously calculated to bring about discord between him and the opposition in the person of Paul Petrovich, and certainly...
a provocative step toward a Field Marshal known as a friend of Prussia.

It is not surprising that on May 24, 1789, Rumyantsev, offering his thanks for this, not without irony, could not refrain from mentioning his "sorrow" caused by his removal from the southern front (then at war) with which he was well acquainted. The well-informed Bezborod'ko said that Rumyantsev would not go to St. Petersburg but would ask permission to go abroad to take the cure. And this is what actually happened. The necessary permission was granted, but Rumyantsev did not go abroad and stayed in Yassy. This disturbed Catherine II very much: "His [Rumyantsev's] presence in Moldavia will give rise to rumors detrimental to my own and general affairs," she wrote Potemkin on September 6, 1789. "I wish and demand," the Empress added "that he should leave Moldavia." Rumyantsev nevertheless did not leave. Catherine then wrote him personally (April 17, 1790) that he should either go abroad or to Russia because his stay in Yassy was harmful to her interests. Even this order from the Empress was not obeyed by Rumyantsev. We can assume that he did not wish to take leave of the army where he had many devoted officers. Catherine lost her patience and wrote Potemkin on August 20, 1790 that "it would be best if you would send for Rumyantsev and tell him that it might easily happen that the Turks will take him away unless he gets away himself first, and if even this does not help, then send him a convoy which would accompany him and take him out." This was a direct threat, but even then Rumyantsev did not give in. He did not leave for his estate, Vyshenky, in the Krolevets region until late in 1790.31

Catherine was very much dissatisfied with Rumyantsev for this disobedience,32 and did not forget it for a long time. She

32 Catherine spoke about this to her secretary, Khrapovitsky, on December 30, 1790 (Dnevnik A. V. Khrapovitskago 1782-1793, St. Petersburg, 1874).
refused (on December 30, 1790) to sign an already prepared letter of thanks for his New Year's greetings to her. On January 2, 1792 she crossed out from a letter to him the words: "wishes for success in your affairs and plans" stating that "he is not doing anything." After the signing of the Yassy peace on December 29, 1791, Rumyantsev received only a jewelled sword for occupying Moldavia (at the beginning of the war).\textsuperscript{33}

Thus, the Ukrainian autonomists of the 1780s and 1790s, most of them united in the Novhorod-Siversky patriotic circle, could count, if not on support, then at least on sympathy from Rumyantsev. This was of the utmost importance to the Ukrainian irredentist movement because it facilitated putting through the necessary political moves, and perhaps it even provided assurances in the event of failure. We can also believe that this played a major part in the flawless conspiracy which marked the affair of Kapnist's foreign mission, and in the entire political activity of Ukrainian autonomism of the late eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{34}

A few words about Rumyantsev's subsequent position. Although he was removed from governing the Ukraine, he continued to live there (in Tashan') and exercised much influence upon local affairs and conditions. His semi-private position was, to a certain extent, beneficial in this respect. But Rumyantsev's political role was by no means ended. On February 27, 1794, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Russian Army in Right-Bank Ukraine for action against Poland. Contemporaries attest that the Field Marshal was then in full command of his mental faculties and will, although he ailed physically; his legs were failing him. Paul I's ascension to the throne opened new prospects to Rumyantsev. On December 3, 1796, he was given the inspection command of the Ukrainian division, i.e., chief command of all armed forces in the Ukraine. On this occasion Paul I sent him a decree in

\textsuperscript{33} P. Maikov, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 565.

\textsuperscript{34} The very interesting problem of Rumyantsev's masonic connections, particularly in the Ukraine, requires special research.
which he assured him of his "most benevolent feelings" for him.\textsuperscript{35}

But the old Field Marshal was already on his way out of this world. He died on December 8, 1796, in his Tashan,\textsuperscript{36} deeply mourned by his Ukrainian friends and favorably remembered in Ukrainian historical tradition.

\textsuperscript{35} P. Maikov, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 566-567.

\textsuperscript{36} Rumyantsev was buried on January 8, 1797, in the Uspensky Cathedral of the Kievan Lavra Monastery. A beautiful tombstone was erected over his grave (the work of I. Martos).
In the period around 1890, there existed in Austria-Hungary four Slavic universities: two Polish, one in Kraków and one in Lviv, a Czech university in Prague, and a Croatian university in Zagreb. Many students of Slavic origin studied in Vienna and in Graz. Schools of higher learning in technology, mining, agriculture, and veterinary medicine were located either in the university centers, or in cities offering facilities to specialized students. The language of instruction was either German or Slavic, and in some cases two languages were used to prevent splitting of professional schools along linguistic lines. As the laws and regulations pertaining to academic life were much the same in all provinces, it was comparatively easy to transfer from one institution to another. In general, there was little fluctuation, as students were mostly recruited from the area surrounding the intellectual center. It was not customary in the lands of the Hapsburgs to travel around in search of advanced degrees if they could be obtained in the native province. It goes without saying that the higher institutions of learning in Vienna were more richly endowed than schools in provincial centers. It was, therefore, no wonder that this city of imperial residence on the Danube attracted many gifted students from all parts of the monarchy, as well as from other countries, including Russia.

Contacts and exchanges in academic life were fostered more intensively by students than by professors. The range of interests was much wider than the curriculum, which was uniform in basic subjects, but varied in quality and variety of courses. The students were as a rule more active and versatile than their instructors, bridging the gaps and demolishing deep-rooted prejudices. The ethnic divisions were on the whole sharp and clearly drawn. In bilingual areas students of rival nationalities seldom communicated. In Vienna and in Graz German students were a majority and
had their own organizations, whereas the Slavic groups either frequented their exclusive circles or endeavored to establish contacts with other minority groups.

Owing to its geographical position and to local circumstances, Kraków became, in 1890, the center of attention. The stronghold for progressive students there became Czytelnia akademiczna (The Academic Reading Club). Among their leaders were Franciszek Nowicki, Kazimierz Tetmajer, Wilhelm Feldmann, and Maciej Szukiewicz. In 1889, two other members of this group, Arthur Górski and Ludwik Janikowski, founded the magazine Ognisko (The Hearth) to serve, in general, the same purpose which Karel S. Sokol and his associates assigned to Časopis českého studentstva. Social problems were given more prominence in Ognisko than in Časopis, which corresponded to the general orientation of the Polish progressive groups.

Striking the keynote, the editors of Ognisko wrote in the opening article as follows:

Our Country is young Poland—Poland of the people, a world of the common, nameless masses, suffering, even exploited by their fellow-countrymen, and by their enemies, deliberately pushed aside from the political arena. Our national future lies in the Polish people, in the Polish proletariat, waging a desperate struggle for their very existence, against poverty, ignorance and exploitation. This is our young Poland.

Contacts with corresponding groups in Lviv were cordial. Ernest Breiter very often appeared in the pages of Ognisko. The editors opened their magazine to the pioneers of progressive concepts irrespective of age, and gladly published contributions from Bolesław Limanowski, Zygmunt Miłkowski-Jež, Bolesław Wysłouch, and Ivan Franko.

As no attempt was made by the editors to disguise their program, protests from the Right were bound to come. After them followed repressive measures by provincial authorities. Since the middle seventies the governors of Galicia had kept a sharp eye on the restive elements among both students and workers, and

harbored suspicions against Russian citizens of Polish or Ukrainian nationality who were inclined to operate in busy university centers. Hunting down suspected persons, arbitrary confiscations of pamphlets or articles in periodicals, decrees dissolving undesirable organizations came to be accepted as matters of almost daily occurrence. Occasionally, the government decided on heavier blows to intimidate members of the progressive organizations. Arrests, trials, and convictions on slight evidence were favored as weapons against advocates of political or social radicalism. The former subjects of the Czars, with such exceptions as Wysłouch, were continually harassed until they decided to move on to Switzerland or some other safe haven in western Europe.

Involved in conflicts with local authorities, the progressive groups in Prague looked with keen interest for information concerning academic life in other Slavic centers. Antonín Hajn distinguished himself as the organizer of a news service for Časopis českého studentstva. Josef Partytsky, a Ukrainian student in Lviv, was one of his most faithful correspondents. It was probably from one of his letters that the Czechs learned of student participation in the Lviv observance of May 1, 1890. It seems likely that Josef Partytsky sent to Prague a copy of the program of the Radical party which Antonín Hajn translated and published with a commentary.²

Other correspondents were less conscientious, but from time to time Časopis printed reports from Slovakia, Croatia, and the Lusatian centers, failing only to find a Slovene correspondent. Antonín Hajn occasionally abstracted articles on student affairs from the Warsaw Głos (The Voice), or from Pavlyk’s Narod (The People). Very often he acquainted his subscribers with the contents of the current issue of Ognisko. The speech which Franciszek Nowicki delivered when campaigning for the chairmanship of Czytelnia akademiczna impressed Hajn so favorably

² Pertinent information can be found in Antonín Hajn, Výbor prací, 1889-1909, Pokrokové hnutí let devadesátých, pt. I, Prague, 1912, pp. 133, 191, and 249. According to Antonín Pravoslav Veselý, Omladina a pokrokové hnutí, Prague, 1902, p. 92, three Czech Social Democratic papers reprinted the program.
that he at once translated it into Czech. On the other hand, *Ognisko* reprinted from *Časopis* Masaryk's contribution, "Some Thoughts on the Duties of Czech Students," and presented it to its readers with explanatory notes and some reservations.³

The grave problems of student life were temporarily obscured by stormy events precipitated by the rigid steps the authorities took against student leaders. The days of *Ognisko* were numbered. In January 1890 its three editors were expelled from the university. Its publication was suspended and it was not until July that a new issue appeared in pamphlet form. Along with the suppression of the magazine, action was taken against *Czytelnia akademicka* which met with the same fate as *Akademický četenářský spolek* in August 1889.⁴

In protest against the government's policy, the Polish students marched in the streets. Mass demonstrations in Kraków lasted five days and were reported by Czech dailies. A special letter in *Časopis*, along with the editor's comment, were suppressed by the Prague censor.

Ever since the suppression of *Akademický četenářský spolek* the Czech student body lived in a state of repressed agitation; little, indeed, was needed to touch off a storm. The decree of the academic senate of March 7, 1890 banning Karel S. Sokol from the university for two semesters, was the last straw. The students first vented their indignation against unpopular members of the senate. When the police stepped in, demonstrations took a more serious turn and went on for several days. The final act was a mass procession to Podhoř, a village outside city limits, and there a militant resolution was unanimously adopted. A telegram was received from Kraków assuring the Czech colleagues of sympathy.⁵

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⁴ Antonín Hajn's data can be supplemented by the article, "Wilhelm Feldmann jako publicysta i działacz społeczny," contributed by Josef Grabiec to the volume of essays, *Pamięci Wilhelma Feldmanna*, Kraków, 1922, p. 78.
⁵ For a detailed description of the Prague events see Antonín Hajn, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-92.
Excitement and tension in both Kraków and Prague somewhat subsided during the Easter holiday, but it proved impossible to restore peace. Instead of calming their minds, the political and academic authorities added fuel to the flames by attempts to prop up conservative student organizations and, with their aid, reverse the tide. The progressive groups were determined not to let the initiative pass from their hands. Realizing that more was at stake than just local problems, they endeavored to build up a common front.

In the spring of 1890 arrangements were under way for the transfer of the mortal remains of Adam Mickiewicz from Montmoréncy in France to the cathedral at Wawel. The progressive students welcomed this opportunity, and urged their Slavic colleagues to visit Kraków on that occasion. It is not at all surprising that the idea of a Slavic student congress displeased the conservative circles. The governor of Galicia and the academic senate of the Jagellonian University simultaneously issued decrees forbidding the assembly.

Despite the ban, some students traveled to Kraków and met with members of other nationalities who studied there. Antonín Hajn (1868-1949) with Václav J. Klofáč (1868-1942) and Alois Rašín (1867-1923) joined the official Czech delegation to the Mickiewicz ceremony, headed by Eduard Jelínek, a poet and spokesman for Czech-Polish amity. They marched in the procession through the Kraków streets and were particularly impressed by the speech which was delivered at Wawel by Władysław Lewicki, a student of progressive views. They spent a good deal of time sightseeing or in company with their Polish hosts as well as other visitors to Kraków on that memorable occasion.6

II

The political and academic authorities had vetoed the students' original plan to hold a congress to honor Mickiewicz's reinterment at Wawel. However, they found it advisable to close their

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6 A description of the visit by Antonín Hajn appeared in Časopis, and was reprinted in Výbor, I, p. 122 ff.
eyes to informal meetings. The city was crowded and repressive measures would have stirred up popular indignation. Władysław Lewicki became a hero in the eyes of the young visitors to Kraków when it became known that, at the behest of the Provincial Marshal, Jan Tarnowski, he had been summoned by the Rector magnificus of the Jagellonian University and reprimanded for his speech at Wawel.

When the ceremonies were over, a “commerce” of Slavic students was held in a public garden. The majority of those attending were Poles, but other nationalities were also represented by students who were matriculated at either Kraków or Lviv. Antonín Hajn made the acquaintance of some Ukrainian, Bulgarian and Croatian students. Informal speeches were delivered by Poles from three parts of the Polish national territory, as well as by a delegate from Paris. One Bulgarian student also spoke in Polish, while others used their mother tongue. Not every word was understood, but the differences of language did not prevent a friendly exchange of ideas. Some prominent personages appeared while the discussion was in progress. Dr. August Lewakowski, one of the representatives of the Democratic Party in the Council of the Empire, joined the debaters; others, like the editor of Głos, talked to the students when the formal speeches were over.7

Another occasion for toasts and fraternization was the excursion, on July 5, to the salt mines at Wieliczka. The students were addressed by Marja Wysłouchowa, who concluded her remarks with a toast to the democratic idea. After their return to Kraków the students attended the plenary session of Akademichna Hromada, the center of Ukrainian students. A lively discussion followed the lecture by Yakiv Nevestyuk on “The idea of Autonomous Federation of Slavic Peoples According to Drahomanov.”8

7 No name for the editor is given in Hajn’s account. Głos, with trends similar to those of Przegląd społeczny, was edited by Jan Popławski and Jósef Bohusz Potocki. See W. Pobóg-Malinowski, Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski, 1864-1945, Paris, 1953, vol. I, p. 43.

8 According to Antonín Hajn, op. cit., p. 137, the lecture was published in Czech translation in Časopis českého studentstva, Vol. III, No. 1.
The pilgrimage on Sunday, July 6, to Kosciuszko’s mound was the high point on the improvised program. Once again honors went to Władysław Lewicki, who reported on his appearance before the Rector. The Czech delegates were given a mandate to prepare a student congress to be held in Prague sometime in 1891.

Soon after the registration for the academic year 1890-1, a committee was organized to prepare the congress and invitations were sent to various Slavic centers. The congress was scheduled for Whitsuntide, 1891, to coincide with the opening of the Provincial Bohemian Exhibition. The central figure of the committee was Antonín Hajn, who was familiar with ideological trends among students of various nationalities and had many contacts both in and outside of Bohemia. He was assisted by Bohdan Dobiáš, Václav J. Klofáč, Karel S. Sokol, and Jan Vlček. An appeal to Slavic students, probably drafted by Antonín Hajn, was published on January 15, 1891.9 Student organizations were urged to appoint delegates to the Prague congress.

Some passages in the appeal gave rise to both sympathetic comment and polemics. An unreserved endorsement of the congress appeared in Kurjer Lwowski, where the hope was expressed that Galician youth of both nationalities would be adequately represented in Prague. Progressive Czech newspapers approved the appeal, whereas it was criticized from the Right. Its authors had intended it for progressive groups and made it sufficiently clear that the presence of conservative elements would only hinder the proceedings.

Less than a month later Dr. Vladimír Tomša, the rector of the Czech university, issued a statement indicating that the congress would not be sanctioned by the academic authorities. Writing in a patronizing tone, the rector asked the students to abstain from campaigning.10 The rector’s warning was discussed both in student meetings and in the press, but Hajn’s committee paid no attention to it and did not break off correspondence with

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10 Ibid., pp. 143-4.
the prospective delegates. No word came from the security organs until May 14, 1891, when a decree, addressed to Antonín Hajn, was issued by the chief of police, forbidding the congress as incompatible with laws regulating academic life.\footnote{Ibid., p. 178.}

Coming like a bolt from the blue, the decree created momentary consternation, but it came too late to keep the delegates from traveling to Prague. Many of them arrived by a special train from Vienna on May 15, 1891; others came directly from their homes or from abroad. In many respects the Czech capital resembled the Kraków of early July, 1890. On May 15 a Provincial exhibition opened, marking the centenary of the first survey of Bohemian crafts and skills in 1791. Boycotted by the German-speaking inhabitants of the kingdom, the exhibition was turned into a display of the material and intellectual progress made by the Czechs since 1791. Conventions and pageants enriched the program and attracted masses of people to Prague, especially on such a holiday as Whitsuntide. It is easy to imagine with what feelings the Czech public received the ban of the congress, and how heartily the Slavic students were acclaimed when they marched from the railroad station through the crowded and flag-draped streets of the metropolis.\footnote{Most of the available information comes from the writings of Antonín Hajn. He reprinted his article on the congress and prefaced it with an exhaustive account of meetings and with full text of resolutions adopted. See \textit{Výbor}, I, pp 178-200. According to Štefan Janšák, \textit{Život dra Paula Blahu. Slovenské národné hnutie na prahu XX. storočia}, Vol. I, Trnava 1947, p. 74, Pavel Blaho, the leading Slovak delegate, kept in his private archives a rich collection of documents relating to the congress.}

Steps were quickly taken to salvage as much as possible of the intended program. The committee cancelled arrangements for plenary sessions so as to avoid drastic intervention from the police. The two hundred and forty-four participants were organized into national sections which were to meet in places known only to the steering committee. It was expected that the sections would discuss the set of proposals drafted by the Czech groups. Seven sections were constituted: Croatian (22 members), Czech
(120), Polish (45), Russian (4), Serbian (26), Slovak (16), and Ukrainian (16). The few Slovenes and Bulgarians present in Prague were admitted as guests. Each section elected three men as members of the central committee. This committee supervised the sections and kept an eye on the security organs, in order to achieve a maximum of success as well as to insure secrecy as to the movements of the delegates.

The central committee held three long sessions. Despite Hajn's efforts to keep the delegates together, two secessions occurred between the opening and the final meeting. The Serbians dropped out in protest against Hajn's reference to the Serbo-Croatian nation, and the Russians, who were students living in Vienna, were antagonized by a Ukrainian delegate. The resolutions were discussed and finally voted on by spokesmen of five nationalities, the Croats, Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and Ukrainians.

The central committee was a distinguished group, as the names of its leading members indicate. One of the Croatian members was Ante Radić. The Czech section elected Antonín Hajn and Václav Klofáč. The third delegate, Urban, was far less prominent than his two colleagues. The Poles were represented by Stanisław Bądzyński (1862-1929), who came to Prague from Zurich, Franciszek Nowicki, and Stefan Surzycki; the Slovaks by Pavel Blaho (1867-1927), Dušan Makovický (1866-1921), and Ján Smetanaj (b. 1867); the Ukrainians by Ivan Franko, Roman Jaroshevych, and Josef Partytsky, who for some time corresponded with Antonín Hajn, sending him reports on student life in Galicia.

Trusting that the police would hesitate to take stern measures on a day regarded by the Czech people as a national festival, the committee made arrangements for a banquet to be held on Whitmonday, May, 18. The place was carefully selected. One of the islands in Vltava in the heart of the city, then known as Sophia's Island, and later as the Slavic Island, had served in 1848 as the meeting ground for the first Slavic congress. In the main hall there, the social gathering of the student congress took place on May 18, 1891, the dining room being filled to capacity.

The series of short speeches and toasts opened with a message
of welcome from the hosts delivered by Alois Rašín. Speaking for the Poles, Władysław Szukiewicz recalled the conference held in Kraków in July, 1890, and praised Eduard Jelínek, the chief promoter of Czech-Polish cultural exchanges. Taking up the thread, Dr. Yaroshevych spoke in warm terms of František Řehoř,13 whose zeal in forging links between the Czechs and Ukrainians was highly valued on both sides. The speech made by Dr. Ivan Franko opened with a tribute to Taras Shevchenko with special references to his poem on Jan Hus. Passing to another topic, Franko pointed out some of the concrete results which had followed cooperation between progressive Polish and Ukrainian groups. At the end, he voiced his opinion that the Slavic question, which he believed to be a question of the concrete interests of the Slavic peoples, was entering a realistic state. Other student delegates who proposed toasts—Dr. Stanisław Bądzyński, Pavel Blaho, Antonín Čížek (1865-1897), a Czech student of law, Dušan Peleš (born 1867) speaking on behalf of the Serbs, and Ante Radič (1868-1919)—were in tune with their colleagues, treating either student affairs or current problems.

Three members of the Council of the Empire honored the banquet by their presence and spoke shortly after the first round of student toasts. Thomas G. Masaryk deliberately abstained from discussing political issues, stressing the need for concentration on cultural matters and on social problems in the broadest sense of that word. Vjekoslav Spinčić (1848-1933), a Croatian deputy from Istria, recalled the Slavic congress of 1848. The third speaker was Josef Sokol (the father of Karel Stanislav) who represented the district of Pardubice in the Parliament in Vienna. He endeavored to dispel the pessimistic undertones in Čížek's address, and prophesied that brighter days would come for the Slavic people and that members of the congress would be able to play and active role in politics. At a somewhat advanced hour

the program closed with three contributions from students, the speakers being a Pole, Śękiewicz, Václav J. Klofáč, and František Vahalík, a native of Moravia.

By skillful maneuvering the student leaders evaded the attempt of the police to suppress the assembly. Not a single meeting, either of the national sections or of the central committee, was broken up by the police and certain features of the program, especially the banquet, were widely reported by the press. Časopis českého studentstva in its issue of May 30, 1891, carried a summary account by Hajn; it was considered advisable to reveal as few concrete facts as possible. Resolutions adopted by the central committee also got some publicity. A provincial newspaper containing a resolution condemning persecution of students in Galicia was confiscated, and the censor's step was approved by the District Court at Litoměřice.

Most of the points discussed in the national sections and approved by the central committee came from drafts prepared by the Czech, Polish, and Ukrainian delegates. Some moderate members of the congress felt that these three groups dominated the assembly and that the conclusions bore a distinct imprint of Polish and Ukrainian radicalism. From the Czech side it was readily admitted that, thanks principally to Dr. Ivan Franko, the Galician delegates of both nationalities had full command of both political and socio-economic problems, and that they excelled as well-trained and experienced debaters.

Two groups of problems claimed most of the time and attention: reorganization of Austria-Hungary and social and economic reform. The delegates were unanimous in formulating general articles, but in some specific matters vague phraseology was used to bridge over differences of opinion.

In order to regenerate the Dual Monarchy, the congress postulated equal rights for all nationalities, delimitation of national areas with full autonomy, and that their federal union be based on recognition of civil freedoms and on the guarantee of protection to national minorities. Almost all national groups secured concessions for their specific problems, such as the recognition of
historical rights, emphasized by the Czechs and Croats, restitution of the Polish national state, or the legitimacy of close contacts between the Ukrainians inside and outside the monarchy.

The Galician delegates were not fully successful in pressing their demands for social and economic reform. Apart from a reserved support from the Czech side, they received little applause or encouragement. No general principles were declared in the name of the congress. Seven articles enumerated such pressing needs as the abolition of custom duties on imported foods, or the establishment of provincial agencies for protection of emigrants against unscrupulous agents. In matters pertaining to social legislation, the congress recommended protective laws for labor, reduction of working hours, fixing of minimum wages, and similar measures.

In its editorial of May 23, 1891, the weekly Čas (Time), edited by Jan Herben (1857-1936) gave a positive evaluation of the congress and its recommendations.14 The author, one of Masaryk's close collaborators, spoke highly of the realistic approach chosen by the students, and of their serious preoccupation with problems touching upon the well-being and advancement, both moral and material, of all classes among Slavs, including the workers. He also underlined the sober appraisal of the position of the Slavic peoples in Austria-Hungary and the democratic orientation of the students.

Czech and other newspapers varied in their comment on the congress and the spirit of its resolutions. Sympathetic notices appeared in the socialist press which, at that time, had a small circulation. Some provincial newspapers in Moravia deprecation the exclusion of conservative groups. Similar objections appeared in Narodnie Noviny (National News), a Slovak newspaper at Turčianský Sväty Martin. The Old Czech Hlas národa (The People's Voice) agreed with the Slovak criticism. In another issue Hlas reprinted a dispatch from Novoe Vremya (New Time) of St. Petersburg, sent by its correspondent from Vienna. The Russian correspondent echoed some Viennese journalists, and

was probably also influenced by Russian students who, after the rift with other students, had returned to Vienna. The Polish weekly *Trybuna* rejected the idea of a federal union of national territories, and praised Croatian and Czech students for their adherence to historical rights. Some comment came from Germany. The *Kölnische Zeitung* was apparently more unfriendly then other German papers.\(^{15}\)

The Prague assembly adopted a motion that the next congress be held in 1892, and Vienna was mentioned as the ideal place since members of all Slavic groups were enrolled there at the university and other centers of higher learning. After the polemics and correspondence about the Prague resolutions had ended, the Czech students of Antonín Hajn's circle began to prepare the coming conference. Although some of them would have preferred Kraków or the Galician capital to Vienna, in the end the original idea prevailed and the date was set for Whitsuntide 1892.

During the academic year 1891-92 two trends could be observed among those student groups which, directly or indirectly, participated in the Prague assembly. Antonín Hajn and his friends worked deliberately for a closer alignment of the Czechs with Galician students of both nationalities. In the Czech orbit there was an evident increase in anticlerical tendencies, on the one hand, and a livelier interest in socio-economic problems, on the other. A book by J. W. Draper, *History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science*, appeared at that time in Ukrainian and Czech versions, the former prepared by Mykhaylo Pavlyk, the latter by S. Mokrý. In cooperation with *Politický klub český*, an organization of Czech workers, Antonín Hajn and his brother Alois published a Czech translation of Bolesław Limanowski's *Historja ruchu społecznego w XIX stoleciu* (A History of the Social Movement in the Nineteenth Century).

\(^{15}\) Antonín Hajn, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-6. See also *Čas*, 1891, Vol. V, p. 405. The methods adopted by the Prague police were criticized by Dr. Bedřich Pacák, a ranking Czech member of the Council of the Empire, at a session of the budget committee, on June 25, 1891. Excerpts from his speech are in *Stenographische Protokolle. Haus der Abgeordneten*, XI. session, p. 1195.
Antonín Hajn had a middle-class background, and in the early stage of his activities he warmly supported the program of historical rights. In 1891 he listened eagerly to his Galician friends who stressed the need for cooperation with the underprivileged masses both in cities and the countryside. Ivan Franko and his Galician followers impressed Hajn and some other Czechs. Late in June 1891 Antonín Hajn attended the congress of Austrian Social Democrats in Vienna and wrote for Časopis českého studentstva an analytical study on nationalism and internationalism among Czech workers.16

Antonín Hajn endorsed some points of the socialist program but he disliked its international character. His sympathies were with the national wing of Czech socialists whose point of view was rejected in Vienna. In his search for a compromise, Hajn antagonized the adherents of international socialism. He also had only limited influence on the moderates among graduate students, who resented any link with the socialist Left. Among some other Slavic groups the traditional line, middle-class and nationalistic, had even more ardent supporters than among the moderate Czechs, and their interest in the Prague resolutions melted away before they had received the invitation to appoint delegates to Vienna.

When the congress opened there on June 5, 1892, the attendance was far below the total reached in Prague. Only three groups were represented, the Czechs (14 members), the Poles (8) and the Ukrainians (5). On the following day the Slovenes joined their colleagues. Although the Ukrainian section was numerically weak, it scored a notable success when one of its members, Yevhen Levytsky (1870-1925), a law student at the University of Vienna, was elected the president of the congress. Three national sections were constituted immediately and they elected their officers. In the Polish section Stanisław Kozłowski (1860-1922) became the chairman, Jan Stapiński (1867-1946),

16 Ludwig Brügel, Geschichte d. österreichischen Sozialdemokratie, Vol. IV, Vienna 1923, has an informative account of the congress, which was attended by 193 delegates. Hajn apparently attended as an observer.
reporting secretary, and Stanisław Zabłocki secretary; in the Ukrainian section the officers were Osyp Brylynsky, Mykola Hankevych (1869-1931) and Vyacheslav Budzynovsky (born 1868); in the Czech section Antonín Hajn, Josef Škába (1870-1933) and Albert Dutka (1868-1920). A Czech student, František Žilka (1871-1943), who was matriculated in the School of Protestant Theology, and Břetislav Kalandra (1872-1930), a student of medicine, were responsible for local arrangements. The national chairmen also served as vice-presidents of the congress.

In the midst of the election, Dr. Josef Kaizl (1854-1901) entered the assembly hall. He came on behalf of the Club of Czech deputies to the Council of the Empire to convey greetings and best wishes to the students. Since the Social Democrats were holding their conference in Vienna at the same time, Hankevych moved that a message be sent to them. It was short but incisive, and ended: "May the proletariat soon score a glorious victory in its struggle against exploiting capitalism." 17

There was no time for the Slovenes to complete their preparations. Soon after the opening of the session on June 6, 1892, the police raided the premises of the Slavic Club where the students were gathered and dissolved the congress. The elected officers sent a protest to the Governor of Lower Austria. Knowing well that the police decree would not be promptly rescinded, they decided to hold private meetings in the afternoon. Stanisław Kozłowski presided at that clandestine session. The third day, June 8, 1892, was also devoted to conferences, with Kozłowski and Hajn alternately in the chair. From these discussions emerged a fairly detailed "Program of the Progressive Slavic Youth." 18

There is little evidence of Slovene participation in the debates. It can, therefore, be safely concluded that only the Czech,

17 Information concerning the proceedings comes, again, mostly from Antonín Hajn's notes, Výbor, I, pp. 289-298.

18 Antonín Hajn reprinted in Výbor, I, pp. 296-303, both the Czech preliminary draft, and the definitive text which came out of secret conferences. According to A.P. Veselý, Omladina... p. 73, the Program was circulated as a pamphlet and almost became the Gospel for the progressive youth."
Polish, and Ukrainian delegates were responsible for the Program of 1892, which was in many points more concrete and outspoken than the Prague resolutions of 1891. Instead of a mere coordination of student activities, the program of 1892 envisioned the founding of a political party which would disregard the existing boundaries and recruit members from all Slavic areas in Austria. The hope was expressed that a single party would be more successful in the struggles against the ruling groups than parties limited to one nationality. The concept of a federal union of all nationalities living under the Hapsburg rule was reiterated in words almost identical with the Prague resolutions. A notable step forward was made when the delegates endorsed the campaign for abolishment of the curiae system and postulated its replacement by universal, direct, and secret suffrage for all citizens above 21, irrespective of sex.19 The section pertaining to social and economic problems was prefaced by a preamble, distinctly reflecting the socialist orientation of the Galician groups.

Although the number of active delegates was comparatively small, agreement on some controversial points was not reached easily or spontaneously. The Ukrainian delegates opposed the right wing of the Czech section, which, headed by Karel Stanislav Sokol, pressed for recognition of the historic rights of the lands of the Bohemian Crown. When the preamble to socio-economic problems came up for discussion, Sokol voiced his disagreement and was seconded by some Czech delegates. Yevhen Levytsky was ready to recognize Časopis českého studentstva as the provisional organ of the envisioned party, but he recommended a radical change in both its external appearance and its editorial policy. His suggestions were not adopted. Instead, a compromise was passed recommending that the Ukrainians use Narod, edited by M. Pavlyk, as their mouthpiece, and that the Poles should found their own journal. Finally, it was agreed to hold the next meeting in 1893 in Kraków.

The Vienna congress received some publicity both during the

19 It was demanded also by the Ukrainian Radical Party. The Young Czechs had it in their platform for the election of 1891. See Čas, Vol. V, p. 115.
preparatory stage and immediately after its formal suppression by the police. Wide repercussions came at a somewhat later date due to an unexpected action against some Czech delegates. Five of them, including Alois Hajn, who were enrolled in the university and still under academic jurisdiction, were summoned on June 25, 1892, to appear before the rector of the Czech University in Prague and four were expelled from the school, the fifth being only reprimanded for passive participation. The stern measure was justified primarily by reference to the preamble which, according to the rector, echoed the Gotha program of the German Socialist Workers’ party.

The blow was not too heavy, since the students were free to transfer to other universities. In the fall of 1892 two of them went to Vienna and two to Graz. But the rector’s decree, endorsed by the academic senate (the leading historian, Jaroslav Goll, abstained from voting) created a painful impression among the Czechs and abroad. It was severely criticized not only by students but also by prominent journalists and political leaders. Speaking in the Council of the Empire on July 5, 1892, Dr. Karel Kramář (1860-1937) regretted that some faculties were being virtually turned into local branches of the police.20

III

No congress of Slavic students was held in 1893 to follow the Vienna conference of 1892. Failure to convene the fourth conference might be ascribed to various circumstances.

In the course of time changes took place in student organizations and the program of cooperation of Slavic nationalities in Austria lost many ardent supporters. One of its most enthusiastic champions, Antonín Hajn, completed in 1892 the prescribed course of

studies. Some of his colleagues also were awarded degrees and moved from the academic scene to practical occupations or to other positions in public life. Toward the end of 1892, a decision was made to discontinue Časopis českého studentstva. In its place Antonín Hajn launched a political weekly Neodvislost (Independence) but he soon found it difficult to publish it regularly. Simultaneously, Karel S. Sokol founded a bi-weekly, Nové Proudy (New Trends), opening it to former contributors to Časopis as well as to other young talents.21

The concept of a progressive party with members recruited from all Slavic areas of the monarchy, which was endorsed by the Vienna conference, was a step forward from vague schemes of an all-Slavic union, but the ground was not prepared for its realization. The difficulties which the leaders of the Social Democratic movement encountered when trying to bring together workers of several nationalities were symptomatic. Citizens who were enfranchized under the system of four curiae liked to vote for candidates of their own tongue. When the right to vote was extended to the underprivileged peasants and workers, the same tendencies manifested themselves, dislocating the supranational Social Democratic bloc which the pioneers had laboriously built. Most of the progressive youth was recruited from student ranks and solidarity among them was far less developed than among the proletariat.

The founding of the Ukrainian Radical Party was not directly connected with efforts to bring Slavic students into a closer union. It rather indicated an adverse trend and pointed to the future course of events. Instead of merging into a supranational progressive party, the movement gradually lost its common base, at least in politics. Its various components either continued to exist as miniature factions or amalgamated with larger political bodies.

Three trends were manifested in the areas represented at the youth congresses. One was the incentive to close the ranks of adherents of progressive principles and to play the role of the intellectual vanguard. Another possibility was membership in

21 A.P. Veselý, Omladina..., pp. 113-124, and 133-143.
the existing parties, but few students found such a decision compatible with their convictions. The third course—active participation in parties for either workers or peasants—proved to be the most viable. Many names known from the student congresses reappeared in the rolls of such parties, and later in the annals of either the parliaments or provincial diets.

The favor with which the Czech progressive youth viewed the rise of the Young Czech Party to primacy was not the factor determining their political orientation. The Young Czech leaders were anxious to keep together heterogeneous elements so that the party might retain its character of a national party, and act accordingly in negotiations with either the Crown or the cabinets. The election of 1891 pointed in that direction, but soon afterwards the Young Czech Party showed symptoms of internal crisis. The decision arrived at by T. G. Masaryk in the summer of 1893—to sever the ties with its leadership and to give up the seats both in the Vienna parliament and in the diet of Bohemia—foreshadowed more serious disharmonies and splits within the Young Czech ranks.

The progressive movement not only loosened its dependence on the Young Czech Party but quickly lost much of its original cohesiveness. The centrifugal forces increased notably in 1893 and 1894, under the impact of repressive actions by which the government wanted to break the backbone of the progressive movement. Street demonstrations in Prague on August 17, 1893, the eve of the Emperor's birthday, served as justification for rigid steps against the youth. Arrests and imprisonment of young men suspected of disloyalty failed to produce the desired effects. To get the situation under control, on September 13, 1893 the cabinet declared a state of siege in Prague and the surrounding districts. More arrests followed and preparations were made for a mass trial. It was maintained in the ruling circles that the police uncovered a widespread illegal organization known as Omladina (The Youth). On the basis of fragmentary and partly fabricated evidence, sixty-eight defendants were sentenced to terms varying from eight years to two weeks. Among them were
figures who had been prominent in the progressive movement from its infancy—Antonín Hajn, Alois Rašín, Karel S. Sokol, and Josef škába.22

The Omladina trial had repercussions on the Czech political scene. The progressive youth bitterly resented the opportunist attitude which the leaders of the Young Czech Party adopted when confronted with a dilemma: should they intervene energetically on behalf of the persecuted youth, or should they engage in evasive maneuvers which could disguise a lack of genuine interest in the fate of the victims of persecution? Some of the Young Czech deputies visited the prison in the Law Courts of the New Town of Prague, but more than individual manifestations of sympathy was expected from the strongest party, aspiring as it did to national leadership.

When the Young Czech vanguard opened the campaign against Rieger and his party, any ally was welcome. As soon as the goal had been reached, however, and the Old Czechs were driven out from the key positions, the Young Czech Party revised its tactics of abstaining from coalition supporting the Vienna government. In view of this, amalgamation of the progressive movement with the bulk of the party was regarded as undesirable, since it might mark the party as a receptacle for disloyal elements. At the party congress held at Nymburk in September 1894, a fairly clear line was drawn between the moderate majority and the progressive youth.

The tension which arose from this decision did not lead to a sharp break. The progressive movement was not compact enough to make possible a mass exodus as the first step toward creation of a new party. Its end was less spectacular and was caused by secessions of smaller groups, and by polemics and sectarian feuds.

The left wing of the movement was marked by a keen interest in social problems. It was split into three distinct groups. Progressive socialism, as championed by A. P. Veselý, appealed strongly to certain members of that wing, but it was found unsatisfactory

22 A.P. Veselý, op. cit., pp. 303-4, reprinted the full list: he himself was sentenced to seven months in prison.
by the more resolute minds, who were won over to Marxism. Moderate elements, on the other hand, while preaching the need for social reform, found progressive socialists too internationalistic. Harping on patriotic sentiment, Václav J. Klofáč, who had moved to prominence as the leader of national workers, made his political debut as a Young Czech. After he turned against these associates, he fought against them most often by the very methods he had acquired from them—flag-waving and flowery speeches. It was his original intention to keep the national workers as a subdivision of the Young Czech Party, but he found little enthusiasm for his scheme among the party leaders, who were primarily mindful of middle-class interests. In order to harass the Social Democrats more successfully, Klofáč severed his ties with the Young Czechs and founded, in 1899, a new party of National Socialists. In the parliamentary election of 1901 Klofáč and his co-workers contested several constituencies and secured four seats in Bohemia and two in Moravia. One of them, the industrial district of Kladno, went to Klofáč whose leading position in the party nobody dared to challenge.23

The most ardent adherents of the progressive program felt no urge to enlist the masses. Their individualism and intellectualism made success highly unlikely in campaigning among either industrial workers or the countryfolk. Their preference was a small selective party recruited from the educated class. Intensive study of political problems, local as well as general, made them sensitive to ideological differences. Lively debates or literary polemics brought about estrangement, which in turn led to a split that could not heal easily without friendly help from somebody whose authority would be generally recognized.

A heavy dose of inflammatory material was supplied by the government organs during the persecution. The drive which culminated in the arrests and the Omladina trial was not too carefully prepared, since the police did not get a true picture of the youth movement and in some cases were misled by external

23 For information concerning the rise of the party see Alois Hajn, Politické strany u nás, Pardubice, 1903, pp. 69-78.
appearances. Even friendship had its limits. How could anyone prevent an accumulation of bitterness among the prisoners in the penitentiary at Bory when they learned which of their intimate collaborators got out of the net in which they themselves had been caught?

While Antonín Hajn and other leading figures served their terms, their friends endeavored to repair the damage, and saved the movement from total ruin. Since Neodvislost had been suppressed during the trial, a new paper, Radikální Listy (The Radical Paper), was launched outside Prague. A group headed by Antonín Čížek steered it successfully through no small difficulties. When the prisoners were amnestied and returned from Bory, the paper became the rallying point of the progressive youth. Some of the released prisoners, however, found it too timid and advocated a more vigorous course in relation both to the Young Czech leadership and the Vienna government. Constantly increasing differences set in and reached a stage at which unity could no longer be maintained. In April 1897, Antonín Hajn, his brother Alois, and Antonín Čížek set up the Radical Progressive Party. The other faction, led by Karel S. Sokol, Alois Rašín, Josef Škába, and Albert Dutka, retained control of Radikální Listy and in 1899 was constituted as the Radical Party of the State Right. While the former stressed the need of social reform, the latter emphasized such political slogans as recognition of the historical rights of the Bohemian Crown.24

None of these miniature parties could expect a rapid increase of members. Their funds were meagre, precluding extensive campaigning or development of a party press. Their leading members were not too worried by poor chances of success in elections to either the provincial diet or to the Vienna parliament.

24 Ant. P. Veselý, Omladina..., pp. 386-430 described in detail the conflicts among the progressive youth. Alois Hajn, Politické strany u nás, has chapters both on his own group and its rival, pp. 30-50. He was, of course, not an impartial judge, and as his account was written only a few years after the rift, his chapter on the Radical Party of the State Right is mostly polemical. From a distance it is often difficult to see where the dividing line ran, and differences of temperament, even if not expressly referred to, have to be kept in mind.
Intellectual integrity and independence of political bargaining were valued more highly than wide response from among the masses.

The number of small parties increased at the threshold of the twentieth century. After seven years of concentration on literary work, T. G. Masaryk decided to re-enter the political arena. His relations with the Young Czechs, whom he had joined in 1890, had become in the meantime so strained that neither side gave thought to re-establishing friendly links. This was true also of Masaryk’s former collaborators, Dr. Josef Kaizl and Dr. Karel Kramář. Backed by the subscribers to Čas and to the monthly Naše doba (Our Epoch), T. G. Masaryk founded, in 1900, the Czech People’s Party, known as the Realists. The new party did not join, even for tactical purposes, the two Radical factions, but at a somewhat later date a regrouping took place. Alois Hajn with his followers parted from his brother and joined the Realists. Weakened by the secessions, the Radical Progressive Party sought a way to join the other group and a fusion was brought about in 1908. The name of the reunited party (státoprávně pokroková) indicated that the struggle for restitution of national independence came to be regarded as the main duty. In the years preceding the outbreak of the World War the Realists came closer to this reorganized party, giving up hope for a regeneration of the Hapsburg monarchy by a thorough constitutional reform, which T. G. Masaryk had up to 1908 held to be feasible.25

The electoral reform of 1907, introducing universal male suffrage in Austria, made the prospects somewhat brighter, but none of the miniature parties could win an election without assistance either from one of the big organizations or from non-party voters. In the election of May 1907 T. G. Masaryk was supported by the Social Democrats. At the same time Antonín Hajn won a seat in

25 The position of these two parties on the eve of the first World War was described by Jan Heidler in his succinct study of the Czech political system, České strany politické, Prague 1914, pp. 38-47. In the parliamentary election of 1911 the Progressive Party won two seats and the Realists one. These three deputies formed an independent parliamentary club with T.G. Masaryk as chairman, and Antonín Kalina as secretary.
parliament on a combined ticket of his own party and of the National Socialists. Karel S. Sokol came to the parliament in a by-election, which took place in 1909 after the death of the former deputy. Another pioneer of the progressive movement, Alois Rašín, saw the advantages of backing by a large party and in 1905 he joined the Young Czechs. As their candidate he was elected to parliament in 1911, this being the last election before the outbreak of the World War.²⁶

The course of modern Slovak life was determined by the establishment, in 1867, of the Dual system. Their national territory was included in the Hungarian half of the monarchy. The political and administrative center of Hungary was the twin city of Budapest, which from 1867 grew rapidly and began to compete with Vienna. Political cooperation of the Slovaks with the Czechs had been brought to a standstill, and even cultural contacts were curbed as incompatible with loyalty to the Crown of St. Stephen. A heavy dose of self-confidence and moral courage was needed to decide to cross the boundary between the Hungarian and the Austrian half of the monarchy. Enrollment at the University of Vienna was treated as a lesser sin than studies at Czech institutions, but it was not encouraged except in highly specialized fields for which there were no facilities in Hungary.

The Prague congress of 1891 had a fairly strong Slovak section although its members did not come from their homes for that purpose. Most of them studied in Prague. Others came from Austrian centers. The chairman was Pavel Blaho, a student of medicine at the university of Vienna. He and his two friends, Ján Smetanaj and Dušan Makovický, represented Slovak youth in the executive committee. Another prominent figure in the student club Detvan, Vávro Šrobár, was unable to attend, having been called to military service. The Slovak group was more conservative than the Czechs. After his return to Vienna, Pavel Blaho found it rather difficult to justify his acquiescence in

²⁶ For more details on this election see Zdeněk V. Tobolka, Politické dějiny čsl. národa, Prague, 1936, Vol. III, part 2, p. 452 ff.
resolutions approved by the congress.\textsuperscript{27} The fear that the conference in Vienna would again be dominated by Czechs, Poles, and Ukrainians with leanings toward socialism, was probably the main reason for the decision of Slovak students to abstain from it.

No cordial relationship sprang from the meetings and from correspondence between the representatives of the Czech progressive movement and the Slovaks. Little good could come to the Slovak people from the campaign for recognition of the historical rights of the Bohemian Crown. The Dual system seemed to be petrified and only a thorough reorganization of the monarchy would have undermined its supporting pillars.

Progressive Slovak students were attracted by T. G. Masaryk, who turned away from the historical line and stressed the ethnic kinship of the Czechs and Slovaks. Conditions in Hungary hindered attempts to set up political parties representing non-Magyar nationalities. Preaching that the kingdom was indivisible, the Magyar politicians required attachment to parties that were ostensibly supranational but, in fact, were monopolies of the Magyars.

In 1897 Dr. Pavel Blaho returned to his birthplace Skalica, on the Slovak-Moravian border, to practise medicine there. In cooperation with Vavro Šrobár, he founded the review \textit{Hlas} (Voice) in 1898 and developed it into a rallying point for enlightened Slovak patriots. Out of the group of students who in 1891 participated in the Prague congress, only Pavel Blaho scored a political victory prior to 1914. Since he was extremely popular in the Slovak districts near Moravia, in 1906 he won a contest with a Magyar candidate for the seat in the Budapest parliament. A quiet career was in store for Ján Smetanaj. Toward the end of the nineteenth century he stirred up polemics by some pamphlets in which he advocated a close cooperation with the Czechs. As he advanced in years he turned to less controversial topics and became a librarian in a Slovak town. Dušan Makovický chose medicine as his subject. In his student years he became

\textsuperscript{27} See his letter to Antonín Hajn, reprinted in \textit{Výbor}, I, p. 193.
acquainted with the teachings of L. N. Tolstoy, which were to be the determining influence in his life. After his graduation he stayed in Innsbruck for some time. From there he wrote to Antonín Hajn in June 1892, excusing his absence from the conference. When he was sufficiently experienced he returned to Slovakia and devoted himself to his practise and to social work among his underprivileged countrymen. His devotion to L. N. Tolstoy was, however, so strong and sincere that in 1904 he left Slovakia and settled at Yasnaya Polyana to serve there as the family physician.28

Pavel Blaho’s letter to Antonín Hajn was not an isolated expression of dissent against the distinct trend toward socialism, for which the Galician delegates were held mainly responsible. The absence of Croatian students and the improvised participation of the Slovenes at the Vienna conference were mostly due to the same reasons that motivated the Slovaks—a scant interest in, or even dislike of, socialism.

Both in Prague and in Vienna the Ukrainian delegates acted mostly in accordance with the program of the Radical Party, as formulated by Ivan Franko and Mykhaylo Pavlyk. Some of them sympathized with the Marxist concept of socialism, as might be gathered from the motion that a message of greetings be sent to the Social Democratic congress. Both its initiator and the chairman of the congress, Mykola Hankevych and Yevhen Levytsky, departed from the Radical Party and founded, in 1897, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Social Democratic Party as a branch of the labor movement which gained momentum in other parts of the monarchy.29 Although for some time in the forefront, Yevhen Levytsky was not indissolubly attached to Marxist tenets. The political regrouping, out of which came, in 1899, the Ukrainian National-Democratic Party, made a strong

impression on Levytsky and some of his friends. Levytsky shifted his loyalty to the new party and in 1907 he was elected as its deputy to the Vienna parliament, as was his friend V. Budzy­novsky.

Organized at an earlier date and held together more tightly than the Ukrainian Social Democrats, the Polish Social Democratic Party campaigned successfully in the election of 1897, along with the Austrian and Czech comrades. Altogether the Social Democrats won fifteen seats in the parliament. The chief spokesman of the Polish Marxists, Ignacy Daszyński, failed to convert the patriotically-minded groups. Daszyński’s dislike of Ernest Breiter and his low opinion of Breiter’s political acumen was apparently not shared by independent socialist voters. Breiter was sent to parliament in 1900 and enjoyed undiminished popularity in the Lviv constituency until the outbreak of the World War.30

One Polish group, which sought contacts with other Slavic peoples, actively supported Bolesław Wysłouch. To this group belonged Stefan Surżycki, who played an active role at the Prague congress of 1891, and Jan Stapiński who was sent from Lviv to the Vienna conference. Stapiński met Wysłouch when he came to the Galician capital to study law. He assisted him in editing Przyjaciel Ludu, but it took some time before they came to understand each other perfectly.31 The Polish group of students at the agricultural college at Dublany was informed of the Vienna conference and sent a message of greeting.32 Stefan Surżycki, who studied at Dublany, was probably responsible for this gesture. Having worked with Wysłouch in complete accord since 1893, Jan Stapiński campaigned in the rural areas to prepare the ground for establishment of a party which would be recruited mostly from among the peasants, although some progressive middle-class groups would not be excluded from membership. At the

30 Fritz Freund, Das österreichische Abgeordnetenhaus, 1911-1917, p. 433.
32 Antonin Hajn made a passing reference to this message in his account of the Vienna Conference, Výbor, I, p. 296.
congress at Rzeszów in 1895, Jan Stapiński was assigned a promi-
inent place among the founders of the Polish Peasant Party. In
1898, at a comparatively young age, Stapiński was elected
to parliament, and returned there again in 1907 after the passage
of universal suffrage.33

Of all national groups represented at the student congresses,
the Czechs showed the strongest leanings toward theoretical dis-
cussions not necessarily connected with practical aims. The
academic atmosphere which they found in Prague, affected
variably the students who came either form provincial towns
or from villages. A fairly large number of students stood aloof
from extra-curricular activities, either because of lack of interest
in current affairs, or fear of delaying their studies. The type of
"eternal student" living on a monthly allowance was also to be
encountered, though more frequently in beer-halls or dingy
cafés than in classrooms or laboratories. Not uncommon was the
other extreme, students who got along with minimum subsistence
and made full use of opportunities offered to them by the uni-
versity, public libraries, or private collections. Voracious readers,
tireless debaters, polyglots, débutants in literature or apprentices
to journalism belonged in this category. They helped to bring
about that intellectual effervescence for which the nineties came
to be regarded as the opening of the glorious chapter in Czech
national history.

A large number of graduates, indeed a majority, returned to
the provinces to earn a living in the professions, government or
municipal service, or in other appropriate occupations. Among
the Czech intellectuals there was no strong trend toward senti-
mental attachment to the countryfolk or glorification of the
peasantry as the sole guarantee of national existence. Some pro-
gressive students evidenced interest in agrarian problems,34 but

33 Wilhelm Feldmann, op. cit., II, pp. 61-66; Peter Brock, op. cit., p. 155; for
Stapiński's position in the Council of the Empire see Fritz Freund, op. cit., p. 494.
34 A.P. Veselý, Omladina, pp. 83-89, reprinted A. Rašín's letter to Antonín Hajn
suggesting that the progressive program be extended to include peasant reform.
No action followed and the progressive movement had only a very faint echo
among the countryfolk.
no systematic study of the countryside and of its needs was undertaken. Attempts to organize Czech peasants for political activities, independently of the Young Czechs, sprang from other sources. Only a handful of active adherents of the progressive movement followed Emanuel Hrubý when he left the Radical Party and joined the founder of the Agrarian Party.

Writing about differences between students of peasant origin and their colleagues with middle class-background, Stjepan Radič noticed a predilection for arts and literature among the latter, whereas to the former he ascribed an interest in political and economic problems. Simplified as it was, his analysis corresponded more truly to trends prevailing among Croatian students than among Czechs. In the course of their advanced studies, Stjepan Radič and his older brother Ante came under urban influences, and through contacts with members of various progressive groups they widened their circle of friends considerably. Ante Radič attended the Prague congress in 1891 and took an active part in its program. However, he failed to appear in Vienna. As there is no document to explain his abstention, it can only be surmised that he, too, like some Slovaks, resented over-emphasis on problems of the urban proletariat.

After his graduation, Ante Radič chose grammar-school teaching as his career, and pursued his studies of ethnography and folklore. When his more versatile brother Stjepan set out to organize the Croatian peasants, Ante supported him effectively. While Stjepan gave most of his time to matters of organization, Ante edited the magazine Dom (The Hearth). In its columns, he formulated the principles by which the Croatian Peasant Party was guided both in the initial stage of its work and in the later years of successful campaigning throughout the entire Croatian countryside. His early attempts to secure a seat in the Croatian Diet (sabor) were defeated, and only in 1910 did Ante Radič win the election in a predominantly agrarian constituency.

The balance sheet of the progressive movement is uneven,
containing both debits and credits. The movement owed its existence not to coordinated and maturely considered efforts, but to a spontaneous outburst of discontent of the sons with the fathers. Similar conditions in other Slavic areas of the monarchy gave birth to similar reactions. When these local movements outgrew their infancy, the possibility of connecting links and of mutual support was explored. The conferences at Kraków, Prague, and Vienna in 1890-1892 marked a departure from an exclusive preoccupation with problems pertaining to a single province or nationality, to cooperation with related groups. The idea of a single progressive party with members recruited from all Slavic districts of the monarchy, canvassed at the Vienna conference, figures among the major debits, since no practical steps were taken towards its realization; but its mere enunciation was a step forward from the existing system in which only parties of different nationalities had a chance of survival.

Although pioneered by men of twenty to thirty years of age, the progressive movement was marked by realism and a sense of proportion. The Slavic congresses of 1890-1892 were deliberately limited in scope and appeal. Men like Antonín Hajn, who were responsible for their organization, excluded the conservative groups to reduce futile debates and frictions. Russian students then living in Vienna were admitted to the Prague gathering, but after their exodus the congress, instead of being shattered, regained its original character as a meeting of Slavs from the Hapsburg monarchy only. In this respect the conferences of 1890-1892 followed the line set by the initiators of the Slavic congress held in Prague in 1848, although little attention was paid to historical precedents. In fact, the Prague gathering of 1848 was

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36 An effort has been made to supply biographical data in as many cases as possible. Anyone acquainted with biographical dictionaries and similar handbooks from Central Europe will immediately see the technical difficulties in such research. Some students who had come to the fore during the conferences soon retreated from the arena and their names cannot be traced. In many cases the date of death could not be ascertained. The war period, beginning in 1939, and its aftermath disrupted contacts and caused confusion in which many threads were lost.
mentioned only once, in a speech made by one of the senior guests, Vjekoslav Spinčič, at the banquet on Whitmonday, May 18, 1891.

There was no organic link between the striving for solidarity among the Slavic peoples, as organized by the progressive youth in 1890-1892, and the movement which came to be known as neoslavism. One of the leading representatives of neoslavism, Dr. Karel Kramář, was elected to the Vienna parliament in 1891, and in one of his speeches there he rejected the police methods used against the progressive youth.37 His intervention on behalf of Czech university students sprang from a desire on the part of Young Czech leaders to keep the progressive movement in alliance with the Young Czech Party. No direct links between the organizers of the congress of 1891 and Dr. Karel Kramář are apparent. He differed from the pioneers of the progressive movement on many points, and his concentration on the problems of the middle class precluded cordial contacts.

Neoslavism was in full bloom in 1908. At that time the former leaders of the progressive youth were fully occupied by political and cultural problems arising out of conditions prevailing in their respective provinces. Keen interest in general schemes by which the Dual monarchy could be rebuilt and regenerated vanished, and the needs of each ethnic group called for concentration on concrete tasks. In 1908 parliamentary debates, journalism, literature, and scholarship offered enough satisfaction to men like Ivan Franko, Yevhen Levytsky, Jan Stapiński, Stanisław Bądzyński, Václav Klofáč, Karel St. Sokol, Pavel Blaho, and Ante Radić. Student years and the search for wider contacts lingered in their memories. The internal crisis which rapidly weakened the position of the Hapsburg monarchy, and the mounting tension in international relations made heavy demands on their time and energy. Only such indefatigable workers as Dr. Antonín Hajn found time enough to keep alive the spirit of cooperation, and to save documents relating to the meetings of 1890-1892 from dispersal and destruction.

37 See footnote 20.
TIMUR'S CAMPAIGN OF 1395 IN THE UKRAINE AND NORTH CAUCASUS*

ZEKI VELIDI TOGAN

The data concerning Timur's first campaign against Toktamysh in 1391 was published and analyzed by Charmoy, a member of the Russian Imperial Academy of Sciences, in the first half of the last century. However, although information on Timur's second campaign in 1395 to the Dnieper area and North Caucasus was presented by Sharaf al-dîn Yazdî and Ibn 'Arabshâh and was known in the eighteenth century, and their texts were published, this data has never been analyzed. Their material is very important both for historical geography and for the political history of Eastern Europe. J. Klaproth, D'Ohsson and V. Minorsky, in their studies on the Caucasus, referred to this material, but researchers of the history and the ethnography of the Ukraine (M. Hrushevsky, A. Sobolevsky, P. Klepatsky) did not have the opportunity to use this information. Other sources concerning Timur's activities became accessible to scholars quite recently. In 1957, F. Tauer published the chronicles of Nizâm

* This paper was read at the plenary conference of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States on April 27, 1958, in New York City. Transliteration of geographic and proper names represent the author's system.


The Arabic text and the Latin translation of Ibn'Arabshâh were published by Samuel Henricus Manger as Ahmedis Arabiadae vitae et rerum gestarum Timuri, Leovardiae, 1767, 2 vols; the French translation by Petis de la Croix, Histoire de Temir Bek, appeared in London, 1936.

al-dīn Shāmī and Hāfiz Ābrū,⁴ and Jean Aubin published the history by Muīn al-dīn Natanzi.⁵ Tiesenhausen’s uncompleted translation of his excerpts from N. Shāmī and Hāfiz Ābrū into Russian was published in 1941.⁶

That the political importance of Timur’s second campaign was not limited to affairs of the Golden Horde only, but concerned all contemporary Eastern Europe, is evident from Timur’s letter sent in February 1395 from Shīrvān (a locality between Baku and Derbent) to the Osmanili Sultan Bājezīd I. I published this newly discovered letter in the last issue of the Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft.⁷ This letter is of special interest. It is preserved in the Süleymaniye Library in Istanbul; as far as I know, it is the only extant copy. In this letter Timur proposed to Bājezīd a joint conquest of the Dnieper area. Timur planned to march “from this side,” that is, from the side of the Caucasus. Bājezīd was to move “from the other side,” that is, from the Danube River and the Balkans. In the same letter Timur called himself “conqueror of non-Moslem countries of the East” (India and China) and characterized Bājezīd as such a conqueror in the West (the Balkans). Timur said that both conquerors should act jointly. He mentioned that the rule of Bājezīd’s governor, Timur-Qutluq, in the ulus Dzozi (Golden Horde) was threatened by Toktamysh, who revealed a treacherous attitude toward Islam and the latter, according to Timur, “while accepting military and perhaps financial aid, was engaged in secret political activity and spying (tadjas-sus).” Timur stated that Toktamysh, together with “unfaithful

⁵ Muīn al-dīn Natanzi, Mutakhab al-yavarikh, edit. by Jean Aubin, Teheran, 1957 (the Persian text only).
Franks,” was crossing the Uzi River (Dnieper) and sometimes was forced to seek concealment in forests of the Crimea and the Kafa (Black) Sea coast. By “unfaithful Franks” Timur meant the Lithuanians and Poles from the Dnieper area and perhaps also the Genoese from Azov and Kafa, because the Sea of Azov, at that time, was also known as the “Sea of Franks.”

It is well known that in the years 1390-1394 Toktamysh’s friends, the three Lithuanian Princes Jagiello, Vytovt (Vytautas, Witold), and Skyrgaylo took possession of Starodub, Kremenets, Kiev, and Zhytomyr. Muscovy did not oppose these developments and did not support Volodymyr Olgerdovych, the ruler of Kiev. Timur evidently was aware of these changes in the power situation. He understood that the position of his feudal administrators (Timur-Qutluq and Edige) would be imperiled if the Dnieper lands (which were under the control of Prince Bekyariq, one of the commanders-in-chief of Toktamysh’s Army) and the Crimea were to become supporting points for the latter. Timur probably knew about the intentions of the chieftains of the Dnieper “Franks” (the Poles and Lithuanians)—Jagiello and Vytovt. It is known that within two years after Timur’s retreat Vytovt came out with his plans to occupy the Western part of the Golden Horde under the pretext that he was an ally of Toktamysh. In 1397 Vytovt advanced to the Don River; in 1398 he built the Zamek śv. Joana in the vicinity of the Perekop isthmus. Only in 1399 was he defeated and stopped for some time at the Vorskla River by Timur-Qutluq and Edige.

In his letter Timur warned Bājezīd that the Toktamysh-Frank alliance would be eventful also for the Osmanlis. It is known that Jagiello succeeded in obtaining from Pope Boniface IX the bull of the crusade dated May 4, 1399 against the unfaithful, that is against the Moslems. And Toktamysh was an ally of the Franks! The crusade, as is known, was aimed against Bājezīd and Edige.

Bājezīd, however, was not as farsighted as Timur. One of his greatest enemies, Stephen I, the Hospodar of Moldavia, wrote

8 For the sources see B. Spuler, Goldene Horde, p. 137, and M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 315.
to Jagiello on January 6, 1395 (about the time when Timur wrote his letter to Bâjezîd from Shîrvân) that he would mobilize all the forces possible and fight the enemies of Poland, including the Turks and Tatars. By “Turks,” he meant the Osmanlis headed by Bâjezîd, and by “Tatars,” the forces of Edige and Timur-Qutluq.

Bâjezîd evidently was not sufficiently informed about the plans of these Eastern European “Franks”; he did not follow Timur’s advice and did not accept his proposal for a joint operation in the Dnieper area. Three years later, however, in 1398, Bâjezîd’s army had to fight against Toktamysh and it is quite possible that this battle took place at the Danube or in Moldavia.

Meanwhile Timur had defeated Toktamysh on April 14, 1395 at the Kuri River to the north of the Terek River. Of some concern to Timur were his administrators, Edige and Timur-Qutluq, who, as the rulers of the Özbeks (Uzbeks) on the “left flank,” maintained a neutral policy during Timur’s campaign against Toktamysh, although they had proclaimed a policy of “neutral solidarity with Timur.” After the campaign was completed, they asked Timur to forgive their action.

Although after Toktamysh’s defeat at the Terek a great part of his forces remained in the North Caucasus, Timur decided to leave those troops behind and proceed with his main forces toward the town of Ükek, near present Saratov. Timur chased Toktamysh, who was compelled to flee to the north of the town of Bulgar on the Volga. Then Timur turned toward the Dnieper where Toktamysh’s army, under the command of Prince Bekyariq Oglan, was deployed. This Prince’s domain bordered on Kiev. Timur’s army was reinforced near the locality of Yuqluq-Buzugluq (situated somewhere on the Don River, possibly below Voronezh) by those troops which he had left in the Terek area under the command of Emir Seyfeddîn. Then Timur’s army proceeded toward Minkermen, that is Kiev, at the Uzi River

9 Avrel Decei in Z. V. Togan’s Armagan, Istanbul, 1956, p. 81; B. Spuler, op. cit., p. 139.
(Dnieper). Here he defeated Toktamysh’s main forces which were under the command of Bekyariq Oglan.

Toktamysh’s forces in the Dnieper area were composed of two groups. One group was under the command of the above-mentioned Bekyariq; the other was under the command of Prince Tashtimur Oglan, the famous ancestor of the Crimean khans, and of Aqtav, who was the chieftain of the “Aq Tatar” (White Tatar) tribes. This second group had been deployed below Kiev. After Bekyariq was defeated this group retreated in the direction of the horde (ulus) of Hurmuday, perhaps in Zaporizhzhya; Hurmuday was evidently a Tatar petty prince who was hostile toward the above Tashtimur and Aqtav. After an armed skirmish the latter were compelled to retreat and went to the Rûm country (Byzantine Empire). They remained for some time in the Asry-Yaqa (“the lower coast”), that is, the European shore of the Straits. Later they moved to Bājezîd. Aqtav’s Tatars are mentioned in the sources on the history of the Osmanlis as comprising more than 100,000 people (tents or souls) who lived near Adrianopol.11

Having defeated Bekyariq at the Dnieper, Timur divided his forces into two groups. The main group was under the command of Timur himself, of Emir Seyfeddin Nukuz, and of Timur’s grandson, Sultân Mohammed Mirzâ. This group received orders to chase and annihilate Bekyariq’s forces in the area of the upper Dnieper, at the Don, and in the Muscovy Principality. The second group was under the command of Timur’s son, Mîrânsâh Mirzâ, who was the governor of Azerbaijan, and of Emir Djahânshâh Bahâdir. This group had to operate within “the right flank of the Özbeks,” that is, on the lower Dnieper, in Zaporizhzhya, in the Crimea and near the Black and Azov seas, where, according to the plan, both groups were to meet after completing their operations in Muscovy and along the lower Dnieper.

Bekyariq retreated in the direction of Muscovy, toward the upper Don, where Timur, in hot pursuit, defeated him. Bekyariq

11 For “Aqtav Tatars” see Aurel Decei in Z. V. Togan’s Armagan; for the figure “100,000” see Taayyib Gökbilgin, Rumeli‘de Yürüklер, Tatarlar ve Evlad-i fatihan, Istanbul, 1957, pp. 17, 88, 90, 97.
and his son fled, the rest of his family being captured. Timur behaved chivalrously: he gave generous gifts to Bekyariq’s wives and children, honored them highly, and “having secured their inviolability, sent them in the direction where the Prince had fled.” The units of Timur’s army plundered Qara-su (Black Water) and a town in Rus’ (most likely Chernigov). Historians who describe Timur’s campaign state that he and his grandson Mohammed Sultân plundered provinces in Rus’, “having turned everything there upside down,” (in the words of the Koran, “‘āliyahā sāfilahā”). Then, historians say, Timur destroyed “all the lands of the ruler who was known by a name derived from the name of the land called Qabuči (or Qaburči) Qaravul.” Then the Körbuga, Kürlen, Bürkit, and Keleči tribes fell victim to Mohammed Sultân Mîrzâ. The names of the latter three tribes were known to have been applied to the Özbek tribes, even after the Özbeks migrated from the area of the present Kazakh steppe to Transoxania (Mâverā’ uhnahr).

The Hustynsky Chronicle while describing the events of 1362 mentioned Kutlubukha, Karbey, and Dmitra as the chieftains of Tatar hordes in the Kiev area. Körbuga and Qütlubugha are well-known Turkic-Mongolic names. The above-cited territory, Qabuči Qaravul was mentioned by the historian Hâfiz Ābrū, as “provinces of the man who is known under the name Qabuči Qaravul,” and by Sharaf-al-dīn Yazdī as “all the peoples subject to a certain man who became famous under the name of Qabuči Qaravul.” Evidently, this was a Tatar nickname for a person who had another, perhaps a foreign name, and who ruled over certain “provinces” (vilâyät) or “peoples” (aqvām). It is also possible that this nickname was applied in chronicles to a certain non-Tatar administrator.

Interestingly enough, the names of the Özbek and Tatar tribes were applied directly and without any comment to the tribes which lived in the upper Dnieper area and in the North Caucasus. The only comment made was about the name Qabuči (also Qubuči or Qubun) Qaravul which, if spelled “qabuči” means “doorkeeper, guard,” and if spelled “qabunči” means “melon planter”; it was stated that “he became famous under
this nickname.” A Tatar chieftain having the title “Qaravul” was encountered in the lower Dnieper area at that time.\textsuperscript{12}

During Timur’s campaign, Vyтовt went far to the North. In the autumn he spread a rumor that he was going to fight Timur, and returned to Smolensk.

The second group of Timur’s army, which was under the command of many generals subordinated to Prince Mîrânshâh and which went “to the right,” evidently in the direction of Zapôrizhzhya, was said to have subjugated and plundered many lands of the “right flank” area which were under the rule of Bek-Khodja. Saray, Urus, and Urusçuq are specially mentioned as lands of the peoples belonging to the “right flank” area. Saray was a known Özbek tribe mentioned in sources on the history of the Özbeks. However, it is not clear what peoples are meant by the term Urus and Urusçuq. Čuq is a suffix which forms diminutives. The word Urusçuq means “Little Russians” in Turkic. Petits de la Croix offered the same meaning for this word.\textsuperscript{13} It seems to me that some Russians living outside of Muscovy, (perhaps in Halych-Volynia Rus’)\textsuperscript{14} as well as some Ukrainians were among the peoples who populated the “right flank” of the Golden Horde. The text does not reveal whether these peoples had been under the rule of Bek-Khodja, but they are mentioned just after the name of this Emir as belonging to the “right flank.” The same group of Timur subjugated and plundered the Crimea and the Azov coastal region.

It is said that Timur himself, having finished his operations in the areas of the upper Dnieper and upper Don, took a gidjirči, i.e., military guide, and made his way to Balčimgen.\textsuperscript{15} I suppose that this locality was in the North Caucasus, perhaps near Beshtau.

\textsuperscript{12} For “Qaravul” in the lower Dnieper area, see M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 316.

\textsuperscript{13} Petits de la Croix, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 363 (“Roayume de Moscovie et selui de Orusdgic ou petite Russie.”).


\textsuperscript{15} For Balčimgen-Bestav see Z. V. Togan, “Timur’s Osteuropapolitik,” loc. cit., p. 359.
(Pyatigorsk), the site of Timur's camp in the early winter. En route to the Caucasus, near Azov, Timur was joined by the group of his army under the command of Mîrânshâh. On September 14, Timur took possession of the town of Azaq (Tana). He annihilated all the Genoese inhabitants of this town and liberated the Moslems who had languished under their rule. Evidently Timur left Muscovy early in September.

Last year the French orientalist Jean Aubin published in Tehran the book on Timur by Mu'in al-dîn Natanzî. According to Natanzî, the cause for Timur's early retreat to the south was perhaps the oncoming of an early winter. He wrote that Timur "in order to subjugate all the Özbek uluses had to cross the lands of Rus' and of the Khazars [perhaps the Crimea is meant here] and turned everything upside down in these countries." When the winter came he found suitable winter quarters. Hāfiz Ābrû, who participated in Timur's campaign, asserted that the winter was so severe that Timur's soldiers could march over the ice toward the fishing island of Baliqči on the Caspian Sea, when they wanted to capture these islands.

Fearing an early winter, Timur did not take possession of Moscow and did not begin his campaign against the "Franks," that is, against the Lithuanians and the Poles. He could have done this if the Osmanli sultan had joined him. Timur crushed Toktamysh's forces, plundered towns in the Dnieper area and in Muscovy and turned back before snow and frost could hinder him. In so acting, he escaped a fate which later befell Napoleon and Hitler.

Having captured Azov and Kafa, Timur proceeded to the Kuban valley. He marched eight days across the land of the Cherkessians (Circassians) and, in the vicinity of Beshtau (Pyatigorsk), he established his headquarters for the operations in the Caucasus. Emir Seyfeddin Nukuz who had been Timur's main Tuvači (a rank akin to chief of the general staff) was appointed commander of the headquarters.

Historians of Timur, especially Hāfiz Ābrû, compiled detailed descriptions of Timur's operations in the North Caucasus (these writings include voluminous and very interesting ethnographic
and geographic information). According to these descriptions, Timur started his operations in the western part of the North Caucasus, then moved to the center of the country and finally to the eastern part. At first he sent his son, Miranshāh, his grandson, Sultān Mohammed Mirzā and Emir Djahānshāh Bahādir to conquer the lands of the Cherkessians, the Ās (Ossets), and the Urus at the Kuban River. Ḥāfiz Ābrū states that the force marched up to "the sea of the Ferendj (Franks), also called the Azaq (Azov) Sea. Later Timur himself followed with strong forces.\(^{16}\)

Ḥāfiz Ābrū refers to the clans (il) of Böri and Berdibek in the region between the sea and Elbruz, which were evidently Turkic, and which were subjugated by Timur. According to Nizāmeddīn Shāmi, Timur captured the chieftain Buragan in the wooded country of Elbruz. Shārat al-dīn Jozdī says that Buragan was the chieftain of the Ās (Ossets). Besides the Ās, mention is also made of the Rūs, who were "fond of power," and whose "heads were cut off by warriors of Chaghatai." Without doubt, some Russian troops were in the army of Toktamysh in the battle at the Terek, as Ibn 'Arabshāh asserts. But his text was in rhyming prose and the words "rū’ūs" (heads) and "Rūs" (Russians) were not understood by editors and translators. The text actually says: "the foreheads of Djibah [perhaps the name of a tribe] and the heads of the Rūs fell off on the altar of war," i.e., they were killed. Samuel H. Manger (1767) translated this phrase as Seque de-miserunt frontes frontium (primorum) et capita eorum, qui ipsi capita erant, in campo praelii, velut in oratorio sacro ad adorandum,\(^{17}\) which in the new English edition turned out to be, "and the brows of the leaders drooped and the heads of the heads bent in the devotion of war and fell forward." (!)\(^{18}\) Nothing is said about the Rus'. However, Ḥāfiz Ābrū used the same expression for the Russians saying "the heads of the Russians" ("rū’ūs"

\(^{16}\) Muīn al-dīn Natzanī, op. cit., p. 365: "Bilād-i Rūs u Khazār ke dar mamarr vāqi' būd āliyahā sāfiluhā kardaand"; p. 366: "Ba'd az ānke zimistān-i an sāl ham dar ān navahī (āmad) bağahat-i qişlāq yūrt-i munāsib bar ān dīde and."


\(^{18}\) Ibn 'Arabshāh-Sanders, op. cit., p. 81.
TIMUR'S CAMPAIGN

and "Rūsān"). Outside of Muscovy, the Russians under the authority of Toktamys were observed at the Terek, in the Kuban valley together with the Ossets, and in the lower Dnieper area together with the Ukrainians. In any case the characteristics given by Häfiz Ābru, one of the official historians of Timur (they were "fond of power," or "liked to be chiefs" [riyāset-djūi]) are rather striking for that time. The participation of the Russians in Toktamys's army was apparently caused by more than compulsory mobilization. These people were remnants of the ancient Rus' people at Taman'. Timur's historians, as well as writers of the Ṣedjukid epoch, applied the name Saqsīn to the non-Moslem peoples of the Kuban area. The Saqsīn (another name of the Suvar branch of the Volga Bulgars) were probably connected with the Balkars in this area. However, the question of the Saqsīn in the northwest Caucasus is not quite clear to me.

After the conclusion of operations in the northwest Caucasus, Timur's armies gathered again near Beshtau (Pyatigorsk) and here feasted lavishly in celebration of all their victories of the previous six or seven months beginning with the battle at the Terek. Then Timur began his campaign against the Özbek Emir Kūle and Taus in the Elburz area, in the land of the Irkuum people. On the way, Timur rested for a few days in Blqan, possibly the land of the Balqars. Then he attacked the horde (ulus) of the Djozid Prince Bek-Pūład-Oglan who had his castle, the "Castle of Pūład" in Blqan. Here, Emir Ütürkü, one of the highest commanders of Toktamys's army at the

19 Felix Tauer, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 120.
20 Saqsīn, on the Kuban River, is mentioned in the report concerning the expedition of the Ṣeldjuk Emir Hisam al-dīn Chuban. Cf. Ibn Bibī, Al-Awāmīr al-ʿalāʾīey, mss. of the Ayasofya Library in Instanbul, No. 2985, f. 442-4.
22 Nizām al-dīn Shāmī, op. cit., p. 163 (cf. footnote 4): Balqan, with N apparently for Arabic R.
23 Prince Bek-Pūład-Oglan and Tashtemir (the great-grandfather of the Crimean khans) were already ruling the Crimea in 1390. Cf. the sources given by M. Hruševsky, op. cit., Vol. IV, pp. 305-306.
time of the battle at the Terek, found refuge. The castle was in the area lying to the west of Elbruz and including Abase (Abkhazia). Some fortified islands in the "Idil (?) area" are likewise mentioned by Hāfiz Ābrū; all other sources, however, always apply the form Adil and not Idil to the Volga River. The fortress of Qapçigay was unsuccessfully defended by Ütürkü.

When these operations were concluded, Timur’s armies again gathered in the vicinity of Beshtau. The Djozid Prince, Mohammed Oglan, a son of Gayer Khan (this author could not find any references to this name in other sources) arrived with his ulus in the Simsim area and subordinated himself to Timur. The country of the Avar people was also subjugated. After the population of Beshkent (evidently the town Basken of the Dargen people in North Daghestan) had been subjugated in a peaceful manner, Timur destroyed and subjugated the Chavdar Qazaq tribe (il). This tribe, which evidently professed Christianity, was known to have a store of honey. It may be assumed that the tribe stayed in the vicinity of the Avars, along the right tributaries of the Terek River. Then Timur established his winter quarters in the sands of Bogaz-Qum, evidently in the Nogai steppe. From here, he undertook some small-scale campaigns, as for example against the ulus of Mamuqtu. This name suggests a Mongolian origin of the horde; this author does not have more information about this tribe. Timur also struck against the tribes of Gazi-Qumuq and Baliqchi, fishermen living on small islands in the Caspian Sea, and sent his detachments to plunder Saray, the capital of the Golden Horde. Timur visited Astrakhan personally and was received hospitably there by the Governor Muhammadi.

In the spring, after settling affairs with the Gazi-Qumuq, Timur captured Askuche (evidently the town Askussa of the Dargens in north Dagestan) and conquered the Qaytaq tribe. Then Timur crossed the Terek and with all his forces proceeded via Derbent and Shīrvān to the shores of the lower Kura River. There, in April 1396, he was honored by the Shīrvānshāh Sheih Ibrāhīm with a lavish feast.

Timur treated the subjugated non-Moslem peoples of the
North Caucasus very severely and tried to convert them to Islam; toward tribes which had converted, he manifested kindness.

Quite possibly, the fate of the north Black Sea coastal area (including the lower Danube, Dniester, and Bug) would have been quite different in the course of the next centuries had Sultân Bâjezïd accepted in 1395 Timur’s proposal of joint action against the Franks, that is, against the Lithuanians and Poles. This did not happen and the Tatar tribes closely connected with Toktamysh and his relatives fell victim to persecution by Timur-Qutluq and Edige, who continued Timur’s policy. These tribes found refuge in the neighboring Christian countries. Gradually they forgot their language, as was the case with the Lithuanian Tatars, or lost their language and religion—the case of the Tatars in Moldavia, named Qara Bugdan and described by Ibn ‘Arab-shâh as a tribe of many people. The Osmanli historian Seyyid Mustafâ al-Hüseynî added that the remnants of Toktamysh’s army who settled in Lakh (Valachia) were converted to Christianity.24 (It is possible that the ancestors of Dimitri Kandemir belonged to this group). Also the ulus of Hurmuday was no longer called by its own name. One of three Tatar hordes in the upper Dnieper area referred to in the Hustynsky Chronicle in 1362 had the name Dmitra, evidently having been converted to Christianity.25

Historians write only about large political and military groups, but quite possibly small groups of the Tatars and separate families, which in the time of unrest and internal disorders went into hiding among the Christians in Zaporizhzhya, Moldavia, and Lithuania, were also quite significant.

Finally, that the Lithuanians and the Russians had sustained hostile feelings towards Edige among the exiled sons of Toktamysh should be noted; the Lithuanians and the Russians supported the exiled sons during the latters’ attacks against Edige and the sons of Timur-Qutluq. Djalâleddîn (Sultân Zeledin of

25 P. Klepatsky, op. cit., p. 23.
Długosz) “a sincere friend and vassal of Vytovt” came from Moscow accompanied by Tatar detachments subject to Vytovt, as well as by Russian detachments, and took Saray in 1411. Edige went to Herât personally to request Shährukh, the son and successor of Timur, to continue the policy of the latter. After eight years, in 1419, Sultan Qâdï-berdi (called Jeremferden by Długosz), another son of Toktamysh, according to Karamzin “the most true ally of Vytovt,” came to Saray and killed Edige in the battle at the river Yaik (Ural) near Sarayčiq. The contemporary Praise to Vytovt states that this vassal of the Dnieper Franks, who was called “a young saldan,” (i.e., sultân) was appointed by Vytovt and served him so zealously that he “went every-

26 M. Hrushevsky (op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 317) refers to the sons of Toktamysh as kliyenty, postavlennyky, and vassals of Vytovt. With regard to Prince Betsubul, his name should probably be read “Bek Sufu Og’an”; cf. the form “Bexubowitz” on p. 490 of op. cit. Dlugosz wrote that Betsubul was crowned by Vytovt in Kiev (according to Karamzin in Vilno). Betsubul was killed in Saray by Kerimberdi, another son of Toktamysh, who was also “a friend of Vytovt.”

27 Ibn ‘Arabshâ’s account, “The full moon of the rule of Prince Djajal al-dîn from the orient of the dynasty of Toktamysh rose from the countries of Russia” was not understood by S. H. Manger (Ibn ‘Arabshâh-Manger, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 421) and translated as follows: “cumque in plenilumio esset felicitas imperii Gelali, ecce, ab Oriente orta suit resplendescens stirps Toctamischi, ac summum culmen tenuit a regione Russorum opposita.” The English translation of this passage by J. H. Sanders (Ibn ‘Arabshâh-Sanders, op. cit., p. 87) is as follows, “when the prosperity of the rule of Jalal was in full brilliance, behold, from the East rose resplendent the offspring of Toktamysh and gained height in the country of Rus on the opposite side.”


29 See Praise to Vytovt, quoted by M. Hrushevsky, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 317. The Russian surname Malyi saldan corresponds to Qadirberdi yash sultan (young Sultan) in the epos devoted to Edige (M. Osmanov, Nogaiskaya khrestomatiya, St. Petersburg, 1883, p. 45).

The Arabs often apply names Djayhân and Sayhân to two parallel rivers flowing to the sea. Therefore Ibn ‘Arabshâ applied the name Sayhân to the Yaik River, where Edige was killed, near Saračiq. S. Manger (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 421) did not understand this text and gave the following monstrous translation: “donec obit Aidecou submersus, vulneribus confectus, quem ex fluvio Jaxarte in continentem Choukae extractum, projecerunt tanquam abjectissimum.” Subsequently Sanders (op. cit., p. 87) gave the following translation of this text: “the river Jaxartes onto the dry land of Huq.” Out of the name “Sarayčiq” first they made
where he was told to."³⁰ Edige, like Timur, was an embodiment of the widespread feelings of the Turko-Mongolian population of three uluses (uluses Džoči, Chagaday and that of the Ilkhâns in Iran) at the time of the turmoil of the Tschingisids after the middle of the fourteenth century. Some of the members of the dynasty sided with the foreigners (the Iranians, the Osssets, and the Russians) and thus lost their influence over their own people. In the great epos of the late Golden Horde, with Toktamysh, Edige and their sons as the central figures (according to Häfiz Äbrû, the epic devoted to Edige was already in existence during his lifetime),³¹ the idea prevails that it is better when dignified men, offspring of the common people, rule the state, rather than degenerate members of the Tchingisid dynasty; the latter might be utilized as a symbol of the unity of the empire only. The accusation of Toktamysh by Timur in a letter, to the effect that Toktamysh "takes aid from unfaithful foreigners and is engaged in secret political activities with them" is in harmony with the spirit of the epos of the Golden Horde: there are songs of a woman, the mother of Edige's grandsons Uraq and Mamay, who poetically describes the intrigues by foreigners among the statesmen of the Golden Horde.³²

³¹ Häfiz Äbrû states in his treatises concerning history and historical sources that such epics as those concerning Edige and other heroes of the fourteenth century cannot serve as sources for scholarly research: Ibn 'Arabshâh (cf. Ibn 'Arabshâh-Manger, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 420) wrote about the "curious stories and interesting epic and anecdotes about Edige."
³² I quoted and translated this passage from the epic, Uraq-Mamay, in my study, Bugünkü Türkistan ve yakin tarihî, Istanbul, 1942, pp. 139-140.
THE FIGURE OF MICKIEWICZ IN IVAN FRANKO'S LIFE

ALFRED BERLSTEIN

Franko was not only a great Ukrainian figure; he was also one of the great Slavic personalities and one of the most outstanding Europeans. There are unfortunately but few works on Franko's life, none of them complete. His general European and local (Austrian, Ukrainian, Polish) background has been scrutinized but superficially. The numerous specimens of Frankiana published in the Soviet Union and other Slavic countries in recent years are, with some notable exceptions, biased and one-sided. Franko, a very complex figure, belongs to the great panorama of Central Europe and, in a much lesser degree, to Eastern Europe. To reach the core of his personality, a complete penetration from the standpoint of cultural history and psychology methods is indispensable. Among the numerous phenomena to be examined some of the more significant should be mentioned: European thought in the 1850's in the field of sociology, philosophy and the natural sciences; early Socialist movements and Marxism; realism, positivism and naturalism in literature (Balzac, Flaubert, and Zola); the political climate of Austria-Hungary (centralism and federalism, nationalities problems, tolerance and scepticism) and Pan-Slavism; his Polish background—the fight for national independence, national ideology, heroism and positivism, messianism; the Russian climate with its political and cultural contradictions.

Mickiewicz played a vital role in Franko's life. However, to get to the root of the enigma of what might be called the Franko-Mickiewicz complex, the relations between Franko and Polish culture and Polish society must be outlined. These relations had at one time become a very emotional and "political" subject, about which public opinion of both the Ukrainians and, to a larger extent, the Poles ran high, even indulging in name calling. Today, though not all relevant facts are known, it is time to
stop referring to Franko as a Ukrainian chauvinist and enemy of the Polish nation.

Among representatives of Ukrainian literature and scholarship there is probably no one who knew Polish society and culture better than Ivan Franko. He grew up in a region where Ukrainians, Poles and Jews lived close to each other for centuries; until the second half of the nineteenth century they were good neighbors most of the time. Franko, who graduated from a Polish grammar school in Drohobych and a Polish university in Lviv, used the Polish language as he did his mother tongue; he wrote fiction and poetry in Polish; some of his scholarly publications, his literary criticisms, and many of his newspaper articles are written in Polish. In addition to this, he first became familiar with European civilization and contemporary social and economic problems through the medium of Polish literature and science and through Polish translations. Before World War II the Os­solinski Institute in Lviv had in its collection a Socialist catechism written in Polish by Franko. In the seventies and eighties of the nineteenth century he dedicated himself to the unity of the Socialist movement in Galicia and to concord between the Ukrainians, Poles and Jews; he also did educational work in Lviv among workers of all three nationalities.

Franko's conflicts with the Poles started in the late seventies when he became active in the work of the national awakening of his countrymen. His contacts with Drahomanov caused him to be suspected of being a Socialist. At that time this was a synonym for a conspirator and a criminal, especially for the ignorant Polish officials in Galicia. Without any reason he was jailed in 1877, 1880 and 1889, always for several weeks or months. This political persecution was senseless and humiliating. It was followed by the refusal of the Polish authorities in Galicia to grant him a job as a Gymnasium teacher and, later, to appoint him an assistant professor of Ukrainian literature in Lviv, despite Franko's outstanding qualifications and the unanimous approval of the faculty. There is no doubt that he was wronged by the Polish ruling circles; their attitude created bitterness and hatred in his soul. Being deprived of the possibility of a professional and schol-
arly career, he had to hire himself out—as he called it—to strangers in order to make a living. For ten years he was a member of the editorial board and a columnist of the Polish daily *Kurier Lwowski*. He was attacked by some Ukrainian groups and accused of something like national treason because of his activities as a Polish journalist. In this complicated situation Franko developed a deep feeling of guilt and of resentment against the whole Polish society and against the Polish nation, which he saw personified in the person of Mickiewicz. He tried to compensate for this intolerable situation by more participation in politics, by running for public offices, including the 1897 election for the Austrian parliament.

To understand more fully what Mickiewicz meant to Franko, some general statements on Mickiewicz’s influence on Ukrainian literature have to be made. They are based mainly on the excellent study by Dmitry Čiževsky on this subject. Hardly any of the Slavic poets were as well known, as much read and as much honored in the Ukraine as Mickiewicz. On the other hand, the number of Mickiewicz translations into Ukrainian is insignificant and not done by major poets. There are only a few echoes of his poetry in Ukrainian and his influence on Ukrainian literature is very small. Some reasons for this phenomenon are: the already prevalent knowledge of Mickiewicz’s work in the original Polish, due to familiarity with this language in a large part of Ukrainian territory; also the fact that the birth of Ukrainian literature at the end of the eighteenth century had been a reaction against Russian literature, so that Ukrainian poets looked for inspiration in other Slavic literatures, primarily in the Polish language. Mickiewicz was the poet who could appeal most to Ukrainian romantics and was closer to them than Pushkin, but the majority of them read Mickiewicz in the original Polish. The more intimate knowledge there is of a work in the original language, the more difficult to produce an adequate translation. But the influence of Mickiewicz on the Ukrainian national ideology was unique, clear

and considerable. Another important factor for the subject of this paper is the unique esteem in which Mickiewicz was held in partitioned Poland from the time of his death to the end of the last century. In his work, Mickiewicz embodied the soul of his people. He expressed all its affirmations and contradictions. Somebody called him Poland's Dante and Homer at the same time. A veritable myth was created around him. His influence can be compared with that of Lincoln on American soil. He expressed himself with tremendous elementary power and exerted a permanent influence upon those who read or heard him. This should be remembered to understand the influence of Mickiewicz's work and personality on Franko. Another factor concerning the relationship between Franko and Mickiewicz was that the latter made the calling of a poet a prophetic mission which surpassed great leaders and statesmen in depth of response and influence.

Education in Galicia in the late sixties up to 1875, when Franko attended the German grade school and the Gymnasium in Drohobych—which became Polonized after 1867—was in a period of transition. German bureaucracy and teachers and German influences were in retreat. Polish culture and the longing for independence were predominant. Mickiewicz was the very ideal of a poet and a spiritual leader. The Polish-Ukrainian political and cultural antagonism had hardly begun. The names of Shevchenko and Mickiewicz became known to Franko probably at the same time and both poets became the most important figures in his life. The charm of Mickiewicz held sway over Franko during his entire lifetime, despite later developments. Of course, the idyl of his early years soon vanished as the political situation changed. But even in the formative years of Drohobych it was not a complete idyl. In his anti-Mickiewicz article of 1897 (which will be analyzed hereinafter) Franko, after having paid tribute to his Polish teacher Julian Turczynski—who introduced him to the masterworks of Polish and Ukrainian poetry—continued as follows:

...I want to express some ideas which have been buzzing in my head since my Gymnasium years. I graduated from a Polish Gymnasium.... Mickiewicz was recommended to us as the man to read,
his works and biography were in our school books... we used to admire Mickiewicz as the greatest spiritual hero, his words as utterances of a great genius. Because of my habit of contradicting, I opposed the official interpretation of his poetry in a composition, was considered a heretic and had lots of trouble... Since that time, I looked upon Mickiewicz as an... odd saint... and later, when I studied his works, I discovered I was right...²

In a later passage, Franko praised the genius of the Polish poet.

These Gymnasium memories are probably to a certain degree somewhat like a post-factum rationalization to explain Franko's attitude in 1897; still the story might have some elements of reality. Already in those early school years began the ambivalent attitude towards Mickiewicz which was to last during all of Franko's life: he was attracted by the poet and his magic quality, but he fought the political leader as a personification of Poland; he struggled with him as with an evil spirit, while paying tribute to his poetical genius. In spite of a rather deprecating change of attitude on the part of the Polish literary circles toward Mickiewicz in the last two decades of the nineteenth and in the first decade of the twentieth centuries, Franko, an expert literary critic himself, remained a consistent admirer of the Polish poet, who for some time was eclipsed by Słowacki and lost his prestige as the greatest artist of the period of "Young Poland" (Młoda Polska).

There is no doubt that Mickiewicz was very much a part of Franko's life during his university years and the period following it, because his curriculum at the Lviv University included lectures on Polish literature with Mickiewicz as a central figure, and also because of Franko's educational activities and close contacts with Polish intellectuals up to 1897. As a critic of Polish literature, Franko referred to Mickiewicz frequently; in 1885, in the Polish periodical Kraj of St. Petersburg, he published a brief review of Ukrainian translations³ of Mickiewicz, reprinted in pamphlet

³ Ivan Franko, "Adam Mickiewicz w rusinskiej literaturze," Kraj, St. Petersburg, 1885, part 47.
form in 1890 in Lviv. In Volodymyr Doroshenko's bibliography only passages of the first book of Pan Tadeusz and the poems Precz z moich oczu and Reduta Ordona are included; D. Čiževsky also mentions translations of parts of the Ustep (Introduction to Dziady, part 3) and of the poems Do Matki Polki and Czaty.

In the decade between 1887 and 1897 Franko lived a kind of double life—a Polish journalist and editor on the one hand, and a Ukrainian writer and active anti-Polish politician on the other. The conflicts and dilemmas became sharper, and an eruption was inevitable. In 1895 a very significant and very little known prelude to the final crisis occurred that should be mentioned. Franko had been carrying on vehement political agitation, with fierce attacks against the Poles. The Polish camp became very bitter. This Franko, they argued, our man, a Polish writer, slanders us. In 1895 Tadeusz Romanowicz, a well-known liberal journalist, for the first time spoke of wallenrodyzm. Nothing could wound Franko deeper than to be called a Wallenrod, i.e., an Ukrainian who becomes a Pole to betray the Poles. He answered in several newspaper articles and, a little later (also in 1895), he published a Polish pamphlet full of long-winded accusations and polemics. This was the first stage of the conflict.

It has already been mentioned that some Ukrainian circles had called Franko a traitor. To refute the charge, Franko published in Polish his Szkice Galicyjskie (Galician Sketches) with a foreword, "Nieco o sobie samym," full of bitter criticism of his compatriots. The foreword contained the famous words, "I do not love the Ruthenians, I do not even love our Ruś..." This was one of the last phases of his many years' fight against the backwardness, pettiness and materialistic egotism of his countrymen. This attack, in the form of a confession, caused a great commotion in the community, but was soon forgotten. However, it contributed further to Franko's complicated situation.


5 D. Čiževsky, op. cit.
Political events also aggravated the tension. Franko was the only Ukrainian candidate for the Vienna parliament, after the national and Russophile parties had withdrawn; but he lost the election because of the incredible methods (such as mass arrests, and all forms of brutality, coercion, and fraud) of the Polish authorities in Galicia.

This was the background of the eruption of 1897 in the form of an article, "Der Dichter des Verrathes" (The Poet of Treason), published in Die Zeit, Vienna, one of the best European magazines of that time.6 The article is extremely well written; as a document it deserves the careful attention of all scholars interested in Franko and in Polish, Ukrainian and Central European cultural problems. Most of the people who have quoted the article have never read it. It is much more than an attack on Mickiewicz because he glorifies wallenrodyzm, i.e., treason. It was meant to be a settlement of all Franko's accounts with the Polish poet, with Poland, with his Ukrainian detractors, and even with himself. Many of Mickiewicz's works were analyzed in the article and everywhere elements of treason were found; in Zywilla, świtezianka, Rybka, Tukaj, Grazyna, Dziady, Popas w Upicie, Do Matki Polki, and of course in Konrad Wallenrod, and even in Pan Tadeusz (Jacek Soplica committed treason and had to repent by a life of sacrifice and by his death). Franko comes to the conclusion that

... it is a sad symptom that a nation extols and considers as its spiritual leader a poet who propagates such ideas and in this way poisons future generations....

Franko's criticism is rather far-fetched, artificially presented and in some cases distorted. Franko mixed legitimate literary criticism with politics and personal passions. One of the many mistakes of the article is its impossible generalizations. A detailed examination of the article (which sounds very persuasive to one not familiar with Mickiewicz) would be far beyond the scope of the present paper. But it is important to clarify at least the reasons for Franko's phantastic misrepresentation, which he later re-

6 Ivan Franko, "Der Dichter des Verrathes," op. cit.
greeted, and which a part of Ukrainian public opinion condemned. For Franko the article meant several things: (1) an act to end the conflict in himself between his admiration for the poet and his hatred for Mickiewicz as the personification of Poland; (2) an act of public service for his nation, as he conceived it; (3) an act to free himself of the guilt complex toward his nation by means of attacking wallenrodyzm and the author of Wallenrod; (4) an act of defense against the accusation of the Poles in calling him, Franko, a Wallenrod. To do a complete job, Franko pronounced a moral condemnation of Mickiewicz in order to become free and rid himself of all his complexes by destroying Mickiewicz as an ideal. The article was an irrational act, senseless on the surface but deeply motivated—an act which could mean self-destruction. It is of great importance to see the complete picture of Franko in 1897: a Ukrainian nationalist and servant of his nation; an idealist and an admirer of poetical greatness; a humanitarian who overstepped the narrow boundaries of nationalism, blasting his own people and his Polish enemies almost simultaneously. Finally, let us remember that Franko was already a sick man then.

Franko did not achieve all he wanted, but he acquired some freedom from his guilt complex by cutting his links with the Polish circles after he lost his job with the Kurier Lwowski (Die Zeit article occasioned a storm of indignation in all partitioned Poland) and for the rest of his life remained almost completely in the Ukrainian orbit. But he could not settle his account with Mickiewicz. He returned to him later. Already in 1898 in his poem Pokhoron there is an answer to wallenrodyzm; the hero bears the name Myron, one of Franko's pseudonyms. With one minor exception, Franko did not write in Polish any more. But he wrote on Polish subjects, e.g., on Boga Rozica. In 1903 he translated a political pamphlet written by Mickiewicz in 1853—Do przyjaciół galicyjskich (To My Galician Friends). The translation was accompanied by a mild polemic. There was some analogy in the political situation of 1853 and 1903, but the real reason for undertaking the translation of this forgotten piece was Mickiewicz. He was still on Franko's mind.

The finale of this strange relationship came in 1914. A volume
of Mickiewicz's poetry came out in Ukrainian, edited by Franko, with the poet's biography by W. Spasowicz. In the preface Franko declared his intention to show the Poles that he would not sow hatred only. Therefore he characterizes "Polish masterworks in Ukrainian as evidence of the close connection of both nations in the field of culture and literature." These words, written two years before Franko's death, were a sort of final message after the storms had passed. Jósef Kallenbach wrote in regard to the Mickiewicz volume: "Franko rozpisywał się o polskim poecie zdrady a dziś go tłumaczy. Lepiej późno niż nigdy." (Franko once wrote about the Polish poet of treason and today he translates him. Better late than never). Unfortunately, the volume also contained "Wielka utrata," a very poor poetical fragment on the 1830 uprising, which Franko—a deathly ill man—attributed to Mickiewicz against all evidence. A fitting epilogue to a long, fascinating story!

Summing up, it becomes clear that Mickiewicz played a very strange part in Franko's life. His was not the influence of a great master like Goethe or a spiritual mentor like Drahomanov. Mickiewicz was not Franko's rival, and therefore that situation is not analogous to the Mickiewicz-Słowacki relationship.

Mickiewicz was for Franko a source of delight and attraction—a kind of sunbeam Franko could not resist—and at the same time a shadow, a constantly challenging adversary. Franko had to fight this adversary—who said "Ja i ojczyzna to jedno" (I and the Fatherland are one)—as a member of the Ukrainian community, and also for personal reasons to extricate himself from an unbearable situation.

The Mickiewicz-Franko relationship is no longer an enigma, and a complete psychological analysis can be expected. But it will remain a symbol of all the contradictions of Franko's complex personality, and one of the most fascinating examples of human and spiritual interrelations between two great men, two true geniuses, one of whom was born one year after the other died.

I. The Epoch of the Nobility (up to the 1840's)

The beginning of the national renaissance of the Ukraine is usually dated from the publication of the travestied *Aeneid* by Kotlyarevsky in 1798. However, although the *Aeneid* was undoubtedly epoch-making in the history of Ukrainian literature, from the viewpoint of the development of national consciousness it is rather an echo of the previous Cossack epoch. The entire literary and cultural movement up to the appearance of Shevchenko and the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in the 1840's was a sort of prolonged epilogue to the Cossack era.

In the Eastern Ukraine, in the former territory of the Hetmanate (provinces of Chernihiv and Poltava) and of Slobidska Ukraine (province of Kharkov), the nobility of Cossack origin continued to be the leading class of society through the first half of the nineteenth century. Foreign travellers (such as Kohl, a German, in 1841) noted that the Ukrainian nobles were dissatisfied with the existing order and antipathetic toward the Muscovites. However this discontent found almost no expression in practical politics, except for such episodes as the secret diplomatic mission of Vasyl' Kapnist to Prussia in 1791, certain hopes raised by Napoleon's invasion in 1812, and the participation of Ukrainians in the Decembrist uprising in 1825. A counterpart to these manifestations of active opposition were the occasional attempts (during the Napoleonic War and again during the Polish revolt of 1830-1831) to win at least a partial restoration of the old Cossack autonomy through a demonstration of loyalty to the throne and the Empire.

* Only the problems connected with the part of the Ukraine formerly under Russian rule are treated in this article.
Ukrainian consciousness was expressed much more strongly in the form of an apolitical, cultural "provincialism," i.e., an attachment to the historical and ethnic particularities of the homeland, but with a passive acceptance of the political and social status quo. This nostalgia for the glorious Cossack past, lost beyond recall, served as the basis for a vigorous movement of historical and antiquarian dilettantism. A practical aim was also present here: that of vindicating by historical documents the rights of the nobles which Russian law had long denied to the descendants of the lower ranks of the Cossack Starshyna (high-ranking officers). This last is enough to make it clear that local patriotism, so understood, was in no way contradictory to loyalty to the dynasty and the Russian Empire. It is worthy of mention that, in spite of the notorious severity of the absolutist-bureaucratic regime of Nicholas I, the Ukrainian literary movement as such was at first not persecuted, because the government regarded it as harmless, although at the same time the work of administrative leveling of characteristic Ukrainian traits was continued (abolition of Ukrainian civil law as embodied in the so-called Lithuanian Statute, suppression of the Uniate Church in the Right-Bank Ukraine, etc.

During this epoch we find the beginnings of scientific research into the various fields of Ukrainian studies, particularly in the field of historiography. The central point of interest of the historiography of the Ukrainian nobles was the military and diplomatic history of the Hetmanate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The historiography of the nobles had a much more outspoken sense of Ukrainian state loyalty than did the "Populist" historiography of the next generation. But the logic of this conception, which identified the nation with the previous political organization of the Cossack class, led to the conviction that the nation must have been extinguished as a result of the death of the state. The aristocratic authors of the first third of the nineteenth century felt themselves to be epigones, who wished to preserve from oblivion the remnants of a Ukraine which practically no longer existed. In these circles the conviction was widespread that even the Ukrainian
language was dying out. In reality this feeling of decadence was a reflection of the situation of the nobility in the Ukraine, who were weakened politically by the absolutism of Nicholas, economically by the crisis in the system of serfdom, and morally by their alienation from the people, and were ready to abdicate from the historical stage as an independent force.

The chief importance of the aristocratic period in the formation of Ukrainian consciousness lies in the fact that it preserved the continuity of development between Cossack and modern Ukraine. There were also noteworthy original achievements of the period which were not destroyed by the decadence of the nobility and which entered into the permanent Ukrainian heritage. We have just mentioned the beginnings of scholarly research into Ukrainian studies. The conception of Ukrainian history, elaborated by the aristocratic authors in the first third of the nineteenth century, had a profound influence on later generations of scholars and also on public opinion. The beginnings of a new Ukrainian literature proved to be even more fruitful. This new literature used the language of the people, unlike Ukrainian literature in previous epochs which, up to the second half of the eighteenth century (i.e., to the end of the Cossack State), preserved Old Church Slavonic as the linguistic base. This new Ukrainian literature, fertilized by the general trend of European pre-romantic and romantic poetry towards the “popular” and local color, at first made no claims to be a national literature or to compete with Russian literature, the flowering of which many native Ukrainians contributed to. The Ukrainian writers of that period were bilingual; they wrote in Ukrainian when addressing the narrower local circle of connoisseurs, and in Russian when they wanted the wider audience of the entire educated public of the Empire. Here the linguistic line of division in no way coincided with any division in political ideas. In works in Ukrainian we often find complete loyalty to the tsar and the Empire. And on the other hand, the work which expressed most radically the anti-Russian national opposition, and which had an enormous influence on the development of
national consciousness in the first half the nineteenth century—*Istoriya Rusov* (History of the Rusy)—was written around 1800, in Russian. Sociologically the Ukrainian literature of the aristocratic epoch was clearly a regional *Heimatkunst*. Nonetheless, the generation which began with Kotlyarevsky produced a number of worth-while artistic works. Particularly important was the achievement of legitimizing the vernacular in literature, thus forming a sort of “investment capital” which later Ukrainian national literature could draw upon.

No less important for the future were the efforts to create a synthesis between Ukrainian patriotic feelings and modern Western political ideas. The great importance of *Istoriya Rusov* lies in the fact that here, for the first time, the traditional defense of the rights and liberties of the Cossacks was fused with European liberalism of the Age of Enlightenement. A similar phenomenon in the next generation was the birth of a program of democratic, federalistic Pan-Slavism, developed by the young conspirator-officers in the Society of United Slavs—a particularly Ukrainian brand of the Decembrist movement. However, the Ukrainian Decembrists fell under the direction of Russian revolutionary “Jacobins,” men such as Pestel, and they perished without having brought any permanent gain to their homeland. That was a portent of the future. During all of the nineteenth century, the bleeding of the Ukraine by the Russification of its elite continued, not only on the “right” by service in the imperial bureaucracy, but also on the “left” by participation in the all-Russian revolutionary movements.

So far we have spoken chiefly of the Left-Bank Ukraine. However, analogous, if less clear-cut, processes were also visible on the Right Bank among the Polish or Polonized nobility. The so-called Ukrainian School in Polish literature corresponded to that of Gogol and other writers of Ukrainian origin in Russia, with exactly the same romantic enthusiasm for the beauties of the Ukrainian land and the life of its people. Here also there were beginnings of literature in the popular language. The political ideology of this circle was the ideal-
ization of the old Polish Commonwealth as an alleged fraternal union of three nations: Poland, Lithuania, and Rus'-Ukraine. But the revolutions, in 1830 and 1863, of the Polish nobility, in the name of the restoration of pre-partition Poland, ran into a wall of resistance and hostility among the Ukrainian peasantry of the Right Bank. The myth created by the Ukrainian School of Vernyhora—"a fantastic, completely artificial Ukrainian peasant, who aspires to serve aristocratic Poland"¹—was in too great contradiction to the true history of Ukrainian-Polish relations to be a social reality. Nonetheless, in a subtle way difficult to identify, the Polish heritage (or more exactly, the heritage of the nobles of Polish civilization living in the western half of the Ukrainian territory) contributed to the crystallization of modern Ukrainian national consciousness, making the movement more political, and strengthening the anti-Russian position.

This can be illustrated by the following examples. At a time when, before the appearance of Shevchenko, the new vernacular Ukrainian literature, created by Left-Bank writers, was politically rather harmless, it was a Polish-Ukrainian poet, Tymko Padura, who dared to glorify Hetman Mazepa as a great champion of liberty. "Mazepism" had always been, in Russian eyes, the very embodiment of Ukrainian separatism. Another Ukrainian Pole—or should we rather say a "Polish Ukrainian"—Franciszek Duchńiński ("de Kiow," as he signed his French pamphlets) made an important contribution to the formation of modern Ukrainian political thought. Duchńiński, an advisor to Prince Adam Czartoryski, the "uncrowned king of Polish emigration," formulated the theory that the Great Russians or Muscovites, their language notwithstanding, were not real Slavs, but only superficially Slavicized "Turanians." The Ukrainians, on the other hand, were genuine Slavs and hence, according to Duchńiński, closely related to the Poles. The latter thesis failed to impress Ukrainians,—but the former did. Du-

¹ Wacław Lipiński, Szlachta na Ukrainie (The Nobility in the Ukraine), Kraków, 1909, p. 69.
chiński was not a sound scholar and by his fantastic exaggerations compromised his theory which, however, contained an element of objective truth. The differences in mental attitudes and in social and cultural traditions between Great Russians and Ukrainians are certainly more profound than the variation of the two East Slavic languages would indicate.

A look at a nineteenth century political map of Europe shows that, but for the Austrian section, all Ukrainian lands were united in the Russian Empire. But this is not the full story. On the Right Bank there was a dominant Polish class. Actually these noble families were frequently of Ukrainian descent, having become Polonized through conversion to Roman Catholicism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Polish public opinion was unanimous in claiming not only ethnically Polish territories, but also all provinces of the historical Polish State in its pre-partition frontiers. Even Russian authorities, at least before 1830, tacitly recognized the Right-Bank Ukraine (and similarly, also Byelorussia and Lithuania) as a Polish sphere of influence. After the defeat of the 1830 insurrection, the tsarist government proceeded to remove the most glaring symbols of Polish ascendency in the area; e.g., the Lyceum of Kremyanets, the chief educational center for sons of the Polish gentry in Ukraine, was closed down. But the conservative social outlook and the devotion to serf-owning interests made it impossible for the regime of Nicholas I to attack the roots of Polish power on the Right Bank.

So for most of the nineteenth century the Ukraine remained a battlefield where Russian and Polish forces clashed. Neither side was ready to give the Ukraine a position of equality. Russians and Poles fully agreed—discounting a few exceptions—in rejecting the Ukrainian claim that the Ukraine had the right to a free national development of her own. But, as a matter of fact, the Russo-Polish struggle was a retarding factor in the process of assimilation of Ukrainians to either neighbor. It prevented the Ukrainian problem from becoming fully and exclusively an internal concern of Russia. For instance, during the Crimean War, the Polish-Ukrainian adventurer, Michał
Czajkowski (Sadyk Pasha), organized in Turkey a Cossack legion against Russia. Between the Russian hammer and the Polish anvil, Ukrainian patriots were forced to define their attitude towards both their neighbors. This helped to develop an awareness of the Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainian answer to Russian and Polish pressure was formulated theoretically by Mykola Kostomarov, a noted historian and publicist of the ensuing “Populist” generation: he defined the Great Russians as pre-eminently despotic, the Poles as aristocratic, and the Ukrainians as democratic people. Here we see the birth of a Ukrainian “messianism.”

The leaders of the Ukrainian movement in the nineteenth century did not separate the cause of their people from that of all of Eastern Europe. They believed that the Ukraine had a mission to fulfill. By liberating herself, the Ukraine would also help Russians and Poles to throw off the most objectionable traits in their inheritance, and so secure a better common future to all three peoples. This is the kernel of the federalistic idea which, up to 1917, remained the very foundation of Ukrainian political thought.

II. Populism (1840’s to 1880’s)

Beginning with the 1840’s, the leadership of the Ukrainian movement passed into the hands of a new social group, that of the intelligentsia, composed in part of declasse nobles, in part of elements risen from the lower classes. This new intelligentsia gravitated toward the universities which had recently been founded in Ukrainian territory, in Kharkiv (1805) and Kiev (1834). The first political organization of the intelligentsia, the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, was founded in 1845.

The standard-bearer of this new epoch was Shevchenko, the poetical genius who, born a serf, was an artist by profession. Shevchenko synthesized national pathos and social protest with a deeply religious (though radically undogmatic and unorthodox) yearning for the ethical regeneration of man and society.
Shevchenko's thinking was strongly influenced by the ideas of the previous epoch, such as the conception of Ukrainian history as presented in *Istoriya Rusov*. What was new with him was his revolutionary passion, his implacable condemnation of that modern Babylon, tsarist Russia. He sharply criticized the Ukrainian nobles who, he felt, had dishonored themselves by their submissiveness to the tsar and by their support of serfdom. Of course it would be wrong to look for a systematic political program from a poet. Nonetheless Shevchenko's role was not simply that of an influential literary figure; as a great spiritual leader he might better be compared with the Hebrew prophets. His steadfastness under persecution gave Shevchenko the halo of a martyr. In his person the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth century achieved for the first time a dimension which surpassed the limits of Little Russian regionalism.

Two consecutive stages of development may be distinguished during the Populist epoch, the “romantic” (the generation of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood) and the “positivist” (the generation of the Old *Hromada*). The first stage was characterized by the idealization of the Cossack order (not only nationally, but also socially, as a retrospective Utopia of equality and brotherhood), by religious enthusiasm slightly tinged with the spirit reform, and by a tendency toward democratic-federalist Pan-Slavism. The literary expression of this generation is depicted in the poems of the young Shevchenko and in the programmatic works of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, primarily in the *Knyhy Bytiya ukraïns'koho narodu* (Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People) by Kostomarov. The positivist generation, which emerged in the 1860's and reached maturity in the 1870's, put the strongest accent on the power of critical knowledge. The Cossack epoch was no longer idealized indiscriminately; the egoism and aristocratic prejudices of the *Starshyna* (high-ranking officers) were contrasted with the interests and aims of the common people. Moreover, Slavophilism was gradually replaced by “Europeanism,” i.e., by an orientation toward the democratic and radical currents of the West of that time.
It must be pointed out that fundamentally the Populist epoch placed its emphasis on the "people," equated with the peasantry. From this comes the very designation of Populism (narodnytstvo) which came into current usage in the 1860's. It is no accident that the favorite field of scholarly study of the time was ethnography, which also influenced the historiography of the period. The historians of the Populist school, from Kostomarov to Lazarevsky and Antonovych, interpreted the past of the Ukraine as a series of elemental popular movements for social freedom and especially for the free possession of the soil. The retrospective national consciousness of the aristocratic period, facing backward to the former Cossack statehood, had been helpless against the reality created by the incorporation of the Ukraine into the Russian Empire. Now the center of gravity was shifted to a living object of great promise: the people. The Populist intelligentsia felt the call to contribute to the emancipation of the people, who had only been freed from serfdom in 1861, and to the raising of their social and cultural status. This gave a clear direction to the constructive work of the Populist intelligentsia, and at the same time it provided a solid foundation for the Ukrainian national cause. "Giving precedence to peasant ethnographical interests rather than to political historical ones and placing emphasis on democratic Populism rather than aristocratic state consciousness of rights and privileges, were at that time the only salvation for the national idea, the only possible exit from an ideological blind alley."2 In close connection with the apotheosis of the people was the cult of the popular language, "the Word," which was honored as the most important vessel of the soul of the people. The Populists were first to stress the linguistic and ethnic unity of all the areas of Ukrainian settlement. This was the prerequisite for the development of first a cultural, then political Pan-Ukrainian consciousness. The first practical step in this direction was the union of representatives from the Left-

Bank and the Right-Bank Ukraine in the Kiev Hromada around 1860; those from the Left Bank had either previously been members of or were successors to the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood; those from the Right Bank were the so-called khlopomany (peasant-lovers), who had split away from the Polish nobility and aristocratic intelligentsia.

The failure of the 1830-31 insurrection had spurred a great deal of soul-searching among Polish patriots. Accusing voices were raised calling attention to the aristocratic character of the revolution and to the lack of popular support as the chief reasons for the catastrophe. So a new political movement was born among the Poles, one which attempted to win “the people” for the national cause by hoisting the flag of the emancipation of the peasants. The underground activities of this new Polish movement spread also to Ukrainian lands. The conspirators did not let themselves be deterred by the fact that here, in the Ukraine, the people whom they tried to approach had no use for Polish patriotism. Even Polish “red democrats,” while employing Ukrainian in their proclamations and leaflets, remained devoted to the idea of the historical Polish State. But in time a new group emerged, in which there was a shift of emphasis; for them the emancipation of the peasants was no longer merely a tactical means, subordinated to Polish political interests, but an end in itself. Their attitude can be defined as a truly Populist one. These so-called khlopomany, in embracing the people’s point of view, were obliged to reject the fetish of Polish “historical patriots”—the frontier of 1772. The final break between the khlopomany and the Polish society was brought on by the approach of the new Polish insurrection. Polish conspirators had but little hope for success in the Ukraine; nevertheless, they decided to rise, if only to demonstrate the claim of Poland to the historical Dnieper frontier. The khlopomany, on the other hand, rejected this planned Polish nationalist action on non-Polish soil as futile and senseless. As the leader of the khlopomany, Volodymyr Antonovych, explained to a Polish friend: “Because we are with the people, and the people are
against you, we cannot march with you.”³ Cutting off their ties with Polish society, the khlopomany declared that the principle of solidarity with the people entailed also the return to Ukrainian nationality, which their forefathers had betrayed for the lure of the privileges attached to Polish nobility. This was the content of Antonovych’s “Confession”⁴—a true profession of faith in Ukrainian Populism.

The concentration on the “people” led to a certain weakness and one-sidedness in the Populist ideology. Aspects of the Ukrainian cause which did not correspond to the “popular” were neglected. For instance, the medieval Rus’ of the Princes was largely effaced from the historical horizon; in the studies of the Cossack epoch, the efforts of the Hetmans and the Starshyna to create a state were deprecated; while even clearly destructive whims of the masses were condoned. Culturally, Populism often led to narrow utilitarianism: it was considered less important that literature be of high quality than that it be easily understandable and have a social and educational function. One person who had a fine perception of the weakness of the Populist ideology, and who protested against cultural vulgarism and the danger of mob rule, was a former member of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, Panteleymon Kulish, historian, publicist, poet, and translator of Shakespeare. But his criticism remained fruitless, for he was unable to offer a constructive concept to oppose the Populist current.

The narrowness of the social basis of Ukrainian Populism was the cause of its weakness in practical politics. The Ukrainian movement, or “Ukrainophilism,” as it was called at that time, wished to carry its message to the masses, but in fact its influence was limited to scattered groups here and there, composed almost exclusively of representatives of the intellectual professions: teachers, students, Zemstvo officials, etc. The Ukrainophiles, who were a minority even among the educated classes of the Ukraine, had a very limited influence on the great

³ Wacław Lasocki, Wspomnienia z mojego życia, I, Kraków, 1933, p. 331.
social changes that were taking place in the Ukrainian lands at that time. The transition to capitalism did not produce a nationalist Ukrainian bourgeoisie; on the contrary, the development of railroads, industry, and commerce linked the Ukraine more closely to the Russian Empire. In this respect there was a retrogression in comparison to the previous decades, when the wealthiest and socially-leading class in the Left-Bank Ukraine—the nobility—still had a certain traditional feeling for the Ukraine. But in the second half of the nineteenth century the Russification of the Ukraine reached its apogee, particularly in the cities. And yet, it was at this very time that, in the darkness, the seeds of 1917 were being sown.

The weakness of Ukrainophilism was reflected in the modesty of its practical platform:

All the dreams of the Ukrainophiles were limited to the furthering of Little Russian literature and the publication of educational materials in the Little Russian language, in order to extend useful knowledge among the people.5

In an article by Kostomarov, published anonymously in Herzen's Kolokol, and therefore free from tsarist censorship, we find a brilliant apology for the independence of the Ukrainian historical process from Russia and Poland, but the political desiderata are limited to two points: the unhindered development of Ukrainian literature, and the use of the Ukrainian language in the elementary schools.

In spite of the modesty of these aims, it was precisely during the Populist epoch that the tsarist government began its systematic persecution of the Ukrainian movement. The first victim was the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, which was suppressed in 1847. The Polish uprising of 1863 was the occasion for further repression, even though all vocal Ukrainians had opposed Polish claims to the Right-Bank Ukraine.

5 K. Mikhal'chuk and P. Chubynsky in Trudy etnografichesko-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v Zapadno-Russkii krai, as quoted by M. Drahomanov in Avstro-Rus'ki Spomyny, Lviv, 1892, p. 322.
ever, there can be no doubt that, in trying to suppress the Ukrainian movement, the Russian bureaucrats were, in their own way, showing foresightedness. Behind the actual weakness of the Ukrainian Populist movement lay a great potential force which could have been developed almost instantaneously, once the movement spread from the intelligentsia to the masses. Even during the few years between the Crimean War (1855) and the Polish uprising (1863) the symptoms of the beginning of penetration of Ukrainian ideas among the masses multiplied. For instance, educational and other literature in Ukrainian sold to the peasants many times faster than did writings in Russian. The Russian chauvinists, including some Russified Ukrainians, excited by the Polish insurrection of 1863, launched a furious campaign against the phantom of “Ukrainian separatism.” These incitements led to the Valuyev Ukaz, 1863 (named after its author, then minister of the interior), which forbade popular educational and religious publications in Ukrainian. It aimed at creating a wall between the Ukrainophile intelligentsia and the peasants. This and similar measures, although unavailing in the long run, did delay the formation of a modern Ukrainian national consciousness for decades.

During the relatively liberal reign of Alexander II the Ukrainian movement made further progress, and during the 1870's it took on a definitely political hue. A network of conspiratorial communities (hromady), under the leadership of the Kievan (or Old) Hromada, covered all the principal cities of the Ukraine. The Ukrainian movement created a position for itself in scientific associations (The Southwestern Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society) and in the press (the daily Kievskii Telegraf, of course in Russian). The literary, and especially the scientific, production of those years was important. One might even speak of the beginnings of Ukrainian foreign policy: the regulation of relations with Galicia and the action taken in connection with the Balkan Wars. At the same time contact with the Russian opposition, both revolutionary and liberal, was intensified, and both ob-
tained considerable support in the Ukraine. Many of the members of the terrorist Narodnaya Volya organization, including its leader Andrey Zhelyabov, were Ukrainians by birth. The Ukrainian Zemstvos, particularly those of Chernihiv and Kharkiv, were tinderboxes for the Russian constitutional movement. In 1879 a secret conference took place in Kiev; the leaders of the Hromada offered their mediation between Zemstvo liberals and the terrorist “Executive Committee.” The purpose was to create a common front of all forces of opposition against autocracy. The conference failed, but this event shows that in the 1870’s there was already a tendency of all democratic groups of “South Russia” to unite on a platform provided by the Ukrainian national movement. This foreshadows the situation of 1917.

The many-sided and successful activities gave the Ukrainian patriots a feeling of assurance and self-confidence. Leading the effort to make the Ukrainian movement political was Mykhaylo Drahomanov, the author of its first systematic political program. Drahomanov envisaged the solution of the Ukrainian problem by the democratization and federalization of Russia and Austria-Hungary, and in an alliance of the Ukrainians with the progressive forces among all peoples of Eastern Europe, the Great Russians not excluded, but under the guarantee of an organizational independence of the Ukrainian movement.

Deeply disturbed by this development, the Russian government proceeded to an anti-Ukrainian counterattack in 1875-1876. In a series of well-planned measures, the legal forms of social and cultural activity were destroyed, the Ukrainian language banned in publications (Ukaz of Ems), and the leaders banished. The first Ukrainian reaction was resistance; the Russian opposition was approached more closely, and Drahomanov was sent abroad to create a political center for propaganda in the West. But Hromada’s hope that the storm would soon blow over, and that the Russian Empire would be transformed into a constitutional regime, were not fulfilled. On the contrary, Alexander III’s accession to the throne
stabilized absolutism and reaction. Under the blows of repression, the morale of the Ukrainian movement collapsed. The exuberant optimism of the 1870's was replaced by depression and passivity. As the slogan of the times, the old one of the "apolitical and purely cultural" character of the Ukrainian movement was again taken up. In the 1860's this had been suited to the immaturity of the movement, but after the great upswing of the 1870's it was unquestionably a retreat. But by this self-mutilation the Ukrainophiles at least managed to preserve the continuity of scientific work in various fields, even if these studies were written in Russian and treated problems innocent of any suspicion of immediacy (cf. the review *Kievskaya Starina*). But the national movement became isolated from society at large. For the loyalist and conservative elements, the reputation it had for political unreliability and democracy made it suspect, while its political colorlessness made it lose control of the radical youth, who fell under the influence of the Russian revolutionaries. As a publicist of the next generation expressed it, "The tactics of the Ukrainophiles were such that they alienated the entire young generation of the Ukraine, while at the same time they did not know how to win the sympathies of the old Ukraine [i.e., of the nobility]."6 In the 1880's the Ukrainian movement shrank to a narrow rivulet, but it did succeed, under the cautious leadership of Volodymyr Antonovych, in preserving the kernel of the Kiev *Hromada* and an embryonic organizational network throughout the land.

From Switzerland Drahomanov continued his brilliant journalistic and propagandistic activities. His efforts gave the Western public their first authentic information about the Ukrainian movement and its persecution in Russia. But Drahomanov's sharp attacks against absolutism seemed inopportune to the Kiev *Hromada*, because they aggravated the government and contradicted the *Hromada*'s policy of lying still and harmless. This led to a break between Drahomanov and his Kiev sponsors in the middle of the 1880's. The little émigré

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group clustered around Drahomanov was the seed of the Ukrainian socialist movement, but at that time its direct organizational influence reached only Galicia.

III. Modernism (from the 1890's to the First World War)

The period of the quarter century before the First World War does not have a fixed name in Ukrainian historical literature. But there is no doubt that it marks a separate and important step in the development of Ukrainian national consciousness and political thought, clearly distinct from both the previous Populist epoch and the following one of the Great Revolution. To designate this period we shall borrow from the history of literature the term “modernism.”

Two factors had an exceptional influence on the Ukrainian cause at that time. The first was the progressive weakening of tsarist absolutism and of the Russian state apparatus; the second was the economic flowering of the Russian Ukraine, its rapid industrialization, and the raising of the general standard of living of the population. The undoubted economic progress had a sinister side, however, in the proletarianization of the landless peasants on the one hand, and in the mushrooming of speculative capitalism on the other, which sharpened the social contrasts in the country.

The intelligentsia continued to be the chief channel of the Ukrainian movement. But in the 1890's a new generation appeared, one which, in comparison with its Populist fathers, was not only numerically stronger, but also, as a result of the general change in the political atmosphere, more courageous and energetic. From this generation arose a galaxy of gifted persons, who were later destined to play a leading role in the Ukrainian revolution. Probably the most representative figure of that generation was Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, the great scholar and organizer of scientific studies, the outstanding politician and journalist.

In that epoch the Dnieper (Russian) Ukraine saw the beginnings of Ukrainian party differentiations and organizations.
The first attempts to organize politically in the new way were made by the Brotherhood of the Disciples of Taras (Shevchenko) (Braterstvo Tarasivtsiv), in 1892. In 1899 the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party (R.U.P.) was founded in Kharkiv; it later adopted a Marxist program and the name Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' Party (USDRP). After 1905 the beginnings of several other parties were visible: a liberal (the Radical-Democrats), an agrarian socialist (The Socialist-Revolutionaries), and a nationalist (the Ukrainian People's Party). These were still in an embryonic state, however, and after the victory of reaction in 1907 they became disorganized and were driven underground. Nevertheless a virtual party differentiation had become a fact. No less remarkable was the debut of the Ukrainian movement in the parliamentary field. In the first and second imperial Dumas there were strong Ukrainian representations, which were, however, unable to develop any program of activity, since both times the Dumas were dissolved soon after election. After the government’s arbitrary alteration of the electoral laws there was no organized Ukrainian group in the third and fourth Dumas, although there were still Ukrainian sympathizers. In any case proof had been given that, with a chance for free expression, the Ukrainian people were ready to give preference to Ukrainian parties and Ukrainian electoral platforms.

The most important achievement of the period was the breaking down of the artificial walls which tsarism had sought to impose between the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the masses. Even after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, Russian law continued to treat the peasants as a separate class without full rights. But with the spread of elementary education, with the increase in trade between the cities and the villages, and with the growth of a class of well-to-do and “capitalistically” minded peasants, the legal sequestration of the peasants became an anachronism. The Revolution of 1905 led to the repeal of at least the crudest forms of discrimination against the peasants. The villages began to awake to modern political consciousness, and found themselves in the Ukrainian nation-
al idea. Now, the fact that since the days of Shevchenko and the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood the Ukrainian movement had had a strong social orientation, one that was in conformity with the gropings of the peasantry was to bear fruit. Under the new, if very limited, measure of Russian constitutionalism after 1905, the villages and towns of the Ukraine were dotted with Folk Reading Halls (the famous Prosvita), cooperatives, and various other organizations, all of which served as points of support for the Ukrainian movement. The chief propagators of national awareness among the masses were the members of the special social group of "village intelligentsia," elementary school teachers, leaders of cooperatives, etc. Most of these people were the offspring of peasants; they remained close to the village communities and, enjoying their confidence, were able to influence popular opinion in a way with which not only the tsarist administration, but also the alien Russian parties, were unable to compete. The members of the village intelligentsia themselves owed their national enlightenment to the secret patriotic student groups of the universities, normal schools, and even Gymnasiums. In this way the Ukrainian national consciousness spread out from its tiny centers of origin, the hromadas of the second half of the nineteenth century, through the intelligentsia, and out to ever-widening circles of the people. A Russian historian has described this process pertinently:

Though everything Ukrainian was forbidden, the social development was creating an increasingly favorable soil for the national movement by the growth of a rural intelligentsia and a "semi-intelligentsia." These groups were almost entirely Ukrainian in their consciousness, and when the revolution of 1905 came the movement was in their hands... After 1907, and especially during the war, the national movement again became the object of persecution and suppression. But by that time it was irrepressible. When the pressure of tsarism was lifted it became apparent that practically all the democratic intelligentsia and "semi-intelligentsia" of southwestern Russia was conscious of itself as Ukrainian, that the peas-
ants were on the verge of becoming conscious of the same, and that the Ukraine was going to be an independent nation.”

The national idea also reached, though more slowly, the other classes of society. Before 1914 there were already small bridgeheads of “conscious Ukrainians,” i.e., of active Ukrainian patriots, among the workers, bourgeoisie, and the landowners. Even where the feeling of Ukrainian national individuality had not yet clearly evolved, there was a strengthening of “regional consciousness.” For instance the bourgeoisie of the Ukraine, though Russified in language and culture, was profoundly dissatisfied with the economic centralism of the tsarist government, which favored the Great Russian provinces. An awareness of the conflict between the economic interests of the Ukrainian South and the Great Russian North spread. Similarly, among the workers a tendency to form regional “South Russian” unions became apparent. There is no doubt that in the course of natural development these tendencies would have, sooner or later, turned into a consciously Ukrainian ideology. But the Revolution precipitated the outcome of this drift, preventing the normal gradual growth to maturity.

In the course of the quarter century before the First World War the character of Ukrainian literature changed. With the appearance of such writers as Kotsyubynsky, Lesya Ukraiyinka, Vynnychenko, and others, Ukrainian literature could no longer be regarded as purely “popular”; it had begun to fulfill the sociological requirements of a national literature, i.e., one able to satisfy the many-sided spiritual interests of a diverse modern society.

In that same period, the foundations were laid for scholarly and technical terminologies in Ukrainian. Up to the end of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian literature had been, with few exceptions, limited to poetry and fiction with subjects taken from country life. Even conscious patriots wrote most of their scholarly and political works in Russian. It was only

7 D. S. Mirsky, Russia, a Social History, London, 1931, pp. 277-278.
now that the Ukrainian language became an instrument of scholarship, journalism, and politics.

It is no wonder that about 1905 the idea of the complete class structure of Ukrainian society was formulated. Vyacheslav Lypynsky appealed to the Polonized nobility of the Right Bank to return to the Ukrainian nation. At first glance this seems like a simple continuation of the khlopomany (peasant-lovers) movement of the 1860's, which had desired the return of the nobility to the people as a radical break from the interests and traditions of the class to which they belonged. But Lypynsky's position was different. Although he certainly did not dream of preserving the anachronistic class privileges of the aristocracy, he did believe that if the nobles would place their experience and their cultural and political potentialities at the service of the Ukrainian cause, they would thereby obtain the moral right to be reintegrated into the new national elite of the renascent Ukraine. The essential value of this concept transcends its immediate occasion. In seeking the national reorientation of the Polonized or Russified Ukrainian nobility, Lypynsky basically asserted that the Ukraine should be composed of all the classes and social groups which every modern nation possesses. This was a true revolution against the political philosophy of the Populists, who saw the essence of the Ukraine in its plebs.

The progress of national consciousness was reflected in the development of Ukrainian historiography and historical evaluation. With Hrushevsky and his school, a true turning point was reached in this field.

The aspect of Hrushevsky's writings which had the greatest ideological significance was his vindication of the continuity of Ukrainian national development from the Kievan Rus' through the Galician-Volhynian Kingdom, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Gossack State, to the modern Ukraine. The medieval Kievan State, which had been neglected by Ukrainian historians of the Populist school and had been annexed by Russian historiography, was once again integrated into
Ukrainian tradition. Since the period of the old Rus' had been epoch of Kiev's imperial glory and the climax of its importance in Eastern Europe, this enhanced the Ukrainian feeling of national self-esteem.

The second historian to introduce a new viewpoint was Lypynsky, whom we have already mentioned. His studies of the Khmelnytsky period completely revolutionized the habitual conceptions of the Cossack age. Lypynsky demonstrated that the Khmelnytsky Revolution was not only a peasant and Cossack uprising, but also a political movement of the upper strata of Ukrainian society. It was precisely the aristocratic elements, the nobles and Starshyna who had been treated with suspicion by the Populist historians, who had, according to Lypynsky, provided the leadership in the revolution and in the creation of the Cossack State, and who were responsible for the bold and constructive plans and acts of the Khmelnytsky era. Lypynsky introduced into Ukrainian historiography the problems of power, leadership and the elite.

The growth of national consciousness found its natural culmination in the formulation of the idea of an independent Ukrainian State. By the turn of the century, in 1900, a pamphlet by Mykola Mikhnovsky appeared under the self-descriptive title, *Samostiyna Ukrayina* (The Independent Ukraine). The pamphlet ended with the slogan "A one and united, free and independent Ukraine, from the Carpathians to the Caucasus." But until 1917 the idea of separatism did not find general acceptance. For one thing, the arguments adduced by Mikhnovsky in support of Ukrainian statehood were not ones to impress his contemporaries very deeply. Mikhnovsky, a lawyer by profession, utilized as his chief premise the legal argument of the inalienable political rights of the Ukraine in relation to Russia, as fixed in the Treaty of Pereyaslav, 1654; as a practical program Mikhnovsky proposed a struggle for the revalidation of the "Constitution of Pereyaslav." But too long a time had elapsed since the downfall of the Hetmanate for such a policy of legitimism to be practicable. Moreover Mikh-
novsky, unlike Drahomanov and Lypynsky, neither formulated his ideas in ponderous tomes nor gathered a group of disciples about himself. Thus his raising of the separatist banner remained, at least in the Russian Ukraine (in Galicia the situation was somewhat different), an isolated act. The general drift of the Ukrainian national movement indicated that the issue of statehood was bound to be raised sooner or later, but no one could foresee that this was to be the case in the comparatively near future. For the time being tsarist Russia, decadent though it was, appeared unchallengeably powerful in comparison with the young Ukrainian forces. For this reason the spokesmen of the Ukrainian cause contented themselves with the traditional call for an autonomous Ukraine in a decentralized and federative Russia. The paramount immediate aim, the struggle against tsarism, necessitated an alliance with the Russian democratic groups. Finally, the highly inflamed class conflicts, very perceptible in that period, delayed the crystallization of the feeling of national solidarity and of a basic community of interests of all Ukrainians, which were a necessary prerequisite for the creation of a Ukrainian State.

From the days of Shevchenko and the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, the social element had played a tremendous role in the ideology of the Ukrainian movement, in which the protest against social injustice was at least as strong a battle cry as that against national enslavement. In the era of modernism this old social tendency definitely took the shape of a socialist idea. The overwhelming majority of the younger generation was socialist. It is even possible to speak of this as an ideological fashion, which in many cases was never more than a rather superficial and passing youthful enthusiasm. But behind this fashion there were also quite serious, objective factors: the proletarization of the landless peasants, the development of industry, and the general sharpening of social contrasts. Thus the ground was prepared for the growth of the socialist movement. But the budding Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (USDRP) did not create an original program corresponding to Ukrain-
ian conditions and clearly differentiating Ukrainian socialism from Russian. There had been very promising beginnings of a specifically Ukrainian school of socialism in the 1870's and 1880's in the pioneer work done by Drahomanov and his friends Podolynsky and Ziber. But the émigré character of this group and the breach between Drahomanov and the Kiev Hromada had the result that this experiment was practically lost. When, in the 1890's, the Ukrainian movement again raised its head in Russia, its socialist wing did not continue Drahomanov's line but adopted, from Russian sources, the ready-made formulas of international socialism. One of the results of this Russian influence was an insufficient appreciation of the value of political constitutional freedom. Another negative effect was the fact that the Ukrainian socialists did not know how to integrate the social-economic and the national sides of the program. Marxism in general, and the Russian brand in particular, gave very little attention in its doctrine to problems which were of burning importance to the Ukrainians, as members of a subjugated nation. Of course this does not mean that Ukrainians who were converted to Marxism lost their patriotism. But in their thinking they developed an undigested amalgam of the formulas of a simplified Marxism and a naive, romantic patriotism. On the political scene there appeared the type of revolutionary youth with Marx's Communist Manifesto in one pocket and Shevchenko's collected poems, Kobzar', in the other. To be sure, the talented Mykola Porsh, the spiritual leader of the USDRP, tried to adapt Marxism to local conditions, and defended the demand for autonomy from a socialist position. But in general the young generation of socialists, the most dynamic force in the Ukrainian movement, demonstrated a high degree of confusion in their thinking, combined with great emotional excitability. These traits, explicable by the immaturity of the group and their lack of a balanced education and of practical experience, were harmless enough as long as their political task was mainly negative, that of undermining the foundations of tsarism. It was to be hoped that in due course of time most of these child-
hood diseases would be outgrown. Nobody could have predicted the tremendous scope of the problems the Ukrainians were to be faced with as a result of the sudden collapse of the Empire in 1917.

The period preceding the First World War was probably the happiest one in all of modern Ukrainian history. This was the time of the rapid and well-rounded growth of the Ukrainian national cause. The obstacles in its path were high enough to serve as a stimulus, but not sufficient to stop progress. Though the destruction of the Cossack State and the Russification of the Cossack aristocracy had reduced the Ukraine to the level of a politically amorphous ethnic mass, now, from this mass, the Ukrainian nation was beginning to re-emerge. But the huge dimensions of Ukrainian territory, the great number of its population, the complexity of the internal and international questions involved, the stern repressive policy of the Russian government and the despotic character of the Empire which handicapped any free civic activity—all this made the process of rebirth longer and more difficult than was the similar process for other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. When the First World War started, the Ukrainian movement in Russia already presented a real power factor, but it was still only a "movement." It was not as yet a crystallized nation, as were the Poles, Czechs, or Finns. It was during the Revolution that the modern Ukrainian nation was created.

IV. In Retrospect.

The political, and then cultural, Russification of the former class of Cossack Starshyna toward the end of the eighteenth century formed a turning point in the development of Ukrainian national consciousness. In an epoch where the people were still represented by their aristocracy, it meant an interruption in the national existence of the Ukraine. With it came an alienation between the popular masses and the ruling class, who had ceased to serve the interest of their native land. This alienation of the elite from the masses condemned the former
to civic impotence, while depriving the latter of much needed cultural services. Up to 1917 the greatest problem in the realm of Ukrainian consciousness remained that of the competition of two currents within Ukrainian society: one, "Little Russianism," which saw no other path than that of the deepening and securing of the union with Russia, and the other, "conscious Ukrainianism," which clamored for the maintenance and reactivation of Ukrainian identity. Of course, this was not a free competition on both sides, reflecting the internal reactions of the Ukrainian community alone. The "Little Russian" current was supported by the power of the Empire, while the Ukrainian national current was discouraged and persecuted. In the course of the nineteenth century, between these two extreme positions there was a whole scale of nuances. Even the "Little Russians" preserved a sense of their ethnic difference from the "Muscovites" and a certain attachment to local characteristics and customs; and, on the other hand, the "conscious Ukrainians" did not postulate a radical break with Russia—which in any case seemed beyond the bounds of possibility—and sought rather a compromise between Ukrainian and Pan-Russian interests. The decisive factor was to be the attitude of the new social groups that made their appearance in the nineteenth century (intelligentsia and bourgeoisie) and that of the popular masses, who could not be kept in a state of civic tutelage forever. These new social forces were to decide whether they would confirm or reject the national capitulation of the former Cossack aristocracy.
As the possessor of the "largest collection of Slavic material in the Western Hemisphere," the Library of Congress is also one of the most important centers of Ukrainian monographs and serials on the American continent. Its valuable pre- and post-revolutionary holdings concerning the Ukraine, in Ukrainian, as well as in Russian, Polish, English, French, German and other languages, not only should attract scholars and research workers in the United States and abroad, but also serve as a basic source of information for the general reader interested in the history and present conditions of the Ukraine and of Ukrainians living abroad. Some rare editions should interest literary historians, bibliophiles and the cultured public in general.

The Library’s Cyrillic Union Catalog—a unique achievement of its kind—is of immense and immediate practical value to Slavists and Ukrainists the world over. A recently acquired catalogue of some Ukrainian collections abroad (e.g., that of the Shevchenko Society at Sarcelles, France, 1955), excellent facilities for the microfilming of items which are not available in Washington and, finally, an active inter-library loan

* An excerpt from the paper read at the Annual Meeting of AATSEEL in Washington, D.C. on December 30, 1956. As an exception, Ukrainian titles and corresponding names in this article are transliterated according to the Library of Congress rules of 1945.

system—all contribute to make the Library a valuable center of Slavic, and particularly Ukrainian, studies in the United States.

Unfortunately, no adequate survey of Ukrainian holdings in the Library of Congress has as yet been made. Former and present Ukrainian staff members of the Library have been occupied with other work or with other matters only remotely related to the Ukrainian field. Thus, this author’s study in 1956 is the first survey of the Library’s Ukrainica. It was made possible through the initiative and deep understanding of Dr. Sergius Yacobson, Chief of the Slavic and Central European Division of the Library of Congress.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to state the exact date and origin of the first Ukrainian items in the Library of Congress. In his history of the Library, David C. Mearns furnishes evidence that the first publication from Russia came to Washington in 1868.3 Since, at that time, the majority of the Ukrainian people were under Russian domination and, since, on the other hand, many Ukrainian books of the nineteenth century were published in Russia proper (e.g. in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Saratov, etc.)4 it is possible that some publications on the Ukraine reached the Library as early as 1868. Among the uncatalogued Slavic books is an interesting item, Malorusskii literaturnyi sbornik, published by D. L. Mordovtsev in Saratov in 1859; it is quite possible that this book reached the Library in 1868 or even earlier. The same applies to the journal Pravda, published in Lviv in 1868-1880.

By 1901 there were 569 “Russian” Books in the Library,5 some of which—e.g., V. Koval’skii, Ruska chytanka dlia nizhshoi gimnazii, Vienna, 1852 (PG 38526, K6) accessioned as

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4 D. Doroshenko, Pokazchyk novoii ukraiinskoii literatury v Rossii za 1798-1897, Prague, 1925.
5 David C. Mearns, op. cit., p. 184.
early as 1870—were written in Ukrainian and deal with Ukrainian literature. There is evidence that other books on the Ukraine were also coming into the Library before 1901 from Western Ukraine (Galicia, Bukovina, the Carpathian Ukraine) which at that time was under Austro-Hungarian domination. Thus, for example, the Smithsonian Deposit included some very valuable publications printed in Western Ukraine, which were accessioned by the Library in the second half of the nineteenth century. Among them are the following: Golovatskii, I. F., O narodnoi odezhde i ubranstve rusynov ili russkich v Galichine i Severno-vostochnoi Vengrii (no date), Cyr. 4 DK 942 (accessioned as part of the Smithsonian Deposit in 1897); and Etnografichnyi zbirnyk of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv (DK 508. N35), the first volume accessioned on June 23, 1900.

Very valuable nineteenth century publications concerning the Ukraine were included in the Yudin Collection, acquired by the Library in 1907, such as the complete set of an extremely important journal of Ukrainian history, literature, folklore, language, etc., Kievskaya Starina, Nos. 1-94 (DK 508.A.2.K5). Other interesting items from the Yudin Collection regarding the Ukraine are: Kostomarov, N. I., Bogdan Khmel’nitskii, St. Petersburg, 1884 (DK 508.7.K6); Shevchenko, T. G., Poemy, povesti i razskazy pisannya na russkom iazyke, published by Kievskaya Starina, Kiev, 1888 (unclassified); Shevchenko, T. G., Chigirinskii Kobzar’ na malorusskom narechii, St. Petersburg, 1867 (unclassified); Kropyvnytskyi, M. L., Povnyi sbirnyk tvoriv, Kharkiv, 1895 (PG 3948.K75); Pyskuniv, F., Slovnytsia ukrains’koii (abo iuhovoi rus’koi) movy, Odessa, 1873 (PG 3893.R8L4); Petrov, N. I., Ocherki istorii ukrains’koi literatury XIX st., Kiev, 1884 (PG 6 Until 1918 the term “rus’kyi” was used in Galicia, Bukovina and the Carpathian Ukraine instead of “ukrayins’kyi” (Ukrainian).

7 Golovatskii (Holovatsky in Ukrainian) was the first Professor of the Ukrainian language and literature at the University of Lviv, 1848-1867.

8 David C. Mearns, op. cit., p. 184.
UKRAINIAN HOLDINGS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS


The history of the Ukraine is represented in the Yudin Collection by *Istoria Malorossii* by D. Markevych, Moscow, 1842 and ff (DK 508.M34); and Ukrainian ethnology is covered by the same author’s *Obychai, pover'ia, kuhnia i napitki malorossian*, Kiev, 1860. P. O. Kulish’s important book on Ukrainian folklore and history, *Zapiski o iuzhnoi Rusi*, 2 Vols., St. Petersburg, 1856-1857 (DK 508.K95) is also in this collection. From the literary point of view, a very interesting item in the Yudin Collection is the first edition of P. O. Kulish’s *Chorna rada*, St. Petersburg, 1857 (PGR 1527.K9A2C1) and its translation into Russian by the author himself (PGR 1527.K9A2C).

Even the Library’s earliest collections of the poetry of the Ukrainian national writer, Taras Shevchenko, came with Yudin’s books, such as Shevchenko, T. H., *Kozbar’,* St. Petersburg, 1860, as well as the edition of 1884 (PG 3984.S5K6). It would be a highly commendable undertaking to compile an evaluative list of Ukrainica in the Yudin Collection. Here we can only state that the bulk of the most interesting pre-revolutionary items regarding the Ukrainian language, literature, folklore, etc., came to the Library as part of the collection.

The first official mention of Ukrainian books is found in the *Annual Report of the Librarian of Congress* for 1924; it reads as follows: “The Library purchased a collection of Ukrainian publications, 246 titles in 1924/25.” Later on, the data on newly acquired Ukrainian books were published in *Annual Reports* and in *Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions*; the latter presented in 1946 a very detailed description of one of the oldest Ukrainian books in the Library, Innocentius Gisel’s, *Mir s Bohom…* (Kiev Lavra Monastery,
1669). Some useful data regarding the history of Ukrainian holdings in the Library are found in the Library of Congress Information Bulletin.

A new development took place in the history of the Library's Ukrainica in 1956 when the Library entered in a direct exchange relationship with the Governmental Public Library of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R. in Kiev.

Also in 1956 the Library engaged a special Consultant (the author of this paper) who worked at the Library during May and June, 1956, and as a result of his investigations a preliminary survey of Ukrainica in the Library of Congress was published by the Reference Department of the Library.

There is no doubt that in the future the work on Ukrainica in the Library of Congress will be developed further.

THE QUESTION OF ANGLO-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

LUBOMYR VYNAR

Communicated by Olexander Ohloblyn

The question of Anglo-Ukrainian relations in the seventeenth century has not been fully elucidated either in English or in Ukrainian historiography. Ukrainian historians have very seldom made Anglo-Ukrainian relations the subject of their research.¹

The English first learned about the Ukrainian Cossacks and their activities late in the sixteenth century from certain contemporary European publications as, for example, the books by Jean Lasicki² and Leonard Gorecki.³ These books were circulated in all European countries; in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, they were widely read in England. Elie Borschak⁴ presented data concerning English attitudes toward the Cossacks in the early seventeenth century and reviewed some publications about the subject. I. Krypyakevych⁵ gave details concerning the international situation of that period, and concerning the Protestants’ intentions, regarding the Ukrainian Cossacks. Evidently, in the 1620’s and in the early 1630’s, the Cossacks played an important role in the political plans of Sweden, England and Transylvania. In the 1650’s these states watched with ever increasing attention the events of the national revolution led by Khmelnytsky and the strengthening of the Cossack state.

In 1882 Oleksander Lazarevsky published in Kievskaya Starina

² Johannis Lasocii Historia de ingressu Polonorum in Valachiam cum Bogdano voiuoda, Frankfurt, 1578.
³ Leonhardi Gorecii Descriptio belli Ivonieae, Frankfurt, 1578.
⁴ Elie Borschak, ibid., pp. 138-143.
the following excerpt from a letter which he believed might have been written by Cromwell to Khmelnytsky:

Theodatus Chmielnicki, Dei gratia generalissimus ecclesiae Graecorum, imperator omnium cosarorum Zaporovianorum, terror et extirpator nobilitatis Poloniarum fortalitiorumque expugnator, exterminator sacerdotum Romanorum, persecutor ethnicorum, Antichristi et Judacorum.6

Only this excerpt remains from Cromwell’s alleged letter to Khmelnytsky. The excerpt was found in the Ossolineum Library in Lviv, in a manuscript volume having the number 113. Lazarevsky did not furnish the name of the author of the manuscript, mentioning only that

the book belonged to a person, not known to us, who in the middle of the seventeenth century wrote down in this book excerpts from the books and manuscripts read by this person.7

The above excerpt was entered on page 831 of the manuscript, under the year 1649. Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s title occupied three lines; the rest of the page was left blank. It is known now that the manuscript volume was a notebook which belonged to a resident of Kraków, Martin Golinski, and consisted of two parts. The first part ends with the year 1648; the second part, compiled in 1665, has the title, Termina różnych rzeczy które się działy r. 1648 do r. 1664.

In the course of research for the present paper, the author elicited the opinions of several Ukrainian historians concerning Cromwell’s alleged letter, and concerning the correspondence between Cromwell and Khmelnytsky in general. Elie Borschak8 and Olexander Ohloblyn9 do not believe that any relations be-

7 Ibid.
8 Elie Borschak, letter of January 11, 1954, Paris: “I think that the source of Cromwell’s letter to Khmelnytsky is just a legend, having its origin in the work by Chevalier who applied to Khmelnytsky the name ‘A Cromwell of Rus’.” Kubalya popularized this expression by Chevalier and thus the legend was born.” Cf., Ukrayina, Paris, 1953, Vol. IX, p. 790.
9 Olexander Ohloblyn, letter of April 21, 1955, Ludlow, Mass: “In my opinion, the problem of Khmelnytsky-Cromwell relations is veiled by legends. It seems to me that no documentary evidence exists.”
between Cromwell and Khmelnytsky took place. Natalya Polons’ka-Vasylenko\textsuperscript{10} assumes that these relations were possible, yet she points to a lack of documentary and other sources concerning these relations.

Some historians, however, merely on the basis of the above excerpt of the letter, considered the existence of relations between Cromwell and Khmelnytsky an irrefutable fact. Dmytro Doroshenko supports this contention.\textsuperscript{11} Ivan Krypyakevych asserts that “Cromwell wrote to Khmelnytsky as his equal and called him ‘the Ruler of the Cossacks Lands’.”\textsuperscript{12}

In his recent work on Khmelnytsky, Krypyakevych considered the “Cromwell letter” an authentic document, but he did not state categorically that Cromwell personally had written the letter.\textsuperscript{13}

George Vernadsky likewise assumed the existence of Anglo-Ukrainian relations in Cromwell’s time. He writes that Khmelnytsky’s agents tried to contact Cromwell through Rakoczy and Karl Gustavus.\textsuperscript{14} Vernadsky mentions that “there was even at one time a suggestion of direct coordination between them.”\textsuperscript{15} He believes that the relations between the English and the Cossacks were established in 1656.

The so-called Cromwell letter was found in Golinski’s notebook under the year 1649. However, a study of the turbulent events of this year in England, raises the question whether Cromwell might have written any letter at that time to Khmelnytsky who was just beginning to enter the broad European scene as

\textsuperscript{10} N. Polons’ka-Vasylenko, letter of January 23, 1956, Germany.
\textsuperscript{13} I. Krypyakevych, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian S.S.R., Kiev, 1954, p. 399.
\textsuperscript{14} George Vernadsky, Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1941, p. 110.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 118.
a representative of the new Cossack power. On January 29, 1649, the King of England, Charles I, was beheaded. Cromwell, who played an important role in the events leading to the King's execution, was at that time the general of the Army of the English Parliament, but not the dictator of England. Following the execution of Charles I, Parliament proclaimed the Commonwealth under the rule of the Council of State. John Bradshaw headed the Council; Cromwell became one of its most active members.

Khmelnytsky's title and the spelling of his name in the "Cromwell letter" present additional arguments against the authenticity of this letter. In 1649 Western European countries were rather well informed about Khmelnytsky's activities. However, the spelling of his name was distorted in dispatches concerning the Cossack uprising. For example, the most popular contemporary European newspaper, Gazette de France, in 1648, alluded to Ehmielecki or Zmilsky.16 English documents of that time called Khmelnytsky Chimilski, Chmielinsky and Chmilinski.17 The first two spellings were used in 1653; the latter, in January 1655. Contrary to those erroneous transcriptions of Khmelnytsky's name in English documents, the "Cromwell letter" of 1648 gave the correct transcription, Theodatus Chmielnicki with the title, imperator omnium cosacorum Zaporoviensium ... Perhaps Golinski himself corrected an erroneous English transcription. The title given to Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the "Cromwell letter" is not typical for Cromwell, who, in spite of the etiquette of the period, was chary of writing full titles of sovereigns in his letters to them. The title of the King of Sweden was the only exception, being always written by Cromwell in full. There was a custom at that time to write at the top of the letter the names of the addresser and of the addressee, e.g.: "Oliver Protector of the Republic of England to the Most Serene Prince of

Transylvania, greetings—Most Serene Prince... etc.\textsuperscript{18} There is no name of the addresser in Golinski's notebook.

The author had an opportunity to peruse compilations of Cromwell's letters and speeches, including letters to the King of Sweden, but did not succeed in finding any mention in them of Khmelnytsky and the Cossacks. Elie Borschak once informed this author that he had searched archives in London for Cromwell's letters to Khmelnytsky, but did not find them.\textsuperscript{19}

In view of all of the above evidence, it would seem that the letter in Golinski's notebook was not written by Cromwell.

In 1663 Pierre Chevalier published in Paris his book on the history of the Ukrainian Cossacks.\textsuperscript{20} In 1672, it was translated into English by Edward Brown.\textsuperscript{21} In his preface Brown explains his interest in the Ukraine as follows:

> Although Ukraine be one of the most remote Regions of Europe, and the Cossackian name very Modern; yet hath that Countrey been of late the stage of Glorious Actions, and the Inhabitants have acquitted themselves with as great Valour in Martial affairs, as any Nation whatsoever; so that this, and other Motives have made me earnest to put this account of it into English.\textsuperscript{22}

Then the author compares the feats of the "sea dogs" with those of the Cossacks, conquerors of the wild steppe. He writes:

> The Ocean is our delight, and our Engagements upon the Seas, have renetered us considerable to the World. Cossacks do in some measure imitate us, who took their rise from their Victories upon the Euxine, and setled themselves by incountering the Tartars in those Desart Plains, which do so far resemble the Sea, that the


\textsuperscript{19} A personal communication.


\textsuperscript{21} Pierre Chevalier, \textit{A Discourse of the Original, Countrey, Manners, Government and Religion of the Cossacks, with another of the Precopian Tartars. And the History of the Wars of the Cossacks against Poland}, translated by Edward Brown, London, 1672.

\textsuperscript{22} Pierre Chevalier, \textit{A Discourse ...}, The Preface, p. 1.
Mariners Compass may be useful for Direction in the one, as well as the other.\textsuperscript{23}

Brown considered the Cossacks to be the "Eastern Frontiers of Europe" and great lovers of freedom. There is an interesting characterization of Khmelnytsky in the preface, typical for the seventeenth century. Brown writes:

The Actions of Kmielniski, General of Cossacks, are very remarkable; and how he raised himself to that greatness, as to be feared by a Nation, which neither the Power of Christendom, nor the Turks could shake.\textsuperscript{24}

In the French edition of Chevalier's book Khmelnytsky was compared with Cromwell. This comparison is missing in the English translation. According to Borschak, this comparison of Khmelnytsky with Cromwell gave rise to the legend of their relations.

The legend concerning the correspondence between Cromwell and Khmelnytsky resulted in the obfuscation of the question of Anglo-Ukrainian relations during the Khmelnytsky period. However, it is quite possible that these relations existed.\textsuperscript{25} The abundant material showing the interest of the English in Bohdan Khmelnytsky's struggle are to be found in John Thurloe's published papers.\textsuperscript{26} John Thurloe (1616-1668) became Cromwell's secretary in 1653, and was in charge of the English intelligence service and secret police.\textsuperscript{27} Beginning with 1653 there are systematic notations on Khmelnytsky's victories and defeats in Thurloe's seven volumes. These notations were mostly made on the basis of reports of the English agents. The relevant excerpts from Thurloe's papers were published in Ukrainian translation by Volodymyr Bezushko.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Elie Borschak, "Early Relations...," where English publications of that time are reviewed manifesting an interest in Ukrainian affairs.
\textsuperscript{26} A Collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, Esq.
Almost no information has been found concerning the relations between the English diplomats in Constantinople and the Cossacks. On June 12, 1651, Semen Reni reported from Constantinople to the Emperor Leopold concerning contacts between the English, the French, the Transylvanian, and the Cossack diplomats. However, nothing is known about the negotiations of the Cossack delegates with the English in Constantinople.

Late in 1653, Cromwell received the title of Lord Protector of the Republic of England and concentrated all power in his hands.

In November 1655, Khmelnytsky, through his envoy, Father Danylo Hrek, proposed to Karl X Gustavus “a broad military plan of coalition of Sweden, the Ukraine, Muscovy, England, Venice, Austria, and Persia. This coalition was planned with the purpose of defeating and liquidating Turkey and liberating all the Christians from Turkish slavery; the Greeks would be liberated first.” In this author’s opinion, this proposition was inspired by Father Danylo Hrek, who was a prominent leader of the Greek liberation movement in exile. Possibly, he was a mediator between Khmelnytsky and Cromwell. Khmelnytsky’s proposal for the creation of an anti-Turkish league which would include England was never realized. However, the proposal is evidence that Khmelnytsky considered England a prospective ally.

It would seem that the years 1656 and 1657 were favorable for the development of Anglo-Ukrainian relations. At that time Khmelnytsky’s political plans were in agreement with those of Cromwell. A coalition of the Ukraine, Moldavia, Walachia, Transylvania, and Sweden was created, with an anti-Polish and anti-Muscovite character. Karl X Gustavus and George Rakoczy, for their part, had friendly relations with Cromwell, who aimed at creating a league of European non-Catholic states. England, through its agents, followed the Cossack-Swedish negotiations.

On September 12, 1656 an English agent informed his government:

Hier at Elbing is arrived a patriarch sent from Chmielnitsky, generall of the Cossakes, to the king of Sweden for to treat with his majesty a liga and conjunction of armes against the Muscoviter. He goes tomorrow from hence to Frauenburg to the king; and the report goes, that the king will send with this patriarch two of his gentlemen to the above named generall Chmielniczky for to conclude and confirme the treatie, whereof I shall impart more particulars of with the next post... 31

It is known that shortly afterward, Karl X Gustavus sent two envoys, Welling and Törnskjöld, to the Ukraine in order to conclude a treaty with Khmelnytsky.

On the basis of the available material, the existence of direct relations between Cromwell and Khmelnytsky cannot be proven. Nevertheless, English sources reveal an interest by the English government in Ukrainian affairs in the seventeenth century, while Bohdan Khmelnytsky gave consideration to a coalition with England, and the Cossack diplomats had the opportunity to meet English envoys abroad.

A NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF THE BANDURA

New light on the history of the bandura is provided by two books which appeared in Poland since the war. The more important of these is Adolf Chybinski's *Słownik muzyków dawnej Polski*¹ (A Dictionary of Musicians in Ancient Poland) which mentions: "Taraszko, Rafał; bandurzysta królewski w Krakowie w r. 1441..." (... Court bandurist in Kraków in 1441...)

This is a highly significant statement for it throws incontrovertible doubt on the contention, made by A.S. Famintsyn in his book *Domra і srodnye ei muzykal'nye instrumenty...* (The Domra and Related Musical Instruments...) which appeared in St. Petersburg in 1891, that the Ukrainian bandura was borrowed from the English. As proof of this Famintsyn adduced the following: the oldest known mention of the bandura in the Ukraine dates from 1580 and an instrument called the "Bandora" had been invented by John Rose, an Englishman, in 1561. Ergo, the Ukrainian bandura had come to the Ukraine directly or indirectly from England.

The material contained in Chybiski's book, perhaps unknown to Famintsyn, would seem to disprove this contention.

The fact that there were Ukrainian bandurists before 1580 is corroborated by another Polish book: *Muzyka Polskiego Odrodzenia* (The Music of the Polish Renaissance) by Zofia Lissa and Józef Chominsky.² The authors state that during the reign of Sigismund the Elder (first half of the sixteenth century) among the instrumental soloists at the court there was "even one Ukrainian bandurist, also the king's companion at chess."

M. J. Diakowsky

In the beginning of the twentieth century seed cultivation was very poorly developed in the Ukraine and large modern estates were fully dependent on seeds imported from Germany and partly from Austria-Hungary. Large estates annually imported seeds of original varieties of sugar beet, rye, wheat, barley, oats, and peas. A well-known German firm Rabbethge und Giesecke established a large elevator for cleaning and storage of seed in the town of Vynnytsya. The elite sugar beet seeds were being brought from Germany and reproduced on fields of local estates by agreement with their owners. After being cleaned and dried at the Vynnytsya elevator, sugar beet seeds were sold by the firm to local sugar beet growers as original seeds of the Rabbethge und Giesecke firm. Sometimes this firm, not having enough original stock, sold seeds of doubtful quality.

The seeds of cereals were also imported by Ukrainian planters from Germany and Austria-Hungary. The situation was aggravated by the fact that seeds of cereals cultivated under different climatic conditions, when brought to the Ukraine and cultivated there, showed in the course of one or two years a sharp decrease in yield or even perished (e.g., wheat) in the winter under the effect of frost.

It is understandable that some enlightened agriculturists came to the conclusion that seed production and selective breeding of local varieties of sugar beet and cereals should be developed in order to avoid dependency on foreign firms. Selected local varieties would result in larger yields, since these varieties would be adapted to local environment. The first practical steps in the development of seed production and selection were taken early in the 1900's when, on the initiative of estate owners, selective breeding stations were founded in the Kiev, Poltava, Kharkiv,
and Podillya regions. The following experiment stations started their work on selection of sugar beet and cereals before World War I: Bila Tserkva, Ivanivka, Lintsi, Myronivka, Nemercha, Uladivka, and Yaltushkiv. Almost simultaneously the Katerynoslav, Kharkiv, and Poltava state-supported experiment breeding stations came into being. Academician A. A. Sapyehin founded the Odessa Breeding Station which later was reorganized as the Odessa Institute of Genetics and Selection. In the beginning the private-owned stations used mostly seeds imported from Germany as the initial material for the cultivation of seeds of sugar beet; for the cultivation of cereal seeds they used Ukrainian local populations and foreign varieties cultivated at that time by some estates. Although at first the selective breeding was carried on rather primitively and on a small scale, its practical results, especially in the field of cereals, became important during World War I. Mass selection and individual selection (in self-pollinated plants) were used at that time as the main methods of selection.

Early in the 1920's, when agricultural production in the Ukraine was being reestablished after the turbulent years of wars and Revolution, special attention was paid by the Soviet regime to seed selection and cultivation of varieties of high quality, and development in all fields concerned spread on a rather large scale. A special institution, Sortivnycho-nasinnyove upravlinnya (The Plant Variety and Seed Administration), was founded in Kiev. This institution and its first head, Professor B. Panshyn, contributed generously to reorganizing seed selective breeding and seed cultivation in the Ukraine according to modern standards of West European countries. Rather primitive seed stations formerly belonging to private owners now came under the management of the above Administration and were shortly reorganized into well-equipped laboratories. Young specialists were trained and assigned to work at certain stations. In addition to the Vynnytsya elevator, new, better-equipped elevators for cleaning and storage of seed were constructed in Lebedyn and Bakhmach.

In the 1920's almost all breeding stations applied, on a broad scale, the method of crossing local varieties of cereals and sugar
beet with different foreign varieties. The method of inbreeding was applied in work with cross-pollinated plants. The state-owned network of variety test fields was organized for the purpose of testing varieties, newly bred by experiment stations, under various conditions of climate and soil. This network was also used for dividing the Ukraine into regions suitable for the cultivation of certain varieties.

In order to supply the farmers with seeds of pure varieties, the breeding stations began wide-scale production of the elite seeds of all varieties prevailing on farms in the areas of activities of certain stations. Seed nurseries gave an opportunity for yearly cultivation of large areas of elite seeds and to cultivate fields of the first reproduction. Special seed farms were engaged in propagation of the elite seeds and the seeds of the first reproduction. The seed farms supplied seeds to all farmers.

Subsequently, late in the 1920’s, the pure Ukrainian varieties of winter rye, wheat, and oats were used in the greatest part of the Ukrainian territory. The only seeds used for cultivation of sugar beet were those selected at local seed stations.

The compulsory collectivization of farms in the Ukraine in the early 1930’s ruined this well-organized system of supplying seeds of varieties of high quality to all farmers. In 1934 efforts were again made to put the process of seed selection and cultivation into operation. Before World War II the Ukrainian selective breeding had acquired some achievements: quite a few new varieties of cereals were bred by Ukrainian breeders.

Some varieties of cereals cultivated in the Ukraine are described below.

**Winter Rye**

*Tarashcha Rye.* This variety was bred at the Verkhnyachka Selective Breeding Station in the Kiev region by breeders L. N. Maksymchuk and E. Yozhikova in 1922-1926. The method of individual selection was used, and the variety was selected from the local rye grown in the Tarashcha district. The heads consist of a large number of spikelets and have a square horizontal section. The grains are greenish-yellow and of a medium size.
These ryes are adapted to the environment of Western Ukraine and do well on poor soil. During a few successive years these ryes produced larger crops than those produced by ryes of the known German variety, *Petkus*.

*Nemyshlyanka Rye.* This variety was bred at the Kharkiv Selective Breeding Experiment Station by the breeder Yur’yev, before World War I. It was selected from the local varieties by the method of individual selection. The ryes are well adapted to the environment of the Right-Bank Ukraine. Being adapted to the severe winter weather conditions, this variety fully supplanted the *Petkus*, a German variety which was not frost resistant. During the course of many years the *Nemyshlyanka Rye* produced much higher crops than the *Petkus* did. Its morphological character has close similarity to that of the *Tarashcha Rye*. The plant is grown in the Right-Bank Ukraine.

**Winter Wheat**

Winter wheat is the chief cereal in the Ukraine. Before World War II, ca. 25 per cent of the total land used for cultivation in the Ukraine was in winter wheat.¹

*Ukrayinka* was bred at the Myronivka Selective Breeding Experiment Station by the breeder L. I. Kovalevsky in the years of World War I. The method of single selection was used and the plant was selected from the variety *Banatka* (originated in the Banat Province in former Austria-Hungary) which had been widely cultivated in the Ukraine before World War I. This wheat has white heads with long beards and red grains (var. *erythrospermum*). The variety has a high yield, producing flour and bread of a fine quality. It matures early and is drought resistant. However, in years with high precipitation this variety is attacked by rust and lies flat. Despite this, *Ukrayinka* is the best variety cultivated in the Ukraine and before World War II was grown on an area of ca. five million hectares.

*Durável 348* was selected at the Ivanivka Selective Breeding Experiment Station by the breeder B. Lebedynsky in 1909, from

¹ *Posevnye ploshchadi SSSR*, 1938.
the variety *Banatka*. The method of individual-single selection was used. The heads are white, with long beards and red grains (*var. erythrospermum*). The plants mature late, but have a rather high winter resistance and produce large crops. Due to their winter resistance, these wheats are chiefly cultivated in Russia. In the Ukraine they produce crops lower than those produced by *Ukrayinka* wheats.

*Kharkiv* 917 was selected at the Kharkiv Breeding Station by the breeder Yur’yev before World War I from local wheats. The method of individual selection was used. The morphological and partly physiological character is close to that of the *Durable* variety. It is also widely cultivated in Russia.

*Kooperatororka* was selected at the Odessa Breeding Station by A. A. Sapyehin in the years of World War I. The method of individual-single selection was used. This wheat originated from *Banatka*. Its morphological character is close to *Ukrayinka*; however, it is less winter resistant and therefore is mostly cultivated in the south (Kuban region).

*Verkhnyachka* 017 was selected at the Verkhnyachka Breeding Station by the breeders L. P. Maksymchuk and T. D. Kovytn in 1932 by the method of crossing. As parental forms, *Ukrayinka* and *T 386* wheats were used, the latter being a pure line selected from the local Tarashcha wheats. This was the first beardless variety selected in the Ukraine (*var. lutecens*) with white heads and red grains. This new variety has a higher yield than *Ukrayinka*, as was manifested in the course of several years. The quality of the grains is the same as that of the grains of *Ukrayinka*, but *Verkhnyachka* is rust resistant and the plants do not lie flat. Therefore *Verkhnyachka* gradually supplants *Ukrayinka*, although World War II deferred this development. Now it has the name *Stalinka*.

*Zorya* was selected at the Nemercha Breeding Station by the breeder L. I. Kovalevsky early in the 1920’s. The method of individual selection was used. The heads are white, very large, with beards. The grains are large and red (*var. erythrospermum*). This variety is not attacked by rust. In the northwestern part of the Right-Bank Ukraine its yield is higher than that pro-
duced by *Ukrayinka* wheats. However, *Zorya* is not drought resistant and has a low frost resistance. Therefore it is cultivated much less than *Ukrayinka*, being limited to several regions of the Right-Bank Ukraine, where it is the best variety to cultivate.

1239 *Kharkiv* was selected at the Kharkiv Breeding Station by the breeder Yur’yev in the first years of World War I. The heads are red, with beards. The grains are red (var. *ferrigineum*). This variety matures late, but shows a high frost resistance and therefore is cultivated in the eastern-steppe part of the Left-Bank Ukraine, where *Ukrayinka* wheats are destroyed by frost in the years of low snow coverage.

**Summer Barley**

*Kharkiv 0353/133* was selected at the Kharkiv Breeding Station in the years of World War I by the breeder Yur’yev. The method of individual selection was applied and the variety was bred from the local farmers’ barleys. The variety produces high crops in the Left-Bank Ukraine. It belongs to the two-rowed husky forms (var. *nutans*). The plant matures early and in some years is attacked by the disease *Helminthosporum sativum*.

*Odessa 046* was selected at the Odessa Breeding Station by Academician A. A. Sapyehin in the years of World War I. The plant is drought resistant, two-rowed, husky, and has smooth beards (var. *medicum*). The latter characteristic results in high quality straw, making good fodder. *Odessa 046* is chiefly cultivated in the steppes of the Right-Bank Ukraine.

*Verkhnyachka 06* was selected at the Verkhnyachka Breeding Station by the breeder Yozhikova in 1927. The method of individual selection was used and the variety was bred from the local farmers’ barleys. This variety has high yields and is attacked neither by smuts, nor by *Helminthosporum sativum*. The plant belongs to two-rowed husky barleys (var. *nutans*, sub-varietas *europeum*). It has a medium growing season, reaches a considerable height and is cultivated in the northwestern part of the Right-Bank Ukraine.

*Uman* was selected at the Verkhnyachka Breeding Station by
the breeder I. K. Bespalow in 1932. The method of individual selection was used and the variety was selected from local barleys. This variety has large yields, is not attacked by diseases, matures early and has high qualities as a source for beer production (a low per cent of husks and 10 to 12 per cent protein). Before World War II in the Right-Bank Ukraine it began to supplant the varieties *Verkhnyachka* 06 and *Loosdorf* (an Austrian variety brought to the Ukraine after World War I).

*Hrushevo* is an old variety bred by mass selection on the estate Hrushevo, Odessa region, before World War I. This variety is drought resistant, and since the plant belongs to multi-rowed forms (var. *pallidum*) the grains have a lower quality than those of two-rowed forms. *Hrushevo* barleys are cultivated only in the Mykolayiv and Odessa regions.

**Oats**

053 *Verkhnyachka* was selected at the Verkhnyachka Breeding Station in the years of World War I by the method of individual multiple selection from a sample of oats, *Teodoziya*, imported from Poland. The plant belongs to middle-grain beardless oats and has yellow grains (var. *aurea*). In the years 1925-1937 this was the best variety in the Ukraine and was most widely distributed. Since it matures late it was grown in the northern parts of the Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine.

*Verkhnyachka* 339 was selected at the above-named station in 1932 by breeders I. K. Bespalow and L. P. Maksymchuk from samples of oats of Circassian (the Caucasus) origin. The plant belongs to coarse-grain forms, has beards and white grains (var. *aristata*). Due to its high resistance to attacks of Swedish and Hessen flies and because of its immunity to smuts and rust, in the course of several years this variety turned out to be the best variety of oats in the Ukraine and the Caucasus, yielding the highest crops. Before World War II it was cultivated on an area of ca. 200.000 *hectares*. It was presented at the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow in 1939-40 as the new, best va-
variety of oats, and Verkhnyachka Breeding Station received a prize for having selected it.

*Kharkiv* 596 was selected by the Kharkiv Breeding Station by the breeder Yur'yev during the years after the end of World War I. The method of individual selection was used. The variety originated from varieties of oats imported from Germany, which at that time were cultivated in the Ukraine. The plant is beardless, belongs to medium-grained oats, the husk is not much developed and the grains are yellow (var. *aurea*). The variety matures early, is rather drought resistant and is therefore cultivated in the steppe zone of the Left-Bank Ukraine.

**Summer Wheats**

Summer wheats are grown much less than winter wheats in the Ukraine. The rather small areas of cultivation of summer wheats are situated chiefly in some southern regions, e.g., in the Mykolayiv and Odessa Provinces. This is explained by the fact that summer wheat in comparison with barley, millet and oats has a very low yield.

*Dnipropetrovsk* 010 was selected at the Dnipropetrovsk (formerly Katerynoslav) Station in 1911 by the method of individual selection from the foreign variety *Noe*. The heads have beards, are of red color, and the grains are white. The variety belongs to hard wheats *Triticum durum*, var. *Hordeiforme*. It is cultivated in the Ukraine on small areas, but is grown more extensively in Russia and in West Siberia. The variety produces flour suitable for macaroni.

*Hirka* 274 was selected by the Odessa Breeding Station by the method of individual selection from the local varieties *Hirka*. The plant belongs to the naked soft wheats *Triticum vulgare*. It is cultivated only in the southern Right-Bank Ukraine. A negative characteristic of this variety is that it matures late.

**Millet**

Millet is not appreciated in the United States or Western Europe, but it is extensively cultivated in the Ukraine, where
its greatest use is as grains for porridge. In certain years millet gives larger crops than winter wheat and barley. The usual yield is 35-40 centners from a hectare. The most extensively distributed variety is described below.

*Veselo-Podol* was selected at the Veselo-Podol Station in the years after the Revolution by the method of individual selection from the local farmers' millets of the Poltava region. The plant belongs to millets with drooping heads and branchy panicles, have large grains and few husks. The variety has high yields and is cultivated everywhere in the Ukraine.
BOOK REVIEWS


If one wants to know how linguistics would appear today had it not developed during the last fifty years, let him read books published recently in the Ukraine. It is amazing how Ukrainian linguists manage to maintain their scientific innocence and isolation. The studies by A. Sobolevskij (1907), often referred to, and by Kryms'kyj (1908), used mostly without reference, are the latest sources of their inspiration and knowledge. Even the titles of A. Šaxmatov’s books (1916, 1918) rarely appear in the recent publications. The Ukrainian linguists of the Twenties, V. Hancov, O. Kurylo, P. Buzuk, V. Simovyč, I. Zilins'kyj, the acme of Ukrainian linguistic thought, are passed over in silence for well known political reasons. No Polish scholars are quoted either, and it is apparent that young Ukrainian linguists have no idea of the work and the concepts of T. Lehr-Spławiński, W. Kuraszkiewicz and Z. Stieber, to mention only the most outstanding. Western European and American research, to judge from the Soviet Ukrainian writings on linguistic subjects, seems never to have existed, if rare references to A. Meillet, known from Russian translations, are disregarded. Even the only expert in Slavic linguistics and the sole creative mind in Ukrainian linguistics today, L. Bulaxovs'kyj, though likewise affected to a great extent by the parochial character of Soviet Ukrainian linguistics, is quoted with some reluctance or caution, such references being limited to his more conformist statements. The only work of a later date, which is unreservedly recognized by Soviet Ukrainian linguists today is *Ocerki po istorii russkogo literaturnogo jazyka staršego perioda* by S. Obnorskij (1946), a book in which ignorance and negligence of facts so well match the pretentious all-Russian political bias.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that in the publications of Soviet Ukrainian linguists on the history of Ukrainian we find, as a rule, no new ideas and no new facts. They consist of telling and retelling what was considered truth fifty years ago, and the reader is happy if the facts are not too distorted (to a certain degree they always are distorted because they must be adapted to political requirements) and if there are at least some new examples drawn from original sources.

Within this pattern, however, certain gradations exist. None of the recent publications on the history of Ukrainian contribute anything to our know-
ledge of the subject. But they may be considered as contributions to our knowledge of the present status of Soviet Ukrainian linguistics. From this standpoint they can be of interest, and it is our duty (a very dull duty!) to follow them up. The first book in the field to reach us was F. Medvedjev’s Istorična hramatyka ukrajins’koji movy (Kharkiv 1955). This probably is the most disgraceful and scandalous book in the whole history of Ukrainian linguistics: not a single new fact, striking ignorance and cringing servility surpassing all the limits so far set; these are the characteristics of the book. A Porivnjal’na hramatyka ukrajins’koji i rosijs’koji mov by six authors (T. Bajmut, M. Bojčuk, M. Volyns’kyj, M. Žovtobrjux, T. Malyna, S. Samijlenko. Kiev 1957) followed, being a naively concocted hodgepodge of synchronic and diachronic approaches, facts of the languages and facts of spellings all on the level of an elementary school grammar, but with somewhat more dignity and honesty than in Medvedjev’s work.

The third book, that under review, is undoubtedly better, though basically on the same level. Copious examples, many of them secondhand but many taken from original texts and for the first time offered for general use, are a positive feature of the book. Moreover, there is in the book an original theory (though concerning a separate fact) which is unprecedented in Soviet Ukrainian linguistics of the last quarter of the century. Thus, M. Žovtobrjux attempts to reconsider the chronology of what is traditionally called change of e into o in the cases like včera, pšono, to the effect that the change must have been a phenomenon of the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries and not of the oldest period in the history of Ukrainian as is traditionally assumed. Establishment of a correct chronology in many instances gives clues to an understanding of the real nature of phonetic changes in Ukrainian. In older research these problems were often neglected. This resulted in a lack of any coherence in the historical phonology of Ukrainian and made the latter seemingly the most illogical and entangled among the histories of the Slavic languages. Therefore any well-founded endeavor to revise problems of chronology in the phonetic development of Ukrainian is welcome. Žovtobrjux’s transference of the change e > o into later centuries is tempting because this would account for Western Ukrainian deviations (like učera, šestýj), although Žovtobrjux himself does not appeal to these facts. His only argument is the considerably later appearance of spellings with o in the old texts, except in some morphologically conditioned cases (type imuščomu, poslědujuščomu). Yet this argument, in the style of Sobolevskij and Kryms’kyj, and on their level, is insufficient. We know now that texts very often delay reflecting a phonetic change for many centuries. In addition, the data of the texts, as in most cases, are contradictory. Examples like ouražons, blažons cannot be deduced from morphological analogy. To solve the problem it would be necessary to analyze it against the background of the whole phonemic system of Proto- and Old-Ukrainian dialects in their developments, as well as against the comparative background, a pro-
procedure never applied by Žovtobrjux and his co-authors, thus again following the methods of Sobolevskij and Kryms’kyj. If the phonemic and comparative approach is used, one still is rather prone to retain the traditional chronology, placing the split of the Common Slavic *ea (≡ e) in e and o into the prehistoric period. I touched upon these problems in my article on the status of consonants before e in Proto-Ukrainian (Festschrift M. Vasmer, Berlin 1956, pp. 482ff) and would like to refer the reader to this article.

Besides this theory of Žovtobrjux, the reviewer was unable to uncover any new ideas in the book, nor any methodically interesting approaches. True, the book contains two more “innovations.” The period before the fourteenth century is labeled here, according to the all-Soviet prescription, as the period of a uniform “Old Rus’ language.” Data concerning the literary language, which actually was by and large common for the Eastern Slavic tribes and principalities, and concerning the spoken language, i.e., the dialects, are deliberately confused, without any attempt to disentangle them. This is now obligatory in the Soviet Union. The “innovation” consists of the authors’ quoting old Novgorod, Rjazan’ and Moscow texts, without the slightest reservation—as pertinent to the history of Ukrainian—and giving testimony about the makeup of the Ukrainian language of that time. This is, of course, a logical consequence of the idea of an absolutely uniform Old Rus’ language and, whatever the intention of the authors, it is also the best means to compromise this idea and make it ridiculous. The second “innovation” going along with the first one, is the authors’ transcribing of all the e’s of the Old Ukrainian and even Old Church Slavonic texts as je (e), thus writing njebo, sjelo, etc. This is in many instances tantamount to direct falsification of the texts. That consonants were palatalized before e, at least in some dialects of Old Ukrainian, is quite possible. But, first it should be proved, and not taken for granted, and, secondly, there is no need to introduce a phonetic transcription of the old texts in this regard while leaving them intact in all other respects. (One should then transliterate ě as a diphthong, write words of the type volk as vorvk, etc.) No doubt, this “innovation” is dictated by the wish to make the “Old Rus’ language” closer to Modern Russian not only by its name but also by the manner in which it is to be pronounced. This is however mere politics and not at all linguistics.

There is nothing else to discuss in the book. The reviewer’s duty normally consists also of pointing out the factual distortions and blunders. They are, however, so numerous in the book under review that it is impossible to fulfill this requirement (although the book has not only five authors but also an editor, and won the special prize of the Ministry of Education). A few examples taken at random will suffice. The Finnish word for scab is karsta, not korsta (18); there is no Finnish word tolkoo borrowed from the Slavic toloka (common pastureland) (18); Bojčuk obviously has confused it with talkkuna, Sl. toloknɔ (oat flour); the name of the Carpathian mountains
Beskydy did not develop from Bez-kind-y, has nothing in common with the German Kind (child) and of course does not preserve the Common Slavic k without change into č according to the rule of the first palatalization (19); the idea of any etymological connection between the German Kind and the Slavic čedo, (both child) current in the older times was refuted long ago (19); the river name Ros' is no exception from the Ukrainian change of o into i because it never had o in Old Ukrainian, but had ь (19). This is a small sample of blunders by Bojčuk, taken from just two pages. And examples from Žovtobrjux follow, this time taken from three pages: Czech has sit’ (net), sira (sulphur) and not sit’, sira (78); Lithuanian has vėtra (storm) and not vētra (or is it Lettish vetra?), ेðmị (I eat) and not ेdmị (78); the change of initial jo into i- was not Common Slavic but dialectal (Cf. Czech jehla (needle), not *jihla) (80); b in brat (brother) cannot continue Indo-Europen b because it developed from IE bh (80); the affricate š in Ukrainian dzvin (bell) did not arise from dissimilation with the preposition z (81) but was brought about by phonemic reasons (Cf. my article in Festschrift A. Martinet, Canarias 1957. pp. 251ff).

Errors like these, abounding on each page, so that the book practically cannot be used by a layman, characterize all the authors of the book. Only in the chapters written by Samijlenko are there fewer errors. One of the most striking examples of the provincial and the secondhand character of the book is how Lithuanian examples are quoted. Žovtobrjux quotes them in the modern spelling though with numerous mistakes. Other authors give their Lithuanian examples in Polish spelling abandoned about forty years ago. And finally in Bezpal’ko we reach the climax: The Lithuanian examples appear in Russian Cyrillic alphabet which was forcibly imposed on Lithuanian by the Russian government in the 19th century and never used since 1905! A major portion of the Greek quotations are full of misprints and errors. Some mistakes in analysis are so elementary that even a school child would be ashamed of them (mylovar being analyzed as containing the suffix ar!—p. 220).

This enumeration may go on and on to constitute not less than another book of about the same size. To be just, however, one must say that the number of errors, though too high even for a student’s paper, is much lower than in Medvedjev’s hack work. In addition, one must take into account the situation of young linguists in the Ukraine. They lacked proper teachers because the older generation of Ukrainian linguists had been destroyed in the thirties; they lacked reading material because all the best books of Ukrainian authors have been forbidden since the thirties; they have no access to foreign publications because their knowledge of foreign languages is insufficient; they cannot buy foreign books, and even the libraries for a very long time were not supplied with foreign books. Everything has been done to make the young generation provincial. It is not surprising if they are like this. What is unusual is that, unlike Medvedjev, at least some of the
authors of the book reviewed apparently try to improve their production, at least in some minor details. Bezpal'ko turns to Potebnja, a great scholar, who, however, is in many respects obsolete and, in addition, is naively utilized. Žovtobrjux's attempt at some independent thinking has been mentioned above. Samijlenko tries hard to be accurate in handling his data.

The book cannot stand up to any criteria applied either to a textbook or to a study. It shares the low level with most other books in the field, recently published in Ukraine. But one does not get the impression that all the authors are hopeless. What they need is, first, a sense of responsibility, which will impel them to take their data from the original sources. If, however, they take data from secondary sources, they should at least verify it. Secondly, and this is most important, before they write anything for publication they must study their predecessors, both Ukrainian and Western. We see now that many a Russian linguist does this. Andreev, Ivanov, Reformatskij, Šaumjan and others do not conceal that they learn much from the great linguists of the Modern West. The leading Russian linguistic periodical Voprosy jazykoznanija abounds in references to Western European and American sources. Obviously, Russian linguists are aware of the fact that such study is the only means of overcoming the provincial character of Soviet linguistics. Are these Western European and American sources taboo for the young generation of Ukrainian linguists? Are these students unable to read these sources? Do they not dare? Do they not want to? Without such study their writings will forever remain parochial, out-of-date before they are published, atomistic and naive in their approach, unreliable in their data, devoid of any worth-while ideas, and disseminating ignorance and falsehood instead of knowledge.

George Y. Shevelov
Columbia University


The appearance of this book is a major event for observers of the contemporary Soviet scene, for it is the first truly full-scale effort to analyze the nationalist component in the Soviet system of rule. Dr. Barghoorn, now Professor of Political Science at Yale University, is extraordinarily well qualified to undertake this analysis. The five years (1942-47) that he spent in the Soviet Union as American press attaché have provided him with an experience of direct observation of recent Soviet conditions almost unequalled among American scholars. Such direct observation has been especially important to the author in the preparation of the present volume, since the published Soviet sources he has extensively employed, while useful, are inadequate gauges of the extent of Russian nationalism. Moreover, it should be stressed
that Barghoorn's exceptionally lucid prose style is a very decided asset in the presentation of the complicated problem with which he deals. Barghoorn's analysis has three major aspects. One, of course, is the nature and cause of Russian nationalism in the U.S.S.R. Like many other writers, he regards the nationalist element in contemporary Soviet thought and action as part of an uneasy amalgam with totalitarian Communism. Indeed, he even detects a continuing state of tension between these elements: "Traditional nationalism, whatever its defects, and these are many, is not totalitarianism," (p. 260). This tension exists, Barghoorn seems to feel, because the major motivation for use of Russian nationalism by the Soviet leaders is a utilitarian one, "to fill the void left by the destruction of beliefs and customs capable of satisfying the Russian—and the universal human—need for emotionally satisfying myths," (ibid.). In taking this view, the author is to some degree at variance with many critics of the Soviet regime who have held that Russian nationalism, rather than Communism, was the real ideological force behind the Soviet regime. Barghoorn, however, advances powerful arguments to show that needs inherent in the totalitarian system—maintenance of power through reliance on the largest and most "proletarian" national group; uniformity of culture to facilitate administration; and the provision of the indispensable social myth described above—were sufficient to cause the regime to turn to Russian nationalism. As Barghoorn sees it, the Soviet rulers have used all means that have appeared conducive to strengthening their rule, and these have usually meant increased centralization, and suppression of national diversity: "there is a barbaric logic, not necessarily connected with nationalism, in the Soviet attitude toward non-Russian border peoples," (p. 83).

The impact of Russian nationalism upon these non-Russian subjects of the Soviet empire is the second major theme of the work. Barghoorn makes a careful and interesting analysis of the position of each of the major nationalities and the extent and future prospects of their "Russification." While this reviewer cannot fully accept the "continuum of Russification" presented on pp. 92-94 (he would consider the Byelorussians and the non-Moslem Finnic groups the most Russified, the Moslems least, and the Ukrainians, together with the Armenians and the Georgians, in an intermediate position), he is bound to agree with Barghoorn that the long-run forces in the Soviet system tend to denationalize, i.e., to Russify, the nationality groups. While, as Barghoorn carefully points out, the ethical justification for the American pattern of incorporation of voluntary immigrants into a pre-existing national culture cannot be extended to the Soviet practice of denationalizing groups forcibly incorporated, with their homelands, into the U.S.S.R., the practical consequences of the two "melting
pots" may well tend in the long run to be the same. Both countries, in contrast to typical colonial empires, are characterized by very high social and geographical mobility, in the context of an increasingly urban, industrial civilization. Under these conditions the "mobile men" tend to adapt to the dominant cultural pattern, and all the uprooted "anonymous" city dwellers tend to lose their traditional national identification. This somber picture is somewhat relieved, however, by the reflection that in the short run, especially if the Soviet system should be subjected to severe strains arising from another source, the Soviet efforts at denationalization may have the effect of stimulating the development of a defensive nationalist reaction among the non-Russian groups.

The third major problem analyzed by Barghoorn is the effect of Soviet Russian nationalism upon the relations of the U.S.S.R. with the external world. Unfortunately, lack of space precludes detailed discussion of this fascinating theme, which is, of course, intimately related to Barghoorn's earlier work, The Soviet Image of the United States.1

Barghoorn's work is extraordinarily free of factual errors, and, while the conclusions cannot be taken as definitive in view of the extreme difficulty of predicting the course of Soviet affairs, they are both moderate and well-reasoned. With a few exceptions, the subject is well covered. This reviewer would, however, have welcomed some more effort to utilize the experience of the Russian emigration as a clue to nationalist attitudes in the U.S.S.R. itself. While Barghoorn does frequently cite the views of individual émigrés whom he interviewed, an analysis of the organizational and ideological evolution of Russian nationalist groups abroad, and especially their experience in the German-occupied U.S.S.R., might be very revealing. It is surprising, moreover, that in his extensive analysis of the foreign policy implications of Soviet Russian nationalism, the author fails even to allude to the use of Pan-Slav themes in Eastern Europe during and immediately following World War II. These, however, are minor criticisms, and on the whole one must be most grateful to Professor Barghoorn for having set the study of Russian nationalism upon such a comprehensive and objective level.

John A. Armstrong


The value of Andriy Kotsevalov's works lies in the abundance of Soviet studies on the subject he reviewed, as well as in his able criticism of the methodological approach of Soviet scholars as a result of their endeavors to apply the Marxist method to the studies. The author briefly reviews publications pertaining to the studies of the ancient history and culture of the North Black Sea Coast region, including works on archaeology, history of arts and crafts, epigraphy, and numismatics. A great part of his work Kotsevalov devotes to the problem of the history of social relations in the above-mentioned region, criticizing the concepts of Soviet scholars. The author argues with the theory which is based on a misinterpretation of Strabo's text, implying that production methods in Scythia were based on the slavery structure of the society. Kotsevalov thinks that the view of Soviet scholars on the existence of primitive Communism in Scythia was caused by confusing the concept of the true Scythians as understood by Herodotus with the later, broader, concept of the "Scythians" by Strabo. The latter replaced the primary ethnic concept of the Scythians by the new geographic concept, in which "Scythians" included various European and Asiatic nomadic people.

Discussing the uprising at Bosporus under the leadership of Saumak, Kotsevalov argues against the opinion that Saumak's host was composed of slaves. He thinks that they were Scythians, hirelings of the Bosporian tsar. Saumak himself was a commander in the tsar's services, probably not a Scythian, but a member of the Bosporian aristocracy. The author is right in stating that "only a strong military unit would be able to conquer the Bosporus in a short time, having taken possession of Theodosiya and Pantikapei" (p. 25). Therefore there is no reason to see in Saumak's uprising a social revolution and suggest that he and his host were the oppressed slaves. This could also be a court-revolution.

Kotsevalov also disputes the "patriotic tendencies" of Soviet scholars which ascribe to the native population (the Scythians, Sarmatians, and others) a too important role in the development of the culture of the North Black Sea Coast region, which implies the concept of Greek-Scythian or Greek-Sarmatian culture. The Greek-Scythian culture was allegedly marked by its singularity, in many respects exceeded the
culture of Greek metropolis, and strongly influenced the Slavic culture.

In the opinion of Soviet scholars the Eastern Slavs were an autochthonous population. Kotsevalov contradicts this thesis by advancing a theory of migrational ethnogenesis. Unfortunately the author does not present a systematic exposition of his concept. In this reviewer's opinion, both theories could be conciliated on the basis of contemporary research: early in the first millennium B.C. the ancient Slavs already populated the northern part of the present Ukraine. Later other elements joined them, having come in the process of migrational movements in Eurasia.

Alexander Dombrovsky


Mr. Wlasowsky's work on the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is planned in four volumes in an English and a Ukrainian edition; the English translation being prepared by M. J. Diakowsky. Three volumes of the Ukrainian edition have already been published. The first volume of the English edition is reviewed here.

The author is known for his studies concerning both the history of the church and certain theological problems. His *Outline History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church*, although a general treatment for the non-specialist, is of interest as the first attempt at a comprehensive study of the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Till now most writings concerning the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have treated only individual aspects of this problem.

In the introduction the author discusses some general ideas of nationality and religion, and of national churches. The literature on Ukrainian church history is mentioned here in passing. A section of the introduction is devoted to Christianity in Ukrainian territory before the conversion of the people of Ukraine-Rus'. Chronicles and folk legends were used by the author as source material for this discourse. He states (p. 26) that while historians deny the complete accuracy of the *Primary Chronicle*, "it has its own importance not because of the external facts contained therein but because of its internal significance."

The author introduces a periodization of the history of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, basing his period divisions on historical events which influenced the development of the Church. The reviewed volume covers the First Period, 988-1240, the Second Period, 1240-1458, and a part of the Third Period, 1458-1688.

Describing the First Period, Mr. Wlasowsky illuminates the spread of Christianity from Kiev after the baptizing of Volodymyr and the people of
Kiev. The Church hierarchy and administration of the Period are thoroughly analyzed, and the author polemizes with the writers who were of the opinion that the Orthodox Church was based on Caesaropapism. Mr. Wlasowsky states that, "From its organization in the days of Volodymyr the Great, through all of its history, the Ukrainian Church has been an outstanding example of the application of the system of symphony, of harmony between the state and church administration for the good of the people." (p. 47). This reviewer is of the opinion that if it is possible to consider Caesaropapism with regard to the Orthodox Church, then it could be applied probably to the Muscovite Orthodox Church, beginning with the reign of Peter I.

Mr. Wlasowsky treats in some detail the cultural and educational influence of the Church, the changes which it brought in the people's traditions during the transformation from paganism to Christianity.

Covering the Second Period, the author describes events from the fall of the Kievan State to the division of the Kiev Metropolitanate. New states with new political centers were created after the fall of the Kievan State, resulting in a struggle between them for the Orthodox metropolitan see. The efforts of Muscovy are emphasized in its endeavors to take the Metropolitanate from Kiev. A section is devoted to the question of the relation of the Church to Christian and non-Christian rulers controlling certain Ukrainian lands. Internal administration of the Church, and its spiritual life, are also discussed. Mr. Wlasowsky presents material showing that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was closely connected with the people's life, the Christianization being particularly noticeable in ritual folk poetry dating back to pagan days. Carols are cited to show how the old pagan songs were changed under the influence of Christianity.

The Third Period (1458-1686) is divided by the Union of Berestye in 1596 into two parts. Only the first part treating events leading up to the Union is dealt with in the reviewed volume. Mr. Wlasowsky dwells in detail on the conditions of life in the Ukraine and on the development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Polish-Lithuanian State. The internal condition of the Church is presented as aggravated by difficulties caused by its existence in a state where another religion predominated. The author stresses the role of the Church in the development of schooling and of spiritual life in the sixteenth century: founding of the Ostroh Academy in Volynia at the end of the 1570's and the Brotherhood School in Lviv in 1586. The first printing of books in the Ukraine was connected with the Church activities. Concerning the problem of the Western and Central European Reformation, whose repercussions were felt in the Ukraine, the author expresses views somewhat different from those of Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, Dmytro Doroshenko, and Olexander Lototsky.

Mr. Wlasowsky describes in detail Skarga's action; the latter published a book in 1577 in which the idea of union of the Orthodox Church with
Rome was advanced. Then Mr. Wlasowsky discusses in detail developments in Catholic and Orthodox circles which resulted in the Church Union of Berestye. The volume ends with a discourse concerning events in Berestye on October 6-9, 1596. Unfortunately, the author, in analyzing events preceding the Berestye Union, did not present a broader survey of religious life in Eastern Europe. A description of religious processes in the lands under Turkish domination would be of special interest, since the Ukrainian-Turkish relations of that time greatly influenced many later developments.

A few comments are to be made concerning the book as a whole. This reviewer shares the author’s opinion that besides Byzantine influences, the Balkans also greatly affected the development of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, as is shown by many facts presented in the reviewed volume. It is a pity that the author did not refer to other influences, stemming, for example, from the Georgian Church. This influence was manifested in borrowings by the Ukrainian Church of some Georgian words and traditions. A serious shortcoming of the book is the deficiency in references. This situation could be partly improved by appending a list of bibliographical sources to the last volume. In addition, the transliteration of bibliographical sources is not consistent throughout the volume.

Ivan Sweet


Professor Clark’s book—a monograph on a selected branch of Soviet economics, concentrated on the development of the iron and steel industry in the U.S.S.R.—is a welcome contribution in this field. He does not discuss the development of this industry in pre-revolutionary Russia, giving only a few data referring back to the situation on the eve of World War I (1913), in order to make the picture of statistical comparison more clear. The author correctly points out that the Soviets did not start out from zero; they inherited a very strong iron industry, particularly in the Ukraine with her 49 blast furnaces in 1913. Concerning this last figure, it may be noted that some Soviet sources refer to 63 as the number of blast furnaces in the Ukraine at that time.\(^1\)

Clark ably analyzes all the factors influencing the growth of the iron and steel industry in the Ukraine, in Ural and Central Russia, and in the Asiatic regions of the U.S.S.R., and also indicates what importance the Soviet leaders and scientific and technical personnel attach to those factors. From the author’s analysis, it is clear that in an over-

whelming number of cases the motives for decisions in the U.S.S.R. are based on entirely different reasoning that in the USA. The most striking examples of this are: little or even no attention is paid to the consumers' market (in the Western meaning of the word); a different approach is used to evaluate the productivity of a steel plant (no man-hour coefficient); a deep-rooted antipathy exists toward any imports as a remedy for shortages in rich iron-ores and high-quality coking coal. In connection with these features, Clark envisages that huge difficulties may arise in the near future for the Soviet iron and steel industry. The most dangerous are the continuous deterioration of iron-ores used, the difficulties in securing high-grade coke supplies, and, last but not least, the far from sufficient scrap supply. The quantity of raw iron-ore needed to produce one ton of ore ready for the smelting process will rise in the U.S.S.R. in 1960 to 1.41 tons (according to plan), as compared with 1.27 tons in 1955.²

A renowned authority on Soviet metallurgy, Academician I. Bardin (widely cited by Clark) discussed the perspective for and difficulties of increasing Soviet iron and steel production in Asiatic regions of the U.S.S.R.;³ he cannot hide the fact that iron-ore resources in Asiatic regions are far from sufficient to support the projects of building new plants in Kazakhstan and Western Siberia. The situation concerning the coal supply and particularly hydroenergy is better there and that is why Bardin suggests the building of electric iron-ore smelting furnaces. However, Soviet engineers seem to have now become more critical toward the building of uneconomic plants requiring permanent huge subsidies, like those built in the third Five-Year-Plan and during the war period. Clark points out correctly that in the case of such plants as in Novo-Tula in central Russia the subsidy amounted to 42.2% of the cost of production. There are many more plants of that type in the U.S.S.R., for example, in Novo-Lipetski and Czerkezovets, as well as in Moscow and Leningrad, which became actual parasites not only on Ukrainian iron-ore and coal resources, but on the whole Ukrainian iron and steel industry, which has to pay heavily to support the upkeep of the mentioned plants. In addition to this, it is not only the operation of these plants that is tremendously expensive, but the initial cost of their construction was unusually high, amounting to (e.g., the case of the Novo-Tula plant) 192 million rubles.⁴ The analysis of the productivity of plants and man-power

² Planovoe Khozyaistvo, 1957, No. 5, p. 72.
³ Planovoe Khozyaistvo, 1951, No. 2, pp. 18-29.
completes the generally unfavorable picture of the Soviet iron and steel industry drawn by the author.

This reviewer would like to comment that Soviet scientists and economists are also quite aware of many shortcomings and bottlenecks of the industry. In several engineering and scientific periodicals published in the U.S.S.R. during the period 1954-56, many articles have been found admitting faults and errors which occurred in the Soviet steel industry in the past, the most recent examples being the articles by S. Pervushin⁵ and L. Zusman,⁶ which criticize the extremely poor state of exploration of iron-ore resources in the U.S.S.R. and the unsatisfactory techniques of steel smelting in even stronger words than Clark uses. L. Zusman declares plainly that from 55.0 million tons of Fe included in 129 million tons of lean iron-ore and scrap smelted in 1955 in the U.S.S.R., almost 7 million tons of Fe were lost, due to poor conditions in the Soviet steel industry, a detailed illumination of which follows his statistics.

There are a few data in Clark's book that were not brought up to date. Thus, Appendix “A”, while giving a picture of the organization of the iron and steel industry in the U.S.S.R., does not show that the All-Union Ministry has undergone new, deep changes since February 10, 1954, when the separate Ministry of the Iron and Steel Industry (official name: Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy) in the Ukraine (Dnepropetrovsk) has been created and took over all the most important steel-works in the Dnieper and Donbas area.

Appendix “B” lists all Soviet iron and steel plants in alphabetic order. The author was cautious enough to indicate that the list dates back (with some exceptions) to 1950, though the text of the book refers in many cases to the 1954-55 period.

Since Clark decided to collect information on the size of all Soviet iron and steel plants, we wonder why information on capacity of open-hearth and Bessemer departments is not included. The same applies to mill-plants. Since such data are missing, the possibility exists that some readers, not well enough informed on the subject, will estimate the size and importance of individual Soviet plants improperly and may come to incorrect conclusions (e.g., the pipe-plants in Nikopol and Leningrad, or plate and sheet mills in Novomoskovsk and Dobryanka are mentioned with exactly the same comment on the list, although there is a tremendous difference in their size and capacity, respectively).

Generally, Clark's book is an example of an able approach and

⁵ Planovoe Khozyaistvo, 1957, No. 5, pp. 28-36.
⁶ Ibid., pp. 70-76
analysis of the problem. It supplies a rich compendium of basic information on the problems and trends of an immensely important branch of the Soviet economy.

Stefan G. Prociuk


Antanas Baranauskas (1834-1902) was an interesting personality in nineteenth-century Lithuania. He composed poems in his native language, conducted research in Lithuanian dialectology, ardently studied mathematics and served as the Bishop of the Catholic Church. In all of these fields he made worth-while contributions.

*The Forest of Anyksciai*, a pastoral poem, was written during the summer vacations of 1858 and 1859, while Baranauskas was at the town of Anyksciai (his birthplace) surrounded by the beautiful forests and placid waters of the Holy river (Sventoji). Wonderful landscapes, forest creatures, wild birds and flowers and various herbs—all these are beautifully pictured in this vivid poem. The author very frequently alludes to old Lithuanian myths. It is no wonder that most Lithuanians know this poem from memory.

The poem represents an important stage in the development of Lithuanian literature. It taught Lithuanians to be proud of their country's beauty.

Natas Rastenis successfully translated this poem in 1934 in order to commemorate Baranauskas' centennial birthday. However, it was published for the first time in 1956. Thus, though somewhat late, the 100th anniversary of the creation of *The Forest of Anyksciai* is duly commemorated.

Yar Slavutych
OBITUARIES

BORYS DMYTROVYCH KRUPNYTSKY

Borys Dmytrovych Krupnytsky was born on July 24, 1894, in Medvedivka, a small town in Kiev Province, in a family of the clergy. In 1913 he graduated from the Gymnasium in the town of Cherkasy and in the same year entered St. Volodymyr University in Kiev, Department of History and Philology. From the very beginning he took an interest in the history of the Ukraine, having studied under the guidance of Professor M. V. Dovnar-Zapol'sky and V. Yu. Danylevych.

World War I interrupted Krupnytsky's studies; in 1916 he enlisted in the Army. In 1918 he returned to the university, but in 1919 he joined the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and participated in the struggle against Bolshevist Russia. In 1920 he retreated with the Army to Poland and was interned. Then he emigrated to Germany and for a few years earned his living by manual work.

In 1925 Krupnytsky settled in Berlin and renewed his studies, enrolling in 1926 in Friedrich-Wilhelm University, where he was trained by Professors K. Stählin and O. Hötzsch (history of Eastern Europe with emphasis on the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries), F. Meinecke (philosophy and sociology), A. Brackmann (medieval studies), W. Sombart (political economy). At the same time Krupnytsky received a scholarship at the Berlin Ukrainian Scientific Institute where he studied the history of the Ukraine under the guidance of Professor D. I. Doroshenko. He took a special interest in Ukrainian historiography and participated in Doroshenko's seminar, concentrating on the history of the Ukraine in the light of Western-European literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 1929 he received his Ph. D. from Berlin University for his dissertation, Johann Christian von Engel and the History of the Ukraine, approved by Professor O. Hötzsch. Then he was appointed an assistant of the Chair of History of the Ukraine at the Ukrainian Scientific Institute.
in Berlin; later, from 1933 to 1945, he was active there as a research associate and a member of the Professors Council. In 1931-32 Krupnytsky became a docent at the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, and in 1941 a professor of the history of the Ukraine. A permanent resident in Berlin, he often visited Prague, lecturing at the university and at the Ukrainian Historical Philological Society, of which he was a member. In 1938 he was elected a full member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv and the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Warsaw.

After World War II Krupnytsky settled in Himmelpforten (Niederelbe), a small town in northwestern Germany, and visited Munich, lecturing at the Ukrainian Free University (which had moved there from Prague) and at the Ukrainian Orthodox Theological Academy. In 1947 he became the head of the Historical Section of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences in Germany, and in 1948 a full member of the Academy. He also participated in the activities of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and was, from 1947, the head of its Historical Commission. In 1953 he was elected a full member of the International Academy of Arts and Sciences in Paris.

Krupnytsky’s broad and prolific scholarly activities were concentrated chiefly on the history of the Ukraine in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, on Ukrainian historiography and historiosophy. He is the author of about 150 scholarly publications in Ukrainian, English and German which make an important contribution to the historiography of the Ukraine and of Eastern Europe as a whole. His main interest was the study of the political history of the Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century. He devoted three long monographs to this period: Het’man Pylyp Orlyk. 1672-1742. Ohlyad yoho politychnoyi diyal’nosti (Hetman Pylyp Orlyk, 1672-1742. Outline of His Political Activities), Warsaw, 1938; Hetman Mazepa und seine Zeit (Hetman Mazepa and His Time), Leipzig, 1942; Het’man Danylo Apostol ta yoho doba (Hetman Danylo Apostol and His Epoch), Augsburg, 1948. He wrote quite a
number of other works on the subject, beginning with the study which earned him his appointment at the university, *Het’man Mazepa v osvitolenni nimets’koyi literatury yoho chasu* (Hetman Mazepa in the Light of Contemporary German Literature), up to his last publication dwelling on the “Mazepa problem.” While living in Western Europe Krupnytsky used widely German and Swedish archives that contained important documents pertaining to the history of the Ukraine of the periods of Mazepa and Orlyk, which previously had not been very accessible to Ukrainian historical science. In this respect Krupnytsky’s work on Orlyk are of special importance because he based them on the rich material from the archives of Dresden, Berlin, and Stockholm.

Krupnytsky also did much work in the field of Ukrainian historiography of the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries: his dissertation on Engel as a historian of the Ukraine, his research on the ideology of *Istoriya Rusov* (History of the Rusy), a few articles on M. Hrushevsky’s and D. Doroshenko’s scholarly work, critical reviews of modern Ukrainian historiography, and others. Krupnytsky devoted a few works to problems of historiosophy, which was always in the realm of his interests. His *Osnovni problemy istoriyi Ukrayiny* (Basic Problems of the History of the Ukraine), Munich, 1955, is the most important of his works on the subject.

He contributed widely to German scholarly publications, writing on the problems of Ukrainian historiography. Numerous articles and book reviews were published in *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Geschichte, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Ukrainische Kulturberichte* (publication by the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin), and others. His great achievement was the publication of an outline of Ukrainian history in German: *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Leipzig, 1939; the second edition, Leipzig, 1943. A number of his articles were printed in *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., The Ukrainian Quarterly, Ukrainian Review* (Munich), and others.

Severe illness darkened Krupnytsky’s last years and prevented
fulfillment of many of his plans, although he tried hard to work right up to his death. He died on June 5, 1956 and was buried in Himmelpforten, West Germany.

Ukrainian historiography lost in him one of its outstanding researchers; world scholarship has lost a Ukrainian historian who deeply understood the importance of international scholarly cooperation and contributed widely to it.

Olexander Ohloblyn

MYKOLA OHLOBLYN (HLOBENKO)

Mykola Mykolovych Ohloblyn, also known as Hlobenko, a member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, died in Mougins, France, on May 29, 1957. He was the author of many works in the field of history of Ukrainian literature. He was likewise an editor and a lecturer.

Ohloblyn was born on December 19, 1902, in a priest's family in the village Novo-Heorhiyivske, Kharkiv Province. In 1928 he was graduated from the Literary-Linguistics Department of the Kharkiv Institute of Public Education (formerly Kharkiv University). The family background was a hindrance to Ohloblyn in his scholarly career. After graduation he worked as proofreader and editorial assistant for Ukrainian newspapers in Kharkiv, and as a lecturer on the Ukrainian language. In 1933 he began lecturing on Ukrainian literature in institutions of higher learning in Kharkiv, including the Institute of Journalism. In 1940-41 he taught at Kharkiv University and was engaged in research on the history of Ukrainian literature under the direction of Professor O. I. Biletsky.

In 1943 Ohloblyn left the Ukraine. After World War II he lived in Western Germany and participated actively in the cultural and scholarly life of the Ukrainian emigration. He became a member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences.

In 1948 he began lecturing at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich and became a member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. Ohloblyn continued his research on the history of Ukrainian literature, publishing his findings under the name
of Mykola Hlobenko. He contributed numerous essays on Ukrainian writers of the past and present to Ukrainian periodicals in Western Germany.

In 1951 Ohloblyn came to Sarcelles, France, to work as the deputy editor-in-chief of the *Entsyklopediya Ukrayinoznavstva*, published by the Shevchenko Scientific Society. In this capacity he worked till his death. To this Encyclopaedia he contributed several original articles covering certain periods of the history of Ukrainian literature.

Ohloblyn's scholarly interests were centered on Ukrainian literature of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. He had an original concept of the development of Ukrainian literature in that time, viz., that it should not be divided into periods of renaissance, baroque, and classicism, but should be treated as a single baroque literature. Ohloblyn also studied the literature of the Princely Period and expounded its influence on the literature of the sixteenth century. In addition, he devoted several studies to contemporary Ukrainian literature.

Able and industrious scholar and a gifted writer, Mykola Mykolovych Ohloblyn lacked the opportunity of fully applying his manifold abilities because of all the hardships encountered in the time in which he lived. However, by his tireless work he succeeded in influencing and in promoting many developments in the Ukrainian cultural process of the last decades.

**PAVLO HRYYAK**

Pavlo Hrycak, a young Ukrainian historian and an associate of the Academy, died suddenly on April 2, 1958 in New York City.

He was born on June 26, 1925 into a teacher's family in Peremyshl, Ukraine. He studied at the Ukrainian Gymnasium in Peremyshl, and after World War II, at Ludwig-Maximilians-University and at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich, where he became interested in Ukrainian history. He received his M.A. at the University of Minnesota and was also graduated from the Library School there. After graduation, Hrycak worked as a librarian, first at the Brooklyn Public Library, and from February 1957 till his death, at the Slavonic Division of the New York
Public Library. Simultaneously he continued his studies and research in the field of Ukrainian history, as a Ph. D. candidate at Fordham University, under the sponsorship of Professor Oskar Halecki.

Hrycak’s scholarly interests were concentrated on the history of Medieval Ukraine. In 1955-57 he published several articles on the subject and a few book reviews in Ukrainian journals in this country.

Hrycak was an active participant in the work of the Academy. He read papers at conferences of the Historical Section and in 1957 delivered two lectures at the plenary conferences of the Academy. He was the secretary of the Academy’s Black Sea Commission. Hrycak gave much help in checking bibliographical data for Academy publications.

An untimely death cut short the work of this promising scholar who, in addition to his intellectual abilities, also possessed a spirit of friendly cooperation and good will.

YURIY SENKO

Yuriy Vasyl'ovych Senko, an associate member of the Academy, died in Trenton, N.J. on November 20, 1957.

He was born on April 27, 1913 into a Cossack family in Burimtsi village, Chernihiv Province. Senko graduated from the Kharkiv Pedagogical Institute and in 1939-1941 taught in high schools in Poltava Province. Living in rural communities, he took an interest in popular customs, in ethnography, in folklore, and also in archeology. Yuriy Senko became a contributor to the Ethnographic Commission of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in Kiev, for which he collected data on folklore, customs, and rites.

After World War II, Yuriy Senko lived in Western Germany. He became an associate member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences upon the founding of the latter in 1945, and continued his studies in the fields of ethnography and folklore.

Senko came to the United States in 1950, continued to work on his collections of material, and published a few studies on Ukrainian folk songs and customs.

Yuriy Senko participated actively in the work of the Academy Foundation, as head of its Trenton Branch.
During the period from July 1, 1956 to January 1, 1958 the following lectures were delivered at the plenary sessions of the Academy:


November 24, 1956 —Olexander Ohloblyn: *The Problem of Growth and Decay of the Ukrainian State in the Seventeenth-Eighteenth Centuries.*

—Vadim Pavlovsky: *Kiev Before World War II and Today.*

December 22, 1956 Grand Conference devoted to the Ivan Franko Centennial.
—Volodymyr Doroshenko: *Ivan Franko and Mykhaylo Hrushevsky.*
—Alfred Berlstein: *The Figure of A. Mickiewicz in Franko’s Life.*
—Damian Horniatkevych: *Ivan Franko and Religion.*
—Milena Rudnycka: *Ivan Franko and Feminism.*
—Petro Odarchenko: *Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrayinka.*

December 30, 1956 —George L. Kline: *My Impressions of the Ukraine and the Soviet Union Today.*

January 10, 1957 —Dmitry Čiževsky: “*St. Domestika and St. Selediy*” by Ivan Franko; *On the Question of the Style of Old Ukrainian Literature; Philosophical Basis of Komenský’s Pedagogy.*

January 26, 1957 Memorial Meeting honoring the late Dr. Arnold Margolin, member of the Academy.
—Michael Vetukhiv: *In Memory of Arnold D. Margolin.*
—Yaroslav J. Chyz: *A. D. Margolin’s Activities in the United States.*
—Yakiv Zozulya: *Life and Achievements of A. D. Margolin.*

**February 17, 1957**

**February 23, 1957**
—John A. Armstrong: *Three Ukrainian Cities Today.*

**March 9, 1957**
Grand Conference in honor of Taras Shevchenko, sponsored by the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in America.
—Vasyl Lev: *The Centennial of Shevchenko’s Liberation from Exile.*
—Pavlo Hrycak: *George Washington’s Ideas in Shevchenko’s Creative Works.*

**March 10, 1957**
Conference in memory of the late President of the Academy, Prof. D. Doroshenko.
—Olexander Ohloblyn: *On the Genesis of Contemporary Ukrainian Historiography (75th Birthday of the Ukrainian Historians, D. Doroshenko, V. Lypynsky, V. Modzalevsky, M. Slabchenko).*

**May 13, 1957**
—Metropolitan Ilarion: *Sabbataism and the Ukraine.*

**June 21, 1957**
—Michael Vetukhiv: *The Work of the Academy During the Past Year.*

**August 23, 1957**
—John Reshetar: *Impressions of the Trip to the Ukraine and U.S.S.R.*

**September 6, 1957**

**December 14, 1957**

**December 21, 1957**
Grand Conference in memory of the Ukrainian historian Dmytro Ivanovych Bahaliy.
—Philip E. Mosely presided and made the opening address.
—Oskar Halecki: *Ukrainian and Polish Historiography—Possibilities of Cooperation.*
—Olexander Ohloblyn: Dmytro Bahaliy and Ukrainian Historical Science.
—Pavlo Hrycak: The Ukrainian Opposition Movement of the 1820's in the Works of D. Bahaliy.
—Michael Vetukhiv: Dmytro Bahaliy in Cultural and Public Life.

The following Lectures and Seminars were held under the auspices of the Sections and Commissions of the Academy in New York City:

LITERARY AND PHILOLOGICAL SECTION

October 5, 1957 —Petro Odarchenko: A New Monograph on Lesya Ukrainyinka.
November 16, 1957 —Eugene Malanyuk: Yuriy Klen, as a Man and a Poet.

HISTORICAL SECTION

November 25, 1956 Joint Conference with the Black Sea Commission.
—Lyubomyr Vynar: Oliver Cromwell and Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

February 9, 1957 —Ivan Sweet: Ukrainian Clergy in Asia (Siberia, Far East, China) in the Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries.


ANCIENT HISTORY SECTION


February 16, 1957 —Alexander Dombrovsky: Influence of Trypillian Culture on Herodotus' Scythia.
April 14, 1957 —Tetyana Ivanivska: *Periods in Development of Scythian Art in the Ukraine.*

June 9, 1957 —Roman Olesnycky: *Roman Law from Ancient to Present Times.*

October 27, 1957 —Andriy Kotsevalov: *Dura Europos and Inscriptions There.*

December 8, 1957 —Anatoliy Kotovych: *Historical Process in Illyria; Bulgaria and Baptism of Ukraine-Rus’.*

THE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY UKRAINE AND THE SOVIET UNION


February 24, 1957 Joint Conference with the Law Section.
—Vasyl Markus: *The Ukrainian Soviet State in International Relations and Its Status in International Law up to 1923.*


October 12, 1957 —Vasyl Chaplenko: “Sovietization” of Pavlo Tychyna.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SECTION


November 30, 1957 —Bohdan Zahaieievych: *Bibliographical News.*

BIOLOGICAL SECTION

December 1, 1956 —Serhij Krascheninnikov: *New Data in the Study of Balantidium Coli and Balantidiosis.*

February 16, 1957 —L. H. Winchester: *Contemporary Botanical Gardens.*

June 8, 1957 —Mykola Yefremov: *A Magnesium Stage as the Contemporary Stage of Development of Matter.*

September 20, 1957 —Olexander Arkhimovych: *Cultivation of Virgin Lands in the U.S.S.R.*
—Natalya Osadcha-Janata: *Sixtieth Anniversary of Ivan Federovych Rozhin.*


**PHILOSOPHIC SECTION**

December 7, 1957 —Ivan L. Rudnytsky: *The Theory of Cultural Circles (Spengler) and a Criticism of This Theory.*

December 29, 1957 —Ivan L. Rudnytsky: *The Theory of Cultural Circles (Toynbee) and a Criticism of This Theory.*

**ECONOMICS AND LAW SECTION**


May 17, 1957 —Vikentiy Shandor: *Inclusion of the Carpathian Ukraine into the Ukrainian S.S.R.*


**FINE ARTS GROUP**


April 27, 1957 —Damian Hornyatkevych: *Volodymyr Svyentsitsky and His Merits in Development of the Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv.*
—Bohdan Kravtsiv: *I. Svyentsitsky, as a Man and Teacher.*
THE COMMISSION FOR PRESERVATION OF THE LITERARY HERITAGE OF THE LATE UKRAINIAN WRITER VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO


GROUP OF THE ACADEMY IN DENVER, COLORADO

September 6, 1956 Conference in Salt Lake City, Utah.
—Yuriy Slastion: *Architecture of Ukrainian Churches in America and Canada.*
—Ivan Hromyk: *Beans in the Western Ukraine.*
—Filimon Ukradyha: *A New Theory on Kidney Function.*
—Leo Bykovsky: *A. Honcharenko, as a Thinker.*
—Vasyl Gvozdetsky: *My Research Work at the University of Utah.*

September 16, 1956 Conference in Ontario, Calif.
—Valentyn Hayevsky: *Book Honoring Saksahansky.*
—Leo Bykovsky: *A. Honcharenko, as a Thinker.*

November 17, 1956 Conference in Denver, Colorado.
—Bohdan Vynar: *On the Question of Ukrainian-Russian Relations in the U.S.S.R.*
—Leo Bykovsky and Yuriy Slastion: *Report on the Tour to the West and Conferences Organized.*
—Leo Bykovsky: *A. Honcharenko's Grave.*

January 25, 1957 —Mrs. E. Chapman: *Bibliographical Institute, as a Tool in Research Work.*


October 26, 1957 —Leo Bykovsky: *Natalena Koroleva, Her Life and Creative Work.*


**GROUP OF THE ACADEMY IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN**

December 9, 1956 Conference devoted to the Ivan Franko Centennial, with the cooperation of the Detroit Group of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

—Ivan Rozhin: *In Memory of Ivan Franko.*
—Yuriy Koshelnyak: *Social and Personal Themes in Franko's Poetry.*
—Edvard Kozak: *Ivan Franko in Fine Arts.*
—Myron Dolnytsky: *Conclusion.*

—Ivan Rozhin: *P. Tutkovsky as an Ukrainian Naturalist.*

June 20, 1957 —Halyna Karpova: *M. Zerov as a Scholar and as a Man.*
—Ivan Rozhin: *O. Arkhimovych—Life and Scientific Work (On the Occasion of His 65th Birthday).*


December 7, 1957 Conference devoted to Oleksander Granovsky's 70th Birthday.
—Ivan Rozhin: *Granovsky's Scientific Work.*
—Yuriy Koshelnyak: *Granovsky's Poetry.*

**GROUP OF THE ACADEMY IN WASHINGTON, D.C.**

March 10, 1957 Conference in honor of Taras Shevchenko.
—Petro Odarchenko: *The Role of Shevchenko in Ukrainian Literature.*
—Panteleymon Kovaliv: *The Influence of Folklore on Shevchenko's Creative Works.*
—Olexa Powstenko: *An Architectural Design by T. Shevchenko.*

November 14, 1957 —Volodymyr Kedrovs'ky: *A Censor's Copy of P. Kulish's “Dosvitky.”*
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The following transliteration system has been used:

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Titles of bibliographical sources, published in Roman lettering, and the names of corresponding authors are cited in full agreement with the original text. Those published in Cyrillic lettering are transliterated according to the system on page 1456. Names of some authors (e.g., Čiževsky, Borschak) are given in transliteration as used by the authors themselves in their writings in Western European languages. Ukrainian family names having the ending ський and Russian names ending with ский were transliterated as sky. The same endings in names of publications were transcribed according to the above system of transliteration.

The spelling of well-known place names, generally accepted in English usage, retain such accepted form (e.g., Kiev, Dnieper). The Ukrainian forms of place names are used in other cases, the symbol (for ь) being omitted.

In articles on comparative philology the “international” transliteration (see Annals, Vol. I, No. 2, 1951, p. 188) will continue to be used.
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