THE ANNALS
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SPECIAL ISSUE
DEVOTED TO THE MEMORY OF ARNOLD MARGOLIN

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MICHAEL VETUKHIV
1902-1959

This is the last issue prepared under the editorship of Michael Vetukhiv, President of the Academy, who died June 11, 1959, in New York City, deeply mourned by his friends and associates. Professor Vetukhiv had been editor of the “Annals” since its founding in 1951. Death did not come until he had completed the work which meant so much to him. A memorial to Professor Vetukhiv will appear in the next issue.
Soon after his return from Petrograd to Kiev in February 1918, Arnold Margolin was elected one of the Justices of the newly organized Supreme Court of the Ukrainian Republic.

The Supreme Court (Pravitel'ствuyushchii Senat) of the Russian Empire had been, in fact, abolished by the Bolsheviks. Once the Ukraine was proclaimed a separate body politic, a high court of appeals had to be established.¹

It was the task of the Central Council (Tsentral'na Rada)² to elect members to that supreme judicial institution. Among the candidates first nominated were those members of the Kiev Circuit Court and the Kiev Chamber of Justice who were noted for their staunchness and liberalism in the era of Shcheglovitov.³ Three of them—Achkasov, Radchenko, Butovsky—had demonstrated civic courage in connection with the Beilis case,⁴ in submitting dissenting opinions protesting against the

* We present three excerpts from Arnold Margolin's book Ukraina i politika Antanty: Zapiski evreya i grazhdanina, S. Efron, Berlin [1922], which were edited by Dr. Leonid C. Sonevysky who also compiled footnotes and wrote the short italicized introductions to each excerpt.

These selections characterize Margolin's activities in the period of 1918-1919, and include the following subdivisions:

I. In the Supreme Court of the Ukraine, pp. 60-64 of the original.
II. Entering into the Ukrainian Diplomatic Service, pp. 103-107.

¹ The Supreme Court (General'nyi Sud) of the Ukrainian Republic was established by the law of December 15, 1917.
² Provisional Parliament of Ukraine in 1917-1918.
³ Imperial Russian Minister of Justice April 1906—July 1915.
⁴ Mendel Beilis was a Jew accused by authorities of the Russian Imperial Government of murdering a Christian boy, allegedly for ritual purposes. Arnold Margolin acted as a member of the counsel for the defense of Beilis. The trial took place in Kiev in 1913. The jury found Beilis not guilty and acquitted him.
decision to disbar me. Under Shcheglovitov this was tantamount to incurring disfavor, which meant the end of their official careers as far as promotions were concerned. All of them were elected by a vast majority of the Central Council. Elected at the same time were well-known Ukrainian leaders from the bench of the Odessa circuit court: Shelukhyn\(^5\) and Shyyaniv as well as Khrutsky and the Moscow lawyer Khvostov. While subsequent candidates were to be put forward by this original group, the official initiative for nominating candidates was vested in the political parties represented in the Central Council.

My candidacy for membership on the Supreme Court was proposed in the [Central] Council by the committee of the All-Russian Labor-People's Socialist Party, to which I still belonged,\(^6\) and was supported by all the Ukrainian parties. The elections were held on April 2 [1918] and Professor Bohdan Kistyakovsky, M. P. Vasylenko,\(^7\) P. V. Yatsenko, and I were elected by secret ballot.

The number of votes which I received attested to the complete lack of anti-Semitism among members of the Central Council, while the names and the past activities of other candidates elected with me to the Supreme Court indicated the possibility of implanting principles of true justice in the Ukraine. Subsequently the Central Council advanced the candidacy of Greifenturn, a noted civil lawyer, a former member of the Kiev Chamber of Justice and Assistant Attorney General of the Senat (Supreme Court), a courageous and staunch jurist who had also submitted a dissenting opinion on the occasion of

Subsequently, in connection with the Beilis case, Margolin himself was tried in disciplinary proceedings and was disbarred. Not until 1917 was Margolin's case reviewed and dismissed on the ground that there had been "not a single reprehensible element" in the actions charged against him. In consequence, Margolin's rights were restored.

\(^5\) Subsequently Minister of Justice.
\(^6\) Margolin was a member of the All-Russian Party of Labor-People's Socialists until June 1918, when he resigned from that party and joined the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists.
\(^7\) Later Minister of Education and President of the Supreme Court, a prominent historian of Ukrainian law.
my disciplinary trial in connection with the Beilis case. Greifenturn, who lived in Petrograd, consented to the nomination; his appointment took place under Hetman Skoropadsky’s administration. Greifenturn arrived in Kiev seriously ill and soon passed away.

I dwell on the history of these elections since it is little known or forgotten by the general public and yet is highly significant and characteristic [of the period concerned].

We elected M. I. Radchenko as President of the Supreme Court.

I was included, as a criminologist, in the Criminal Department of Appeals. As early as May [1918] court sittings in all three Departments (Administrative, Civil, and Criminal) were opened, taking place temporarily, until separate premises could be found, in the building of the Kiev Chamber of Justice where at one time I had been destined to appear so often in my capacity of attorney and was to experience so much later on.

Of all these members of that incomplete first composition of the Supreme Court I alone did not know the Ukrainian language. When I was first invited to submit an acceptance of nomination (in accordance with the required form), I was in the beginning greatly embarrassed by that circumstance, and gave notice of my lack of knowledge of the Ukrainian language. Thereupon an answer followed that during the first six months or even a year I could review cases and write decisions in Russian and that within this period of time it would be possible to master the Ukrainian language sufficiently.

And indeed, subsequently I encountered no obstacles in this respect. I reviewed cases and wrote opinions on my decisions in the Russian language until our Supreme Court was changed to the State Senat in the period of Hetman Skoropadsky’s government.9

8 Skoropadsky was proclaimed Hetman (Head of State) on April 29, 1918, in place of the overthrown government of the Ukrainian Republic.
9 The Supreme Court became the State Senat of the Ukrainian State by the law of July 8, 1918.
In the course of April and May [1918], I took lessons in Ukrainian and soon ascertained how rich and flexible that language was. To be sure, scientific terminology had not yet been developed. This was particularly felt by civil lawyers because of the variety of terms used in civil law and because of the conventional, strictly limited meaning attached to each such term. It was far simpler with the limited and less complicated terminology of criminal law and criminal procedure.

General sessions of the Supreme Court took place very frequently. There was plenty of work, both organizational and purely judicial. Simultaneously at the Ministry of Justice feverish work was proceeding on the establishment of commissions for translation of laws into the Ukrainian language. Pending enactment of our own legislation, laws of the Russian Empire with all later amendments and modifications of the provisional governments were recognized as in force so long as these were not incompatible with the new order of the Ukrainian state.

The strenuous teamwork and friendly, intimate relations established among the members of the Supreme Court will always remain in the memory of all of us who were justices of the original court.

The staff of the Attorney General’s office, which included the late Ukrainian jurist and writer Markovych, the late Vyazlov, a former deputy of the first Imperial Duma, and Tikhomirov, an able and experienced lawyer, formed together with us one close family. And there was no dissonance whatsoever because they all spoke in Ukrainian and I alone replied to them in Russian. However, I had already mastered enough Ukrainian to understand everything. The Ukrainian spoken by S. P. Shelukhyn, a fiery orator and one of the best experts on the language, was particularly beautiful.

Such close association was doing its work in developing mutual understanding, confidence, and profound sympathies.

---

10 Later Minister of Justice.
II

After the fall of the Hetman regime and the entry of the Directory into Kiev in December 1918, Arnold Margolin was asked by V. Chekhivsky, the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the new Ukrainian government, to accept the position of Deputy Foreign Minister.

In connection with the forthcoming dispatch of diplomatic missions, the question arose of my appointment as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and of my journey abroad.

Our party\textsuperscript{11} took the view that the gravity of the moment obliged all of us to render the Directory any assistance within our powers even if at first such services should be of a purely technical nature.\textsuperscript{12} [\ldots]

I brought up the question of my appointment for the consideration of my colleagues from the Central Committee of the Jewish Territorial Organization. The question was, of course, not of any mandate, since the J.T.O. never was a political party—it could not have been, given the nature of the political thinking of its founders Zangwill and Mandelstam. Yet in so important a matter I wanted to find out the opinion of those close to me. My old, tried friends spoke out in the affirmative.

With the opinion of the party and of the organization to which I belonged thus ascertained, it was up to me to make a final decision on this question.

I treated V. M. Chekhivsky, for all the divergence in our political views at that time, with great respect and warm sympathy. We were bound by old ties and I knew in advance that collaboration with him would be easy and pleasant for me.

The staff of the Ministry also included Professor O. O. Eichelman, later deputy minister, a close friend of all our family, an expert in international law, popular throughout Kiev and noted for his modest, Spartan life of perpetual work. In the Ministry,

\textsuperscript{11} I.e., the Ukrainian Socialist Federalist Party. Cf. footnote No. 6.

\textsuperscript{12} The Ukrainian Socialist Federalist Party refrained from active participation in the uprising against the Hetman and did not take part either in the Directory itself or in the original cabinet formed by the Directory.
from the Kiev bar, were A. I. Yakovliv, a colleague from the party committee who then held the post of director of the Department [of Foreign Relations],\textsuperscript{13} and M. H. Levytsky, the vice-director of the same department.

They were all old friends of mine with whom one could work harmoniously. But decisive for me was the circumstance that I was to work at the Ministry itself only for a period of two or three weeks in order to get acquainted with the composition of the foreign missions and to complete their organization, whereupon I was to depart to Odessa for negotiations with the French military command, and thence to proceed to Paris as a member of the Ukrainian Delegation to the Peace Conference. As for the rank of deputy minister, it was necessary to enable me to speak on behalf of the government not only in Paris but also in Odessa, in London, etc.

Such a task seemed to me most acceptable in view of my belief in the need for help from Western Europe. And in the first days of January [1919], I accepted the post, sincerely believing that it would be possible to obtain that help promptly.

At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I found the work of setting up the foreign missions almost completed, with the major attention devoted to the composition of the delegation departing for Paris. Unfortunately I had then no idea about H. M. Sydorenko, the chief of that delegation. He was at that time in Jassy (Iasi) and was preparing to go directly to Paris. I was also completely unacquainted with Dr. Paneiko, a noted Galician leader and publicist. On the other hand, O. Ya. Shul'hyn, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period of the Central Council and now the third delegate of the dip-

\textsuperscript{13} As an outstanding scholar in the field of the history of Ukrainian law, A. Yakovliv later became professor and, in 1930 and 1944, rector of the Ukrainian Free University in Prague. He also was a full member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., actively participating in its work until his death in 1955. Several articles written or edited by him have been published in \textit{The Annals}. 
Diplomatic section at Paris, was known to me personally. I looked forward to valuable and fruitful collaboration with him. I had known Shul'hyn in his student days. He was one of the noblest, most honest and cultured Ukrainian leaders, and one could foresee the fine impression he would make in Paris.¹⁴

Besides Shul'hyn and myself, the following were appointed from among members of our party: Justice of the Supreme Court S. P. Shelukhyn as legal adviser to the delegation, and M. A. Kushnir as counselor to the political section. Professor M. I. Tuhan-Baranovsky,¹⁵ also a member of the committee of our party, was appointed economic adviser to the delegation. We have noted [elsewhere in the book] the premature death of this outstanding authority. En route to Paris, he passed away of an attack of angina pectoris.

Diplomatic missions to Turkey, Greece, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden were headed by Social-Federalists as well. Later, representatives to Rumania, the Scandinavian countries, and Great Britain were appointed from the ranks of the same party. As a matter of fact, our party sent to the foreign service most of the members of its central committee.

It was during my term of service that the well-known Jewish historian and publicist Dr. M. L. Vishnitzer was appointed secretary of the diplomatic mission to Great Britain. I recommended Dr. Zarkhi, a young physician known to me for his work in the Jewish Territorial Organization, as a person versed in several foreign languages. He was included in the political section of the Paris delegation. Finally, from among the Jewish youth, the students Kulischer, Rabinovitch, and Gluzman were appointed to the staffs of foreign missions.


¹⁵ Distinguished scholar in the field of political economy, professor at St. Petersburg University, and in 1918 at Kiev University, full member of the Ukrainian Academy, in 1917 Secretary of Treasury in the Ukrainian Government. See the Annals, 1954, Vol. III, No. 3 (9).
On April 17, 1919, Arnold Margolin arrived in Paris where he acted as a member of the Ukrainian Delegation to the Peace Conference until September 1919, with an excellent opportunity to observe French policy toward Eastern Europe.

At the Russian Division of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France’s old orientation toward a united and strong Russia made itself manifest. Pichon, Berthelot, and Kammerer were at that time under the strong influence of the dominating conception that in the end Russia would certainly be restored and that even if the ventures of Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenich should fail to bring such a result, this would happen later in a “purely spontaneous way.” A sense of duty to the former ally which had contributed so much to the rescue of Paris at the beginning of the war, on the one hand, and a feeling of the risk involved in view of such a possibility of Russia’s spontaneous restoration, on the other, restrained the Ministry from expressing sympathy for the full realization of the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination. Pichon and his collaborators were influenced at that time by groups headed by Sazonov and Maklakov. Following these [Russian circles], they also spoke of setting up a united Russia “with autonomy for the nationalities.” They saw, as before, a future powerful Russia as their bulwark in the East against Germany.

Although they were skeptical about Denikin’s fighting abilities and highly exasperated by the fact that the general con-

16 French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
17 Director of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
18 Chief of the Russian Division of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
19 Former commanders of the Tsarist armed forces, in 1918-1920 leaders of the “White” Russian movement waging the struggle for the restoration of the old regime and of “one and indivisible” Russia.
20 1910-1916 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Tsarist Russian government. After the revolution of 1917, while living in France, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by Kolchak and acted as Denikin’s representative.
21 In 1917 Ambassador of the Russian Provisional Government and later of the Kolchak government in France.
stantly relied on Great Britain alone as his chief protector, the Ministry's circles nevertheless insistently recommended that we take the course of an agreement with Denikin's army and government. They pointed out to us that Denikin's strength lay in persistent backing by Great Britain and believed that with the aid of British tanks and guns he might eventually succeed.

This pro-Russian policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not shared, however, by certain influential French military and public circles.

A pro-Polish policy aroused far more sympathy and active support on the part of these influential circles. This policy was aimed at creating, in order to counterbalance Germany, a great Poland at the expense of the neighboring German, Byelorussian, Lithuanian, and especially a considerable part of the Ukrainian territories. This project—the creation of a great Poland—received the strong sympathy of French military circles and of Clemenceau himself. The latter were secretly ready to grant paper recognition of independence to a small Ukraine, which would be virtually subordinated to Poland and would be towed along by her as cannon fodder against Germany. It was planned to complete such a coalition of a great Poland and a small Ukraine in the East by drawing into it Rumania and, if possible, Czechoslovakia as well.

The designs and claims of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, aimed at preserving for themselves various territories inhabited by the Ukrainians, formed to some extent the basis of the idea of this coalition, with the leading role assigned to Poland as France's most loyal and reliable ally. Stripped of part of its western territory in favor of Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine was envisioned by the authors of this scheme as bounded on the East by the Dnieper, while the left bank of the Dnieper was to be used to appease the claims of Great Russia.

It is highly significant that these two contrasting policies, the pro-Russian and the pro-Polish, were never sharply differentiated for the outside world. The spokesmen for such different views and political prognoses as to the desirability of one or
the other policy to be followed by France in Eastern Europe acted, as if by tacit agreement, \textit{in concert}. It was as if bets were being made on two cards. A double insurance was being attempted. If a strong Poland failed to materialize, there would be a strong Russia, and vice versa. The main point was to have in the future a strong bulwark against the Germans in one or the other powerful ally.

As to the idea that it would be possible to win the sympathies of \textit{a number} of friends among \textit{all or most of the peoples} of the former Russian Empire, it did not correspond with the general course and tradition of French policy or with the basic characteristics of French thinking and feeling. The French were too strongly imbued with the spirit of centralism. France herself, as a centralized bureaucratic state, vividly exemplifies the psychology of the French people and of their most gifted representatives in questions concerning the system of the state organization. It was difficult for them to reconcile themselves at once to the loss of a \textit{single} strong ally in the East and to the necessity of finding instead \textit{a number of} allies in the new state formations.

Only a small group—the deputy Franklin Bouillon,\textsuperscript{22} Pélissier,\textsuperscript{23} and a few other sincere friends of the Ukraine who were thoroughly acquainted with the Ukrainian question—truly sympathized with the just aspirations of the Ukrainian people and rendered assistance within their powers to the Ukrainian delegation in its work at Paris. Quite honestly and wisely this group advised us to make the requirement for the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly a basic point in our program, putting off the question of the ultimate governmental system of the Ukraine until such a Constituent Assembly would have had an opportunity to convene and vote on the question. As to the immediate future, they recommended that we seek the \textit{de facto} recognition of the Ukrainian Directory and Government and aim at obtain-

\textsuperscript{22} Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission in the French Chamber of Deputies, in 1917 Minister in Painlevé's cabinet.
\textsuperscript{23} French journalist who established contacts with the members of the Ukrainian government while on his mission to Kiev in the summer and autumn of 1917.
ing moral and technical help for them in their struggle against anarchy and bolshevism.

Such was the state of the Ukrainian question in France in the spring and summer of 1919; such were the political orientations of French governmental and public groups concerning the question of the fate of Eastern Europe.

It was obvious that the hopes placed in France by the spokesmen for Ukrainian policy were not justified. And yet France herself at one time had given serious grounds for belief in her readiness to render support to the Ukraine and to the Ukrainian people in their aspirations for independence. Suffice it to mention that France was the first to officially recognize the Ukrainian Government of the Central Council and to appoint as early as December 1917, almost two months before the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk peace, General Tabouis\(^24\) as her official representative to the Ukrainian government. The appointment of Picton Bagge,\(^25\) the representative of Great Britain, followed several days later, early in January 1918.\(^26\)

These dates show that the first to embark on the path of recognition of the Ukraine were *not the Central Powers, but France and Great Britain.*

\(^{24}\) Of the French military mission in Kiev.
\(^{25}\) Former British consul-general in Odessa.
\(^{26}\) See the official notes of the representatives of France and Great Britain to the Ukrainian government which are quoted in Appendix I, pp. 1472-1474.
NOTES OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN TO THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT OF THE CENTRAL COUNCIL*

FRENCH LEGATION
IN ROMANIA

RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE
Jass, December 29th, 1917.
From The French Minister in Rumania,
To General Tabouis, French Commissioner in Ukrainia.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the French Government has appointed you as French Commissioner in Ukrainia.

You will be good enough to inform the Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Government of your appointment as Commissioner, and to hand him this letter, which accredits you in that capacity.

(Signed) St. AULAIRE.

* The following documents are reprinted from the League of Nations, Assembly Document 88, Application of the Ukrainian Republic for Admission to the League of Nations, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, pp. 19-20. The documents were quoted by Arnold Margolin in French in Ukraina i politika Antanty, Appendix 1, pp. 365-368.
From General Tabouis, French Commissioner accredited to the Ukrainian Government. To The Secretary-General, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Republic.

Sir,

I have the honour to request that you will inform the Ukrainian Government that the French Government has appointed me as Commissioner of the French Republic to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic.

I, therefore, request that you will be good enough to inform me on what day and at what hour I may have the honour of being officially received by the Head of the Government.

I remain, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) TABOUIS.

From General Tabouis, French Commissioner to the Government of the Ukrainian Republic.

To The Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Republic.

Sir,

On December 5/19, at an interview which was attended by M. Vinnichenko, President of the Council, and by the Secre-
taries of State for Foreign Affairs, Finance, Food, Transport and Justice, I had the honour to present the following request:

(Here follows the text of General Tabouis' note verbale of December 5th, that is, of a date anterior to his appointment as French Minister accredited to the Ukrainian Government.)

Since that date France has entered into official relations with Ukrainia.

In view of the rapid march of events and to avoid any loss of time, I have the honour to request that you will communicate this reply to me as soon as possible.

(Signed) TABOUIS.

Office of the British Representative

January.

To His Excellency, the President of the Council of Ministers of the National Ukrainian Republic.

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you that His Britannic Majesty's Government has appointed me by cable as the sole representative at present of Great Britain in Ukrainia.

I am directed by my Government to assure you of its goodwill. It will support the Ukrainian Government to the utmost of its ability, in the task which it has undertaken of establishing good government, maintaining order, and resisting the Central Powers, who are enemies of Democracy and Humanity.

As far as I, personally, am concerned, I have the honour to assure Your Excellency of my whole hearted support in the realisation of our common ideal.

(Signed) PICTON BAGGE,
British Representative in Ukrainia.

Certified True Copy.
London, October 19th, 1920. NDISHNITZ.
APPLICATION OF THE UKRAINIAN REPUBLIC FOR THE ADMISSION TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS*

Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in the United Kingdom,
75, Cornwall Gardens,
Kensington,
London, S.W.7
14th April, 1920.

Dear Sir Eric Drummond,

Herewith I have the honour and pleasure to send you the application for the admission of the Ukraine to the League of Nations.

Yours very truly,
(Signed) A. MARGOLIN.

The Honourable Sir Eric Drummond, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
Sunderland House,
Curzon Street, W. 1.

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Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in the United Kingdom to the League of Nations, London.

In accordance with Article I of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and authorized thereto by the mandate of the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, under the presidency of Mr. Simeon Petloura, and in the name of that Government, the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in the United Kingdom

* This document bearing the signature of Arnold Margolin is reprinted from the League of Nations. Assembly Document 5, Admission of the Ukrainian Republic to the League of Nations, pp. 3, 5, 7.
has the honour to transmit to the League of Nations the request for admission of the Ukrainian Republic as a Member of the League of Nations.

In support of this request we have the honour to set forth the following brief historical survey:—

The Ukraine was formerly for many centuries an independent and sovereign State, recognised as such by all the other European States. It was only since the XIVth and following centuries that certain Ukrainian territories on the right bank of the Dnieper were conquered by the Poles. In the XVIIth century, however, the Hetman Chmelnitsky liberated these territories also from the Polish domination and reunited all the Ukrainian lands as one independent State.

In 1654, the Ukraine voluntarily allied herself by the Treaty of Perejaslav with Russia as a sovereign and confederate State, accepting only the protectorate of the Tsar, but expressly reserving, by Articles VI and XIV of this Treaty, not only complete autonomy in its internal affairs, the free election of its Hetmans, but, more than that, the right of international and diplomatic relations.

Later on, Russian absolutism succeeded in gradually annihilating all these prerogatives of independence and sovereignty and bringing the Ukraine under the Russian yoke. But this was done illegally, not only in contravention of all international and human rights, but also against the will of the Ukrainian people, which showed itself by several insurrections brutally suppressed by the Tsars.

In April, 1917, following the Russian Revolution, the Ukrainian National Congress elected the Central Rada as the Ukrainian Parliament, which was composed of 813 deputies from all the Ukrainian parties and also from all the national minorities (Great Russians, Jews, Poles, etc.). This Parliament confirmed the restoration of the Ukrainian State, and proclaimed the sovereignty of that State by the Acts of 7th [20th] November, 1917, and of 9th [22nd] January, 1918.

In December, 1917, France and England accredited to the Ukrainian Republic certain diplomatic representatives, to wit,
General Tabouis and Mr. Bagge, and by this act have recognised the Ukrainian Republic.

The Great Russian Soviet Government for its part also recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine, by the Decree of 4th [17th] December, 1917, published in its official gazette (No. 26 of "Gazeta Vremenogo Robotshago i Krestianskago Pravitelstva"); but at the same time it declared war on the Ukrainian Government, regarding it as a Bourgeois Government.

Threatened by invasion by the Bolsheviks, the Ukraine was constrained to conclude the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918.

In May, 1918, the Russian Soviet Government sent its representatives to Kiev in order to negotiate peace with the Ukrainian Government, and recognised anew the sovereignty of the Ukrainian Republic.

After the coup d'état of the German General-Staff at Kiev, which dissolved the Central Rada and imposed on the country the Hetman Skoropadsky, a federation of all the Ukrainian parties was formed at the end of 1918, and it instituted the Directory as a Provisional Government.

After the fall of the Hetman Skoropadsky and of his supporters, the Directory convoked at Kiev, in January, 1919, the National Congress of representatives of the peasants and workmen of the Ukraine, which confirmed the Directory in its powers.

Despite the successive invasions of the Ukraine by the Russian Bolsheviks, on the one hand, and by the Russian Volunteers of Denikin, on the other hand, the entire Ukrainian population has and does always recognise the Government under the presidency of S. Petloura (President of the Directory) as its national Government.

In any case, the entire Ukrainian population has strikingly shown by the afore-mentioned facts, as well as by the sacrifices of blood in its bitter combats against the Russian Bolsheviks and against the Russian Volunteers of Denikin, its steadfast will to be, and to remain, a sovereign State.
Except for that part of its territory now occupied by the Russian Bolsheviks, the Ukrainian State governs itself freely, possesses its own army and its diplomatic representatives.

Seeing that the Ukrainian people owe their liberation from the yoke of absolutism and the re-birth of their sovereignty to the ideas which are the origin and form the basis of the very existence of the League of Nations, the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in the United Kingdom, on behalf of the Ukrainian Government, solemnly makes this declaration of the sincere intention of the Ukraine to observe all international engagements, even as we, on behalf of the Ukraine, fully accept the rules laid down by the League of Nations concerning our military and naval forces and armaments.

(Signed) A. MARGOLIN,
Chief of the Mission.

III

LETTER DATED 19TH OCTOBER, 1920, FROM THE UKRAINIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN LONDON TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO THE HANDS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, THE HON. SIR ERIC DRUMMOND, K.C.M.G.*

With regard to the letter of 25th August, 1920, addressed by the League of Nations to the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian Republic, we have the honour, in the name and on behalf of the Government of the Ukrainian Republic, to transmit under this cover to the League of Nations copies of the required documents. With them we desire to submit the following expla-

* This letter bearing the signature of Arnold Margolin is reprinted from the League of Nations, Assembly Document 88, Application of the Ukrainian Republic for Admission to the League of Nations, Memorandum by the Secretary-General, Annex VII, pp. 16-18.
nation, which may be regarded as an amplification and comple-

tion of the brief historical survey set forth in the application

of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in the United Kingdom

of April 13th, 1920.

Regarding the Acts by which the Ukraine declared its

independence.

A. 1. When in March, 1917, the Revolution in the former

Russian Empire broke out it assumed in the Ukraine from the

beginning a most national form. The National Congress ga-

tered at Kieff on 8th April, 1917, and in this participated the

representatives of the learned, economic and co-operative So-

cieties, as well as the representatives of the professional organi-

sations, municipalities and of the local self-governments (Zem-

tvos), together with the representatives of the peasantry from

the whole country. This Congress elected about 100 of its

members to be the “Central Rada,” i.e., a provisional Parliament.

Later, the Rada was enlarged by the introduction of Delegates

from three other Congresses, the Congress of Peasants, the Con-

gress of Soldiers, and the Congress of Workmen, and comprised

in all 800 members of which 600 were Ukrainians, the other

members being Russians, Jews and Poles. Among these were

represented all the most important parties, Ukrainian as well

as Russian, Jewish, Polish, etc.

2. In the meantime the elections were also made to the Con-

stituent Assembly of former Russia, which, however, was dis-

solved by the Bolsheviks who took over the Government in

Petrograd in October [November], 1917. These elections, made

on the basis of the universal, equal, secret, direct and propor-

tional system, were in the Ukraine a striking victory for the

Ukrainians. Of the 150 Deputies that the Ukraine had to elect,

115 (being more than 75 per cent.) represented the Ukrainian

party. The other 35 were of different nationalities, some 20

being Jews, and the others Russians or Poles.

3. In the autumn of 1917, the Central Rada decided to con-

vene an Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. The elections were

made in December, 1917, and in January, 1918. Unfortunately

at that moment the Bolsheviks had made their first invasion
of the Ukraine, and in the Eastern Ukraine the elections could
not take place. Of the 326 Deputies who should have been sent
to the Constituent Assembly, about 250 were elected. They
comprised 190 Ukrainians, 30 Russians, 20 Jews, 10 Poles and
others.

Of the ten million votes polled, eight million were for the
Ukrainian party. The overwhelming majority of the elected
Deputies belonged to the same Ukrainian political parties as
those which formed the crushing majority in the Central Rada.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that if this Constituent As­
sembly, which had been elected by the whole population of the
Ukraine, had not been prevented from meeting by the au­
thorities of the German occupation, they would have unani­
mously declared themselves for the independence of the Ukraine
as the Central Rada had done.

4. The Central Rada, as provisional Parliament, elected on
the broadest basis, proclaimed by two Acts (called “Univer­sals”) of 7/20 November, 1917, and of 9th [22nd] January,
1918, the independence and the sovereignty of the Ukrainian
Republic. Copies of these two documents are annexed hereto—
sub. 1 and 2.

5. In April, 1918, the German military authorities, which
came into the Ukraine after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on the
pretext of stopping the invasion of the Ukraine by the Russian
Bolsheviks, but actually to get grain and food for themselves,
being disappointed with the attitude of the Central Rada, which
held fast to the standpoint of the full independence of the
Ukraine and opposed the interference of the German authori­
ties in Ukrainian affairs, made a coup d’etat. In agreement
with a section of Ukrainian and Russian landowners, they im­
posed General Skoropadsky on the country as Hetman of the
Ukraine, and dispersed the Central Rada which had been act­
ing and ruling the country as a Parliament during a whole
year. Hetman Skoropadsky, under pressure of the general opinion
of the whole country, was obliged to accept from the beginning
the standpoint of the full independence and sovereignty of the
Ukrainian State. This standpoint is expressly recognised in the
Law promulgated on April 29th, 1918, the law of the provisional Constitution of the Ukraine, a copy of an abridged translation of which is annexed—sub. 3.

6. The Ukrainian democracy was of [the] opinion that the Government of the Hetman was representative of one class only, viz. that of the landowners. Moreover, among those the influence of the Russian elements increased continually. In due course there began in the whole of the Ukraine an insurrection against the Hetman’s authority. The Ukrainian National League, consisting of representatives of nearly all the Ukrainian parties, stood at the head of this general movement and elected a Director as the provisional Supreme Power of the Ukrainian Republic.

7. After the regime of Hetman Skoropadsky had ended, a Congress of Workers and Peasants and working intelligentsia of the whole of the Ukraine met at Kieff from 24th-29th January, 1919, a Congress consisting of about 500 members. This Congress was elected on the basis of universal suffrage in three grades, i.e., peasants, who elected about 400 Delegates (four in each district), the town workers or artisans who elected about 100 Delegates, and the working intelligentsia, who elected about 50 Delegates. This Congress confirmed by the resolutions of 28th January, 1919, which are annexed—sub. 4 and 5—the full sovereignty of the Ukrainian Republic, as well as the Directory and the Council of Ministers of the provisional Government.

8. During the whole of 1919 and 1920 the Ukraine was surrounded on all sides with enemies and left without any help to its own resources. From the one side the Russian Bolsheviks, with their imperialistic aims well disguised, from the other side the Russian General Denikin, actuated by the same motive, both endeavoured to subdue the Ukrainian country, without regard to any right of self-determination. But in spite of all invasions, in spite of the lack of any help—not only in material, so necessary for the successful conduct of modern warfare, but even in sanitary materials and medicaments to put a stop to the terrible epidemics raging in the Ukraine—
the Ukrainian people till this day has been waging a heroic fight for its independence, an independence that even the Russian Bolsheviks were at last constrained to recognise, albeit in the form under which they hope successfully to conceal their imperialistic pan-Russian aims.

B. Concerning the recognition of the sovereignty of the Ukrainian State on the part of the other States, we have the honour to point out the following:

1. In December, 1917, *i.e.*, before the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and after the Central Rada had promulgated the independence of the Ukraine, France and Great Britain both sent to the Ukrainian Government in Kiev their diplomatic representatives, General Tabouis and Mr. Picton Bagge, respectively, who handed to this Government the official accrediting letters, copies of which we annex—sub. 6.

2. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria have recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian State within the boundaries fixed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, an abridged translation of which is annexed—sub. 7.

3. The Russian Soviet Government for its part also recognised the independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine, by decree of 4th December, 1917, published in its Official Gazette, No. 26, 1917. Again in May, 1918, it sent its representatives to Kiev, in order to negotiate peace with the Ukrainian Government.

4. In 1918, Finland, and in 1920, Poland and Latvia recognised the independence of the Ukrainian State.

These last facts, cited in sections 3 and 4 above, are notorious.

On behalf of the Ukrainian Government,

(Signed) Senator A. MARGOLIN.
Dr. F. OLESNITSKY.
The First Millennium of Jewish Settlement in the Ukraine and in the Adjacent Areas

Philip Friedman

1. Introduction

Prehistoric Eastern Europe was never sufficiently studied by or known to the outside world. For the Greek and Roman writers it was the legendary country of the Scythians, later the Sarmatia and Roxolania settled by the Estii, the Alans, the Venedi, the land of early Goths and of their journeying. Later, in the first centuries of the Christian era, the Slav peoples were first mentioned in historical sources, while the Huns made their appearance in the European East.

In its western part this was chiefly a country of thick forests, jungles and swampy wilderness. Toward the East the landscape changed. Immense, endless steppes expanded to the South, to the Black Sea, and to the East.

The steppes were not an insurmountable barrier for travelers and merchants. Through the valleys and through the sometimes difficult currents of the Borysthenes (Dnieper) and the Tanais (Don) and through the linking broad valleys of the Prypyat, the Vistula and Viadua (Oder), travel-hardened tradesmen and warriors fought their way from the Black Sea to the very heart of the continent. The ancient Greeks had already discovered this route. They called the Black Sea the "Euxinus"—the Hospitable Sea—and founded on its shores a galaxy of Greek colonies. The Tauris Peninsula (the Crimea) was the remote, prehistoric setting in Greek mythology for the tragedies of Iphigenia, Orestes and Pylades. In the era of the Scythians, out of the individual Greek city-republics in the Crimea a greater political unit headed by a Greek-Scythian dynasty was established. In the first century B.C., in the Crimea and on the adjacent areas of the Black and Azov Seas a number of small city-republics flourished, namely: 1) The Cimmerian Bosphorus with Panticapaeum; 2) Olbia on the...
Hypanis River (Boh); 3) Phanagoria (on the Taman Peninsula) on the Caucasian coast, and 4) Gorgippia (Anapa) at the foot of the Caucasus.

A second way of Greek infiltration into Eastern Europe was the Gold Coast of the Western Caucasus, the Colchis. Here many Greek adventurers sought the Golden Fleece, and their historical experience had been exploited in the myth of the Argonauts (Jason and Medea).

Since the Hellenistic era, the Greek and the Jewish merchants were closely interlocked both in cooperation and in competition in Eastern Europe. The Jewish tradesman of Asia Minor, the Caucasus, Armenia, Byzantium and even of the more remote Syria and Arabia was the counterpart of the Greek merchant and settler.

There were two ways of Jewish expansion in Eastern Europe, a physical and an ideological one. No less significant than the presence of Jewish tradesmen in these areas was the infiltration of the ideas of Judaism.

The expansive capacities of Judaism in the early days of the Imperium Romanum have been rather underestimated in historical literature. In the first century A.D. the Jewish population in Imperium Romanum was estimated at approximately 6,000,000, of whom about one and one half million were in Palestine and four to four and one half million in the Roman Diaspora. It may be assumed that those large masses of Diaspora Jews were not of pure ethnic Jewish extraction. A considerable part of them represented a variety of nations, groups or individuals, converted to Judaism, commonly called "the God-fearing men," σεβόμενοι τὸν θεόν ὑψιστὸν ("those who fear [worship] God the Highest"). Along the shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea were the groups and settlements of Jewish converts, from Gibraltar through North Africa—where a considerable amount of the Carthaginians, beaten by the Romans, seemed to have found in Judaism a solution to their inferiority complex—up to the Balkans and the Caucasus. This tide turned at the end of the first century. The expansion of Judaism had been checked by two important de-
The rise of Christianity which took over a great number of former Jewish proselytes, and the political setbacks of the Jewish people (the destruction of the Second Commonwealth and the crushing defeats of the Jewish uprisings under Traianus and Hadrianus which resulted in a serious loss of Jewish prestige in the Gentile world). Simultaneously Jewish prestige suffered severely in the only large extra-Roman Jewish settlement, in Persia, where the accession to power of the Sassanians resulted in massive persecution against other religious groups including the Jews. It is likely that the protagonists of Judaism looked, in their predicament, for new areas where ideological expansion and also economic, political and religious security could be found, and therefore turned to the underdeveloped areas of Eastern Europe. This wave of eastward emigration started probably as early as the second century, developed steadily and lasted until the tenth and perhaps the eleventh century.

This Jewish East-European penetration probably reached its peak in the eighth century. Then the gradual withdrawal began. The struggle with Islam and Christianity became more and more tense. The victor in the combat arena of the three rival religions in Eastern Europe was the Christian faith of the Orthodox Greek denomination supported by one of the mightiest economic and political powers of that time, the Byzantine Empire.

This expansion of Judaism in the vast areas from the Carpathian Mountains to the Urals and from the Black Sea to the upper regions of the Dnieper and Volga, in a period of almost one thousand years, has been rather sparsely recorded.

2. The Hellenistic and the Roman Era

The springboards for Jewish penetration in Eastern Europe were the Jewish colonies on the southern shores of the Black Sea and in the Caucasus. Some Jewish settlements in Armenia and in other countries in the Caucasus are very old, particularly in the vicinities of Lake Van and Tbilisi. The Jewish legend called these Jews the “Red Jews” and assumed them
to be the offspring of the Ten Tribes allegedly settled by Alexander the Great in the Dark Mountains and closed up from the outside world by the legendary Sambation River. However, historical research points rather to the migration from Armenia as the main source of Jewish settlement in the Caucasus. The Jews most probably settled in Armenia in the era of the Second Commonwealth. They also have legends of being the descendants of the Ten Tribes. According to Josephus Flavius,¹ the grandson of Herod the Great of Judea, Tigranes, was king of Armenia, and so later was Herod’s great-grandson of the same name. Both Armenian kings from the Herodian dynasty had, however, been brought up since childhood in pagan surroundings and had severed all their ties with Judaism. But it can be assumed that they maintained commercial and social ties with Judea and with their families there, and that there were some Jews in their entourage who came along with them to Armenia. Many families of the Armenian nobility used to trace their ancestors back to an ancient Hebraic (Biblical) figure. In the non-Jewish Armenian historiography, the tradition of Jewish kings and dynasties in Armenia is very popular. The Armenian (non-Jewish) chronicler Moses of Khorene (fifth century, A.D.) was able even to point to the Jewish descent of a famous family, the Bagratuni, who wielded considerable political influence in Armenia. In a number of Christian families in Armenia the tradition of Jewish descent is very much alive. Thus, for instance, Hayim Greenberg, in his Leaves from a Diary (published in Yiddish, Bletlekh fun a Togbukh, New York, 1954) tells of his teacher Egyazarov, professor of law at the University of Kiev, who told him that he belonged to a clan of “Shambats,” Christian Armenians of Jewish descent; the “Shambats,” at that time, were clandestinely keeping the various Jewish traditions and customs, learning Hebrew, and intermarrying only in their own group.

The small kingdom of Adiabene on the southern border

of Armenia is well known in Jewish history. The king of Adiabene and his wife Helene adopted Judaism. The queen undertook religious pilgrimages to Jerusalem. Both her sons were also practicing Jews and participated in the Jewish War of Independence against the Romans (70-72 A.D.). Not only converts but also Jews seemed to have been living in considerable numbers in Armenia, according to the Byzantine chronicler Faustus (fourth century). The Yeshivah (Talmudic Academy) at Nisibis (In Hebrew—Netzivin) in Northern Mesopotamia, near the Armenian border, was a well-known center of Jewish knowledge as early as the second century. The Jews had a central autonomous organization there headed by an exiliarch (Rosh-Hagolah). Both Christian Saints Nina and Gregory of Georgia and Armenia, in western Trans-Caucasia were of Jewish extraction.

In the sixth century the Persian kings conquered Dagestan in the eastern Caucasus. They founded the fortress of Darband and erected the famous wall to protect their empire from the mighty Khazars. The Greek and Armenian writers used to call Darband “Uro-Parakh” which means in Armenian “the Jewish Stronghold.” The cities of Darband, Samandar and Balanjar in the steppes north of Dagestan, and Attil (Itil) on the mouth of the Volga River attracted the Jews from Persia and Armenia and later apparently became centers of Jewish religious propaganda.

Jewish settlements on the southern shore of the Euxinus flourished as early as the fourth century B.C. A Greek annalist at the time of Seleukos Nikator (355-280 B.C.) assumed that these were the remnants of the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel. At the beginning of the Christian era the northern coast of Asia Minor harbored many important Jewish communities.

For the Crimea and the other Jewish colonies on the European shores of the Black Sea, the northbound drive by sea seems to have been of greater importance than the continental drift through the Caucasus. The oldest traces of Jewish settlements in Eastern Europe are to be found in the Greek colonies. These Hellenistic Jews settled in Olbia on the delta
of the Hypanis (Boh), and in other cities and ports on the mouths of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov rivers (Tyras-Dniester, Borysthenes-Dnieper and Tanais-Don).

But the bulk of this population, both Jewish and Greek, settled in the flourishing towns of the Crimea, in Panticapaeum (Kerch)—the capital of the United Republics of the Bosphorus—in Caffa (Theodosia), in Phanagoria (Taman), Gorgippia, Cherson (near present Sevastopol), Tanais (Azov), and Sar-kelel (probably on the lower Don).

As early as the first century A.D. these settlements are mentioned in Philo’s “A Mission to Caligula” (written about 40 A.D.), as harboring Jewish communities in the Far East.

In the neighborhood of Panticapaeum two Greek inscriptions from 80-81 A.D. have been discovered telling of ἀπελευθέρωσις (manumissio), the symbolic donation to the house of prayer of a slave in the capacity of a temple servant. This procedure meant in effect the liberation of a slave. The temple referred to in both inscriptions is the temple of the Jews (“synagogé tôn yudaiön”). However, the method of liberating slaves in the sanctuaries was a pagan-Hellenistic custom. Thus, since the language, the personal names, the customs are all of a Hellenistic or at least syncretistic character, it is only fair to assume that these were not Jews from Armenia or Persia. Similar marble inscriptions about the liberation of slaves (some dated even earlier, in 41 or 54 A.D.) have been discovered in Georgia. Their connection with the Jewish synagogue is not always certain. A clear case, however, is the story of the Jew Pothos, son of Straton in Gorgippia, who in 41 A.D. recorded his liberation of a slave in the synagogue (proseûché), in an inscription beginning with the invocation to the Highest and Omnipotent God (“hypsistos pantokratōr”). These findings are corroborated by later inscriptions in Panticapaeum, both in Greek and Hebrew, where also Hebrew names and symbols have been used since the fourth century. One inscription in Kerch (Panticapaeum) is of particular interest. This is a script on a stone to commemorate the founding of a synagogue in 306 A.D. by an officer of the Roman Emperor Diocletian. How
large these settlements were is unknown, nor is it known whether they were inhabited by proselytes only or also by Jews. It is also uncertain whether they were able to develop continuously in those areas. So far it has been established that the cities of Olbia and Tanais were destroyed by the Goths and the Herules in the middle of the third century; the same happened to Anapa. However, the Jewish settlements were not altogether discontinued by these events. Their continuity is confirmed by at least two more witnesses. St. Jerome (died about 420 A.D.) mentions in his Commentary to Zachariah that “the Assyrians and Chaldeans had led the Jewish people into exile not only to Media and Persia but also into Bosporus and the extreme North.” The Byzantine annalist, Theophanes (eighth century), writes in a note on the year 617 A.D.: “In Phanagoria and in the neighboring region the Jews who live there are surrounded by many tribes.” But besides historical proofs of Jewish settlements, there is also evidence of propaganda for Judaism among Gentiles. In Panticapaeum a large number of tombstones had been found (up to the beginning of the fourth century) bearing representation of the holy candelabrum (the Menorah) or containing reference to “those who fear God the Almighty,” i.e., proselytes. Later, from the beginning of the fourth century, Christian propagandists and neophytes outnumbered the Jews.

Toward the end of the third century we find in Chersonesus (Taurica) Christian bishops wielding considerable influence. On December 6, 300 A.D., the pagans rose in revolt against the bishops Basilius and Capiton and were joined by the Jews.

3. The Rise and Fall of the Khazar Empire

There is a gap in our information about the East European Jews until the eighth century. Later developments, however, bring indirect evidence that a small number of Jews probably succeeded, in the meantime, in penetrating the southern parts of today’s Ukraine. This penetration was considerably strengthened by the important political changes in Eastern Europe
caused by the appearance of new invaders. The Asian nomadic tribes of Mongol and Turkic extraction made inroads into Europe through “the Gate of Nations” between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea. The most powerful of them, the Huns, swept far down to Rome, Northern France and Italy but soon lost momentum and after the sixth century no longer played any considerable part in Europe. Another Asian tribe, the Khazars, established an empire of their own in Eastern Europe. They brought under their control other nomadic hordes, got into political contact with the Byzantine Empire and into economic and cultural exchange with the Arabs and the Jews of Crimea. In contrast to other short-lived nomadic conquests, the influence of the Khazars on East European history was strong and of long duration. Their empire therefore has been eagerly studied by contemporary authors. There is a vast galaxy of Latin, Greek-Byzantine, Arabic, Armenian, Syrian, Persian, Georgian, Slavic, Hebrew, Chinese and German sources on the Khazars. Considerable scholarly research has been done in this field, particularly since the nineteenth century, by German, Jewish, Karaite, Russian, Ukrainian, Polish, Hungarian, Turkish, British, French and other scholars. Nevertheless, many problems have not yet been solved, and the available sources and scholarly opinions are still controversial on many issues.

The first controversial issue is the name and the extraction of the Khazars. The name has many different spellings: Khazars, Kuzars, Akatziroi. Sometimes they were also called Turks, Kabars, Sabirs, Onogonduroi, or Barsiloi. It has been said that the word Khazar in some Turkish dialect means a “roving tramp” or a nomad. But there is no evidence that the Khazars were of Turkic extraction. Some theories speak of Mongolian, others of Ugro-Finnish extraction. Even Gruzinian (Georgian) extraction has been considered plausible. We still do not know what their native tongue was. A recent searching philological inquiry by a prominent Karaite scholar (the turcologist Ananias Zajączkowski of Warsaw) has uncovered significant links between the Khazar and the Turkic languages, on the one
hand, and the language spoken by the Polish Karaites, on the other hand.

The time of the Khazars' first appearance is also controversial. According to some scholars, the Khazars appeared in Europe in the second century A.D. By the time of the Huns their role had been already established. The great king of the Huns, Attila (fifth century), tried to get along with them on a peaceful footing and finally succeeded in designating his eldest son as the heir of the Khazar kingdom. However, a recently published scholarly study by D. M. Dunlop vigorously denounces this theory and places the appearance of the Khazars in Europe as late as the second half of the sixth century. Whatever the case, after the defeat of the Huns, the Khazars became the most powerful Eastern European nation. Before long they got into a close political and military alliance with the Byzantine Empire and fought together against the Persians in 627 A.D. Soon they became engaged in a fierce struggle with the Arabs who, after the conquest of Persia and Azerbaijan, tried to penetrate Eastern Europe through the Caucasus. The First (642-652) and the Second (722-737) Arab-Khazar War checked the march of Islam in Eastern Europe, as the Franks did in Western Europe in the battle of Tours in 732. After the second Arab-Khazar War, the inner struggle which developed in the Arab World after the death of Caliph Uthmar between the Umayads and the Abbasids diverted the attention of the Arabs from Khazaria, which was left in peace for a long time. Their common interest in fighting the Arabs strengthened the ties between Byzantium and the Khazars. The Byzantine emperors maintained in Constantinople a bodyguard of Khazar mercenary soldiers. The Byzantine Emperor Justinian II married the sister of the Khazar Khaqan, Theodora (702), and the Emperor Leo IV, nicknamed "the Khazar," was the son of a Khazar princess, Irene. After her son's death (780) Irene governed Byzantium for several years.

The rise of Islam in the seventh century started new political and ideological developments also in the Eastern European area. The fanatic religious zeal of the new creed gave momen-
to the expansionist policy of the Persian Empire, a stronghold of Islam since the seventh century. On the other hand the religious controversy, which again raged all over the Mediterranean world in the first centuries of Christianity between Christians and Jews or Christians and various pagan philosophers, gained new momentum. Religious strife between Christianity and Islam renewed the old sectarian controversies between various religious persuasions. Before long, the Islamic-Christian controversy also reached Khazaria. Both the Byzantines and the Arabs were anxious to win control over the powerful and valiant Khazar nation; both tried to achieve this by religious missions. Out of this struggle for their souls the Khazars chose a third way: they stuck to Judaism, thus choosing a neutral position between the two bitterly opposed religions.

The Judaization of the Khazars stirred the contemporary world. A whole array of legendary tales and historical chronicles described this event in its own way.

A Jewish legend tells of a religious discussion at the court of the Khazar Khaqan, Bulan, between the representatives of three religions: Jews, Christians and Moslems. The leaders of the Christian and Moslem faiths disputed bitterly and each challenged his opponent’s arguments and supported his own by quotations from the Old Testament. Said the king: “If you both go to the Old Testament to prove your point, then the best of all is probably the religion coming directly from this venerable Book of Books. So let me go to this source.” And consequently he chose Judaism.²

This rather simplified account seems to be the official version maintained by the Khazar court and by the leading Jewish circles there. This version had been used also in the famous

² It seems that since the conversion of the Khazars, a kind of double kingship developed in the country. While the old office of the Khaqan was not entirely done with, its role changed considerably. The Khaqan became merely a shadow king while the real power rested with the new rulers of Jewish persuasion who were frequently referred to as the kings of Khazaria in the various travel reports that have come down to us. The position of the new Jewish rulers can be compared in some respects to the position of the major-domos in Merovingian France, or of the shoguns in Japan.
letter of the Khazar king, Joseph, to the Spanish-Jewish statesman, physician, scholar and patron of Jewish letters, Hasdai ibn Shaprut, the adviser on foreign affairs of the Caliph of Cordoba. Hasdai ibn Shaprut had learned about the existence of a Jewish state in Eastern Europe from some Khurasanian, Byzantine and Slavic diplomatic missions to the Caliph’s court and had sent an enthusiastic letter to the “King of Judaea” asking him for more information about the stirring and great news that came to him about 960 A.D. King Joseph’s answer contained the above-mentioned version of the Khazar conversion to Judaism. However, recently some doubt has arisen as to the authenticity of the king’s letter. Some students of history assert that the letter is probably authentic but distorted by later interpolations. As a matter of fact the letter of the king, in the present or, rather, in another, older and probably more genuine form, was known to the Spanish Jews and became popular when the great Hebrew poet and philosopher, Judah Halevy, used its contents for a historical background and introduction in his philosophic dialogue “Kitâb-al-Khazarî” (at the beginning of the twelfth century).

Legends are seldom a product of sheer imagination. We should always look for their historical core, the more so in this case when similar legends are recorded in Arabic sources too, where we also find the notion of a dispute between the representatives of the three monotheistic religions. But the Moslem version explains the reason for the Jewish success in a quite different manner: not by persuasion did the Jews win their victory over the Moslem and Christian representatives but by ruse; they poisoned the pious Mufti.

The third version was again a Jewish one and was discovered in a depository of old Hebrew books and manuscripts in an ancient synagogue in Cairo (the Genizah fragments), some sixty years ago. This is a contemporaneous letter found in a damaged and incomplete condition, written by a Jew who apparently lived in Khazaria or in Constantinople. He tells the story more realistically—the Jews had been long settled in the Khazar Empire and they were completely assimilated. One of
the Jewish soldiers, an army commander, was so outstanding on the battlefield that the Khazars appointed him to the highest rank in the kingdom, second in rank to the Khaqan. The new Jewish king remembered the forgotten religion of his ancestors. He ordered that the old Jewish religious books long buried in a cave be unearthed and he reinstated the forgotten Jewish religion.

These stories are anything but accurate. There is a difference of opinion among scholars not only on the whereabouts of the conversion but also on its date. Contemporary Arabic writers placed the conversion to Judaism in the time of the Caliph Hārūn-al-Rashīd of Bagdad, that is, between 786-809. A student of Khazar history, Julius Brutzkus, sets the date as 732 A.D. Brutzkus believes that the conversion was the work of Persian, not of Crimean Jews, since the Crimea was then still far away from the capital, the old residence of the Khazar king, the city of Samandar (Tarku). D. M. Dunlop arrived recently at a different conclusion. He believes that the conversion of the Khazars developed in two phases. First, around 740, the Khazars adopted a kind of watered-down, modified form of Judaism. Only later, about 800, in the days of King Obadiah, came a religious reform, and a more rigid, rabbinical form of Judaism was introduced.

Another theory forwarded by some Karaite scholars is that the conversion of the Khazars was carried out by a man who was close to the Karaite sect. This theory was based on a sensational discovery made by a Karaite scholar, Abraham Firkovich, about 100 years ago. In his book, published in 1873, Firkovich asserted that he found the tomb and the epitaph of Itzhak Sangari (or Singari), the man who reputedly was the chief interlocutor in the dispute which led to the conversion.

5 Abraham Firkovich, Avnei Zikkaron, Vilno, 1873.
of the Khazar king. Firkovich discovered the tomb in the cemetery of Chufut Kale, one of the oldest Karaite communities in Crimea. After a long and fervent discussion Firkovich's discoveries have been proved to be a forgery. Nevertheless, some Karaite scholars still cling to Firkovich's thesis.

The conversion of the Khazars to the Karaite denomination seems improbable. If we accept the year 732 as the date of the conversion, the whole Karaite conception drops out automatically since the Karaite schism did not develop before 760 A.D. But even if we accept the last possible date of conversion, at the end of the eighth century, there is very little probability that the young Karaite sect could have already gathered enough strength to have had a vital branch in Crimea or in Khazaria and to be capable of such a remarkable religious conquest.

However, it seems that even in the Middle Ages controversial opinions prevailed about the religious allegiance of the Khazars. The above-mentioned letter of King Joseph contains an interpolation probably inserted at some later date emphasizing the high standards of rabbinical and Talmudic lore among the Khazars. This seems to be a remote echo of an older polemic. Also R. Abraham ibn Daud in his anti-Karaite book Sepher Hakkabalah (twelfth century) takes up the cudgels in this issue. He writes: "There are Rabbanite communities . . . up to the Itil River, where the Khazars who embraced Judaism live. . . . We have seen some of their descendants who are scholars (talmidey hakhamim) in Tudela [a city in Spain]. They told us that the surviving [Khazars] adhere to the Rabbanite traditions." Ibn Daud found it necessary to emphasize the point that the Khazar scholars he has seen in Tudela were "talmidey hakhamim;" in his terminology, students of Talmudic lore, Rabbanites and not Karaites. This discussion reflects, in our opinion, the basic fact that several different kinds of denominational Judaism spread in the territories of Khazaria.

First, the hellenistic Crimean Jews, who settled there from the first centuries of the Christian era, probably were bearers of a Jewish creed as it was patterned in the era of the Second Commonwealth, before Mishnah and Talmud. The later arrivals, first the Persian Jews, brought along with them the Talmudic learning and Law, the observances and the customs of the Rabbanites. But there was still a third element: the ethnic Khazars and other gentile elements who were converted to Judaism and who probably had only a superficial smattering of Judaism like the afore-mentioned "believers of God the Almighty." In short, it seems that the conversion of the Khazars had taken place by degrees during the eighth century and gradually reached the more influential strata of military and administrative officers while the bulk of the Khazar population remained untouched by it. It seemed to have been originally a watered-down sort of a minimal "religion of Abraham."

From the records that have come down to us it is not easy to discover why the Khazars embraced Judaism. The question of adhering to one of the three monotheistic religions, however, was not merely a theological problem but was primarily a political act, related to the civilizing of a nomadic tribe. After their spectacular military victories the Khazars tried to get settled in the vast, recently-conquered areas, to build up an economic and political structure, and to get away from the barbarian primitivism exemplified in paganism. Higher organizational forms, elaborated patterns of law, ethics, and social norms were to be found in the cultural heritage of the three monotheistic religions. Two of them, Islam and Christianity, were connected with great political powers of that time; to adopt Christianity or Islam meant, therefore, to commit themselves to the political aims or, at least, to the political pressure either of Byzantium or of the Arabic Caliphate. It meant also to abandon the convenient position of neutrality between the two rivaling powers. The most convenient monotheistic culture to be adopted was, therefore, Judaism because no disadvantage of political pressure, liabilities and aspirations was connected with it. There it would only be the advantage
of large commercial connections, old and elaborate traditions of legal science and ethics, of administrative knowledge and culture. These might have been the reasons why the Khazar royal family as well as some of the higher ranks of bureaucracy and nobility adopted Judaism.

Having adopted Judaism for primarily practical reasons, the Khazar rulers lacked the missionary zeal to enforce Judaism on their subjects. They apparently continued to observe the rules of strict neutrality after their conversion to Judaism. Their country remained open to missionary activities of all three religions. Arabic writers observed that in the courts of the Khazars the set of judges (seven or nine) used to be based on a kind of religious parity: two Jews, two Moslems, two Christians and the rest (one or three) heathens. This gives us perhaps a hint on the numerical correlation of the different denominations. One of the Arabic writers relates: "The Khazar warriors are Moslems, the city dwellers (merchants) are Jewish."

The religious tolerance of the Khazars seems to be unique for that epoch. In the middle of the ninth century the most illustrious of all Byzantine missionaries, the Saint Constantine (Cyril) was allowed to propagate his faith in the empire. According to Byzantine sources the Emperor of Byzantium sent him and his brother Methodius on rather a political than a religious mission. He chose the two brothers, one a philosopher, the other a monk, upon the recommendation of Patriarch Photius, who told him it would be good for the prestige of Christianity to send ambassadors who could impress the Khazars and their Jewish theologians by scholarly erudition. Constantine particularly took this advice very seriously. He went to Cherson in Crimea and took lessons there to improve his knowledge of the Hebrew language and letters from a Samaritan who lived there. (Incidentally, this is the only source to mention that Samaritans had also settled in the Crimea.) The knowledge of Hebrew was helpful to Constantine in his disputations with Jews. Thus he was invited by the Khazar king, Zachariah, to a religious debate in Sarkel. This disputation was described at
length in the official biography of Constantine, the *Vita Constantini*. The biographer mentions that the missionary had frequent discussions with "the Judeans who blaspheme the Christian faith," and "by prayer and eloquence [he] defeated the Judeans in dispute and put them to shame about the year 860 A.D." Thus we learn that the legendary dispute in King Bulan's Court was not the only one and that the ideological struggle was carried on also in later years. However, only one record of serious religious friction has come down to us: in 932 the Moslems destroyed a Jewish synagogue in the city of Darband. In retaliation the Khazars ordered the destruction of the tower (minaret) of the Moslem mosque and the execution of the muezzins in the capital, but soon discontinued these repressive measures, fearing repercussions for the Jews in the Moslem countries. According to another source, the episode occurred in Itil, not in Darband.

It would, however, be wrong to explain the religious tolerance of the Khazars in the modern terms of an enlightened liberalism. The tolerance of the Khazars was rather a residue of the former beliefs and tradition of this Turko-Mongol nation. The pagan shamanism of the Turk, Mongol and other Ural-Altaic tribes was tolerant in the sense that it regarded the gods, the priests and the medicine men of other religions as equals in their own sphere of influence and adopted toward them an attitude of peaceful coexistence, instead of the intransigent, monopolistic attitude prevalent in the three great monotheistic religions. The religious tolerance practiced in the Khazar Empire is borne out in a comparison with the religious indifference observed in other empires of similar ethnic extraction, like those of the Huns and of the Mongols.

The ethnic core of the Khazar nation living mainly on the northwest coast of the Caspian Sea was not very big. The capital was transferred, after the First Arab-Khazar War, from Samandar to a less dangerous location, to Atil (Itil) near the mouth of the Itil River (Volga). Later the city was named Saqsín. After its capture by the Tatar "Golden Horde" the city was destroyed and in its vicinity arose a new city, Tazi-Tarchan.
(Hāddžī-Tarchan, Astrakhan). But in addition to the ethnic Khazar territory, the Khazars held large areas populated by a score of other tribes and nations. During the sixth and seventh centuries, beginning with 576, the Khazars conquered Crimea. The biggest political expansion of the Khazar Empire is reported in the eighth and in the first half of the ninth century. The western frontiers of the Khazar Empire at that time expanded to the Dniester River and to the Carpathian Mountains. Some historians believe that for some time they even controlled the southern part of today's Poland and Czechoslovakia. To the north they expanded to the Kama River, to the east, to the Ural Mountains, to the south, to the foot of the Caucasus. To these vast areas streamed a considerable Jewish immigration after the Khazars adopted Judaism. Waves of Jews from Byzantium arrived after their expulsion by Emperor Leo III, the Isaurian, in 723, and during the persecutions of Basileios I (866) and Romanos Lekápenos (919-944). Hebrew sources recorded also Persian Jews, seeking refuge from persecutions in Eastern Europe, penetrating even as far as eastern Germany. There is also some information on immigration of Babylonian, Arabian and Egyptian Jews. Commercial interchange and travels to Khazaria seemed not unusual to the Jews in the Middle East. Thus, Rabbi Saadiah Gaon mentioned, in one of his Responsa, a Jew who “went to Khazars” (about 929 A.D.). Also Karaites and members of other Jewish sects persecuted by the authorities arrived from Byzantium and Persia. The Jewish traveler Eldad Hadani (about 888) speaks of great numbers of Jews in the Khazar Empire. The evidence of Eldad, who is known for fantastic exaggerations in his travel reports, is certainly not dependable but in this case it coincides with the other sources.

Most Jews of Khazaria were probably engaged in mercantile activities. Of course, the overland trade in this country of roving tribes, hunters and cattle drivers could not be the basic support for a large Jewish population. But Khazaria was also an important transit area for international trade.

7 T. E. Modelski, Król “Gebalim” w liście Chasdaja, Lviv, 1910.
Since the seventh century the southern part of Eastern Europe developed into an internationally important transit area. In the seventh and eighth centuries the Arabic control of the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the transcontinental Asian routes became complete, and it was the policy of the Moslem Caliphs to tax the lucrative international trade with high customs duties. The situation was aggravated by constant danger of pirates on the seas and by persecutions of the Jewish merchants in Byzantium. Therefore Spanish and Byzantine Jews, as well as non-Jewish merchants, made strenuous efforts to find another route. One of the new international routes, as described by various travelers and the Arabic postmaster, Ibn Khurdādbih (ninth century), was as follows: from India and China down the Oxus River and westward, passing the Caspian Sea to Itil, the Khazar capital, thence to Sarai on the Don and down the Don to Tanais (Azov). The new route gave rise to the commercial prominence of the Khazars and encouraged daring merchants to settle there. They traded in fish, furs, slaves, wool, honey, wax, etc. The most important commercial center was the city of Itil. More to the west, the Dnieper was the main economic artery. Furs, honey, wax were here the staple articles of export. The protection exercised by the Khazars over the Dnieper trade helped to develop the country. Trading posts and many cities were built along the Dnieper and its tributaries. The southern part of the Dnieper from the Black Sea to Kiev became popular as the “Greek way.”

It seems also likely that the Jews introduced to the country more advanced ways of cultivating the soil. In the lower Volga region much rice was produced during the flowering of the Khazarian Empire; this widespread culture totally disappeared after the latter’s downfall. An Arabic geographer, Muqaddasi (Maqdisi), pointed out that the country was rich with “large quantities of sheep, honey and Jews,” thus equating the Jews with other natural resources of the land.

After the Judaization of the Khazars, the Jewish propaganda in the East gained both momentum and prestige. Jewish religious expansion is recorded in the vassal country of Yendzer
(Samandar), in Daghestan, among the Black Bulgars on the upper Volga (here the proselytes soon were outnumbered by Moslem neophytes), among the Alans in the large steppes, among the Chalizes on the Caspian Sea, in the Kingdom of the Black Mountains in the Urals, and even across the Urals toward the East into the West Siberian plains. This seems, however, to have been a slow and superficial process of Judaization. No trace of any governmental pressure on the part of the Khazars in behalf of this Judaization was recorded in the pertinent sources. Also, no record has been preserved on conversions to Judaism among the Slav vassal states of the Khazars.

The Slav countries paid several tributes to the Khazars in the form of iron, fabrics, weapons, hides, etc. The city of Kiev also carried in those times the Khazar name “Sambat” or in Old-Slavic: “Vyshegrad.” The name Sambat for Kiev was familiar to the Arabic and Greek writers of that time. Constantine Porphyrogenitus (in his *Administratio Imperii*, chapter IX) refers to the caravan of small cargo boats assembling annually at Kiev: “They come down the Dnieper River and assemble at the strong point Kioava also called Sambatas.”

According to some Ukrainian chroniclers, Kiev was founded by the Khazars and formed three separate settlements which later merged into one. The part of the city called “Kozary” is mentioned for the first time in an official document dated 944 or 946. The name of the upper part, the “High Fortress”—Sambatas, gave to Dr. Itzhak Schipper the idea for an interesting theory. Dr. Schipper believed that the Khazar Empire was the primary source for the legend of Sambation, recorded by Eldad Hadani and other Jewish writers. According to this legend the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel lived beyond a mythical river called Sambation, a very turbulent river, full of moving stones and practically untraversable. Only on the Sabbath, the Day of Rest, the stone movement ceased; hence the name of the river, Sambation. This river, Dr. Schipper assumed, is the Dnieper and it was called Sambation because it streams alongside Kiev-Sambat. As a matter of fact, the Dnieper River is very turbulent in its lower course because of its numerous cascades and cliffs,
the famous Dnieper Rapids. And the description of the inhabi-
tants of the "Sambation region" as the "red Jews" in the legend
may have its explanation in the slight Mongol skin pigmen-
tation characteristic of many Khazars and other racially related
tribes living there. To Eldad Hadani and to Hasdai ibn Shap-
ruth the Khazars and the "red Jews" appeared to be beyond
any doubt the descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes. Of course,
the answer of the Khazar King Joseph should have undermined
this mystic belief.

In the second half of the ninth century the powerful Khazar
Empire began to decline and to yield to the pressure of its
former vassals, the Slav tribes which gradually consolidated
their organization and military power. Northern invaders from
Scandinavia called "Rus" succeeded in setting up a strong po-
litical organization in northern Rus'. Being not only warriors
but also able merchants and navigators, the Varengo-Rus cov-
eted the important trade routes, mainly the Dnieper-Black Sea
route. In the second half of the ninth century the Rus-Varan-
gian Prince Helgo (Oleh) seized control of Kiev and recap-
tured from the Khazars a large part of their Slav dependencies.
A hundred years' war raged between the Rus' (allied with By-
zantium) and the Khazars. In 965 the last pagan Kievan Prince
Svyatoslav conquered the important Khazar stronghold, Sarkel,
i.e., "White Tower," (in Old-Slavic, "Belaya Vezha"—in Turkish,
"Azev," i.e., "Ferry Town"). Another decisive blow to the
Khazar Empire was the war waged by Svyatoslav's successor,
Volodymyr the Great, in 986. Volodymyr occupied the impor-
tant cities of Theodosia and Tamataracha (Phanagoria), and
these conquests drove a wedge between the Khazar lands. The
once mighty Empire fell apart into two smaller states: the
Crimean kingdom and the East Khazar kingdom on the Cas-
pian Sea.

It seems that the Khazars tried to neutralize their enemy by
the same techniques of missionary diplomacy which had earlier
been applied to them. The old Rus' Nestorian Chronicle related
this colorful story:
The Khazar Jews came to Volodymyr the Great and told him: "We have heard that the Bulgars [adherents of Islam] came to you to preach their faith; the Christians believe in a man who was crucified by us, and we believe in One God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob." Volodymyr asked the Jews: "What do your laws prescribe?" To this they replied: "To be circumcised, not to eat pork or game and to keep the Sabbath." "Where is your country?" inquired the prince. "In Jerusalem," replied the Jews. "But do you live there?" he asked. "We do not," answered the Jews, "for the Lord brought wrath upon our forefathers and scattered us all over the earth for our sins, while our land was given away to the Christians." Thereupon Volodymyr exclaimed: "How then dare you teach others when you yourselves are rejected by God and scattered? If God loved you you would not be dispersed in strange lands. Do you intend to inflict the same misfortune on me?"

This legend bears unmistakable traces of contemporaneous religious arguments and is in itself clear evidence of heated propaganda battles between the Jews and Christian missionaries in those areas. As a matter of fact, more accounts of similar religious discussions in the ninth and tenth centuries came down to us. The untiring missionary efforts of the Church are well illuminated by the epistle of the patriarch Photius to the bishop of Bosporus (Kerch), in the ninth century: "Were thou also to capture the Judeans there securing their obedience unto Christ, I should welcome with my whole soul the fruits of such beautiful hopes."8

In the meantime the military and political situation of the Khazar state was deteriorating. The Byzantine-Rus' cooperation was strengthened by Volodymyr's adherence to the Greek Orthodox Church in 988. In 1016, Volodymyr's son Svyatopolk launched an attack on the Khazar kingdom from the continent while the Byzantines attacked it from the sea. The last Khazar prince, Sanherib, later (after his baptism) renamed Georgios Tzulos, was defeated and his country divided between the two victorious allies. The conversion of the prince was an example to be followed by a great number of members of the royal family, the aristocracy, the bureaucracy and the army. Appar-

ently only a few Khazars adhered to their Jewish allegiance and joined the ethnic Jews, who did not give up the religion of their forefathers. Some part of the Jews emigrated to the West (to Kiev, to the areas of today's Rumania and Hungary, and even to Spain). Some others retired to the Caucasus, but the bulk probably remained in their native country. Their descendants in the Crimea were later called "Krymchaki" (as distinguished from the later Jewish arrivals). During a later period of Moslem domination in Crimea, many of them were converted to Islam.

The East Khazar kingdom (on the lower Volga River, with Itil as its capital) lasted for almost two centuries. The East Khazar kingdom maintained cultural and probably also commercial links with Babylonian Jewry. The traveler Petahiah of Regensburg, while in Bagdad (in 1175), "saw messengers from the Kings of Meshekh [S. W. Caucasus], which . . . extends as far as the Dark Mountains. . . . All needy scholars go there to teach them [the Khazars] and their children the Bible and the Babylonian Talmud. From Egypt, too, scholars came there to teach them."9 It seems that the East Khazar kingdom made efforts to break its political isolation and even tried to restore the Jewish domination over Palestine. When the First Crusade in 1096 stirred the Christian world and upset the Jewish communities in Europe by a wave of bloody pogroms, the whole Levantine area was thrown into an uproar. Messianic aspirations and movements arose in the Jewish communities of Europe and Asia. Many Jews of Central Europe fled persecution. Quite a number of these refugees arrived in Constantinople and soon the rumor spread among them that the Ten Lost Tribes and the Khazar Jews were marching from the fabulous "Hills of Darkness" in order to precede the Christians in the conquest of the Holy Land. One of the most popular rumors was that seventeen communities in Khazaria had left their homes and marched into the desert in the hope of meet-

ing there the Lost Ten Tribes and walking along with them to the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{10}

The Khazars, however, did not fully live up to these expectations. Khazaria was probably the source of one of the most remarkable and mysterious messianic movements of those times (twelfth century), led by David Alroy (called also Menahem ben Solomon al-Rühî or ibn Duji). The movement—a Khazar Jewish counterpart of the contemporaneous Christian Crusades—spread rapidly to Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, and other parts of Persia and Babylonia, and assumed the character of a military effort aiming at the conquest of Palestine. It failed, however, after the assassination of David Alroy in El 'Imādiya, and thus the last attempt of the Khazar Empire to break out from the ever tightening ring of its stronger neighbors definitely collapsed. Still the East Khazar state stubbornly resisted the impact of the Mongol invasion, set in motion by Genghis Khan in the beginning of the thirteenth century. In 1237 the Khazar state succumbed to the second Tatar onslaught and was completely wiped out. Only the Jewish Khazar principalities in the mountainous regions of Daghestan succeeded in continuing an independent existence for several hundred years.

The Khazar era was undoubtedly a period of great splendor for the Jews and the adherents of Judaism in Eastern Europe. Although the information that has come down to us about this epoch is rather sparse and uncertain, it can be assumed that the Jewish settlers there enjoyed a long and peaceful development. The catastrophe of the Khazar Empire destroyed the flourishing Jewish community in those areas. However, Jewish settlements did not entirely disappear. While the Jewish centers in Khazaria proper were on the verge of disappearance, new Jewish communities began to develop in the Slavic countries, in the Ukraine and in Poland. Thus the downfall of the Kha-

zar Empire was marked not only by an eclipse of the old Jewish settlements, but also by the emergence of new ones.

4. The Aftermath and the New Beginning

Undoubtedly many Jews remained in Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Khazar Empire. The first reference to the Jews in a Rus’ chronicle is the aforementioned “tests of faith” arranged in 986 in Kiev in the presence of Prince Volodymyr the Great. Kiev, the focal point of domestic commerce and foreign trade assumed a cosmopolitan character at the time of Kievan Rus’. Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Germans, Moravians and Venetians lived there side by side. Thietmar of Merseburg, an early German chronicler, credits Kiev with 400 churches and eight markets (in 1018). A Jewish community in Kiev, apparently dating back from the Khazar period, is mentioned several times in contemporaneous Rus’ chronicles and Jewish writings. The Grand Prince Svyatopolk (1093-1113) granted various privileges to merchants and artisans, named in the documents sometimes as Jews and sometimes as Khazars. This embittered the Christian city dwellers. In 1113, during the interregnum following the death of Svyatopolk, riots broke out. The mob threw itself upon the Jews and plundered their property. Svyatopolk’s successor, Volodymyr Monomakh, issued a decree expelling the Jews from Kiev. There is no historical record indicating whether the decree was carried out or was rescinded. In any case, before long the Jews lived again in Kiev. In 1124 the Jews suffered severely from a fire which destroyed a considerable portion of the city. According to a record of the years 1146-1151, a gate in the city of Kiev was called “the Jewish Gate,” probably by virtue of its relation to the Jewish quarter. In that city, which served as a link between Western Europe, the Black Sea and Asia, the Jews also maintained far-reaching contacts with their coreligionists in other countries. In 1181, one Reb Moshe from Kiev was a student of the famous Rabbenu Tam in Rameru (today Ramerupt, Northern France) while another Jewish student, Reb
Isaac of Chernihiv, studied in the yeshiva of London at the same time. Another (or, perhaps, the same?), Rabbi Moshe of Kiev, is mentioned in a Hebrew source of the twelfth century as addressing a scholarly inquiry to the well-known Talmudic authority, the Gaon of Bagdad, Rabbi Samuel ben Ali. Another source, which mentions a Jewish merchant of the city of Volodymyr in Volynia attending the fair in Cologne in 1117, is still in dispute (the name of the document may be a misspelled version of Valdemar in Mecklenburg).\textsuperscript{11}

One of the most important activities of international trade in the tenth and eleventh centuries was still the slave trade. Slaves were bought by Christian, Jewish and Moslem merchants in the East European countries and transported to the Western countries, particularly to highly developed Mohammedan Spain, where they were sold with great profit. The Christian Church waged a fierce struggle against the slave trade, particularly against the Moslem and Jewish merchants, blaming them for forcing their slaves to adopt their faiths.

A strong campaign against the Jewish slave trade was conducted by the Greek Orthodox Church in the Byzantine Empire. It was carried also into the adjacent Slavic areas, as we can learn from the story of Saint Eustratios. This story, incidentally, sheds an interesting light on conditions in the Ukraine and in the Crimea. Whatever the narrator’s pious ornamentation and biased exaggeration may be, the old legend nevertheless reflects both the moral climate as well as the polemic tension of the religious struggle of those days. In this version (thirteenth century), the bishop of Vladimir in the principality of Suzdal tells the story to the monks of the Kiev-Pechersk Monastery:\textsuperscript{12}

Saint Eustratios had been taken captive by the godless Hagarenes (Cumans) during their attack on Kiev [1096 A.D.] and had been sold to a Jew. Together with him some 50 slaves had been sold,

\textsuperscript{11} Julius Aronius, \textit{Regesten zur Geschichte der Juden im fränkischen und deutschen Reiche bis . . . 1273}, Berlin, 1887-1902.

among them 30 monastic laborers and 20 citizens of Kiev. After 14 days all but Eustratios died of hunger and pain. On the day of the Lord’s Resurrection the Jew crucified him [Eustratios] and he thanked God for it and lived 15 days more. But before he died he predicted to the Jew that he and all other Jews who lived with him would be punished and destroyed. At the same time a wealthy and very enterprising Jew of Cherson [in the Crimea] had turned Christian and had been appointed eparch of Cherson by the Emperor [of Byzantium]. Having obtained this office he granted the Jews throughout the Greek Empire permission to purchase Christians for their service. But the impious eparch was discovered and executed together with all the other Jews living in Cherson. Thus the prediction of Saint Eustratios was fulfilled.

Of course, the real facts of the legend cannot be checked, but it seems to be a recollection of religious conflicts and polemics not too long past, and of an implacable struggle against the Jewish slave trade.

A letter found in the Genizah of Cairo sheds some interesting light not only on the travels of the Slavic Jews but also on some cultural aspects. It mentions a Rus’-Jewish merchant who came in the eleventh century to Salonika and intended to go to Palestine. He received a letter of recommendation13 to his coreligionists in Palestine with the request that he be given help because he spoke only Old East-Slavic, knew no other language, not even Hebrew. The letter runs as follows:

To the most highly esteemed congregations of the Holy Nation, the scattered remnants of Yeshurun. . . . The case of X. ben Y. of the community of Rus’, who is a visitor among us, the community of Salonika. . . . He has requested of us these few lines to serve as an introduction to your worthiness, so that you might lend him a helping hand and guide him along the best road from city to city . . . for he knows neither Hebrew nor Greek nor Arabic but only his native Rus’ language [lit., “Canaanitic”].

It is likely that the Jewish religion still constituted a threat to the Christian faith in those only recently Christianized countries. After the great disputes of the eighth, ninth, and tenth

13 Źródła hebrajskie do dziejów Słowian i niektórych ludów środkowej i wschodniej Europy, compiled and edited by Franciszek Kupfer and Tadeusz Lewicki, Warsaw, 1956, Polish Academy of Sciences, Jewish Historical Institute.
centuries many other religious debates took place. The abbot of the famous Kiev-Pechersk Monastery, Theodosius (1051-1074), is reported as having had the habit of getting up at night and secretly going to the Jews to argue with them about Christ. (The story is told in *The Life of Theodosius* written allegedly by Nestor.) Also the Metropolitans of Kiev, Ilarion and Ioan (about 1050 and 1080), used to preach against Jews and Judaism. It is almost beyond doubt that both rabbinical and Karaite Jews lived in the Ukrainian lands at that time. In 1150 the monk Theodosius of Kiev describes minutely the Sabbath rites of the Karaites. The Jewish traveler Petahiah of Regensburg did not find genuine Jews in the land of Kedarim (probably the Cumans on the banks of the Dnieper) but only "heretics and sectarians" ("míním," as he put it in Hebrew).

Rabbi Petahiah asked them: "Why do you not believe in the words of the sages?" They replied: "Because our fathers did not teach them to us." On the eve of the Sabbath they cut all the bread to be eaten on the Sabbath. They eat in the dark and sit all day on one spot. Their prayers consist only of psalms, and when Rabbi Petahiah imparted to them our rituals and after-meal prayers they were pleased. They also said: "We have never heard of the Talmud."\(^{14}\)

This description exactly fits the Karaites.

It seems that a steady flow of Jews from the former Khazar areas, particularly from Crimea, still came to the North in the twelfth century. In 1171 a great number of Jews from Bila Vezha (Sarkel) was reported as having immigrated to Chernihiv. The Tatar conquest of Crimea and of Kievan Rus' further strengthened the regular commercial intercourse between those two countries and probably stimulated migrations.

As for the Crimean Jewish settlements—two Jewish communities (a rabbinical and a Karaite one) flourished during the thirteenth century in the ancient Tatar capital Sulkhat (Colgat, now Eski-Krim). Also the old Karaite community of Chufut-Kale ("the Fortress of the Jews"), famous for its huge number of Jewish tombstones ranging from the twelfth to the

eighteenth centuries, grew again, beginning early in the fif­
ten centuries, in number and in influence. Chufut-Kale was
situated near the new Tatar capital of Bakhtchi-Sarai and was
surrounded by numerous Jewish and Karaite rural estates. An­
other important sea harbor, Caffa (the old Theodosia), be­
came an international trade center since the thirteenth century
when its Genoese patrons obtained essential commercial priv­
ileges from the Tatar khans. Italians, Greeks, Jews and
Armenians flocked to Caffa and adjacent localities. If the testi­
mony of the traveler Schiltberger, who visited Crimea between
1394-1427, may be relied upon, there were “two kinds of Jews”
(he refers to the Jews and the Karaites) in Caffa and they had
two synagogues and 4,000 houses. Caffa was surrounded by
many Jewish vineyards and kitchen gardens. Kerch too seems
to have had a considerable Jewish population. The contempo­ary Arabic geographer Ibn Faqth called the upper part of
Kerch (Sam-Karch) flatly “Samkarch a'-Yahûd.”

It may be assumed that Jews in Kiev and other Ukrainian
and southern Russian cities under Tatar rule received priv­
ileges and protection from the khans and enjoyed a relatively
quiet period from the thirteenth century up to the time of the
Tatar-Lithuanian War (1396-1399).

While the westward migration of Jewish elements from the
Western parts of Khazaria and from Crimea can be traced at
least to some degree, there is almost no reliable material about
the fate of the Jews in the Eastern Khazar state, destroyed by
the Mongols in the thirteenth century. The bulk of the popu­
lation of the Eastern Khazar state probably was absorbed by
the “Golden Horde.” The ethnic Jews, whose number prob­
ably decreased gradually during the last few centuries of dis­
integration and political misfortune, were either submerged in
the non-Jewish populace or emigrated to Central Asia (Bok­
hara, etc.), Persia and perhaps also, in small numbers, to the
West and the North. The Russian sects of “Subbotniki” and
other “Zhidovstvuyushchie” (“Judeo-heretics” or “Judaizantes”)­
who made their appearance from time to time in the Ukraine
and Southern Russia may have been a small vestige of long-
forgotten and obliterated traditions and creeds. However, the “Subbotniki” and other “Judeo-heretics” appeared on the Russian scene and in the Ukraine much later, probably not earlier than in the last decades of the fifteenth century, and a direct link between them and the Khazars can hardly be established. Only some oral traditions and travel reports may be quoted for the sake of a complete record. Thus, Joseph Elias in his Memoirs of a Russian Zionist (Tel Aviv, 1955, Hebrew) tells of meetings with Jewish Cossacks of the Tzarist army who had a tradition of direct Khazar descent. More specific is the record of the Cossack writer D. Skobtzoff, now in Paris, who describes the life of the Kuban Cossacks in his book, Gremuchii rodnik, (Paris, 1938). Among them, he states, were numerous groups of Cossacks who were called Subbotniki or Cossacks of the Mosaic Covenant, particularly in the Cossack stations of Urupskaya, Mikhailovskaya and Petropavlovskaya, in the neighborhood of the city of Armavir in the Caucasus. They had their own rabbis whom they used to send to Warsaw to get their rabbinical training. Similar observations about Khazar-Jewish traditions were recorded in several travel reports from the areas on the Caspian Sea.

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The following list does not pretend to give a full and comprehensive bibliography of the problems discussed in this paper. Such a bibliography would have run to many hundreds of entries. Our list is limited to publications quoted or frequently used in this article. For more bibliographical material on Jewish history in the Roman-Hellenistic, Khazar, or early Slavic periods the reader is referred to the following publications listed below:

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BORYSTHENES — BORYSTHENITES AND TANAIS — TANAITES

ANDRIY KOTSEVALOV

I. BORYSTHENES

The Greek city on the Hypanis, which is called Olbia in inscriptions, is usually known as Borysthenes in literary remains and only at times (in Arrianus, for example) is the name Olbia found. Following Marr, S. A. Zhebelev and other Soviet researchers explain this change in the name of the city in the following manner:

The old name of the aboriginal settlement which was located here before the founding of the Greek colony was Olba (“settlement” in the aboriginal language). The name Olbia (“fortunate” in Greek) appeared among the Greeks as a folk-etymological development.

Herodotus, who was struck by the beauty of the Borysthenes River, also called the city Olbia Borysthenes, and this name is found in classical literature.

The term Borysthenes, which is used in the Olbian decree on money, means, according to Zhebelev, “the Dnieper-Bug (Boh) estuary.” I cannot agree with this thesis. There is no need to assume that the name Olbia came from the local Olba.

Zhebelev tries to show that, in Greek, adjectives without the addition of the word πόλις (city) cannot be used alone as names of cities. For example, there was a city Νέα πόλις (New City) and not merely Νέα. But then, what about such Greek names of cities as Αἰπεια (High), Μακαρία (Fortunate), Μεγάλη (Great), Νέα, a part of Syracuse in Sicily?

On the other hand, it seems that Latyshev is right in asserting

1 S. A. Zhebelev, “Schastlivye goroda,” Izvestiya Gosudarstvennoi Akademii Istorii Material’noi Kul’tury, 1933, 100, pp. 355-362; and “Chto ponimat’ pod Borisfenom v Ios PE 1224,” Olvia, a collection, Instytut Arkheolohiyi Akademiyi Nauk Ukr. RSR, Kiev, 1940, pp. 275-280; (Ios PE is the abbreviation for Inscriptiones antiquae orae septentrionalis Ponti Euxini Graecae et Latinae and will be used hereafter).
that the older name of the city on the Hypanis was *Olbiopolis* and that *Olbia* is an abbreviation of this name; compare this with the form *Olbiopolis* in an inscrip­tion from Miletus\(^3\) from 330 B.C., and with the name of a citizen of the city of *Olbia*, *Olbiopolites*. However, for example, Ὄλβεύς, as in the case of the Cilician Olba,\(^4\) is not to be compared with this form.

What, then, was the local settlement called on the site where the Greek colony of Olbia was founded? I think that it was called *Borysthenes*. The reasons which lead me to believe this are:

1) Its very etymology indicates that the word Borysthenes originally meant a territory and only later was used to designate the Dnieper. According to K. Müllenhoff and M. Vasmer, Ὅρυσθένης corresponds to the Iranian *vourustana* — “a broad place.”\(^5\)

2) The following words by Herodotus (IV, 18) support the hypothesis of the existence along the Lower Dnieper of a ter­ritory called *Borysthenes*:

Across the Borysthenes, the first country after you leave the coast is (Hylaea) the Woodland. Above this dwell the Scythian Husband­men (Scythae Georgi), whom the Greeks living near the Hypanis call Borysthenites, while they call themselves Olbiopolites.\(^6\) These Husbandmen extend eastward a distance of three days' journey to a river bearing the name of Panticapes, while northward the country is their for eleven days' sail up the course of the Borysthenes.

The suffixes -ίτης, -ότης, -ήτης, -ώτης express the idea of one who lives in a given city or country (gentilia). Thus Συβαρίτης is one who lives in Sybaris (from Σύβαρις),

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\(^3\) *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, a G. Dittenbergero condita et aucta; nunc tertium edita, Lipsiae, 1915, v. I, 286; (hereafter referred to as *SIG*).

\(^4\) On this see also A. Kotsevalov, *Antichnaya istoriya i kul'tura Severnogo Pricernomor'ya v sovetsknom nauchnom issledovanii*, Issledovaniya i Materiały Instituta po izucheniyu istorii i kul'tury SSSR, 1955, Seriya I, Vyp. 19, p. 43.

\(^5\) I will not examine here F. Boltenko's fantastic etymology of the term Ὅρυσθένης, from the Thracian, for estuary, strait. *Vide* A. Kotsevalov, *Antichnaya istoriya*, p. 32, footnote 129.

\(^6\) Herodotus and other Greek authors call the citizens of the city of Olbia *Borysthenites*. 
'Αβδηρίτης— a resident of Abdera (from "Αβδηρα"); Τεγεάτης, Σπαρτιάτης, Σικελιώτης (a Greek resident of Sicily), etc. 7

Thus Βορυσθενεῖται means inhabitants of the territory which is called Borysthenes.

3) In the Olbian decree on money, the term Βορυσθενής also, it seems, has territorial significance. The decree thus begins: [Εις Βο]ρυσθένη είσπλειν τόν βου[λόμεν]ον κατά τάδε.

The decree permits import and export (εισαγωγή καί εξαγωγήν) of all kinds of minted gold and silver and commands that these be bought and sold on the stone found in the ecclesiasterion (from ecclesia—a public meeting place) and that Olbian copper and silver be used for the purchase of all wares (lines 14 and 15).

Here the term Borysthenes can mean either a) the River Dnieper; or b) the Dnieper-Boh estuary (Zhebelev); or c) the city of Olbia (Latyshev, E. H. Minns, E. V. Diehl); or, finally, d) a territory.

The following considerations militate against the first three possibilities: a) there was no Dnieper River in Olbia; b) the scope of the term Borysthenes in the decree also includes Olbia, since the terms import and export (εισαγωγή καί εξαγωγή) are usually used in reference to city-states. The decree also refers to trade in minted gold and silver on the stone in the ecclesiasterion—in Olbia, naturally.

Zhebelev thinks that the first phrase of the decree refers not to Olbia, but to the Dnieper-Boh estuary, for otherwise the construction εις Βορυσθενή πλείν and not εις Βορυσθενή εισπλείν would have been used. According to Zhebelev the ancient Greeks spoke of "sailing into a bay (sea)" but of "sailing to a city (island, country)"; εισπλείν εις τόν κόλπον (τήν θάλασσαν), but πλείν εις τήν πόλιν (νήσον, χώραν).

This thesis, however, evokes some doubt, since εισπλείν εις is also used with names of cities and islands.

First, in the formulation of decrees granting politeia (citi-
zenship), proxenia, ingress and egress (εἰσπλουν and ἐκπλουν), it is surely understood as the following: εἰσπλουν εἰς τόλιν τινά (νῆσον τινα). And to be sure, we do find in inscriptions such expressions as: “and let ingress (ἐσπλον ε[ς Κν]ιδον) and egress belong to him himself and his descendants”;

“May he himself and his descendants be proxeni and benefactors of the city of Telos and may they possess εἰσπλουν καὶ ἐκπλουν εἰς Τῆλον ”;10 “Let the people decide that entrance into Miletus (εἰσόφιξιν εἰς Μίλητον) be granted to those of the Sardians who desire it, without robbery and without treaty, both sailing in and sailing out” (καὶ ἐσπλέοσι καὶ ἐκπλέοσι).11 Here, as indicated by the context, εἰσόφιξις does not differ from εἰσπλους.

Second, Zhebelev attempts to buttress his thesis with quotations from Thucydides. According to Zhebelev,12 the verb εἰσπλεῖν is used by Thucydides without a predicate, but from the context the predicate, such as ἐς τὸν κόλπον (a bay or a bay with a city located on it), is to be assumed. Then what about such places as mentioned by Thucydides in History, IV, 27, 1?

At Athens, meanwhile, the news that the army was in great distress, and that corn found its way in (ἐσπλεί, scil. ἐς τὴν νῆσον), to the men on the island (ἐν τῇ νῆσῳ) . . .

or in Hist., VII, 1, 1:

They (scil. Gyliippus and Pythen) now received the more correct information that Syracuse was not completely invested, but that it was still possible for an army arriving by Epipolae to effect an entrance (ἐσελθείν, scil. ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας); and they consulted, accordingly, whether they should keep Sicily on their right and risk sailing in by sea (ἐσπλέουσαι, scil. ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας) . . .

Generally, it seems, the difference between the expressions πλεῖν εἰς and εἰσπλεῖν εἰς is as follows: πλεῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν (νῆσον) means “to sail in the direction of a city (or island),”

8 And not merely πλοῦν.
9 SIG, 187, v. 13 sq., 360 B.C.?
10 Ch. Michel, Recueil d’Inscriptions Grecques, Brussels, 1900, v. 430 sq., second century B.C.
11 SIG, 273 v. 5 sq., 334 B.C.? Miletus.
but with the possibility of changing the route; compare with Thucydides, VII, 41,2:

Astyochus at once gave up going to Chios [τὸ ἐς τὴν Χίον, scil. πλεῖν] and set sail for Caunus [ἐπλεῖ ἐς τὴν Καῦνον]

and ἔσπλειν εἰς τὴν πόλιν (νῆσον) signifies to “sail into a city (island), that is, into its harbor,” to “reach a city (or island).”

4) Latyshev thought that in the Olbian decree on money Borysthenes had the same meaning as Olbia, for in the fourth century B.C. the term Borysthenes and also the term Olbia were used by the inhabitants themselves to designate their city. It is difficult, however, to agree with Latyshev on this, for in the decree there is also mention of “Olbian” (Ὀλβιοπολιτικόν) copper and silver, and so it cannot be thought that two separate terms with the same meaning would be used in one document: Ὀλβιοπολιτικός meaning Olbian and Βορυσθένης meaning Olbia.

5) Thus by the process of elimination I come to the conclusion that in the Olbian decree on money the term Borysthenes is used to refer to a territory adjoining the city of Olbia. It is difficult to say what area is covered. According to Herodotus (IV, 18) the land of the Scythian Husbandmen or Borysthenites—Borysthenes—stretched east of the Dnieper to the River Panticapes, and northward for eleven days' travel up the Dnieper (Borysthenes). It can be assumed that before the founding of Olbia by the Greeks, the Borysthenites also extended to a territory west of the Dnieper, centering on the site of the future Olbia. The center of the Borysthenites, perhaps including the surrounding territory, was called apparently Borysthenes in the narrower sense of the term.

It is not known what territory the author of the fourth-century decree on money meant by the term Borysthenes, whether only the region around Olbia or also some of the territory east of the Dnieper.

13 As shown by finds of stone axes on the site of Olbia from the second millenium B.C., bits of pottery from the Bronze Age, etc.
The Greeks founded their colony of Olbia on the site of the Scythian center. The metropolitan Greeks, however, continued to call the new Greek settlement of Olbia by the old, familiar name, Borysthenes. Thus it may be assumed that the city on the Dnieper-Boh estuary changed its name twice. First it was called Borysthenes by the aborigines. When the Greek colony was founded, it took the name Olbia but remained Borysthenes to the metropolitan Greeks despite the new official name. This assumption corresponds completely with the testimony of Skymnus of Chios and the Periplus by an unknown author. Skymnus writes (v. 804 sq.): “At the juncture of two rivers, the Hypanis and the Borysthenes, there was founded (κτισθείσα) a city (πόλις) which was earlier called (καλουμένη) Olbia, but later was again named Borysthenes by the Hellenes (μετά ταυτ9 ύφ9 Ελλήνων πάλιν Βορυσθένης κληθείσα).”

The Periplus by an unnamed author (86 (60)) repeats this statement by Skymnus almost word for word. The word πάλιν (again) by Skymnus and by the author of the Periplus indicates that the city was earlier (before the founding of the Greek colony) called Borysthenes. It is difficult to conceive that Zhebelev is right when he, without considering the word πάλιν, interpreted these statements as meaning that the first name of the city was Olbia and that this was later replaced by Borysthenes. In vain does Zhebelev write in the same work that the Greeks were responsible for replacing the local name of the settlement with the term Borysthenes and that consequently Olbia was not the Greek name of the city.

Skymnus, although he has information about the pre-Hellenic settlement of Borysthenes (for this reason πάλιν!) gives data

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14 Scythica et Caucasica, e veteribus scriptoribus Graecis et Latinis collegit et cum versione Rossica edidit V. Latyshev; the supplement to the Zapiski Imperatorskago Russkago arkheologicheskago obschestva, 1893, I, p. 285.
15 S. A. Zhebelev, “Schastlivye goroda,” p. 361; he translates the words of Skymnus πάλιν Βορυσθένης κληθείσα as follows: “it was renamed Borysthenes.” The translation, in my opinion, is not completely successful, since πάλιν (original meaning “back”) has the same root as πόλος — Drehpunkt, πέλομαι — I turn, Ich drehe mich (see E. Schwyzer, Griechische Grammatik, I, Munich, 1939, p. 295) and means “returning to a previous state.”
only about the Greek colony of Olbia-Borysthenes. The words πόλις κτισθείσα indicate this, since the verb κτίζειν was specially used with reference to the colonization of cities by Greeks.

Thus the name of the Scythian settlement (later Greek colony) on the Hypanis and of the adjoining territory changed as follows:

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<tr>
<th>Before Greek Colonization</th>
<th>After Greek Colonization</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Name of Settlement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Name of Adjoining Territory</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>In the Local Language</td>
<td>Borysthenes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Used by Authors</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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II. TANAIS

The question of the name of the Greek city on the Don River is equally complicated.

Classical Authors

Classical authors use both the terms Tanais\(^{16}\) and Emporion (= market place, port) to designate this city. Strabo (XI, 2, 3, page 493; also compare with Eustathii Commentarii in Dionysium Periegetem, 663) uses the term Tanais in reference to the Greek colony on the Don:

\(^{16}\) Compare the Iranian dānu and the Ossetian don — “a river.” Thus in this instance the river gave its name to the territory and not vice versa as was the case with the Borysthenes. See M. Vasmer, Reallexikon der Vorgeschichte, Vol. 12, p. 248.
On the river and lake there is found the city of the same name, Tanais, a colony of the Hellenes who hold the Bosphorus. It was the general market place for the Asian and European nomads and those who sail the lake from the Bosphorus.

But in XI 2, 11, page 495, Strabo says:

Of the Asian Maiotai some obeyed those who hold Emporion which is in Tanais (τῶν τὸ έμπόριον έχόντων τὸ έν τῷ Τανάιδι) and others the Bosphorites.

In both instances Strabo couples Tanais with Emporion. In XI, page 495, he calls the city itself Emporion (the question as to what Strabo meant here by the term Tanais will be left unanswered for the time being).

According to Alexander Polyhistor (in Stephen of Byzantium s.v. Τάνοαις) the Hellenic city of Tanais also had another name—Emporion: “A Hellenic city, Tanais, which is also named Emporion, is found where the Tanais River flows into Lake Maiotis.” Ptolemy in III, 5, 12 says the following about Tanais: “... and between the estuaries is the city of Tanais.” Pliny in his Naturalis Historia VI, paragraph 20 (c.7) does not give the name of the city on the Don, but says merely: “oppidum in Tanais quoque ostio.”

The gentile Tanaites corresponding to the term Tanais always refers in the writing of classical authors to barbarian tribes and not to the Greek inhabitants of the city of Tanais. True, Stephen of Byzantium (s.v. Τάνοαῖς) says: “A citizen [of the city] is a Tanaite, the feminine is Ταναίτις.” But this assertion by Stephen is, it seems, simply his theoretical supposition, since Strabo, to whom he refers, XI p. 495, does not call the citizens of the city on the Don “Tanaites” but rather “those who hold Emporion which is in Tanais.” This use of the term Tanaites

17 Compare Ptolemy, III, 5, 10: “Near the bend in the River Tanais are the Ophlones and Tanaites, past them the Osyloi up to the Rhoxolanoi”; Pliny, Naturalis Historia, VI, paragraph 22 (c.7): “Others [aver] that the Scythian tribes—Auchetae, Athernei, Asampatae—intruded there and that the Tanaites and Inapaei were completely [viritim] destroyed by them”; Ammianus Marcellinus, XXXI 3, 1: “The Huns, then, having overrun the territories of those Halani (bordering on the Greuthungi) to whom usage has given the surname Tanaites . . .”
does not at all say that the name which corresponds to it, Tanais, meant from the very beginning the Greek city.

Thus we have two terms used by the authors to designate the city on the Don, and the gentile Tanaite speaks for the view that the meaning of the term Tanais for “the Greek city on the Don” was a secondary one.

Inscriptions

In Tanais inscriptions, from the second and third centuries A.D., the name of the city on the Don is 'Εμπόριον. For this reason the legate of the King of Bosphorus in an inscription from Tanais is referred to as “sent by the king to Emporion,” (ἐκπέθεΙς υπὸ του βασιλέως εις τὸ 'Εμπόριον). Compare also the following inscriptions on buildings: “Didymoxarthos, son of Chodainos, the Archon of the Tanaïtes, and Rhodon, son of Phazinamos, Hellenarch, rebuilding the tower which had been ravaged by time, restored it for Emporion”; “The Hellenes and Tanaïtes, rebuilding the tower, renewed [restored it] for Emporion” (τὸ 'Εμπορίω).

In the inscriptions the term Tanaïtes refers to barbarians. An inscription from Panticapaeum of 47–17 B.C. says: “The great King Aspurgos who rules over all Bosphorus, Theodosia, the Sindoi, Maïtai, Tarpites and the Toretai, Psessoi and Tanaïtes. . .” In the Tanais inscriptions the Tanaïtes are distinguished from the Hellenes, that is, the Greek inhabitants of the city: “The Hellenes and the Tanaïtes. . . restored the tower. . .”

The Tanaïtes had their own archon and at times several, who in the inscriptions are distinguished from the archons of the Greek citizens (Ἐλληνάρχης). The archon (archons) of the Tanaïtes and the Hellenarch together restored the towers,
the agora, etc.; cf. the inscription quoted above:

“... restocked it for Emporion”; and perhaps also the following inscription: “Archons of the Tanaites ... I, Basileides, the Hellenarch, restored the agora for the city and the traders” (τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις).

Thus in the Tanais inscriptions we have data on two communities—the Greeks and the Tanaites, each of which had their own archons. The question arises, were there also separate territories corresponding to these two communities and, if so, what territories. Perhaps the following formula used in building inscriptions will contribute to solving these problems: such and such people restored the tower, gates, agora for the city and the traders — (τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις).

In the opinion of K. Lehmann-Hartleben, in this formula ἡ πόλις = Ἑλληνες and οἱ ἐμπόροι = τὸ ἐμπόριον = Ταναεῖται. He identifies the citizens (πόλις) with the Greeks, and the traders (ἐμπόροι) with the Tanaites. Lehmann avers that the ἐμπόριον was outside the city walls. Kseniya Kolobova agrees with Lehmann as to the interpretation of the formula τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις, but feels that there was no parallel between the formulas τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις and Ἑλληνες καὶ Ταναεῖται. Her view was that the second formula meant that in one city there were actually two administrative units, one Tanaitic and one Hellenic. T. Knipovich came to the conclusion that the whole city lived one life and that the Hellenes differed from the Tanaites only in name. For this reason, the Tanaites often had

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24 See footnote 19.
25 *Ios PE*, II, 430. The author of the inscription does not make it clear by his style whether the archons of the Tanaites actually participated in these works with the Hellenarch Basileides (Stephani), or whether the names of the archons of the Tanaites refer only to the formula of dating (Latyshev).
Greek and Roman names, while the Greeks often had barbarian names. Kolobova's views about the territorial separateness of the city and the Emporion are considered fallacious by Knipovich. She interprets the formula τή πόλει καὶ τοίς ἐμπόροις as meaning that it or another building had been constructed to serve all the inhabitants of Tanais, not only its permanent inhabitants (τή πόλει, τοῖς πολίταις), but those who travelled to the city (τοῖς ἐμπόροις).

And finally K. Kolobova again expressed her views on the Tanaites. Today she completely accepts Knipovich’s thought about the existence in the city of two originally-separate ethnic groups—the Hellenes and the Tanaites. But she holds that the self-government in Tanais was organized by the Tanaites and that theirs was the primacy in the city, not the Greeks'. She supports this thesis by the following observation: according to Ios PE, II, 433, Demetrius, son of Apollonius, a Tanaite, restored the tower (or some building). Thus, in the opinion of Kolobova, the right to be called by the name of the civic community belongs not to the Hellenes but to the Barbarians—the Tanaites, aborigines in the city.

It is hardly possible, following Lehmann, to believe that the Emporion was some sort of settlement outside the city walls. As we have seen above, the term Emporion is synonymous in the classical authors with the term Tanais, and the inhabitants of the Greek city on the Don called their city Emporion. According to inscriptions (Ios PE II, 427, 428), the towers (evidently in the walls of the city) were restored specifically “for Emporion.” Thus Emporion could not have been a settlement outside the city walls.

Kolobova’s and Knipovich’s opinions about the absence of local separateness between the Hellenes and the Tanaites are contradicted by the following formula of dating in Ios PE II, 423, 193 A.D.: “in the time of Boraspos, son of Babos, Archon of Tanais (Τανάεως) and the Hellenarch Rhodon, son of Chari-ton...” The term “Archon of Tanais” here obviously refers to

the same position as "archon of the Tanaites" in other inscriptions, and Tanais—Tanaites. Thus in any case, the Tanaites had their own territory.

But what should here be understood by the term Tanais? This center of the barbarians could not here mean the city on the Don, founded by the Hellenes, connected with the Hellenes, and called Emporion in inscriptions. In my opinion, Tanais referred to a wider territory surrounding the Greek city and inhabited by a barbarian tribe known as Tanaites. Thus the city was the Hellenes', while the surrounding territory was occupied by the Tanaites. The Tanaites were to be found within the city walls (particularly, we may assume, in times of military danger). The Tanaite community and private individuals did restore towers and the inscriptions were dated with references to the Hellenarch and the Archon of Tanais. The Tanaites were hellenized and sometimes had Greek names—but they occupied a separate territory and it is doubtful whether they enjoyed all the rights of citizens of the city.

The titles of the military leaders of the Hellenes and the Tanaites support my views. The title used by the Greek (citizens) was "Strategos of the citizens" (στρατηγός πολειτῶ[ν]) and by the Tanaites "Lokhagos of the Tanaites" (λοχαγός Ταναε[ιτῶ]). The titles "Strategos of the citizens" and "Lokhagos of the Tanaites" show that the citizens (Hellenes) distinguished themselves from the Tanaites and that the latter were not citizens and did not belong formally to the city.

It seems to me that the desire on the part of Kolobova to

31 It is not for nothing that Strabo, as seen above, calls it a Hellenic colony.
32 This name is also found in the inscription Ios PE, II, 423 in which is found the term "Archon of Tanais."
33 Apart from the Borysthenes and Tanais there are known to me the following instances of the name of a river used to designate a territory as well: Gerros (Herodotus mentions both the river Gerros—IV, 20, 1.IV, 56 and χώρος (locality) Gerros—IV, 53, 4. IV, 56); Exampaios (according to Herodotus IV, 52, 3, both the name of a bitter spring and of the place from which it flows), etc.
34 Ios PE, II, 423, A.D.
35 In a new inscription from Tanais from the first half of the third century A.D., published by A. Boltunova, Vestnik Drevenoi Istori, 1951, 2, pp. 120–126 B.
support Knipovich's theory about the existence in the city of two separate communities impels her to draw certain fallacious conclusions in her new work. Thus I cannot understand at all how the barbarian Tanaites could have had primacy in the organization of civic self-government in a city which after all was, according to Strabo, a Greek colony, and why the Tanaites are in this case therefore not called πολίται. For it was thus that everywhere in Hellas full-fledged citizens were designated.

Rather, the name Demetrius, son of Apollonius, a Tanaite, supports my understanding of the term Tanais, since the adding of this term to the name of a person means that this person belongs to a foreign group and does not have all of the civic rights (the ethnikon is usually not added to names of full-fledged citizens of a given city).

This confusion has arisen from the fact that researchers have not exactly established what meaning the term Tanais originally had. Tanais is the territory near the city, settled by barbarians. The city itself was called Emporion (Έμπόριον) and not Tanais.

As far as the formula τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις is concerned, I completely accept Knipovich’s interpretation of this formula but, in my opinion, ή πόλις has a broader scope than Knipovich thought and τῇ πόλει is identical with “the whole permanent population of the city (not only Greek citizens, but also those Tanaites who lived in the city).” The term ἐμπόροι is from the same root as ἐμπόριον. Outside traders who used the market place are also included in the concept ἐμπόριον. Thus the formula τῷ ἐμπόριῳ has the same meaning as the formula τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς ἐμπόροις.

Conclusions

1 The term Tanais first designated the territory settled by barbarians, which received the name Tanaites. In this sense the term was used in the local Greek language. Thus perhaps Strabo, too, in XI, p. 495 in the expression τῷ ἐμπόριον

36 Kolobova is quite familiar with the military titles “Lokhagos of the Tanaites” and “Strategos of the citizens” and generally she gives a correct interpretation of these titles.
τὸ ἐν τῷ Τανάϊδι calls Tanais the barbarian territory in which the Greek emporion lay.

2) The name of the Greek city on the Don was Ἐμπόριον. This name remained in the local Greek language. The authors began early to extend the name of the barbarian territory to designate the Greek city, calling it Tanais (compare with the use of the term Borysthenes, instead of the term Olbia, to designate the Greek city on the Hypanis by the authors). But the authors continued to use the old name Ἐμπόριον and the term Tanaite never had for the authors the sense “Greek-citizen of the city on the Don.”
A FEW EXAMPLES OF ANALOGY IN THE ANCIENT UKRAINIAN AND JUDAIC CULTURES

ALEKSANDER DOMBROVSKY

A comparison of the ethnographic and folklore material of tribes and peoples of different periods and parts of the globe shows certain similarities and dissimilarities and discloses affinities and differences in underlying forms and ideas. Research in this field has established many analogies and even identities. These analogies are not necessarily indications of mutual influences, direct or indirect; not infrequently, so great a difference in time and so wide a separation in area may be involved as to exclude any such influences.

The perception of man's surroundings, whether he be an individual or a member of a group, the criteria of thinking, and the process of spiritual improvement of primitive man from the very beginning to higher stages of civilization and, finally, the formation of his world outlook are, generally speaking, common to all mankind. These common factors have formed common analogies.

One of the problems in comparative ethnography and folklore is to find analogies between the folklore of the inhabitants of ancient Ukraine and that of the ancient Jews. At first the search for such analogies may seem farfetched. On the one hand, there is the Iranian and Hellenistic world of lower forms of polytheism strongly influenced by Eurasian nomadism, wide steppes of fertile soil with great agricultural potential, the social structure of a slave system with certain remnants of the neolithic matriarchate and a political form of a primitive feudalism, and, finally, the subordination of the autochthonous, rural inhabitants of ancient Ukraine to the invading nomads. On the other hand, there is the quite different Semitic world with a crystallized monotheism, a desert and mountainous territory for pasturing livestock, and the social structure of a strict patriarchate. The anthropogeographical, geopolitical and cultural factors in these two worlds were different.
Palestine's geopolitical situation gave rise to a crossing of many cultures there from the ancient Orient. The influence of the Canaanites on the Jews, who arrived in Canaan as seminomadic shepherds, the polytheism of the land of Pharaoh with a considerable influence of totemism, ancient Chaldea, and Zoroaster's motherland with a specific system of dualistic Parseeism, the spirit of the Hellenistic period, and the idea of religious syncretism—these are only the most important ancient influences which crossed over this territory. In contrast, Southeastern Europe, except for agricultural cults of the settled rural inhabitants of ancient Ukraine and the impact of the Greek pantheon, was under the influence of nomadic Eurasian shamanism.

The oldest phases of the Jewish past, viz., the period of patriarchs and judges, developed under the influence of anthropogeographical factors; while the historic period, i.e., the reign of kings, viz., Saul, David, and Solomon, and the political state dualism of Israel and Judah, were overwhelmingly influenced by geopolitical conditions. At the same time, it must be remembered that two spiritual ideologies were present among the ancient Jews, especially during archaic and then early historic periods. The orthodox Jews led by their priests and prophets held to monotheistic Jahvism, while the influence of primitive religious forms of the archaic period gained ground among the masses of the population; later, during the historic period, these masses were influenced by the religions of the neighboring peoples and tribes, i.e., lower and, later, higher forms of polytheism. These influences often reached the palaces of Jewish kings, and even the sanctuaries of the priests themselves. This is why the ancient Jewish folklore has not only the spiritual elements connected with monotheistic Jahvism, but also foreign influences, i.e., elements of religious primitivism in the form of fetishism, animism, and totemism from the archaic period of the Jews, as well as the lower and higher forms of polytheism from the historic period due to the influence of the cultures of Egypt, Chaldea and Babylon, Phoenicia, Persia, and the Hellenistic period. The
spiritual influence of the neighboring peoples on the Jews at that time was so strong in Palestine that the Jews were subject to them, despite their devotion to Jahvism. Reinach\(^1\) was right when he stated in passing that the Jews were totemists without knowing it.

Anthropogeographical conditions in ancient Ukraine were much stronger, and geopolitical factors developed under the influence of Hellas and Asia Minor (the influence of the latter being introduced through the Caucasus). The influence of Central Asia was felt strongly, mainly political; this was also an important factor in the cultural process.

Such are the general characteristics of the developmental process of the mentality of the inhabitants of ancient Ukraine and Palestine, whose analogies in folklore we shall examine.

The archeological material alone brings to light some questions related to the archaic period. The idea of painting the dead with ocher is worthy of our attention. Skeletons of the dead with traces of ocher were found in the graves of the late neolithic and early metal period in the Ukraine.

Ebert\(^2\) is right in believing that man at that time strewed ocher over the dead bodies in order to impart to the pallor of the dead the appearance of the rejuvenating force in human blood. Ebert believes that the idea behind strewing ocher over the dead rested in the belief that blood was part of a man’s soul. The very ceremony of using ocher dates back to the paleolithic period.

A similar practice is also found in the books of the Old Testament. Ancient anthropology pays tribute to the significance of human blood. In Deuteronomy 12:23 we read: "Only be sure that thou eat not the blood: for the blood is the life; and thou mayest not eat the life with the flesh."

The prohibition against eating blood is also found in Leviticus 3:17, 7:26, and in 17:10 and 11. In Deuteronomy 12:16 we find the prohibition with the command that the blood be poured upon the earth. In Samuel I, 14:33 it is said that the

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\(^2\) M. Ebert, *Südrussland im Altertum*, Bonn und Leipzig, 1921, p. 40.
Jews had sinned because they had eaten blood. The Old Testament texts quoted above, and especially Moses’ Law, the Pentateuch, reveal that ancient folklore regards blood as a soul—nepheš, i.e., the highest biological principal of both man and animal and, therefore, forbids the consumption of it. The meat of a slaughtered animal could be used only after the blood had been drained. Such an understanding of blood linked it with the religious idea of catharsis, i.e., a sacrifice in order to cleanse man of his sins (see Leviticus 4:27-30).

The concept of blood as the “life” and “the soul” of man and animal found an analogous idea in the ceremonial act of strewing ocher over the body of the dead among the Scythians. The possibility is not excluded that the idea of painting the body of the dead with ocher was not only in order to eliminate their deathly pallor, but also reflected certain, perhaps weak, gleams of faith in life after death.

Archeological finds tell us that the inhabitants of Palestine believed in life after death. Various objects of everyday life, including clay wares in which remains of food were found, were discovered in Palestine.3 The custom of putting everyday objects into the graves with the dead is common to almost all primitive peoples. Herodotus also speaks of this custom (4, 71) when he describes the burial of Scythian kings. The difference here is in the fact that also the king’s concubine, cupbearer, cook, stableman, servant, and herald—i.e., the people who served the king when he was alive and whom he was believed to need in the life after death—were killed and laid in the king’s grave. When a common Scythian died, only everyday objects and domestic animals were buried with him.

The family graves of the ancient Jews are relevant here. Those outside the family were forbidden burial in these graves. This custom had a peculiar name, viz., “to be buried with the parents” or “to be joined with one’s own people.” The dying Patriarch Jacob said:

I am to be gathered unto my people: bury me with my fathers in the cave that is in the field of Ephron the Hittite. . . . There they buried Abraham and Sarah his wife; there they buried Isaac and Rebekah his wife; and there I buried Leah" (Genesis 49:29, 31).

Individual books of the Old Testament, viz., Genesis (23), Samuel I, 25:1, Kings I, 2:34, Chronicles II, 16:14, Isaiah 22:16, tell us of these family graves. Common burials were assigned only to the poor, to strangers, and to criminals (Kings II, 23:6; Jeremiah 26:23). It was a severe punishment when someone was not buried with his parents (Kings I, 13:22). This is why some of the atheistic kings were not buried in kings' graves (Chronicles II, 21:20, 24:25, 28:27).

The Old Testament belief finds a certain analogy also on Scythian territory. Darius, who during his Scythian expedition sought an opportunity to fight the Scythians in the open, was told by their King Idanthyrsus:

. . . We Scythians have neither towns nor cultivated lands, which might induce us, through fear of their being taken or ravaged, to be in any hurry to fight with you. If, however, you must needs come to blows with us speedily, look you now, there are our fathers' tombs—seek them out, and attempt to meddle with them—then ye shall see whether or no we will fight with you (Herodotus, The Persian Wars, 4, 127).

Idanthyrsus' words referred to the kings' graves in the land of Gerrhi (4, 71); Herodotus calls it "the Royal district" (4, 20).

The Jews did not burn their dead. On the contrary, they regarded the burning of the dead as a disgrace (Amos 2:1). Cremation was only an intensification of the punishment by death which was applied to the most notorious criminals (Leviticus 20:14, Joshua 7:25).

This idea from the Old Testament is similarly reflected among the Scythians. We find in Herodotus (4, 69) how the Scythians punished by death the "lying diviners":

. . . a wagon is loaded with brushwood and oxen are harnessed to it; the soothsayers, with their feet tied together, their hands bound behind their backs, and their mouths gagged, are thrust into the

midst of the brushwood; finally the wood is set alight, and the oxen, being startled, are made to rush off with the wagon.

One of the common elements in the folklore material of primitive man is fortunetelling. Distinct traces are found both in the ancient Ukraine and in Palestine; their forms, however, are different. According to Herodotus (4, 67), Scythian soothsayers foretold the future by means of a number of willow wands and the inner bark of the linden tree. This mode of divination was indigenous to Scythia. Fortunetelling by willow wands and the bark of the linden tree has fetishism as its basis. Many researchers believe that the Scythian bath, which, according to Herodotus (4, 73-75), was taken after a burial and had a cleansing function, was of a religious nature. Meuli\(^5\) thinks that the Scythian bath might have had some deeper meaning in connection with the cult of the dead. If this was the case, then elements of necromancy are not excluded. From the burials of the Scythians it is seen that the latter had a certain primitive conception regarding life after death; and this is the first and most important step to necromancy.

Among the masses of the Jewish population, foreign influences, chiefly Babylonian, with respect to life after death gained ground. The prohibition against fortunetelling and necromancy found in the Old Testament (Leviticus 19:31; Exodus 22:18; Deuteronomy 18:10-12; Leviticus 20:27; Isaiah 8:19) in itself confirms this influence among ancient Jews. A classical example of such necromancy is the story of King Saul and the woman fortuneteller from En-dor (Samuel I, Chapter 28).

Hedodotus says of the Scythians' baths after burial of the dead (4, 73):

\[\ldots\text{ they soap well and wash their heads; then, in order to cleanse their bodies, they make a booth by fixing three sticks in the ground}\]

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inclined towards one another, and stretching around them woolen felts, which they arrange to fit as close as possible: inside the booth a dish is placed upon the ground, into which they put a number of red-hot stones, and then add some hempseed.

This might point to the belief of the Scythians that contact of the living with the dead contaminates the former.

This kind of belief can be observed also among other peoples of that time, including the Jews. Moses' Law regarded anyone as impure who had touched the dead, because "... whosoever toucheth one that is slain with a sword in the open fields, or a dead body, or a bone of a man, or a grave, shall be unclean seven days" (Numbers 19:16, 5:2).

Herodotus tells us that every Scythian, to indicate his mourning, "chops off a piece of his ear, crops his hair close, makes a cut all round his arm, lacerates his forehead and his nose, and thrusts an arrow through his left hand" (4:71).

Moses' Law forbade the ancient Jews this kind of practice (Leviticus 19:28, 21:5; Deuteronomy 14:1). Prohibition of this practice indicates that such burial customs had been practiced among large numbers of Jews.

The difference between these two analogies between the Scythian and the Jewish folklores lies perhaps in the fact that this burial rite of the Scythians was related at the time to the subordination of the Scythians to their dead sovereign, and had a certain political significance, whereas among the Jews it was an expression of the Jewish soul, i.e., a psychological state. This view is the more probable because Herodotus mentions this form of mourning only in describing the burial of the Scythian kings, while he says nothing about it when he describes the burial of common Scythians (4, 73).

Of some interest at this point is the matter of totemism, which has been found among ancient inhabitants of the Ukrainian territory and among the ancient Jews. Herodotus, in telling us about the Neurians (4, 105), on the basis of the stories he has heard from the Scythians and the Greeks, says that each Neurian became a wolf for a few days once a year and later
returned to his normal state. Niederle, who regards the Neu-
rarians as Slavs, says that this belief is the Slavic belief in werewolves. This approach, however, gives us very little toward understanding of the genesis of the beliefs which, in various forms, are found in the ethnographic and folkloric material of ancient peoples.

The belief in werewolves has been found under various geographical conditions and is adapted to the animal species found in a given region. In Abyssinia and Eastern Africa we find a belief in man's metamorphosis into a hyena, a leopard or a lion; in India, into a tiger; in Borneo, into a goat or a leopard; and in South America, into a jaguar. These beliefs originate in totemism, whereby an animal or even a plant elicited a religious response in primitive man. It is possible that the griffins, mythological animals with wings found in Aristeas' narration (Herodotus 4, 13), whose duty it was to watch gold treasures, also belong to the oldest objects of totemism. In the Greeks' account of the origin of the Scythians (Herodotus 4, 9), we find that a creature half-woman, half-snake had three sons by Hercules. These children were named Agathyrsus, Gelônus and Scyth. The question arises: are we not dealing here with a specific variant of the sexual totem?

Regarding the religion of the ancien Jews, we find, according to the view of scientists, certain signs of totemism. For instance, the Prophet Hosea (8:5, 10:5) opposes the cult of the calf, or rather of the bull, which was a totemic idol in the land of Canaan and was the embodiment of Baal.

The masses of Jews who often retreated from the orthodox principles of monotheistic Jahvism were surrounded by primitive peoples and were unwillingly subject to the influence of foreign, primitive religions, i.e., polytheism in general, and animism, totemism and even fetishism. We recall the inci-

dent of Rachel, wife of the Patriarch Jacob, who stole images from Laban, her father (Genesis 31:19, 34).

An analysis of ethnographic and folklore material shows that the concept of fire is a common fundamental religious principle of prehistoric and ancient man; this concept is found almost everywhere in numerous folklore variants.

In the Scythians’ own version of their origins we find that the first human in Scythia was Targitaus. He had three sons: Leipoxais, Arpoxais, and Colaxais the youngest.

While they still ruled the land, there fell from the sky four implements, all of gold—a plough, a yoke, a battle-axe, and a drink-in-cup. The eldest of the brothers perceived them first, and approached to pick them up; when lo! as he came near, the gold took fire, and blazed. He therefore went his way, and the second coming forward made the attempt, but the same thing happened again. The gold rejected both the eldest and the second brother. Last of all the youngest brother approached, and immediately the flames were extinguished; so he picked up the gold, and carried it to his home. Then the two elder agreed together, and made the whole kingdom over to the youngest born (Herodotus, 4, 5).

Undoubtedly, we find in this tale one of the numerous variants of the belief in the holiness of fire, which primitive man believed came from heaven. The names Leipoxais, Arpoxais and Colaxais, with their -xais endings, show their Iranian origin.9

The idea of the holiness of fire was cultivated especially in Iran. In mentioning the Scythian gods, Herodotus tells us that the Scythians praised Histia most, whom they called Tabiti, i.e., the goddess of the hearth:10 “And only then they pray to other gods, namely: Zeus-Papi, Gaia-Api, Apollo-Oitoziros, Aphrodite-Argimpaza, and Poseidon-Tagimazadas” (4, 59). Herodotus tells us also that the Scythians used to swear by the royal hearth if they wanted to swear by the strongest oath (4, 68).

Distinct analogies concerning such beliefs are also found in

the religion of ancient Jews. For instance, Jahveh reveals himself before Moses in the form of a burning bush (Exodus 3:2); he manifests himself in the form of a fire before the Jews on Mount Sinai (Exodus 19:18); he appears as a “consuming fire” (Deuteronomy 4:24). In the anthropomorphic conception, smoke comes out of Jahveh’s nostril and fire from his mouth (the Second Book of Samuel 22:9). In the eschatological image of Isaiah (66:15) we find that Jahveh “shall come with fire.”

A common element in the ethnographic and folklore material of individual peoples is the story of giants capable of accomplishing extraordinary deeds. This story belongs to the semi-mythological and mythological period.

In the Old Testament, too, we find reference to this kind of giant who, according to the tradition, lived in Palestine (Genesis 6:4). To these giants belongs first Samson, known for the superhuman strength of his hair. He was invincible, and only after he was betrayed by Delilah, his mistress, and taken by the Philistines, who blinded him, was he robbed of his glories (Judges, Chapters 13-16).

We believe that Reinach,11 in finding in Samson an ancient object of the totemistic beliefs of the Jews, has gone rather too far. Reinach advances the view that Samson, who had fought the lion, must have been a lion himself whose strength was in his mane.

In accordance with Herodotus’ tale about Hercules, Scyth, the youngest of the three sons of the creature whose upper body resembled that of a girl and the lower that of a serpent, must be regarded as a giant—he was able to draw the giant bow of Hercules, his father (Herodotus 4:8-10). Scyth’s elder brothers, who could not draw the bow, were driven away by their mother while the youngest was given all power. An erotic motif similar to that in the story of Samson is found also in Herodotus’ tale about Hercules and the above-mentioned creature, half-human, half-serpent; it appears that here the sexual motif is dealt with, and apparently also the sexual totem, as noted above.

The manifestation of civilized life in Eastern Europe, including the Black Sea region, is a synthesis, generally speaking, of three main elements: Oriental, Greek, and local. Since the older, Oriental element lies "at the bottom," it is less conspicuous. However, in analyzing the ethnographic material in the light of ethnological studies, we also find the older, Oriental traces upon which is superimposed the later, Grecian layer, which entered the ancient Ukraine, either through the Caucasus or the Bosphorus, or even through the Urals and the Caspian. All these influences played a role in the development of the local folklore.

It happened, however, that historic fate has brought together these ethnic groups—the prehistoric Ukrainians and the Jews—by settling the Jews on the territory of the ancient Ukraine. It was then that the folklores of both of these peoples, geographically speaking, came closer. At the same time, supplemented by the Grecian element, they produced religious associations known as σεβόμενοι θεόν υψιστον. Unfortunately, the epigraphic material of modern science is too scanty to learn fully the relative importance of each of the three basic elements in the history of the development of these associations.

MYKHAYLO DRAHOMANOV, IVAN FRANKO, AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DNIEPER UKRAINE AND GALICIA IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE 19th CENTURY*

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

Among the factors that have shaped the Ukrainian national movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries must be counted the specific contribution of the Western Ukrainian provinces, in particular of (East) Galicia. This paper attempts to make a preliminary and tentative appraisal of this contribution at the turn of the century by focusing on the relationship between two leaders of the movement: the Eastern Ukrainian scholar and publicist Mykhaylo (Michael) Drahomanov (1841-1895) and the Galician Ivan Franko (1856-1916), who is usually cited as the greatest Ukrainian poet next to Shevchenko, as well as a scholar and an influential journalist.

In a very rough outline, the historical background is as follows:

During the Cossack wars the Ukraine was divided between her two strongest neighbors, Russia and Poland, by the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667). A century later Poland's turn arrived. In the course of the partitions of Poland, Russia annexed all Ukrainian territories except Galicia, Bukovina and the Transcarpathian province.

In the eastern territories Ukrainian statehood was progressively curtailed rather than immediately extinguished. It was

* The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Michael Karpovich of Harvard University, in whose seminar the paper was first discussed; to several kind persons in New York and Philadelphia, notably the late Professor Svitozor Drahomanov, who helped him with advice and materials; and last but not least, to the Trustees of the Penfield Traveling Scholarship Fund of the University of Pennsylvania, who awarded him a scholarship for 1956-1957.

1 Henceforth, the term “Galicia” is used to denote only the eastern part of that region having Lviv (Lemberg) as its capital. Western Galicia (capital: Kraków) is Polish territory both in a historical and ethnographic sense. It remains outside the scope of this paper.
not until the reforms of Catherine II in the 1770's and 1780's that Ukrainian Cossack officers were finally deprived of their traditional rights of self-government. At the same time, the Imperial Court promised to grant them equal rights with the Russian nobility if they could prove their noble descent. On the other hand, in Galicia, the most important of the three western provinces, the Poles had been much more successful in assimilating the Ukrainian landowning gentry and rich burghers. When the Hapsburgs annexed Galicia they found a strong Polish or Polonized upper class ruling an impoverished Ukrainian (or "Ruthenian") peasantry, with a number of not-yet-Polonized Uniate priests trying to defend the interests of their flocks. It was a society of peasants and priests, or of *khlopy i popy*, as the Poles derisively called them.

This delay in integrating the East Ukrainian elite into the multinational supporting stratum of the Russian Empire had important consequences for the history of the Ukrainian movement. With the French Revolution, the Napoleonic wars and the rising tide of Romanticist ideas, came the spread of liberal nationalism. A people united in a nation as opposed to cosmopolitan aristocrats, became the object of admiration that was more or less sincere. The restrictions placed upon the Ukrainian Cossack gentry were regarded as wrongs that had been committed against the Ukrainian people as such. Research in old family documents yielded many a proof of past glory, and before long secret societies were founded among the Ukrainian nobles to defend the ancient liberties of their people. After the Decembrist Uprising of 1825, all of these circles were suppressed; at the same time, most of the Ukrainian gentry were placated by making it easier for them to enter the ranks of Russian nobility. But new strata—poets and university professors—took over their concern with Ukrainian history and culture. Taras Shevchenko, a serf who had become a society painter

2 See, e.g., the program of the secret Little Russian Union of the 1820's, headed by Lukashevych, Marshal of the Nobility of the Pyryatyn District in the Poltava Province—Dmytro Doroshenko, *History of the Ukraine*, Edmonton, Canada, Institute Press, 1939, p. 548.
(1814-1861), was a patriot who inspired the patient work of his contemporaries with poetic genius. After the defeat in the Crimean war, quite a number of more or less secret societies were organized all over the Russian Empire which pledged themselves to advance the cause of the people, i.e., of the peasants. Under the influence of Shevchenko and his predecessors, some of these circles included in their programs development of the Ukrainian language and culture. They were called Hromady, which is the Ukrainian word for communities.

As a rule, the Hromady consisted of students, teachers, and university professors, with some eminent writers and a sprinkling of wealthy estate owners and bourgeois. Drahomanov, for example, had joined the Kiev Hromada in the early 1860's when he was a student at the local university. Their basic aim was furthering popular education, woefully neglected in the Russian Empire before the institution of the zemstvos. In this they paralleled, possibly even anticipated, a similar movement among the Russian intelligentsia. In the 1860's the great concern with the plight of the peasantry was shared by Russian and Ukrainian intellectuals alike, though it was not until the early 1870's that it was elevated to a credo of the rapidly expanding populist movement. But the Ukrainian intellectuals differed from many of their Russian colleagues in their insistence that the peasants be first educated in Ukrainian, for that was the only language that the peasants in the Ukraine understood well. Ukrainian scholars, however, would write their learned monographs in Russian, the language that was spoken by the intelligentsia throughout the Empire.

The political and social outlook of the Hromada members in the 1860's was rather diverse. In his autobiography Drahomanov notes “that among the Ukrainian youth at that time there were hopes of creating in the Ukraine something like the ancient Cossack republic, and of a peasant uprising like that described by

4 Hugh Seton-Watson in The Decline of Imperial Russia, New York, Praeger, 1952, p. 64, mentions the Chaikovsky circle in St. Petersburg (1869-1872).
Shevchenko—the Haydamaky rebellion of 1768.”⁵ But he is quick to add that the majority were much more interested in cultural development. Nevertheless, the Ukrainophiles, as the Hromada members were usually called, did not escape accusations of Ukrainian separatism, levelled against them by extreme Russian nationalists and Russified Ukrainians. Around 1875 there existed two trends in the Kiev Hromada. The majority wanted to develop the scientific underpinning for Ukrainian nationalism: to do research in Ukrainian history, literature and folklore. They were led by the well-known Ukrainian historian Volodymyr Antonovych. A minority, however, consisting of Drahomanov, his friend Kovalevsky and the composer Lysenko, favored greater political activity to attract the youth who, interested in politics rather than Ukrainian cultural studies, tended to be sucked into the all-Russian opposition movement.⁶

Before 1863 the Tsarist government did not single out the Ukrainian movement for special persecution, although occasionally it would strike out sharply, as by exiling Shevchenko from the Ukraine in 1847 for the rest of his life (1847-1861). Its attitude changed, however, with the Polish uprising of 1863, when the Ukrainians, too, fell under suspicion of political separatism—an accusation that was premature, to say the least. Occasional respites notwithstanding,⁷ it remained hostile through-

⁵ Mykhaylo Drahomanov, Vybrani tvory, Ukrainian Sociological Institute in Prague (Pavlo Bohatsky, ed.), Vol. 1, Prague-New York, Ukrainian Progressive Associations in America, 1937, p. 59. [Henceforth cited as Vybrani tvory.]

⁶ S. Hlushko, “Spomyny Iryny Volodymyrivny Antonovych pro M. P. Drahomanova,” Ukrayina, Kiev, 1926, No. 4, pp. 120-134, 129. I. Antonovych refers to a meeting of the steering committee of the Kiev Hromada in 1875, at which were present twelve of the most influential members.

⁷ E.g., in 1873 the Government permitted a group of Ukrainian scholars (including the historians Antonovych and Drahomanov and the ethnographer Chubynsky) to establish in Kiev a branch of the officially subsidized Imperial Russian Geographic Society. Thus with the financial help from St. Petersburg, Ukrainian authors published a surprising amount of material on the past and present of their country. The branch was ordered closed down three years later.
out the nineteenth century. Specifically, it drastically restricted the publication of any books and journals in Ukrainian.8

Austrian policy in Galicia was different. In Galicia the Ukrainians were being oppressed by the Poles who themselves had been incorporated into Austria by force. Hence, when the Ukrainian national movement slowly began to develop in the West in the 1830's, a generation after its counterpart in the Eastern Ukraine, the Court at Vienna found it politic to support the Ukrainians against the Poles. In the Revolution of 1848, the Austrian Poles threatened to re-establish their independence, whereas the Galician Ukrainians pledged their loyalty to the Hapsburg Throne, declaring at the same time that they were but a part of the larger Ukrainian nation. By this move they might have won considerable concessions from Vienna, had it not been for the threat from Budapest. After granting far-reaching autonomy to the Hungarians in 1867, Vienna was compelled to look for countervailing support in the Reichsrat against the Czechs and the Croats, who had been alienated by this step. This it found in the ranks of conservative Polish landowners at the price of virtually granting them a free hand in Galicia.9 Nevertheless, the quasi-constitutional structure of the Hapsburg Empire permitted the Galician Ukrainians to continue their struggle against Polish predominance through parliamentary and bureaucratic channels.

Confronted with superior Polish force and Austrian indifference, the three and a half million Galician Ukrainians started looking for outside help. Two possible courses were open to them: they could solicit the aid of the eleven and a half million


compatriots in the East,\(^{10}\) or they could appeal directly to the vastly more powerful Russians, who might after all be less dangerous than the Poles. Both courses were duly tried by different groups of Galician scholars and writers. In the beginning the essentially political alternatives were presented as a dispute over ways of spelling—the Ukrainophiles or Populists (\(\text{Narodovtsi}\)) modeling their rules on the spoken language, which was very similar to that used in Eastern Ukraine, the Russophiles insisting on a more etymological spelling, which would have brought the Galician language closer to the Russian. But whereas the Russian historian Pogodin showed continued interest in his Galician admirers, the contacts with East Ukrainian leaders remained quite sporadic until the late 1850’s,\(^{11}\) and the failure of the East Ukrainians to respond to the Galician declaration of solidarity in 1848 did not improve the position of the Ukrainophile wing in the western province. Thus by 1875 the Russophile group became the stronger by far. The Ukrainophiles might have been forced to retreat had it not been for the enterprise of one Ukrainian poet, the death of another and a premature move on the part of the Russian government.

To cut a long story short, the Eastern Ukrainian poet and scholar Panteleymon Kulish, an energetic but somewhat unstable and tactless man, was the first to establish permanent contact with his Galician compatriots in 1858.\(^ {12}\) Three years later Taras Shevchenko died. So impressive were the popular

\(^{10}\) The figures are taken from the Galician declaration of 1848. See Ivan Krypyakevych \textit{et al., Velyka istoriya Ukrayiny}, Winnipeg, Tyktor, 1942, 2nd rev. ed., pp. 677-678.


manifestations attending the transfer of Shevchenko’s body from St. Petersburg to Kaniv on the Dnieper that a large section of Galician youth, moved solely by their reading of eyewitness reports, vowed to become good Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{13} Finally, by its 1863 decree the Russian government supplemented the emotional bond by a more practical consideration: it forced the Eastern Ukrainian writers and scholars to print their works in Galicia. To facilitate this, the Eastern Ukrainians even bought a complete printing press in Lviv. Thus it might be said that when Drahomanov met Franko in 1876, the permanent relationship between the Ukrainian East and West had already existed for some fifteen years. Moreover, Drahomanov’s interest in the life of the western province was eagerly welcomed by the Galicians themselves, who could not get on very well with Kulish.\textsuperscript{14}

II

When in 1876 Franko was introduced to Drahomanov in Lviv, the latter was 15 years his senior in age and a great many years older in status. Franko was then 21 years old, a student of philosophy at the University of Lviv and a regular contributor of verse to the student magazine \textit{Druh} (Friend). Drahomanov had already gained a reputation in the Russian Empire as a promising historian and ethnographer—a reputation which shone the brighter when the Tsarist government cancelled his lectureship at the University of Kiev for alleged Ukrainian separatism in early 1875. He enjoyed great respect in wide Ukrainian circles, and after his dismissal from the University his compatriots voted him an annual stipend, in return for which he was to publish abroad a journal similar to Herzen’s \textit{Kolokol}, under the title \textit{Hromada}. The disparity in age and status notwithstanding, Franko and Drahomanov soon became great

\textsuperscript{13} Korduba, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{14} See Kyrylo Studynsky “Persha zustrich Drahomanova z halyts’kymy studentamy,” \textit{Ukrayina}, Kiev, 1926, Nos. 2-3, pp. 70-75.
friends, and their voluminous correspondence proves that they remained such until Drahomanov’s death in 1895.\(^{15}\)

Their friendship was soon to be put to a severe test. In June 1877 Franko was arrested for “socialist agitation” together with the whole editorial board of \textit{Druh} and others, a total of one hundred persons, and in January 1878 an Austrian court convicted him of membership in a secret socialist society and sentenced him to six weeks in prison, in addition to the six months he had already spent in jail since his arrest. According to the prosecution, the moving spirit of the society was Drahomanov, whose radius of activity was alleged to have encompassed the whole territory inhabited by Ukrainians, from the Dnieper to the Hungarian (i.e., Transcarpathian) \textit{Rus’}.\(^{16}\)

While the available evidence indicates that the danger which threatened the Hapsburg throne from Drahomanov, Franko and their associates was more imagined than real, it is nevertheless true that about 1878 Drahomanov had a considerable influence in the Dnieper Ukraine and that his ideas had taken root in Galicia, too. In any case, according to Franko’s recollections, he had sent out many letters to his Galician friends, including Franko, with rather vague but sweeping instructions to go to certain places in the countryside in order to establish contacts. The purpose of these contacts seems to have been to found a united Polish-Ukrainian Socialist Party in Galicia, which was to fill a gap in Galician politics because both the Ukrainophiles and the Russophiles tended to forget social and economic problems over their cultural disputes. But for some reason these letters were intercepted by the Austrian police.\(^{17}\)


\(^{17}\) M. Hrushevsky, \textit{Z pochyniv ukrayins’koho sotsiyalistychnoho rukhu. Mykhaylo
The trial had painful consequences for both Drahomanov and Franko. Drahomanov's name became something of a swear word in the intimidated Galician community, while Franko was brutally ostracized by the Lviv notables from all the Ukrainian organizations in the city. But it is characteristic of both men that neither would give up his political ambitions, though they had to engage in a long and wearisome process of laying the foundations for their political activity, a process that lasted for more than a decade, 1878-1890.

What support did Franko still enjoy among the Ukrainians in Lviv in 1878?

Leafing through an old issue of the Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk, a journal edited by Franko in the 1890's and 1900's, I came across the memoirs of Dr. Olesnytsky, who had met Franko in 1878 when he, too, was a student in Lviv, and who in the 1890's became one of his friends and political associates. While the extracts I will quote are rather long, they are invaluable as a vivid though perhaps not wholly objective description of Galician life in the late 1870's, as seen by some of the youth.18

What I found in Lviv [apparently in the fall of 1878—Y. B.], disappointed me very much. The life of the Lviv Ukrainian community appeared to me pitiful indeed—even worse than that.

The whole Ukraine-Rus of Lviv met in the club Rus'ka Besida [Ruthenian Conversation], which then occupied two small rooms at 14 Cracow Street, and beside it, in a very small room, was the Prosvita [Enlightenment].19

The Besida was frequented by a small group from the faculty of the Academic Gymnasium, two university professors (the late Ohonovsky brothers), and several officials—from among the same group the Prosvita branch was recruited at that time. The Populists did not play any political role whatsoever, their only newspaper Pravda, appeared very irregularly, sometimes once every few months. The attempt to publish a political semi-monthly Pravda failed; one

Drahomanov i zhenev's'kyi sotsiyalistychnyi hurtok, Vienna: Ukrainian Sociological Institute, 1922, pp. 64 ff.


19 Society for popular education, founded in 1868.
could not think of publishing it more frequently primarily for lack of the bail bond then required by law. The booklets of Prosvita were rather flat: they consisted chiefly of reprints and the warming up of older issues; besides publishing these booklets the Prosvita did nothing else. The plenary meetings of Prosvita which took place at Lwów once a year would scarcely draw a few dozen people, and they would never go beyond dry administrative reports. Once a year the Ukarainophiles would have an evening in memory of Shevchenko, and even that in a hall not their own (in the City Hall or the Sharpshooters' Club) and with forces not of their own (with the assistance of choirs and soloists from the Polish musical association . . . ). This is all there was to the activity of the Narodovtzi [Populist] community in Lwów.

Dr. Olesnytsky continues to tell how he attended a meeting of a Populist youth organization at which it was moved—unsuccessfully—to expel such dangerous members as Franko, and how this very proposal incited in him the "ardent curiosity to look the devil in the eye," until finally he found his way "to the very bottom of hell"—Franko's apartment at 4 Klainivsky Street. He writes:20

There was nobody in Galician Rus' whose influence upon the contemporary youth could match that of Ivan Franko.

The reason for this lay in Franko's erudition (vidomosty) and personality. He had a critical mind and was an acute observer. Our acquaintance with Franko introduced us young people into a wholly different world; the scope of his reading, unusual for his years, his perceptiveness and his severe but just criticism of current daily affairs did not fail to impress and attract the young people around him.

On the third floor in Klainivsky Street, a real new school was opened for those who had access to him, which introduced us into the world of new principles and new views. . . .

Even then he possessed a good library which was used by the young people of his circle; we found in his library all the books which at that time could not be obtained elsewhere in Galicia: the Vestnik Europy,21 the Otechestvennye Zapiski the works of Shchedrin, Belin-

20 Ibid., p. 130.
21 "European Messenger," a well-known liberal Russian journal, one of whose contributors was Drahomanov. Probably a good many Russian and West European journals and books had been acquired by Franko at the suggestion and with the help of Drahomanov.
sky, Dobrolyubov; Zola, Flaubert, Spencer, Lassalle; and Drahomanov and Myrnyi of the Ukrainians. These were books that led us out into the world and like a sledge hammer broke out an opening in the stone wall, which had been erected around us by the public education of that time and the stagnant and soulless Ruthenianhood (rutenshchyna). Nor could the more able and sincere youth remain satisfied with the “Ukrainianhood” (ukrayinschyna) which predominated in the community in Lviv and which was restricted to rather weak, purely formal and, in addition, rather infrequent manifestations. The school of Ivan Franko taught us to see the Ukrainophile movement in a different light, pointed out to us its real essence, and Drahomanov’s forceful, ruthless critique reinforced this impression and evoked in us a reaction against the formal Ukrainophile movement that had prevailed in Galicia until then.

With the enthusiastic help of such men as Olesnytsky, with the counsel of Drahomanov, who had gone to Geneva, and with whatever funds Drahomanov and his supporters in the Eastern Ukraine could scrape together, two or three months after his release from jail Franko set about publishing a socialist journal—a hopeless task in a conservative Galician community dreading the repressions of Austrian police. Before long, in 1880, Franko was arrested again and jailed without trial for three months—then released. This was apparently a broad hint to abstain from open political activity, and this time Franko took it.

The next ten years, from 1880-1889, were filled with great hopes, great disappointments and seemingly not a single achievement. Drahomanov continued to point out to Franko all the advantages of establishing a third party in Galicia. In 1886 he learned of an incipient conflict between the older and the younger members of the Kiev Hromada, with the young students becoming exasperated with the apolitical cultural orientation of their elders, notably Drahomanov’s opponent Antonovych. In Drahomanov’s opinion, the older members were passive, were looking toward Lviv. If there should be created in Galicia “a middle ground, a pure and honest ground—all would join a third party together.”

22 Drahomanov to Franko, Feb. 25, 1886, Drahomanov-Franko Correspondence, Academy ed., 1928, p. 168.
Franko tried to do his best, but under the pressure of the Austrian police and the intimidated Galician community, he failed until 1889 to establish even an independent newspaper, quite apart from a political organization. Moreover, whereas Drahomanov distrusted the nationalist Galician *Narodóvtsi* as a matter of principle, Franko did not abandon the hope of winning over some of its socially progressive members to his cause. His willingness to cooperate on the editorial boards of several *Narodóvtsi* organs greatly irritated his friend in Geneva, who on occasion could be quite doctrinaire.

Nevertheless, in 1883 Franko succeeded in gathering around himself a small legitimate circle devoted to the study of "the countryside in its ethnographic, statistical, geological and other aspects," which would allow its members to travel, to exchange opinions, and even to circulate books. Drahomanov gladly took it upon himself to advise the ostensibly apolitical circle in their choice of projects. Both through his writings in various Galician journals and through his organizational activity, Franko was successful in maintaining around him a circle of enthusiastic young followers.

In 1888 it seemed that Drahomanov's favorite project of having a third party in Galicia modeled on his ideas could never be realized: whenever Franko was about to establish anything even as modest as an independent journal, either the Austrian police would intervene or the Ukrainian community in Galicia would press him to accept some ephemeral compromise. But two years later the opportunity arrived rather unexpectedly, and Franko was not slow to take advantage of it. In 1889 he had finally succeeded in founding the independent biweekly *Narod* (the People). And in 1890 the Galician Ukrainophiles, who were backed in this by some Nationalist *Hromada* members in the Eastern Ukraine, put themselves into a vulnerable position by concluding a compromise with the Poles. This latter is important in the history of Galician and Dnieper Ukrainian relations and I shall, therefore, analyze it briefly.

As early as 1848 two prominent Czech members of the Aus-

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23 Franko to Drahomanov, undated letter [1881], *ibid.*, pp. 28-29.
trian Parliament, Palacký and Rieger, suggested publicly that the Hapsburgs should use Ukrainian nationalism against Russia. In the late 1880's, in connection with the Bulgarian crisis of 1876-1877, the relations between Austria and Russia became tense and there were rumors of a possible war. It seems that the Ukraine was considered a pawn in this struggle—possibly inspired by the German Foreign Office; the German philosopher Edward Hartmann had published, in the December 1887 and January 1888 issues of *Gegenwart* (Berlin), an article in which he advocated the re-establishment of the Ukrainian Kievan Principality. All this of course could not remain hidden from the right wing of the Ukrainophiles in Kiev, and in 1888 Antonových hinted in a private conversation that the Ukrainians might support the Austrians (as early as 1885 he had intimated to a friend of Franko's that there were Austrophile sentiments in the Eastern Ukraine). In 1890 a deputy of the Ukrainophile group in Galicia, Romanchuk, declared in the Galician Diet that the Ukrainians would be ready to cooperate with the Poles in return for certain concessions in the cultural field. Apprised of this move, Drahomanov immediately pointed out that the rapprochement could scarcely have been made without the good offices of Antonovych, who appears to have had discreet contacts with the Polish nobility in Galicia. Be it as it may, any cooperation with the Polish ruling class in Galicia was a rather controversial issue, and a year later in elections to the *Reichsrat* it proved of rather dubious value, the Ukrainian parties electing fewer deputies to the Galician Diet than before the compromise in 1889 (7 instead of 17). In any case, the rapprochement was to the advantage of both Drahomanov and Franko who were able to create a regular political party, using their rejection of the compromise to create popular appeal.

24 Korduba, *loc cit.*, pp. 70 ff.
25 See on this also Hugh Seton Watson, *op. cit.*, pp. 174 ff.
26 One of them was the establishment of a professorship of Ukrainian history at the University of Lviv. In 1894 it was first taken over by Michael Hrushevsky, a disciple of Antonovych.
The decision to form the party was made, however, in a rather improvised fashion and was not apparently directly related to the compromise. Early in July 1890 a meeting was held in Franko’s apartment. Most of his guests were students who helped him publish Narod. Kyrchiv, the representative of one wing in the Narodovtsi group, had also come to complain of a certain decision three leaders of the Ukrainophile Party had made in the name of the whole Ukrainian community in Lviv.27 He proposed that an ad hoc committee be formed to protest against the unjustified assumption of power by the Ukrainophiles. Whereupon one of the young students present suggested that a new party be organized to be called the “Radical Party.” Franko said that he personally did not believe that the time was ripe for establishing a new party, but if his friends thought that it was, then, “in God’s name, let’s start.”

Unfortunately, I have not been able to find the program of the Radical Party. Voznyak states in his article that it adopted a maximum and a minimum program, the maximum economic objectives including the collective use of property which was considered “socialism.”28 The practical aims of the party become clear if one analyzes their election platform of 1891, which is extensively referred to by Voznyak. The platform starts out with a number of socio-economic demands, goes on to enumerate desirable political freedoms, and ends with a few provisions for cultural development touching on the national question. Among the most important economic objectives are: (1) land and house taxes are to be abolished, a progressive income tax to be introduced; (2) the authorities are not to foreclose mortgages on that portion of a landholder’s property which is indispensable to his and his family’s survival; and (4) the village communities (Hromady) should have priority

27 Mykhaylo Voznyak, “Ivan Franko v dobi radykalizmu,” Ukrayina, Kiev. 1926, No. 6, pp. 115-163, 129. The particular decision by Julian Romanchuk, Natal Vakhnynyn and Ivan Beley was not to participate in the ceremonies connected with the solemn transfer of Mickiewicz’s body to Kraków.
28 Ibid., p. 130.
in buying land. Furthermore, in the political and cultural sphere, the platform demanded (13) the introduction of equal suffrage, i.e., the abolition of the curia system, (14) the continuance of the policy of introducing Ukrainian into Galician schools, and (16) a free secondary education. In general, writes Voznyak, the Radical Party of Galicia was the first Ukrainian party to demand universal equal suffrage, freedom of the press, agrarian and tax reforms. Three questions are now germane to our discussion: how strong was Franko’s influence in the Radical Party, how strong was that of Drahomanov, and to what extent can one assert that the Radical Party was led by a triumvirate of Franko, his Galician associate Pavlyk and Drahomanov?

Voznyak states that Franko’s contribution to the Radical press constituted its main force of attraction. But he also cites the memoirs of one of the founders of the Radical Party to prove how great an authority Franko enjoyed in the Party, at least in the beginning. At the founding congress in October 1890, the writer of the memoirs (Budzynovsky) moved that the Party should include in its maximum program the demand for the unification of all Ukrainian territories into one independent state, and in its minimum program, an administrative separation of Ukrainian East Galicia from Polish West Galicia. This proposal was defeated chiefly by Franko, who at that time was still thinking of cooperation between the new Radical Party and the Polish Peasant Party (Polska Partja Ludowa) that had similar socio-economic objectives. Budzynovsky states that not a single hand was raised against Franko’s opinion. It is true that under the influence of Bachynsky’s Ukraina irredenta the Radical Party at its Congress in 1895 included in the maximum program the demand for political independence of the Ukraine, but this does not seem to have happened against the explicit will of Franko: his review of Bachynsky’s pamphlet in Zhytie i slovo is favorable.

Drahomanov’s influence upon the Party is less clear. That he sympathized with its aims and supported it by his journal-

29 Ibid., p. 135.
istic contributions is quite evident; two political treatises that represent his most mature work, the *Chudats'ki dumky pro Ukrayins'ku natsional'nu spravu* (Peculiar Thoughts on the Ukrainian National Cause), 1891, and *Lysty na Nadniprovs'ku Ukrayinu* (Letters to the Dnieper Ukraine), 1893, were published in the official organ of the Radical Party, *Narod* (People). Also in *Zhytie i slovo* there appeared two very interesting papers by Drahomanov in the projected series on old Charters of Liberty: “Vstupni Zavvahy” (Introductory Remarks) and “Serednyovichni anhliys'ki Khartiyi” (Medieval English Charters).31 *Narod* is also known to have received financial support from the Eastern Ukraine, which was collected by Drahomanov’s staunch friend Kovalevsky.32

It is, however, rather difficult to pinpoint in what way Drahomanov directly influenced the formulation of the Radical program. From a letter of Pavlyk’s it appears quite clear that Drahomanov was not consulted before the Radical program was published,33 as he had been in the case of the invitation to subscribe to the new journal *Postup* (Progress) in 1886.34 But a case can be made out to show that, quite apart from the difficulties of correspondence, one of the reasons for the lack of previous consultation with Drahomanov was the political advantage of making it appear as the exclusive product of Galicians. Another, though perhaps a less weighty reason, was that the program of the journal *Postup*, which had been mutually agreed upon between Franko and Drahomanov, was much more than a mere statement of editorial policy—that, as Voznyak justly remarks, it actually amounted to a program of a new political party. Thus such demands, as those for freedom of the press and for establishment of free economic collectives

34 See *Drahomanov-Franko Correspondence*, Academy ed. 1928, pp. 202 ff.; letters F. to D., Sept. 17, 1886; D. to F., October 12; F. to D., Oct. 31; D. to F., Nov. 25, 1886. The journal was immediately suppressed by the Austrian police.
as a guarantee against exploitation, were already contained in the program of Postup of 1886.

Drahomanov's criticism of the 1890 program is so illuminating with respect to his relationship with his Galician friends that it is worth while to reproduce excerpts from it at some length:35

Dear Friend, [writes Drahomanov to Pavlyk]. I received your two letters [of October 11, 1890 and one whose beginning has been lost], and before that a brief note from Yaroshevych that the program had been enclosed. . . . I have read a summary of the program in N. Freie Presse and I am waiting impatiently to see the whole thing. Judging by what I have read in the N. Fr. Pr. one can assume that the program has more of a literary than political character—furthermore, that it is a copy of French and German socialist programs rather than the outgrowth of [specifically] Galician circumstances. If the real program is what it appears to be, and if in its practical policy the Party will not get its teeth into the current Galician affairs, then its activity will assume a purely literary character, provided, of course, that its members do not fall asleep after having done no more than edit the program. . . .

I do not care much about maximalist points in programs myself. In this I am an Englishman and think that about ideals—maxima—one ought rather to write books, but that one should step out into politics with something that could be achieved in a short time—within one to three parliamentary sessions, e.g.—both by our own people and by those who could support us on the given practical points though they might disagree on others. Thus, in England certain points of the Labor platform are supported even by bishops—from whom your program demands "rationalism." (The literary character of your platform goes so far that you have included realism in art in the program of a party, i.e., a political group.)

As a matter of principle, I cannot even condemn Ok.36 for his fear of "words" such as "socialism." As for me, I am not afraid of words—but as far as public opinion is concerned, I should fear them in some respects. It was in the International that they adopted the word collectivism because the word communism was so widely abhorred. To a large extent, politics must be pedagogy.

In any case, I do not think that it is the maximal part [of the program] that will provide your Party with political weight now, nor

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35 Drahomanov-Pavlyk Correspondence, Vol. VI, pp. 79 ff. [Italics in original.]
36 Theophile Okunevsky, a deputy to the Reichsrat, sympathizing with the politics of the Radicals.
in 20 or 30 years, nor will your label do the trick. I think it will depend on your ability to engage yourselves in behalf of the present affairs and needs of the people.

Finally, Drahomanov approved the point in the program limiting the activity of the Radical Party to Galicia—it should be up to the Eastern Ukrainians to regulate their own affairs, about which they were better informed than their western compatriots.

We do not know whether the election platform of 1891 was drafted with Drahomanov's criticism of the 1890 program in mind—this is quite possible. We do know, however, that sometimes his advice was bad and had to be rejected. Thus, e.g., in a letter to Franko, June 23, 1891, Drahomanov definitely counselled against the admission of students to the Radical Party, on the ground that when they grew older they would turn reactionary anyway. Franko replied that this was hardly feasible because the hard core of the Party was made up of university students. He also replied at some length that he did not think that Drahomanov was justified in his strictures against the admittedly unstable students. By joining the Radical Party the students incurred a stigma that would cling to them throughout their official and professional careers, and even a temporary membership might permanently imbue them with new ideas and conceptions.

But apart from whatever concrete evidence may be found on the direct influence of Drahomanov, the general direction of Radical politics and the intellectual temper that prevailed in the Party were such as to justify Voznyak's claim that "the spiritual father of the Radical Party was M. Drahomanov." One may doubt whether the Radical Party would have become a populist party par excellence had it not been for the influence of Drahomanov. To be sure, neither the Ukrainophile (Narodovtsi) nor the Russophile group would ignore the economic plight of the peasantry entirely. But it is equally true

37 Drahomanov-Franko Correspondence, Academy ed. 1928, p. 350.
38 Ibid., August 31, 1891, pp. 358 ff.
that the two parties tended to concentrate on cultural matters, whereas it was the Radicals that made the interests of the "people," i.e., under Galician conditions of small peasants with a sprinkling of industrial workers, the main concern of their political activity. Said Franko in an election speech in 1892:

The Radicals have the merit of being the first to have abandoned the empty and silly squabbles about nationality and of having focused all our attention on the road along which we could march with united forces to achieve a better order: prosperity. Once we are prosperous everybody will respect us, and then we shall find it easy to obtain national and political rights for us. We shall simply take them ourselves.

Furthermore, we find in Radical politics also an emphasis upon local associations, which in the 1891 election platform were called Hromady—a term, more likely than not, derived from Drahomanov. Party members played an outstanding role in the emerging co-operative movement and in extending the network of educational societies. The leaders took great pains to organize local branches of the Party; they used to enlist able speakers from the peasants themselves, and would hold party congresses quite regularly—in general, once a year. While it is true that the Radicals might have modeled their party statutes after those of the German and French Socialist Parties, the emphasis upon this particular kind of local associations seems to stem from Drahomanov, who was known as an ardent foe of any centralization.

Probably the greatest influence of Drahomanov should be sought in the pragmatic attitude of the Radical Party, its lack of doctrinaire rigidity. In a letter to Yu. Yavorsky, one of the leaders of the Party, Drahomanov wrote: "An eight-hour working day is more important than disputes about the forms of collectivism." I do not know anything about the reaction of

40 Voznyak, ibid., citing Narod, 1892, p. 67.
41 Hryhoryyiv, op. cit., p. 28.
Yavorsky, but Franko did certainly heed this prescription, and so did the authors of the election platform of 1891.

III

Against the background of the relations between the Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia, I have tried to show that Drahomanov had an important influence upon Franko’s political activity. To what extent did this meeting of minds and hands reinforce the ties between the two parts of the country?

One might approach this question by first summarizing Drahomanov’s hopes as to what he could accomplish. To justify his preoccupation with Galicia, Drahomanov wrote in his first letter to the Kiev Hromada, apparently at the end of 1876:

Our cause will proceed smoothly only when the Galicians and Hungarians [here he refers to the inhabitants of what today is called Transcarpathia, then under Hungary—Y. B.] will rise to the level of our ideas; and then they will do some things better than we, for they have grown up in a more normal atmosphere and in political freedom, too.

In a letter to Franko he advised him on what the editorial policy of his organ should be:

By all means, adopt a clear attitude toward Russia: declare yourselves immediately pan-Ukrainians, but without the national-political formalism. Say that you are concerned about the freedom and the development of the whole Ukrainian people, but [that it does not matter to you] under what states it would remain.

Finally, we have already seen that in the middle 1880’s Drahomanov hoped that a progressive party in Galicia could serve as a powerful magnet to attract all Ukrainian forces in the East and thus eliminate the incipient conflicts between the old and the young generation of politically active Ukrainians.

But whatever the hopes, to realize them presupposed a reasonable degree of communication between the two parts of the country. The available evidence on this point is, however,

44 Drahomanov-Franko Correspondence (1928 ed.), p. 107 (March 12, 1885).
rather difficult to evaluate. Apparently it was possible for indi-
viduals from the Dnieper Ukraine to come to Galicia and vice versa (e.g., Drahomanov was in Lviv in 1876; Franko went to Kiev in 1885, and again in 1891; Konysky, an Eastern Ukrainian writer and friend of Antor'ovych, lived in Lviv for longer periods of time starting with 1865; Kovalevsky came to Galicia in 1889). Some of these people brought funds with them—the Shevchenko Scientific Society and a few Galician journals and papers such as Pravda, the Ukrainophile organ, and also Franko's Narod, were supported by Eastern Ukrainians. Galician journals published poems, short stories, reports that were sent in from the Dnieper Ukraine. All this could be fully documented. But even at that the most important question remained unsolved: how many Eastern Ukrainians would read the material produced or published in Galicia? (Because of Russian censorship laws, very little was printed in Ukrainian in the East.) From the memoirs of a contemporary, it appears that the students' circles of Drahomanov's orientation in Kiev, in the 1880's and 1890's, had access to and eagerly read some Galician editions, to wit, several volumes of the literary journal Zorya, Pavlyk's study on reading rooms, the organs of the Radical Party Narod and Khliborob (Agriculturist).45 In a letter to Drahomanov, Franko also mentions that both the younger and older Ukrainophiles in Kiev were reading the Narod and that some of them were also acquainted with Pravda, the organ supported by the Narodovtsi and the rightist members of the Hromada.46 As far as government policy is concerned, we have the statements by a careful student of Russian censorship that in the 1860's “Pravda [then virtually edited by Kulish], albeit with frequent cuts, continued to enter Russia,” and that during the 1880's two or three Galician newspapers were being admitted by the Russian customs.47 On the other hand, Franko

46 June 8, 1891, Drahomanov-Franko Correspondence, 1928 ed., pp. 347 ff.
implies in his cited letter that while the average member of the Kiev (Old) Hromada might have known something about Galician politics, he often found it infinitely confusing and probably not worth the trouble of clarification. Maintenance of the ties with Galicia was, so to speak, the undisputed domain of a few Eastern Ukrainian leaders, notably the rightist Antonovych, who supported the Galician Ukrainophiles, and Drahomanov’s friend Kovalevsky, who helped him to aid the Radical Party. Franko even goes so far as to accuse Konysky and Antonovych of writing in Pravda goodness knows what in the name of the Eastern Ukrainians and of then hiding those issues from the eyes of the Kiev Hromada.48 If this is true, it shows that in the early 1890’s most of the Ukrainians in Kiev did not really care about the issues of Galician politics, otherwise they would not have allowed themselves to be so easily deceived by old copies of Pravda. But without a comprehensive monograph on the Hromada movement in Eastern Ukraine, it is not possible to place all these bits of information into a proper perspective. It seems, however, certain that at least by 1895 one could not speak of an integrated Ukrainian national movement, encompassing Galicia as well as the Dnieper Ukraine. In any case, Drahomanov’s favorite project of a Galician progressive party uniting the various wings of the Eastern Ukrainian movement failed. After his death the Galician Radical Party began to disintegrate.

But with all these admissions, it is also evident that important advances toward at least the cultural unity of the Ukraine were made. The Eastern Ukrainians benefited from the cooperation by obtaining a fairly convenient place to publish their works whenever Russian censorship was tightened up. While much of the spadework in Ukrainian history and philology continued to be done in the Dnieper Ukraine, rather than in Galicia, before Hrushevsky was sent to Lviv in 1894, one may assume that even the most devoted of the Eastern Ukrainian kul’turnyky (cultural workers) would have found

it rather difficult to persist in their activity, had not Galicia provided an outlet for their popular works, such as historical pamphlets à la Nechuy-Levytsky\(^49\) and belles-lettres in Galician periodicals. To the extent, however, that an Eastern Ukrainian preferred politics to compiling dictionaries, and to the extent that he could or would keep himself reasonably well informed about Galician affairs, to that extent he was reminded of the fact that Ukrainian politics as distinct from the mixture of a national all-Russian politics and Ukrainian cultural development might still be possible even within the Russian Empire. Drahomanov's continued participation in Galician affairs since 1871 was for him, so to speak, a warranty that all those confusing disputes had a significance that was not merely provincial.

The benefits of this cooperation to Galicia appear more tangible, for they are more easily formulated in terms of ideas. We have the balanced testimony of Franko to attest to the fact that the influence of Eastern Ukrainian thought on Galicia was considerable indeed. Starting with 1848, he says, the national consciousness of the people and the intelligentsia had grown, "though only very slowly."\(^50\) It took the Galicians a decade to find out what nationality they belonged to, and still another ten years to determine what constituted "the essence of that nationality (Narodnosty)," namely, to serve the common people, "to help them achieve for themselves a free human life on a par with that of other people." (Here, it seems, we see the influence of the Populist Drahomanov.) Franko continues:

The application of the utilitarian principle to all the achievements of civilization has forced the young intelligentsia, who previously had bounced around hither and yon in dilletante fashion, to concentrate their attention on what the people need most, i.e., popular education, finding out what the social, economic and spiritual conditions of the people were, making the people aware of their national, political and civil rights.

\(^49\) Nechuy-Levytsky, a well-known Eastern Ukrainian writer, proved quite skillful as a popularizer of Ukrainian history in Galicia—see Korduba, loc. cit., passim.

\(^50\) Franko, review of Ukraina irredenta, Zhytie i slovo, Lviv, 1895, Vol. IV, p. 474.
(A person acquainted with the political thoughts of Drahomanov will have little difficulty in also tracing these ideas back to him.) Having sketched the various new concepts that had penetrated Galicia since 1848, Franko goes on to appraise their influence as follows:

It can be said with certainty that all of these ideas and directions would have developed in the Galician Rus' by themselves, without any outside influences; but I am no less certain that, given the general weakness of the Galician-Ruthenian process of development, it would have taken us not 50, but about 100 years to see them fully developed, had it not been for the strong influx of stimulating ideas that had come from the Ukraine under Russia.51

On the other hand, one should not underestimate the significance of the practical experience which Galician Ukrainians gained in parliamentary politics, in the setting up of Ukrainian language schools, in adult education and in economic associations—all of them matters in which the Eastern Ukrainians were not very knowledgeable.52

Even more difficult than an appraisal of the significance of the Galician—Dnieper Ukrainian relations in general is an attempt to evaluate the particular role that was played in the Ukrainian movement by Drahomanov and Franko and their associates, i.e., the socially progressive trend. If one takes the crudest indicators, on the one hand, the predominance of the rightist members in the Old Hromada in the 1880's and early 1890's, and, on the other hand, the failure of most of Franko's attempts to establish an independent paper in the 1880's and the weakness of the Radical Party in the 1890's,53 it would appear that the more nationalist Ukrainophiles prevailed in both parts of the country. But the available sources are not adequate to answer the question as to how many of Drahomanov's ideas penetrated the Ukrainian movement as a whole.

51 Ibid.
52 It seems to me that if one examines closely the development in Eastern Ukraine after 1895, one will find indications that the Galician experience was utilized (e.g., in 1905 a Prosvita was set up in the East, apparently with the same purpose as the Galician Prosvita which had been founded in 1868).
53 E.g., in the elections to the Galician Diet in 1895, the Ukrainian parties elected 14 deputies, only 3 of whom were Radicals. See Hryhoryyiv, op. cit., p. 28.
nov's and Franko's ideas percolated into the opposite camp while Drahomanov was still alive, and how many of them were carried into it by Franko when he left the Radical Party to join the reformed Narodovtsi in 1899.

Without doubt, however, the friendship between Drahomanov and Franko stands forth as an example of fruitful intellectual and practical cooperation between two men who had similar personalities, who shared common values and who agreed on rational means for achieving these values.
The subject of this study is the ethnic minority composed of individuals living in a country other than their own, specifically the Jewish people, a classic example of such minority.

A little more than ten years ago the Jews differed from all other peoples of the world in possessing no territory of their own. The situation changed after Israel was founded on May 14, 1948, in part of what was formerly Palestine. Ever since, those Jews who have settled on their own land have made up the majority of the population there and have organized life according to their own wishes under the protection of their own state and that of international law. At present around two million Jews live in Israel. However, a great part of the Jewish people, some ten millions of them, live in the Diaspora, scattered in nearly all countries of the world. From the standpoint of the state of Israel these ten million Jews may be considered the Israeli Diaspora. Evidently these people have a feeling of belonging to this Diaspora as is attested by the considerable funds coming to Israel from the Jews in other countries.

The renewal of territorial status of the Jewish people has had a profound psychological effect on the attitude of non-Jewish people toward the Jews, as well as on the consciousness of the Jews in the Diaspora. It is impossible to determine today the degree to which these changes in attitudes have influenced patterns for the Jewish minority in the Diaspora. This remains a task of the future, since a historical perspective is needed for conclusions of this kind.

The fact that the Jews now possess territory of their own makes the status of these unique people similar in a certain respect to that of other peoples who, although they have never lost their territory, have in the course of history given up parts of their population to other countries, mainly as emigrants. Most of these peoples are concentrated in their own countries, with the minority living outside. In spite of the fact that only
the minority of the Jews live within their own land while the majority form the Diaspora, there is a great similarity in the living conditions of groups of Diaspora Jews and those of other peoples. This similarity has become still more marked in the course of the last ten years as a result of epochal changes in the international status of the Jews since nationhood was achieved. This resemblance is caused by the fact that any ethnic minority living in a country other than its own is dependent on the host of that country, i.e., on the people forming the majority. The life of an ethnic minority is ruled by peculiar sociological patterns, which have been clearly expressed in the conditions of the classic ethnic minority represented by the Jews, and to some degree in the life of any ethnic group in a foreign environment. Essentially, this life depends on the attitude of the native population toward the newcomers, who have to adjust to the loss of their home country and to forget the conditions of life there, where everyone had a right to activity in any field.

People living in their native country feel that that country, with all its natural resources and its social, political, and cultural institutions has from time immemorial belonged to the native population and to nobody else. Thus, the feeling prevails among the natives that only they are entitled to order the life in the country according to their understanding and aspirations. This right to live on their own land and to use its resources is felt by the ethnic majority as their primary right. Such a conviction makes them unwilling to share this right with ethnic minorities living in their country, even if they have lived there for centuries and form a majority in certain parts of the country.

In some cases the minority groups feel themselves closely tied to the adoptive country and look on it as their new home. History has recorded examples of devoted service of minority groups in the interest of their country of residence. However, the attitude of minority groups has never determined the fate of these groups in certain countries nor affected their social
status there. These have been determined by the attitude of the majority.

The ethnic majority is always sure that the right of the minority to participate in the life of the country is determined by the degree of advantage to the majority obtained from the minority's participation in economic, political, cultural and other fields. These feelings of the majority underlie the relative or secondary right of the minority to settle and to live in the country. The Jews throughout the long history of their dispersal among peoples and countries of the world have been subjected to this relative right to live and to act in a foreign environment—a right which at any time could be restricted, violated and abolished. Other ethnic minorities have also been subjected to this. However, the Jewish minority presents a classic example for studying the peculiar patterns which govern the life of any minority, resulting from the exercise of this relative right.

Migration has always been of great importance and is now of the utmost significance both for peoples and individuals. Mass migration is always forced, even when it occurs not through war or revolution, but as a result of an open violation of political, religious or racial character. Even migration in pursuit of better living conditions actually is forced since it is caused by poverty in the home country. The Jews again present a unique example of the forced migration resulting from persecution and poverty.

It is quite natural that in a new place and under new conditions people of common origin, language, faith and traditions hold together and at first are rather isolated. This self-isolation soon gives place to a contrary tendency, that of close cooperation with society in all fields of activity. Such desire to come in close contact with the local population, the tendency toward complete amalgamation with the population, exacts a price in the newcomers' ethnic characteristics—their language, traditions and ways of life; this is clearly manifested in the second and third generations. However, because of the relativity of the right of ethnic minorities to participate in the local life,
usually they are not treated as equals by the indigenous population. Opportunities for participation by minorities in a given field are conditioned by the advantages gained from this activity, and depend also on circumstances of place and time, as well as on the minority's geographic and racial origin. All ethnic minorities encounter certain obstacles in their activities. These obstacles, although of different dimensions, result from the existence of the *relative right*, as mentioned above.

The attitude of the majority toward the Jews in many countries is again an example of the resistance of the local population to the penetration of newcomers into different strata of the society, against their belonging to local classes and guilds, and against their right to work in any field of their choice. The principle of "relative existence" is clearly manifested in relations between the Jewish minority and the non-Jewish majority.

This study is concerned with showing how the principle of "relative existence" applied to the Jewish minority has influenced the fate of this minority. We shall see that the Jews in the Diaspora could win the right of residence among other peoples and the right of participation in the economic life of their adoptive countries only because their sojourn was justified by the *utilitarian profit* they rendered to the host population.

In general, people belonging to foreign ethnic groups, particularly the Jews, are confined to such forms of activity, including the economic, as are considered harmless and profitable for the ethnic majority. In the course of many centuries the Jews have rendered services for other peoples but never together with those peoples. This article will show that this relationship between the ethnic majority and the Jewish minority did not change essentially with the beginning of the age of industrialization. It is true, a free competition replaced the closed economy, abolished *estates* and groups from which Jews had been restricted; and finally the walls of the Jewish ghetto fell and the isolation seemed to come to an end. The activities and initiative of the Jews contributed generously to the establishment of new economic forms. However, the legal emancipation of
the Jews brought about by the new economic organization was not accompanied by a real economic and social emancipation. Although the Jews made great efforts to join the non-Jewish milieu and to assimilate therein, they did not succeed here. Sociological patterns which govern interrelations between these ethnic groups are of long duration and do not depend on economic and social status, since they are patterns of a national kind and govern interrelations between nationalities everywhere and in all historical periods.

Participation of the Jewish population in economic activity in any country in no way resembles the participation of the non-Jewish population of the same country in identical spheres of activity. Social stratification also differs to a considerable degree in the two ethnic groups.

I shall endeavor to present in figures a general picture of the economic composition of the Jewish population of three European countries in which the great majority of European Jewry lived, prior to the Jewish catastrophe of the Second World War: in Russia (later the U.S.S.R.), Poland and Germany. This economic distribution of the Jews will be compared with the economic distribution of the entire population of those countries. Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia will also be considered, thus embracing an area within the limits of which there lived more than seven million Jews, that is, half of all the Jewish people of the period examined here. We are considering so many countries because each had reached a different stage of economic and social development. Thus a more dynamic picture is given of the effects of industrialization upon the processes investigated.

Within the borders of the Russian Empire there were more than five million Jews at the time of the first population census in 1897. This census disclosed a striking contrast between the economic distribution of the Jews and the economic structure of the country as a whole: in 1897, 3½ per cent of Russian Jews were engaged in agriculture, at a time when
75 per cent of the total population of Russia were engaged in this activity.\(^1\) This contrast in the structure of occupations did not change much during the period of more than forty years between the first tsarist census and the last Soviet census of January 1939:\(^2\) this time we see a decrease in the proportion of the agricultural population to 63 per cent in the whole country, which is explained by the rapid rate of industrialization. At the same time we note the opposite trend among the Jews, with whom the proportion in agriculture rose to 7 per cent.

The same contrast in trends is indicated in other spheres of the national economy:\(^3\) industry and trade accounted for 10.3 per cent of the general population in 1897, and 5.8 per cent according to the Soviet census of 1926. (The 1926 data refer only to people gainfully employed, including agriculture.) With respect to the Jews, the ration in 1897 was 35.4 per cent, and in 1926, 34.4 per cent. The same phenomenon is repeated in commerce: 3.8 per cent for the general population in 1897, and 38.6 per cent for the Jews. In 1926 the data were: 1.4 for the general population and 19.3 for the Jews. The figures pertaining to the Ukraine in 1926 show the wage-earning population engaged in commercial occupations as 0.7 per cent, with 20 per cent for the Jewish population. The changes in the balance of economic occupations, especially in commerce were brought about by changes in the political system.

Poland provides quite a similar picture, as the figures of the two censuses of 1921 and 1931 indicate.\(^4\) In Poland, 5.8 per cent of the total Jewish population were engaged in agriculture during the period of the first census; 66.7 per cent of

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\(^1\) N. Gergel, *Di lage fun di jidn in Russland*, Warsaw, 1926, p. 36.

\(^2\) Jacob Lestschinsky, *Does sovjetische jidntum*, New York, 1941, p. 171.


the non-Jewish population were farmers in that same year. The census of 1931 shows the same divergence: 4.3 per cent of the Jews earned their living from agricultural occupations; among non-Jews 61.4 were farmers. Two occupational fields, next in importance after agriculture, presented quite a different relation between numbers of Jews and non-Jews engaged in these fields. In 1921, 15.8 per cent of the general population were engaged in industry, and 19.4 per cent in 1931. Corresponding figures for the Jews are 36.7 and 42.2 per cent. The contrast is still sharper in the field of commerce in which 6.5 per cent of the general population were engaged in 1921 and 6.1 per cent in 1931. For the Jews: 41.3 in 1921 and 36.6 per cent in 1931.

The same imbalance in the main economic occupations of the Jews and the total population can be seen in Germany. Here too the same trend is seen for 25 years, between the censuses of 1907 and 1933:5 the Jewish population is concentrated in occupations which are unimportant as means of livelihood for the non-Jewish population, as though Jews avoided those branches of the economy in which the Germans were engaged. Thus, in 1907, 33.7 per cent of all Germans were engaged in agriculture, but there were only 1.4 per cent farmers among German Jews. True, a lesser, but still quite considerable disparity occurs in occupations of the two groups in industry: 38.2 per cent for Germans and 24.2 for Jews. This disparity was probably most significant in the field of commerce (together with credit and transport): more than half of the German Jews, or 55.8 per cent, were concentrated in these occupations; the percentage of the Germans engaged in commerce, credit and transport was only 11.55 per cent in 1907. Diverse also was the scale of "free professions," together with services, between the Jewish and non-Jewish populations of Germany 50 years ago: 6.4 per cent for the Jews and 3.6 per cent for the non-Jews.6

The 1933 census in Germany was taken in the last year of complete political and social equality of the Jews in a demo-

5 Jacob Lestschinsky, "Die Umsiedlung und Umschichtung. . . ."
6 Ibid.
ocratic Weimar Germany. What was the economic structure of
the half million German Jews in comparison with the struc­
ture of the entire population of Germany at that historic
moment? Had the German Jews succeeded in bringing their
economic structure to the level of the structure of the rest of
the population? Nothing of the kind! Just as the structure had
differed from that of the rest of the population over the many
centuries of the Jewish minority’s residence in Germany, just
as it differed from that of the Germans during the long period
of Jewish habitation behind the ghetto walls, it retained its
distinct character during the period of complete social and
political emancipation of the two last centuries. As in the early
period, according to the 1933 census, the main occupations of
the Jews in the last year of their stay on German soil differed
markedly from the occupations of non-Jews. Here are the 1933
census figures: agriculture among the Jews, 1 per cent, the
rest of the population 21 per cent. Industry and handicraft:
Jews—19.1 per cent, non-Jews—38.8 per cent. Commerce and
transport: 52.5 per cent for the Jews, 16.9 per cent for non-Jews.
In “free professions” and services 10.7 per cent accounted for
the occupations of the Jews, 7.8 per cent, for the occupations of
non-Jews. 7

From these statistics we may conclude that the occupational
distribution of Jews in any country, regardless of the period,
the national economic level or the political and social system,
is in inverse ratio to the occupational distribution of the general
population of the country.

However, the statistics quoted fall short of the requirements
for a dynamic analysis, because the figures for each of the three
countries refer in the first census period to the entire popula­
tion, whereas in the second census period only the gainfully
employed population is covered. The above picture of economic
structure is therefore static for the time being.

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7 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich.
Since the chief index of a modern economy is its industrialization, it is interesting to compare the degree of industrialization in European countries inhabited by considerable Jewish minorities during the period under consideration, that is from 1900 up to the last world war, which was the time of the annihilation of the great majority of those Jewish minorities.

This investigation will confine itself to the existing statistical material, in which only official census data will be utilized, and of these only the figures that have been used in registration of the population to indicate nationality or religion. These indices make possible a comparison of the positions of various ethnic groups. Therefore, the research embraces eleven countries of different sizes and levels of economic development, according to the index of the degree of their industrialization, starting with Byelorussia and the Ukraine in the East, and proceeding to Germany in the West. Our figures apply only to the earning population in its distribution according to chief occupations. In each country and in each occupation we are contrasting the percentage of Jewish with that of non-Jewish earners and thus are determining the importance of each general occupational classification as the means of livelihood for the Jewish minority of each country, or group of countries, in comparison with the importance of that same occupation as a source of livelihood for the non-Jewish majority; thereby the role of each of the two ethnic groups in each occupational class and in the economy of the country as a whole will be determined.

These eleven countries will be divided into three categories in accordance with the degree of their industrialization, which is also a measure of their economic level. A comparison of the economic status of these two groups in countries at various stages of industrialization can give exactly the required dynamic picture: the economic status of a given group in a country of a higher level of industrialization can be accepted as a likely, even a certain, prediction for that same ethnic group in a country now on a lower level of industrialization.
Table I

THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE TWO ETHNIC GROUPS
ACCORDING TO THE INDEX OF THE LEVEL OF INDUSTRIALIZATION

Percentage of Jews and Non-Jews in Occupational Fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
<th>Free Professions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-Jews</td>
<td>Non-Jews</td>
<td>Non-Jews</td>
<td>Non-Jews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Agrarian countries</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Transitional (semi-industrial) countries</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Industrial countries</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Agrarian countries: Soviet Ukraine (1926), Byelorussia (1926), Galicia (1921), Poland (including Galicia, 1921), The Carpathian Ukraine (1921), Romania (1913).

II. Countries in transition: Hungary (1920), Slovakia (1921).

III. Industrial countries: Bohemia (Czechia, 1921); Moravia (including Silesia, 1921), Germany (1907).

Even a superficial glance at this table confirms our original thesis concerning the inverse character of the economic structure of the Jewish minority. The thesis, which was established on the basis of the data on population distribution according to economic occupations in three different countries, Russia, Poland and Germany, is now supported by the comparison of that distribution in the three economic spheres. But this time the figures speak in much more distinct terms. The figures of this table show also the tendency of an inverse development for the Jewish minority in relation to the non-Jewish majority. With the transition of any country, inhabited by a considerable Jewish minority, from a lower economic level to a higher, there occur, of course, certain changes also in the distribution of occupational fields among the Jews, but the general picture of the inverse relationship remains.

But this is not all. Industrialization means of course an in-

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crease in the scale of industrial activity in the national economy. In the two columns of the foregoing Table I, we see how the percentage of the non-Jewish population engaged in this branch of activity increases with the transition of agrarian to industrial countries from 5.8 per cent for the former, to 18 per cent in the case of semi-industrialized (transitional) countries, and up to 38.4 per cent in the case of industrial countries. This process, which corresponds to the economic development of our age, is obvious, but looking at the Industry column at the percentages of the Jewish population engaged in this activity, we observe the inverse process: a decrease in industrial occupations among the Jews from 34.1 per cent in agrarian countries to 29.9 per cent in semi-industrial (transitional) countries and, finally, to 23.4 per cent in industrial countries. Therefore, there is evidence in the case of the Jewish minority of an inverse process, one which runs counter to the basic principle of economic development of our age—industrialization.

The obviousness of this inverse trend in the economic structure of a Jewish minority is indicated clearly in the following Table II. The first horizontal line indicates the industrialization level of six European countries—Romania, the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany. This level is seen in the figures on rural population: with increased industrialization the proportion of farmers in the whole population decreases. Thus is seen a progressive growth of industrialization in these countries, starting with Romania to Germany, with a decrease in the rural farm population from 80.5 to 30.5 per cent. The next horizontal line indicates the trend in the growth of the percentage of occupations in industry for the non-Jewish population. Here is a line of figures, which from left to right, from Romania to Germany, all swing directly upward: from 7.0 per cent to 41.4 per cent. Finally, the third line shows the importance of industry among the sources of livelihood for the Jews. Here, too, is a line of consecutive figures, but here all figures point downward: starting from 42.5 per cent of "industrialized" Jews in agrarian Romania, down to 21.9 per cent in highly industrialized Germany.
**Table II**

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF JEWS AND NON-JEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% in rural occupational fields (Jews and non-Jews)</th>
<th>Romania 1913</th>
<th>U.S.S.R. 1926</th>
<th>Poland 1921</th>
<th>Hungary 1920</th>
<th>Slovakia 1930</th>
<th>Germany 1925</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of non-Jews engaged in industry</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Jews engaged in industry</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This contrast in the trend of economic development of Jews and non-Jews is clearly seen in the ensuing diagram: The curve of industrialization of the non-Jewish population climbs gradually and crosses the curve of agrarianization of the population in question—always in accordance with the trend of economic development. We see then how the curve of industrialization for Jewish population runs parallel with the curve of agrarian-

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1—Percent in rural occupational fields (Jews and non-Jews).
2—Percent of non-Jews engaged in industry.
3—Percent of Jews engaged in industry.

9 Three sources cited in footnote 8, and also: Statistická ročenka ČSR, 1935; Statistickij obzor ČSR, 1934;
ization and crosses the general curve of industrialization, that is, continues against the trend of economic development in all these countries.

It is apparent that there must exist certain specific factors contributing to the fact that the economic structure of a Jewish minority is in an inverse relation to the main trend of economic development that determines the economic structure of the majority. We shall now try to analyze the statistical data of several countries of eastern and western Europe.

We shall begin with Galicia for which we possess the census data compiled in 1900 and 1921, taking the four main occupational fields which develop rapidly in a period of industrialization: industry and trade, commerce and credit, transport and communications, services and "free professions." We shall consider the significance of these fields in the occupations of the non-Jewish and Jewish populations in Galicia in 1900, and compare it with the 1921 figures. Obviously, this time the clear dynamic comparison will help to establish the trend of development with respect to the two ethnic groups. Taking the 1900 figures arbitrarily as 100, the situation in 1921 is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational fields</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>non-Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry and trade</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>140.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and credit</td>
<td>102.6</td>
<td>160.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>151.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services and free professions</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>169.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The conclusion of this table is absolutely clear: there is a relative stagnation (even a considerable loss in the last category) in the case of Galician Jews, and in contrast with this, a rapid rate of development for the non-Jewish population of Galicia.

The picture will be still more distinct when the rates of development for Jews and non-Jews are contrasted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industry and trade</th>
<th>Commerce and credit</th>
<th>Transport and communications</th>
<th>Services and free professions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Jewish population</td>
<td>+40.0</td>
<td>+60.8</td>
<td>+51.0</td>
<td>+69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish population</td>
<td>+7.2</td>
<td>+2.6</td>
<td>+8.0</td>
<td>-11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 *Schriften für Ökonomik und Statistik*, Berlin, 1928, Band I, pp. 39 and 43.
The most significant feature in this difference in rates of development is that one can observe in this process a penetration by non-Jewish elements in the occupational fields which for centuries served the Jewish population, chiefly urban, as the main means of livelihood. Therefore, the question arises whether this stagnation in the development of the Jews, and even the loss of ground, is not a result of the penetration of the former "Jewish professions" by the non-Jewish population? Is it not by this circumstance that we must explain the fact, which at first seems so strange, that in industrial countries such a typically urban element as the Jews occupies a secondary position in the performance of such typically urban professions as those in industry, commerce, transportation, and so on; whereas in the agrarian countries we see a contrary situation? Is this not because of the fact that in agrarian, backward countries the Jews are almost the only persons engaged in industrial activity, simply because the non-Jewish population is still continuing to perform the traditional economic function of their ancestors, and still continues to look upon the "urban professions" with a little contempt as being purely "Jewish?"

Of course, to provide a final and convincing answer to these questions, it is not enough to present for comparison purposes the example of economically-backward Galicia. For that reason we shall turn to Bohemia, at the time industrially more developed, where one may expect the rates of development to be still more distinct. If we take the 1921 figures as 100, the situation in 1930 is as follows: 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational fields</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>non-Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry and trade</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>109.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and credit</td>
<td>100.03</td>
<td>141.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>118.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and free professions</td>
<td>105.3</td>
<td>110.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table, too, has its interesting aspect. During the period 1921-1930 the economy of Bohemia had reached quite a high level of industrialization. For this reason the rates of develop-

11 Statistická ročenka ČSR, 1935, p. 10; Statistickij obzor ČSR, 1934, p. 143.
ment are not so rapid here. Yet the loss of previously held positions by the Jews in industry and in transport, as well as the stagnation in commerce, service and free professions, continues. Is the interdependence between the non-Jewish penetration of industrial occupations and elimination of the Jews from these areas also present here? Before looking for an answer to this question, let us also see, with respect to Bohemia, what kind of differences exist in the rates of development for these population groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Industry and trade</th>
<th>Commerce and credit</th>
<th>Transport and communications</th>
<th>Services and free professions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Jewish population</td>
<td>+ 9.9</td>
<td>+41.1</td>
<td>+18.2</td>
<td>+10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish population</td>
<td>-11.7</td>
<td>+0.03</td>
<td>-41.9</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus we have: a comparative, moderate progress for non-Jews in such occupations as industry, transport, services and free professions; a very significant rate of progress in commerce. In contrast to this we have in the case of the Jews a loss, especially in transport, and stagnation in the commercial field. According to the 1921 census the commercial field has been the source of income for 44.3 per cent of the Jewish earners in Bohemia, with 18.8 per cent dependent on industry and 8.4 per cent in services and free professions. Therefore one is able to arrive at a conclusion about the significance of the situation in 1930 for the Jewish population in that country. What has become of those who had lost their former employment, since the entire Jewish population of the country decreased only by 4.4%? Apparently they were living on public charity.

Finally, we shall dwell upon that same dynamic process in Germany. Here there are statistics for a more extended period for the entire earning population of the country, according to the censuses of 1882, 1895, 1907, 1925 and 1933, while for the Jewish minority of this country there are only the census statistics of 1907, 1925 and 1933. As before we are using the

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12 Statistisches Handbuch für das Deutsche Reich; Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich.
figures of the first census as 100, and on this basis are comparing the data of the subsequent censuses.

**DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION OF GERMANY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational fields</th>
<th>1882</th>
<th>1895</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry and trade</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>172.4</td>
<td>236.5</td>
<td>228.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and transport</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>242.1</td>
<td>362.1</td>
<td>410.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF JEWISH POPULATION IN GERMANY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational fields</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry and trade</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>103.0</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and transport</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>109.1</td>
<td>101.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two tables clearly define the relationship between the two groups in the national economy. It is apparent that for the Germans activity in both areas increases rapidly and sharply over the period 1882-1933, by 128.9 in industry and 310 in commerce. For the German Jews, however, the situation is reversed: they lose ground (11.6) in industrial occupations, and in commerce barely hold their own, with a 1.2 increase over 1930 and a 7.9 drop from the 1925 level. In 1925, 51.4 per cent of the Jews in Germany depended on employment in commerce; by 1933 only 48.9 per cent were so engaged. As a result of this process (here and in other areas) there was a 33 per cent increase in the unemployed among German Jews during the period 1925-1933.

In order to find the answer to the question as to whether there exists a casual interdependence between these two such contradictory structures and the rates of their development, it is necessary to analyze the situation in countries of different economic levels, systems of government, and social orders. In each case we contrast two phenomena: 1) the percentage of non-Jews engaged in certain economic fields at various periods; 2) the percentage of Jews among all those engaged in the same
field. This analysis will show the effect of an increase or decrease in the percentage of non-Jews in certain areas, that is, changes in the significance of a given field as employment for the non-Jewish population, in relation to the number of Jews engaged in the same field. If there actually is interdependence here, then we should expect an automatic decline in the participation of the Jews in a given field as that field grows in importance for non-Jews. In other words: the Jews must yield their position to competitors from the non-Jewish majority.

Now we shall turn to the analysis of existing statistics, once more beginning our analysis with Galicia.

NON-JEWS AND JEWS IN INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN GALICIA IN 1900 AND 1921\(^{13}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational fields</th>
<th>Non-Jews</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry and trade</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and credit</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interdependence here is quite clear: with the increased importance of industry and commerce for non-Jews, from 4.2 per cent to 5.2 in industry, and from 0.6 per cent to 0.9 in commerce, the proportion of Jewish earners in the two fields declines from 25.0 per cent to 20.3 in industry, and from 81.7 per cent to 74.1 per cent in commerce and credit. The Jewish minority little by little yields ground in the two fields to new, non-Jewish competitors.

NON-JEWS AND JEWS IN INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1921 AND 1930\(^{14}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational fields</th>
<th>Non-Jews</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same interdependence appears in Czechoslovakia, except that the non-Jews in this industrialized country have maintained for so long such dominance in the field of industry that there is very little room for the Jewish minority. In industry the percentage of Jews ranged between slightly more and slightly less than one half of one per cent (that is, for every 200 employed in industry only one was a Jew).

And now a look into one corner of the German economy—the situation as it pertains to commerce in Prussia. Here we have the data for a longer period: from 1861 to 1925.\textsuperscript{15}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non-Jews</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data here are so clear that interdependence—penetration of a field by non-Jews and retreat from the field by Jews—is incontrovertibly established.

Finally this question will be considered with respect to the economy of Germany as a whole during the period covered by the censuses of 1907, 1925 and 1933 for the three main fields of this highly industrialized economy: industry and trade, commerce and transport, services and free professions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Non-Jews</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These three fields embrace about 70 per cent of the German economy. The importance of all three as means of livelihood for the population grew steadily over the census periods (with the exception of 1933, in industry, when a small decrease re-

\textsuperscript{15} Jacob Lestschinsky, \textit{Das wirtschaftliche Schicksal des deutschen Judentums}, Berlin, 1932.
sulted from the world-wide economic crisis, 1928-1934). But this was not true for the German Jews: they lost ground in all three fields in the course of the entire period. Certainly there can be no economic logic in this down-grading of the Jews. There is, however, a different logic: the force of the competition between nationality groups.

It seems to us that on the basis of the preceding analysis we may say we have succeeded in demonstrating the existence of a specific principle which characterizes the economy of Jews in the Diaspora. This principle can be described as an inverse dependence of the Jewish economic structure on the economic structure of the majority or, more correctly, of the master peoples of those countries where the Jewish masses, in their constant wandering, found themselves. This principle is one of interdependence between the interest of the non-Jewish population in certain economic occupations and the relative importance of letting the Jews perform these functions. This pattern assumes a special significance in mutual relations in the economy between the Jewish minority and the non-Jewish majority.\(^{16}\) It would be desirable to study this process in countries of the New World, especially in the U.S.A.

\(^{16}\) In addition to the above cited references, the following publications may be of interest: Salomon Goldelman, Löst der Kommunismus die Judenfrage? Vienna-Prague, 1937, and Das historische Wirtschaftsschicksal der deutschen Juden, Prague-Sukachevo, 1936-1937; L. Singer, Evreiskoje naselenie v SSSR, Moscow, 1932; Jacob Lestschinskij, Die ekonomische lage fun jidn in Polen, Devin, 1932, and Dos sovjetische Jidntum, New York, 1941.
The question of Bukovina was one of the problems which became an object of international negotiations shortly after the outbreak of World War I. This happened not only because soon after the opening of hostilities Bukovina was turned into a battlefield and was conquered and reconquered time and again. Of decisive importance were the persistent efforts of both rival camps to induce Rumania to take action against their adversaries. To attain this objective, the Central Powers as well as the Triple Entente made many an offer and promise to the Bucharest government, including offers of a territorial nature. While the Central Powers were ready to support Rumania's expansion first of all at the expense of the Russian Empire and Serbia, the Entente Powers did not hesitate to offer Bucharest territories belonging to Austria-Hungary. It is, therefore, obvious that the question of Bukovina was primarily an object of negotiations conducted between the Imperial Russian government and the governments of other Entente Powers, on the one hand, and the government of Rumania, on the other.

1.

Attempts to win the cooperation of Rumania were made by both opposing groups of the European powers from the very beginning of the July crisis of 1914. Diplomatic activities which aimed at influencing the Bucharest government and inducing it to participate in common action increased with the deterioration of the general situation and with the growing possibility of transformation of the Austro-Serbian conflict into a general European conflagration.

Efforts of the Russian government to gain Rumania's support in the crisis started the day after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. On July 24, 1914, the Bucha-
rest government was invited by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to take part in the diplomatic action of the great powers.\(^1\) Two days later Sazonov instructed Poklevsky-Kozell, the Russian envoy at Bucharest, to refer in a talk with the Rumanian Prime Minister to the common interests of Rumania and Serbia and to find out what position Bucharest would take if the conflict became inevitable. “If Austria,” Sazonov telegraphed to Poklevsky on July 26, 1914, “moves today against Serbia with the charge of irredentism, the same fate will meet Rumania tomorrow or she (i.e., Rumania) herself will have to give up forever the realization of her national ideal.”\(^2\)

Having received Poklevsky’s report about Bratianu’s reluctance to define the policy of the Rumanian government in the event of war, Sazonov sent on July 29, the day after Austria-Hungary’s declaration of war on Serbia, new instruc-

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In the above-mentioned Russian foreign office diary the following remark was made: “It was of the greatest advantage for us that Rumania should be drawn in on our side, while for Rumania it was manifestly flattering to participate as an equal in the diplomatic steps taken by the Great Powers.” Quoted after How the War Began: The Diary of the Russian Foreign Office 3-20 [Old Style] July 1914. Translated from the Original Russian by Major W. Cyprian Bridge. With a Foreword by S. D. Sazonov and an Introduction by Baron M. F. Schilling. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1925, p. 30.

\(^2\) M.O., 5, No. 85

As a matter of fact, Poklevsky had already telegraphed Sazonov on the previous day that he had asked Bratianu privately what attitude would be taken by Rumania were the Austrian ultimatum to result in a general European conflict. Ibid., No. 72.
Poniatovsky was authorized to answer Bratianu's questions about the attitude of the Russian government in case of war and about Russian war aims, and to insist on the clarification of Rumania's position in such an event. At the same time the Russian envoy at Bucharest was empowered to give Bratianu to understand that "the possibility of benefits for Rumania [were] not excluded" by the Russian government in case of Rumanian participation in the war against Austria. Finally, Sazonov wanted to learn what intentions the Rumanian government itself had with regard to this matter.

On the following day, the day of the Tsar's final approval of the general Russian mobilization, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs described more exactly those "benefits which Rumania could expect in case of her participation in a war against Austria." Without awaiting Poniatovsky's report on the reaction of the Rumanian government to suggestions sent from St. Petersburg on the previous day, Sazonov authorized the Russian envoy at Bucharest to declare that the Russian government was ready to support the annexation of Transylvania by Rumania. This offer was repeated by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the next day. In a telegram sent July 31, 1914, he drew Poniatovsky's attention to the news indicating the possibility of Rumania's military action against Russia on the side of Austria. In order to prevent this and to secure Rumania's non-interference and, if possible, her military cooperation against the Dual Monarchy, Sazonov was willing to promise

3 Ibid., No. 216.

One day earlier, on July 28, 1914, Sazonov had sounded out the Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg on the attitude of Rumania in the threatening conflict. Diamandy, op. cit., p. 806.

4 The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was at that time worried by rumors about the possibility of the military cooperation of Rumania with the Central Powers against Russia. See Sazonov to Poniatovsky, 28/15 July 1914, M.O., 5, No. 165.

5 Sazonov to Poniatovsky, 30/17 July 1914, ibid., No. 280.
the support of the Russian government in the acquisition of Transylvania by Rumania.  

Russia was not the only power of the Entente ready, when the outbreak of a general European war seemed imminent, to offer Transylvania to Rumania. A similar suggestion made by the President of the French Republic was reported by the Russian ambassador at Paris on August 1, 1914, the day of Germany’s declaration of war on Russia. Because of rather unfavorable news from Bucharest about the alleged intentions of the Rumanian government, Poincaré expressed the view that it was necessary without loss of time to exert pressure on Rumania by promising her Transylvania.  

In the meantime Poklevsky reported that after he had informed Bratianu about Sazonov’s proposal, the Rumanian Prime Minister asked whether Russia’s allies would sanction the cession of an Austrian province, since Great Britain allegedly wished the restoration of the status quo after the end of the approaching war. When the Russian envoy had assured Bratianu that the allies would take into account pledges given by the Russian government, the Rumanian Prime Minister tried to stress the idea that the possibility of Rumania’s cooperation with Russia was not excluded.  

Notwithstanding the decision of the Rumanian Crown Council on August 3, 1914, in favor of a policy of noninterference in the European war, the Russian government continued its efforts to induce Bucharest to an active cooperation against Austria-Hungary. Even prior to Vienna’s declaration of war

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6 Sazonov to Poklevsky, 31/18 July 1914, ibid., No. 341.
7 Izvolsky to Sazonov, 1 August/19 July 1914, ibid., No. 411.
8 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 31/18 July 1914, M.O., 5, No. 365.
9 Sazonov was informed about the decisions of the Rumanian Crown Council by Poklevsky’s telegram dated 3 August/21 July 1914, ibid., No. 504.
on Russia on August 6, new diplomatic steps were taken by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. On August 5, at a conference with the Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg, Sazonov submitted the text of a formal Russo-Rumanian military alliance which was subsequently transmitted to Bucharest. According to the proposed treaty, Rumania was to be obligated to cooperate with all her military forces in the war against Austria-Hungary, and the Russian government, on its part, was to promise not to put an end to the war with the Dual Monarchy until the provinces of Austria-Hungary inhabited by the Rumanian population were united with Rumania.10 This time there was reference not to Transylvania alone, but to “the lands of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Rumanian population”; hence, the Rumanian part of Bukovina was also included.11

In sending the text of the projected Russo-Rumanian convention to Paris and London, Sazonov proposed that simultaneously with the signing of it the territorial integrity of Rumania be guaranteed by identical written declarations by the representatives of the three great powers of the Entente

10 Diamandy, op. cit., p. 806.

The full text of the proposed alliance, as quoted in Sazonov’s telegram to Izvolsky and Benckendorff dated 7 August/25 July 1914 (M.O., 6, No. 22), contains the following clause:

“La Russie s’engage à ne pas cesser la guerre contre l’Autriche-Hongrie avant que les pays de la monarchie Austro-Hongroise habités par une population roumaine ne soient réunis à la couronne de Roumanie.” The extent of the territory to be incorporated into Rumania was supposed to be shown on an attached map which is missing.

11 The inclusion of Bukovina is explicitly confirmed by the following entry in the diary of the then-French ambassador at St. Petersburg under the date August 6, 1914:

“Sazonow m’apprend qu’il a fait venir le ministre de Roumanie, Diamandy, pour lui demander le concours immédiat de l’armée roumaine contre l’Autriche. En échange, il offre de reconnaître au cabinet de Bucarest le droit d’annexer tous les territoires austro-hongrois habités actuellement par une population roumaine, c’est-à-dire la majeure partie de la Transylvanie et la région septentrionale [sic—It should be obviously ‘méridionale’] de la Bukovine.” M. Paléologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la grande guerre. 3 vols. Paris: Librairie Plon, 1921-1922. I (1921), pp. 61-62.
at Bucharest; the representatives of France and Great Britain were also to be authorized to declare at the same time to the Rumanian government that they were acquainted with the extent of territorial cessions promised Rumania by Russia and had no objection in that respect.

The French government agreed with the terms of the Russo-Rumanian convention as proposed by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The British government raised no objection to the territorial acquisitions which had been offered by Russia to Rumania, and even expressed its willingness to support after the end of the war the territorial integrity of Rumania by diplomatic means, without binding itself, however, to any formal guarantee. In order to achieve a complete harmony, the director of the Chancellery of the Russian Foreign Ministry, M. Schilling, on August 9, 1914, at a conference with the British and French ambassadors and in agreement with them, drew up the following wording of a declaration which, at Sazonov's request, was to be handed in writing and without loss of time to the Rumanian government by the representatives of Great Britain and France at Bucharest:

1. Having received communications about the terms that have been offered by Russia for the active cooperation of Rumania against Austria-Hungary, France (Great Britain) agrees to these terms, and
2. As long as Rumania will fight on the side of Russia against Austria-Hungary, France (Great Britain) will consider herself at war with any power which would attack Rumania during this time.


Neither France nor Great Britain were yet in a state of war with Austria-Hungary at that time. Diplomatic relations with the Dual Monarchy were broken off by France on August 10; war was declared on Austria-Hungary by France and Great Britain on August 12, 1914.

14 The original French text of the proposed declaration in Sazonov to Izvolsky and Benckendorff, 9 August/27 July 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 39.
On the same day the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs empowered his envoy in Rumania to sign jointly with the Romanian Prime Minister the proposed Russo-Rumanian agreement in order to avoid the delay which would have been caused by the Rumanian envoy's journeying from St. Petersburg to Bucharest and back.\textsuperscript{15}

The question of Bukovina became, thus, in the very first days after the outbreak of the general European war, an object in international negotiations even though the name Bukovina was hardly mentioned as yet in the diplomatic acts.

Although Russia's western allies were not yet formally at war with Austria-Hungary, the governments of both France and Great Britain approved the declaration that had been drafted at the Russian Foreign Office and was to be made at Bucharest. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the French envoy in Rumania to deliver jointly with his British colleague the proposed declaration to the Rumanian government.\textsuperscript{16} The British Foreign Secretary, who likewise consented to act at Bucharest in accordance with Sazonov's proposal, suggested, however, that the words "has no objection to" (n'a pas d'objection contre) be substituted for the work "agrees" (adhère) in the first paragraph of the declaration. The British government raised no objection to the cession to Rumania of

\textsuperscript{15} Sazonov to Poklevsky, 9 August/27 July 1914, Stieve, No. 62.

The decision of the Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg to go to Bucharest and Sazonov's pressure to hasten Diamandy's departure are described in Diamandy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 807.

\textsuperscript{16} Izvolsky to Sazonov, 10 August/28 July 1914, Stieve, No. 67, and 11 August/29 July 1914, M.O., 6, No. 66.

On August 12, 1914, the French Foreign Minister Doumergue informed the French ambassador at St. Petersburg in a telegram decoded at the Russian Foreign Office:

"Nous sommes également entièrement d'accord pour donner à l'Italie et à l'Roumanie en cas de leur concours militaire toutes les assurances désirées au sujet des avantages territoriaux qui leur seront accordés à l'issue heureuse des hostilités, ces avantages étant accordés sans préjudice pour nos propres intérêts nationaux." M.O., 6, No. 79.
BUKOVINA IN THE DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS OF 1914

the territories proposed by Russia, but was not willing to commit itself to participation in the annexation of those areas.¹⁷

Soon, however, the diplomatic action concerning the planned declaration that was to be made to the Rumanians by the French and British envoys at Bucharest simultaneously with the signing of the Russo-Rumanian convention, became pointless because the Rumanian government declined to sign the proposed Russo-Rumanian agreement. In a talk with the Russian envoy the Rumanian Prime Minister declared that he could not accept the Russian proposal since this would run counter to the resolution recently adopted by the Rumanian Crown Council.¹⁸ Bratianu was ready merely to take note of the Russian offer if the Russian government demanded no immediate reply and left the question open; he was willing to give an official answer to the Russian proposal only after the arrival of the Rumanian envoy from St. Petersburg and after Diamandy's account of his personal talks with Sazonov. The Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs was reported to have

¹⁷ See M.O., 6, p. 34, footnote 5.
¹⁸ Poklevsky to Sazonov, 12 August/30 July 1914, M.O., 6, No. 82.

The rejection of the Russian offer by the Rumanian government is mentioned by the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg under August 13, 1914. Paléologue, op. cit., I, p. 77.

The reluctance of the Rumanian government to go to war against Austria-Hungary was not incorrectly ascribed by Sir George Barclay, the British envoy at Bucharest, primarily to the opposition of the Rumanian king, the mistrust of Bulgaria, and the desire on the part of Rumanians to await clearer indications as to the development of military operations. Barclay's view was shared by his French and Russian colleagues. M.O., 6, No. 157. The Russian military attaché as well as the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest were at that time likewise of the opinion that Rumania would maintain neutrality until the outcome of decisive military campaigns became clearer and that then she would join the stronger party. See Semenov's report, 17/4 August 1914 (M.O., 6, No. 121); and Czernin to Berchtold, 6 and 8 August 1914 (Österreichisch-Ungarisches Rotbuch: Diplomatische Aktenstücke betreffend die Beziehungen Österreich-Ungarns zu Rumänien. 22. VII. 1914-27. VIII. 1916, Vienna, 1916, Nos. 7 and 8. [Hereafter cited as Ö.-U. Rotbuch].)

The anxiety prevailing at Bucharest about Bulgaria's intentions was reported repeatedly by Poklevsky (e.g., on August 2, 3, 7 and 10, 1914. See M.O., 5, Nos. 469 and 502; 6, Nos. 30 and 59).
emphasized that, although at that time his government could not sign the proposed convention, the Russian suggestions were so attractive that Rumania did not wish to dismiss them altogether. Porumbaru was said to have added that any incident or any deterioration in the relations between Rumania and Austria-Hungary might permit the Rumanian government to change its attitude entirely.

In the meantime, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs recommended proceeding at Bucharest extremely cautiously and without undue haste, and avoidance of exerting too strong pressure or anything that might offend highly sensitive Romanians and produce results quite contrary to those desired.19 Taking into consideration this advice and similar suggestions of the Russian envoy in Rumania who urged that he refrain from any steps in the nature of an ultimatum, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs suspended his efforts to bring about the proposed Russo-Romanian convention and did not insist on an official answer from the Rumanian government to the Russian proposal.20

Several weeks later, however, the situation changed. The Russian government reopened negotiations with Rumania, and, at the same time, the question of Bukovina reappeared on the chessboard of European diplomacy.

II.

The Russian envoy at Bucharest, who had an opportunity to observe the Rumanian diplomatic and political situation on

19 Izvolsky to Sazonov, 11 August/29 July 1914, M.O., 6, No. 66; and Doumergue to Paléologue, 12 Aug. 1914, ibid., No. 79.

Approximately at that time, Sazonov was informed by the Russian ambassador in Italy that the Italian envoy at Bucharest was completely convinced Rumania would join Austria against Russia. Krupensky to Sazonov, 10 August/28 July 1914, Tsentrarkhiv, Tsarskaya Rossiya v mirovoi voine, with a preface by M. N. Pokrovsky, Vol. 1, Leningrad, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1925, p. 154, No. 17. [Hereafter cited as Tsar. R.]

20 In the last days of August 1914 Sazonov himself requested Russia's allies to avoid any action that might provoke the slightest suspicion on the part of the Romanians. See M.O., 6, Nos. 165 and 184, and p. 146, footnote 1.
the spot, arrived at the conclusion that under the then-existing conditions it would have been advisable for the Russian government to have first secured Rumania's neutrality.

On August 27, 1914, Poklevsky reported that the Rumanian king at a meeting with Diamandy, the Rumanian envoy who had come from St. Petersburg to Bucharest with the draft of the Russo-Rumanian convention, had pointed to the incompatibility of the proposed agreement with Rumania's alliance obligations toward the Central Powers as the circumstance hindering the acceptance of the Russian offer.21

A few days later the Russian envoy at Bucharest commented at some length upon Russo-Rumanian relations. In a report to Petrograd he argued that in view of Rumania's commitments to the Central Powers and the attitude of the Rumanian king, Rumania's neutrality policy had to be considered by Russia as a friendly act. Poklevsky expressed the opinion that it was hardly possible to induce Rumania to go to war against Austria-Hungary before further clarification of the military situation, or without such specific developments as Italy's entry into war on the side of the Entente Powers. He emphasized that, on the other hand, the continued German military successes and the very alluring offers of Russia's adversaries might facilitate efforts of the Rumanian king and other friends of the Central Powers in the country to draw Rumania into war against Russia.22 After reporting that the Rumanian leaders

21 See M.O., 6, p. 195, footnote 2.

22 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 1 Sept./19 Aug. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 204.

About the Rumanian commitments to the Central Powers and the political
expected some definite Russian promises in return for the neutrality of Rumania, and that certain prominent personalities as well as some organs of the Rumanian press alluded even to the cession of a part of Bessarabia to Rumania by Russia, Poklevsky notified the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs that Bratanu was interested in obtaining from Russia, France, and Great Britain, in exchange for Rumania's neutrality, a written pledge guaranteeing, in the event of final victory of the three orientation of the Rumanian king, Poklevsky had also written Sazonov earlier (e.g., on July 31 and August 12, 1914. M.O., 5, No. 365; 6, No. 82).

As early as August 2, 1914, Poklevsky reported that he had answered in the affirmative Bratanu's question whether Russia would regard the maintenance of neutrality by Rumania as a token of friendship (M.O., 5, No. 469). Poklevsky's view on the subject was shared by the French ambassador at London and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (M.O., 6, Nos. 78 and 79).

The policy of the Rumanian government of awaiting sufficient clarification of the military situation before entering the war was also noted by other members of the diplomatic corps at Bucharest. Cf. footnote No. 18.

The influence of the Italian policy upon the attitude of the Bucharest government was mentioned by Poklevsky in his reports dated August 4 and 28, and September 11, 1914, as well. M.O. 5, No. 552; 6, Nos. 180 and 248.


At the end of August 1914 the possibility of an attack by Rumania on Serbia was taken into consideration by the powers of the Triple Entente in their negotiations with Serbia concerning compensations for Bulgaria. See M.O., 6, No. 205.
powers and in case of a change in the then-existing equilibrium on the Balkan peninsula, the integrity of Rumania’s territory and compensations in the form of those Austrian provinces where the Rumanian population was in the majority. According to the report of the Russian envoy at Bucharest, the Rumanian Prime Minister remarked that “in such a document he would draw enough strength to withstand all attempts to seek the assurance of Rumanian interests by other means.” Finally, Poklevsky stressed the importance and advantages for Russia of the suggested understanding.23

Sazonov was not much impressed, however, by the arguments of the Russian envoy at Bucharest. After the rejection of the proposed offensive alliance by Rumania it was necessary, in the opinion of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to await further clarification of the military situation and, in the meantime, to continue the parleys with the Rumanian government without, at the same time, granting hastily any “concrete commitments in exchange for unproved promises.”24

Sazonov instructed Poklevsky to tell the Rumanian Prime Minister for the time being that Petrograd continued to be disposed very kindly toward Rumania and her interests, but that the answer to the suggested understanding could be given only after consultation of the Russian government with the governments of France and Great Britain.

A few days later the Russian envoy at Bucharest made another attempt to convince his superior of the advisability of concluding the proposed arrangement with Bratianu by which Rumania, for the maintenance of her neutrality, would have been promised the Austro-Hungarian provinces which had Rumanian majorities. Poklevsky also referred to assurances of the Rumanian Prime Minister that such an agreement would by no

23 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 2 Sept./20 Aug. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 209. The original text of the quotation in Russian.

In the first days of September 1914 the battle in Galicia was approaching its climax and on September 3, Lviv, the capital of Galicia, was taken by the Imperial Russian army.
means prevent Rumania from taking action against the Habsburg Monarchy if Rumanian interests required it.25

Soon thereafter, however, the Russian envoy at Bucharest submitted a new suggestion to Sazonov. On September 14, 1914, Poklevsky telegraphed to Petrograd:

It seems to me that it would now be useful and timely to propose confidentially to the Rumanian government that it occupy with Rumanian troops that part of Bukovina held by us which is populated by Rumanians. Even if she (i.e., Rumania) did not decide to accept our proposal, the latter would represent, nevertheless, new evidence of our friendly attitude toward Rumania and would dispel apprehensions existing here in some circles regarding our intention to annex to Russia the provinces of Austria-Hungary populated by the Rumanians.26

Another telegram sent by the Russian envoy at Bucharest to Sazonov on the same day disclosed why such a proposal seemed then to Poklevsky “useful and timely.” The Russian envoy reported that the news about the recent Russian and French victories resulted in an outburst of enthusiasm and mass demonstrations in Bucharest, and that the movement in favor of a war with the Habsburg Monarchy was supported by prominent figures of Rumanian society and by leaders of various parties.27


26 The original Russian text in Tsar. R., p. 160, No. 32.

27 See M.O., 6, p. 277, footnote 1.

On September 11, 1914, general retreat in Galicia was ordered by the Supreme Command of the Austro-Hungarian Army. See Conrad, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 702 f. By the middle of September 1914 the greater part of Galicia and most of Bukovina were occupied by the Imperial Russian armies.

One day earlier, on Sept. 13, 1914, the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest reported from Sinaia to Vienna: “Ministerpräsident (i.e., Bratianu) steht unter dem Eindrucke, dass unsere Situation in Galizien höchst ungünstig sei, und wollte Näheres von mir erfahren. Ich erklärte ihm, er befände sich im Irrtum, unsere Lage sei nicht so schlecht, wie er meine, und wir hätten allen Grund, voll Vertrauen in die Zukunft zu blicken. Trotzdem blieb Herr Bratianu bei seiner Auffassung und der Ansicht, dass unsere militärische Situation höchst kritisch sei.

Letztere Auffassung ist hier leider überhaupt sehr verbreitet. Die Stimmung uns gegenüber hat sich in ganz bedeutendem Masse verschlechtert, und die
Poklevsky's proposal was approved by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the text of a communication which was to be made to the Rumanian government was worked out at Petrograd. Since, however, in the event of Rumanian acceptance of the Russian proposal, the Rumanian troops would have come into contact with Russian forces in Bukovina, Sazonov wished to learn whether, from the military point of view, there were any objections to the suggested diplomatic step at Bucharest. He inquired, therefore, about the opinion held by the Russian General Headquarters. Meanwhile the Tsar approved the proposed diplomatic move at Bucharest, and also declared himself in favor of sending to the then-Russian-occupied capital of Bukovina an official of the Diplomatic Bureau, who was to be authorized to explain that the question of the future boundary was still to be examined, and that therefore the utmost caution had to be displayed in order, without predetermining anything, to inspire the Rumanians neither with undesirable apprehensions nor with excessive expectations.

On September 16, 1914, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs empowered Poklevsky to communicate to the Rumanian government the following declaration:


As early as September 6, 1914, the Russian ambassador at Constantinople informed Sazonov that the Russian victories in Galicia had made an “enormous impression” in Rumania. See Tsar. R., p. 158, No. 27.

28 Sazonov to Kudashev, 15/2 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 258.

The director of the diplomatic bureau at the Russian General Headquarters answered the following day that he the Commander-in-Chief agreed to the proposed diplomatic action at Bucharest provided wide-spread publicity were given to the fact that the Rumanian troops entered Bukovina at Russia's invitation. See “Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del,” Krasnyi Arkhiv, Vol. 26 (1928), p. 7, footnote 1. Excerpts from Kudashev’s answer telegram are published in M.O., 6, p. 252, footnote 4, but there the condition under which the Russian Commander-in-Chief agreed to the proposed Russian diplomatic step at Bucharest is inaccurately ascribed by the editor to Sazonov.

29 See M.O., 6, p. 252, footnote 3.
Having occupied a part of Bukovina, Russia has taken the first step toward the liberation of that province from the Austrian yoke, the liberation which unites the Russian and the Rumanian peoples in one desire. The Imperial Government, therefore, addresses the Royal Government anew with an invitation to join it in order to accelerate the accomplishment of this common task, and requests it to occupy on its part without delay southern Bukovina and Transylvania. The dislocation of the Russian and the Rumanian troops in Bukovina could be regulated by mutual agreement of commanders-in-chief of both armies, guided exclusively by considerations of purely military order, without prejudice to the subsequent delimitation of the territories, to which both Governments will proceed in due time on the basis of the ethnographic distribution of the population.30

By this statement the Imperial Russian government was officially implying its claim to that part of Bukovina which was predominantly inhabited by the Ukrainian population.

Various means were applied by Sazonov to induce Rumania to accept the Russian proposal. Efforts were made by him from the beginning to overcome doubts and hesitation on the part of the Bucharest government.

Anticipating the Rumanian concern about the possible Bulgarian threat to the rear of the Rumanian army, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Poklevsky, the day after the dispatch of the Russian offer, to explain at Bucharest that since the Austrian main forces had been destroyed, no considerable number of troops would be needed to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania and that, consequently, Rumania would be able to retain enough forces on her Bulgarian border.31

Having learned about rumors that the Viennese cabinet promised to grant Transylvania autonomy if Rumania took action against Russia, Sazonov instructed the Russian envoy at Bucharest to verify the accuracy of that information and, if it proved to be true, to point out to the Rumanians that Russia offered them not merely autonomy but the annexation of Transylvania.32

30 The original French text in M.O., 6, No. 263.
31 See M.O., 6, p. 257, footnote 2.
32 Sazonov to Poklevsky, 17/4 Sept. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 271.
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs also wished to avoid any needless misunderstanding which might have produced an unfavorable impression in Bucharest at that time. When a proposal suggesting the dispatch of the Russian troops into New Dobrudja became known at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov was anxious lest the Rumanians assumed that Russia intended to send her forces to Rumanian Dobrudja. He ordered Poklevsky on September 19 to declare to Bratianu that the idea, considered purposeless at Petrograd, had not originated there.33

Finally, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs initiated a new diplomatic action when the first news indicated that one of the principal factors restraining the Bucharest government from the acceptance of the Russian offer was Rumania’s fear of a Bulgarian attack.34 On September 21, Sazonov proposed that the following declaration be made by Russia, France, and Great Britain at Bucharest:

If the Rumanian Government, according to the offer made to it by Russia, France, and Great Britain, proceeds to the occupation of Transylvania and of the Rumanian part of Bukovina, the three Powers mentioned will use all their authority to prevent Bulgaria from an attack upon Rumania as long as the latter will make common cause with the three Powers in the present war against Austria-Hungary.35

In another telegram sent on the same day to Paris and London, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed himself in favor of a joint declaration at Bucharest and remarked that Rumania’s action, although of less importance than at the beginning of the war, would nevertheless definitively prevent Rumania from joining subsequently the Dual Monarchy, would draw off at least a small part of the Austrian forces for protection of Hungary, and might affect Italy.36

33 See M.O., 6, p. 280, footnote 2.
34 See Izvolsky to Sazonov, 20/7 Sept. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 285. Also Poklevsky to Sazonov, 19/6 Sept. 1914, Tsar. R., p. 161, No. 36.
35 The original text in French. See M.O., 6, No. 288.
36 See M.O., 6, p. 282, footnote 3.

Two days later, on Sept. 23, 1914, Izvolsky replied that Delcassé agreed with
Sazonov did not limit himself, however, to efforts aimed at overcoming by persuasion the doubts and hesitation of the Rumanian government, or to attempts directed at securing Rumania by diplomatic guarantees. Well informed of internal developments in Rumania, particularly about the outburst of enthusiasm there which followed the French and Russian military victories and about the growing movement among Rumanians in favor of a war with the Habsburg Monarchy, he decided also to exert pressure on the Bucharest cabinet. Immediately after the transmission of the Russian proposal requesting Rumania to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania, Sazonov, in the next telegram, instructed Poklevsky to give the Russian offer, if it were possible under local conditions, widespread publicity even if the latter had to be importunate. Suspecting a few days later that the Rumanian government was trying to conceal the Russian proposal, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs asked Poklevsky anew to give it the most extensive publicity. The Rumanian people and army had to know, Sazonov continued, that Russia, having created by her victories most favorable conditions for the realization of the old dream of the Rumanians, herself requested the Bucharest government to occupy, almost without effort, Transylvania and southern Bukovina, and that if Rumania failed to take advantage of this, the blame would fall exclusively on the Rumanian government.

III.

Yet all the efforts of the Tsarist government to induce the Bucharest cabinet to occupy at once southern Bukovina and

the formula as proposed by Sazonov. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs interpreted the expression “all their authority” in the sense of a moral pressure for, in his opinion, the allies could not have in mind any military action against Bulgaria. Ibid.

37 See M.O., 6, p. 257, footnote 2.
38 Sazonov to Poklevsky, 20/7 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 282.

Writing about the Russian offer, Diamandy remarked: “Cette communication, qui aurait dû demeurer secrète, fut intentionnellement colportée dans le public.” Diamandy, op. cit., p. 809.
Transylvania proved useless. On September 21, 1914, the Russian envoy at Bucharest reported that Bratianu declined the Russian offer. After Poklevsky had made the prescribed communication, the Rumanian Prime Minister, visibly excited, asked him to leave it in written form and promised to give an answer at Sinaia, alluding to the necessity of meeting the King. On the next day in Sinaia, Bratianu told the Russian envoy to thank the Imperial Government for its friendly proposal, but expressed the wish to let it remain open because an immediate acceptance of it would have been equivalent to Rumania’s declaration of war on Austria-Hungary, and Rumania could not take such a decision at the given moment.39

As a matter of fact, Poklevsky had given Petrograd to understand as early as September 19 that a negative reply by the Rumanian government to the Russian offer was to be expected.40 In spite of a powerful movement for active cooperation with the Entente Powers and continued violent demonstrations in Bucharest, the Rumanian Prime Minister was reported to have been convinced that the time for action had not yet come. He told the Russian envoy that for the time being he, Bratianu, could not assume the responsibility for an immediate entry of Rumania into the war and that, were public opinion to continue exerting a strong pressure on him through the manifestations, he and the liberal party would prefer to withdraw from the government. Notwithstanding the great victories of the Entente Powers at the Marne and in Galicia in the first half of September 1914, the Rumanian Prime Minister considered, according to Poklevsky, the general military situation still too complicated to involve Rumania in war.41 Another factor that,

39 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 21/8 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 289.
   The Bucharest government was not even willing at that time to prohibit completely the transit of military supplies and personnel of the Central Powers through Rumania to the then still neutral Bulgaria and Turkey. See M.O., 6, p. 287, footnote 1.
40 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 19/6 September 1914, Tsar. R., p. 161, No. 36.
41 Bratianu’s similar attitude two months later caused the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest to remark ironically that the Rumanian Prime Minister belonged to those “friends” of the Habsburg Monarchy “welche meinen, die Si-
in the opinion of the Russian envoy at Bucharest, influenced Bratianu's policy was the fear of a Bulgarian attack from the rear if Rumania were drawn into the European war. At the

tuation sei noch nicht reif, man müsse erst warten, ob wir (i.e., Austria-Hungary) wirklich geschlagen werden.” Czernin to Berchtold, 14 November 1914, Ö.-U. Rotbuch, No. 24.

42 Bratianu's preoccupation with Bulgaria was also mentioned by the Russian envoy two days later, on Sept. 21, 1914. Declining the Russian offer, the Romanian Prime Minister referred again to Bulgaria and argued that it was impossible for Rumania to wage war on two fronts, whereas retention of a considerable part of the Rumanian army to guard the Bulgarian border would make Rumania's assistance less valuable for Russia. See M.O., 6, No. 289.

On Sept. 15, 1914, the Russian envoy at Sofia reported that, in the opinion of his Rumanian colleague, Rumania could be secured against Bulgaria by a promise to cede the territory lost by Bulgaria to Rumania in 1913. See M.O., 6, p. 280, footnote 2.

Rumania was also threatened with reprisals by the Turkish fleet, reinforced by the German cruisers “Goeben” and “Breslau.” According to Pallavicini's report dated Sept. 22, 1914, the German ambassador at Constantinople declared to the Rumanian envoy on that day that if even a single Rumanian soldier crossed Transylvania’s border, the Turkish fleet would immediately destroy Constanta. See M.O., 6, No. 343.

According to Giers' telegram dated Sept. 30, 1914, and based on the information of the Rumanian envoy at Constantinople, the Bulgarian envoy at Bucharest was authorized to notify Bratianu that if Rumania opened hostilities against Austria-Hungary, Bulgarian troops would enter Dobrudja; the Turkish envoy at Bucharest was instructed to declare to Bratianu at the same time that in such a case Turkey would support Bulgaria with her troops. See Tsar. R., pp. 44-45, No. 84; also M.O., 6, No. 334. In a statement made by the Turkish envoy, Bratianu was told, according to Poklevsky's report dated October 2, 1914, that if any Balkan state entered the European war, Turkey would be forced to give up her neutrality. See M.O., 6, p. 346, footnote 3. The Turkish and Bulgarian steps were taken not without stimulation by the Central Powers. See Conrad, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 203.

In a decoded telegram transmitted by Giers to Petrograd on Oct. 4, 1914, the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople expressed the opinion that Bucharest had quieted down because of apprehensions about exposure, in case of Rumania’s action against Austria-Hungary, to an attack by Turkey and Bulgaria, particularly in connection with the appearance of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. See M.O., 6, p. 346, footnote 3.

The cruiser “Breslau” had gone to the Black Sea to carry out reconnoitering there on Sept. 20 and 22; the cruiser “Goeben” on Sept. 21, 1914. See Tsar. R., p. 44, No. 83 and p. 43, No. 82; M.O., 6, p. 292, footnote 3, and No. 336.
same time, the Rumanian Prime Minister was said to have believed that it was not possible to enter into confidential preliminary negotiations with Bulgaria because the contents of the parleys would have been immediately known at Vienna. But the main reason for Bratianu's hesitation in all probability was, in Poklevsky's opinion, the opposition of the Rumanian King.43

At the time when the Russian government was attempting to induce Rumania to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania, the Central Powers contemplated concessions in Bukovina and Transylvania for Rumania's active cooperation in the war against Russia.

When the Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest reported that Rumania would be ready to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers if the district of Suceava were ceded, the Supreme Command of the Austrian army spoke in support of the idea. On September 11, 1914, the very day when, at the suggestion of the chief of staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, the battle in Galicia was broken off and the general retreat ordered, a telegram was sent by Archduke Frederick to Francis Joseph asking the Emperor, in view of the then-existing military situation, to consent to the sacrifice of Suceava as a price


The following entry is given by Conrad v. Hötzendorf under the date September 19, 1914: "Rumänien. Einer Mitteilung des Vertreters des Ministeriums des Äussern Nr. 258 zufolge hatte König Carol auf den Vorschlag Bratianus, in die Bukowina einzumarschieren und die Russen 'hinauszuwerfen,' geantwortet: auf eine solche Proposition ginge er nicht ein, er hätte 'auch noch Ehre im Leib.' " Conrad, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 813. See also p. 768.

According to Schilling's telegram dated 24/11 Sept. 1914, the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd said after his return from Bucharest that for the time being the Rumanian government was not resolved to act against the will of the king. See M.O., 6, p. 227, footnote 2.
for Rumania's active cooperation against Russia.\textsuperscript{44} The scheme was said to have been also favored by the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and both Prime Ministers. Although Emperor Francis Joseph would have nothing to do with it since Rumania had not yet officially raised the question, he was reported probably not to have been disinclined to the idea once the suggestion was made.\textsuperscript{45}

Referring to the deterioration of the state of affairs in Rumania, the Austro-Hungarian military attaché at Bucharest reported on September 15 that, in the opinion of Count Czernin, not only could the situation be saved but even Rumania's active interference on the side of the Central Powers would be possible if a part of Bukovina were ceded to Rumania and immediate and far-reaching concessions granted to the Rumanians of Transylvania. The Austro-Hungarian envoy at Bucharest was said to have emphasized that he would no longer be able to vouch for the neutrality of Rumania if the suggested measures were not taken up.\textsuperscript{46} Two days later, the Austro-Hungarian military attaché reported on his talk with the Rumanian Minister of the Interior who had told him that, if the Rumanians of Transylvania were given the same rights as those to which the Rumanians of Bukovina were entitled, a radical change of feeling in Rumania would still be possible; this was to be done

\textsuperscript{44} The telegram is quoted in Conrad, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. 4, pp. 724-725.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., pp. 864 and 880.

\textsuperscript{46} The Austro-Hungarian military attaché added: "Was heute noch erreichbar, ist wahrscheinlich in kurzer Zeit unmöglich."

quickly, however, for otherwise it would be too late.\textsuperscript{47} Here-upon it was decided by the Supreme Command of the Austro-Hungarian army to send an aide-de-camp to the Hungarian Prime Minister in order urgently to recommend concessions to the Hungarian Rumanians.

In the meantime Germany stepped in advising her ally to seek to induce Rumania to active cooperation even at the price of satisfying the Rumanian demands within the Habsburg Monarchy and, if needed, by ceding the district of Suceava.\textsuperscript{48} Finally, on September 19, 1914, Freiherr von dem Bussche called on the Rumanian king with the mission to promise concessions to the Rumanians in Transylvania and to offer rectifications of the border in Bukovina. King Charles, however, declined the proposal, referring to the internal situation in the country.\textsuperscript{49}

As mentioned above, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs requested Poklevsky on September 17, 1914, to verify rumors that the Viennese government had allegedly promised to grant Transylvania autonomy if Rumania joined the Central Powers. The Russian envoy at Bucharest replied on September 22 that

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 790. See also p. 857.

\textsuperscript{48} Stürghk to Bolfras, September 19, 1914, Conrad, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. 4, p. 814.

\textsuperscript{49} The king remarked in his diary: "Je réponds (to von dem Bussche) que l'opinion est impossible, qu'on veut entrer en Transylvanie, etc. . . . et que Bratiano serait abandonné." Diamandy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 819.

Another unsuccessful attempt was made by Germany somewhat earlier, in the first days of September 1914, when Emperor William II urged King Charles of Rumania by telegrams to join the Central Powers. \textit{Ibid.}

When at the end of September an Austro-German offensive began in Poland, German military authorities pressed for a new effort to induce Rumania by most far-reaching concessions to active cooperation. Conrad, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. 4, p. 890. The suggestion was renewed by the Germans when Hindenburg's offensive between the Vistula and the Warta started in November 1914. It was asserted then that generous promises to Rumania and assurances of equal rights to the Rumanians in Hungary would presumably induce the Bucharest government to enter the war on the side of the Central Powers. In order to achieve that aim, General Hindenburg urged territorial promises to Rumania. The Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs was, however, of the opinion that not promises but military successes alone might bring Rumania to the side of the Central Powers. Conrad, \textit{op. cit.}, Vol. 5, pp. 472-473 and 486-487.
members of the Rumanian government had not revealed any information about promises given by Austria-Hungary for Rumania's armed cooperation; it was known to him, however, from a "completely trustworthy source" that a special statute for Transylvania and insignificant rectification of the border in Bukovina had been recently promised by the Austrian government.50

While the Central Powers were inclined to grant constitutional concessions in Transylvania and territorial ones in Bukovina if Rumania entered the war on their side, the Russian government was not even willing to discuss the possibility of cession of a part of Bessarabia in return for Rumania's immediate participation in the war against the Habsburg Monarchy.

As early as September 1, 1914, the Russian envoy at Bucharest notified Sazonov that certain Rumanian statesmen as well as some organs of the Rumanian press gave it to be understood that they expected the cession by Russia of a part of Bessarabia in exchange for Rumania's neutrality.51 A few days later, on September 7, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs transmitted to the ambassador of Great Britain at Petrograd a telegram from the British envoy at Bucharest, which was subsequently decoded at the Russian Foreign Ministry and in which it was reported that three indispensable conditions for Rumania's action against Austria-Hungary had been specified by the Rumanian Minister of Finance, one of them being the cession to Rumania by Russia of a part of Bessarabia.52

50 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 22/9 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 296.
51 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 1 Sept./19 Aug. 1914, ibid., No. 204.

The Rumanian envoy at St. Petersburg intended originally to attempt to regain, in exchange for Rumania's commitment to preserve neutrality, that part of Bessarabia which had been ceded to Russia in 1878. After returning in August 1914 to Rumania, however, he found that "le grand courant de l'opinion publique roumaine s'était déjà, très ostensiblement, déclaré hostile à la coopération avec les Puissances centrales et cette attitude gênait fort le jeu des combinaisons diplomatiques." He concluded that "La carte de notre (i.e., Rumanian) neutralité, trop tôt jetée par nous, rendait la Russie moins accessible à toute négociation concernant la Bessarabie." Diamandy, op. cit., p. 808.
52 See M.O., 6, p. 224, footnote 2. It seems to be correct to assume that in the decoded telegram reference was made to Bessarabia.
On September 11, the Russian envoy in Greece informed his government of the mission of Diamandy and Istrati who were passing through Athens on their way to Italy. According to Demidov, these Rumanian politicians were allegedly authorized to ask the British ambassador in Rome for an intervention of the London cabinet in order to induce Russia to the cession of a part of Bessarabia; they were to give assurance that in that case Rumania would immediately enter into the war on the side of the Entente Powers. \(^53\) Having received a copy of Demidov's telegram, the Tsar wrote on it on September 13: "Now we need the active participation of Rumania less than was the case at the beginning of the war." \(^54\)

\(^53\) See *M.O.*, 6, p. 259, footnote 1.

After several weeks the subject was actually broached by the British Prime Minister in a talk with the Russian ambassador at London. Emphasizing the importance of winning over Rumania, Asquith, according to Benckendorff's account, asked him whether the Russian government would consent to some slight rectifications of the border in Bessarabia in favor of Rumania after the war in which Rumania participated, and whether there existed any strategic arguments against it. At the same time the British Prime Minister stressed his increasing delight that in the solution of questions the Russian government was adopting the ethnological principle, the only principle considered by the British government to be a serious and lasting one. Finally, Asquith was reported to have remarked that such a splendid act of magnanimity would assure Russia in Europe a moral influence which was not to be underestimated. The Russian ambassador replied that as far as the strategic point of view was concerned, he was not able to express an opinion but that, in the case of which the British Prime Minister spoke, the ethnological point of view was at the moment doubtful. Benckendorff was ready to admit that each act of magnanimity always bore fruit; he added, however, that in this particular case the point in question was not only a territorial decrease, always a very serious and difficult matter, but also a place with painful reminiscences of the Crimean War, and that he had, therefore, doubts whether Russian public opinion would assent to it. Thereupon Asquith was said not to have insisted on his suggestion but to have emphasized once more the importance of accession of Rumania and Italy to the alliance. The Russian ambassador concluded his report by remarking that the idea of a rectification of the border of Bessarabia was not new either in England or in France, and that with regard to that point the British government cherished a hope which would contribute extraordinarily to the strengthening of the future relations between Russia and Great Britain. Benckendorff to Sazonov, 30/17 October 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 430.

\(^54\) The Tsar's remark in Russian. *M.O.*, 6, p. 259, footnote 1.
Somewhat later, on September 16, 1914, the Russian ambassador at Rome reported that on that day Diamandy and Istrati had paid him a visit. Allegedly with Bratianu's knowledge and the authorization of Take Ionescu, Filipescu, and the Romanian Minister of Finance Costinescu, they asked Krupensky to urgently notify his government that if Russia consented to return to Rumania the Bessarabian districts incorporated in 1878, Rumania would immediately declare war on Austria and send all five corps against her. The Rumanians first referred to the principles of ethics and justice, and then argued that it would be impossible for their country to go along with Russia without restoring the old border because the insult made to allied Rumania by the detachment of the specified districts was still alive. The Russian concession would, in their opinion, force the Rumanian king to consent to a war with Austria-Hungary. If the Russian government preferred to give the requested promise not directly to the Bucharest cabinet but through the British and French cabinets, this would satisfy Rumania too. Such a decision would be reported immediately to the Rumanian parliament and all Rumania would enthusiastically become a Russian ally, according to the assurances of the Rumanian statesmen. Krupensky informed Petrograd that he had refrained from comment and asked for a speedy answer, adding that, if Rumania went with Russia, Italy could not remain neutral and would immediately act against the Dual Monarchy too. Nicholas II remarked, however, on the margin of Krupensky's telegram on September 19: "I am against the cession to Rumania of even a strip of Russian land."55

In the opinion of Serbian diplomats, Russia's unwillingness to even enter into negotiations on the question of Bessarabia contributed to the decision of the Rumanian government to remain neutral.56

55 "Ya protiv ustupki Rumynii khotya by kloch'ka russkoi zemli." Krupensky's tel. and Tsar's comment in M.O., 6, No. 266.
56 The remark was made in a communication of the Serbian legation of 6. Oct./23 Sept. 1914. See M.O., 6, p. 444, footnote 1.
IV.

While declining the Russian offer of an immediate Romanian occupation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania, Bratianu was at the same time eager to obtain from Russia, France, and Great Britain a guarantee of Rumania's territorial integrity and a pledge that Rumania would be compensated with the Austro-Hungarian provinces, inhabited by the Romanian population, in exchange for the maintenance of neutrality by the Bucharest government. The Rumanian Prime Minister was reported to have emphasized that such an agreement would by no means preclude the active cooperation of Rumania in the future. On the other hand, Bratianu was said to have argued that violent manifestations for an immediate declaration of war on Austria-Hungary could lead only to such an internal upheaval in Rumania as would hardly be desirable or beneficial to the Russian government.

The Russian envoy at Bucharest favored the idea of securing Rumania's neutrality by giving the Rumanian government certain definite promises, since this would prevent, in his opinion, any fluctuations on the part of the Rumanians if the fortunes of war were to become more advantageous for Russia's enemies. Poklevsky suggested that if the Russian government considered Bratianu's wishes too excessive, a distinction be made between cooperation and neutrality, and Transylvania alone be promised for a written pledge by the Rumanian government to maintain neutrality until the end of the war. The Russian envoy at Bucharest did not share Sazonov's view that widespread publicity be given in Rumania to the Russian proposal requesting the Rumanian government to occupy at once southern Bukovina and Transylvania. Poklevsky reported

57 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 21/8 Sept. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 289.
58 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 26/13 Sept. 1914, ibid., No. 319. Bratianu's view was shared by Poklevsky.
59 See M.O., 6, No. 289.

The French envoy at Bucharest was against compensations for Rumania's mere neutrality. Ibid., Nos. 319, 324 and p. 323, footnote 2. In spite of Blondel's opposition, Poklevsky defended his point of view. Ibid., No. 319.
to Petrograd that he had made more prominent Rumanian politicians confidentially acquainted with the Russian offer, but that he regarded it as undesirable to spread news about it.\(^{60}\) In general it seemed to the Russian envoy at Bucharest advisable to act rather cautiously and to avoid anything which might have caused a split among the Rumanian parties. In Poklevsky’s opinion the Rumanian king could be forced to change his policy only under the combined pressure of representatives of all the Rumanian political parties, which differed merely on the question when to act against the Habsburg Monarchy.\(^{61}\)

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was, however, apparently displeased with Bratianu’s negative reply to the Russian proposal of an immediate Rumanian occupation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania. After receiving the news from Poklevsky, he ordered the Russian envoy at Bucharest to make clear to Bratianu that the Russian government was not asking, especially after the defeat of the Austrian army, for Rumania’s help but was merely requesting that it take what at the moment could be taken by Rumania without any effort. Therefore, Sazonov continued, nothing prevented Rumania from keeping a great part of her troops against Bulgaria; besides, a declaration of the three Entente Powers proposed by Russia would secure Rumania from a Bulgarian attack. Then the Russian Foreign Minister resorted to a threat. The three allied powers, he declared, had agreed that at the time of decision only those who participated in the common cause would have the right to a reward. Consequently, the wishes of the Rumanian Prime Minister appeared too exorbitant to Sazonov. In the opinion of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, the most that could be given the Bucharest government for its written pledge to maintain neutrality till the end of the war was a corresponding promise of the three Entente powers acknowledging Rumania’s right to the annexation of Transylvania, if no special military


In another telegram of the same day, Sazonov requested Poklevsky to take a step at Bucharest, conceived by the Russian Foreign Minister earlier but then postponed until Bratianu’s refusal to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania became known at Petrograd. The Russian envoy at Bucharest was ordered to make a presentation to the Rumanian government regarding the transit of German war matériel through Rumania to Turkey. At the same time Poklevsky was instructed to demand the Rumanian government’s permission for a free passage of military supplies through Rumania to Serbia.

While still on September 22, under the impression of unfavorable news from Bucharest, Sazonov threatened Rumania with losing the right to a reward after the war as a result of her neutrality policy, in the very next days thereafter he entered into negotiations over a Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement, thus abandoning his unsuccessful efforts to induce Rumania to seize at once southern Bukovina and Transylvania. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs did this, although both the French and the British governments were backing the Russian proposal of the Rumanian occupation of the territories mentioned, and in spite of a report of the Russian ambassador at London that Great Britain would not join Russia in promising Rumania Transylvania in return only for the country’s

62 Sazonov to Poklevsky, 22/9 Sept. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 291.
63 Sazonov to Poklevsky, 22/9 Sept. 1914, ibid., No. 293.
64 The Russian envoy at Bucharest was told to raise the question of the transit to Serbia with Bratianu, if needed, even single-handed. And, indeed, the British government hesitated to make to Rumania “from the point of view of international law two contradictory declarations.” Benckendorff to Sazonov, 23/10 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 303.
Sazonov was undoubtedly influenced by conversations he held with Diamandy, the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd, who had just returned from Rumania.

As early as September 23, the tone of a communication dispatched by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to Bucharest differed markedly from that of telegrams sent by him to Poklevsky on the preceding day. It became apparent at a meeting with the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd, Sazonov telegraphed, that there existed the conviction in Bucharest that in consequence of Rumania's refusal to act immediately against Austria-Hungary Russia was no longer inclined to consent to the annexation of Transylvania and southern Bukovina by Rumania. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs assured Diamandy that this conviction was erroneous and that Russia agreed as before to these territorial increases. The complete disinterestedness displayed thereby by Russia, Sazonov argued, should open the eyes of the Rumanian government as to the sincerity of Russian friendship and Russia's desire to establish lasting neighborly relations with Rumania in the future, as well. The Russian envoy at Bucharest was instructed to talk with the Rumanian Foreign Minister in the same rather conciliatory spirit.

On September 24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs called off the diplomatic action he himself had launched three days earlier. No longer expecting to induce the Rumanian government to an immediate open break with Austria-Hungary, he notified Paris and London of his wish to shelve the planned joint declaration of the three Entente Powers at Bucharest, de-

65 See Grey to Buchanan, 22/9 Sept. (M. O., 6, No. 294) and Benckendorff to Sazonov, 23/10 Sept. 1914 (ibid., No. 301), respectively. Cf. also Benckendorff to Sazonov, 28/15 Sept. 1914 (ibid., No. 329).

66 Sazonov to Izbolsky, 17/4 October 1914, Stieve, No. 229. Also Diamandy, op. cit., p. 810.

Sazonov mentioned a talk with Diamandy for the first time in a telegram dated 23/10 Sept. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 299. In a telegram dated 24/11 Sept. Schilling referred to Diamandy's return to Petrograd. Ibid., p. 277, footnote 2.

67 Sazonov to Poklevsky, 23/10 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 299.
signed to assure Rumania against a Bulgarian attack.\textsuperscript{68} Sazonov realized that the Russian government had invited the Bucharest cabinet to enter southern Bukovina and Transylvania at an inopportune moment, when Rennenkampf's army had suffered defeat in East Prussia, and expressed the opinion that this factor probably contributed to the Rumanian refusal to accept the Russian proposal.\textsuperscript{69}

The decision of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to secure at least Rumania's neutrality by promising Austro-Hungarian territories with a predominantly Rumanian population was made at the time when alarming news were arriving at Petrograd from Constantinople accompanied by disturbing reports about the situation in Sofia and Nish.

The dispatches from Constantinople spoke of the appearance of the cruisers "Goeben" and "Breslau" in the Black Sea.\textsuperscript{70} Upon receiving the news, Sazonov considered the situation on September 23, 1914 so serious that he recommended the preparation, without loss of time, of an insurrection of the Armenians, Aissorians, and Kurds against the Turks, a rebellion which was to take place in the event of a Russo-Turkish war.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{68} See \textit{M.O.}, 6, p. 282, footnote 3.

In the meantime the Russian ambassador in France reported in a telegram dated September 23, 1914, that Delcassé had approved Sazonov's draft of the declaration. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{69} The view was given in Sazonov's telegram to Kudashev dated 25/12 September 1914, \textit{M.O.}, 6, p. 284, footnote 1.

Sazonov was informed about the military situation, and was told particularly that the Russian victory over the Austro-Hungarian army was not sufficiently utilized and that Rennenkampf suffered defeat, by a letter of the director of the Diplomatic Bureau at the Russian General Headquarters, Kudashev, dated 18/5 Sept. 1914, \textit{Krasnyi Arkhiv}, Vol. 26, p. 5. Cf. Kudashev's letter to Sazonov dated 26/13 Sept. 1914, \textit{ibid.}, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{70} In a telegram dated September 21, 1914, the Russian ambassador in Turkey reported that the "Goeben" had entered the Black Sea; on September 22 he informed Petrograd about the voyage of the "Breslau" there. \textit{Ministerstvo inostrannykh del. Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov: Peregovory ot 19 iyulia do 19 oktyabrya 1914 goda predhestvovavshie voine s Turciyu, Petrograd, Gosudarstvennaya tipografiya, 1914, Nos. 57 and 58, respectively. [Hereafter cited as Sbornik.]

\textsuperscript{71} Klemm to Giers, 23/10 September 1914, \textit{M.O.}, 6, No. 298.
The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was fully aware that the appearance of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" in the Black Sea might easily lead to incidents resulting in a war with the Ottoman Empire. As early as September 10, 1914, he had instructed the Russian ambassador at Constantinople to warn the Grand Vizier that the dispatch of the cruisers to the Black Sea might give rise to grave complications.\textsuperscript{72}

The activity of the German Admiral Usedom, who arrived at Constantinople in the middle of September 1914 and soon thereafter became the General Inspector of the Coast Defense at the Dardanelles, was not reassuring either. On September 24 the Russian Foreign Ministry notified in an aide mémoire the British ambassador at Petrograd that the German admiral had inspected the Dardanelles and expressed himself in favor of the mining and closing of the Straits.\textsuperscript{73}

Sazonov had even more reason to be concerned with these developments in view of reports reaching Petrograd during the preceding three weeks that a landing on the Black Sea coast and, in particular, a descent upon Odessa was contemplated.\textsuperscript{74} The information based on secret sources and communicated by the Russian Foreign Ministry to the Ministry of Naval Affairs on September 13, 1914, indicated that the Turkish fleet might sail out of the Bosporus in order to cover a descent near Odessa or on the Black Sea shore of the Caucasus and that Germany pressed the Porte to land troops at Odessa and to advance from there towards Proskuriv.\textsuperscript{75}

While on September 21 and 22 the Russian ambassador at Constantinople reported the appearance of the "Goeben" and "Breslau" in the Black Sea, on September 23 he informed his government of rumors spread by the German embassy that Genadiev, the former Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs who

\textsuperscript{72} Sbornik, No. 49, and M.O., 6, No. 255.
\textsuperscript{73} M.O., 6, p. 340, footnote 2.
\textsuperscript{74} See Giers to Sazonov, 3 Sept./21 August (Stieve, No. 197), 10 Sept./28 Aug. (Sbornik, No. 47), and 24/11 Sept. 1914 (M.O., 6, No. 309). Also Pallavicini to Berchtold, 2 Sept./20 Aug. 1914, Tsar. R., p. 35, No. 64.
\textsuperscript{75} M.O., 6, p. 303, footnote 2.
had visited Turkey, was returning to Sofia accompanied by
the Bulgarian envoy at the Porte, with a draft of the Bulgarian-
Turkish agreement.\footnote{Tsar. R., p. 41, No. 75.} According to a communication dispatched
by Giers one day later, the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at
Constantinople telegraphed on September 15 that the neces­
sity to compel Bulgaria to take a definite stand was, in the
opinion of Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, the
main preoccupation at the given moment.\footnote{Giers to Sazonov, 24/11 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 309.}
On the following
day the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was notified of
the anxiety at Athens caused by reports that Bulgarian-Turkish
joint actions were allegedly being prepared.\footnote{Demidov to Sazonov, 25/12 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 314.}
Thus, the rumors about a Bulgarian-Turkish understanding
and the preparation of joint Bulgarian-Turkish actions fol­
lowed closely the news that the cruisers “Goeben” and “Bres­
lau” had been sent to the Black Sea and, obviously, could not
but add to the uneasiness at Petrograd. The possibility that
Bulgaria might join Russia’s adversaries had seriously to be
taken into account, after the failure of intensive efforts made
by Sazonov in August and early September 1914 to induce
the governments of Nish and Athens, in return for the terri­
torial expansion of Serbia and Greece at the expense of Austria-
Hungary and Albania, to agree to territorial concessions accept­
able to the cabinet of Sofia.

The situation in Serbia was at that time not encouraging
either. The Serbian army lacked ammunition. Referring to the

\footnote{On September 27, 1914, a report of the Russian military attaché at Sofia
was transmitted to Sazonov in which Romanovsky adduced evidence supporting
the rumors about a “complete accord” between Bulgaria and Turkey. M.O., 6,
No. 325.}
\footnote{The Turks were repeatedly reported unwilling to enter the war against
Russia without being assured as to Bulgaria’s attitude. E.g., Giers to Sazonov,
9 Sept./27 Aug., 28/15 and 29/16 September 1914, Tsar. R., p. 39, No. 72;
p. 42, No. 80; p. 43, No. 82; p. 44, No. 83.}
\footnote{The possibility of common Bulgarian-Turkish actions was hinted at to Sazo­
ov by Patev, the Bulgarian chargé d’affaires at Petrograd, on September 16,
1914, \textit{ibid.}, No. 264.}
urgent need of articles of war in Serbia, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed Poklevsky on September 22, 1914, to request the Rumanian government for permission to transit military supplies to the Serbs.79 On the same day the Russian envoy at Sofia was authorized to make a similar request to the Bulgarian government.80 The cabinets of Bucharest and Sofia, however, did not seem in a hurry to reply, and in the meantime the adverse news continued to arrive at Petrograd. On September 25 the Russian envoy at Athens reported that the shortage of artillery shells threatened to halt in a short time the military operations of the Serbian army; the Russian ambassador in France telegraphed that the French government would not be able for some time to deliver the needed shells to the Serbs.81

In view of all these developments Rumania's position assumed special importance. It was at this time that Sazonov became more susceptible to the idea of a Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement which was ardently espoused by the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd who had just returned from a trip to Rumania.82 Realizing that for the time being the Rumanian government was hardly to be moved to a hostile action against Austria-Hungary, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs gave up his efforts to induce the Bucharest cabinet to the immediate

79 M.O., 6, No. 293.
81 M.O., 6, No. 314, and p. 310, footnote 1.
82 Diamandy wrote on the subject:

"Je me rendais compte de l'importance que présentait pour la Roumanie un traité de neutralité conclu avec la Russie, garanti par la France et l'Angleterre et qui laissait mon pays libre quant au moment de son entrée en guerre; je savais également, par les instances de Jean Bratiano, combien il y tenait. Aussi mis-je toute mon ardeur à le mener à bien. N'eût-ce été qu'un point de vue professionnel, ce premier traité, négocié par moi, prenait à mes yeux un caractère passionnant.

J'entamai donc les pourparlers dès le lendemain de mon retour à Pétrograd, avec l'intention d'obtenir en échange de notre neutralité les mêmes conditions que la Russie eût voulu réserver uniquement à notre coopération militaire immédiate." Diamandy, op. cit., p. 810.
occupation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania, and entered into negotiations over a Russo-Rumanian neutrality pact. Sazonov was ready now to compensate the Rumanians with territories of the Dual Monarchy for the maintenance of Rumania's neutrality alone. By such an agreement he expected not only to secure Rumania's benevolent neutrality, but also to oblige the Rumanian government to put an end to the transit between the Central Powers and Bulgaria and Turkey as well as to the deliveries of Rumanian products to Austria-Hungary and Germany, on the one hand, and to obtain the permission of the Bucharest cabinet for the passage of military supplies through Rumania to Serbia, on the other.\footnote{See the draft of an annex to the Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement of October 1, 1914, M.O., 6, No. 341.}

V.

The conversations between Sazonov and Diamandy soon brought about the first positive results.

On September 25, just a few days after Diamandy's return to Petrograd, the Rumanian envoy informed his government of a statement made by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in which Sazonov declared that Russia wished to have at her frontier a satisfied and friendly Rumania, and aimed at the stabilization of relations among the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy on the basis of the principle of nationality. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs was said to have remarked that Rumania's military assistance was no longer necessary to Russia and that Rumania was called simply to occupy what was rightly to be hers, namely territories in Transylvania and Bukovina.\footnote{Diamandy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 810.}

The Rumanian Prime Minister was probably influenced by this telegram when on the next day he asked Poklevsky to convey his deep gratitude to Sazonov for the magnanimous appreciation displayed by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Rumanian national ideal and for future Russo-
Rumanian relations. Bratianu mentioned then the offer concerning Rumania’s neutrality, but the Russian envoy emphasized anew as he had done two days earlier that what the Rumanian Prime Minister referred to was to be considered rather as Sazonov’s personal opinion than as a formal offer. While reporting, however, his conversation with Bratianu to Petrograd, Poklevsky argued for negotiations with the Bucharest government on the basis of Rumania’s neutrality.\(^{85}\) The Russian envoy at Bucharest seemed as yet unaware of the rapid progress made in the negotiations between Sazonov and Diamandy.\(^{86}\)

It was on September 26, precisely on the day when this conversation between Bratianu and the Russian envoy at Bucharest took place and when the latter dispatched his report about it to Petrograd, that Sazonov sent to Poklevsky the following draft of a Russo-Rumanian agreement worked out by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs jointly with Diamandy:

> “Russia engages herself to recognize Rumania’s right to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Romanians. In Bukovina the principle of the majority of population will serve as a basis for the delimitation of territories to be annexed either by Russia or by Rumania. Rumania will be entitled to occupy these territories at a moment considered opportune by her. In exchange Rumania engages herself to observe until the moment when this occupation will take place a benevolent neutrality toward Russia.”\(^{87}\)

\(^{85}\) Poklevsky to Sazonov, 26/13 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 319.

\(^{86}\) After remarking that the Russian legation at Bucharest was “plus exigeante dans ses demandes et moins large dans ses offres que le chef du Pont-aux-Chantres dans ses pourparlers avec moi, à Petrograd,” Diamandy ascribed that attitude to “un excès de zèle” and asserted that the only aim of that policy was “d’empêcher le premier ministre roumain de calmer, par la perspective d’une neutralité fructueuse, les impatiences de l’opinion publique roumaine.” Diamandy, op. cit., pp. 810-811.

Actually, as the respective dispatches of the Russian legation at Bucharest to Sazonov reveal, Poklevsky supported Bratianu’s point of view and persistently endeavored to win Sazonov over to the idea of a Russo-Rumanian understanding based on Rumania’s neutrality.

\(^{87}\) The original French text in M.O., 6, No. 317.
The Russian envoy at Bucharest was instructed to submit the draft of the proposed agreement to Bratianu. It was suggested that, if approved by the Rumanian government, the agreement be signed at Petrograd by an exchange of notes between Sazonov and Diamandy.

The Imperial Russian government expressed thus explicitly its claim to the ethnically Ukrainian part of Bukovina.

The results of the negotiations at Petrograd must have been extremely welcome news to Bratianu who wished to report at a meeting of the Rumanian Crown Council to be held in the near future that it was possible to obtain compensations from the Russian government in return for Rumania's mere neutrality. By pointing to a conspicuous achievement of his neutrality policy, the Rumanian Prime Minister, notwithstanding an anti-Austrian sentiment and a strong agitation in the country for a war with the Habsburg Monarchy, could convincingly argue that for the time being it was more advantageous to Rumania to remain neutral.

Bratianu immediately empowered the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd to proceed with the exchange of notes but at the same time attempted to induce the Russian government to additional commitments as well as to territorial concessions. The Rumanian Prime Minister asked specifically that Rumania's frontiers be guaranteed and proposed that the boundary between the Russian and the Rumanian parts of Bukovina be drawn along the river Prut because that line would, in his opinion, make a stable border between the two countries and would allegedly correspond to the ethnic division of the province. Finally, Bratianu suggested that the agreement be kept secret until the time of its fulfillment.

88 See M.O., 6, No. 319.

At the meeting of the Rumanian Crown Council then planned, Rumania's neutrality was to be confirmed. Czernin to Berchtold, 28, 29, and 30 September 1914, Ö.-U. Rotbuch, Nos. 15, 16, and 17.

89 Poklevsky to Sazonov, 28/15 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 330.

In fact, however, the line of the Prut would have left the greater part of the Ukrainian ethnic territory in Bukovina on the Rumanian side.
On September 29 Diamandy called on the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and declared that he was authorized by the Rumanian government to sign the agreement. Yet at the last moment difficulties arose which almost caused the collapse of negotiations. At the Russian Foreign Ministry an annex to the note was worked out which, according to Sazonov's wish, was to be signed together with the main document. This supplementary note defined the Russian commitment to oppose any infringement of Rumania's territorial status quo as including a diplomatic but not a military action. On the other hand, it interpreted the "benevolent neutrality" to be observed by Rumania as including prohibition by the Bucharest government of any passage of military personnel through Rumania, as well as any export or transit of articles considered war contraband, to countries at war with Russia and her allies or to countries whose attitude in the conflict was still uncertain (i.e., to still neutral Bulgaria and Turkey); at the same time Rumania was, according to this interpretation of "benevolent neutrality," to grant all possible facilitation to the transit of war matériel and supplies from Russia to Serbia.

When Sazonov submitted to the Rumanian envoy the additional note, Diamandy flatly refused to sign what he called later "un véritable contrat de contrebandiers." The Rumanian envoy was reported to have been very much displeased and extremely excited because of this new Russian suggestion. Emphasizing in a talk with the director of the Chancellery of the Russian Foreign Ministry that Sazonov's proposal would make a most unfavorable impression at Bucharest and that it would be hardly acceptable to the Rumanian government, which consequently might be induced to give up the idea of an agreement with Russia altogether, Diamandy was said to have remarked that he himself would rather resign than sign such a document even if Bratianu were to approve it.

Eventually the deadlock was broken since both governments were interested in the conclusion of the agreement. The Rumanian Prime Minister was said to have been disturbed by the postponement of the planned exchange of notes at Petro-
grad. Pointing to the deterioration of the internal situation in Rumania, he pressed Diamandy to complete the negotiations. Sazonov also was anxious to bring the parleys to a successful end and decided, therefore, not to insist on the simultaneous signature of the proposed annex with the main note. The principal obstacle to the conclusion of the agreement was thus eliminated.90

In the meantime suggestions were made at the Russian General Headquarters that advantage be taken of the Russian military successes in the Carpathians in order to initiate new diplomatic actions. At first it was proposed that the Rumanians be informed of the advance of General Pavlov's troops into the then-Hungarian possessions and that Bucharest be urged anew to enter Transylvania.91

A few days later, in view of the rumors about a complete disorganization of the Hungarian units, which allegedly had escaped of their own will beyond the Carpathian Mountains in order to defend their country, another proposal was brought forward by General Yanushkevich. Guided by strategic considerations, he advanced the idea that an attempt be made to enter into an agreement with the Hungarian commanders. The Russians were to promise, according to the General's suggestion, not to advance into Hungary and the Hungarians were, in return, to withdraw their troops into the interior of the country in the direction of Transylvania. Since, however, such an understanding might have affected the negotiations with Rumania, Yanushkevich wanted to know the opinion of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject before entering into contact with the Hungarians.92

Sazonov strongly objected to the idea of negotiating an agreement with individual Hungarian commanders, persons without necessary authorization. He argued that, while not sufficiently securing Russia from the direction of Hungary, the

90 The episode is described in the Russian Foreign Office diary (M.O., 6, No. 353) and in Diamandy, op. cit., pp. 811-812.


92 Kudashev to Sazonov, 1 October/18 Sept. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 344.
proposed understanding might, on the other hand, do much harm to the Russo-Rumanian agreement which was being negotiated with some difficulty, and would, in addition, limit Russia's freedom of action in relation to Hungary in the future when questions concerning the Slavic population of the Kingdom of Hungary (i.e., of Transcarpathia, Slovakia, Croatia, and Banat) would be resolved.\textsuperscript{93}

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied to General Yanushkevich on the very day of the conclusion of the Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement. It was on October 2, 1914, at 3 P.M., that the exchange of notes between Sazonov and Diamandy took place at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Petrograd.\textsuperscript{94} Simultaneously it was decided that reservations of the Russian government regarding the interpretation of the Russian guarantee of Rumania's territorial integrity and regarding the interpretation of the "benevolent neutrality" to be observed by Rumania, would be communicated to Bratianu by Poklevsky.\textsuperscript{95}

The Russo-Rumanian neutrality agreement of October 1,

\textsuperscript{93} Sazonov to Kudashev, 2 October/19. Sept. 1914, ibid., No. 346.
\textsuperscript{94} See \textit{M.O.}, 6, No. 353, and Diamandy, \textit{op. cit.}, p 812.
\textsuperscript{95} On October 3 Poklevsky was instructed by Sazonov to make the corresponding statements to Bratianu. \textit{Tsar. R.}, p. 167, No. 44. Before the Russian envoy at Bucharest succeeded in carrying out the mission entrusted to him, however, serious complications developed. See \textit{M.O.}, 6, Nos. 366 and 371, and p. 381, footnote 4.

The Rumanian Prime Minister did not agree with the interpretation of Rumania's "benevolent neutrality" as defined in Poklevsky's written statement, and refused to accept the note of the Russian envoy. He even authorized the Rumanian envoy at Petrograd to declare that the Russo-Rumanian agreement would not be considered as accomplished if the Russian government insisted on the acceptance of Poklevsky's note. Finally, in accordance with a compromise solution which had been worked out at Petrograd, the interpretation of the nature of the Russian guarantee of Rumania's territorial status quo was communicated to Bratianu by Poklevsky in writing, and the Russian interpretation of Rumania's "benevolent neutrality" was explained by the Russian envoy at Bucharest orally. Poklevsky's statement was followed by the corresponding oral assurances of the Rumanian Prime Minister. See the Russian Foreign
1914, included text of the draft dispatched by Sazonov to Poklevsky on September 26 almost *in toto*, with only some minor changes in wording.96 At the same time, it met most of Bratianu's wishes as communicated to Petrograd by Poklevsky on September 28.97 Thus, according to the agreement concluded, the Russian government recognized Rumania's right "to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Rumanians" at a moment chosen by the Bucharest government which, in return, committed itself to observe until the day of the occupation of those territories a "benevolent neutrality" in relation to Russia. In addition, the Russian government obliged itself to oppose any violation of the *status quo* of the then-Rumania's territory, as desired by the Rumanian Prime Minister. Another of Bratianu's wishes was met by a provision to keep the understanding secret until the time of the annexation of the above-mentioned territories by Rumania.

Only on the question of the future Russo-Rumanian delimitation in Bukovina, the Rumanian Prime Minister had to give up his ambition with regard to the frontier along the river Prut. Both the draft sent by Sazonov to Poklevsky on September 26 and the final text of the agreement contained the following clause: "That which concerns Bukovina especially [in the draft of September 26: 'In Bukovina'] the principle of the majority of population will serve as a basis for the delimitation of territories to be annexed either by Russia or by Rumania." Moreover, the final text of the Russo-Rumanian neutrality

Office diary, 14/1 October 1914, and Poklevsky to Sazonov, 17/4 October 1914, *M.O.*, 6, Nos. 389 and 394, respectively.

Yet the question of Rumania's "benevolent neutrality" remained a controversial problem. Cf. *M.O.*, 6, Nos. 402 with attached footnotes and 405. Dissatisfied with the policy of the Rumanian government, Sazonov was reported even to have been contemplating at one time the possibility of making a statement to the Bucharest cabinet that the three Entente Powers would retract their freedom of action concerning an eventual annexation of southern Bukovina and Transylvania by Rumania. Paléologue to Delcassé, 22 October 1914, *M.O.*, 6, No. 408.

96 The text of this draft has been quoted above, p. 1620.
97 See above, p. 1621.
agreement specified the procedure by which the future delimitation in Bukovina was to be brought about: "This delimitation [i.e., in Bukovina] will be effected on the ground of special studies on the spot. With this aim a mixed commission will be named provided with instructions which will be inspired by the spirit of conciliation that animates both Governments."  

The Russo-Rumanian understanding of October 1, 1914, also included the pledge of the Petrograd government to engage in securing the ratification of obligations of the agreement by the British and French cabinets. Accordingly, the Russian ambassadors at Paris and London were instructed on October 17 to inform the French and British governments of the Russo-Rumanian understanding and to express the hope that France and Great Britain would not refuse their consent to the future occupation of Transylvania and southern Bukovina by Rumania alone, without any help of the Entente Powers.  

The consent of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was reported immediately on the following day. Delcassé concurred, although somewhat earlier the French envoy at Bucharest was reported to have been opposed to the idea of compensating Rumania in exchange for a mere commitment of the Rumanian government to maintain the country's neutrality.

98 The original French text of the quotation is as follows: "Pour ce qui a trait spécialement à la Bukovine [in the draft of September 26: 'Dans la Bukovine'] le principe de la majorité de la population servira de base à la délimitation des territoires à annexer soit par la Russie, soit par la Roumanie. Cette délimitation sera effectuée à la suite d'études spéciales sur les lieux. Une commission mixte sera nommée à cet effet, munie d'instructions qui s'inspireront de l'esprit de conciliation qui anime les deux gouvernements."

99 Stieve, No. 229.

100 See M.O., 6, p. 361, footnote 1.

Two days later, on October 20, 1914, the Russian ambassador at London notified Sazonov of Nicolson's promise to inform Grey on the subject.

101 Cf. footnote No. 59.

Also the French ambassador at Petrograd was critical of the Rumanian policy of Sazonov who "somewhat imprudently" agreed to confirm in writing the Russian pledges to Rumania. Paléologue to Delcassé, 22 October 1914, M.O., 6, No. 408.
As far as Russia was concerned, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had even earlier assured the Russian ambassador that France, naturally, agreed in advance to the Russian territorial claims which were determined in general outline.\textsuperscript{102}

The claims of the Imperial Russian government concerning Bukovina met with no opposition in London either. The projected delimitation on the ground of ethnic distribution of the population corresponded to the reported wishes of the British government to settle territorial questions in Europe after the end of the war according to the ethnographic principle, which was said to have been considered at that time by the London cabinet as the only effective basis for a lasting peace.\textsuperscript{103}

As to the Rumanian claims, the British government already had declared in early August 1914 that it had no objection to the cession to Rumania of the Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by the Rumanian population, as was proposed then by Russia in exchange for Rumania's active cooperation in the war against the Central Powers. At that time the London cabinet also expressed its willingness to support by diplomatic means the territorial integrity of Rumania.\textsuperscript{104} When in the middle of September the Russian government requested the Bucharest cabinet to occupy southern Bukovina and Transylvania, the British Foreign Secretary authorized the British envoy at Bucharest to support his Russian colleague if asked to do so.\textsuperscript{105} Several weeks later the Russian ambassador at London reported that the British government attached great importance to the participation of Rumania in the war on the side of the Entente Powers. The British Prime Minister even inquired whether the Russian government would assent to some frontier rectifications in Bessarabia in favor of Rumania.

\textsuperscript{102} Izvolsky to Sazonov, 13 Oct./30 Sept. 1914, M.O., 6, No. 385.

\textsuperscript{103} Benckendorff to Sazonov, 28/15 September and 30/17 October 1914, ibid., Nos. 329 and 430.

\textsuperscript{104} See chapter 1, p. 1591 ff.

\textsuperscript{105} Grey to Buchanan (Petrograd), September 22, 1914, M.O., 6, No. 294.
if Bucharest joined the allies in the war against the Central Powers.106

When, however, Sazonov at one time suggested that the three great powers of the Entente should recognize Rumania's right to annex the Austro-Hungarian territories in return only for a written pledge of the Bucharest cabinet to preserve neutrality until the end of the war, the Russian ambassador at London expressed doubt as to whether in such case Great Britain would join Russia in assuming the proposed obligations.107 A few days later Benckendorff again emphasized that the British government could be expected to support the Rumanian claims to the Austro-Hungarian territories provided Rumania took up arms on the side of the Entente.108

VI.

Although the question of Bukovina became an object of international negotiations in the very first days after the outbreak of the general European war in 1914, the name of Bukovina was at first not mentioned in the diplomatic acts and correspondence. In the first phase of the negotiations between the Entente Powers and Rumania references were made to territories of Austria-Hungary inhabited by the Rumanians in general terms, without specifying those areas which included a part of Bukovina. One month later, however, the name Bukovina began to appear rather frequently in various diplomatic communications of that period.

In early August 1914 the Entente Powers offered Rumania, for Bucharest's active cooperation in the war against the Dual Monarchy, the Austro-Hungarian lands with predominantly Rumanian population, including the ethnically Rumanian part of Bukovina. In the middle of September 1914, after a great part of Bukovina, with the capital of the province, had been conquered by the Imperial Russian army, the offer was renewed by the Petrograd government, which requested then that Rumania occupy immediately southern Bukovina and

106 Cf. footnote No. 53.
107 Benckendorff to Sazonov, 23/10 September 1914, M.O., 6, No. 301.
108 Benckendorff to Sazonov, 28/15 Sept. 1914, ibid., No. 329.
Transylvania. Shortly thereafter, however, in the Russo-Romanian neutrality agreement of October 1, 1914, the Tsarist government agreed to recognize Rumania's right to annex the regions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy inhabited by the Rumanians in exchange only for Bucharest's benevolent neutrality during the war.

In the negotiations with Rumania, Petrograd advanced first implicitly and then explicitly its claim to the ethnically Ukrainian part of Bukovina since the Tsarist government considered Ukrainians (Little Russians in the official Russian terminology of that time) as but a part of the Russian people. The claim of the Petrograd government met with no opposition in Paris or London.

The question of the Russo-Romanian delimitation in Bukovina was not raised until the middle of September 1914. In its communication of September 16, 1914, to the Bucharest cabinet the Imperial Russian government suggested that the future boundary in Bukovina be determined according to the ethnic distribution of the population. The principle of the ethnic majority of the population was recognized as a basis for the delimitation in Bukovina in the Russo-Romanian neutrality agreement of October 1, 1914, in spite of the suggestion of the Rumanian Prime Minister to draw the Russo-Romanian border along the river Prut, a delimitation which would have resulted in leaving on the Rumanian side the greater part of the Ukrainian ethnic territory in Bukovina.

Bukovina was not only an object of negotiations between the Entente Powers and Rumania in the summer and autumn of 1914. As a consequence of an unfavorable military situation on the Russian front, the Central Powers were inclined in September 1914 to certain territorial concessions in Bukovina in favor of Rumania, contemplating especially to cede the district of Suceava as a price for Rumania's active cooperation in the war against Russia.

Bukovina thus became an important factor in the diplomatic struggle between the Central Powers and the Entente for Rumania's adherence to their respective causes.
The institutions of government and of the national community (which succeeded the tribal community) are two major facts of mankind's social existence. Historically the state preceded the nation. Some form of political authority and organization has been found wherever human life existed. Such an organization has not always coincided or coalesced with the tribal and, later, national community. The ancient Greek city-state was much smaller than the Greek cultural tribal-national community. The old Roman Empire was considerably larger than the city-state of the Romans from which it evolved. The feudal country-states in the Middle Ages were all multi-tribal. Not until the fifteenth through the eighteenth century were nation-states formed in Western European lands on the basis of cultural association and political consolidation of the multi-tribal population.

Some form of clearly perceptible group-consciousness has been found wherever communities have existed. There has been something akin to modern national self-consciousness ever since men realized that there were many things binding them into a close-knit unit and separating them from other men. Linguistic and racial, religious and cultural differences, varying modes of living were always felt strongly, though with changing emphasis. This always tended to cultivate loyalty to one's own group as well as antagonism to outsiders. However, this primitive tribalism or, in the more developed communities of the ancient Egyptians, Jews, Greeks, Romans, and later, the English, French, Spaniards and the Czechs, the historic nationalism occurred briefly and irregularly. Only in the course of the above-mentioned formation of nation-states in Western Europe did true modern nationalism emerge, first cultural only, and then political. Broadly speaking, it ascribed to national character and loyalty a high place in the hierarchy of human values. Consequently, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
sometimes called the Age of Nationalism, the idea became widespread that every self-conscious national community had a right to national self-government (or self-determination), at least under certain conditions, and to consolidation of and increase in the power of its nation-state (national sovereignty). All nations should be permitted to work out their own problems, free from interference from without, and, in the case of subject nations, even to secede from the states to which they belong.

John Stuart Mill expressed this view in his celebrated *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861):

> Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a *prima facie* case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. This is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. One hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves. But, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still more vital consideration. Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. . . .

> For the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities.1

This “modern theory of nationality,” that is, of the nation-state, was opposed by Lord Acton who, instead, propounded in his essay on “Nationality” (1862) a conception of the “co-existence of several nations under the same state.” He predicted that, on the one hand, the tendency to identify state and nation would lead to political absolutism (“the State becomes . . . inevitably absolute”), and, on the other hand, when an established state included several different nationalities the “ruling nation” would try to reduce “practically to a subject condition all the other nationalities that may be within the [state’s] boundary.”2


There is sufficient historical evidence to prove Lord Acton's farsightedness about the solipsistic, often destructive and aggressive aspects of nationalism. Yet its cooperative and constructive aspects prompt several leading contemporary thinkers to accept nationalism, if checked and properly channelled, as the idea upon which a just and stable international order of the world might rest. The great democrat, scholar and statesman Thomas G. Masaryk once affirmed that "mankind is a sum of nations, it is not something outside the nations, and above them," *(On Thought and Life: Conversations with Karel Capek).*

II

It is customarily believed that modern nationalism is a child of the French Revolution, which proclaimed grand principles of Liberty, Fraternity and Equality, assimilated to these ideals the love of one's country, and thus created new concepts of a popular state, a political nationalism and a self-governing nation. In retrospect and considering the global aspects of nationalism it would probably be more correct to consider this nationalism a product of the late eighteenth-century revolutionary era in general, keeping in mind the influence not only of the French Revolution but of the American Revolution as well.

There is a substantial difference between the two revolutions though they occurred at almost the same period and with the

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same idea of liberation. The French Revolution undertook to liberate the French people from tyrants in the name of the rights of man, not of nations. Its first aim was to change the system of government of the established state. The revolutionary masses of the French people, their ideologists and their leaders demanded that political institutions of the state be reformed and that the ruler should be their agent, not their master. Initially only an attack upon the political order of the French state, the Revolution quickly evolved not only into a smashing assault upon the native aristocracy with its privileges and monopolization of property and power, but also into an inflammatory advocacy of social transformation, political democracy and the collective rights of a nation, which soon transcended the boundaries of France. Professor Hayes writes:

the French Revolution promulgated to Europe and then to the world the dogma of national democracy. It asserted the rights of individuals not only to determine their form of government but also to choose the state to which they would belong. In other words, it enunciated both the doctrine of popular sovereignty and the doctrine of national self-determination.\(^6\)

It is noteworthy that there has been a close connection between revolutionary democracy and modern nationalism. The French Revolution introduced the new concept of human rights and of the role of the individual citizen in the political system of the state. It was a new social approach to the problem of relations between people and government.

The French Revolution created neither the new state nor the new nation. Yet its ideals affected and continue to affect the transformation and development of many states and nations. It gave a stimulus to rebuild many nations, but only if there already existed the matrix of an independent state government. It was able to inspire people to change the internal order of the existing states, but, in fact, it could only with difficulty remove the authoritarian ingredients of the old established states. These gradually corrupted, in several cases, the democratic and hu-

\(^6\) Hayes, Essays . . . , p. 44.
manitarian, progressive and cooperative, "Mazzinian" elements of European nationalism and, instead, developed authoritarian, exclusive and aggressive elements. It seems that the state always preserves, in spite of changes and reforms, the astounding stability of the country's fundamental traditions, which manifestly override all differences in the activity of parties and classes. This is why "both the Jacobins and the Bolsheviks," the most ardent followers of the French Revolution's governmental system, "in certain respects continued the traditions of the regimes which they had set out to exterminate."

The nationalism of the American Revolution is an essentially different phenomenon. Socially if not politically, its aims were moderate, but its achievements considerable and stable. The French Revolution aimed at the annihilation of the ancien régime with its reigning socio-political sentiments and values, tendencies and arrangements.

The forces behind the American Revolution did not aim to reform a state but to build one. There was no hatred against the institutions, even against the monarchy, of the mother-country, as there was in France. There was no desire to exterminate any class or group, to disrupt existing property relations or to change drastically the distribution of power. The Americans wanted to build a new and independent state, where the whole people, all inhabitants, would be equally interested in the building and development of a new national state-community, sharing in the fruits of future success. They cherished

7 As early as 1862 Lord Acton envisaged the emergence from the French Revolution of totalitarian nationalism, which propounds the theory of a nation "founded on the race" and sacrifices citizens' "several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of nationality, and crushes all natural rights and all established liberties"; see Acton, op. cit., p. 184. Cf. Hans Kohn, American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay, New York: Macmillan, 1957, p. 94. Prof. Bowie (op. cit., pp. 12, 45) differentiated between the "Mazzinian" and the "Treitschkean" aspects of the nationalist idea which "coexist in an increasingly dangerous world."

the English tradition of constitutional liberty, and on the basis of their rich experience in popular, at least local and provincial, self-government they created a stable and vigorous national democracy. Whereas in French nationalism and democracy individual liberty tended to become obscured, if not wholly nullified as in totalitarianism, by the claims of national corporate freedom and, even more, of national power and expansion, in American nationalism the principle of individual liberty did not lose its elevated place. This is so because American nationalism identifies itself not only with the idea of individual liberty, as English nationalism does, but also with the multiple, primarily federal, character of the national community of the United States.

The formation of the American nation and the growth of American nationalism in its early phase is closely connected with the very disparate ideas and lives of two great men: Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Hamilton was concerned chiefly with the establishment of a strong central government; he distrusted the political wisdom of the people and his nationalism was based on an economic rather than a popular foundation. In fact, he favored a monarchy, though he despaired of introducing it in America. He considered the British system of government the best in the world, but he found that government unacceptable for America, because it revealed itself by its action as a foreign power, which could not be tolerated on American soil. Jefferson, on the contrary, was primarily concerned with the liberties and happiness of common men. Yet, he was also so much interested in the creation of one consolidated American nation that "it may be a little disturbing to Jefferson's enemies as well as to some of his fol-

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9 One prominent writer emphasizes the fact that England was the first country to work out a practicable system of all-national self-government and develop social habits which made the working of the "machinery" of self-government possible. Ramsay Muir, National Self-Government, London: Constable, pp. 10, 34.

10 See Kohn, American Nationalism, p. 135.

lowers,” asserts one author, “to discover that he was so nationalistic.”

The revolutionary character of American nation-making lies not only in the founding of a new national state but also in the practical approach to the solution of a fundamental problem—how to build a strong nation-state quickly and successfully. Theoretically there was no doubt in the minds of Jefferson and the majority of those who signed the Declaration of Independence that the best way to succeed would be by way of pure democracy. However, the establishment of an efficient democracy has necessarily to meet with practical difficulties, one of them being the distribution of political power and the other, the problem of making competent decisions in a national community. During the debate on the federal constitution, Hamilton posed a fundamental question:

If government [is] in the hands of the few, they will tyrannize over the many; if in the hands of the many, they will tyrannize over the few. It ought to be in the hands of both; and they should be separated. This separation must be permanent.

The fears of Hamilton had been partly removed by Jefferson’s interpretation of the doctrine of majority rule. Jefferson committed himself to this Lockean principle: the “absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority” was a “vital principle of republics,” he declared in his first Inaugural Address, March 4, 1801. However, as an ardent supporter of popular rule, Jefferson was also anxious to safeguard the rights of minorities:

This sacred principle, that though the will of majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable; that the minority possess their equal right, which equal laws must protect, and to violate which would be oppression.

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Commenting on the governmental powers of a popular representative assembly, Jefferson stated his view that

... one hundred and seventy-three despots would surely be as oppressive as one.... An elective despotism was not the government we fought for, but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.15

The subsequent history of the United States confirmed and justified the wariness, shared by both Hamilton and Jefferson, about the doctrine of majority rule. More than that, the United States having thoroughly assimilated the other democratic principle of toleration, has evolved a truly modern constitutionalism (including first of all the two-party system) which secures the rights of the popular majority and simultaneously protects those of minorities. On the basis of these creative principles a new state was built which could develop without any burdening inheritance from the past. It was not only the birth of a new nation, it was the beginning of modern nationalism.

The spirit of American nationalism, well tried in peace and war, might well enrich, or be blended with, other forms of humanitarian nationalism, and be practiced—as a truly modern nationalism—on a world-wide scale.

III

It may sound flatly paradoxical, or seem like wishful thinking, to emphasize purely political American nationalism among all the attempts to channel the nationalist emotions and forces not only toward the emancipation of nations but also toward a peaceful and cooperative international order.

For the followers of Count de Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, whose creed of racial purity and supremacy of the Nordic race inspired Hitler, the American nation is a bitter disappointment and American nationalism an inferior nation-

15 "Notes on the State of Virginia" ibid., p. 132.
alism, if, indeed, it is a nationalism at all. From the racialists’ point of view the Americans are a nation of mongrels deserving of disdain and subjugation. Hitler, with his primitive tribal-racist ideological approach, wanted to conquer the whole world in order to set up the domination of the “superior” German race, the *Herrenvolk*. But the racist theory is now antiquated. It will never regain its vital spirit because the intranational as well as global migration cannot be stopped and agelong mixing of races cannot be prevented. The American experiment of “mixing,” of integrating various racial-ethnic groups has proved successful and, consequently, the present prominent role of the American people in world affairs is incontrovertible. It is true the American nationalism does not seem full-fledged, nor worthy as an example, even to all those who, if not racialists in the strict sense of the term, regard ethnic descent, linguistic affiliation and, sometimes, religious or cultural association, as the only valid characteristics of a nation. However, their nationalism is only a revival of the old tribalism, wholly unmodern and as unscientific as the doctrine of racism itself. Certainly, common language, culture, religion and ethnic descent are important in determining the membership of men in a specific group or even in a cultural “nationality,” that is, in a group of persons speaking the same language and observing the same customs.16 Such a group might sometimes develop a truly national spirit and look upon itself and be regarded by others as a nation, but only if its self-consciousness transcends religious, ethnic and even linguistic limitations. There are many definite ethnographic groups which are not and do not regard themselves as nations.17 They obviously lack the will to exist and to grow as separate nations.

Ernest Renan affirms in the celebrated address “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” (1882) that, properly speaking, what constitutes a nation is not the use of the same tongue or belonging to the same ethnic group.

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which are really only one, go to make up this soul or spiritual principle. One of these things lies in the past, the other in the present. The one is the possession in common of a rich heritage of memories; and the other is actual agreement, the desire to live together, and the will to continue to make the most of the joint inheritance.\(^{18}\)

The question of belonging to a nation became an affair of the mind or spirit rather than of physical relationships. "The only way to decide whether an individual belongs to one nation rather than another," according to one scholar (who, however, neglects the politico-legal aspect of the problem), "is to ask him."\(^{19}\)

The modern concept of a nation and nationalism outgrows the incipient phase of its development, the period when its content depended exclusively on language and race, religion and culture. In this newer concept the notion of a multi-group population comes to the fore, living within a definite territory and possessing a common stock of thoughts and feelings, acquired and transmitted during the course of a common history by a fairly discernible common will.\(^{20}\) American nationalism identifies itself with the multiple character of the United States with respect to the national, racial and religious descent of its people and the composite political structure; and it combats the anti-national, racist and other antagonistic tendencies of some regions and sections of the population. Switzerland is another example of a modern, not only multi-group but also multi-lingual, nation. The people of India are comprised of many different tribes who speak different languages, who are of different racial descent and follow different religious faiths. But they all form one Indian nation. A similar situation exists in many other countries, and there the experience of American nationalism may be utilized. Certainly there are many coun-


\(^{20}\) Snyder, op. cit., p. 54.
tries where the population is much more uniform, especially with respect to the national language; in such countries the experience of American nationalism may be put only to limited practical use. Yet, the spirit of civic tolerance of American nationalism, its principle of individual liberty and its willingness to engage in international cooperation should be appreciated and properly adopted.

Truly modern nationalism represents territorial nationalism. It accepts the multi-group character of a national community and fosters the spirit of common national allegiance and solidarity; yet it safeguards for each member of the nation his right, individually or in community with others, to foster the habits and traditions of his profession, faith or language. It aims by disintegration of artificial political bodies to consolidate the nation internally or to establish or to restore, as the case may be, the self-governing nation-state. Finally, it works for the close cooperation of the nation-states in international organizations.

The widest possible dissemination of this concept is of the utmost importance. Much too often the masses, grown up and educated in conditions of narrow-minded tribalism or old-fashioned nationalism, are not easily receptive to the idea that the entire state-community is the legitimate bearer of the title of Nation, and not a majority group of common ethnic or religious origin only. Much too often such a group stubbornly opposes the emancipation of the members of minority groups and the extension of their exclusive privileges for social and political control. But this is exactly what cannot be reconciled with the spirit of our age and the concept of truly modern nationalism. People who ignore the development of this broad-minded multi-group nationalism in the last half-century and continue to associate themselves with the old-fashioned, ethnocentric nationalism, manifest their political immaturity and inability to keep pace with the social changes of mankind.
In the nineteenth century the growth of nationalism was confined only to certain regions of the world. In the twentieth century it is a truly ubiquitous phenomenon.

In this “age of nationalism” many peoples of the world became conscious of their nationhood and claimed their right not only to be ethnographical but also to be organized politically. From Western Europe and North America this phenomenon spread to neighboring countries and other continents; now it is truly universal. Wherever a self-conscious national community exists the demand for national self-government is voiced incessantly; there is, in Lord Acton’s famous phrase, “a soul, as it were, wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again.”

The realization of the idea of self-government of nations or of emancipation of peoples who have had no states of their own has been encountering many obstacles. These obstacles are set either directly by the states which exercise sovereignty in territories claiming independence and are unwilling to accept such self-determination and secession, or they result indirectly from lack of interest on the part of other states which are not concerned directly with the national aspirations of claimants. Lacking understanding that unsolved or unsatisfactorily solved conflicts among nations endanger the prospects of international peace and cooperation, the latter states do not support these claims for national self-government.

The idea and practice of national self-government has developed in a peculiar manner. The idea itself gained almost general acceptance, though not without effective opposition, but its practical realization was far from being orderly. The programs for national self-determination were discussed and proclaimed by many; they were often used and very often abused. Several new nation-states started to suppress their own national minorities as soon as they themselves were liberated.

21 Acton, op. cit., p. 171; [discussion of the Polish quest for freedom after Poland’s partition].
Big and powerful states have tried, in some instances with success, to "self-determine" smaller ones out of existence. But this neither nullifies nor disproves the idea of national self-government; sound ideas are never accepted and realized without difficulties, opposition and distortion.

In realizing self-determination, many nations have achieved unification in a single nation-state, and many long-established states have suffered revision of their boundaries or even loss of large portions of their territories. Involuntary unions and uneven partnerships of several peoples in the great empires, guided and exploited by the ruling nations for their own advantage, have been breaking up everywhere, first in the Near East and Eastern Europe, and then in Asia and Africa. It is worth noting that the great American statesman Woodrow Wilson strove to realize national self-determination not only in Central and Eastern Europe, but in the Far East as well. As early as 1901 he foresaw the "transformation" of the East which, he wrote, "must make the politics of the twentieth century radically unlike the politics of the nineteenth."22 He thought it inevitable that the nations of the East would soon mature politically, and very advisable to "secure for them, when we may, the free intercourse and the natural development which shall make them at least equal members of the family of nations."23

The Ottoman Empire was the first to be dissolved. It was followed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The British Empire thought fit to grant national sovereignty, first, to Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Ireland, and then to India, Burma, Ceylon and Ghana. Several other former colonies of Great Britain and of other colonial powers recently achieved either independence or limited self-government, in certain instances to be transformed into full-fledged national self-government in the near future.

However, there is still an empire where the idea of national self-government meets with great opposition, supported skill-

23 Ibid., p. 298.
fully and systematically by naked force and other more refined means of coercion. This is the Russian empire, called now the U.S.S.R. The Revolution of 1917 crushed the monarchy there only to replace it with another more dictatorial government. Nevertheless, several peoples who in the past two or three centuries were incorporated into the Russian Empire by various methods, lost no time after the outbreak of the Revolution to manifest their existence and their will to continue as self-governing nations. They immediately declared their independence from the Russian state and established their own free governments. The declarations of independence of Poland, Finland, the Baltic states, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were acts of the greatest importance for these countries. No matter how short-lived their true independence was, they did revive with vigor their claims for national sovereignty and recognition as self-governing nations.24

The Russian Bolshevist Revolution had little sympathy with these aspirations. Its task, like that of the French Revolution, was to change the system of government and to effect the social transformation of the vast empire, while non-Russian nationalities aimed at liberation from Russian power, which was for them the power of an alien conqueror. They all asked either for national emancipation in some form short of secession or, in some cases, for the outright creation of new national states. In the march of events the tsarist Russian Empire was dissolved; along with the new Russian state, the R.S.F.S.R., several other new states of the neighboring nations were established. However, their true independence was brief. In time the Bolshevist government of the R.S.F.S.R., by manifold political maneuvers as well as direct military aggression, virtually “self-determined” them out of independent existence.

24 The people that proceeds to reestablish its national independence may be compared to a civil claimant—the plaintiff who starts an action, based on the statute of limitation, in order to prevent one who has no title to property he is occupying from acquiring title to it, and thus interrupts the passage of time in favor of the usurper (instead of the Anglo-American “limitation of actions” the term “prescription of claims” is used elsewhere).
For several years before the Revolution the Bolshevist party used Lenin's slogan of free self-determination of peoples in order to secure the sympathy and support of the non-Russian nationalities in the Russian Empire and of the other suppressed peoples in the world. When it came into power the Bolshevist government of the R.S.F.S.R. confirmed the legitimacy of the claims for national self-government of those peoples who organized themselves into autonomous units within the R.S.F.S.R. as well as of those who established independent states. But it used the principle of self-determination only as "a sop to the amour-propre" of these peoples\textsuperscript{25} or "a psychological weapon"\textsuperscript{26} supplementing other, mere conventional measures of coercion and war. In practice, the Bolshevist power substituted for the loudly acclaimed grand ideal its truly "neo-annexationist policy."\textsuperscript{27} The outcome of this policy was the re-establishment of the old Russian empire in the form of the U.S.S.R.

Although the bilateral treaties between the R.S.F.S.R. and the forcibly Sovietized Azerbaijan and Ukraine (1920), Byelorussia, Georgia and Armenia (1921), and the "Treaty of the Creation of the U.S.S.R." (1922) as well as both Constitutions of the U.S.S.R. (1924, 1936) recognized the national statehood of the enumerated republics, actually these nations as well as all those who were later recognized as within, incorporated in, or associated with the U.S.S.R. were deprived of the peoples' right to self-determination and national self-government.

Fearing that this outright mockery of the idea of national self-government would prove its unreliability, the Bolshevist regime made efforts to assimilate the American (or Swiss) pattern of nationalism. It tried to create artificially a new integrated nation—the Soviet nation—disregarding the lack of common feeling and will of the peoples. However, very soon the


concept of a Soviet nation gave way, with the blessing of the Bolshevist leadership, to the glorification of the Russian nation, its peculiar superiority and its lofty task of brotherly protection of the smaller nations in the Soviet Union. Even this experiment proved a failure. After World War II the theory of a special Soviet Russian mission and leadership was applied to other neighboring peoples in Eastern and Central Europe who were liberated from German occupation only to become vassals of Moscow. This was an outright imperialistic action notwithstanding all Bolshevist exhortation against imperialism. While other colonial powers have accepted, more or less willingly, the disintegration of their empires and the creation of new national states, the Soviet policy of incorporation and subjugation of several national states has shown clearly the inherent expansionist-annexationist tendency of the Soviet Russian empire. Soviet Russian imperialism, which makes the Russian Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) dominant over other Soviet and peoples' republics, is a very tangible phenomenon.

The pressure of national aspirations in the U.S.S.R. is often somewhat hidden because of the general suppression of public opinion and because, as a consequence, political dissatisfaction there is often conveyed into cultural, economic and other less "political" channels. However, it is incessant and effective. After Stalin's death it was the pressure of the subjugated groups and peoples which brought some liberalization of the regime. It was followed by some decentralization of public administration and of the all-Union economic structure. In particular, several administrative powers were returned to the governments of "national" republics, and, latterly, territorial economic-administrative units with considerable managerial powers were created within their boundaries. However, these changes cannot satisfy the subjugated nations in view of the usurping character of the Bolshevist regime. Furthermore, as the suppression of the Hungarian uprising shows clearly, there is no lessening of the suppressive and expansionist character of Soviet policies.

Soviet foreign policy places a heavy burden not only on the non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R., but also on the Russian
people itself. It seriously impedes the cooperative coexistence of nations in a peaceful international order. This impediment will disappear only when the mockery of the principle of self-determination of nations in the territories of the U.S.S.R. proper and the associated countries gives place to the true realization of the principle of national self-determination and self-government.

The principal issue of our time is not the mere rivalry of the great powers. It certainly is not the competition between Western and Oriental civilizations since they are really interdependent and truly complementary. Nor is it conflict between the races. It is not, at least not yet, the contest between capitalism and socialism as there is plenty of room in the world for divergent forms of socio-political arrangements. It is the struggle of two rival concepts of world transformation. One of them is the concept of the peculiarly Soviet brand of Communism and world-wide dictatorial power. The other is the concept of international cooperative order based on the world-wide fulfillment of the principle of national self-government.

The general purpose of the Soviet empire is to stop the natural development of nationalism towards world-wide constitutionalism that would guarantee national liberties, and to replace it with quasi-supranational Soviet Communism. But Soviet Communism, which is based, to a considerable extent, on the skilful utilization and the consistent abuse of the great concepts of free society, such as liberty, justice, popular government, and national self-determination, is bound to reveal its weakness more and more, even where it seems firmly entrenched. There is no doubt about the end result of the global contest, although it may be long in coming.
MEMOIRS

UKRAINIAN-RUSSIAN NEGOTIATIONS IN 1920:
A RECOLLECTION*

LEVKO CHIKALENKO

In the years 1917-1920 the struggle against the Bolsheviks was waged simultaneously by the governments and armies of the national republics, formed as a result of the disintegration of the Russian Empire; and by White Army forces under Kolchak, Yudenich, Denikin, Wrangel, and others. The lack of understanding between political and military centers of the national republics, on the one hand, and the Russian anti-Bolshevik centers, on the other, strongly contributed to the defeat of the anti-Communist forces.

However, some attempts were made in 1917-1920 to set up negotiations between the two types of centers. The Ukrainians tried to negotiate first with Denikin's government and later with Wrangel's government. Arnold Margolin, who is commemorated by this volume, exerted tremendous efforts to achieve better understanding among these groups.

As a participant in the negotiations between the representatives of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic and the representatives of Wrangel's government, I would like to present here some notes which may be of interest.

In the late summer of 1920 Colonel Noga, an official representative of the High Command of the Armed Forces of South Russia, came with full credentials from Crimea to the headquarters of the Army of the Ukrainian People's Republic in Khryplyn, near Stanyslaviv. In August the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic decided to send a delegation to Crimea in response to the invitation delivered by Colonel Noga. There were two reasons for this decision. First, the government

* Although it is not a policy of the Annals to publish personal reminiscences, the editors invited Dr. Chikalenko to recall his experience in Crimea because of the light it sheds on the world of Arnold Margolin.
and the military circles wanted to come to an understanding with Wrangel with respect to the common enemy, the Bolsheviks. Second, private letters coming from Crimea mentioned a somewhat more favorable attitude toward the Ukrainians in Wrangel’s group.

The Ukrainian military and civil authorities came to an agreement on the composition of the delegation, which was headed by Colonel Ivan Lytvynenko and included Colonel Mykhaylo Krat, Ensigns Romensky and Bludymko, and myself. I was appointed by the government because I had some experience in the negotiations with Denikin’s forces in 1919.

Before leaving for Crimea I had talks with the Prime Minister, Vyacheslav Prokopovych, and the Commander-in-Chief, Symon Petlyura; they both gave me instructions with respect to the negotiations. After receiving credentials from army headquarters and obtaining a captain’s uniform, money, and all necessary passes and documents, I went via Chernivtsi to Bucharest, thence to Galatz where I joined the delegates and Colonel Noga. We waited for the large steamship “Saratov” which was to take us to Sevastopol. To board the “Saratov” we had to travel to the seaport of Reni. We embarked on a small tug which towed a number of barges carrying troops for Wrangel’s army. The troops were borne along the mighty river to the sea to board large steamships. We learned that these men formerly had belonged to White Army units which in 1919 had been defeated by the Reds and had retreated to Polish and Rumanian territory. Now under orders from the Entente, they were being transporteć to Galatz and then to Reni whence they were to be transported to Crimea to fight under General Wrangel’s command. In Reni we boarded the “Saratov” directly from our tug. Other passengers were soldiers. The “Saratov” anchored at Yalta where we stayed for a day waiting for transportation to Sevastopol. In Yalta, on the advice of Prokopovych, I visited Horyansky, a local teacher known for his adherence to the Ukrainian cause. Horyansky informed us about Ukrainians in Crimea and about the attitudes of the top people of Wrangel’s army.
The next day we came to Sevastopol aboard a small cutter. I saw that Colonel Noga was rather astonished that nobody came to meet us at the port. He left us a few times, probably to telephone, then asked us not to worry and left for some time to find accommodations for us. Then he returned with three cabs and brought us to a hotel, explaining that political attitudes in Wrangel's group had greatly changed during Noga's absence from Sevastopol. He said that his journey to the Ukrainian Army staff had been inspired by General Slashchev, who at that time influenced Wrangel's strategy and policy. Noga himself had been a man of some importance in Slashchev's circle. Now it turned out that Slaschev was not only set aside, but was in disgrace. We saw that Noga was greatly embarrassed by this new situation and told him that we would wait a few days to see how things developed.

Next day we went to Headquarters to be introduced to the Quartermaster General, Kyriy (Kirei), evidently an important person in Sevastopol. Some members of our delegation had known the General, who had been in the Ukrainian Army for some time as Chief of Staff of the Slobidsky Corps (Kish) which, under Petlyura's command, in 1918 defended the approaches to Kiev from the direction of Kharkov. Later General Kyriy had disappeared and the rumor spread that he had left the Ukrainian Army, angered at the Tsentral'na Rada which had deprived him of his grandfather's land. He was born of a cossack family in Chernihiv Province and could not resign himself to the loss of some 150 acres of his inherited land. None of our delegation knew when and in what way General Kyriy had joined the White Army.

General Kyriy received us in a friendly manner, but explained that he was very busy. He asked us if we liked our quarters and advised us not to worry and to spend the next few days in sight-seeing. He said that Colonel Noga would continue as liaison officer and would inform us of new developments. He recommended that we board at a small restaurant owned by the Kotlyarevskys, a well-known family from Kharkiv, and
asked Colonel Noga to take us there and introduce us to the owners.

At the restaurant we were received as star boarders. Madame Kotlyarevsky acted as cashier, and her two young daughters were waitresses. The elder girl talked uninterruptedly and asked us many questions as she served us. Later it turned out that the girls’ brother was at that time a secretary to Krivoshein, Prime Minister to Wrangel’s government.

While walking around the city we became aware of constant attention from passers-by. Evidently this was because the Ukrainian uniform, with its unusual colored stripes and its trident insignia, had never been seen in Sevastopol before.

A local newspaper reported on the arrival of our delegation and soon we were approached by some Ukrainian residents of Sevastopol. Chernysh, one of the most active figures in local Ukrainian circles and an adherent of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, told us about the prevailing sentiments toward Ukrainians in Wrangel’s circles, about the partisans there, of improvement of Ukrainian-Russian relations, and of their attempts to better conditions which had greatly deteriorated in Denikin’s time.

Days went by and no progress was seen in the matter for which we had come to Sevastopol, although we were informed by Chernysh that the situation was being discussed by high authorities. In the meantime I had a chance to meet quite a few people from the Ukraine and Russia brought to Sevastopol by the turbulent events of the time. For example, once I had a talk with the popular Russian writer, Arkadii Averchenko, who showed a keen interest in Ukrainian affairs.

We were also contacted by officials of the French and American Missions in Sevastopol. Evidently they had learned about us from the Polish Mission which we had visited immediately after our arrival. The French Mission representative who came to our quarters spoke fluent Ukrainian; he brought an invitation from the Chief. Colonel Krat, Colonel Lytvynenko and I went to visit the French officer and found him to be very amiable and well-acquainted with recent events in the Ukraine.
The invitation from the American Military Mission was delivered by an American sailor. I alone was commissioned by our delegation to visit Rear Admiral Newton A. McCully, chief of the Mission, aboard his ship. The Admiral and a Russian lady interpreter awaited me in his cabin. When I introduced myself in Russian the lady began to translate my words into French. I told them that I spoke French, and accordingly the Admiral dispensed with the interpreter, asking her instead to serve us coffee. In this very cordial atmosphere the Admiral showed a keen interest in Ukrainian affairs. Concluding our conversation he confidentially told me that Wrangel’s prospects were not very bright, and advised us not to stay too long in Sevastopol. He offered to provide us with transport to Constanta on one of his ships, and promised to send us a message when he considered it time for us to leave.

I think that a few general comments will help to elucidate the attitude towards the Ukrainian question inside Wrangel’s group. As already mentioned, the negotiations between Wrangel’s government and the Ukrainian People’s Republic had been initiated by General Slashchev, who at the time of our arrival at Sevastopol was isolated and was on the brink of arrest. It seemed that Slashchev was associated with groups of Ukrainian origin who happened to be in the White Army.

It should be remembered that earlier the theatre of operations of Denikin’s army was mostly in the Ukraine. This army consisted of older men who had formerly belonged to the Russian tsarist army, most of whom originated from Russia proper, and of younger men, mostly from the Ukraine, recently enlisted as officers and soldiers. Among the younger group, many were the offspring of landowners, priests, and tsarist officials. They were set against the revolutionary masses, and in particular against the Ukrainian peasants who had turned them out of their estates; the children of priests and officials were deprived of their privileges. These people saw the Revolution mainly as the revolt of local peasants and of rural teachers, telegraphists and other so-called “half-intellectuals,” all the latter elements
mostly associated with the ideals of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

That social incentives, at that time, prevailed over national ideas was manifested by the fact that many elements, formerly with the White Russian forces, changed sides and joined the Hetman because they shared his social program. Fluctuations in the political mood were typical at that time, and the shifting of men from the White Russian to the Ukrainian army and back was common. Thus, while many people of Ukrainian origin who had joined the White movement did not reveal their Ukrainian sympathies in the Denikin period, after the failure of Denikin's policy, when Wrangel took command, they began to turn toward rapprochement with the Ukrainian People's Republic. Evidently Slashchev, Kyriy, Noga and Chernysh belonged to those in Wrangel's group who tried to reach an understanding with the Ukrainian Republic. It may be of interest that the Leontovych brothers, Ivan, Volodymyr and Konstantyn, were of this company.

In the meantime our waiting was broken by an invitation for a conference with Prime Minister Krivoshein. Colonel Noga accompanied us there but did not attend our meeting. Krivoshein received our delegation in his study, sitting at his writing-desk. Our talk was of an informative character. Krivoshein revealed an interest in the Ukrainian army, its organization, arms, etc. Colonel Lytvynenko, chief of our delegation, sat opposite Krivoshein and answered most of his questions. It turned out that Lytvynenko, who before the war had been a bookkeeper at some provincial sugar refinery, spoke very poor Russian. Many of his mistakes sounded rather comical and I saw that Krivoshein could not help smiling. Anyway, Krivoshein got an opportunity to see that there was a difference between the Russian and Ukrainian languages, and that not all Ukrainians spoke Russian properly.

Krivoshein told us that he was sorry to keep our delegation waiting so long for conferences with representatives of their government and command. There were many reasons for this—one, the preoccupation with current affairs, and another, the
fact that our visit was to a certain degree a surprise for his government. The latter statement was a hint that someone else had initiated our coming, not the influential people of the day. I remarked that under such complicated circumstances all kinds of mistakes were possible, and that our negotiations might be postponed. Krivoshein was taken aback by my words and promptly began to excuse himself, saying that matters had been cleared up and that in a few days we would be received by Wrangel and his ministers.

Later the same day Chernysh informed us that a group of Ukrainians had invited us to a party next day at which we would meet some ministers of Wrangel’s government, who had an understanding of Ukrainian affairs and favored the measures taken to bring us to Sevastopol.

The reception next day was in a large hall and was rather crowded, mostly with elderly men. I heard the titles “prince” and “count” in the introductions quite a number of times. Supper was served at a long table, with all the members of our delegation sitting side by side at the center and several ministers sitting vis-a-vis, among them Glinka-Yanchevsky, Minister of Agriculture. Prince Volkonsky was also nearby. Speeches during supper expressed pleasure that hostilities had ceased between the White Russians and Ukrainians and that now friendly visits were taking place. Denikin was blamed by some speakers as the man responsible for sharpening conflict between the two sides. Glinka-Yanchevsky in his long and rather involved speech outlined his land-reform plan which, he believed, would satisfy the peasants and influence them in support of Wrangel’s liberation action.

In two days or so we were informed that Wrangel would receive us. Chernysh and I helped Colonel Lytvynenko to prepare his address, which was rather restrained. In general terms it welcomed the initiative of the Command of the Armed Forces of South Russia to come to an understanding with the Ukrainian People’s Republic. It stated that such an understanding would be of great importance in the history of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples when the Bolsheviks’ yoke was shaken off.
General Wrangel received us in his office. We entered this large crowded conference room and saw Wrangel at his writing-desk.

The General rose to greet us. After General Kyriy had introduced the members of our delegation, Wrangel made an official statement. He was glad to see us at his headquarters, he said, and hoped that our visit marked the beginning of a new period in our common struggle. His primary aim was the liberation of the country from the Bolsheviks, but he understood that this liberation could not be achieved by the methods used by his predecessors. He stated that he had drastically changed many things, and now appealed to us to find new forms for the cooperating in our common struggle which were acceptable to all of us. He would not just then discuss the problem of the future of Russia, but would try to achieve an understanding between all the peoples fighting the Bolsheviks. He said that he had come to an agreement with Ivanys, Ottaman of the Kuban Cossacks, and with the mountaineers of the North Caucasus, and now wanted to enter into an agreement with the Ukrainian armed forces for united military action. He added that he was sure that the representatives of the Ukrainian army would negotiate successfully with his representatives in Roumania headed by General Gerua.

After Lytvynenko had replied to this statement, we were introduced to some of the others at the reception. I met Savytsky, a young man whom I had encountered a few years before and who was now a secretary to Peter Struve, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Krivoshein's government. I asked Savytsky to arrange a meeting for me with Struve, formerly the well known professor of economics whose two former students, Valentyn Sadovsky and Oleksander Kovalevsky, were members of the Ukrainian government.

Next day I visited Struve and was impressed by his intelligence and refinement. Regarding the planned Russian-Ukrainian understanding Struve was rather skeptical. The complicated international situation made it hard, he said, to foresee further developments.
A few days later a messenger from Rear Admiral Newton A. McCully came to urge us to leave immediately because of the situation on the front. We left for Constanta on an American destroyer (which also carried General Wrangel's wife as passenger) and returned via Bucharest to our Army headquarters only a short time before Wrangel was defeated.

I hope that my brief notes may be of some interest to the historian studying events of the Revolution, and may be of help in further speculations on the problem of Russian-Ukrainian relations.
ANDREAS COUNT SHEPTYTSKY, ARCHBISHOP OF LVIV, METROPOLITAN OF HALYCH, AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN GALICIA DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR*

KURT I. LEWIN

The city of Lviv lies at the crossroads of the old trade routes leading from the shores of the Black Sea into Central Europe, and thus East and West met in its market place. It was a curious blend of the old and the new, where the Renaissance Boim Chapel was attached to a Romanesque church, and a baroque Cathedral looked down upon the city from Mount St. George. The inhabitants—Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Poles and Ukrainians—reflected the catholicity of the city which has been compared with Florence.

Trade flourished from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries; merchants came and went and the market hummed with activity. Venice, Genoa and Florence maintained their representatives in Lviv for the express purpose of protecting their merchants and relaying to their respective governments information concerning mercantile developments.

However in the middle of the seventeenth century a decline set in, caused first by the Cossack and then by the Turkish wars, and thus the importance of Lviv gradually diminished. The city enjoyed a renascence in the days of the Habsburg rulers, who made it the capital of the province of Galicia and the seat of the provincial parliament and the Governors. After the First World War a decline in the importance of the city had set in again while the Second World War destroyed the character of Lviv completely. The population was either killed during the war or deported afterwards. There is still a city called Lviv but it is inhabited mainly by strangers. What is left are its houses, its old buildings and its beautiful churches.

Before 1939, there were approximately 100,000 Jews living in Lviv, members of an old community which traced its origin

* Although the Annals does not usually publish recollections, this personal account by the son of the Lviv Rabbi is included for its relevance in this particular issue.
to the thirteenth century. In its time the community had num­bered many scholars who were widely known, as well as artisans and craftsmen whose work was valued in many quarters. Being old, the Jewish community in Lviv had weathered many storms through the years: the Tartar raids in the thirteenth century, the Cossack wars in the seventeenth, and the Polish pogroms of 1919. Its records are filled with descriptions of turbulence, persecution and suffering.

However, the Jewish community in Lviv could not weather the storm of the Second World War. Its members died in the gas chambers of Belzec, were shot in the ghetto and killed in the Janowski concentration camp and, when the holocaust ended, only three hundred registered with the Jewish Committee, after the Germans withdrew. The charming city with its lovely gardens and its beautiful and graceful architecture had been a backdrop for tragedy and suffering.

Israel had few friends in its hour of need. The local people were either indifferent to the fate of the Jews or actively participated in killing them. Few showed any compassion, and even fewer made an attempt to help. But in their hour of need, the Jews did find a friend in His Excellency, the Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytsky.

The Metropolitan Sheptytsky headed the Church, which had united with Rome in the sixteenth century. A scion of the old nobility, whose title dated back to the thirteenth century, the Metropolitan Andreas dedicated his life to his Church and to the welfare of the Ukrainian people. He reorganized and revitalized the Church in the parishes of his diocese, and set out to restore the rich Byzantine tradition, in which the Greek Catholic Church had its origin and roots in liturgy, vestments, and Church art. Under his aegis, education and guidance appeared in backward Ukrainian villages. Schools and hospitals were built for the use and benefit of his people, payed for by the revenues from the landed estates held by the Sheptytsky family in Galicia. In fact, a princely income from private holdings was devoted to the education and improvement of the community, while the owner of the property went about dressed
in a clean and carefully mended monk's habit which had seen better days. In brief, the Metropolitan Andreas Sheptytsky was a true spiritual leader of the Ukrainian community, respected and loved by his followers and even by those who disagreed with him.

Galicia did not escape the stirrings of nationalism that rumbled in Europe through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It made its appearance there in a virulent form at the beginning of this century, increasing and sharpening friction, discord and hatred among the various national and religious groups. But the surge of Ukrainian nationalism could be used to further the German policy of "Drang nach Osten," and consequently the German government attempted to utilize the movement for its own ends, thus adding fat to an already brightly burning fire through an effective campaign of anti-Polish and anti-Jewish propaganda.

The Jews were caught in a cross current of Polish suspicions of favoring the Ukrainian cause, and Ukrainian certainty that the forced "Polonization" by the government had Jewish support. The backdrop for the Jewish tragedy had been set.¹

In the midst of this political whirlpool, the Metropolitan Andreas did not limit himself to spiritual matters. He restrained the Ukrainian nationalists, he tried to bridge the gap between the Ukrainian factions, in an attempt to prevent a hopeless blood bath. He clearly understood the political constellation of the times and foresaw future developments; again and again his voice was heard in warning against harmful political influences both from the East and from the West and, as early as 1933, he bade the Ukrainians to beware of becoming pawns in a German game.² However, his wise counsel was lost in the din of nationalism and the warnings went unheeded. To the Jews the Metropolitan Andreas had always been a friend, respecting their heritage with compassion for their sorrow and

¹ The political events described above took place all through the 1930's.
² A personal communication by Father Herman Budzinsky and Father Nykanor, Studite monks who heard this at the St. Uspensky Church in Univ, in a speech made by the Metropolitan Andreas.
suffering. The Jews responded with respect and deep affection. Whenever the Metropolitan visited a township or village, he was met by the Ukrainian community led by its priest and by the rabbi and the elders of the Jewish community, a strange sight in a country where intolerance and hatred thrived.

The Metropolitan's residence was a small baroque palace, opposite the Cathedral, both built at the same time. The gate had an iron chain for a bell pull, and brother Athanasius, a Studite monk, was there to open the door and show the way to the waiting room on the second floor, constantly filled with people, all waiting patiently to be received. The door was always open to anyone who cared to enter. Peasant delegations, Basilian nuns, priests, men in uniform, all came and equally waited their turn. Occasionally a Jewish delegation, sent by one of the communities located near the Metropolitan's estates, sat waiting to ask for a donation to a Jewish charity. In fact the synagogues of some of these little towns were built with lumber donated by the Metropolitan. The atmosphere in the waiting room was one of silence and expectancy as if those present were on the verge of a deep and unforgettable experience. The audience took place in a large, sunny room lined with book shelves. Next to a huge desk in a wheelchair sat a very tall, white-haired man, with penetrating blue eyes—Andreas Count Sheptytsky, Archbishop of Lviv, Metropolitan of Halych. The Metropolitan's crippled legs were covered by a rough blanket, but despite the wheelchair, he conveyed an impression of strength and power. His right hand, disfigured and deformed by illness but nevertheless beautiful with long thin fingers, motioned the visitor to come closer, to sit down, to be frank and open. A strange atmosphere of warmth, kindness, sincerity and affection combined with strength and power pervaded the room. Sunlight drifted through the open windows and the smell of the orchards wafted in together with distant voices of men working in the garden. Whatever his troubles, one felt at peace in the Metropolitan Andreas' office and left it strengthened and uplifted.3

3 That is how Metropolitan Andreas appeared in 1937-39.
The Second World War broke out. Lviv was bombed by the Luftwaffe on the very first day. With the explosion of the first bomb, a way of life was destroyed. When the Germans occupied Lviv in 1941, matters were made even more difficult because of discord and lack of cooperation among the various national groups. The Jewish community became the prime target of pogroms, persecution, and outright killing, with the Germans instigating and encouraging anti-Jewish riots. They marked every Jew with the Star of David in order to have the victims easily recognizable. The Jews were deprived of protection by law, and of any basic human rights. Immediately after the entry of German troops, anti-Jewish riots started in which many thousands of Jewish inhabitants of Lviv lost their lives. The pogrom was organized by the Germans, but the atrocities were committed by the Polish and Ukrainian mobs. Rabbi Dr. Jechezkiel Lewin, the last Chief Rabbi of that city, decided to go to Metropolitan Andreas to ask for his intervention with the rioting mob. He came to Metropolitan Andreas as his friend and because the Metropolitan was the only person of influence who was willing to listen, and willing to help. It was futile to approach the Germans and, unfortunately, it was almost as futile to approach leaders of other communities.

These were the late Rabbi Dr. Lewin’s words:

I came to you, Your Excellency, in the name of the Jewish community in Lviv. I came to you in the name of half a million Jews living in the territory under your ecclesiastic jurisdiction. Sometime ago you told me that you consider yourself a friend of the Jews. I ask you now, in the hour of mortal danger, to give evidence of your friendship. I ask you to save thousands of human lives.4

Rabbi Lewin departed with the Metropolitan’s promise that everything would be done to help. Metropolitan Andreas tried to prevent Rabbi Lewin from returning to his home while the

4 This speech was written by the late Rabbi Lewin before setting out to the Metropolitan’s palace. This writer, who is Rabbi Dr. J. Lewin’s son, translated the speech into Ukrainian, a language with which his father was only slightly acquainted.
riots were raging through the city. Rabbi Lewin refused the offer of shelter with thanks, stating that his place was with his people.\(^5\) He died a martyr’s death, at the Brygidki prison, in a heroic attempt to protect his beloved community.

The Metropolitan kept his promise. Throughout the German occupation he helped and sheltered Jews, restrained members of his Church in the name of Christ, or threatened punishment and political consequences after the war. He published a pastoral letter pertaining to the Jews, entitled appropriately: “Though shalt not kill.” Naturally the Germans confiscated this writing but nevertheless its text was read in every Greek Catholic church. The letter discussed the treatment of Jews frankly and courageously, and its message carried a grave warning to the Ukrainians, enjoining them from direct or indirect participation in exterminating Jews.

However, this restraining influence was not always effective. Outside sources unleashed hatred and savagery, which made the masses either callous or stone deaf. Although the Metropolitan’s views and advice were read from every pulpit, the German influence on the local population during the first two years of the occupation was too strong. The Metropolitan Andreas went so far as to send a letter of protest to the “Hangman of Europe,” Heinrich Himmler, voicing a strong objection against employing the Ukrainian youth to help exterminate the Jews. There is little doubt that the Metropolitan Andreas was one of the very few spiritual and political leaders under the German occupation who dared to protest against the calculated and cold-blooded mass murder of the Jews.\(^6\)

No one doubted that the Jewish community would once again have to face a time of danger, trial and tribulation, and it was obvious that large numbers would succumb to the pogroms, or to the persecution. But even the worst pessimists did not

\(^5\) This was related to the author by the Metropolitan himself.

\(^6\) The author worked in the Metropolitan’s library and archives in 1943-1944, where he saw a copy of the letter sent to Himmler, and Himmler’s reply in which he advised the Metropolitan not to interfere in affairs which did not concern him.
envisage the extermination of the whole community. At first the consensus held was that, as soon as the front line moved further on, a status quo would be achieved, and the population would quiet down. But as weeks and months passed the lot of the Jews grew worse and worse. Over the first wave of vindictive killing caused by hatred, was superimposed an organized and systematic operation designed to strip the Jewish population of its wealth, and simultaneously to employ Jewish manpower at forced labor. This in turn was replaced by a well-thought-out plan of physical destruction: first the old and disabled, then the children, then the breaking up of families by separation of men from women, and then the terribly final road to the gas chamber. The German machine ground slowly but surely as train after train left Western Ukraine to Belzec, the graveyard of almost 2,000,000 Jews. Town after town was emptied of its Jews and large signboards declaring “Judenrein” were placed at the approaches to each town.

The Metropolitan Andreas became interested in the details of daily life within the ghettos. How did people manage? What was the amount of their bread rations? What was happening to the children? Who took care of the sick? To obtain answers to these questions he appointed Father Kotiv to collect information about events in the ghettos. And in addition to his previous course of action, the Metropolitan now embarked on a positive campaign to save and shelter individual Jews; those whom he knew, and total strangers, adults and children, in fact any Jew whom he could help.

The moving force behind this operation was the Metropolitan’s brother Klemens Sheptytsky, head of the Order of St. Theodore the Studite. Over six feet tall, slim, he was an ascetic-looking man in his late sixties, with a touch of severity

7 During the German occupation bread and other foods were rationed. The Jews received approximately one tenth of the normal ration.
8 The Metropolitan undertook this task in the summer of 1942, when the destruction of the ghettos began.
9 Theodore of Studium, Saint, 759-826 A.D., Byzantine, also called St. Theodore the Studite. His influence was critical in the history of the monastic roles of the Byzantine Church.
in his face. But appearances were misleading, and this monk, who may very well have stepped down from a Byzantine ikon of St. Theodore the Studite, possessed warmth, infinite understanding and boundless compassion. Father Hegumen Klemens carried the actual burden of sheltering the Jews, and arranging their swift removal when the local people were about to notify the Germans that Jews were to be found.

By 1942 it was quite clear to everyone concerned that the Germans planned to solve permanently the Jewish problem in the gas chambers. Whoever could and had the strength to do so tried to escape this horrible death. Jews hid in cellars and in forest dugouts, they were camouflaged by forged papers or moved to strange places under assumed names. The Germans countered these desperate efforts at escape with a proclamation that sheltering or helping Jews in any way whatsoever carried the death penalty. Many Christians were indeed publicly shot or hanged for aiding their fellow men. Official announcements were printed in newspapers, and walls were plastered with them everywhere. In addition, a positive inducement of food was offered to informers who led the Germans or the local police to hiding places of Jews. Thus, thousands who escaped from the ghetto were led to their death by these present-day Judases, who bartered lives for food instead of the traditional thirty pieces of silver. Some among the local population, who did not act as informers, were nevertheless pleased with the prospect of looting, which the liquidation of the Jews afforded, and so favored the act itself. Like vultures such persons circled around the ghetto buying wedding rings for a loaf of bread, and burgling houses whose occupants were already on the road to death. The great part of the population was completely indifferent to the human agony before their eyes, and the terror, hatred, and German encouragement of anti-semitism completely deadened the sensibilities of the people.

In this poisonous atmosphere the Metropolitan Andreas and Father Proto-Hegumen Klemens launched their work of saving Jews. Despite the danger from the Germans and the hostility of the population toward any acts of succor to the hunted, both
men succeeded in inspiring bravery and even heroism in those around them. This labor of saving Jews was possible only because of the cooperation of a small army of monks and nuns together with some lay priests. They gathered the Jews into their monasteries and convents, orphanages and hospitals, shared their bread with the fugitives, and acted as escorts with total disregard of the danger of Jewish company. Whenever necessary, they disrupted the rhythm of their beloved monastic life to carry on these activities, so remote from their daily life. Some of them, taught and guided by the Metropolitan Andreas, reached a new height in spiritual life, spread the teachings of their great Prince of the Church among the people, and followed his path in all things. They were the ones most active in giving aid and comfort to the hunted fugitives. Others, never completely free of their anti-Jewish prejudice, nevertheless helped Jews because of their abhorrence of German cruelty. There were those who were indifferent but, on being summoned to help, obeyed that summons with eagerness and selflessness. All of them, regardless of motive or attitude, equally shared the grave peril, and helped to provide Jews with shelter and food. But most important of all, they gave moral support to those whom they hid, and hunted Jews deprived of every human right and stripped of any sort of protection, were made to feel wanted and thus allowed to regain faith in humanity. And those monks, nuns and priests kept faith by their silence.

For two long years no outsider knew about the Jews who were hidden in each and every cloister, and even in the Metropolitan’s private residence.

The monks and nuns of the Order of St. Theodore the Studite unquestionably executed the instructions given by the Metropolitan Andreas or Father Proto-Hegumen Klemens, and the Superior of each cloister led his monastery or her convent in this noble undertaking.

Father Superior Marko Stek was in charge of “operation save the Jews” at the Studite monasteries. To accomplish this task, he first carefully paved the way for reception of individual Jews, sometimes by an explanation only, sometimes by a con-
vincing talk, and sometimes even by a resort to monastic discipline. Then the requisite documents had to be prepared, and finally, the "naturalized Ukrainians" had to be provided with an escort and transported from place to place.

Strange things, indeed, were happening to Father Marko in those days. He was to be found travelling in a railroad car with two lively Jewish boys. Once he had to tackle the delicate problem of a married Jewish woman who "entered" a convent as a "novice" in a very early stage of pregnancy! Another day, on returning to his cell from the evening prayers, sung so beautifully by the monks of the Lychakiv Monastery, he discovered waiting there three little boys aged three to five. The children had to be removed from Bryukhovychi, where they had been cared for by the parish priest, Father Pobereyko, because a neighbor had informed the Germans of their presence. Until a new hiding place was found, Father Marko shared his monk's cell with his little guests. In this difficult work, Father Marko was ably assisted by Fathers Nykanor, Tyt, Herman, and the Studite monks.

While the Studite Fathers looked after the men, girls and women were cared for by the Studite nuns headed by Mother Superior Josepha. But it is impossible to omit Mother Superior Monika, of the Order of St. Basil the Great, from the list of those who saved Jewish children. At the convent in Pidmykhailivtsi, Mother Monika gathered the boys and girls, helping them to adjust in the shift from the warmth of their parents' homes to the new circumstances of life. All those sheltered by Metropolitan Andreas survived the war in spite of constant searches, informers and other dangers.

It should be stressed that Metropolitan Andreas and his brother exerted no religious pressure whatsoever. Their attitude was that conversions under the circumstances would not be an expression of free will. This policy was followed by the monks and the nuns. Approximately one hundred and fifty Jews survived, thanks to Metropolitan Andreas. Although this figure is a small one, to save that number required untold efforts and
exertion. Only survivors of the holocaust can appreciate the difficulty and danger encountered in saving even one life.

In the autumn of 1943, Rabbi Dr. David Kahane and the author arrived at the monastery of St. Josaphat, near Mount St. George. A short time afterward, Father Superior Nykanor informed the assembled monks that from now on two Jews were to stay with them. He stated that it would be advisable if one member of the monastery were to take the whole responsibility on himself and thus protect others in case of detection. All the monks realized that they were in mortal danger and that one of them was called upon to risk his life for men of a different faith. Father Nykanor, a tall, soft-spoken man, still showing traces of a year and a half spent in a German prison, then asked for a volunteer. As one man, the whole monastery stood up—old Brother Varlaam, Brother Yerotey the printer, young Brother Lazarus the novice, Brother Ambrose, Brother Patrick, Brother Joseph the cook, Brother Modest the carpenter. Last but not least there was Brother Theodosius who, in addition, conducted a private crusade against the Germans by hiding two Jewish families at the factory where he worked. Stillness pervaded the whitewashed room, and the monastic community of St. Josaphat was closer to God than ever.

After the German retreat, the Metropolitan helped those he had sheltered to start life anew. The children were placed with the few remaining Jewish families, but only after approval of the foster parents by Rabbi Dr. Kahane. Father Proto-Hegumen Klemens stated: “The children are a trust left to me by their dead parents; I can release them only to the care of responsible people.”

The pitifully few survivors gathered on Yablonovska Street, where a Jewish committee was organized. There was no one to give aid or comfort except the Metropolitan Andreas, who sent food, clothes and blankets to the committee.

Slowly the survivors dispersed. Today they live in Israel and England, the United States and Australia. But to all these far places they took with them the memory of Metropolitan
Andreas and his brother Klemens, and that memory will remain in their hearts till the day they die.

In those tragic times a great and noble man lived on Mount St. George. He had a heart full of compassion for human suffering and misery. He truly earned the name "friend of the Jews," as he had described himself many years before all these events, and he proved it in the darkest hour at the risk of his own life. His name will be inscribed forever in the annals of Jewish history.
ON ARNOLD DAVYDOVYCH MARGOLIN
Arnold Margolin in 1901
Arnold Margolin and Victor Chernov in 1943
ARNOLD DAVYDOVYCH MARGOLIN*
1877-1956

MICHAEL VETUKHIV

A Ukrainian patriot and statesman, a man of tremendous energy and high ideals, Arnold Davydovych Margolin applied all his intellectual forces in the service of the best ideas of his time. He was active in public affairs, in politics, and in journalism.

Arnold Davydovych Margolin was born on November 4/17, 1877 in Kiev. His father, Davyd Semenovych Margolin, was a well-to-do businessman, owner of a large steamship on the Dnieper River, and widely known for his social welfare work. A man of great abilities and good will, he contributed generously to the welfare and growth of his native city. To mention but one of his contributions, it was mainly at his initiative that street cars, the first in the Russian Empire, were introduced in Kiev. His wife, Rozaliya Isaakovna, nee Tsuker, was a gentle cultured woman, constantly engaged in charitable works. With her assistance the first baby health clinic was opened in Kiev. Arnold Davydovych derived from both his parents a special quality of good will and warmth. He had, too, his father's drive and initiative and his mother's gentleness.

Arnold Davydovych was graduated from the Gymnasium in Kiev, and in 1900 from the Department of Law of the St. Volodymyr Kiev University. He continued graduate studies in Leipzig and Lyon.

In 1896 Arnold Davydovych married Lubov Naumovna Greben', then eighteen, who was his devoted wife and companion and the affectionate mother of their three daughters, Olga, Nadezhda, and Lubov. She died in 1937.

From his early youth Arnold Davydovych was interested in jurisprudence, in criminology, in public affairs, and in political activity. He was a proficient writer.

Early in the nineteen-hundreds Margolin became a member

* This is a draft of the eulogy Professor Vetukhiv was preparing during his last illness. He had planned a much more extensive paper.
of the Russian bar and took part in many famous political trials.¹ In 1911-1913 he participated in the celebrated Beilis ritual murder case. He served as defense counsel in the case involving a group of young men active in public affairs who were accused of aiding the Jews. Among the accused were several Ukrainian leaders, including Andriy Livytsky.

From 1905 to 1917 Margolin was secretary-general of the South Russian Branch of the Union for the Achievement of Equal Rights for the Jews. He was also one of the founders, the secretary-general and later the president of the Jewish Territorial Organization (1906-1918).

In the first days of the Revolution of 1917 Margolin became completely absorbed in political activities. Firmly believing in the right of self-determination for all peoples, Margolin became closely associated with the Ukrainian democratic forces engaged in the founding and building of the Ukrainian democratic state.² He was a member of the All-Russian Party of Labor-People's Socialists until June 1918, when he resigned from that party and joined the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists which at that time attracted many Ukrainian intellectuals. In the days of revolution, Margolin came to learn the Ukrainian language and appreciate Ukrainian culture.

Margolin held responsible positions in his service to the newborn republic. He was elected one of the justices of the newly-organized Supreme Court of the Ukrainian Republic. In the period of the Directory he held the position of Deputy Foreign Minister, was a member of the Ukrainian Delegation to the Peace Conference, and the Chief of the Ukrainian Mission in London. As a member of the Ukrainian Delegation, Margolin appeared before the League of Nations and signed many documents on behalf of the Ukrainian government.³

In 1922 Margolin came to the U.S.A. and up to his death

¹ See below, p. 1690 f., Alexis Goldenweiser's Eulogy.
² See above, p. 1461 ff., Excerpts from A Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty.
³ Ibid., Appendix Nos. II and III.
was active as writer, lecturer, jurist and advisor on public affairs, particularly U.S. foreign policy.

He gives an account of his first impressions of America in his book *From a Political Diary,* from which I quote to illustrate his life-long preoccupation with the “democratic spirit”:

> My everyday contacts in New York greatly impressed me with the fact that the average American man and woman appeared to me superior in many aspects to the average European. Common sense, rapid thinking, absence of servility and inferiority complexes seemed to be the characteristic features of most of the people whom I met in street cars, in the restaurants, shops, and theaters. Nowhere in Europe had I found such a genuinely democratic spirit, such dignified behavior of the man “of the masses.” These were the result of the democratic form of government of the great Republic after one and a half centuries of its existence. And these were the very things for which hundreds of thousands of the generation to which I belong had fought for decades in old Russia.

Margolin was naturalized in 1927. He attended Columbia University Law School, was admitted to the Massachusetts Bar in 1929, and to the Bar of Washington, D. C. in 1934.

From 1929 to 1933 Arnold Davydovych gave lecture courses on Russia in Boston and Cambridge, under the auspices of the Massachusetts Department of Education, and later at New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, and other institutions. He advised a number of government agencies on pre-Revolutionary Russian and Soviet law.

Margolin was continuously associated with Ukrainian émigré democratic circles in Western Europe, as well as with those Ukrainian-American organizations which shared his broad, democratic sympathies.

Margolin worked vigorously to bring about understanding between Ukrainian and Jewish circles and was an advocate of the Ukrainian cause before the latter groups. In 1926 he cooperated with the American Jewish Committee in defending the honor of the late Petlyura. In many of his writings he presented the true historical picture of turbulent revolutionary

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4 Arnold D. Margolin, *From a Political Diary; Russia, the Ukraine, and America, 1905-1945,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1946.
events in the Ukraine, thus contributing to an understanding of Petlyura's difficulties in upholding law and decency in the midst of anarchy.

After World War II Margolin was in touch with Ukrainian democratic leaders in Western Europe again, and cooperated closely with democratic groups as an advisor on the reorganization of the Ukrainian government-in-exile and on the consolidation of Ukrainian democratic forces.

A rich literary heritage was left by Margolin—his books and papers written during 55 years. Most of his pre-revolutionary works treat problems of law. Most of the publications which appeared after the revolution were devoted to problems of politics. The book, From a Political Diary, previously cited, presents a short outline of the Ukrainian liberation movement and is an important source for the study of the history of Ukrainian statehood; it includes original material collected by the author while he was active as a statesman and diplomat of the independent Ukrainian republic. He considered it his "civic duty" to keep and publish an accurate record of the important events in which he participated.

Now a few words about my personal contact and cooperation with Arnold Davydovych. Immediately after the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States came into being in 1950, Arnold Davydovych became an active member. After Professor Andriy Yakovliv's death in 1954, he was elected the Chairman of the Section of Law of the Academy. Dr. Margolin read a number of papers at scholarly conferences of the Academy, among them: "Peoples and Governments,"

5 The best known books by Margolin: Ukraina i politika Antanty, Berlin, 1922; The Jews in Eastern Europe, New York, 1926; From a Political Diary; Russia, the Ukraine, and America, 1905-1945, New York, Columbia University Press, 1946.


"Georgi Fedotov and his Prognosis Concerning the Future of the Present Eurasian Empire and Her Oppressed Nations," "Research in the Field of United States Policy in Regard to the U.S.S.R. and the Ukraine." At Dr. Margolin's initiative, the Academy's Commission for the Study of the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations was founded. He was always ready to help with the work of all the Academy's activities. In 1956 Margolin's book, Derzhavnyi ustriy Spoluchenykh Shtatov Ameriky (The Structure of the Government of the United States of America), was published by the Academy.

I recall our long friendly talks on each of Arnold Davydo-nych's visits to New York. We talked of many things—current events, relations among Ukrainian émigrés, even on the philosophy of life—and I learned a great deal from him. He used to say that many things taken for granted in most contemporary societies were often hard for Ukrainian émigrés to grasp. He held that every nationality is comprised of good and bad individuals. "There are all kinds of fish in the sea," he used to say. On Ukrainian-Jewish relations, Margolin emphasized that there were good and bad among both the Jews and the Ukrainians. "We must cooperate with good people," he said repeatedly. He spoke in the same terms to those who accused the Ukrainians of anti-Semitism.

Margolin loved to talk on nationality problems. He said that the territory of each state belonged to the people who live thereon. We both had no doubts that he, a man of Jewish origin, was a Ukrainian, just as General Petrov of Swedish origin, and General Halkyn of Russian origin were also Ukrainians. We both understood that some people of Ukrainian origin who had participated in the building of the Russian empire, tsarist or Soviet, were Russians.

Margolin maintained that since the present population of the Ukraine includes Russians, Jews, Poles, Germans, Greeks, Tatars and other nationalities, in addition to the Ukrainians, it was very important to study the history of relations between these peoples and to promote friendship among them. He considered the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations uppermost
in this broad field and deemed it the task of intellectuals of both peoples to promote understanding between the two groups and to study the history of relations between these peoples. It is well known that a great part of the Jewish population of the Russian Empire was concentrated in the Ukraine. An historical review of Ukrainian-Jewish relations sheds light on many conflicts, misunderstandings and obscurities between these two peoples, sometimes caused by the fact that these two peoples had a different social status.

Finally a few words on Arnold Davydovych as a person. It was hard to believe that he was in his seventies when I met him, so active, so interested in everything, and so knowledgeable was he. He really had a “young soul.” For him there were two kinds of people, the “decent” and the “non-decent.” He had many friends among the “decent,” and loved them deeply.

We, the members of the Academy, are proud that Dr. Margolin was one of us, and his death on October 30, 1956, has been a heavy loss for all of us. He was a man of great culture and of kind heart, an intellectual in the service of the idea of the Ukrainian democratic state.
A NOTE ON MY FATHER

LUBOW MARGOLENA

Although father was frequently absent from our childhood quarters on the Velyka Zhytomyrskaya Vulytsya in Kiev, or at grandmother's on Mykolayivska, we always felt the warmth of his ebullient personality in anything he did or said. Years of separation, beginning with our parting in the fateful train in Odessa during the rule of the Directory in 1919, never seemed to affect our closeness. Father knew how deeply I respected his political and civic endeavors, and repaid me with confidence from an early age. It is, however, not for me and not for now to elaborate on the meaning and results of his activities. Father's books were left as his testament, and time and historians will do the rest. I will confine myself rather to little things, for they too recreate the spiritual picture of a man.

Two bundles of worn paper lie in front of me as I wonder what should be added to the personal recollections of others about my father, Arnold Davydovych. The older one, securely wrapped and tied with yellowing tape, is a packet of letters, 92 of them—all expressions of sympathy upon the death of my mother in the spring of the year 1937. Remembering father's numerous changes of domicile, his helplessness with things, I was surprised and touched that these letters in memory of a charming, joy-loving, yet unworldly, patient woman who shared and tended him through the vicissitudes of his restless life, should still be here. I know that they were not preserved for us, their children, but kept simply out of reverence and loyalty; loyalty also to friends who remembered Kiev, their common youth and dreams.

I say "restless," for a person of father's constitution, high sensitivity, and with his approach to life, even if not uprooted, could not and would not have led an easy, painless existence. Responsibility, like Ivan Franko's "urge to account for," weighed heavily upon him. Besides, the idea that "time drink-
eth up the essence of every great and noble action which ought to be performed and is delayed in execution,” as expounded in a Hindu scripture, was practically his very own.

Knowing father, I am certain that every letter was acknowledged, for courtesy was his innate trait. If courtesy be understood as concern for the feelings and well-being of others, then, according to liberal interpretation, father should be thought of as a religious man. He could not, of course, belong to any one denomination; not just because he was an agnostic through his maturer years, but also because of his philosophical bent. Just as he found no reason to admire or despise one group of people above others, in matters of organized religion father had no preference.

Someone wondered, at his funeral, what was he most or what exclusively: Ukrainian, Jewish, Russian? In certain respects and in part he was all of these, for although of unusual spiritual quality, he was a man and responded generously to the life about him. Another mourner was heard to whisper quietly but authoritatively that he was a Christian, for “I knew him well and through a lifetime.” And the second friend was also right if Christianity means the exercise of charity and the capacity to forget oneself in the service of others.

The newer packet, barely two years old, contains notes of condolence to us, his daughters; long telegrams, kind letters from friends shocked by father’s tragic death, or solemn lines from those troubled about the void his passing would create. Father always insisted that no one was indispensable, but many trusted him and his judgment as they did few others. In exile particularly our people found he had the strength and courage of a man bound by nothing but his own convictions. His uncompromising character in things that matter made father’s life in present-day conforming America, including Ukrainian and Jewish American institutions, harder than it otherwise could have been. For Arnold Davydovych swam against the current at 75 just as he did at 25; that meant that most of
the time he navigated single-handedly, performing simultaneously the functions of captain and crew.

Father gave up playing his violin right after the purges were started in 1936. Of late his one good ear had failed, but his memory was affected only in trivial matters. Arnold Davydovych could concentrate wherever and whenever called upon and, irrespective of language, he could still dictate a memorandum as clear and as forceful as a jurist half his age. By 78 he began to refuse to accept invitations for longer outings and unnecessary exertions, as even his prodigal strength and health began to fail. His enthusiasm, however, his cheerfulness and love of music father retained to the very end. On a dreary hospital night, when he and we already knew that there would be no recovery, father’s face was illuminated by a smile when my husband sang to him his most cherished melodies.

Inwardly he did not change with the years, as a little incident which happened during one of our last walks will illustrate. A newspaper vendor with inflamed, wandering eyes and grotesque, uncoordinated motions came of a sudden upon me. The man looked so wild that I withdrew instinctively, even before I had a chance to make an excuse. Yet, within an instant Arnold Davydovych had already noticed the sorrowful, apprehensive face of the vendor, whom I had offended so carelessly. Father called me back, quietly slipped his arm under mine, and, as we approached the sick man, said naturally and amiably, “My daughter must have forgotten that we need our evening paper.”

October 30, 1958
MY MEETINGS WITH ARNOLD MARGOLIN

PANAS FEDENKO

My first meeting with Arnold Margolin took place under difficult conditions. It was at the time when the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose government was in Kamyanets-Podilsk, retreated to the West.

In November of 1919, Isaak Mazepa, Premier of the Ukrainian People's Republic, phoned me at the editorial office of the Robitnycha Hazeta and told me that Margolin, who had just arrived in Kamyanets-Podilsk from Paris, was in his office. I hurried there and met Margolin for the first time.

Short in stature, with bright eyes, Margolin roused my sympathy. I was astonished that he, the son of a wealthy capitalist from Kiev, where Russian was predominant among Jewish intellectuals, could speak Ukrainian; moreover, his Ukrainian was better than that of Premier Mazepa, who spoke it with a distinct Byelorussian accent. Now, after forty years, it is not easy to recall the contents of our conversation.

I remember well that Margolin, as a member of the delegation of the Ukrainian People's Republic to the international Conference in Paris, stressed on several occasions his belief that France, and especially England, were disappointed in the policy of the Russian White Army leaders and that there should be a change for the peoples of the former Russian empire who struggled for their independence. Margolin expressed a fear that Poland, with her aggression against the Ukraine, might destroy the remaining military power of the Ukrainian People's Republic. He told us that in Paris he used to meet Polish diplomats who had joined forces with Russian politicians, representatives of the Russian White Army, against the Ukraine.

In his conversation Margolin also mentioned Robert Lansing, then U. S. Secretary of State, who was completely opposed to the independence of the non-Russian peoples and maintained that the Ukraine should recognize the supremacy of the Russian generals of the White Army (Denikin and others).
At that time Premier Mazepa was acting also as Minister for Foreign Affairs, because Andriy M. Livytsky had gone to Warsaw as head of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission. Mazepa asked Margolin to assume the position of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic but he refused. Then Mazepa proposed to Margolin that he become head of the Diplomatic Mission of the Ukrainian People's Republic in London. Margolin said that there were some favorable prospects for Ukrainian diplomats in England, but that he could not accept the Premier's proposition immediately.

Later I learned that Margolin did become head of the Ukrainian Diplomatic Mission in London and successfully carried out his work there. However, when the representatives of the Ukrainian People's Republic signed a treaty with Poland in Warsaw (April 22, 1920) Margolin resigned. This did not mean that he had decided not to take part in Ukrainian political life. He had resigned from his position because he did not believe in the good intentions of Polish leaders with respect to the Ukraine. The position of the British government at that time and public opinion toward Poland made a depressing impression on him. Polish policy toward the Ukraine was considered imperialistic in England, and the Warsaw Treaty was seen as a "maneuver" for capturing as much Ukrainian territory as possible. This was the reason Margolin considered it improper for him to act in London in the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic, which was tied to Poland by the Warsaw Treaty. He told me about it in Prague in 1937, when he came to Europe from the United States.

After the downfall of the Ukrainian People's Republic in November 1920, Margolin was in constant contact with Ukrainian political leaders abroad. He watched closely events in the Ukraine, as well as in émigré circles, and, as a learned sociologist, he firmly believed that the Ukrainian national movement could not be stopped by the regimes of the countries which, after World War I, had divided the territory of the Ukraine among themselves. Margolin's valuable work *The Ukraine and*
the Policy of the Entente, published by Efron in Berlin in 1922 in the Russian language, bears witness to his assiduous interest in the Ukrainian national renascence. He sent this book to me at the Ukrainian Pedagogical Institute in Prague, where I was an assistant professor.

In 1927, in Lviv, I met my good friend Mykola Hankevych, a well-known Social-Democrat worker. At that time he had read Margolin's book and was fascinated by it and said in German: "Das ist eine befreiende Tat." He liked especially Margolin's realistic, unemotional presentation of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the Ukraine during the period of the Ukrainian People's Republic.

We were separated by the ocean, but I was able to follow Margolin's work in the New World where he had become an American citizen. He contributed to the Ukrainian and the American press; his energy was inexhaustible.

Lubow A. Margolena-Hansen, Margolin's youngest daughter, who had lived for some time in Denmark, later followed her father to the United States, where she shared his many interests and activities.

When Germany came under Hitler's reign in 1933, I wrote an article called "Hitlerism and the Ukrainians" and sent it to the Czech Social-Democrat newspaper Právo Lidu, in Prague. This article was published on May 21, 1933. I presented statements in it from writings of the leaders of Hitler's party which discredited their intentions to "liberate the Ukraine."

I sent this issue of Právo Lidu to Margolin in the United States and received the answer from him that he shared my opinion regarding Hitler's so-called "liberation policy." He told me too that, although he had not learned the Czech language, he understood almost everything, because, as he put it, "the Slavic languages are like twins."

When Hitler came to power in Germany, the tension mounting in Europe every month was felt keenly by immigrants living in Czechoslovakia. In the summer of 1937 Margolin unexpectedly came to Prague. He had a conference with his former colleagues and the members of the Ukrainian Party of
Socialist-Federalists (the new name is "Radical-Democrats"): Maksym Slavynsky, Andriy Yakovliv, and others. I. P. Mazepa and I had a few long talks with Margolin regarding the international situation and the situation in the Ukraine. These talks resulted in the writing of an eight-page memorandum in French to the State Department in Washington signed by Mazepa and myself.

Margolin took our memorandum with him to the United States. He was very pleased with its contents; our outlook on the situation was similar.

In our letter to the State Department, we reaffirmed our irreconcilability to the Bolshevik regime and resolutely rejected the pretenses of fascist Germany to rule the Ukraine. We stressed the Ukrainian people's right to independence in the form of a democratic republic.

Soon afterward Margolin left Prague. Before his departure he said that Hitler had prepared for war; this he found deeply disturbing. He told us that neither England nor the United States was prepared, psychologically or technically, for war; he did not believe in France's strength, either. He expressed the opinion that Hitler might even come to an understanding with Poland for a mutual "campaign to the East," but Poland's fate would be in Hitler's hands after the fall of the U.S.S.R. "Both Poland and the Ukraine would become German colonies," he said.

On September 1, 1939, war broke out, and we were separated for several years. Like many Ukrainians who lived in Czechoslovakia, I left Prague and after some experiences came to Bavaria. In 1947, in Augsburg, I. P. Mazepa told me he had received a letter from Margolin. "Just imagine, he is in Germany, and soon we will meet him," he said. He was reminded of the past, when Margolin had come from Paris to Kamyanets-Podilsk, the temporary capital of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1919.

And indeed, a week later Mazepa went to meet Margolin at the Buchloe station. Later we conversed with Margolin in
Augsburg and Munich. From then on I corresponded with him until his tragic death.

In 1947, during our meetings with Margolin, we discussed the matter of the formation of the Ukrainian National Council. Margolin told us that the Ukrainian idea of liberation would be successful only in a democratic world, when it would be represented by a truly democratic organization. He did share Mazepa’s optimism regarding the “radical evolution” of the Ukrainian groups, which before and during the war displayed an attitude of “leadership.” When Mazepa maintained that these groups were not so naive as to adhere to their bankrupt “gods,” that they were beginning to be democratic, Margolin replied, referring to those groups, that “This can only be empty phrases for camouflage purposes—deeds and not words are needed.” And he was right.

Margolin often told me—later he wrote from the United States—“As long as the leaders of the Ukrainian National Council are of the same political opinion as Mazepa, I shall help it and recommend its representatives everywhere.”

In 1951 I moved to London, and our correspondence became more intensive. We were joined by a new “partner,” namely, Lubow A. Margolena-Hansen.

Soon after, on March 18, 1952, Mazepa died in Germany. I received a letter from Margolin full of grief. In conversations which I had had with Margolin in Germany he used to tell me that he loved Mazepa for his high principles, devotion and self-sacrifice for society. In his letter of April 5, 1952 to me, Margolin wrote: “Mazepa’s death is, indeed, a great loss. You were right in stating that the cultural level of the Ukrainian masses is higher than that of the Russian and Polish masses, but the Ukrainian people lack ‘an elite.’ Isaak Prokhorovych Mazepa was the best representative of the Ukrainian elite, and it is hard to imagine that he is no longer among us.”

After Mazepa’s death, Nashe Slovo, the publishing organization in London, began to publish my book dedicated to Mazepa: *Isaak Mazepa—borets’ za volyu Ukrayiny* (Isaak Mazepa—a Fighter for Ukrainian Freedom). Margolin was one of the first
donors whose financial contributions made the publication of this book possible.

In his letters from Washington Margolin kept me informed about political life in the United States and the life of Ukrainian immigrants in particular. He had friends in various countries and advised me whom to get in touch with, and who needed certain information. Then the desired information was supplied by the group of the Ukrainian Socialist Party in London, the Ukrainian Council of the Socialist Movement for the United Countries of Europe (also in London), and the Ukrainian Department of the International Center of Independent Workers of the Professional Movement (in Paris).

Margolin often wrote that the participation of Ukrainians in the international movement of a democratic socialism would make them known. He indicated that President Roosevelt's reforms in the United States corresponded to the minimum program of socialist parties in free countries.

Sometimes in Margolin's letters one could detect a tragi-comic tone. For instance, in one of his letters he wrote that he had been reported to the U.S. security authorities as being "a Bolshevik." It was found that the report had been made by an old emigrant from the Ukraine. The inquiry had revealed that this same person, as I was informed by Margolin, had been a Soviet spy for years. "Now," wrote Margolin in his letter, "he is being taken care of by the proper authorities. . . ."

In 1954 I received a letter from Margolin from Washington. He told me about his intentions of going to London for some time and inquired about living conditions there. He told me he would prefer to participate in political life in Europe, together with our group. My associates and I welcomed Margolin's plan to come to London. He also intended to find a way to establish cooperation between Jewish and Ukrainian political workers in Europe. He was disturbed by the unreasonable anti-Ukrainian propaganda in some of the Jewish press and by the tone of the Ukrainian press abroad.

In his letters to me Margolin also touched upon S. V. Pet-
lyura. He wrote that he personally "had never regarded Petlyura as 'a Pohromnyk'" (incidentally, this problem has been clearly explained in Margolin's book *The Ukraine and the Policy of the Entente*).

The plan for moving to London was to be postponed.

As an American citizen, Margolin considered it his duty to serve the interests of his new motherland by advising U.S. political leaders. In his talks, memoranda, and letters to various American statesmen, he consistently stressed his view that the only just "prescription" to improve relations between the peoples of Eastern Europe would be the following: Do not impose decisions "from above" against the people's will. When the American adherents of federation for the peoples of Eastern Europe proposed their plans in this respect, Margolin replied to them that the condition of federation should be the independence of the people, for only an independent nation could freely determine its fate. A federation imposed "from above" would equal slavery.

In his letters to me Margolin often mentioned the fact that many intellectuals in the United States had been schooled by Russian teachers; therefore, these intellectuals looked at the problems of Eastern Europe through Russian spectacles. Margolin wrote me in a slightly humorous vein that those Americans who had learned "to read Pushkin in the original" were the most dangerous: they thought they understood perfectly all the problems of Eastern Europe.

During the last years of his life in Washington, Margolin complained about his ill health in his letters. He had a very serious operation, but it did not interfere with his cheerful and optimistic attitude. His life's energy was felt in his letters: his thought was clear, his style pellucid and simple. His practical approach to life was also revealed in his letters.

A year before his death he sent me photostatic copies of his correspondence with Louis Marshall, the late President of the American Jewish Committee. These letters were written after Petlyura's death. Margolin had convinced the leaders of the American Jewish Committee not to take part in Schwarz-
bart's defense during the Paris trial in 1927 (Schwarzbart had assassinated Petlyura). Margolin wrote me that he had nothing against my publishing this correspondence after his death.

In October of 1956, one week before his unexpected and untimely death, Margolin sent me a letter to London. Soon afterward I received the sad news: L. A. Margolena-Hansen described in her letter the last sad days of Margolin's life.

The thirtieth day of October is for me a day of mourning for my noble friend, a man of pure heart with high intelligence, and a good adviser; he gave his life to the service of the people. I believe that the Ukrainians, when they will become free, will duly celebrate the name of this worthy son of the Ukraine, who even abroad, thousands of miles away, had preserved his love of his motherland and tried, as much as he could, to help the Ukraine enter the road to freedom, humanity, and social justice, in accordance with the compassionate ideals once expressed by Skovoroda, the Ukrainian philosopher: "I, too, am a man, and all that is human is close to me."
IN MEMORY OF ARNOLD MARGOLIN*

YAROSLAV CHYZ

After more than four years of service as a member of the Supreme Court of the Ukraine, as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, as Chief of the Ukrainian Mission to London, and as a member of the Ukrainian Delegation to the Paris Conference, A. D. Margolin arrived in the United States in 1922. By then the Ukraine was militarily defeated, the Ukrainian cause lost in diplomatic negotiations, and the Ukraine’s fight for freedom unjustly, but firmly, linked with anti-Jewish pogroms. In America he found a complete repudiation of Wilsonian principles (including the idea of a League of Nations, in which he firmly believed), a return to isolationism, the doctrine that the Ukrainian struggle for independence was nothing more than “rebellion” similar to the uprising of the southern states in 1860’s, and again, exaggerated and twisted tales about pogroms.

With his reputation as a lawyer, with his abilities and contacts, he could have withdrawn from public life and turned to private practice—and no one would have blamed him. But, while he took up some private law practice to make a living for his family and himself, most of his efforts in the 34 years of his life in America were devoted to the struggle for his ideas. In his articles and books he presented an accurate picture of the pogroms, clearing the Ukrainian struggle for independence and its leaders from responsibility for them. In countless interviews, memoranda and letters to leading American foreign policy makers in and out of the government, he defended the right of the Ukraine and of other nations subjugated by the Kremlin to full independence. He did not exclude the possibility of a federation of these and other nations, but only

* This is a note found in the papers of the late Yaroslav Chyz, Chairman of the Academy’s Commission for the Study of the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations. It is dated February 12, 1957.
after they were given a chance to decide freely, as sovereign states, as to their future relationship with their neighbors.

As early as 1933 he warned his friends in the State Department that America must abandon isolationism, in view of the danger from the German-Italian-Japanese alliance, which at that time many statesmen did not want to believe. Again, during World War II, he was one of the few political thinkers who, while condemning Hitlerism and what it stood for, expressed emphatically their mistrust of Soviet policies and warned of the danger they presented. During all this time he was also working for better understanding between Jews and Ukrainians.

Toward the end of his life he was fortunate enough to see that his ideas in all the fields of his interest were gaining ground and proving themselves correct and useful.
TWO EULOGIES

I
ALEXIS GOLDENWEISER

He died in the same way that he lived. He crossed the street with his light, rapid, youthful stride without looking around or paying attention to the warning red light, and stopped only when a heavy truck crushed him.

I can remember Arnold Margolin for as long as I can remember myself. In the days of my childhood, in Kiev, the name “Margolin” was not merely a famous but almost a legendary one. And Arnold Margolin inherited from his father not only this great name but also his tremendous energy, tenacity of purpose and creative initiative. However, in the son, these family traits acquired a different direction. I have never known anyone who was less a businessman than Arnold Margolin. He loved life but was totally indifferent to all the tangible paraphernalia of living. Throughout the second half of his life, he lived like a student, without a steady abode, without even the simplest comforts.

After his graduation from the university, he became enthralled by scientific studies, attending courses given by famous European criminologists, writing essays and delivering addresses at meetings of learned societies. But in the long run the life of a scholar did not suit his temperament. He was admitted to the legal profession and began to work as a criminal trial lawyer. As a member of the “Group of Counselors for Defense in Political Trials,” Arnold Margolin took part in many famous cases. In the Gomel Massacre case in 1904, he was aligned with such leaders of the Russian bar as Vinaver, Sliosberg, Kupernik, et al., as counsel for the defense of the Jewish victims. His speech at the trial of the Council of Student Representatives in Kiev in 1907 was notable for a spirited and courageous polemic against the prosecutor.
In 1911, he plunged into the Beilis Ritual Murder case with the same impetuousness with which he walked to his doom on the day of the fatal accident—in the very same way, not looking around, and ignoring the warning red lights. From the very beginning of the case, Margolin realized that the inquest was being conducted unfairly, that there was no honest search for the true murderers but that, on the contrary, the guilty were assisted in covering up all incriminating evidence. He immediately decided that his duty as attorney for the defense was not only to appear for his client on the day of the trial, but to see to it that the inquest be directed along the right path. And he took the risky step of arranging a personal meeting with the woman, Vera Chebyriak, who was groomed to become the principal witness for the prosecution but was, in fact, the leader of the gang of murderers.

From the point of view of the American conception of the lawyer’s function in a criminal case, there is nothing uncommon about the counsel meeting a witness before the trial and trying to find out what the testimony is likely to be. But in Russia the rules of procedure were different. Attorneys were not allowed to take any part in the preliminary inquest. In this instance, the Chebyriak woman proved to be an accomplished actress and gave her interview with Margolin the widest publicity. As a result, Margolin was prevented from appearing at the trial and, after the case was over, he was disbarred. Thus Shcheglovitov, the then Minister of Justice, who could not induce the jury to render a verdict of guilty against the innocent Beilis, took vengeance for his mortification by persecuting the defense attorney. Only after the Revolution did the highest Russian Court reinstate Margolin as a member of the bar and exonerate him of any malfeasance in the Beilis case.

But at that time Arnold Margolin had lost interest in the practice of law. He was fully absorbed in political activities. Many of us acted similarly in 1917, but with the difference that after our defeat in the political arena we laid down our arms, whereas the indomitable Arnold Margolin continued the fight to the very day on which the truck crushed him.
He came to the United States in 1922, without knowledge of the English language, without money, without proper connections. He had to try a variety of occupations: working for charitable institutions, lecturing, writing. For a time he cooperated with American lawyers in cases involving Russian law, and later was himself admitted to the bar. But finally he abandoned all these activities and settled down in Washington, D.C. to become involved in political work once more.

Here he lived during the last twenty years of his life. Throughout these long years he was tireless in writing memoranda, taking part in innumerable conferences in the State Department and in the Department of Defense, and in return had only the satisfaction that his advice was always listened to attentively and given due consideration.

Thousands of residents of Washington are in one way or another occupied with matters political, but few, if any, operate as did Arnold Margolin. He received no subsidies and had no sponsors. He was a free lance in the fullest sense of the word, belonging to no party or association. He had no office, no secretary, not even a typewriter. But always numerous people accepted the services which he freely and generously gave for the mere asking.

Many persons and numerous institutions took advantage of his willingness to serve, but hardly anyone at any time thought of paying for his services. The State Department and the Pentagon could never find in their budgets an appropriation which would allow them to remunerate Mr. Margolin's work. Among the emigrants all over the world it became a habit to ask Arnold Margolin to do for them anything which they needed to have done in Washington. His correspondence was tremendous, but he answered every letter on the very day it was received, and his answers hardly ever contained a refusal.

It often seemed to me that Arnold Margolin had something in common with Don Quixote. Like the indomitable Guialgo, he had a rather naive faith in the force of persuasion; like him too, he was a tireless fighter, constitutionally incap-
able of admitting defeat, of abandoning further efforts. Such
words simply did not exist in his vocabulary.

Arnold Margolin's life was the life of a true idealist, and
as such he will be remembered by all who knew him.

II

VOLODYMYR KEDROVSKY

In deepest sorrow and with a broken heart, I wish to say a
couple of words in memory of Dr. Arnold Margolin.

When, after a long period of oppression under the tsarist
regime, the Ukrainian people reestablished their democratic
republic and their free government, Dr. Margolin, as one of
the most prominent figures in the Ukraine at that time, was
selected and appointed Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Ukrainian People's Republic. By this selection, the people of
the Ukraine placed Dr. Margolin among their most eminent
leaders, those entrusted with guiding their destinies.

Later on, Dr. Margolin was appointed to one of the most
important diplomatic posts, namely, representative of the Ukrain-
ian People's Republic in London. When the fight for a free
Ukraine was transferred from the battlefields to the interna-
tional councils, Dr. Margolin, as consultant of the Ukrainian
Mission, went to Paris to seek support for the Ukrainian cause
at the Paris Peace Conference. For the same purpose, Dr.
Margolin, as a member of a Ukrainian delegation, appeared
before the League of Nations.

These are only a few facts on his political activities under-
taken for the benefit of the Ukrainian people. These facts
prove that Dr. Margolin firmly believed in the right of self-
determination for all peoples and worked hard for the applica-
tion of this right to the Ukrainian people, at the same time
promoting harmony among the people of the Ukrainian
Republic.

The philosophy of Arnold Margolin was that there are no
bad peoples and no good peoples, that only governments can
be bad or good. And he sincerely believed in the equality of all peoples regardless of their race, creed, or national origin. All his life Arnold Margolin fought for what our great President Lincoln called government of the people, by the people and for the people.

The people of the Ukraine and all the world have lost a great liberal and fighter for a better future for all oppressed peoples, including the Ukrainians.

And I myself have lost my dearest friend.

I should like to finish my brief eulogy with an old Ukrainian saying used on such sorrowful occasions: May the earth—which will accept that which is mortal of this great man—be as light for him as feathers.
VADYM SHCHERBAKIVSKY

Vadym Shcherbakivsky, a full member of the Ukrainian Free Academy, archeologist, ethnographer and historian of arts, died on January 18, 1957, in London.

Vadym Shcherbakivsky was born on March 17, 1876 in the village Shpychyntsi, Kiev Province, to the family of the priest. He studied in Gymnasiums in Kiev and Nizhyn. In 1895 he entered the Physicomathematical Department of St. Petersburg University and transferred in 1896 to the same department of the Moscow University. In 1898 he was arrested because of his association with student social-democratic groups. After a few months of imprisonment, he was exiled to the place of his birth with a restriction of movement no farther than 25 versts from his home. Later this restriction was suspended, but Shcherbakivsky was not permitted to continue his university studies until 1902.

In the years of his compulsory residence in the country, Shcherbakivsky interested himself in Ukrainian folklore, embroidery, and the architecture of old Ukrainian churches. Study in this field became his life-long occupation. In 1902 he participated in the All-Russian Archeological Congress in Kharkiv. The same year he renewed his studies at Kiev University and became better acquainted with Professor Volodymyr Antonovych. In 1903 and 1904 he participated in archeological excavations under Antonovych’s supervision. In 1905 he presented a paper on the architecture of Ukrainian wooden churches at the All-Russian Archeological Congress in Katerynoslav. In 1906-1907 he participated in archeological excavations and collected ethnographic materials for the Kiev Historical Museum.

He was imprisoned again in 1907 because of his revolutionary activities and was exiled abroad. The years 1908-1910 he spent mostly in Lviv, collecting materials for the Church Museum founded by Metropolitan Sheptytsky. He returned to Kiev in 1911.
Shcherbakivsky came to work as a curator of the Museum in Poltava in 1912 and held this position up to 1922. He was one of the founders in 1917 of the Ukrainian Free University in Poltava, and was a professor there in 1918. In 1922 he emigrated first to Vienna, then to Prague where from 1922 to 1945 he was a professor at the Ukrainian Free University. During the period 1945-51 he was with the same university which was transferred to Munich, being its President and then Dean of the Philosophical Department. In 1951 he came to London where he worked intensively on the ancient history of the Ukraine, collecting material in libraries.

Shcherbakivsky participated in many international scholarly congresses, was a member of numerous scholarly societies, and wrote more than a hundred works, both books and articles, in the fields of archeology, ancient history of the Ukraine, and history of Ukrainian arts and architecture. Because of the versatility of his interests, he worked in many domains of Ukrainian studies; but the Ukrainian people and all the manifestations of their creative spirit was the main subject of his research. The book, *Formatsiya ukrayins'koyi natsiyi* (Formation of the Ukrainian Nationality) was Shcherbakivsky's *magnum opus*.

The greatest value of Shcherbakivsky’s works lies in his scrupulous collecting of materials, their juxtaposition and comparative study.

**REV. VASYL’ KUZIV**

The Reverend Vasyl’ Kuziv, pastor of the Ukrainian Evangelical Church, member of the Academy Commission for the Study of the History of Ukrainian Immigration in the U.S. and member of the Academy Foundation, died on July 24, 1958, in Newark, N. J.

Vasyl’ Kuziv was born on February 3, 1887 in the village of Denysiv, Ternopil region, the Ukraine. He was graduated from the Gymnasium in Berezhany. In his early youth he emigrated to the United States. In Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, he met Min-
ister Nyzhankivsky and under his influence was converted to Evangelism. In 1907-1910 he studied theology and since that time was active as an Ukrainian Presbyterian missionary in the U.S.A. (New York and Newark) and Canada. In 1922 he initiated the founding of the Ukrainian Evangelical Association of North America and was active there up to his death. He participated in many fields of cultural and public life of the Ukrainian-American community.

From the first days of the founding of the Academy, Rev. Kuziv participated in its work. He gave several lectures at conferences of the Academy and supported the activities of the Academy Foundation.

SVITOZOR DRAHOMANO V

Professor Svitozor Drahomanov, specialist in economics and well-known Ukrainian journalist, died on December 4, 1958, in Rochester, N. Y.

Son of the great Mykhaylo Drahomanov, Svitozor was born on June 29, 1884, when his parents were living as émigrés in Switzerland. He studied at the Gymnasiums in Switzerland and Sofia, Bulgaria. After his father’s death, Svitozor Drahomanov went with his mother to Kiev where he graduated from high school, then studied at the Polytechnical Institute and later graduated from the Commercial Institute.

Between 1918 and 1920 Drahomanov was an ardent partisan of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and worked for the institutions of the newly organized state. Under the Soviet regime Drahomanov was constantly persecuted and forced to change jobs. He worked first as a proofreader, then as a lecturer at higher educational institutions in Kiev, contributing articles to the Kievan daily Proletars’ka Pravda on urban administration and city planning, working for the film industry and the State Technical Publishing House. In 1932 the publishing of Drahomanov’s articles was prohibited. Late in 1935 he was purged because of his activities in the 1918-1920 period and could find no work up to the war.
In 1943 Drahomanov left for Lviv and then for Germany. When the war ended he became a professor at the Ukrainian Technical Husbandry Institute at Regensburg, West Germany. He contributed many articles to the Ukrainian democratic periodicals in the free world, mostly on a federated Europe and on international cooperation in general.

On coming to this country in 1950, Drahomanov cooperated closely with the Academy and headed the Commission for the Preservation of the Literary Inheritance of Mykhaylo Drahomanov. He was a co-editor of the *Drahomanov Symposium* published by the Academy.

**YAROSLAV J. CHYZ**


Chyz was born February 7, 1894 in Dublyany, near Lviv. His father was a teacher. In 1912 Chyz graduated from the Ukrainian Gymnasium in Peremyshl. During World War I he was a non-commissioned and then a commissioned officer in the Austrian Army and was a prisoner of war in Russia. After the Revolution of 1917 he was among the organizers of the *Sich Sharpshooters* (*Sichovi striït'si*), a Ukrainian military unit composed of Galician prisoners of war in Russia, which was then included in the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. He had the rank of captain and belonged to the Council of Sich Sharpshooters, where he served as the political advisor. After the defeat of the Ukrainian forces, Chyz came to Lviv and joined the ranks of the secret Ukrainian Military Organization formed to overthrow Polish rule over Western Ukraine. He participated in an unsuccessful plot against Piłsudski, and in 1921 escaped to Czechoslovakia. He obtained political asylum there, resumed his studies at Charles University in Prague and was graduated from its philosophy department with specialization in Slavonic languages and literatures. He was fluent in several languages.
Chyz arrived in the U.S.A. in 1922. From March, 1923, to February 1924, he was assistant manager of the Ukrainian Bureau of the Foreign Language Information Service in New York. During 1924-1942 he was editor-in-chief of the Ukrainian newspaper *Narodna Volya*, in Scranton, Pa. He joined the staff of the Common Council for American Unity in 1942 as head of its foreign language press division, and from 1952 until his death served as associate director of the Council. He acted as an expert consultant for the United States government and many public and private agencies.

Yaroslav J. Chyz was an outstanding authority on American nationality groups and on the history of immigration. He was the author of numerous publications on these subjects in English and Ukrainian.

Immediately after the Academy was founded in 1950, Chyz became an active member. He delivered a number of lectures at its scholarly conferences, in 1953 initiated the organization of the Commission for the Study of the History of the Ukrainian Immigration in the U.S. and was its chairman up to his death. He participated actively in the work of the Commission for the Study of the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations. Having a special interest in this field, Mr. Chyz collected voluminous material on the subject; during the last months of his life he worked intensively on preparing for this issue an article treating Ukraining-Jewish relations during the Revolution. Unfortunately, this has not yet been found among his papers.

His death is a great loss to the Academy, which benefited so much from his incomparable knowledge of the history of the Ukrainian immigration.

**HRYHORIY DOVZHENKO**

Hryhoriy Dovzhenko, for many years librarian of the Symon Petlyura Library in Paris, died in Abondant, France, on December 18, 1958. He was 81 years old.

Son of a peasant, he was a worker without formal education.
From his youth he was associated with underground social-democratic groups in Tsarist Russia, and even had personal contacts with Lenin. In the first days of the Revolution, in Kiev, he became a member of the *Tsentral'na Rada* (Central Council). He was a popular speaker at workers’ meetings, noted for his talent for explaining in simple words the ideas of Ukrainian democratic groups. He was elected Chairman of the Council of Workers’ Deputies, a member of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, and later a member of the Ukrainian Workers’ Congress.

Coming to Paris in the late 1920’s, Dovzhenko devoted all his spirit and energy to the Symon Petlyura Library, where he worked devotedly until early 1958. He was active in collecting books and periodicals for the library and tirelessly raised funds for this purpose among Ukrainian émigrés.
CHRONICLE

During the period from January 1, 1958 to April 1, 1959 the following lectures were delivered at the plenary sessions of the Academy:

March 1, 1958
—Volodymyr Kubiyovych: *Ukrainian Diaspora in its Historical Development*.

March 7, 1958
—P. Kuwahara: *Japan Today*.

March 8, 1958
Grand Conference in Honor of Taras Shevchenko, sponsored by the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. and the Shevchenko Scientific Society in America.
—Volodymyr Miyakovsky: *Shevchenko and Kostomarov*.
—Bohdan Zahaykevych: *Shevchenko Cult in the Western Ukraine*.

March 22, 1958
—Oleksander Granovsky: *The Role of Entomology in Economic Development*.

April 20, 1958
—Vasyl Kuziv: *Problems of Psychology and Religion in Relation to Health*.

April 27, 1958
—Zeki Velidi Togan: *Timur's Campaign of 1395 in the Ukraine and North Caucasus*.

May 17, 1958

May 25, 1958
—Aristid Vyrsta: *The Present State of Ukrainian Music in the Ukraine and Abroad*.

June 8, 1958
—Michael Vetukhiv: *The Work of the Academy During the Past Year*.

October 4, 1958
—Boris Martos: *Ukrainian Currency, 1917-1920*.

October 19, 1958
—Anton Adamovych: *Fragments from History of Byelorussian-Ukrainian Literary Relations*.

November 16, 1958

November 30, 1958
A Commerorative Evening on the 40th Anniversary of Foundation of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts in Kiev, 1918.
—Michael Vetukhiv: *Address.*


**December 26, 1958** — Jaroslav Rudnyč'kyj: *Problems of Contemporary Ukrainian Bibliography in the Free World.*

**January 17, 1959** Conference Commemorating Vadym Shcherbakivsky. — Levko Chikalenko: *Vadym Shcherbakivsky, as Ethnographer and Archeologist.*


**February 1, 1959** Grand Conference in Memory of the Ukrainian Historian and Archeologist, Volodymyr Antonovych. Michael Vetukhiv presided and made the opening address. — Olexander Ohloblyn: *Volodymyr Antonovych and Modern Ukrainian Historiography.*
— Leonid Sonevytsky: *Volodymyr Antonovych and Ukrainian Historical Science in Galicia.*
— Volodymyr Miyakovsky: *Volodymyr Antonovych's Political Views in 1860's.*
— Levko Chikalenko: *Volodymyr Antonovych as Archeologist.*

**February 7, 1959** — Oleksander Sas-Yavorsky: *An Analysis of Similarities in the History of the Ukraine and that of the United States.*

**February 21, 1959** — Leon Stilman: *Gogol Ancestry (A Few Inconclusive Facts and Considerations).*

**February 28, 1959** — John A. Armstrong: *Social Factors Uniting and Separating the Eastern and Western Ukraine.*

**March 7, 1959** Grand Conference in Honor of Taras Shevchenko sponsored by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in America and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. — Gregory Luzhnytsky: *Shevchenko and the World Today.*
— Ivan Sweet: *Shevchenko Days in Asia.*
The following lectures and seminars were held under the auspices of the sections and commissions of the Academy in New York City:

**LITERARY AND PHILOLOGICAL SECTION**

February 23, 1958  Conference Commemorating Katrya Hrynevycheva, with exhibit of her publications, manuscripts, photographs, and documents.
—George Y. Shevelov: *Opening Address.*
—Ivan Korovytsky: *Katrya Hrynevycheva—Bard of the Times of Helmets.*
—Yaroslav Hrynevych: *Katrya Hrynevycheva and Ivan Franko.*


May 23, 1958  Joint Conference of the Academy Literary Archive and the Ukrainian Club of Arts and Letters in New York, Commemorating Katrya Hrynevycheva with exhibit of materials on her creative works.
—Ivan Korovytsky, Bohdan Kravtsiv, and Serhiy Lytvynenko presented papers on life and works of Katrya Hrynevycheva.
—Lidiya Krushelnytska and Larysa Mykulenko: recitations.
—Vadym Kipa: musical selections.

October 25, 1958 —V. Doroshenko: *The Manifesto of “Rus’ka Triytsya.”*

**HISTORICAL SECTION**

December 20, 1958 —Isidore Nahayewsky: *History and Legend Relating to Ancient Ukraine.*

February 15, 1959 —Bohdan Kravtsiv: *Makowski and Beauplan—Founders of the Cartography of the Ukraine.*

**ANCIENT HISTORY SECTION**

March 2, 1958 —Alexander Dombrovsky: *Ancient Roots in Byzantine Culture of the Sixth and Seventh Centuries.*

October 26, 1958 —Andriy Kotsevalov: *On the Question of Slavery in Crete.*
THE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF POST-REVOLUTIONARY UKRAINE AND SOVIET UNION


December 13, 1958 —Ivan L. Rudnytsky: The Ukrainian Revolution after Forty Years.

January 24, 1959 Conference on National Conflicts in Communist Parties of Soviet Republics.
—Anton Adamovych: National-Communism in Byelorussia.
—Ilya J. Goldman: Nationalism and Integration in Georgia.
—Garip Sultan: Nationalistic Opposition of Tatar Communists (Suliman-Galiy Movement).
—Vsevolod Holubnychy: Nationalist Deviations in the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

February 8, 1959 —Ivan Sweet: Ukrainian Military Formations in Asia in 1917–1922.

March 14, 1959 —Kost Varvariv: The Ukrainian Revolution in Debates and Documents of the U.S. Congress.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SECTION


BIOLOGICAL SECTION

March 15, 1958 —Alexander Arkhimovych: Results of the Fourth Year of the Cultivation of Virgin Lands in the U.S.S.R.
—Nestor Korol: Virgin Lands in Kazakhstan.

June 14, 1958  Excursion to the New York Botanical Garden led by Olexander Arkhimbovich.  
—Dr. David D. Kick, Acting Director of the garden, guided the tour.

PHYSICO-CHEMICAL AND TECHNICAL SECTION


PHILOSOPHIC SECTION


FINE ARTS GROUP

February 22, 1958 —Damian Hornyatkevych: *Recent Publications in the Field of Ukrainian Arts*.


December 28, 1958 Excursion to the Metropolitan Museum of Art led by Damian Hornyatkevych.

February 22, 1959 The same.

THE COMMISSION FOR PRESERVATION OF THE LITERARY HERITAGE OF VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO


March 21, 1959 —Mykola Shlemkevych: *Volodymyr Vynnychenko in the Period of Tsentral’na Rada and the Directory (Recollections)*.

SEMINAR ON ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL, SOCIAL, DOMESTIC, AND FOREIGN POLICY


December 17, 1958 —Vsevolod Holubnychy: *Soviet Collective Farms as a Form of Agriculture*. 
GROUP OF THE ACADEMY IN DENVER, COLORADO


May 10, 1958  — Lyubomyr Vynar: Recording of the Research Performed by the Ukrainians in the U.S.A.


December 6, 1958 The 25th Anniversary of Afanasiy Slastion’s death commemorated by the conference and exhibition of his works.
— Yurii Slastion: Afanasiy Slastion, the Artist: His Life And Creative Works.

December 20, 1958 Conference Commemorating the Artist Illya Shulha and Exhibit of his Pictures.
— Lidiya Shulha: Life of Illya Shulha.
— Yurii Slastion: Illya Shulha as an Artist.

February 28, 1959 — Bohdan Vynar: Impressions of Travels to Europe in the Fall of 1958.

GROUP OF THE ACADEMY IN DETROIT, MICHIGAN


February 14, 1958 Lectures of Academy Members at the Conference of the University of Michigan devoted to education in the U.S.S.R. today.
— Ivan Rozhin: Critical Analysis of the Current System of Higher Education in the U.S.S.R.
— Vasyl Prychodko: Critical Analysis of the Current High-School System in the U.S.S.R.
— A. Shashlo: Methods of Physics Teaching in the U.S.S.R.
— Mykola Prychodko: Academic and Social Status of Students in the U.S.S.R.

March 15, 1958 — Ivan Rozhin: 40 Years of Creative Work of Ukrainian Scholars and Scientists.
—Mykola Livytsky: *Tasks of Ukrainian Scholarship in the Struggle for Liberation of Ukrainian People.*

April 4, 1958  Conference Commemorating the Fifth Anniversary of the death of Borys Ivanytsky.
—Ivan Rozhin: *Borys Ivanytsky as a Scientist and Public Figure.*
—Yaroslav Zubal: *Borys Ivanytsky, as a Specialist in Forestry.*

February 27, 1959  —Yevhen Pereyma: *The Book as a Creation of Spirit.*
—Zaplitny: *Ukrainian Libraries in Detroit Today.*

March 8, 1959  —Volodymyr Miyakovsky: Address at the Shevchenko Conference in Detroit, Mich., organized by the Ukrainian-American Federation of Michigan and the Metropolitan Branch of the Ukrainian Congress Committee.

GROUP OF THE ACADEMY IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

—Panteleymon Kovaliv: *Shevchenko and his Poem “Kateryna.”*
—Petro Odarchenko: *Shevchenko and Franko.*
—Yu. Starosolsky: *Art in Shevchenko’s Life.*
—Oleska Povstenko: *Kiev in Shevchenko’s Time.*

June 5, 1958  —Lubow Margolena: *Experiments on Biology of Fell, Performed at the Laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture.*


January 24, 1959  Conference Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Unification of the Ukraine.
—Hryhoriy Denysenko: *Processes in the Formation of the State in the Period of the Ukrainian Tsentral’na Rada and the Labor Congress.*

March 15, 1959  —Petro Odarchenko: *Shevchenko and Mazepa.*
—Panteleymon Kovaliv: *Role of Shevchenko in the Development of the Ukrainian Literary Language.*
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The following transliteration system has been used:

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1708
Titles of bibliographical sources, published in Roman lettering, and the names of corresponding authors are cited in full agreement with the original text. Those published in Cyrillic lettering are transliterated according to the system on page 1708. Names of some authors (e.g., Čiževsky, Borschak) are given in transliteration as used by the authors themselves in their writings in Western European languages. Ukrainian family names having the ending 'ський' and Russian names ending with 'ский' were transliterated as 'sky'. The same endings in names of publications were transcribed according to the above system of transliteration.

The spelling of well-known place names, generally accepted in English usage, retain such accepted form (e.g., Kiev, Dnieper). The Ukrainian forms of place names are used in other cases, the symbol ' (for т) being omitted.

ERRATA

In the review by George Y. Shevelov of Istoryčna hramatyka ukrajins'koji movy by O. P. Bezpal'ko, M. K. Bojčuk, M. A. Žovtobrjux, S. P. Samijlenko, I. J. Taranenko, in the Annals Vol. VI, No. 21-22, pp. 1429-1433, there were the following typographical errors:

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CONTRIBUTORS

Philip Friedman, lecturer on Jewish History at Columbia University and research director of the documentary projects of the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research; author of books and articles on Jewish history.

Andriy Kotsevalov, philologist, author of many publications; now resides in New York.

Alexander Dombrovsky, historian, now resides in New York.

Yaroslav Bilinsky, Ph.D. Princeton University; instructor in Politics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N. J.

Salomon Goldelman, former member of the Ukrainian Tsentral'na Rada and professor of Economics, Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in Podebrady, Czecho-Slovakia; now resides in Israel.

Leonid C. Sonevytsky, Ph.D., author of several studies in the field of Ukrainian history, vice-chairman of the Historical Section of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.

Ilya J. Goldman, lawyer, economist and writer, associated member of the Institute for Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.; formerly associated with the government of free Republic of Georgia.

Levko Chikalenko, archeologist and political figure; in 1917-1918, secretary of the Ukrainian Tsentral'n Rada.

Michael Vetukhiv, geneticist, in 1950-1959 President of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.; died in 1959.

Lubow Margolena, biologist, now associate microanalyst at the Agricultural Research Centre, Beltsville, Md.

Panas Fedenko, historian and political figure, author of works on Ukrainian history, now in Munich, Germany.

Yaroslav Chyz, journalist and political figure, died in 1958.

Alexis Goldenweiser, formerly lawyer and professor of law in Kiev, now residing in New York City.

Volodymyr Kedrovsky, a prominent figure in the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, now in Washington, D.C.

The following persons assisted in the editing and technical production of this issue: Ruth Mathewson, Theodore B. Ciu-ciuura, Eda Grellick, Lubov Drashevska and Ivan Zamsha.