The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S. are published by the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., Inc., two issues a year. Each issue is devoted to a particular field of knowledge.

EDITORIAL COMMITTEE: Dmitry Čiževsky, Heidelberg University
Oleksander Granovsky, University of Minnesota
John S. Reshetar, University of Washington
Roman Smal-Stocki, Marquette University
Volodymyr P. Timoshenko, Stanford University

EDITOR: George Y. Shevelov, Columbia University

The views expressed by contributors are not necessarily those of the editor of The Annals

All correspondence, orders, and remittances should be addressed to The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., 206 West 100 Street, New York 25, New York

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTION RATE FOR TWO ISSUES, ONE VOLUME: $6.00
A special rate is offered to libraries and university and college students in the field of Slavic studies. Price of this volume: $6.00

Copyright 1961, by the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U. S., Inc.
CONTENTS

STUDIES IN HISTORY OF THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY UKRAINE
AND THE SOVIET UNION

Lenin on the Ukraine ................................................................. 3
JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

Stalin's Conception of Soviet Federalism (1918–1923) . . . . . . 12
ROBERT H. MCNEAL

Lenin und die “verpasste Revolution” in Deutschland . . . . . 26
GEORG VON RAUCH

The Renovationist Church in the Soviet Ukraine, 1922–1939 41
BOHDAN R. BOCIURKIW

On the Rationale of the Soviet Collectivization of Agriculture
in 1929 ................................................................. 75
VSEVOLOD HOLUBNYCHY

The Agrarian-Industrial Dichotomy in the Ukraine as a Factor
in Soviet Nationality Policy ............................................. 110
ROBERT S. SULLIVANT

Patriotism, “Bourgeois Nationalism,” and the Nationality
Policy of the USSR after Stalin ..................................... 126
ALFRED D. LOW

The Ukrainian SSR in International Affairs after World
War II ............................................................................. 147
YAROSLAV BILINSKY

The Soviet Ukraine as a Subject of International Law . . . . 167
BOHDAN T. HALAJCZUK

Die Sowjetukraine und die europäischen volksdemokratischen
Länder (1958–1960) ..................................................... 189
BORYS LEWYTZKYJ
Representation of Nationalities and Occupations in the Soviets

Peter H. Juviler

The Ukrainian Apparatus as a Key to the Study of Soviet Politics

John A. Armstrong

Soviet and Satellite Sources on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Lew Shankowsky

Allgemeine Probleme des internationalen Privatrechts der Sowjetunion

Andreas Bilinsky

BOOK REVIEWS


Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (C. Y. Bohdan)

Romain Yakemtchouk, *La Ligne Curzon et la IIe guerre mondiale* (Vasyl Markus)

O. I. Biletsky, *Vid davnyny do suchasnosti* (Bohdan Krawciw)

West European and American Doctoral Dissertations on the Ukraine, 1945–60 (Joseph Danko)

OBITUARIES

Ivan Mirtschuk (Jurij Bojko)

Dmytro Halychyn (L.D.)

Oleksander Morhun (L.D.)

CHRONICLE

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
Although Lenin never visited the Ukraine and had no first-hand knowledge of the country, his imposition of Soviet rule upon the Ukrainians has rendered consequential the various statements and opinions on the Ukraine expressed in his works. Examination of the first half of Lenin's total published output discloses neither an awareness of the Ukrainians nor a concern for their particular condition. Such references as are to be found pertaining to the Ukraine in works of the 1893-1911 period deal with purely economic, non-cultural, and non-national matters. Various Ukrainian cities and provinces were referred to by Lenin but only to illustrate economic processes which he regarded as characteristic of the entire Russian Empire. In his *Development of Capitalism in Russia*, published in 1899, he referred to the Ukraine by the official (and pejorative) appellation of “Little Russia.” Initially, Lenin wrote exclusively of the “Russian working class,” “Russian Social Democrats,” “Russian Socialists,” the “Russian proletariat,” and the “Russian labor movement.”

It was only as a result of the 1905 Revolution that Lenin commenced to refer to the “peoples of Russia.”1 It appears that Ukrainians were first mentioned by Lenin in a speech delivered at the Third Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in London on May 6, 1905; on that occasion he referred to Father George Gapon's efforts to unite eighteen revolutionary organizations including the Ukrainian Revolutionary Party and the Ukrainian Socialist Party.2 At the end of 1907 Lenin, in discussing the Bolshevik agrarian program, referred to the “Ukrainian faction” in the Second Duma and to the demand of the Poltava deputy, Efim Saiko, that a separate Ukrainian national land fund be established.3 Significantly, Lenin was apparently not interested in Saiko's demand for the establishment

of a Ukrainian school system nor in his charge that the Ukraine was being exploited by Russia.\textsuperscript{4}

It was only in November 1912 that Lenin began to give the appearance of recognizing Ukrainian national claims when he declared that Social Democratic deputies in the Duma would combat every kind of chauvinism and nationalism, "whether it be the coarse and brutal governmental nationalism oppressing and stifling Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, [and] the Jews . . . or the hypocritical, concealed, and subtle nationalism of the liberals and Kadets [who are] prepared to discourse upon the great-power tasks of Russia and upon its agreements with other states for the plundering of foreign lands."\textsuperscript{5} Yet while criticizing Russian nationalists, Lenin inadvertently lapsed into their practice of calling the Ukraine the "Little Russian province" in an article published in the May 9, 1913, issue of \textit{Pravda}. However, in an article published in \textit{Pravda} on the following day he referred to the Ukrainian nation along with the Polish, Jewish, and Georgian nations but only for the purpose of denouncing "bourgeois nationalism." This phenomenon he defined as the attempt to "\textit{distract} the working class from its great world-wide tasks by means of the national struggle or the struggle for national culture."\textsuperscript{6}

When a Congress of Ukrainian Students meeting in Lviv demanded an independent Ukraine, Lenin defended its right to do so and denounced the Kadets for opposing Ukrainian "separatism"—a term which Lenin enclosed in quotation marks. On the occasion of this so-called defense of the Ukrainian students in an article in \textit{Pravda} of July 16, 1913 (then called \textit{Rabochaya Pravda}), Lenin even penned a partial defense of the Ukrainian socialist Dmytro Dontsov although he also maintained that such "national socials" had to be opposed. This "defense" of the Ukrainian students for their separatism was used by Lenin as a weapon against the Kadets, but it also provided him with an opportunity to make it clear that "Marxists will never permit their heads to be turned by national slogans—whether they be Great Russian, Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, or other."\textsuperscript{7}


\textsuperscript{5} Lenin, XVIII, 392.

\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Ibid.}, XIX, 71. See also \textit{ibid.}, pp. 220, 300, 319; and XX, 8.

\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Ibid.}, XIX, 236–37. Lenin, in an attack on Bishop Nikon, a member of the
While paying lip service to the duty of every democrat to combat the "badgering" of any nation for separatism and to demand "complete and unconditional equality of nations and their right to self-determination," Lenin in a subsequent attack on the Kadets in Proletarskaya Pravda (December 11, 1913) revealed his own reservations regarding this right. "It is understood," Lenin declared, "that the right of self-determination is one thing, and the expediency of self-determination—the secession of one or another nation in one or another circumstance—is something else."8 In the same article he advanced the following dialectical formulation: "For the struggle with the ulcer (yazva) of nationalism in all its forms the advocacy of the right of self-determination has very great significance."9

Earlier in 1913, Lenin had made it clear that Marxists could not think in terms of the slogan of national culture; instead, he contended that "the workers are creating throughout the entire world their own international culture."10 At the same time that lip service was paid to the abolition of all privileges for any language or nation, a demand was made for the "unconditional unity and the complete merging (sliyanie) of the workers of all nationalities in counterpoise to every kind of bourgeois nationalism."11

Such statements simply reflected the Marxist belief in the "worldwide historical tendency of capitalism toward breaking down national barriers, toward the obliteration of national differences, toward the assimilation of nations—[a tendency] which with each decade manifests itself with greater potency, constituting one of the great impellents transforming capitalism into socialism."12 As "proof" for this assertion Lenin cited the assimilation of immigrants in the United States. When certain Ukrainian socialists such as Dontsov and Lev Yurkevych—as well as Jewish Bundists—criticized the assimilatory tendencies of Russian Marxism, Lenin attacked them as "bourgeois nationalists" and initiated a Soviet practice which was to be applied subsequently to all defenders of the rights of non-Russian national

Fourth Duma from Volynia, declared that "only clericals or bourgeois can speak of national culture in general." Ibid., p. 342.

8 Ibid., p. 476.
9 Ibid., p. 477.
10 Ibid., p. 72.
11 Ibid., pp. 319f.
12 Ibid., XX, 12.
cultures. Yurkevych, in particular, was singled out for abuse by Lenin on numerous occasions during 1913 and 1914.\textsuperscript{13}

The most that Lenin was willing to concede in December 1913, in view of the alleged inevitability of assimilation, was “absolute tolerance in the question of the language of propaganda” and the taking into account of “purely local or purely national particularities in this propaganda.” While recognizing that the Ukrainian Marxist might quite naturally develop a hatred for Russian oppression, Lenin insisted that a distinction be made between the “two Russian cultures,” that of the “Purishkeviches, Guchkovs, and Struves” and that of Chernyshevsky and Plekhanov. The hatred of Russian imperialism, Lenin held, must not be extended by Ukrainians to “the proletarian culture and the proletarian cause” of the Russians. Ukrainians were to be content with Lenin’s warning to the Russians that it would be nationalistic for them to “forget if only for a minute the demand of full equality for the Ukrainians or their right to create an independent state.” Yet the value of this assurance was negated by Lenin’s ominous assertion that Russian and Ukrainian workers “must together, and so long as they live in one state, in the closest organizational unity and fusion defend the common international culture of the proletarian movement.”\textsuperscript{14} In practice it was to be a question of the specific content of this culture and the degree of Russian influence to which it was to be subjected.

Yet Lenin succeeded in conveying the impression that he was vitally interested in the fate of the non-Russian peoples. On a number of occasions during 1913 and 1914, as well as in July and August of 1915, he reminded his readers that the Russians constituted only 43 per cent of the population of the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{15} On one of these occasions, in April 1914, Lenin had prepared an address to be delivered in the Duma by Hryhoriy Petrovsky, Ukrainian Bolshevik

\textsuperscript{13} Typical of Lenin’s tactics was a plan revealed in a letter which he wrote to Inessa Armand on April 1, 1914. Lenin had prepared a statement protesting Yurkevych’s demand for a separate national organization of Ukrainian workers, but he did not wish to sign it himself and asked Armand to have it translated from Russian into Ukrainian and signed by a solitary Ukrainian Bolshevik, Lola, or, preferably, by “a group (of at least two or three persons) of Ukrainian Marxists (or better still, of Ukrainian workers).” Lenin also advised: “This should be done tactfully, quickly, against Yurkevych and without his knowledge because this little crook will play foul tricks (ibo sei zhulik budet gadit).” \textit{Ibid.}, XXXV, 100.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, XX, 16.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, XIX, 274, 493; XX, 4, 92, 199, 201; XXI, 277.
deputy from Katerynoslav province and subsequently titular head of the Soviet government in the Ukraine prior to 1938. The address could not be delivered because Petrovsky was expelled from the Duma for fifteen sessions on May 5 (April 22) after having joined twenty-three other deputies in creating a disturbance during a speech of the President of the Council of Ministers, Goremykin. This undelivered address is of significance because it contains the sole reference to Taras Shevchenko in all of Lenin’s voluminous writings.\(^{16}\) It gives no indication that Lenin was in any way acquainted with the works of the Ukraine’s greatest poet. He sought only to capitalize upon the tsarist government’s ban of meetings and religious services commemorating the hundredth anniversary of Shevchenko’s birth, on February 25 (March 10), 1914. Lenin contended that the interior ministry’s ban gave millions to understand that Russia was a “prison-house of nations” and was immensely useful to Social Democratic agitators operating against the government.

The advent of World War I enabled Lenin to continue to pose as a champion of Ukrainian national rights—though with all the negating qualifications and reservations implicit in the Marxist-Leninist view of nationality. For Lenin the war was to be “explained” in terms of the British and French bourgeoisie wanting to seize German colonies and favoring the ruin of a competing nation—and, Lenin added with irony, “for this honorable cause the ‘progressive’ and ‘democratic’ nations are aiding savage tsarism to strangle still more Poland and the Ukraine.”\(^{17}\) In his article “On the National Pride of the Great Russians” (December 12, 1914) Lenin quoted Chernyshevsky’s statement regarding Russia as “a despicable nation, a nation of slaves from top to bottom—all are slaves.” To this Lenin added: “A slave who not only avoids aspiring to his own liberty but justifies and embellishes his slavery (for instance, he calls the strangulation of Poland, the Ukraine, etc., ‘defense of the fatherland’ of the Great

---

16 *Ibid.*, XX, 199–200. It is significant that in the second edition of Lenin’s *Sochineniya*, XVII, 731, n. 124, Petrovsky is identified as the Duma deputy for whom the speech was written by Lenin, while in the fourth edition there is no such indication (see XX, 541, n. 65). The reason is that the latter volume was published in 1948, at a time when Petrovsky was in exile within the USSR—ironically exiled by a regime which he helped to create. Rehabilitation of Petrovsky came only in 1953 after a decade and a half of total obscurity and five years before his death.

Russians)—such a slave is a toady and a cad who elicits the legitimate feeling of indignation, contempt, and loathing.”

As part of a campaign to discredit the Russian autocracy and the Entente, Lenin frequently cited the fate of Galicia during the war and, in particular, condemned the tsarist regime’s efforts to occupy this Austrian-ruled Ukrainian region which had played an important role in the development of the national movement. In an article published on February 1, 1915, Lenin noted with sarcasm the “bewailing of the fate of Belgium while remaining silent concerning Galicia.” In November 1916 he wrote that Russia was fighting for Galicia in order to “strangle the Ukrainian people” and then added that “other than in Galicia this people has not and cannot have a corner of freedom, relatively speaking of course.” He repeated this view on January 1, 1917, when he wrote of Galicia that “it is very important for tsarism to strangle this center of Ukrainian agitation and Ukrainian freedom.” However, all of these allusions to Galicia’s plight and expressions of solicitude for the Ukrainians were intended only to make the two camps of belligerents appear to be “bandits” seeking plunder.

Ukrainian national aspirations were to become for Lenin even more of a pawn with the emergence of the Provisional Government in Russia and its unwillingness to recognize and resolve the nationality problem. It is useful to recall that Lenin, beginning in the summer of 1915 and continuing through most of 1917, repeatedly equated the Ukraine with Finland and Poland in terms of the legitimacy of national rights. In a letter to Boris Souvarine written at the end of 1916, Lenin advanced an even more sweeping political equation: “Our party does not fear to declare publicly that it greets with sympathy wars or uprisings which Ireland could begin against England; Morocco, Algeria, or Tunis against France; Tripoli against Italy; the Ukraine, Persia, or China against Russia.”

When, within a few months, the Ukrainians did manifest resistance to Russian rule, Lenin lent them some support so long as he did not

18 Ibid., pp. 85, 86.
19 Ibid., p. 99. See also ibid., p. 334, and XXII, 111.
20 Ibid., XXIII, 115.
21 Ibid., p. 169.
22 Ibid., XXI, 265; XXII, 129, 142, 176; XXIII, 53, 200; XXIV, 304, 320; XXV, 23, 40.
23 Ibid., XXIII, 189.
control the government in the Russian capital. Thus he criticized the Provisional Government whenever it attempted to ban congresses of Ukrainian soldiers and peasants in support of the Ukrainian Central Rada. Lenin accused the Provisional Government of claiming to advocate a “war against annexations and a peace without annexations” while continuing to pursue a “policy of annexation” against Finland and the Ukraine.24

Yet as soon as the Provisional Government disappeared from the scene, Lenin’s dubious support of the Ukrainian Central Rada was dialectically transformed into its opposite. The Rada was then denounced by Lenin as an “antirevolutionary, bourgeois” government, since it stood in the way of any extension of Lenin’s rule beyond the confines of Russia proper. When the Rada found it necessary to conclude a peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk in February 1918, Lenin, employing the usual double standard, denounced the Ukrainians for doing precisely what he had been attempting to undertake and finally accomplished during the following month.25 The Communist military invasions of the Ukraine, the first of which occurred during the winter of 1917-18, gave final meaning to Lenin’s devious statements regarding the right of self-determination and the right of secession.

The dialectical nature of these formulations was particularly evident in certain pronouncements made by Lenin during 1914. At that time he ridiculed those Russians who feared a grant of limited autonomy to the Ukrainians and asked: “Why is it not possible to strengthen the unity of Russia by means of [granting] autonomy to the Ukraine?” He contended that federalism had not impaired the unity of the United States or Switzerland. Apparently Lenin believed that the non-Russian majority would not wish to secede from the Russian Empire and could therefore safely be given the “right” to do so. There was also the reservation that the “conscious workers do not advocate secession; they know the advantages of large states and the union of large masses of workers.”26 Yet Lenin in the spring of 1914 cited the secession of Norway from Sweden as a proper solution and advised that “possible clashes over the secession of nations be decided only as they were resolved in 1905 between Norway and Sweden and not

24 Ibid., XXV, 23.
25 Ibid., XXVII, 154.
26 Ibid., XX, 92.
in the Russian manner."27 Ironically, it was precisely "in the Russian manner" that Lenin reacted to the secession of the non-Russians in 1917 and 1918. He told the Fourth Congress of Soviets on March 14, 1918, that the Ukraine and Finland were "perishing" and revealed his reluctance to part with these lands.

The deceptive writing on national "self-determination" (qualified from time to time to read "the self-determination of the proletariat within the nations") proved to be a gigantic hoax. This was the result of two blind spots which Lenin was unable to overcome. The first of these was his failure to understand that the oppression of Ukrainians (and of the 100,000,000 non-Russians in general) as well as the reaction which it elicited was not exclusively or even primarily a matter of the capitalistic order since it preceded the introduction of capitalism into Russia. The second was his inability to appreciate the very likely possibility that a Russian "proletarian" would be no more tolerant of Ukrainians, Poles, and Finns than a Russian member of the so-called "exploiting class." Lenin believed that if the subjugation of the non-Russians were termed a "fraternal union" and this formula were repeated with sufficient frequency it would gain acceptance.

If slogan and reality were at variance, it was due not only to the fact that Soviet rule was established in the Ukraine by force of arms but also to the requisitioning of millions of tons of grain from the peasantry. Lenin's writings abound with references to the Ukraine's wealth and to the vital role which Ukrainian grain played in alleviating starvation in Russia itself. In moments of frankness Lenin admitted that this requisitioning operation was carried out in large part by Russian personnel who had been sent into the Ukraine especially for this purpose.28 Ironically, he had denounced German plundering of the Ukraine in 1918 but employed an entirely different standard when judging his own conduct in 1919. It is also worth noting that after repeatedly equating the Ukraine with Poland and Finland, Lenin, beginning in 1919, occasionally reverted to the term "borderlands" in referring to the Ukraine and the Don.29

Yet the hard facts of Ukrainian resistance to the rule of either

27 *Ibid.*, p. 398. Lenin also contended that the secession of Norway "strengthened the ties between the Norwegian and Swedish workers" (p. 400).
Soviet Russia or Denikin during 1919 compelled Lenin to reckon with demands for the use of the Ukrainian language and the appointment of Ukrainian officials. By December 1919 Lenin had recognized the need to "counteract in every way the attempts of the russifiers to relegate the Ukrainian language to second place."\(^{30}\) However, Soviet practice was to reveal a very different policy.

The domination of the Ukraine by Lenin's Russia was to result in a limited degree of resistance even among Communists, in certain concessions granted reluctantly, and in the denial, in practice, of the principle of the equality of nations. One of Lenin's final pronouncements on the Ukraine, made at the Eleventh Party Congress in Moscow on March 27, 1922, reflected these contradictory aspects of Soviet nationality policy and the desire of the center to dominate:

The Ukraine is an independent republic and that is very good. But in Party matters it sometimes—what is the more polite way of expressing it?—sidesteps (*beryot obkhod*), and we shall have to get at them in some way because the people there are sly and the Central Committee [in the Ukraine] I will not say deceives but somehow moves slightly away from us.\(^{31}\)

---


Stalin’s Conception of Soviet Federalism
(1918-1923)

ROBERT H. McNEAJ

In terms of formal political status, it is the federal system of the USSR that most clearly differentiates the position of the Ukraine (and other non-Russian nations) in the Soviet Union and in the old regime. While the most widely disseminated Soviet propaganda maintains that the federal system preserves a high degree of real political independence for the constituent states, this claim can be examined adequately only in the light of a thorough appraisal of the actualities of the past four decades. Since such appraisals are likely to show a rather wide discrepancy between Soviet claims and realities, it is natural enough that many critically minded persons dismiss the evidence of Soviet pronouncements on such matters as a hoax, the liberal camouflage of authoritarian reality. But, as the following essay seeks to demonstrate, even so untrustworthy a writer as Stalin, if read carefully, may provide quite a clear picture of a mind devoted to centralized authority, the precedence of party interests over the interests of national minorities, and the predominance of the Russian nation. It is true that an important degree of deliberate deception remains: the word “federal” and its liberal connotations have been appropriated as an attractive symbol but with almost none of its conventionally accepted content.

And a small part of the documentation of this essay was concealed by Stalin, or the original version was in some cases doctored in its republication in the Soviet Union. But by and large, Stalin is fairly candid in revealing that his federalism had little meaning to him beyond its value as an expedient symbol.

It can scarcely be said that Stalin had any conception of federalism before the October Revolution and the concurrent disintegration of the multinational Russian state. As a Bolshevik he clearly favored unity within Russia, and seems to have given little thought to federalism in general. In his major discussions of the nationality question before 1917 Stalin advocated “local self-government” (mestnoe samo-upravlenie) or “regional autonomy” (oblastnaya avtonomiya), which
was in keeping with the party program of 1903. However, what little he said in explanation of these terms indicated that almost any degree of centralism was compatible with them. Federalism he regarded as one of the undesirable forms of self-determination, along with secession and national cultural autonomy, although he did not deem it necessary to carry on extensive polemics against the federal alternative in the prewar years.

The polemics came in early 1917 when the federalization of the multinational state seemed to be a real possibility. To retreat from existing unity to federalism, said Stalin, would be "absolutely unwise and reactionary." Although this left his federalism undefined, it did foreshadow Stalin's later adoption of federalism as an alternative to the disintegration of the multinational Russian state.

The de facto collapse of this state in the closing months of 1917 obliged Lenin's regime and its Commissar of Nationality Affairs to regard federalism more sympathetically. As early as November 17 (O.S.), 1917, Stalin spoke favorably of federalism as a solution to the question of Russian-Ukrainian relations, and by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in January 1918, the regime and Stalin had definitely embraced federalism as the catch-phrase of their attempt to restore unity within the boundaries of the former empire. Thus, Stalin became a "federalist" quite abruptly and against his previous expectations. He was faced with the task of defining his conception of a political form that he did not care for and knew little about. His response to this problem was one of his chief ideological concerns from 1918 to 1923, and it is from his statements during this period that the following explanation of Stalin's conception of federalism is drawn. Indeed, these were the critical years in the evolution of Stalin's conception of federalism; during the rest of his career he added almost

1 Stalin, Sochineniya (13 vols.; Moscow, 1946–52), I, 44-45; II, 361-63. Unless otherwise indicated, all citations are Stalin's statements; when not cited from Sochineniya, the statement was either omitted or significantly altered in this collection, and it has been necessary to use another source.
2 Ibid., II, 286, 310.
3 Ibid., III, 26.
5 "Tekst razgovora po pryamomu provodu predstavitelya sovnarkoma I. Stalina s predstavitelem TsK USDRP Porshem i oblastnoi organizatsii RSDRP (b) Bakinskим," in V. Manilov, ed., 1917 god v Kievskechina (Kiev, 1928), pp. 531-34; and Sochineniya, IV, 8.
6 Sochineniya, IV, 32-33.
nothing of consequence to the interpretation of federalism that he developed between the collapse of the old multinational state and the formation of the Soviet Union.

A basic premise of Stalin's conception of federalism was that this political form is intrinsically transitional, a step on the road to unity in "bourgeois" and "socialist" states alike. He openly stated that federalism "is destined to play a transitional role to future socialist unity." Unlike the founders of the United States and other non-socialist federations, Stalin never pretended that the preservation of the independence and peculiarities of the federalized states was an end in itself.

Another important premise on which Stalin based his conception of Soviet federalism was that the appropriate area of the socialist federation consisted of the former tsarist empire, whether or not the broader socialist revolution then expected by Lenin and others materialized in the immediate future. In other words, Stalin seems to have taken it for granted that the old empire was not merely an accidentally contrived prison of nationalities, but a viable political unit, an enduring reality despite the major changes in the social character of the government. Thus did Stalin refer to multinational Russia as a "country" (strana), and thus did he assert in July 1918, that "the Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaidzhanian questions are domestic for Russia," even though these nationalities had in fact seceded by the time Stalin made this claim. As early as April 1918, he listed as component parts of the projected Russian federation Finland, Poland, the Ukraine, Transcaucasia, the Crimea, Turkestan, Kirgizia, Siberia, the middle Volga region, and the Tatar-Bashkir territory. The inclusion of Finland

8 Sochineniya, IV, 73.
9 Quoted in K. E. Voroshilov, Stalin i Krasnaya Armiya (Moscow, 1937), p. 40.
10 Stalin, Sochineniya, IV, 67-68. See also "O Tataro-bashkirskoi Sovetskoi Respublike," Pravda, March 23, 1918, in which Stalin stated that the Commissariat on Nationality Affairs was preparing the terms of admission into the RSFSR for Georgia, Armenia, Kirgizia, Sarto-Tekintsiya, and other peoples of Russia. This article may be found in Stalin's Sochineniya, but the passage just cited was deleted. If he did not include Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in these unofficial lists, he certainly did not exclude these nationalities. At a later date they were in fact included in a list of Soviet republics that were merging important administrative functions to assist the war effort. See V. A. Melikov, ed., "Proekt rezolyutsii, pod-
and Poland in the list illustrates the strength of Stalin's determination to include all of the tsar's former possessions in the new federation, for the independence of Finland was in April 1918 an established fact, and the Poles, whose land was under Austro-German control, were making an exceedingly strong bid for independence.

Although at the beginning of the Revolution he was ambitious enough to assume that even Finland and Poland could be reintegrated into a federalized Russia, Stalin did not wish to expand this federation to include nations that had not previously been ruled by the tsars. In a personal letter to Lenin in June 1920, he made a candid statement in which he clearly distinguished the countries of "old Russia" and the outside world.

For nations that were included in the composition of old Russia our (Soviet) type of federation may and must be considered expedient as the path to international unity. . . . These nationalities either have not had their own states in the past or have lost them long ago, and because of this the Soviet (centralized) type of federation is applied to them without special friction.

The same cannot be said of those nationalities which were not included in the make-up of old Russia, which existed as independent entities, which developed their own states . . . for example, the future Soviet Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Finland. . . . I do not doubt that for these nationalities the most acceptable form of relationship would be a confederation (a union of independent states). I have not yet spoken of the remaining nationalities, Persia and Turkey, for example, in relation to which or for which the Soviet type of federation and, in general, federation would be still less suitable.11

Stalin no longer felt sufficiently optimistic to think that Finland and Poland could be included in the Soviet Russian federation, but, instead of admitting that this federation might constitute less than the whole of Russia, he resorted to the surprising argument that Poland and Finland had not been part of "old Russia." His desire to preserve the boundaries of the tsarist state remained, but, under the pressure of circumstances, he seems to have been willing to settle for western boundaries more closely approximating those of 1793 than of 1914.

Stalin aimed not only at the erection of what he called a federation

coinciding with the boundaries of “old Russia” but, more precisely, at the establishment of a federation that would restore Russian pre-
dominance. He made it quite clear that he did not perceive federation
in Russia as the association of more or less equal partners. To him,
federation was the means by which the “borderlands” were joined to
the Russian “center.” Thus it was that in listing the components of
the proposed federation Stalin never bothered to mention that Russia
proper was expected to be one of the constituent units, for he never
thought of Russia’s joining a federation. Instead, the various border-
lands were to join themselves to Russia proper “by federal links.” In
this spirit he wrote in February 1919 that “there developed in the
borderlands, which had experienced the horrors of occupation, a pow­
erful gravitation toward the Great Russian proletariat and its forms
of state structure.”

It was not only the obvious matter of size that inspired Stalin’s cen­
tralist approach to federalism in Russia. His interpretation of feder­
alism was also founded on the belief that the Russian nation was
economically, culturally, and politically advanced, while the border­
lands were comparatively backward. While any observer would agree
that this generalization applies to a comparison of Russia and such
borderlands as Turkestan, Stalin was remarkably Great Russian in his
unwillingness to make any qualifications to cover more important
exceptions. This came out quite explicitly on one occasion when he
contrasted “inner Russia with its industrial and cultural-political cen­
ters, Moscow and Petrograd,” and the “borderlands of Russia, chiefly
the southern and eastern border regions, which have no major indus­
trial or cultural-political centers.” The same Great Russian attitude
is obvious in Stalin’s references to the Central Asian peoples as tuzem­
tsy, a word carrying the condescending connotations of “the natives”
or les indigènes. Cognizant of this, the editors of Stalin’s Works took

12 Stalin, Sochineniya, IV, 354. See also ibid., pp. 51, 110, 160-61, 163, 225-27,
236, 352, 361-63; V, 24-25, 41, 44, 113-14, 185.
13 Ibid., IV, 226-27.
14 Ibid., IV, 236-39; see also V, 1-3, 24, 35-36, 41, 47, 113, 247.
15 Ibid., pp. 285-86. At the Tenth Party Congress Mikoyan suggested that Azer­
baidzhan, with its industrial center of Baku, was more advanced than some of the
provinces of Russia proper. Stalin could scarcely deny this but rebuked Mikoyan
for “confusing Baku with Azerbaidzhan” (ibid., V, 47). A less prudent commentator
than Mikoyan might have replied that Moscow should not be confused with all
of “inner” Russia, either
pains to replace this somewhat offensive expression with less "colorful" substitutes.16

The centralist element in his conception of federalism was also manifest in his discussion of more specifically administrative questions. One such question concerned the number of federations that were needed to deal with the nationality problem. Stalin's initial assumption was that a single federation would suffice for all the nationalities of Russia. For example, in April 1918 he said that the Ukraine, the Crimea, Poland, Transcaucasia, Turkestan, the middle Volga, and Kirgizia could be expected to join the RSFSR, which was then in the formative stage.17 The same thought was evident about a year later in a draft decree, signed by Lenin and Stalin, on the need to create a closer union between the RSFSR and the other Soviet republics. In this draft it was proposed that all matters concerning military supplies and rail transport be placed under the control of the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR, and that no commissariats dealing with these matters be permitted except in the RSFSR.18 Here the trend was decidedly toward the incorporation of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, Lithuanian, Estonian, and Latvian Soviet Republics into the RSFSR. The possibility that a new, broader federation was needed to embody the RSFSR and the independent republics seems to have been far from Stalin's and Lenin's minds at this time.

When preliminary work on the transformation of the independent Soviet republics into a federal union began in September 1922, Stalin still took it for granted that the new federation would be merely an expansion of the RSFSR. At that time he headed a commission of the Politburo "on the admission of the independent republics into the RSFSR," which, in the last days of September, submitted its recommendations to Lenin and the other members of the Politburo.19 The text of the report has never been published, but the essence of Stalin's ideas on the nature of the new federation is known through Trotsky, who preserved the text of Lenin's critique of Stalin's report and the text of Stalin's reply to this critique.20 From these documents one

16 See, for example, ibid., V, 15-29, 33-44.
17 Ibid., IV, 67.
19 Lenin's letter to Kamenev, September 27, 1922, copies to Politburo. Published in part in Trotsky, The Stalinist School of Falsification (New York, 1937), pp. 65-66, and in full in Trotsky Archives, Stalin MS, Box 3.
20 See Lenin's letter to Kamenev and members of the Politburo, and Stalin's
learns that Stalin proposed the entry of the nominally independent Soviet republics into the RSFSR and the merging of the Central Executive Committees of the republics with the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR. This plan was in keeping with his centralist approach to federalism, for the incorporation of the independent republics, as viewed by Stalin, implied their subordination to the Russian government of the RSFSR.

Lenin objected vigorously to the proposal. He began his critique of the report of Stalin’s commission with the general observation that “Stalin is somewhat inclined to hurry,” and suggested that the words “entry into the RSFSR” be changed to read “formal unification with the RSFSR in a Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia.” In other words, Lenin wished to remove the reference to Russia from the name of the federation, replacing it with more internationalist wording, and to create a new federation, encompassing the RSFSR and the independent republics. Lenin wrote: “I trust that the spirit of this concession is obvious. We [the RSFSR] acknowledge ourselves to be on an equal basis with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the others, and, together with them, we enter into a new union, a new federation. . . .” Lenin also objected to Stalin’s plan to retain the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR as the sole legislative chamber in the new structure, an arrangement that would have permitted the Russians to dominate the legislature. Lenin proposed the creation of a second body, “a general-federal Supreme Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia,” because “it is important, in order to avoid giving food to ‘the independents’ [the more sensitive leaders in the independent Soviet republics], [to show] that we do not destroy their independence, but create a new stage still: the federation of independent republics.” In other words, Lenin evidently thought it advisable to establish a chamber of the sort represented by the United States Senate, in which all members of the federation are equally represented, offsetting the power of the larger members.21

Stalin was willing to concede when it came to mere names, and accepted Lenin’s proposal to create a new, superior federation as a reply to Lenin, September 27, 1922. The letter is published in Trotsky, The Stalinist School of Falsification, and is available in full in the Trotsky Archives, Stalin MS, Box 3. All the essential points are verified by V. V. Pentkovskaya, “Rol’ V. I. Lenina v obrazovanii SSSR,” Voprosy istorii, No. 3 (1956), pp. 13-24.

21 Lenin’s letter of September 27, 1922.
name. But he objected sharply to the substance of Lenin's proposal to equalize the constitutional status of the RSFSR and the independent republics. Stalin defended his original plan for a unicameral legislature, omitting any second federal chamber.\textsuperscript{22} This was not the first time that he had rejected bicameralism. During the formation of the RSFSR in 1918 he asserted that bicameralism was associated with "the customary bourgeois legal red tape," and would not be adopted by the toiling masses of Russia because of its "complete nonconformity with the elementary demands of socialism."\textsuperscript{23} In reply to Lenin in 1922 Stalin repeated this argument, asserting that "the existence of two Central Executive Committees in Moscow, one of which will obviously represent a 'lower house' and the other an 'upper house,' will give us nothing but conflict and debate." One may infer that a unicameral system would not run this risk, because the Russians could always carry a majority there.

Stalin's further argument, which reflects his typically Russian attitude toward the other nationalities, was that the proposal to create a second, federal chamber

must lead to the obligatory creation of a Great Russian CEC [Central Executive Committee], excluding from it the eight autonomous republics (the Tatar Republic, the Turkestan Republic, and the others) that are part of the RSFSR, and to the declaration of independence of [these autonomous republics] along with the Ukrainian and similar independent republics, to the creation of two chambers in Moscow (Great Russian and federal), and, in general, to a deep reconstruction that at the given moment neither the internal nor the foreign exigencies require, and that, in my opinion is inexpedient or, in any case, premature in the given conditions.\textsuperscript{24}

The essence of this tortuous sentence seems to be this: Stalin hoped to avert Lenin's proposal of a second, federal chamber. He preferred to include the existing independent republics in the existing Russian federation on a plane with the autonomous republics in matters of legislative representation. But if Lenin succeeded in introducing a second chamber, then Stalin wanted constitutional parity for the independent republics and the former autonomous republics. To achieve such parity it would be necessary to remove the autonomous republics

\textsuperscript{22} Stalin's reply to Lenin, September 27, 1922.
\textsuperscript{23} Stalin, Sochineniya, IV, 70-72.
\textsuperscript{24} Stalin's reply to Lenin, September 27, 1922. The portion quoted is available only in the Trotsky Archives.
from the RSFSR, despite the trouble involved, and then introduce them into the new federation as additional independent republics. Stalin's insistence on this parity indicates that he took a dim view of the pretensions of the Ukrainians, Georgians, and other nationalities represented by the independent republics and did not wish to see them accorded more preferential treatment than the autonomous republics (cf. pages 23–25).

Moreover, he evidently intended that the structure of the legislature would ensure Russian supremacy, whether the form was unicameral or bicameral. If, as Stalin hoped, a unicameral legislature was retained, the independent soviet republics would enter on essentially the same level as the autonomous republics, as members of a basically Russian federation (that is, Russia proper would be the foundation of the federation and not simply one of its component parts). But, if Lenin prevailed and introduced a bicameral system, then Stalin thought it "obligatory" that the Russians have exclusive control of one chamber ("a Great Russian CEC"). In this case it appears that Stalin took it for granted that the Russians would also have a share (perhaps the lion's share) of the new, federal chamber, along with the former autonomous and independent republics.

Unfortunately, there is no available record of the immediate reaction of the Politburo to Stalin's response to Lenin. It seems most probable, however, that Lenin had Stalin's letter in mind several months later when he composed his testament and his general critique of Stalin's tactics in the administration of nationality affairs.25 In any case, Stalin was not forced to concede at once on the question of bicameralism. As late as November 18, 1922, almost two months after the exchange of notes, Stalin told a Pravda correspondent that "there can be no doubt that this opinion [the proposal of bicameralism] will not meet with any sympathy among the national republics, if only for the reason that a bicameral system is incompatible with the structure of the Soviet system, at all events, in its present stage of development."26

26 Quoted from the original version in Pravda, November 18, 1922. In Stalin, Sochineniya, V, 143, the editors of the volume (or of some earlier anthology) added the words "with an upper chamber" after the word "system" in the sentence quoted. This was a bit of editorial chicanery, evidently intended to give the reader the impression that Stalin did not really alter his position on bicameralism when he later came out in favor of a second chamber. The added words would permit one
In his Theses for the Twelfth Party Congress published on March 24, 1923, Stalin reversed himself and stated that the co-operation of the peoples of the federation required the creation of “a special organ representing the nationalities on the basis of equality.” A month later, replying to Rakovsky at the Twelfth Party Congress, Stalin explained in somewhat more detail his conception of the second federal chamber. He proposed that the chamber have “equal representation of all the republics and national regions (oblastei). We have eight autonomous republics and also eight independent republics; Russia [the RSFSR] will join as a republic; we [the RSFSR] have fourteen regions.”

At first glance, this appears to be a major departure from his previous efforts to give Russia the dominant position in the organization of the CEC, for Russia proper was to receive no more representation in the second chamber than the smallest autonomous region. But the underlying intent of the proposal seems not to have been the diminution of Russian influence, but the smothering of the influence of the independent Soviet republics, especially the Ukraine and Georgia, whose representatives furnished most of the national opposition to Stalin at the Twelfth Party Congress. These dissatisfied elements proposed that the second chamber consist only of “state entities,” that is, the RSFSR, the Belorussian Soviet Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, equally represented. This arrangement would have given a coalition of the anti-Stalin Communists of the Ukraine and Transcaucasia half the votes in the second chamber. Stalin's counterproposal adroitly skirted this pitfall by proposing to swamp the second chamber with the representatives of the relatively minor nationalities, most of which were already in the RSFSR. Thus, the votes of the recalcitrant representatives were to be overwhelmed by the votes of the minor nationalities expected to be more tractable. This, of course, was not Stalin’s to infer that Stalin had, in November 1922, opposed only that type of bicameralism in which one chamber is considered superior to the other.

27 Stalin, Sochineniya, V, 191.
28 Ibid., p. 278. Presumably Stalin meant four independent republics: the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Transcaucasia.
29 The dispute between the Stalinists and the Georgian and Ukrainian opposition occurred mainly in the Commission on the National Question and not on the floor of the Congress. Stalin describes the dispute briefly in his report on the national question, ibid., pp. 270-71.
publicly stated explanation of his proposal. What he told the Congress was that the minor, Asian nationalities should be well represented in the new federal chamber because of their importance to Soviet prestige in the East.30

In June 1923 Stalin modified the details, but not the essence, of his proposed system of representation in the federal chamber. He told a “Conference of the Central Committee of the RCP (B) with Officials of the National Republics and Regions” that each independent and autonomous republic was to have four representatives and each national region one representative in the second chamber.”31 Although this arrangement increased the representational share of the independent republics, it still guaranteed the RSFSR and its subordinate autonomous regions and republics a dominant position.

In short, Stalin’s tactical position in the discussion of the new federation underwent numerous shifts between September 1922 and June 1923. But at all times his objective was to maximize the degree of centralization in the new federal Russian state and to insure the leading role of the Russian nation within the federation.

The preceding analysis may suggest that Stalin’s federalism was not federalism at all, and, oddly enough, Stalin at times seemed quite willing to agree that he had never set aside his prerevolutionary slogan of “regional autonomy.” For example, he often neglected to use the word “federalism” or its cognates and spoke of “autonomy” or “autonomous regions,” even though he was clearly referring to members of the new federation.32 Perhaps the most striking case in point occurred in a major doctrinal article of October 1920, “The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia.” In this article Stalin first explained that neither secession nor national cultural autonomy represented an acceptable solution to the nationality problem in Russia. He then added:

There remains regional autonomy for border regions that are distinguished by a specific way of life and national composition, as the only expedient form of union between the center and the borderlands, an autonomy that is de-

30 Ibid., pp. 277-78.
31 Ibid., pp. 294-95. Thus the RSFSR would have fifty votes and the rest of the Union far fewer, no more than half that number. The exact arrangements outside the RSFSR with respect to autonomous republics and regions were in flux at this time.
signed to connect the borderlands of Russia with the center by a federal tie. This is the Soviet form of autonomy.33

The whole sense of this article is that “regional autonomy” is the Soviet program. Except for the rather casual mention of “a federal tie,” the entire article, as far as the question of federalism is concerned, might just as well have been written before 1917, when not “federalism,” but “regional autonomy” was Stalin’s slogan.

There is another clear indication that Stalin’s new “federalism” was simply his former centralist proposal of “regional autonomy” transplanted from capitalism and relabeled “federalism.” This is the relative authority of the central government and autonomous or federal units in the state. Before World War I Stalin had written that the essence of the self-government permitted under “regional autonomy” was to adapt the form of the law of the central state to local conditions. Judged by his postrevolutionary writings, Stalin’s conception of the rights of the members of the Soviet federations, the RSFSR and the USSR, went no further than this, if as far. For example, he explained that the sphere of activity assigned to the “regional sovnar-koms” in the federation was to include, “first of all, the forms of implementation of general decrees.”34 This was a distinct echo of Stalin’s old description of regional autonomy.

It must be added, however, that Stalin did add one new element to his prewar conception of regional autonomy, the theory that different levels of regional autonomy were necessary to accommodate the diverse conditions in so large a country as Russia. This theory was slow to appear in Stalin’s works. Until October 1920 he never discussed the possibility that the term “autonomy” referred to more than one type of relationship. In June 1920 he even criticized Lenin’s draft theses on the national question for the Second Congress of the Comintern because they made “a distinction between the Bashkir and Ukrainian type of federative link. . . . In practice there is no difference or it is so small that it equals nil.”35 This is a remarkable evaluation, because the Bashkir Autonomous Republic was then a part of the RSFSR, while the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was nominally independent. One can only conclude that Stalin privately attached very little importance to the formal aspects of the structure of the Soviet Russian state

33 Ibid., IV, 354.
34 Ibid., p. 70; see also p. 89.
35 Lenin, Sochineniya (3d ed.), XXV, 624.
at that time, most likely because he knew that the Party cut across all state boundaries in Russia.

In public, at least, Stalin abruptly changed this outlook by October 1920. Perhaps at Lenin's suggestion, he then began to praise the "varied forms and degrees of development" of Soviet autonomy, which "enables it to embrace all the various types of borderlands of Russia . . . to arouse to political activity the most backward and nationally diverse masses and to connect these masses with the center by the most diverse ties—a problem that no other government in the world has solved, or has even set itself, being afraid to do so!"36

But fulsome praise did not provide a clear picture of the nature of these degrees of autonomy. In the article "The Policy of the Soviet Government on the National Question in Russia," cited above, Stalin mentioned four stages, but he raised more questions than he answered. The lowest stage was "narrow, administrative autonomy," the next was "a wider, political autonomy" (it is not clear what difference is denoted by the words "administrative" and "political" in this context), the third was "the Ukrainian type of autonomy," and, fourth, there was "the highest form of autonomy . . . treaty relations (Azerbai­dzhana)."37 Since Azerbaidzhan had fulfilled the stage of "treaty relations" before Stalin's article appeared, and the "independent" Soviet Ukraine did not do so until two months later, it is difficult to see why he should have considered that the Ukraine had a lower degree of autonomy than Azerbaidzhan. In any case, both Azerbaidzhan and the Ukraine were still nominally independent republics, not part of the RSFSR, and their inclusion in a discussion of regional autonomy was an interesting reflection of Stalin's low estimate of the actual independence of the "independent" Soviet republics. If these republics were, in his eyes, only exercising a form of autonomy, one may surmise that the regions on the other end of the scale, those exercising "narrow administrative autonomy," were surely subject to a high degree of central control.

In sum, Stalin admittedly was forced by unwelcome circumstances to become an advocate of federalism, and his conversion to this political doctrine was about as balky and halfhearted as possible. Although he subsequently basked in the official adulation of millions as

36 Stalin, Sochineniya, IV, 355.
37 Ibid. A month later Stalin repeated this list of the varieties of autonomy, but omitted the fourth stage. Ibid., p. 404.
the founder of the unusual federal system of the USSR, a system of
defederations within a federation (for instance, the RSFSR within the
USSR), Stalin actually had opposed the foundation of this system
even at the risk of harming his relations with Lenin. And even though
he had been forced, again by unwelcome circumstances (chiefly Lenin’s
will), to accept a federal scheme that at least presented a semblance
of formal equality among the constituent nations, Stalin gave fairly
clear expression to his contempt for federalism, except as an empty
formula. In some ways it appears that the dissatisfied nationalists of
the Ukraine and other minority nations of the Soviet Union should
not complain that Stalin betrayed federalism, but rather that his ac-
tions as dictator were generally consistent with his own, inverted con-
ception of Soviet federalism.

*University of Alberta*
Immer wieder stößt man in der Fachliteratur auf die Feststellung, Lenin habe zum Jahre 1921 den Glauben an eine europäische Revolution in absehbarer Zeit verloren.1 Die Sowjetunion habe sich daher schon seit ihrer Konstituierung im Winter 1922–23 auf sich selbst zurückgezogen.


---

1 Z. B., A. Rosenberg, Geschichte des Bolschewismus (Berlin, 1933), S. 163 ff.
3 Der I. und II. Kongress der Kommunistischen Internationale: Dokumente der Kongresse und Reden W. I. Lenins, hsg. vom Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus
hatte schon vorher, am 4. Juli 1920, die unbedingte Notwendigkeit für die Kommunisten, illegale und legale Arbeit zu verbinden, betont.\textsuperscript{4}

Aber noch mehr. Nach der gescheiterten Märzaktion richtete Lenin am 14. August 1921 einen persönlichen Brief "an die deutschen Kommunisten". Hier heißt es u. a.: "Die Eroberung der Mehrheit des Proletariats ist die wichtigste Aufgabe. . . . Eine solche Eroberung ist möglich, sie schreitet in der ganzen Welt unaufhaltsam vorwärts. Bereiten wir sie gründlicher vor, lernen wir richtig den Zeitpunkt bestimmen, wo die Massen nicht anders können, als sich zusammen mit uns zu erheben. Dann wird der Sieg gesichert sein."\textsuperscript{5}


Sowohl in Lenins im Frühjahr 1920 veröffentlichter Schrift "Der linke Radikalismus—die Kinderkrankheit des Kommunismus," als auch im Briefwechsel mit Stalin im Sommer 1920 wegen der zukünftigen Struktur der Sowjetunion war wiederholt der Ausdruck "Sowjetbeim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Berlin, 1959), S. 287.
\textsuperscript{4} Ebd., S. 309.
\textsuperscript{5} W. I. Lenin, Über Deutschland und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin, 1957), S. 604 ff.
\textsuperscript{6} Clara Zetkin, Erinnerungen an Lenin (Wien und Berlin, 1929), S. 29, 31, 43–44.


An der Spitze des Außenkommissariats stand damals Tschitscherin; als eigentlicher Deutschlandsachverständiger galt Karl Radek.9 Er

8 Lenin, Sobranie Sotschinenij, Bd. XX 2 (Moskau, 1927), S. 127.
9 L. H. Legters, “Karl Radek als Sprachrohr des Bolschewismus,” in Forschun-


Im übrigen hat die Sowjetregierung im Sommer 1923 sich trotz der deutschen Finanzkrise auch sehr um die Intensivierung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen bemüht. Der Außenhandelskommissar Rosengolz traf im Juli in Berlin ein, um zusammen mit dem Botschafter Krestinskij Verhandlungen wegen der Finanzhilfe für die sowjetische Rüstungsindustrie in der Höhe von 35 Million Goldmark zu erlangen.

Die Situation änderte sich grundlegend am 11. August. Mit dem Rücktritt der Regierung Cuno in Berlin zeigte sich der Fehlschlag...

Der Kurs der neuen Regierung Stresemann, der sich auf eine Koalition der bürgerlichen Mittelparteien und der Sozialdemokraten stützte, brachte nicht nur das Ende des "Ruhrkampfes", sondern auch eine außenpolitische Schwenkung, die auf eine Verständigung vor allem mit England hinauslief. In diesem Punkt war man damals in Moskau sehr empfindlich. Das Ultimatum des englischen Außenmini­sters Lord Curzon vom 8. Mai, das sich in fester Form die anti­englische Agitation im Nahen Osten verbat, war scharf beantwortet worden; die Ermordung eines sowjetischen Diplomaten in der Schweiz durch einen russischen Emigranten steigerte die Erregung. Man fürchtete ernstlich, die neue deutsche Regierung werde sich den Westmächten "in die Arme werfen", und sich vollständig vom Rapallo-Kurs abwenden.

Die führende deutsche Kommunistin Ruth Fischer, die damals besonders Sinow'ew nahe stand, berichtet in ihren Erinnerungen, viele Mitglieder des Politbüros hätten unter dem Eindruck dieser Situation ihren Urlaub abgebrochen und seien nach Moskau zurückgekehrt, hier habe Alarmstimmung geherrscht.15 In der Tat wurde eine Sitzung sowohl des Politbüros als auch des EKKI einberufen, um die neue Lage in Deutschland zu erörtern.

Über die Sitzung des Politbüros am 23. August finden sich Angaben bei einem später geflüchteten Sekretär dieses Gremiums, Bashanow;16 seine Angaben finden im allgemeinen Bestätigung durch andere Quellen, z.T. auch die Tagespresse, und wir haben keinen Grund, an dem angegebenen Datum zu zweifeln. Das Politbüro bestand damals neben Lenin aus sechs Mann: Trotzkij, Kamenev, Sinow'ew, Stalin, Rykow und Tomskij. Von ihnen zeigte sich Trotzkij am optimistischsten; die 1919 verpaßte Gelegenheit schien ihm zurückgekehrt

15 Fischer, S. 368. Das Buch stellt den Versuch einer geschichtlichen Darstellung dar, die als Augenzeugenbericht aufschlußreich ist, auch wenn er stellenweise memoirenhaften Charakter hat.
16 B. Bashanow, Stalin, der rote Diktator (Berlin, 1931), S. 122 ff; über ihn vgl. Carr, S. 201.
und die proletarische Revolution in Deutschland eine Frage von wenigen Wochen. War er doch der Mann, der, neben Lenin, immer am stärksten davon überzeugt war, daß das Schicksal der deutschen und russischen Revolution eng miteinander verbunden war.

Sinow'ew war zunächst noch abwartend, während Stalin sich auf der Sitzung schweigsam verhielt und schon in einem Brief an Sinow'ew und Bucharin vom 7. August ganz eindeutig gegen jede Ermutigung der deutschen Revolution Stellung genommen hatte. Man mußte die deutschen Genossen bremsen und nicht anspornen!17


18 G. Bessedowskij, Na putjach k termidoru (Paris, 1931), I, 139–43. Vgl. The Times, 24 u. 29.10.1923; Carr, S. 219; und Schüddekopf, S. 158.

Darüber hinaus scheinen aber seine Berichte den Eindruck erweckt zu haben, als besäßen die Kommunisten in diesen Ländern bereits eine Schlüsselposition und alle Voraussetzungen, eine bewaffnete Erhebung vornehmen zu können, und als bedürfe es nur noch eines Anstoßes von außen, um sie auszulösen.19


Von Bedeutung ist die Begleitmusik, die die Moskauer und internationale kommunistische Presse zu diesen Verhandlungen spielte. "Hände weg von Deutschland", schrieb Radek in der Iswestija vom

19 Vgl. Fischer, S. 381 ff.
20 Hierüber ebd., S. 384; Bashanow, S. 219.
22 Fischer, S. 381.


Fragt man sich, was im August und September in den entscheidenden Sitzungen des Politbüros und des EKKI im Bezug auf Deutschland beschlossen worden war, so geben drei kommunistische Verfasser hierauf eindeutige Antworten. Erich Wollenberg, damals maßgeblich an den Aufstandsvorbereitungen beteiligt, spricht von einem Auftrag, ²³ Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale (Berlin), Nr. 9 (Sept. 1923).

Für diese Verschwörung wurde in erster Linie die "Militärpolitische Organisation" (MP) aufgezogen, die mit dem Militärrevolutionären Komitee in Petersburg, daß von Trotzki zur unmittelbaren Vorbereitung des Oktoberaufstandes errichtet worden war, verglichen werden kann. Der Unterschied war, daß die MP sich entsprechend den sechs Wehrbezirken der Reichswehr über ganz Deutschland erstreckte. Als Berater der deutschen MP-Leiter28 wurden Sachverständige des Weltkommunismus, zum Teil Stabsoffiziere der Roten Armee, nach Deutschland hineingeschleust. Der prominenteste von diesen Bürgerkriegsspezialisten war ein gewisser Skoblewskij, eine jener zwielichtigen Gestalten, die unter wechselnden Namen hier und dort auftauchten.29 Er ist nach dem gescheiterten Aufstand von der deutschen Polizei gefaßt worden, und die Akten des Skoblewskij-Prozesses gehören zu den objektiven Beweisen der sowjetischen Einmischung in die innerdeutschen Angelegenheiten.30 Als der deutsche

25 Ostprobleme (Bad Nauheim), Nr. 19 (1951), S. 575 ff.
26 Fischer, S. 379–84.
29 In einigen Quellen General Aleksej Skoblewskij genannt; nach Wollenberg (S. 576) ein ehemaliger lettischer Arbeiter namens Rose, der sich Skoblewskij oder Gorew nannte; nach Hilger (S. 125) ein Russe, namens Petrow.
Botschafter in Moskau, Graf Brockdorff-Rantzau, Trotzkij voller Empörung Polizeiberichte über Skoblewskij's Waffenkäufe zur Vorbereitung des Aufstandes mit Wechseln der sowjetischen Botschaft in Berlin vorlegte, gab der sowjetische Kriegskommissar zu, Skoblewskij selbst der Botschaft zugeeil zu haben, weil er mit einer unmittelbar bevorstehenden Revolution in Deutschland rechnete.31


Der prominenteste sowjetische Funktionär, der im Oktober 1923 erneut nach Deutschland kam, war Karl Radek. Er schlug sein Hauptquartier diesmal in Dresden auf, um dem Aufmarschgebiet des Kampfes näher zu sein; hier hielten sich in den entscheidenden Tagen auch die maßgebenden Führer der MP und der Zentrale der KPD auf.

Der Lauf der Ereignisse im „deutschen Oktober“ ist schnell berichtet. Am 9. oder 10. verließ Brandler Moskau, von Trotzkij, der sichtlich bewegt war, bis zum Kreml-Tor persönlich begleitet, wo er ihn zum Abschied umarmte.36 Trotzkij sah in Brandler den kommenden Führer der deutschen Revolution.37

34 Über ihn siehe Fischer, S. 393 ff., die mit ihm zusammen nach Deutschland reiste, obwohl Trotzkij sie ebenso in Moskau zurückhalten wollte, wie Maslow, den zweiten Vertreter des linken Flügels der KPD. Dass auch Pjatakow nach Deutschland geschickt wurde, ist nicht belegt.
35 Wollenberg, S. 576.
36 Fischer, S. 393.
37 Die Meldung von I. Deutscher, Trotzki, S. 111, Brandler habe Trotzkij schon
Gleich nach seiner Ankunft in Deutschland trat Brandler, wie vorgesehen, mit zwei anderen Mitgliedern des Zentralkomitees der KPD in die sächsische Regierung ein; in Thüringen wurde ebenso verfahren. Gleichzeitig war die kommunistische Arbeiterchaft auf der Grundlage der "Roten Hundertschaften" bewaffnet worden, die zu einer deutschen Roten Armee zusammengeschlossen werden sollten.

Als nächster Schritt war der allgemeine Aufstand vorgesehen; mit den gesammelten revolutionären Kräften wollte man dann von Sachsen aus den Marsch nach Berlin antreten, um die Reichsregierung zu stürzen, während die thüringischen Kräfte südwärts nach Bayern vorstoßen sollten.38


Es war sehr bezeichnend, daß die Führung des kommunistischen Aufstandes angesichts dieses entschlossenen Vorgehens unsicher wurde und um Instruktionen aus Moskau bat.39 Die Antwort stellt das berühmte Sinow'ew-Telegramm dar, daß in allen späteren Parteitagsberichten erwähnt wird.40 Sinow'ew bekannte sich zum Eintritt der Kommunisten in die sächsische und thüringische Regierung und befahl, die Bewaffnung von 50 000 bis 60 000 Mitgliedern der Hundertschaften "wirklich durchzuführen" und den General Müller zu ignorieren. Man kann sagen, daß dieses Telegramm den eigentlichen Startschuß für den deutschen kommunistischen Aufstand darstellte.

auf der Sitzung des EKKI gebeten, die Leitung der deutschen Revolution zu übernehmen, ist ebenso wenig glaubwürdig, wie die, dass Trotzkiy tatsächlich die Absicht hatte, selbst nach Deutschland zu kommen, aber vom Politbüro daran gehindert wurde (Bashanow, S. 51 ff.).

38 Fischer, S. 387.
39 Ebd., S. 408.
40 Ebd., S. 408. Vgl. auch S. 399, wo zuerst von der Zahl der zu Bewaffnenden die Rede ist.
Die Hundertschaften traten in Alarmzustand und warteten auf den Befehl zur Erhebung, die auf den 23. Oktober angesetzt war.\footnote{Vgl. Carr, S. 221.}


die Reichsregierung übernahm die Macht. Nur nach Hamburg gelangte die Nachricht von dem Verzicht auf den Aufstand nicht rechtzeitig. Hier schlugen die Kommunisten unter Ernst Thälmann, dem späteren stalinähnlichen Parteiführer, los, durch Gerüchte beschwingt, daß eine sowjetische Flotte im Begriff war, in den Hamburger Hafen einzulaufen und die Rote Armee in Polen einmarschiert sei. Daran war nichts Wahres. Der Aufstand kostete einige 100 Tote und brach am nächsten Tag zusammen.44


Woran war aber im Grunde der Aufstand gescheitert? Aus Moskau kamen zwei Versionen. Bucharin schob die Schuld der KPD-Führung in die Schuhe; sie habe geglaubt, mit bürgerlichen Methoden zum Zuge kommen zu können. Trotzkij meinte, eine revolutionäre Situation habe in der Tat vorgelegen, aber Moskau habe nicht schnell genug gehandelt.


Der wahre Grund des Mißerfolges lag aber woanders. Er ist im Verhalten des deutschen Arbeiters zu suchen, der mit seiner Ablehn-

45 Wie A. Thalheimer seine in Form einer Broschüre in Hamburg 1923 erschienene Darstellung nannte.
nung des Generalstreiks in Chemnitz, sofern er Sozialdemokrat war, dem demokratischen Prinzip das Vertrauen aussprach, während die kommunistischen Delegierten die Aktion für verfrüht und daher sinnlos hielten. Hinzu trat die Entschlossenheit der Reichsregierung, alle Kräfte des freiheitlichen Sozialismus und des demokratischen, nationalen Bürgertums zusammenzufassen, um sie in Gestalt der militärischen Machtmittel in die Waagschale zu werfen.

Hier erwies es sich, daß die Spekulation grundfalsch war, nach dem Muster des russischen Oktober einen deutschen Oktober heraufbeschwören zu wollen. Es war der Schematismus von Lenins politischem Denken, der sich besonders deutlich bei allen Versuchen zeigte, Kategorien der für Rußland konstruierten Revolutionstheorie auf Deutschland zu übertragen, wo das Bildungsniveau des Arbeiters, seine sozialen Ansprüche und die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse sehr anders waren. Lenin hatte in seinem Leben insgesamt fast drei Jahre in Deutschland verbracht. Aber er hatte, eingeschlossen im Gehäuse seiner Revolutionstheorie und der um sie kreisenden Polemik und gefesselt von den Auspizien seiner Imperialistustheze, den realen Beobachtungen des Alltags kaum Beachtung geschenkt. Seine Beurteilung der deutschen Verhältnisse war im Grunde genommen lebensfremd.


Erst nach dem Tode Lenins drängt Stalin nach vorn; erst die stalinistische Verfolgung stempelt Sinow'ew, Kamenev, Radek und
Trotzkij zu angeblichen Verschwörern und Verrätern, erst die stalinistische Geschichtsfälschung negiert ihre enge Verbindung zu Lenin.


Lenin war auch nach 1921 keineswegs an der Notwendigkeit und Möglichkeit der Weltrevolution in Ost und West irre geworden; er hatte noch am 13. November 1922 ihre Perspektiven günstig beurteilt.47 Dementsprechend handelten die Leute seines Vertrauens auch in der deutschen Frage des Jahres 1923. Unbeirrbar ließ Sinow’ew noch das Manifest des EKKI vom Oktober 1924 im Einklang mit Lenins Erwartungen mit den Worten: “Es lebe die deutsche Revolution!” enden.48

Wir sprachen von der einzigen Unterbrechung, die Lenins Landaufenthalt im Jahre 1923 erfuhr. Es war an einem Oktobertage, als er noch einmal seine Amtsräume im Kreml aufsuchte.49 Waren es Sorgen um die sich abzeichnenden Gegensätze innerhalb der Parteiführung, die ihn zu dieser letzten, schon kaum mehr tragbaren Anstrengung, zwangen? War es die Erwartung des “deutschen Oktober”?

Seminar für Osteuropäische Geschichte
Universität Kiel

49 D. Shub, Lenin (Wiesbaden, 1952), S. 418.
The Revolution of 1917, which severed the sustaining link connecting the Russian Orthodox Church with the tsarist regime, started a chain of events that shook the very foundations of this Church, profoundly altered its position vis-à-vis the state, and released long-suppressed forces of nationalism and ecclesiastical radicalism, which soon split the Church along national and ideological lines. In the Ukraine, resurgent nationalism extending from the political-cultural realm into the ecclesiastical soon presented the recently restored Patriarchate of Moscow with the new and urgent problem of national self-determination in the Church, a problem which the Patriarchate was neither prepared nor willing to solve to the satisfaction of the Ukrainian national movement. Thus denied the canonical realization of its objectives of the “Ukrainization” and autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, the movement turned to extracanonical means, creating by 1920–21 an independent Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs).1

1 An outgrowth of the national church movement, which had tried unsuccessfully during 1917–19 to bring about the Ukrainization of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine and its emancipation from Russian control, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs—Українська Автоцефальна Православна Церква) was formally proclaimed in May 1920 by the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Council (Рада), in defiance of the largely Russian episcopate. Finding no bishop willing to assume the canonical leadership of the UAPTs or ordain its episcopate, in October 1921 the Рада convoked an All-Ukrainian Sobor which, in violation of the established canons, ordained Archpriest V. Lypkivsky as the Metropolitan of the UAPTs and several other priests as bishops, through the laying-on of hands by the clerical and lay members of the Sobor (hence the labels applied to the UAPTs by its opponents: Lypkivtsi or Lipkovtsy, and samosvyaty [the self-consecrated]). The 1921 Sobor, which adopted a series of radical ecclesiastical reforms, marked the beginning of the rapid growth of the UAPTs. Despite bitter opposition on the part of the Russian episcopate and also, after 1922–23, the Renovationist Church, the Autocephalous Church had by the mid-1920s expanded into a formidable organization numbering 34 bishops, over 2,000 priests and deacons, and about 1,500 parishes, serving, according to the widely differing estimates, from 3 to 6 million faithful. The
The rise of the Ukrainian national church, while weakening the hold of the Russian Church over the Ukrainian village and almost depriving it of any following among the Ukrainian intelligentsia, still left the Russian Orthodox Church the largest ecclesiastical organization in the Ukraine. By the spring of 1922, however, the Orthodox Church in Russia was split wide open by a Soviet-supported movement of the "progressive clergy," resulting in the emergence of a dissident "Living Church," and then, by 1923, of the Renovationist (Synodal) Church, with the regime manipulating the ensuing church conflict to derive maximum advantages for its political program and atheistic campaign. Before long the "progressive" revolution in the Russian Church had extended into the Ukraine, making it the scene of a prolonged three-cornered struggle for the spiritual allegiance of its Orthodox population, a struggle which, due to the impact of Ukrainian nationalism, assumed somewhat different dimensions and a more complex nature than in Russia, creating some unique problems for the Soviet Ukrainian authorities.

Soviet authorities, after a short-lived period of benevolent neutrality towards the UAPT's, by 1922 began to impose increasingly severe restrictions upon this "Petrynytse" church and, after several attempts to split the UAPT's or penetrate it from within, by 1929 turned to mass terrorism against its episcopate and clergy. Early in 1930, in connection with the trial of the Spilka Vyzvolennya Ukrayiny (The Union for Liberation of the Ukraine), the GPU staged an "Extraordinary Sobor" of the UAPT's, which formally "dissolved" its central organs. With most of the leaders of the Church arrested, its remnants were allowed to continue a closely controlled existence, as the "Ukrainian Orthodox Church," until its final suppression during the Great Purges. For a more detailed discussion of the UAPT's, and bibliography on the subject, see this writer's "The Autocephalous Church Movement in the Ukraine: The Formative Stage (1917-1921)," The Ukrainian Quarterly, Autumn 1960, pp. 211-23.

2 The May 1922 coup in the Russian Orthodox Church was engineered jointly by a group of the liberal and pro-Soviet clergy in Moscow and Petrograd and by the Soviet authorities, to coincide with the arrest of the "counterrevolutionary" Patriarch Tikhon, who had anathemized Lenin's government in 1918. Adopting at first the name of "The Living Church" and a radical program combining some radical canonical reforms with a blatantly pro-Soviet political platform, the movement soon split into several warring factions—Vladimir Krasnitsky's "Living Church," Antonin's "Church Regeneration," and Vvedensky's SODAT's (Soyuz obschchini drevle-apostol'skoj tserkvi); the latter had, by the end of 1923, absorbed most of the "progressive" following. On the early years of the "Living" and the Renovationist Churches, see the sympathetic account in J. F. Hecker, Religion Under the Soviets (New York, 1927), pp. 78-132; and the highly critical essay "The Living Church" by S. Troitsky, appended to W. C. Emhardt, Religion in Soviet Russia: Anarchy (Milwaukee, 1929), pp. 301-79.
In what follows, we shall confine ourselves to a discussion of only one of the contestants in the Ukrainian ecclesiastical struggle—the Renovationist Church, its genesis, evolution, and ultimate demise. Little illuminated and all too readily condemned in existing literature on the church in the USSR, the story of Ukrainian Renovationism represents an interesting case of the interplay of several conflicting forces—ecclesiastical radicalism and conservatism, Russian and Ukrainian nationalism, Orthodoxy and communism—a study in futility, with undertones of tragedy.

THE FORMATIVE STAGE OF THE RENOVATIONIST MOVEMENT IN THE UKRAINE, 1922–24

The "progressive" revolution in the Russian Orthodox Church in 1922 could not but involve its Ukrainian Exarchate also in the bitter struggle between the reformist and conservative parties. However, a number of factors delayed the expansion of the Renovationist movement into the Ukraine. While the prerevolutionary liberal church movement tended to center around the principal cities of the Empire—St. Petersburg and Moscow, with their concentration of theological institutions and publications and their greater exposure to foreign contacts—the Ukraine, long reduced to the status of a borderland province, was more removed from the early twentieth-century controversies in Orthodox circles. At the same time, the tendency of tsarist ecclesiastical policy to fill the Ukrainian sees with ultra-conservative, imperial-minded hierarchs (to mention only Metropolitans Vladimir of Kiev, Antonii of Kharkiv, Platon of Odessa, and Archbishop Evlogii of Volynia) could only limit liberal and reformist influences among the clergy. The late arrival of the Soviet power in the Ukraine prevented the local clergy from directly experiencing the church-state conflict of 1918–19 which set the stage for the later revolt in the Church. Above all, the intense national struggle within the Church in the Ukraine overshadowed the issues of reform and strengthened the cohesion of the Russian bishops and clergy, while,

on the other hand, the rise of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and its program of radical church reforms attracted many native elements which otherwise might have spearheaded the reformist movement in the local Patriarchal Church. Finally, the more conciliatory attitude taken by Exarch Mikhail on the issue of church valuables in 1922⁴ and his maneuvers to isolate the Ukraine from the ecclesiastical controversy in Russia⁵ tended to weaken the latter's impact upon the local Church. The combination of these factors not only postponed the formation of the Renovationist Church in the Ukraine but also influenced its character and subsequent evolution, in marked contrast to its Russian counterpart.

While, in 1922, the leaders of the “progressive” coup in the Russian Church could count upon some old contacts and scattered sympathizers among the patriarchal clergy in the Ukraine,⁶ their first impulse was to approach the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. Viewing the latter, not without some justification, as “a renovationist movement,”⁷ the Moscow “progressives” apparently hoped to win it over to the newly formed Supreme Ecclesiastical Administration, absorb it into their organization, and thus avail themselves of a firm and ready-made base from which they could stage their assault on the Ukrainian Exarchate. It was apparently with this objective in mind (as well as to solicit active support for the “Living Church” from the Soviet Ukrainian government)⁸ that the leader of the “Liv-

⁴ Allegedly to aid the victims of the 1921-22 famine, the Soviet government decreed on February 23, 1922, the confiscation of the church valuables (formally nationalized in 1918), “the removal of which cannot actually interfere with the interests of the cult itself” (Izvestiya, February 26, 1922). Five days later Patriarch Tikhon publicly denounced the removal of “consecrated objects” from the churches as a “sacrilege” punishable by excommunication (see M. Spinka, The Church and the Russian Revolution [New York, 1927], pp. 175-77). When a similar decree was issued by the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee on March 8, 1922, the Patriarch’s Exarch in the Ukraine (since August 1921), Metropolitan Mikhail (Ermakov), called upon the faithful in April 1922 not to resist the seizure of church valuables (I. Sukhoplyuev, “Tserkovnoe kontrrevolyutsionnoe dvizhenie na Ukraine,” in Oktyabr’skaya revolyutsiya: Pervoe desyatiletie [Kharkiv, 1922], p. 226).

⁵ See below, n. 35.

⁶ See Heyer, pp. 94-95.

⁷ See Golos Pravoslavnoi Ukrainy (cited henceforth as Golos P. U.), No. 4 (1925), p. 4.

⁸ See Heyer, p. 95. Reportedly, Krasnitsky acted on M. Kalinin’s advice after complaining to the “All-Russian Starosta” about the difficulties in winning control in the Ukraine (Izvestiya, August 15, 1922; Pravda, August 23, 1922).
ing Church,” Archpriest Vladimir Krasnitsky, arrived in Kharkiv in 1922. In order to launch negotiations with the Ukrainian autocephalists, he addressed an official letter to the UAPTs in which he stressed the seemingly common objectives of the two movements: opposition to the monastic clergy and the “old” episcopate, and the winning of ecclesiastical power for the white, married clergy. While there is no record of the actual negotiations between Krasnitsky and the All-Ukrainian Church *Rada*, it appears that his appeal failed to establish even a working alliance between the two groups.9 The evident collusion between the “Living Church” and the authorities, as well as their joint attempts to stir a “progressive” revolt within the UAPTs,10 made the latter understandably suspicious of the proposed fusion. But there were more basic factors that separated the UAPTs from the Russian “progressives”—above all, the church nationalism which made the autocephalists unwilling to surrender their hard-won independence to any Moscow center, and the radical reforms in both the canons (especially on the question of apostolic succession) and the ecclesiastical organization (conciliarism)11 which could not but set the UAPTs apart from the Tikhonites and the “progressives” alike.

It was only with some difficulty that Krasnitsky, aided by a local adherent of the “Living Church,” Shapovalov, succeeded in forming a provisional Supreme Ecclesiastical Administration (VTsU) in Kharkiv.12 “Living Church” committees were gradually set up in other

9 Heyer, p. 95.

10 See Lypkovsky, pp. 162–66. At the October 1922 plenum of the All-Ukrainian *Rada*, a “group of supporters of radical church reforms” led by a priest, Zado-rozhnyi, challenged (unsuccessfully) the policies and leadership of the UAPTs. At the same plenum another priest, Basovol, proposed the formation within the Church of a brotherhood *Tserkva Zhyva* (The Living Church) (“Protokol zasidannya Velykykh Pokrivtsiv Vseukrayins’koi Pravoslavnoi Tserkovnoi Rady,” October 22–29, 1922, a mimeographed copy in the possession of Osteuropa Institut in Munich). The initiators of the “Living Church” in the Ukraine apparently associated their hopes with Basovol’s project for an internal transformation of the UAPTs along “Living Church” lines; when nothing came of this scheme, they later charged that the autocephalist “Living Church” Brotherhood was either a maneuver to undermine the “authentic” Living Church or that Metropolitan Lypkovsky succeeded in suppressing “this movement, which was doubtlessly progressive in spirit,” at its inception. “Revolutsiya v Lipkovshchine,” *Vestnik Svyashchennogo Sinoda Pravoslavnoi Rossiiskoi Tserkvi* (cited henceforth as *Vestnik Sv. Sinoda*), No. 5 (1927), p. 14.

11 *Narodnya sobornopravnist*.

12 Heyer, p. 95. VTsU stands for Vysshee Tserkovnoe Upravlenie.
diocesan centers, including Katerynoslav, Chernihiv, and Kiev. In spreading their organization, the “progressives” had, as in Russia, to rely heavily on the assistance of the Soviet authorities. Their take-over of ecclesiastical authority in the Ukraine was preceded by arrests and exile of the principal opponents of the new movement, including Exarch Mikhail; repressive measures were also taken against the leadership of the UAPTs. A large number of churches were taken away from the patriarchal and autocephalist “fifties,” while some of them were compelled to “re-register” as having “changed their orientation.”

In April 1923 the Moscow Izvestiya surveyed the ecclesiastical situation in the Ukraine, reporting continued opposition to the “Living Church”: “In Kiev the followers of Tikhon have gathered round the Metropolitan [Mikhail]. Proclamations were printed in the Kievo-

13 Sukhoplyuev, p. 266.
14 As a rule, those who refused to obey the newly-formed, “legalized” VTsU were summarily dismissed by the latter; any attempts to defy such dismissals were construed by the authorities as “anti-Soviet” acts and evoked police repressions.
15 The GPU arrested some 45 members of the UAPTs in Kiev, including the secretary of the All-Ukrainian Rada, I. Tarasenko; “unmasked” as the core of a secret “counterrevolutionary organization,” they were summarily executed in August 1922. In September of that year, some 98 autocephalists were shot in the Podillya region. M. Yavdas’, Ukrayins’ka Pravoslavna Avtokefal’na Tserkva (Mu·

16 Lypkivsky, pp. 158–59; Heyer, p. 95. In accordance with the Soviet Ukrainian Decree on the Separation of the Church from the State (as augmented by a joint Instruction of the Commissariats of Justice, Internal Affairs, and Education, of November 10, 1920), all the property of the Orthodox Church and other religious denominations was nationalized, and all churches and religious groups were deprived of the status of a juridical person. Aiming at atomization of the Church, the regime recognized only local “religious associations” (hromady) of fifty laymen (hence the term “fifty”), provided they were duly “registered” with the local authorities. Only such politically screened groups of parishioners were permitted to “lease” church buildings and other liturgical objects from the state, on the basis of a special “contract” with the local soviet. The latter could, however, abrogate such a “contract” under a variety of pretexts (on the relevant provisions of the Soviet law, see I. Sukhoplyuev, Vidokremlennya tserkvy vid derzhavy: Zbirnyk zakonopolozhen’ SSR i USRR, instruktsiy, obizhnykiv i poyasnen* [Kharkiv, 1929], pp. 17–18, 74–93, 114–64). Similar legislation in the RSFSR provided for twenty, rather than fifty, laymen required for the “registration” of a local “religious association.” The “registration” or rather “re-registration” decree by the government on August 3, 1922 (Curtiss, p. 150), was apparently designed to facilitate the “progressive” take-over of the Orthodox parishes, by manipulating the composition of the local “religious associations” and, in a number of reported instances, by declaring such “registration” conditional upon the parish’s recognition of the new “progressive” leadership of the Church.
RENOVATIONIST CHURCH IN SOVIET UKRAINE

Pechers’ka Lavra urging the people to rise against the Soviet government. . . . In Kharkiv, Tikhon’s nest has been rooted out; sixteen priests with Bishop [Pavel] at their head have been arrested. They will be banished from the Ukraine. . . .”17

During 1922-23, amidst bitter controversy,18 several Orthodox bishops and a significant portion of the clergy were in one way or another persuaded or intimidated into joining the Renovationist Church.19 The first among the Orthodox hierarchs to join the “Living Church” in the Ukraine in 1922 was apparently Bishop Aleksii (Ba­zhenov) of Tyraspol, who after a brief exile was reinstated as a “progressive” archbishop in Odessa, and reportedly played a leading role in the formative stage of the Ukrainian “Living Church.”20 The most important “convert” to the Renovationist cause, however, was the well-known Archbishop Pimen (Pegov) of Podillya,21 whose example was followed by four of his vicar bishops.22 Among the few other hierarchs who submitted to the newly formed Ecclesiastical Administration were also the two Poltava vicars, Feodosii (Sergiev) of Pryluky23 and Nikolai (Pirsky) of Kobelyaky.24 In Podillya the

17 Quoted in Valentinov, pp. 183-84.
18 While the Renovationists accused the Tikhonite leadership of monarchist sympathies and anti-Soviet activities, the Tikhonites replied with charges of Renovationist collusion and co-responsibility for the persecution of the Church (see Heyer, pp. 97–100). Also, anti-Semitic propaganda crept into the Tikhonite polemics against the Renovationists; thus in the Ukraine, the local “Living Church” leader was denounced as the “vicar of the circumcised Jew, Bronstein” (Trotsky). See Orientalia Christiana, No. 4 (July-September 1923), pp. 132–33; and Troitsky, p. 312.
19 Lypkivsky, p. 159.
20 See Vestnik Sv. Sinoda, No. 12–13 (1926), p. 8; Sukhoplyuev, p. 266; and Heyer, pp. 74–75, 106. In 1923 Aleksii was appointed Archbishop of Kazan and subsequently elected to the All-Russian Synod.
21 Regarded as a Ukrainophobe, Pimen presided in 1918 over the First All-Ukrainian Orthodox Sobor in Kiev, which frustrated the attempts of the Ukrainian church movement to Ukrainize the Church and sever its links with Moscow. For alleged sabotaging of the 1919 decree of the Ukrainian Dyrektoriya proclaiming autocephaly of the Orthodox Church, Pimen was briefly imprisoned by the Ukrainian authorities. According to Heyer, who does not supply the source of this information, Pimen was blackmailed by the GPU into joining the Renovationists; this supposedly occurred during his stay in Kiev in September 1922 in connection with the Sobor of Bishops (Heyer, pp. 100–101).
22 Bishops Lollii (Yur’evsky) of Mohyliv-Podils’kyi, Gerasim of Balta, Fotii (Mankovsky), and Adrian (Antsipanchikansky) of Ushytsya. The two vicars who refused to follow in Pimen’s footsteps were Bishops Amvrosii (Polyansky) of Vinnytsya and Valerian (Rudych) of Proskuriv (ibid., pp. 101–2).
23 Ibid., pp. 104–5; later Feodosii joined the UAPTs.
“Living Church” found an enthusiastic supporter in a former autocephalist priest, Pavlo Pohorilko, who led a number of the patriarchal and autocephalist parishes in Vinnytsya region into the Renovationist camp and was later, in 1923, rewarded by the Moscow Synod with the episcopal rank. To strengthen the Renovationist leadership in the Ukraine, the Moscow center dispatched two senior Russian hierarchs there in 1923—Metropolitan Innokentii (Tikhonov) being sent to Kiev, the center of the anti-Renovationist resistance, and Metropolitan Evdokim (Meshchersky) to the Odessa-Kherson diocese.

Following the removal of Exarch Mikhail from Kiev, the First All-Ukrainian Church-Renovationist Congress met there on February 12-15, 1923. Attended by a number of bishops (including Pimen of Podillya), clergy, and laymen—predominantly “Living Church” adherents—the Congress elected a provisional All-Ukrainian Supreme Ecclesiastical Administration (VUVTsU). But while constituting this body as an autonomous branch of the Moscow VTsU, the Kievan

---

24 Ibid., p. 119. After some time, Nikolai redefected to the Tikhonites.

25 One of the early leaders of the Ukrainian autocephalist movement, Pohorilko (together with several other priests) broke with the UAPTs in protest against the “anti-canonical reforms” of its 1921 Sobor (Lypkivsky, pp. 55, 159-60).

26 According to Lypkivsky (p. 160), several members of the regional autocephalist Tserkovna Rada in Vinnytsya developed at that time differences with the local Archbishop Ivan Teodorovych and broke away from the UAPTs, joining Pohorilko.


28 Heyer, p. 96; see also above, note 15.

29 Heyer, p. 106. Metropolitan Evdokim was a member of the Supreme Ecclesiastical Administration in Moscow and for a year (August 1923—August 1924) Chairman of the All-Russian Synod.


31 Heyer, p. 101. Heyer erroneously lists Kharkiv as the meeting place of this gathering.


33 Golos P.U., No. 1–2 (1925), p. 2. Among the newly elected members of the VUVTsU (Vseukrayins’ke Vyshche Tserkovne Upravlinnya) was P. Pohorilko.
Congress declared itself in favor of autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church, addressing an urgent “prayer” to this effect to the forthcoming Second All-Russian Local Sobor.\textsuperscript{34} As will be shown later in greater detail, this plea for ecclesiastical independence (not unlike the resolutions of the 1922 Sobor Conference of the Patriarchal Church in Kiev)\textsuperscript{35} appeared to be motivated more by tactical considerations than by a sincere desire for the Ukrainization of the Church. On the one hand, while largely Russian by nationality or orientation, the Renovationists were quite aware of the popularity of autocephaly, Ukrainization, and conciliarism (sobornopravnişt) among the Ukrainian Orthodox. Apparently, by paying lip service to these principles and promising their realization in a “canonical” manner, they hoped to steal the wind from the sails of the UAPTs and assimilate its growing following;\textsuperscript{36} the current Ukrainization policy of the Kharkiv government and its emphasis on the formal attributes of Ukrainian statehood could have provided an additional inducement for the local “progressives.” On the other hand, there seemed to be a growing apprehension in more conservative local Renovationist circles about the radical turn being taken by the Moscow VTsU on the questions of church reforms, an apprehension which was combined with the desire to avert a permanent split between the Tikhonites and the Renovationists in the Ukraine. Subsequent developments showed that the local Renovationists apparently hoped, by winning greater freedom of action, to pursue a more conciliatory and conservative policy in the Ukraine and thus attract the now leaderless Tikhonite following. As their Kharkiv journal commented later, the Ukrainian Renovationists early realized that “only upon the condition of its national freedom can the Ukrainian Orthodox Church find the means to pacify and conciliate the sad schism

\textsuperscript{34} Pomestnyi Sobor, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{35} The Sobor Conference of the Ukrainian Exarchate which met in Kiev on September 2-4, 1922, called upon the episcopate of the Exarchate to proclaim without delay the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, and to introduce Ukrainization of the church services, as well as a broad sobornopravnişt. The Sobor of the Exarchate's bishops, pleading canonical considerations, did not actually proclaim autocephaly, but nevertheless claimed a sort of provisional ecclesiastical independence. See “Avtokefaliya Pravoslavnoi Ukraïnskoi Tserkvi v soveshchaniy deputatov Kievskogo Sobora 1922 goda,” Golos P.U., No. 3, (1925), pp. 3-4; A. Pokrovsky, “Avtokefaliya Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi na Ukraïne,” Ukr. P.B., No. 18 (September 15, 1925), p. 5; and Heyer, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{36} See Heyer, p. 103.
which has appeared within it under the name of ‘Lipkovschina;’ and to liquidate another unhealthy movement in its midst—‘Tikhonovshchina.’ ”

The nature and the purpose of the autocephaly requested by the Ukrainian Renovationists were further clarified when their “prayer” for ecclesiastical independence from Moscow came before the Second All-Russian Sobor in May 1923. Speaking in support of the Ukrainian request, the leader of the “Living Church,” Archpriest Krasnitsky stated:

The autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church has an exclusively external, formal administrative character. Look at the [present] representatives of the Ukrainian Church. They are, in the full sense [of the term], our brothers, our flesh and bones. If they desire to appoint their bishops independently, we should not see any danger in it; they could seize [this right] independently, in a revolutionary way, and yet they pray (prosyat’) to be granted this right.

They are living through a particularly difficult time, struggling with the willful (samovol’noi) hierarchy—Lipkovschina—and they should have their hands untied, they should be given every opportunity, and authority, to restore the church unity which has been violated, to restore the common ecclesiastical ties; and if they need a formal autocephaly to achieve these ends, we should certainly grant it. But the question of Ukrainian autocephaly becomes particularly simplified when we take into account that the Ukrainian Church is united with the whole of Renovationist Russia in a single group communion by the statute of the “Living Church.” The Ukraine and Russia have a single Central Committee of the “Living Church” group, which binds them with voluntary moral ties that are stronger than any official or juridical ties.

Despite the limited nature of the “autocephaly” requested for the Ukraine and its support by Krasnitsky, the Moscow Sobor declined to grant the “prayer” of the Ukrainian Renovationists. After “heated debate” that assumed a “stormy character,” the majority at the Sobor voted “to recognize autocephaly as admissible in principle [but] to postpone the decision until the next session of the Sobor.”

The failure of the Ukrainian Renovationists to win autocephaly at the 1923 Sobor could not but deprive them of the chief weapon

37 Golos P.U., No. 1-2 (1925), p. 3.
38 Pomestnyi Sobor, p. 24. The “prayer of the Ukrainian Church” was presented at the Sobor by Archpriest Filevsky, a professor.
39 Ibid.
they had hoped to use against the "non-canonical" UAPTs and confirmed the latter's allegations that the Russian Church, Renovationist or not, opposed the "true liberation" of the Ukrainian Church. At the same time the radical ecclesiastical reforms adopted by the Moscow Sobor—especially the introduction of the married episcopate, the sanctioning of a second marriage for the clergy, and the adoption of the New Style (Gregorian) calendar—met with an unfavorable reception among the basically conservative Renovationist rank-and-file, and the reforms were now roundly condemned by the Tikhonites as a "heresy" and "betrayal" of Orthodoxy.\footnote{Golos P.U., No. 11 (1925), p. 4; Ukr. P.B., No. 15 (1925), p. 8.} When, shortly after the 1923 Sobor, the authorities allowed Patriarch Tikhon to return to his office, and Exarch Mikhail to resume command of the Patriarchal Church in the Ukraine, disillusionment with the "progressive" cause assumed the proportions of a wholesale defection from the Renovationist ranks in the Ukraine.

These developments, it appears, strengthened the position of both the conservative and the centrifugal elements among the Ukrainian Renovationists, especially the episcopate. Taking its cue from the August 1923 Conference in Moscow,\footnote{The Moscow Conference of August 1923 was an attempt to salvage the Renovationist cause after Tikhon's release from prison, which led to a massive wave of defections from the "progressive" ranks. The Conference adopted a series of measures designed to moderate the radicalism of the 1923 Sobor, and re-established the traditional synodical form of government in the Renovationist Church (see Hecker, pp. 107-9).} the VUVTsU convoked a Sobor of Bishops, which met in Kharkiv on October 25-27, 1923.\footnote{The VUVTsU sent out invitations to the Kharkiv Sobor to all the patriarchal bishops in the Ukraine, apparently hoping that the new conservative line of the Ukrainian Renovationists might facilitate the absorption of the Tikhonites into a single church organization; none of the patriarchal bishops accepted this invitation (Ukr. P.B., No. 12 [1925], p. 1).} This gathering, while usurping the powers of the Local Sobor,\footnote{As was the case with the Second Conference of the "Living Church" in Moscow, in August 1923, the decisions adopted by the Kharkiv Sobor of Bishops violated the canons of the "Living Church" (see Troitsky, p. 322). Only another local Sobor of bishops, clergy, and laymen or an Ecumenical Sobor could have canonically changed the decisions of the 1923 All-Russian Sobor.} effected a series of important changes in the Church. It replaced the VUVTsU with a new body—the All-Ukrainian Holy Synod—and elected Archbishop Pimen as its head, elevating him at the same time to the dis-
tinction of “Metropolitan of Slobids’ka Ukraine and Kharkiv.” The new Synod was to be solidly dominated by the episcopate, with only a token representation from clergy and laymen. Dropping the old group designation—the “Living Church”—the Kharkiv Sobor confirmed “The Ukrainian Orthodox Church” as the official name of the Church, and once again reiterated its position on autocephaly. Taking an even more conservative line than the August Conference in Moscow, the Kharkiv gathering suspended the implementation of several reforms decided by the Moscow Sobor. While retaining the two already consecrated married bishops, it decreed that, in view of the attitude of the “popular masses,” no married candidates would in the future be admitted to the episcopal office; for similar reasons, the Sobor resolved “not to permit the clergy to remarry until the review of this question at the Ecumenical Sobor” and transferred to the latter the decision on the calendar issue as well. Reservations were also voiced with respect to the decisions of the 1923 Moscow Sobor on relics of saints and on monasteries; the gathering at Kharkiv found these decisions “formulated without sufficient clarity and giving ground for critical opinions.”

While the Kharkiv Sobor of Bishops failed to bring about a reunion with the Tikhonites, it nevertheless contributed to the stabilization of the Renovationist Church in the Ukraine and, for the time being, arrested any further decline in the Renovationist strength. The new regime in the Church even brought it some modest gains, especially from among the rank-and-file patriarchal clergy, attracted by the more (politically) secure status and greater opportunities for promotions and rewards in the Renovationist Church. During the year following the Kharkiv Sobor, an impressive number of bishops were consecrated for the ten dioceses of the Renovationist Church in the

---

45 Golos P.U., No. 11 (1925), p. 4; and No. 3 (1925), p. 4.
46 Both were among those “chosen by the people”; one of them was Archbishop Iosif (Krechetovich) of Izyum, one of the chief Renovationist polemists against the UAPTs and an accomplished preacher (Golos P.U., No. 12 [1925] p. 2; Heyer, p. 105). According to Heyer (p. 103), Krechetovich was later removed from episcopal service because of his married status, and was still living in the Ukraine when it was occupied by the Germans in 1941.
47 Golos P.U., No. 11 (1925), pp. 3-4.
48 See Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, No. 7-8 (1932), p. 4; and V. Rozhitsyn, Tikhonovtsy, obnovlentsy i kontrrevolyutsiya (Moscow, 1926), p. 15.
Ukraine, bringing the total to 32 hierarchs, including two metropolitans and 8 archbishops. By October 1, 1925, the Ukrainian Renovationists claimed an apparently inflated total of 3,500 priests and 3,000 parishes. Yet while creating such a large number of bishops, instituting 34 episcopal sees, and claiming a large number of clergy and churches, the Renovationists continued to suffer from a chronic unpopularity among the Orthodox laymen; despite the usually central location of their churches and despite all attempts to beautify their services with colorful ceremony, choral and instrumental music, and skillful oratory, the Renovationist churches attracted only a modest number of worshipers.

In terms of territorial distribution of strength, the Ukrainian Renovationist Church derived its greatest following in three dioceses: the industrialized Kharkiv region, with its Russian minority; the cosmopolitan Odessa diocese, which had been without a patriarchal episcopate since 1922; and the predominantly rural Podillya, where the decisive factor appears to have been the influence of Pimen and the four other local bishops who defected to the “progressive” camp. On the other hand, the Kiev, Poltava, and Volynia dioceses, with their heavy concentration of Tikhonite and autocephalist parishes,
remained the weakest links in the Renovationist organization.\textsuperscript{57} As for its social base, the latter appealed primarily to the Russian or Russophile middle class and intelligentsia,\textsuperscript{68} although there appeared to be many Ukrainians among the rank-and-file Renovationist clergy; among the many motives that led them to join this Church, aspirations for a "canonical autocephaly" evidently played some role.\textsuperscript{59}

It was their anxiety to overcome "the initial sin of the new church movement . . . its aloofness from the mass of the faithful,"\textsuperscript{60} with its direct moral and material consequences for the clergy,\textsuperscript{61} that largely determined the policies of the Ukrainian Renovationists after 1923. Thus, while conspicuously displaying their loyalty to the regime and advertising their privileged legal status,\textsuperscript{62} they continued, in a seemingly ambivalent manner, alternately to appeal for unification with the Patriarchal and Autocephalous Churches and to denounce the leadership of these churches as "reactionary," "monarchist," and "anti-Soviet" (the charges addressed against the Tikhonites) or as "Petlyu­rite" and "un-canonical" (the UAPTs).\textsuperscript{63} At the same time, on the one hand, Renovationist polemics stressed the "strict canonicity" of the Renovationist Church and especially its recognition by the Eastern Patriarchs\textsuperscript{64}—an argument designed to attract the Tikhonite following—while, on the other hand, the rank-and-file of the Autocephalous Church were promised "canonical" autocephaly and Ukrainianization.\textsuperscript{65} Unlike its ecclesiastical rivals, the Ukrainian Renovationist Church could soon broadcast its message in printed form; late in 1924 the government permitted the Renovationists to commence publica-

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., pp. 96, 105-6. See also Golos P.U., No. 4 (1924), p. 3.

\textsuperscript{58} Rozhitsyn, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{59} See "Deyaniya," Ukr. P.B., No. 16 (1925), especially the statements of the priest delegates Khotovytsky, Luminarsky, Vyshnevsky, Baranovych, and Kovalenko (pp. 2-5).

\textsuperscript{60} V. B. Titlinov, cited in Troitsky, p. 366.

\textsuperscript{61} See the resolution of the Kievan Diocesan Conference (December 21-24, 1924) complaining about the "difficult position of the clergy in moral and material respects" (Golos P.U., No. 4 [1925], p. 4).

\textsuperscript{62} The resolutions of the Kievan Diocesan Conference boasted that "only the Holy Synod, the only registered and legal organ of the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, can lead the Ukrainian Church out of this destruction into which it was led by illegal organs and various non-church religious associations" (Golos P.U., No. 3 [1925], pp. 7-8).

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., No. 1-2 (1925), pp. 8-9.

\textsuperscript{64} See ibid., No. 10 (1925), esp. p. 3; and "Tserkovnoe edinstvo," Vestnik Sv. Sinoda, No. 4 (1925), pp. 9-11.

\textsuperscript{65} Golos P.U., No. 1-2 (1925), pp. 3-10.
tion of their press organ, *Golos Pravoslavnoi Ukrainy* (The Voice of the Orthodox Ukraine).*66

Anxious to strengthen their appeal to the autocephalist following, the Ukrainian Renovationists stepped up their demands for formal autocephaly, bringing the matter before the All-Russian Pre-Sobor Conference which met in Moscow on June 10, 1924.*67* With the Russian opposition to Ukrainian autocephaly apparently declining, the Moscow Holy Synod in September of that year granted “provisional autocephaly” to the Renovationist Church in the Ukraine.*68* But in fact the terms of this “autocephaly” only slightly extended the “autonomy” granted to the Ukraine by the Moscow Sobor in 1918. The Ukrainian Church was to remain subordinate to the Moscow Holy Synod, which retained the right to “bless” (that is, confirm) the Metropolitan (to be elected at an All-Ukrainian Local Sobor) and to serve as the appellate instance for the Ukrainian Church. The latter was to send its delegates to the All-Russian Sobors and to be represented on the All-Russian Holy Synod.*69*

Shortly afterwards the All-Ukrainian Holy Synod, with the blessing of Moscow, decided to convocate in 1925 the (Second) All-Ukrainian Local Sobor in Kharkiv, which they hoped would legitimize both the Church’s autocephaly and its canonical organization, thus removing the last obstacles to the reunion of the three major Orthodox factions in the Ukraine.*70*

---

*66* The first issue (No. 1–2) of *Golos Pravoslavnoi Ukrainy* appeared in January 1925, with an original printing of 5,000 copies (reduced within a month to 2,000). Commenced as a monthly, the paper was transformed with its No. 4 (February 15, 1925) issue into a semi-monthly (usually limited to 8 large-format pages). Formally conceived as a bilingual publication, *Golos P.U.* contained only occasional articles and letters in badly written or mistake-laden Ukrainian. While continuing this “bilingual” policy, the publication changed its title with the No. 14 (July 15, 1925) issue to a Ukrainian one—*Ukrayins’kyi Pravoslavnyi Blahovisnyk*. Printed in Kharkiv and then, evidently, in Zaporizhzhya, the publication was discontinued in late 1928 or early 1929, when the regime stepped up its anti-religious campaign. See *Kommunist*, No. 84 (April 12, 1929).

The UAPTs was permitted to publish its press organ only late in 1926 (the first issue of *Tserkva i Zhytтя* appeared early in 1927), while the Patriarchal Church in the Ukraine received such permission only after the Second World War, when it began the publication of *Eparkhiyi Visnyk* in Lviv—largely for the consumption of “converts” from the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church.


*69* *Golos P.U.*, No. 1–2 (1925), p. 3.

*70* The First All-Ukrainian Orthodox Sobor met in Kiev on January 7–19 and
Preparation for the Sobor

On November 11-15, 1924, with prior government approval, an All-Ukrainian Pre-Sobor Conference met in Kharkiv to prepare the agenda and rules of the Sobor. Much attention was devoted to the problem of both combating the patriarchal and autocephalist groups and bringing them into the ranks of the Renovationist Church. It was decided to invite representatives of both groups to attend the forthcoming Sobor.

At the same time, the Conference voted unanimously to propose that the All-Ukrainian Sobor proclaim “full autocephaly and Ukrainization.” On the latter issue the gathering resolved that “the Ukrainization of the liturgy and church life should be regarded as essential, legitimate, and timely; the actual introduction of Ukrainization should [however] depend on the will of the majority of the parish population, while at the same time the legitimate interests of the minority should be satisfied in one way or another.”

The gathering also dealt at length with the thorny problem of monasticism; declaring that monastic institutions should be reformed along the lines of “labor communes,” the Conference stressed the need for the retention of a monastery and a convent in each diocese. The difficult economic and legal status of the Renovationist clergy also occupied the gathering, resulting in a petition that was presented to the government by a Conference’s delegation. The Conference

---

72 Ibid., pp. 5-9. During the conference Metropolitan Pimen proposed to dispatch a “Ukrainian-speaking” Renovationist bishop to the United States, there to combat Archbishop Teodorovych and the American branch of the UAPTs (ibid., p. 10).
73 Ibid., No. 6 (1925) p. 1.
74 Ibid., No. 11 (1925), p. 4. This resolution followed a report presented by Bishop Vladimir of Kupyansk on “the liturgical language.”
75 The Conference participants identified the monks and nuns as the single group most hostile to the Renovationist Church, and the source of the most destructive anti-Renovationist agitation (ibid., No. 1-2 [1925], p. 6). It is likely that the Conference approached the authorities to facilitate the Renovationist take-over of some monasteries, and that the subsequent raid of the Kievo-Pechers'ka Lavra and its transfer to the Renovationists was connected with such a petition.
76 Ibid.
concluded its work by outlining the program of the forthcoming Sobor and created a commission to work out rules and procedures for the Sobor.\footnote{ukr. P.B., No. 16 (1925), p. 5.}

On March 15, 1925, the All-Ukrainian Holy Synod addressed a message to the “Orthodox people of the Ukraine,” which, while condemning the autocephalist “schism” of 1921, called upon the following of the UAPTs to “return” to the “canonical” Orthodox Church.\footnote{Reproduced in full in \textit{Golos P.U.}, No. 6 (1925), p. 1.}

To negotiate with the Ukrainian autocephalists, the Renovationists delegated Pimen’s deputy, Metropolitan Innokentii of Kiev and Halych who, in March 1925, addressed a letter to the All-Ukrainian Rada inviting it to send its representatives as well as representatives from the UAPTs dioceses to the May Sobor in order to effect a merger between the two Churches. Like the Synod’s March message, Innokentii’s letter betrayed an ambivalence hardly calculated to convince the Rada of Renovationist good faith: the UAPTs was described in the letter as the “party of the so-called Ukrainian autocephalists,” and its delegates were offered only a consultative voice at the Sobor.\footnote{Minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church Rada, No. 25/45, April 30, 1927 (Archive of Metropolitan I. Teodorovych in Philadelphia).}

With the Synod’s condemnation of the UAPTs as a “heretical,” “non-church organization” still standing, it was not surprising that the Rada declined Innokentii’s invitation.\footnote{Ukr. P.B., No. 16 (1925), p. 1. According to Pimen, the Rada claimed in its reply that the “Sobor and the Synod are non-church organizations.”} Parallel conversations in Odessa, between the Synod member Professor A. I. Pokrovsky and the leading Rada member V. Chekhivsky, similarly ended in failure.\footnote{According to Pokrovsky, the autocephalists decided to ignore the Sobor “because they were not given the right of the deciding vote” (ibid., p. 6).}

A somewhat more conciliatory attitude to Innokentii’s overtures was shown by the Soviet-supported autocephalist splinter group, \textit{Diyal’na Khrystova Tserkva} (The Active Christian Church).\footnote{On this group, which attempted, with presumably some support from the GPU, to take over control of the UAPTs in the years 1923–26, see Lypkivsky, pp. 162–78; and \textit{Siyach} (Chicago), No. 2 (1927).} Yet, while voicing their desire to join the “canonic autocephaly” of the Renovationist Church, the leaders of the DKhTs set forth the following terms of union: (a) reconsecration of the DKhTs bishops \textit{in}
camera (to avoid public admission of their formerly uncanonic status); (b) retention by these reconsecrated bishops of their former sees; (c) full autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church; (d) Ukrainization of the liturgical language; and (e) participation of laymen in the ecclesiastical government. Ostensibly objecting to the mode of reconsecration as well as the “uncanonical” admission of married bishops which would be involved, the Synod rejected the conditions proposed by the DKhTs.\(^8^3\)

Apparently aware of the virtual impossibility of offering satisfactory terms of union to both the UAPTs and the Patriarchal Church, the Renovationist leadership—far more sympathetic to the Tikhonite camp—doubled its efforts to persuade the latter to participate in the Sobor. As later admitted by two principal speakers at the Sobor, “If one were to show love for the Lypkiutsi, we would thereby alienate the Tikhonites, and vice-versa,”\(^8^4\) but the Tikhonites “are more important to us than Lypkiutsi.”\(^8^5\) Accordingly, the Synod’s invitations were sent out in April 1925 to all the Tikhonite bishops in the Ukraine inviting them to participate in the Sobor, along with two representatives of the clergy and laymen from each diocese. When all the patriarchal bishops ignored the invitation and some returned the Synod’s letter unopened, the Holy Synod early in May addressed personal messages to all the bishops, imploring them, “for the sake of the Holy Orthodox Church and [our] native Ukraine,” to participate in the Sobor.\(^8^6\) Only the Exarch’s deputy, Bishop Konstantin of Kharkiv, replied to this message on May 15, agreeing to meet with the Synod’s representatives.

When a five-man Renovationist delegation\(^8^7\) met with Konstantin and his advisers two days later, it became clear that the Tikhonites would take part in the Sobor only upon condition of (1) the establishment on the part of the Renovationist Synod of canonic communion with the Patriarchal Locum Tenens, Metropolitan Petr of Krutitsy, and the latter’s blessing upon the Sobor, and (2) the repudiation at the

---

\(^{8^3}\) Uk. P.B., No. 16 (1925), p. 3.
\(^{8^4}\) Pokrovsky, ibid., p. 6.
\(^{8^5}\) Archbishop Iosif (Krechetovich) of Izyum, ibid.
\(^{8^6}\) Golos P.U., No. 9 (1925), p. 1.
\(^{8^7}\) Headed by Metropolitan Innokentii of Kiev, the delegation also included Archbishops Aleksandr of Berdychiv and Andrei of Pavlohrad, as well as Archpriest Fetisov and layman Skvorkin (“Resul’taty prizyvov brat’ev tikhonovtsev na Svyashchennyi Sobor,” ibid., No. 11 [1925], p. 8).
Sobor of the earlier Renovationist charges that the Patriarchal Church engaged in "counterrevolution" and maintained connections with the Karlovac Sobor abroad. It was hardly surprising that the negotiations ended in failure, as the acceptance of Konstantin's terms would have been tantamount to the repudiation of the Renovationist Church's raison d'être. Coming as they did in the wake of Soviet repressions against the Synod's opponents, as well as the Renovationist take-over of the Pechers'ka Lavra and a number of the Tikhonite and autocephalist churches, the Renovationist peace offerings could not but appear as just another "progressive" maneuver to absorb or at least divide the Patriarchal and the autocephalous Churches in the Ukraine. Thus, as a grand design for reuniting the Orthodox Church in the Ukraine, the Sobor failed before it even opened its sessions.

The Second All-Ukrainian Sobor of 1925

The Second All-Ukrainian Local Sobor which met in Kharkiv from May 17 to 20, 1925, was attended by 36 bishops (including 4 metropolitans), 88 priests, and 86 lay delegates; among the participants was also a three-man delegation from the Moscow Holy Synod, led by its chairman, Metropolitan Veniamin of Leningrad. With a largely unfriendly crowd besieging the Sobor's meeting-place (the Tr'okhsvyatyteVs'ka Church, only some 100 well scrutinized guests were admitted to witness the proceedings of this gathering.

The Sobor commenced its work by voting the conventional greetings to the Soviet Ukrainian Government, thanking the latter for its "legal protection of the Church." In another message, addressed to the All-Russian Holy Synod, the Sobor expressed its gratitude to its "native sister, the Russian Church" for its "liberation" of the Ukrainian Church. The message hastened, however, to assure the Moscow Synod that "this open-door policy would not weaken our fraternal
relationship and bond with Moscow but, on the contrary, will develop and deepen it to an even greater extent."\(^{94}\)

Foremost on the Sobor’s agenda was the question of the reunion of the principal Orthodox factions in the Ukraine.\(^{95}\) The reports of the delegates showed that behind its imposing facade, the Renovationist Church was continuing to lose its lay following to the Patriarchal Church and the UAPTs, as well as to the rapidly spreading sects.\(^{96}\) The Sobor debates revealed considerable differences on the question of reunion with the other Orthodox groups in the Ukraine. A number of speakers, favoring a merger with the Tikhonites rather than the UAPTs, went to the length of advising repudiation of the 1923 Sobor reforms, admittedly the chief obstacle to such reunion, and called for the resignation of the two married Renovationist bishops.\(^{97}\) Others, primarily the Ukrainian-speaking delegates, urged concessions to the autocephalists, even at the risk of abandoning canonical orthodoxy and alienating the Tikhonites.\(^{98}\)

The Sobor’s majority, however, was persuaded, after a full account had been given of the frustrating pre-Sobor negotiations, that for the time being there was virtually no possibility of a mutually satisfactory compromise among the Orthodox groups in the Ukraine. The immediate task before the Sobor was to publicize Renovationist peacemaking efforts as widely as possible and to shift the blame for continued church strife to the Tikhonites and the autocephalists. Accordingly, the Sobor’s resolution charged that “the Tikhonite movement represents, by its origin, a phenomenon not only ecclesiastical but also political; in its purely ecclesiastical essence, it is a manifestation of the violation of church-canonical discipline, willfulness, and disobedience.” In a special appeal the lay delegates to the Sobor, after admitting that “many of us thought that the cause of our present church schism was the so-called Renovationists,” proceeded to assure the Orthodox flock that this was not the case.\(^{99}\)

\(^{94}\) Ibid., No. 11 (1925), p. 1.

\(^{95}\) On the papers read at the Sobor, showing the wide range of problems considered by this gathering, see Golos P.U., Nos. 10–13 (1925), and Ukr. P.B., No. 16 (1925).

\(^{96}\) Especially the Baptists, Adventists, and Evangelicals (Shtundysty); see Golos P.U., No. 13 (1925), pp. 2–3, and Vestnik Sv. Sinoda, No. 2 (1925), pp. 21–24.

\(^{97}\) See Golos P.U., No. 12 (1925), pp. 1–3.


\(^{99}\) Ibid., pp. 3–4.
As for the UAP Ts, whose genesis, program, and sources of strength received a great deal of attention in the reports and debates, the resolutions of the Sobor, while refraining from the standard political charges against the autocephalists, nevertheless made it clear that there could be no question of a merger with the UAP Ts as an institution nor of any concessions to the latter's "canons." While promised "some leniency," the Lypkivtsi were to be admitted to the Renovationist Church only individually and through repentance.

Meanwhile, the Sobor resolved that the Synod should “create a special commission which [would] center in its hands all activities associated with the reunion of the Lypkivshchina.” The commission was instructed (a) to prepare for publication the Ukrainian translations of the liturgy, other service books, and the Scriptures (b) to prepare, and recommend to the faithful, polemical literature on the UAP Ts, (c) “to Ukrainize the entire rite (bogosluzhebnyi stroi) on the principles of freedom, love, and expediency”; in this connection the Sobor recognized it as "necessary for all the clergy of the Ukraine to learn the Ukrainian language," to open a special chair

100 Some of the reports presented at the Sobor (especially those by Professor Pokrovsky and Archbishop Iosif Krechetovich) showed not only considerable familiarity of the speakers with the subject but also a great deal of sympathy for the aspirations of the Ukrainian autocephalist movement. While objecting to the radical reforms instituted by the 1921 autocephalist Sobor, the speakers generally agreed that the demands of the movement were both canonically justified and necessitated by the circumstances, and that the Russian Church leaders had to accept major responsibility for forcing the autocephalists to adopt revolutionary means to realize their objectives. See Pokrovsky, “Avtokefaliya Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi na Ukraine,” Ukrayins’kyi Pravoslavnyi Blahovisnyk, No. 18 (1925), pp 3–5; and the excerpts from Krechetovich’s report reproduced in A. Richynsky, Problemy ukrayins’koi relihiynoi svidomosti (Volodymyr Volynskyi, 1933), pp. 6–9, and in Ukr. P.B., No. 16 (1925), p. 6.

101 Several delegates protested at the Sobor against the tone of Renovationist polemics against the UAP Ts, including usually accusations of “political activities” and “Petlyurism” (see Ukr. P.B., No. 16 [1925], esp. pp. 2–5).

102 Ibid., p. 6.

103 Such a commission on the implementation of the principles of autocephaly and Ukrainization was established by the Holy Synod on June 16, 1925 (ibid., No. 17 [1925], p. 7).

104 An earlier translation made by Professor I. Ohiyenko was to serve as basis for the Renovationist version.

105 The reference is to the translation made in the late nineteenth century by the Ukrainian writer Pan’ko Kulish.

106 The importance of the Ukrainian language in combating the UAP Ts was stressed by at least one speaker at the Sobor, who confided: “I preserved two
in the Academy\textsuperscript{107} for the study of \textit{Lypkivshchyna}, as well as a special section on this problem in the journal of the Synod.\textsuperscript{108}

Another Sobor resolution, however, called for a great deal of caution in introducing the Ukrainian language in the Renovationist Church:

In consideration of the fact that the replacement in the Divine Service of Church Slavonic with the living popular Ukrainian language . . . might be interpreted . . . as a disrespectful attitude toward the sacred objects . . . it is necessary to announce that the celebration of the Divine Service in Ukrainian in parishes which are not yet prepared for this reform is allowed, but not ordered . . . In parishes where the population has become divided on the question of liturgical language . . . it is necessary to permit the temporary alternation of the two languages in the celebration of the Divine Service.\textsuperscript{109}

In addition to a number of devices against the UAPTs proposed at the Sobor,\textsuperscript{110} the latter instructed the Synod “to petition the civil authorities [to declare] the inadmissibility of a simultaneous or alternate celebration of liturgy in the [same] Orthodox churches by both the \textit{Lypkivtsi} and the Orthodox, because it offends our religious sentiments.”\textsuperscript{111}

The decision “to proclaim the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church” was adopted, after a lengthy discussion, at the May 20 sitting of the Sobor, by an overwhelming majority of 202 against 6 opposed and 7 abstaining votes. The resolution on this question stated that

the Second All-Ukrainian Holy Sobor . . . has come to the firm and unanimous conviction that such autocephaly is dogmatically acceptable, canonically possible, and necessary for Orthodoxy by learning the Ukrainian language in time, and, having provided myself with all the [Ukrainian service] books, I crossed myself and started to celebrate the liturgy in the Ukrainian language. . . . I also preach in Ukrainian” (\emph{ibid.}, p. 4).

\textsuperscript{107} The reference was evidently to the projected Higher Theological School in Kiev that had just been approved by the authorities. See below, p. 66.


\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Golos P.U.}, No. 13 (1925), p. 5.

\textsuperscript{110} Including the formation of Renovationist cells within the autocephalist parishes and the removal of the consecrated objects from the churches seized by the \textit{Lypkivtsi}; also recommended were such practices as occasional “demonstration liturgies” in the Ukrainian language in the Renovationist parishes, the wide use of \textit{blahovisnyky}, the introduction in the church singing of carols and religious folksongs; see \textit{Ukr. P.B.}, No. 16 (1925), pp. 4–5.

\textsuperscript{111} \emph{Ibid.}, p. 6.
RENOVATIONIST CHURCH IN SOVIET UKRAINE

cally founded, historically proven, and necessary . . . it was, in fact granted and blessed not only by the Russian Holy Synod but also by Patriarch Tikhon in the person of his Exarch Metropolitan Mikhail [Ermakov]. In order to give final shape to this newly revived autocephaly and its ecclesiastical-canonical sanctioning, one should first of all, in our opinion, remove all that lies here in the way of the final resolution of this sacred cause, that is, these ecclesiastical-political acts of 1685-87 whereby the long independent Kievian Church was subordinated to the Muscovite Church authorities. Since the aforesaid refers primarily to the episcopal oath which was taken on November 8, 1685, by the Kiev Metropolitan Gedeon Svyatopolk-Chetvertinsky before the Patriarch of Moscow Ioakim, who ordained him, [the Sobor decides] to declare this oath null and void and, with the canonical sanction of the Russian Holy Synod, to release from it the Ukrainian Church, whereby it would receive back its previous independence and freedom from Moscow. The acts of the Church of Constantinople whereby Patriarch Dionysius renounced in 1686 his jurisdiction over the Kievian Metropolitan should however, be left in their full sense and force, since they prove the cessation of any dependence of Kiev on Constantinople. The twofold independence of the Church of Orthodox Ukraine should thus be tantamount to the canonical recognition of its full autocephaly.112

On May 21 the Sobor adopted a formal Deyanie (Act) on autocephaly which largely incorporated this resolution but stated that the Ukrainian Church “shall maintain the closest connection with those [churches] which exist within the borders of the USSR, realizing this community through the All-Russian local sobors, the participation in them of its representatives, and in all other ways determined by the canons and the practice of the Church.”113

This formula of the “closest connection” of the Renovationist Churches in the USSR which made the nominally “independent” Ukrainian Church “voluntarily” subordinate to the All-Russian Sobor (and hence, by implication, also to the All-Russian Holy Synod in Moscow)114 underlined the tactical nature of Ukrainian autocephaly

112 The resolution proposed by Pokrovsky and edited by a special commission headed by Metropolitan Innokentii was later adopted unanimously (see Golos P.U., No. 10 [1925], p. 3).
113 Ibid.
114 Speakers at the Sobor proposed the formation of “a supreme ecclesiastical organ, such as could unite in itself all the autocephalous churches that have emerged within the former Russian Church (Georgian, Belorussian, the autonomous Crimean, etc.)”; Golos P.U., No. 11 (1925), p. 2. The subsequent renaming of the All-Russian Synod as the “Holy Synod of the Orthodox Churches in the USSR” followed along these lines.
as a weapon in the struggle against both the UAPTs and the Tikhonites. Replying to the appeals of the Moscow representatives for the preservation of Russo-Ukrainian ecclesiastical unity, the leading members of the Sobor gave assurance that “one must not see Ukrainian autocephaly as a separation from the center.” Drawing an analogy with the Soviet constitution, Pokrovsky characterized Ukrainian autocephaly as a step in the direction of the federalization of the Russian Orthodox Church along national lines.115

Submitting its Deyanie for final ratification by the Russian Church, the Sobor simultaneously appealed to the Eastern Patriarchs and all other autocephalous Orthodox Churches for recognition of Ukrainian autocephaly.116

While coming as a sort of anticlimax (after the 1924 grant of “provisional autocephaly”), the Sobor’s proclamation of autocephaly was not without some historical significance. Regardless of the tactical motivations underlying it, this act, like the resolutions of the 1922 Sobor Conference in Kiev, represented an important concession to Ukrainian nationalism in the Orthodox Church.

Another important measure taken by the Sobor aimed at removing the stigma of “uncanonicity” and “heresy” from the Ukrainian Renovationist Church and attracting the Tikhonites into its ranks. Recognizing that the major obstacle lay in the Church’s “revolutionary” genesis and the reforms of the 1923 Moscow Sobor, the Kharkiv Sobor took pains to disassociate itself as far as possible from the “progressive” past and to show that “there are no serious, purely ecclesiastical differences between the Synodic and the Tikhonite movements.”117 Accordingly, the Sobor adopted a resolution which reads, in part:

The implementation by the Ukrainian Church of the resolutions of the 1923 Moscow Sobor concerning the married episcopate and the remarriage of clergy, which has already been suspended by the decision of the Ukrainian Holy Synod of March 27 of this year, should be postponed until the Ecu-

115 Ibid. For a similar line of argument, see Vvedensky’s 1927 comment on the status of the Ukrainian Church, cited below (pp. 68–69).

116 See Golos P.U., No. 10 (1925), p. 4. The Moscow representatives of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Alexandria sent friendly (but inconclusive, as far as the issue of Ukrainian autocephaly was concerned) letters of greetings to the Kharkiv Sobor. This writer could not find any evidence that the Ecumenical Patriarch or, for that matter, any other Eastern Patriarch explicitly recognized the autocephaly of the Renovationist Church in the Ukraine.

117 See ibid., No. 12 (1925), pp. 1–3.
menical Sobor makes the final decision on these questions; until then, however, in accordance with the resolutions of the 1923 Sobor of Bishops in Kharkiv, the rights of the now married bishops and remarried clergymen must not be infringed in any way. . . . Agreeing in principle with the decision of the Moscow Sobor on the introduction of the New Style [calendar] into church life, but taking into account the local peculiarities of the Ukrainian Church [the Sobor resolves] to postpone its actual realization until this question is decided upon by the Ecumenical Sobor. . . . The resolution on the relics of saints and on monasteries, being formulated with insufficient clarity and not properly defined, and therefore capable of causing misunderstandings, needs to be revised at the next All-Russian Sobor. . . . The Sobor considers it advisable that the church reforms of May 7, 1923, should be open to a final judgment that would testify to the Sobor's desire to preserve the foundations of the Orthodox faith intact, without at the same time restricting ecclesiastical creativity in its legitimate scope.118

Characteristically, the Kharkiv Sobor wishfully anticipated an Ecumenical Sobor as a panacea for the ills of the Orthodox Church,119 shifting to the former the embarrassing tasks of exonerating the Renovationist Church from the sins of its "progressive" youth and compelling the Tikhonites and the autocephalists to abandon their separate ways.120 The Renovationists obviously overestimated both the feasibility of such an international gathering121 and the effectiveness of its authority with regard to their ecclesiastical opponents.122

The remaining resolutions of the Sobor dealt with such questions as the struggle against sectarianism and atheism, internal church discipline,123 and theological education. The latter resolution noted

118 Ibid., No. 11 (1925), p. 4.
119 The same attitude was taken by the Moscow Holy Synod and the 1925 All-Russian Sobor (see M. Spinka, Church and the Russian Revolution [New York, 1927], pp. 280, 303-4).
120 Thus, for example, the Sobor expected the Ecumenical Church Council to pronounce on the "heresy of the Lypkiwtsi," and the Synod's commission on the latter was to supply the Council with the necessary documentation on the UAPTs (see Ukr. P.B., No. 16 [1925], pp. 5-6).
121 The last (Seventh) Ecumenical Council recognized by all the Orthodox Churches convened in Nicæa in 787.
122 The Holy Synod was invited to represent officially the Russian Orthodox Church at such an Ecumenical Council (which alone would have given the non-represented Orthodox groups the pretext for ignoring the Council's decisions), but the Council (planned for late 1925 or early 1926 in Constantinople or Jerusalem) never took place.
123 Golos P.U., No. 13 [1925], pp. 3-4. The resolution on sectarianism called for a systematic study of its rapid growth and suggested means of counteracting it such
with satisfaction that the government had, on April 24, 1925, granted the long-standing Renovationist request\textsuperscript{124} for permission to open a “Higher Theological School”\textsuperscript{125} in Kiev, a privilege denied to both the Tikhonites and the UAPTs.

The Sobor concluded its activities by re-electing the All-Ukrainian Holy Synod and conferring upon its head, Pimen, the title of “Metropolitan of Kharkiv and the entire Ukraine.”\textsuperscript{126} It also endorsed the amended Statute of the Renovationist Church which had been registered (that is, legalized) on the eve of the Sobor. Officially designated in the Statute as the “All-Ukrainian Union of Religious Associations of the Orthodox Autocephalous Synodic Church,” the Renovationist Church retained a centralized structure heavily weighted in favor of the episcopate, with only nominal scope for lay participation in ecclesiastical government. While vesting the “supreme authority” in the All-Ukrainian Local Sobor, the Statute did not make it a periodic event but left its convocation largely to the discretion of the Synod. The latter, defined as the “executive organ of the Sobor,” was described as “maintaining canonical and the closest fraternal communion with the All-Russian Holy Synod and other synods of the Orthodox Church in the USSR.” The broad powers of the Synod included “exclusive jurisdiction over the composition of the episcopate and the Diocesan Administrations.” The Statute provided for several levels of ecclesiastical administration: parish deaneries (\textit{blagochinnicheskie okruga}) of up to 10 parishes; vicarial ecclesiastical administrations, corresponding to the administrative districts; and, di-

\textsuperscript{124} Previous Renovationist requests had been refused on the grounds that Soviet Ukrainian legislation did not contain the relevant instructions and provisions (see \textit{ibid.}, No. 1–2 [1925], p. 10).

\textsuperscript{125} Originally, the Renovationists applied for permission to re-open the Kievian Theological Academy, a university-level institution capable of granting graduate degrees in theology. The Russian Renovationists were allowed to open theological academies in Moscow and Leningrad.

\textsuperscript{126} The plenum of the new Holy Synod consisted of 14 bishops, including Metropolitan Pimen, chairman, and Bishop Serafim of Zmiyiv, secretary, 6 priests, and 6 laymen. The Presidium of the Synod, also chaired by Pimen, consisted of 4 bishops, 2 priests, and 2 laymen (see \textit{ibid.}, No. 12 [1925], p. 8).
directly subordinate to the Synod, the diocesan ecclesiastical administra­tions corresponding to the gubernii (provinces).\textsuperscript{127}

**The Demise of the Renovationist Church**

The Kharkiv Sobor completed the organizational evolution of the Renovationist movement in the Ukraine, fixing for the years to come its canonical and political complexion. Despite the frustration of pre-Sobor hopes for absorption of the rival ecclesiastical groups, the immediate prospects for the Ukrainian Renovationist Church seemed quite bright.

While the Tikhonites remained in a semi-legal position aggravated by the uncertainties and rivalries of the post-Tikhon interregnum, the Renovationists were still enjoying a preferred legal status as well as support from the Eastern Patriarchs. The Ukrainian autocephaly, duly confirmed on October 6, 1925, by the Third All-Russian Sobor in Moscow,\textsuperscript{128} now untied the hands of the Kharkiv Synod to pursue its own independent line, which, it was hoped, would further disassociate the Ukrainian Renovationists from their more radical Russian brethren and attract both the Tikhonites and the autocephalists into their ranks.

Taking an increasingly conservative turn, the Kharkiv Synod proceeded after the 1925 Sobor to repudiate most of the early Renovationist innovations; despite the guarantees of the Sobor, the few married bishops were soon removed from their sees\textsuperscript{129} and the re-married clergymen dismissed from the parishes, and the old calendar was definitively reinstated throughout the Church.\textsuperscript{130} During 1926 renewed approaches were made to the rival church groups, reflecting greater willingness on the part of the Renovationists to make neces-

\textsuperscript{127} The Statute, registered on April 4, 1925, was published in full in *Golos P.U.*, No. 10 (1925), pp. 4–6.

\textsuperscript{128} *Vestnik Sv. Sinoda*, No. 6 [1925], p. 26.

\textsuperscript{129} Among the two or three married bishops thus removed was Archbishop Iosif (Krechetovich) of Izyum, one of the most popular and eloquent advocates of the Renovationist cause in the Ukraine. While the exact date of his removal could not be established, the Holy Synod announced (*ibid.*, No. 12–13 [1926], p. 10) that Krechetovich, now raised to the rank of Metropolitan, was elected on June 2, 1926, as the new head of the (autonomous) Belorussian Renovationist Church.

\textsuperscript{130} Heyer, p. 103. Heyer’s information could not be fully corroborated from the available primary sources.
sary sacrifices for the sake of union. A Third All-Ukrainian Sobor was planned for 1927 to consolidate these attempts.131

Miscalculations and unforeseen circumstances progressively defeated the aspirations of the Ukrainian Synod. Its conservative course alienated some of the abler Renovationist spokesmen in the Ukraine, without, however, significantly abating the old Tikhonite distrust of the "Red Church." When some progress was nevertheless achieved in negotiations between the two groups during 1926,132 intervention by the authorities apparently prevented any possible reconciliation.

On the other hand, the anti-reform tendency of the Synod and its evident reluctance to implement the Ukrainization resolutions of the 1925 Sobor tended to confirm the suspicions of the Ukrainian autocephalists that the Renovationist "autocephaly" was a mere tactical device devoid of any genuine sympathy for the Ukrainian cause;133 political charges against the UAPTs reappearing in the Renovationist press could not but strengthen this conviction.134 Consequently, when in October 1926 the Synod delegated Metropolitan Innokentii of Kiev to the UAPTs, inviting the latter to take part in the planned pre-Sobor Conference in Kharkiv in 1927, the All-Ukrainian Rada showed little enthusiasm for Innokentii's offer.135

Meanwhile relations between the Ukrainian Renovationists and the Moscow Synod continued to deteriorate. At the plenary session of the Holy Synod in Moscow in November 1927, Metropolitan Alexander Vvedensky sadly commented on the insubordination of the Ukrainian Church:

131 Minutes of the meeting of the Presidium of the VPTsR, No. 25/45, April 30, 1927 (archive of Metropolitan I. Teodorovych).
132 According to Heyer (p. 107), these negotiations were led by Metropolitan Juvenalii of Odessa and were "joyfully (freudig) received by the Tikhonite Church."
133 Lypkivsky, p. 159.
134 For example, the Renovationist organ charged in January 1926 that the Lypkivtsi were merely followers of Petlyura disguised as priests (Ukr. P.B., No. 1 [1926], pp. 7–8).
135 Minutes of the Presidium meeting of the VPTsR, No. 25/45, April 30, 1927 (archive of Metropolitan I. Teodorovych). In contrast to the terms offered to the UAPTs in 1925, the Synod now invited the whole All-Ukrainian Rada, all autocephalist bishops and two priests and two laymen from each diocese to take part, with a deciding vote, in the 1927 Pre-Sobor Conference. There is no evidence in available documents of any action being taken on the Renovationist offer. According to Richynsky (p. 32), on February 17, 1928, Metropolitan Innokentii approached the new head of the UAPTs, Metropolitan Boretsky, with another unification proposal, but the offer was rejected.
Extremely abnormal relations have developed with the Ukrainian Church. . . . The Ukrainian Synod considers us to be Muscovites (Moskovity) while [in fact] we are not as regards our significance. . . . We have functions extending over all the churches existing within the borders of the new Soviet state, and we look upon ourselves as a central, and not a separate Muscovite, administrative-canonical unit. This is why we should remind all the autocephalous churches that we are a decisive instance for them, just as the TsIK [Central Executive Committee] of the Ukraine is part of the TsIK of the USSR.\

While thus charged with insubordination to Moscow, the Ukrainian Renovationist Church had at the same time to face increasing insubordination and demoralization in its own ranks, stemming from multiple sources such as disenchantedment with the Renovationist cause, frustration of hopes for church unity, the depressing material and legal position of the clergy, conflicts between priests and the “parish fifties,” as well as the mounting antireligious pressures from outside. These disruptive influences contributed to new defections from the Church, leading one Renovationist writer to lament: “Will there be no flock for us priests to lead? Will there be anybody left for us leaders to guide?” The unexpected turn of events in the summer of 1927 brought these dark forebodings closer to reality.

The turning point in the fortunes of the Ukrainian Renovationist Church (as for the rest of the movement) that set in motion the process of its rapid decay was the July 1927 Declaration of Metropolitan Sergii, which marked the beginning of the Patriarchal Church’s collaboration with the regime. By adopting the Renovationist political platform, it severed the sustaining link between the Renovationists and the regime; depriving the Renovationists of their major argument for the 1922 “revolution,” the new “loyal” and “registered” Patriarchal Church proved to be an irresistible attraction for those members of the Renovationist Church who had joined it for political or opportunistic reasons. The failure of the plans for the Ecume-

---

137 The Ukrainian Synod’s epistle of March 1, 1926 (quoted in Troitsky, p. 376), complained of loose morals and weak discipline among the clergy.
138 See note 16, above.
141 See V. Uzkov, “Starotserkovniki, obnovlentsy, grigor’evtsy,” Antireligioznik,
nical Council and the stiffening of the Eastern Patriarchs’ attitude toward the Renovationists after the 1927 Declaration also contributed to some extent to the flight from the Renovationist ranks. That the massive wave of defections after 1927 did not completely extinguish the Renovationist Church attests to the strength of conviction and loyalty on the part of the core of that Church, although such factors as the rigorous conditions of readmission into the Tikhonite Church and the regime’s interest in continued ecclesiastical schism should not be altogether discounted.

While the exact number of defections after 1927 cannot be established, the Ukrainian Renovationist Church had lost a substantial portion of its laymen and clergy by the end of the decade; by 1928, according to semi-official estimates, the total number of Renovationist clergy decreased by more than one third the 1925 figure. Among the defectors was the highly respected Archbishop Lollii of Podillya, who rejoined the Patriarchal Church in 1927.

The withdrawal of official support for the Renovationists following the 1927 recognition of the Patriarchate by the regime was soon reflected in the progressive curtailment of Renovationist activities. The projected Third All-Ukrainian Sobor never met, and the officially inspired “boycott” of the “mrakobesy” (obscurantists) made it difficult to hold ecclesiastical conferences and meetings and to maintain communications within the Church. In 1929 the Renovationist journal, Ukrayins’kyi Pravoslavnyi Blahovisnyk, was forced to suspend publication, as the printers “spontaneously” refused to collaborate in spreading religious opium.” In the same year the authorities took

---

142 As a rule, the “returnees” had to go through the ritual of ecclesiastical recantation; only those church orders, ranks, and titles conferred before joining the “schism” were recognized as valid.


144 The 1928 Conference of the Godless in Kharkiv estimated the total number of the Renovationist clergy in the Ukraine at 2,200 (as against 4,900 Tikhonite and 1,200 autocephalist priests), that is, 1,300 (or 37 per cent) fewer than in October 1925. Tryzub (Paris), IV, No. 22-23 (June 17, 1928), p. 41.

145 Heyer, p. 107. Despite his repentance, Archbishop Lollii did not regain his episcopal rank in the Tikhonite Church and henceforth served as an ordinary parish priest.


147 After the Kharkiv printers refused to continue, the Synod made futile attempts to transfer the publication to other cities, including Cherkasy, Zapori-
measures to close down the Synod's Higher Theological School in Kiev,\(^{148}\) and in January 1930 expelled the remaining 48 monks from the Pechers'ka Lavra Monastery, which was soon to be transformed into an antireligious museum.\(^{149}\) The massive antireligious campaign that was put on in 1929—with its vulgar "unmasking of religious frauds," "priest-baiting," closing of churches, and the confiscation of church bells—did not spare the Renovationists. Like all the other religious groups, they now found themselves exposed to sweeping charges of "counterrevolutionary activities" and to mounting repression, which led many of the Renovationist priests to abandon the ministry or even to seek "rehabilitation" through the public renunciation of religion.\(^{150}\)

A similar fate befell the Renovationist episcopate in the Ukraine. In 1929 Metropolitan Iuvenalii of Odessa was arrested by the GPU and deported to the northern regions of the USSR. Increasingly restricted in his activities and briefly imprisoned in 1930, Metropolitan Pimen continued to preside over the dissolution of the Church until his dismissal in 1936.\(^{151}\) For a year afterward he lived in a cemetery chapel in Kupyansk, where he was arrested in 1937 and exiled from the Ukraine, never to be heard from again.\(^{152}\) Shrinking rapidly,\(^{153}\) the Renovationist Church was approaching its final agony, with the authorities intimidating the remaining bishops into forsaking their ecclesiastical duties. Among the latter were Bishop Meletii of Podillya, forced into "retirement" in 1936, and Metropolitan Konstantin zhžhya, and Melitopol. Despite the Synod's offer of "any pay desired," "the [Melitopol] workers' meeting voted to refuse the Metropolitan [Pimen]: 'We do not want to assist in spreading religious opium.' " (Antireligioznik, No. 4 [1929], pp. 106–7; see also Komunist, No. 84 [April 12, 1929]).

\(^{148}\) The "Higher Ukrainian Theological School" was scheduled to open in September 1925 in the Kiev Pechers'ka Lavra (Ukr. P.B., No. 16 [1925], p. 12), but apparently it began its activities only in March 1926 with only 9 students (Dnipro, September 18, 1926, pp. 1, 3). By 1928, the enrollment had reportedly increased to 50 (Curtiss, p. 191).

\(^{149}\) Komunist, No. 8 (January 10, 1929); Pravda, January 12, 1930; Tryzub, VI, No. 5 (February 2, 1930), 1–2.

\(^{150}\) Heyer, p. 114. According to Heyer, the authorities showed a somewhat "softer hand" in disposing of the Renovationist clergy and bishops.

\(^{151}\) Ibid. Pimen was, presumably, compelled to "resign" his office.

\(^{152}\) Ibid.

\(^{153}\) By 1936 in the entire USSR only 2,876 Renovationist churches were still reportedly open, compared to 17,000 in 1925; Antireligioznik, No. 4 (1938), p. 38. This source does not provide a separate figure for the Ukraine.
(Spasskii) of Odessa who "resigned" his post in 1937. Others who, like Archbishop Kirill (Kvashenko) of Yelysavethrad-Odessa, persisted in continuing their ecclesiastical work, were imprisoned and exiled in the closing stages of the Ezhovshchina. By the end of the decade the Renovationist Church in the Ukraine had become virtually extinct, more so than in Russia, where some remnants of Obnovlenchestvo continued to persist until the "self-liquidation" of the Church in 1943.

The fate of the Ukrainian Renovationist Church, although complicated by the peculiarities of the ecclesiastical situation in the Ukraine, with its conflict between Ukrainian and Russian nationalism, on the whole reflected the tragedy of the liberal movement in the Russian Church. Frustrated in their efforts to reform the Church at the 1917-18 Moscow Sobor and too isolated from the mass of the faithful to be able to cope with the conservative reaction that set in within the Church after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Church liberals seized upon the crisis in church-state relations in 1922 to capture the leadership of the Church by revolutionary means which the overwhelming majority of the Orthodox clergy found unethical and anticanonical. In their effort to impose church reform from above, and over the heads of the conservative masses, the liberals for a while sought and received the support of the atheistic regime, which, far from being interested in the "purification" and revitalization of Orthodoxy, saw in the reformers a convenient weapon to split and

154 Heyer, p. 114.
155 According to an authoritative Soviet source, "Renovationism liquidated itself in connection with the death of its most important leader, [Metropolitan] A. [Alexander] I. Vvedensky" in 1943 (L. I. Emeliakh, ed., Pravda o religii [Moscow, 1959], p. 414). It seems that this "self-liquidation" was hardly a spontaneous one and that the principal reason behind it may have been the well-publicized reconciliation between the regime and the Patriarchate in September 1943. It is likely that the terms of the "concordat," rewarding the Patriarchate for "patriotic activities" during the war, included a promise on the part of the regime to end the activities of the Renovationist "schism," despite similar "patriotic" efforts on the latter's part (on the Renovationist contribution to the Soviet war effort during 1941-42, see S. Evans, The Churches in the USSR [London, 1943], pp. 131-35, 154). During 1944, a number of the former Renovationist hierarchs rejoined the Patriarchal Church. A 1947 review of the Patriarchate's activities declared that the "return" of the Renovations to the Patriarchal Church had been "almost completed" and termed the "disappearance of the Renovationist schism" a major achievement for Metropolitan (and Patriarch since 1943) Sergii (Moscow Patriarchate, Patriarkh Sergii i ego dukhovnoe nasledstvo [Moscow, 1947], p. 280).
compromise the former Established Church. Thus, in their choice of means to achieve an admittedly noble end, the partisans of ecclesiastical reform succumbed to the very historical weakness they had condemned in their opponents—the tendency to rely on state power in solving internal church matters.

This unholy alliance with the regime indeed enabled the Renovationists to take over the central administration of the Russian Church. But this was a Pyrrhic victory, bestowing upon the defenders of the ecclesiastical status quo the halo of martyrdom, and turning on the reformers popular wrath over Soviet repressions against the Tikhonites, which the Renovationists publicly condoned and justified in quasi-ecclesiastical terms. While thus compromising the cause of reform in the eyes of the masses, the Renovationists attracted into their ranks a substantial portion of the white clergy, whose narrow outlook, crude opportunism, and largely utilitarian interest in church reforms overshadowed and to a great extent defeated the more profound objective of reinvigorating the spiritual content of Orthodoxy.156

The release of Patriarch Tikhon from prison in 1923 and the subsequent regrouping and solidifying of the anti-reform forces, which led to the massive defection of the opportunistic elements from the Renovationist ranks, proved to be a sobering experience for the hard core of the reformers. Struggling to wipe out among the masses the early image of "Red priests," the chastened Renovationists now took a cautious course, resuming the traditional ecclesiastical forms and moderating some of the excesses of the "Living Church." By the mid-1920s the Synodal Church had achieved enough stability and cohesion to remain, although a minority, an important force in Russian Orthodoxy, even with the loss of the preferred legal status it had enjoyed until 1927. But it was ill prepared to meet the onslaught of the post-1929 antireligious terror. The characteristics of the Renovationist Church—its submissiveness to the regime, its rationalist inclinations, disparagement of martyrdom, and, last but not least, its weak popular base—made the Renovationists more vulnerable to the Soviet antireligious measures than their principal ecclesiastical rival. Moreover, it was the Renovationists' "progressiveness," their attempts to "modernize" the Church, and their strivings to reconcile some precepts of Communism and Christianity—qualities which Lenin had

156 Titlinov, pp. 14-16.
once condemned even more than ecclesiastical "backwardness" and "obscurantism"—which apparently influenced the regime's decision to end the existence of the Renovationist Church.

The complete extinction of the Renovationist Church in the USSR by the end of the Second World War ended the ill-fated movement for reform in Russian Orthodoxy. It left little mark on the internal life of the now reunified Patriarchal Church, except for the Renovationist political platform, which the Patriarchate adopted almost intact.

University of Alberta

157 See Lenin's 1913 Letter to M. Gor'kii, Sochineniya (4th ed.; Moscow, 1941-50), XXXV, 73.

158 See M. Polskii, Kanonicheskoe polozenie vysshei tserkovnoi vlasti v SSSR i zagranitsei (Jordanville, 1948), pp. 84-87. For recent official statements of the Patriarchate's attitude toward the regime, including the denial of any religious persecution in the USSR, see Moscow Patriarchate, The Truth about Religion in Russia (London, 1942), especially pp. 20-21; N. A. Kharyuzov, "Kesarevo Kesaryu, a Bozh'e Bogu," Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhi, No. 11 (1947), pp. 27-29; and Moscow Patriarchate, Russkaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkov': Ustroistvo, polozenie, deyatelnost' (Moscow, 1958), pp. 7-29.
A sampling of Soviet and Western explanations of Stalin's fateful 1929 decision to collectivize the rural economy by force indicates that Soviet interpreters (many of them, possibly, involuntarily) persistently pervert historical truth for the political benefit of the Party and that Western views are still largely incomplete, being based on insufficient data. A study of the Soviet sources now available suggests that the decision to resort to coercion of the peasants was precipitated by some or all of the following causes: (a) a sudden urgent need for capital created by the Stalinists' bizarre industrialization planning and the jeopardy of their programs if that capital were not forthcoming; (b) real or imaginary threat to Stalin's power from the opposition inside the Party in case he failed to carry out his political commitments; (c) the failure of the state farms and of the system of contracting the farm output to supply sufficient surpluses for the transformation into capital and to satisfy non-rural demand; (d) utopian expectations of the productive superiority of collective farming; and (e) Stalin's proclivity to compulsion in general. The facts known at present, then, lead to the conclusion that, besides freeing surplus labor for work in the cities, the main purpose of collectivization was to tap a new major source of capital formation in the form of a monopolistic institution for exploitation of the expropriated peasantry by the state, in the interest of industrialization, technical modernization, and militarization of the country, remuneration of the proliferating bureaucracy, and the strengthening of Stalin's personal dictatorship.

* The author wishes to express thanks for helpful comments and suggestions concerning the initial draft of this paper to Professor V. P. Timoshenko.

Post scriptum: When this paper was at the proof stage, a similar article by Prof. H. J. Ellison, "The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture," appeared in The American Slavic and East European Review (April 1961). The coincidence proves to be a happy one: It not only attests to the growing interest in the subject, but also displays a striking similarity of some conclusions, reached independently by two writers. In most respects, however, the two articles are complementary, with Prof. Ellison stressing the political side of the story.
The official Party line on the portrayal of the collectivization of agriculture was laid down by Stalin in *The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course* (Chapters 10–11) and is repeated without any significant modification in the new 1959 text, *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Chapters 11–12). Since, under present political conditions, social sciences in the USSR are, like the arts, subject to the dictates of “socialist realism,” Soviet writers cannot stray too far away from this official line on the subject.

There is a spate of Soviet literature decrying the well-known economic inefficiency of traditional Russian muzhik farming, and in many a book it is stated in no uncertain terms that the shortage of marketable and exportable surplus in the small-scale farms during the NEP period held back capital formation and hindered the country’s industrialization; at the same time, and in the same pages, collective farms are lauded to the skies precisely for the reason that they are capable of squeezing out large surpluses. And yet, in a strikingly evasive maneuver, these statements are in no way consistently connected and no theoretical conclusion is drawn from them.¹ Nowhere in Soviet literature is it explicitly admitted that the collectivization of peasant farming was carried out *in order to create capital* for industrialization. No one dares to say that collectivization was necessary for industrialization, that industrialization subsequently proceeded and succeeded to a large extent thanks to the institution of collective farming and its exploitation of the peasantry.

Why Soviet writers go only as far as to enunciate the facts but cannot draw the logical conclusions is pretty obvious: On the one hand, they are restricted by the Party delineation and interpretation of facts, and, on the other, they apprehend the profound theoretical and political consequences of such conclusions. The limit of facts acknowledged by the Party and, hence, the boundary line for Soviet writers is about as follows. In the *Short Course* Stalin explicitly mentions the peasantry’s “aid” to capital accumulation and industrialization only during the years preceding the First Five-Year Plan.² This passage is

---

¹ See, for example, P. I. Lyashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSR* (Moscow, 1956), III, 206–7, 418–19, where the two propositions are separated by hundreds of pages. See also *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Moscow, 1960), pp. 418–19. This is the official English edition.

² *Istoriya Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bolshevikov): Kratkii kurs*
reproduced in the new *History of the CPSU* without any significant change.\(^3\) Similarly, the new history acknowledges the existence of a direct relationship between grain production and capital formation only up to the year 1928, and even this is said in criticism of the shortcomings of NEP farming, rather than with the intention of saying that, under collective farming, this relationship became more favorable from the government's point of view.\(^4\) The furthest step in this direction was made by Stalin in his 1928 speech "On the Grain Front," in which he pointed to collectivization as "one of the most important means of increasing the output of grain for the market," \(^5\) at the same time indirectly admitting that the shortage of marketable grain was capable of putting a brake upon the rate of industrialization.\(^6\) On the other hand, in numerous other places Stalin declares that collectivization had no purpose other than to liberate the peasants from capitalism and bondage to kulaks, to enhance their living standards and culture, and to bring progress and happiness to the countryside.\(^7\)

Undoubtedly, it is in the Party's interest to keep a vigilant guard along this particular thought frontier. For if a trespasser reaches the conclusion that industry in the USSR was built at the expense of the peasantry, he will inevitably go further to heresies such as viewing Soviet economics through the prism of Marx's theory of "primitive accumulation," and will next see the "socialist" Soviet system as a modern "oriental despotism"—a civilization flourishing on the exploitation of the peasantry by means of oppressive state institutions.\(^8\)

\(^3\) *History of the CPSU*, p. 407.

\(^4\) Early in 1928 there appeared a deficit in government grain procurements; "this shortage brought the export of grain almost to a standstill, and caused difficulties in accumulating the foreign currency for the purchase of industrial equipment abroad." *History of the CPSU*, p. 424. See also pp. 418–20. But no such relationship is mentioned for any year after collectivization.

\(^5\) J. Stalin, "On the Grain Front," in *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow, 1954), p. 253. This official English translation was made from the last, eleventh, Russian edition of *Voprosy leninizma*.

\(^6\) *Ibid.*, p. 256; he says: "[Should we not] reduce the rate of development of our industry, the growth of which is causing a considerable increase in the demand for grain which at present is outstripping the increase in the production of grain for the market? No, not under any circumstances!"

\(^7\) See, for example, Stalin, *Sochineniya* (Moscow), XIII (1952), 188–89, 238–39.

\(^8\) On this line of thought see Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism* (New Haven, 1957), and "A Stronger Oriental Despotism," *The China Quarterly* (London), Janu-
Consequently, closely following the Party line, Soviet writers have formulated a slipshod theory that the "successful industrialization of the country prepared the way for the successful launching of collective farms"; that, in principle, industrialization is the "premise" of collectivization; that industrialization did not depend on collectivization but that, on the contrary, collectivization depended on industry's supply of tractors, machines, and so on. Soviet writers discuss most of the sources of capital formation under the five-year plans but never mention those originating in collective farming. The furthest they go is the recognition that collective farms have supplied industry with their surplus labor, raw materials, and food (all thought of explicitly in kind rather than in money terms).

D. Shepilov, who once was Stalin's expert on agriculture, then served as foreign minister, and ended as a member of the Molotov-Malenkov-Kaganovich opposition, went so far as to maintain that collectivization became necessary in 1929 because "booming socialist industry, which had already become capable of supplying agriculture fully with first-class equipment, came into conflict with small-scale commodity production which excluded the possibility of the application of modern technics in agriculture." Similarly, in a discussion of NEP agriculture in the 1958 textbook Political Economy, the complaint is made that, under such conditions, "socialist industry [had] no growing internal market for the sale of modern complex agricultural machinery." And the new History of the CPSU, explaining...
how collectivization came about, offers the following figment: Peas­ants “saw that the Party and the government, overcoming difficulties, were building factories to make tractors and new farm machines. Nu­merous peasant delegations visited the new factories and construction sites, attended workers’ meetings, and were inspired by their enthusi­asm. Upon returning to their villages the advanced representatives of the working peasantry took the initiative in setting up new collective farms. The organized workers of industrial enterprises and building sites assumed patronage over rural areas, and sent numerous workers’ teams to the countryside. That was how the mass movement for join­ing the collectives was prepared and begun, a movement which grew into solid collectivization.” 16

And yet this “theory” of collectivization emanating from industrial­ization comes apart at the seams as soon as it is touched by facts. When collectivization began, there were no tractor or complex agri­cultural machinery plants in the USSR. Fifteen pages later, the History of the CPSU betrays the falsity of its own argument by mention­ing that the Stalingrad and Rostov plants (commonly known to be the first of their kind in the Soviet Union) began production only in June 1930.17 And if one goes into the documents contemporary to collectivization, one finds countless statements which contradict the above “theory.” For example, the resolution approving the beginning of all-out collectivization which was adopted by the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Party on November 17, 1929, reads in part: “The main difficulty in carrying out this very great historical task is the fact that the industries which serve agriculture with their products (agricultural machinery, tractors, fertilizers) lag behind the present pace of collectivization and the construction of state farms.” 18

16 History of the CPSU, p. 435.
18 Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK (7th ed.; Moscow, 1953), II, 504; italics in the source. The Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets resolved, on May 28, 1929, that in the course of the whole First Five-Year Plan Soviet industry would produce only 88,000 tractors. See Sobranie Zakonov SSSR, 1929, No. 35, Art. 312. By the end of 1930, 88.5 per cent of all collective farms had no tractors at all, 7.6 per cent had 1 tractor each, and the rest (3.9 per cent) more than 1 tractor. The machine-and-tractor stations served only 13.6 per cent of all collective farms. See Gosplan SSSR, Kolkhozy v 1930 godu: Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1931), pp. 110-11.
In sampling the opinions expressed in leading studies of Soviet collectivization published abroad, we find that, at first, collectivization was seen as taking place essentially for ideological and political reasons, with the Soviet government wanting to do away with the last vestiges of capitalism in the country and to make itself independent of the economic power of well-to-do peasants. However critical of collectivization, this interpretation of events was excessively influenced by the contemporary arguments in the Party press. The explanation was, however, widely accepted also by later writers abroad, and even now it frequently pops up in cursory histories.

After the mass collectivization drive had been completed, interest in the institution of compulsory produce procurements began to develop in Western literature, but without ever culminating in a consistent economic theory describing the functioning and the role of this institution in Soviet capital formation.

As time went by, major specialized studies of Soviet collective agriculture began to appear in the West. Some early interpretations, such as that of Hubbard, displayed rather inadequate study of facts, but finally the main explanations have boiled down to those which predominate today. Thus, in Jasny’s opinion collectivization occurred because NEP farming “could not and did not show the rate of growth needed by the economy as a whole.” The role of collectivization in capital formation is not discussed or mentioned explicitly, though


20 See, for example, Schiller, Die Krise der sozialistischen Landwirtschaft in der Sowjetunion (Berlin, 1933); Timoshenko, “Soviet Agricultural Reorganization and the Bread-Grain Situation,” Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, April 1937; Collectivized Agriculture in the Soviet Union (London, 1934) (University of London School of Slavonic and East European Studies, Monograph No. 2); W. Ladejinsky, “Collectivization of Agriculture in the Soviet Union,” Political Science Quarterly, March and June 1934.

21 L. E. Hubbard, The Economics of Soviet Agriculture (London, 1939). His explanation amounts to the following: By 1930, “the original plan for 15 per cent collectivization at the end of the Five-Year Plan had become much too modest, and for various reasons a much more rapid concentration of the land in large units had become almost a necessity” (p. 110).

there is a phrase that "along with its political purpose of eliminating
individual enterprises . . . the socialization drive in agriculture
achieved to a large extent its major economic purpose of serving as
a basis for the industrialization drive." 23 Identical explanation of the
decision to collectivize is advanced by Volin, though he adds a phrase
to the effect that the "government was anxious to obtain at low prices
the largest possible supply of grain and other agricultural products,
both to feed and clothe the rapidly increasing industrial population
and to export enough to pay for the essential imports of machinery
and raw materials." 24 In these explanations both authors accept Soviet
superrapid tempo of industrialization as an extraneously given neces­
sity which does not belong within the scope of their consideration.
Yet, to a significant extent, that "necessity" was arbitrary, haphazard,
and really needless, and, accordingly, collectivization was not quite
so logical an outcome of circumstances as may appear at first glance.

Among the political historians, the closest explanation has been
advanced by Deutscher, who has written that, on the eve of collec­
tivization, "as things stood, Stalin acted under the overwhelming
pressure of events. The circumstance that he was not prepared
for the events precipitated him into a course of action over which
he was liable to lose control. The unpremeditated, pragmatic manner
in which he embarked upon the second revolution would have been
unbelievable if, during the preceding years, from 1924 until late in
1929, Stalin had not placed his views on record." 25 In this otherwise
shrewd conclusion, the "pressure of events" which Deutscher has in
mind (he says, "Stalin was precipitated into collectivization by the
chronic danger of famine in 1928 and 1929") 26 though, perhaps, accu­
rately rendering Stalin's apprehensions, is demonstrably exaggerated.

At this present stage of the interpretation of the causes of collectivi­
zation in Soviet and Western literature, then, my purpose here is to
add some results of my own, mostly economic, research on the subject
and to specify some problems which remain unsolved. The thirty-year
lapse which now separates us from the years of Stalin's "revolution
from above" 27 should be sufficient to permit a fairly dispassionate

23 Ibid., p. 33.
24 L. Volin, A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture (U.S. Department of Agri­
26 Ibid., p. 322.
27 He liked this characterization and used it himself at least twice: in Istoriya
approach. A thorough study of this once explosive topic is both timely and possible; it may even shed light upon the roots of the present-day plight of Soviet agriculture. The sources on the subject are abundant.\textsuperscript{28} Extremely important additional facts can be uncovered in the contemporary, especially local, daily press.\textsuperscript{29} And in the future, one hopes, more and more archives may be opened to researchers in the USSR.

3

Classical Marxism-Leninism cannot be easily invoked in support of Stalin's decision to collectivize. Marx did display a certain superciliousness toward the peasantry and condemned the "stupidity of rustic life," but with no other emotions than those of any typical city dweller. It is true that both Marx and Engels idealized and ardently advocated "producer co-operatives of agricultural laborers" on "nationalized land" under full-fledged socialism, meaning by "agricultural laborers" the "landless proletariat."\textsuperscript{30} But, as far as small-scale farmers were concerned, they never proposed anything more extreme than the "lowest" form of co-operative—the mutual aid team.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, to achieve even this collectivization, they explicitly called upon communists "not even to think of forcibly expropriating the small peasants," and to effect the transition to co-operatives "not forcibly but by dint of example and the proffer of social assistance for this purpose."\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{28} See, in particular, \textit{Ezhegodnik agrarnoi literatury SSSR} (Moscow, 1926–28); \textit{Agrarnaya literatura SSSR} (Moscow, 1929–31); \textit{Sel'skokhozjaistvennaya literatura SSSR} (Moscow, 1931–34). These bibliographies were published jointly by the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the International Agrarian Institute, Moscow.

\textsuperscript{29} In addition to my own experience, I can cite the following statement by a Soviet researcher: "Both central and local periodicals gave much space to reports on the process of dekulakization and collectivization." P. N. Sharova, "Kollektivizatsiya sel'skogo khoziaistva i sozdanie sotsialisticheskikh proizvodstvennykh otnoshenii v derevne," \textit{Istoricheskie Zapiski} (Moscow), XLVIII (1954), 103.


Lenin was even less inclined to quarrel with the peasants after his painful experience with War Communism (1918–21); he learned more about them than Marx and Engels had known. It was his conviction that “there can be nothing more stupid than the very idea of applying compulsion” against the peasantry. It certainly is symptomatic of the current drift of opinion in the USSR that an old surviving friend of Lenin, Karpinsky, openly protested in his recent memoirs against the injustice done Lenin in associating his name with compulsory collectivization. Stalin undoubtedly belied Lenin when, at the time, he represented collectivization as the logical continuation and final realization of what he dubbed “Lenin’s co-operative plan.” The “plan” itself was little more than a figment of Stalin’s imagination. In his 1923 article “On Co-operation” and in two or three more scattered paragraphs jotted down shortly before his death, Lenin merely reminded the Party that it had forgotten and underestimated the socialist features inherent in consumer, supply, credit, and industrial co-operatives (he even did not mention agricultural producer co-operatives in this connection) and urged that the government lend more active support to them by means of propaganda and financial incentives; he added that co-operatives alone might be considered the “necessary and sufficient [condition] for the construction” of socialism in the USSR, but warned that “at best” it would take “one or two decades” for the Party to “achieve via NEP the participation in the co-operatives of one and all in the population.” Did Stalin see in this a “plan” of compulsory collectivization of agriculture?

33 V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya (4th ed.; Moscow), XXIX (1948), 188.
34 V. Karpinsky, “V. I. Lenin i krest’yanstvo,” Ekonomika Sel’skogo Khozyaistva, March 1960, pp. 11ff.
37 In 1928 he said: “The collective-farm movement is sometimes contrasted to the co-operative movement, apparently on the assumption that collective farms are one thing, and co-operative societies another. That, of course, is wrong. Some even go so far as to contrast collective farms to Lenin’s co-operative plan. Needless to say, such contrasting has nothing in common with the truth. In actual fact, the collective farms are a form of co-operatives, the most striking form of producers’ co-operatives. There are marketing co-operatives, there are supply co-operatives, and there are also producers’ co-operatives. The collective farms are an inseparable and integral part of the co-operative movement in general, and
case, Stalin's myth is propagated even after his death. The textbook *Political Economy* says, for example, that “an integral part of a general plan for the construction of socialism elaborated by Lenin is a plan of the peasants' transition from small-scale, private farming to large-scale, socialist farming via co-operation.” 38

All in all, it seems incorrect to attribute Stalin's collectivization to Communist ideological reasons without serious qualification. It is true that Marx and Lenin cherished collective farming as an element of the future society, 39 and only in accepting this ideal, but not in the ways and means and the time of putting it into practice, was Stalin an orthodox follower of his teachers. In fact, it can be said that those of Stalin's sycophants who thought they were doing him a great honor by ascribing to him the authorship of the "theory of collectivization" 40 were unwittingly correct: In the final account, it was Stalin alone who was the actual author of Soviet collectivization, supported by his close collaborators, Molotov, Kaganovich, Kalinin et al. 41

Moreover, "the idea that agricultural labor in the Russian village community should be collective can be traced to the Slavophils," 42 not to Marx alone. That idea must have been very much at home with Russian Party members of peasant origin whose Marxist education was rudimentary but whose frame of mind was molded by their of Lenin's co-operative plan in particular: "On the Grain Front," in *Problems of Leninism*, p. 254.

38 *Politicheskaya ekonomiya*, p. 379.

39 For example, in his 1903 article, "To the Rural Poor, An Explanation of What the Social Democrats Want," Lenin envisaged "co-operative farming on big estates" of former landlords, while the "small peasant who prefers to carry on his farm in the old way on individual lines will not produce for the market, to sell to anyone who comes along, but will produce for the workers' associations [which] in return will provide him with machinery, livestock, fertilizers, clothes, and whatever else he may require, without his having to pay for it." Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York, n.d.; 12 vols.), II, 293.

40 See, for instance, Shepilov, pp. 18ff. Of course, Stalin's "theory" was no more a theory than Lenin's "plan" was a plan.

41 To a certain extent, Trotsky, too, can vie for the honor of being called the author of Soviet collectivization, which he advocated from 1924; yet, although he called for the suppression of the kulaks by taxes and for accelerated collectivization, he did not propose to apply administrative pressure to the peasantry but merely urged spending more government money on agricultural mechanization and extending credit to the collective farms. See L. D. Trotsky, *K sotsializmu ili k kapitalizmu?* (Moscow, 1925), pp. 18-20.

RATIONALE OF SOVIET COLLECTIVIZATION

personal experience of living in the gregarious Russian *obshchina* or *mir* (village commune). Most writers on the subject seem to neglect the fact that more than one third of all VKP (B) members in 1930 were of peasant stock, and that most of these peasant Communists came from Russia proper, where the *obshchina* survived up to the time of collectivization. In this connection Stalin’s decision to collectivize may have rested, in part, on purely Russian ethnic traits of some of his followers and advisers (for example, Kalinin) and on his belief that Russian peasants, for the most part, would not resist the transformation of the *obshchina* into collective farming.

A more evident ideological factor in the VKP (B)’s decision to collectivize was the utopian belief that collectivization would bring about an immediate rise in the productivity of agriculture and a socialist transformation in the peasants’ psychology and way of life. Especially during 1929-31, many Party spokesmen dreamed of the “agricultural factories” and “agro-cities” that would mushroom almost overnight. Professional observers abroad, such as Timoshenko, noted at the time that the Soviet government’s decree to raise the grain yields by 35 per cent over the period of the I FYP was “utopian,” and they

44 For example, Sharova reports that in the Central Black-Soil Region of the RSFSR, in 1928/29, 94.5 per cent of land tenure was communal, and the government concluded delivery contracts “with the village as a whole.” P. N. Sharova, “God velikogo pereloma v sel’skom khozyaistve Tsentral’no-Chernozyomnoi Oblasti,” *Istoricheskie Zapiski*, LI (1955), 198, 204–5.
45 Compare Volin, “The Peasant Household under the Mir and the Kolkhoz in Modern Russian History,” in C. F. Ware, ed., *The Cultural Approach to History* (New York, 1940). There are also interesting allusions in Maynard, “Collectivization of Agriculture: Russia and India,” * Asiatic Review* (London), April 1943. It must, of course, be borne in mind that outside Russia proper, and particularly in the Ukraine, the traditional land tenure was that of hereditary private property and individual family farming. See, for example, R. Rosdolsky, “Die ostgalizische Dorfgemeinschaft und ihre Auflösung,” *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Wiesbaden), XLI, No. 2 (1954), and the partial list of literature cited therein. In Moslem parts of the Soviet Union the land tenure system was again different, and all this contributed to the differences in the intensity of conflicts during collectivization. On the latter see the pioneering paper in English, V. P. Timoshenko, “Soviet Agricultural Policy and the Nationalities Problem in the USSR,” in *Report on the Soviet Union in 1956: A Symposium of the Institute for the Study of the USSR* (New York, 1956).
46 Jasny, pp. 27–30, gives a good sample of such pronouncements. There were many more, and much more striking. See, for instance, *Elektrifikatsiya sel’skogo khozyaistva: Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1932).
proved to be right. One of the most active proponents of collectiviza-
tion in the Ukraine, O. Shlikhter, predicted in 1929 that by 1932
grain yields in the collective farms would have risen by as much as
50 per cent and that an additional 25 per cent increase in the market-
able grain output should be expected as a result of the substitution
of tractors for horses and oxen.48 In 1931, on the eve of the famine,
an editorial in the central theoretical organ of the Communist Party
of the Ukraine in all seriousness prophesied that the Ukraine's col-
lective agriculture "would, in ten years from now, catch up with and
leave behind the leading countries of America and the West, which
are now technically ahead of us by some fifty to one hundred years." 49

Such views and expectations undoubtedly encouraged Stalin and his
followers to adopt and carry out their decision in 1929 and then, after
a brief confusing retreat of 1930, to push it through to the bitter end
in 1931-33.

4

Most writers on the subject agree that, although collectivization as
such was part of the long-standing program, the decision to exercise
compulsion in collectivization came abruptly and unexpectedly, late
in 1929. In Stalin's published statements references to "agricultural
co-operatives" seem to appear for the first time in May 1925, in his
speech before the Moscow Party organization "On the Conclusion of
the Deliberations of the Fourteenth RKP (B) Conference." Yet, despite
his use there of characteristically brutal expressions such as "the possi-
bility to harness the peasantry" and the need to "implant" the co-
operatives, he was speaking not of collective farms as such but rather
of supply, credit, and similar rural co-operatives.50 Stalin's specific
reference to collectivization appeared in his report to the Fifteenth
Party Congress in December 1927. There he complained that the
growth of agricultural productivity was lagging behind that of indus-
try and that this lag threatened to upset the balance of the economy;
he saw the reason for this lag in the fact that agriculture was con-
ducted in an unplanned manner by small-scale independent farms
and concluded: "The way out is in the transition from small-scale
peasant farming to large-scale, unified enterprises on the basis of

49 Bišhovyk Ukrayiny, No. 2 (1931), p. 11.
50 Stalin, Sochineniya, VII, 125, 128, 132.
socialized land cultivation, in the transition to collective working of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique." 51

The Fifteenth Congress agreed with Stalin and resolved that “further co-operativization” and “transition” to collective farming should from now on be considered the “main task of the Party in the countryside”; however, it explicitly added that this transition was to be “completely voluntary” and “gradual.” 52 That no Stalinist-type collectivization was implied is also evident from the fact that the Bukharinites voted for this resolution. It is misrepresentation when the recent History of the CPSU declares that the Fifteenth Congress “decided on the all-out collectivization of agriculture,” thus implying that it was the same decision that was carried out in 1929.53

Soviet writers maintain that Stalin’s decision to begin collectivization was preceded by a long period of careful preparation.54 Actually, however, the “preparation” for the events of 1929 and thereafter consisted of unwitting attempts to avoid them—extensive legislation on tax relief, credit, and supply incentives for those peasants who voluntarily chose to join the collective farm movement.55 But, although such incentives had been offered since 1919, by July 1, 1929, only 3.9 per cent of the peasants had joined the voluntary collectives.56 And the legislators themselves knew perfectly well that the prospects of voluntary collectivization were slim, since the final version of the I FYP, adopted in April 1929, provided that for 1932/33 only 11.4 per cent of the gross output of agriculture would originate in collective farms.57 The reasons for the failure of voluntary collectivization in the USSR before 1929 deserve and await a careful study.

The Fifteenth Party Congress resolved to intensify the efforts aimed at voluntary collectivization. Consequently, during 1928 the Soviet government decreed the granting of big subsidies to the existing and

51 XV sezd VKP(b): Stenograficheskii otchot (Moscow, 1928), p. 56.
53 History of the CPSU, p. 420.
54 Shepilov, p. 21, even maintains that these preparations lasted twelve years, that is, since 1917.
56 Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel’stvo Soyuza SSR: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 1936), p. 278 (a publication of TsUNKhU Gosplana SSSR).
57 Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo Pravitel’stva po khozyaistvennym voprosam: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow, 1957), II, 29.
new collective farms,\textsuperscript{58} slashed their and their members' income
taxes,\textsuperscript{59} ordered that they be given priority in the allocation of tractors and machinery,\textsuperscript{60} and so forth. There was also alluring propaganda and much ado about the collectives in general, and, indeed, at the time Molotov called all this a "preparation for a mass transition" to collective farming.\textsuperscript{61} But this was still not preparation for all-out collectivization, nor did anything really tangible come of it.

Stalin's speech of May 28, 1928, "On the Grain Front," has been pointed to as the main directive to start all-out collectivization. True, in this speech Stalin was openly impatient with lagging grain procurements and alleged kulak sabotage and unequivocally declared that "the solution lies in the transition from individual peasant farming to collective, socialized farming" for which "the conditions have already ripened" and the "stimulation" and development of which "at increased speed" would be "one of the most important means of increasing the output of grain for the market in the country."\textsuperscript{62} However, it is not at all evident that by "stimulation" and "increased speed" he meant anything different from those efforts to increase incentives for voluntary collectivization which were in progress at the time. The furthest one can go in the interpretation of this speech of Stalin is, perhaps, an assumption that he had made up his own mind by this time to try to apply force in collectivization, but even this cannot be proven. On the contrary, the subsequent actions of the Party and the Soviet government indicate that all-out collectivization was not yet in the offing.

On December 15, 1928, for instance, the government adopted a new General Land Code which was entirely based on the principle of individual farming.\textsuperscript{63} On February 8, 1929, it issued a decree reducing taxes on "middle" peasants and stimulating their private farming.\textsuperscript{64} The Sixteenth Party Conference (April 23-29, 1929), which adopted the final version of the I FYP—with the target for 1932 of having in

\textsuperscript{58} Sobranie Zakonov SSSR, 1928, No. 15, Art. 126.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., No. 24, Art 212.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., No. 41, Art. 375.
\textsuperscript{61} V. M. Molotov, O rabote v derevne (Moscow, 1928), pp. 61–62.
\textsuperscript{62} Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 253. In this officially approved English translation the word "stimulation" does not quite render the shade of the word usilenie used by Stalin. "Intensification" or "step-up" would be a better rendering in the context.
\textsuperscript{63} SZ SSSR, 1928, No. 69, Art. 642.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 1929, No. 10, Art. 95.
the collective and state farms only 13 per cent of the total area under crops in the USSR—also resolved that collective farming was “not to be opposed” to individual farming, that both were to enjoy “simultaneous support” on the part of the government, and that taxes on “middle” peasants had to be “eased” even more. The Fifth All-Union Congress of Soviets adopted a resolution on May 28, 1929, on general development of rural co-operativization in which it was stated that the “productive capabilities of private farming by ‘poor’ and ‘middle’ peasants [were] by no means yet exhausted” and that “still for a considerable time to come” this type of farming would remain the “main supplier” of agricultural produce in the country.

The presently available Party documents go as late as June 27, 1929, with the indication that no all-out collectivization was yet contemplated. On that date, the Central Committee adopted an interesting resolution “On the Organizational Set-up of Agricultural Co-operatives,” in which it proposed that the individual peasant farms join specialized “productive societies” (proizvodstvennye tovarishchestva) on the village level. Through these societies peasants were to receive from the government all sorts of necessary supplies, in exchange for which they were to undertake an obligation, by means of “voluntary contract,” to deliver to the government stated amounts of their produce. The resolution explicitly referred to “individual peasant farms” and said not a word about any possible joint cultivation of land or collective ownership of the means of production, but it did add that, in some indefinite future, the “productive societies” “must become the basis for the mass construction of the large collective farms.” This resolution, it seems, was not put into practice. There was no time left for this.

Occasional reports in the contemporary periodicals convey the impression that from July or August 1929 some discernible acceleration in the formation of the mutual aid teams (tozy, not kolkhozy) did really occur. Between July 1, 1928, and that date of 1929, the percentage of peasant households in all types of collectives increased from 1.7 to 3.9. Then, “in just three months, from July to September 1929, about one million peasant households set up collective farms

66 Ibid., pp. 73-74.
67 Ibid., pp. 84-87.
68 Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel’stvo, p. 278.
— that is, almost as many as during the twelve years since the October Revolution." 69

Whether it was a genuine voluntary movement, caused by the government incentives, or a result of some secret instructions dispatched by Stalin down the channels of his apparatus is not yet clear. This problem requires more research and documentation. But even if it was a spontaneous shift among the peasantry, it by no means appears to have furnished sufficient grounds for the conclusions which Stalin drew nor for a decision to start all-out compulsory collectivization.

Yet on November 7, 1929, Stalin published in Pravda his "Year of Great Change," and announced to the bewildered country "the radical change that has taken place in the development of our agriculture from small, backward, individual farming to large-scale, advanced, collective agriculture, to cultivation of the land in common." Said Stalin: "The new and decisive feature of the present collective-farm movement is that the peasants are joining the collective farms not in separate groups, as was formerly the case, but in whole villages, whole volosts, whole districts, and even whole areas. And what does that mean? It means that the middle peasant has joined the collective-farm movement. And that is the basis of the radical change in the development of agriculture which represents the most important achievement of the Soviet power during the past year." 70

It was probably around this date that the basic decision to begin the compulsory drive was taken. Perhaps it was written into that as yet unpublished decision of the Politburo "to start immediately with the construction of two additional tractor plants" which was mentioned in passing and approved by the plenary session of the Central Committee on November 17, 1929.71 The exact document is not yet available, but there is no doubt that the plenary session of the CC VKP(B) held November 10-17, 1929, was the session which sealed and legalized Stalin’s initial decision and from which the start of all-out compulsory collectivization can be appropriately dated.

The same plenum adopted several resolutions directly related to collectivization:

(1) While repeating Stalin's allegations that a spontaneous mass

69 History of the CPSU, p. 435.
71 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, II, 525.
movement of the peasantry to join collectives was going on at the time, the plenum nevertheless expressed itself in favor of a "radical solution" of the agricultural problem and declared that "this task lies in the direction of further speed-up of the processes of collectivization." 72

(2) The plenum ordered all Party organizations "to put as a keystone the task of further developing mass productive co-operation, collectivization of the peasant households," pointed out "shortcomings in the work of the Komsomol organizations in the cause of collectivization," called for "stepping up the work of drawing farm hands (batriachestvo) into the collective farms," and requested the "mobilization . . . for work in the collective farms" of "at least 25,000" industrial workers belonging to the Party.73

(3) The meeting called for the "most decisive measures" against the kulaks.74

(4) "To guide the collective-farm movement," it proposed the establishment of a centralized All-Union People's Commissariat of Agriculture and stressed the "need of a unified, all-Union agricultural plan"; it also took to task those who opposed this centralization "under the mask of protecting the alleged 'national interests'" of the constituent republics.75

(5) The plenum singled out the Ukraine in a separate resolution in which it declared: "The Ukraine . . . possesses all the prerequisites both in the Steppe Belt and on the Right Bank [of the Dnieper River] in order to proceed at a more intensive pace and ahead of other republics in the field of transferring individual peasant farms to collective rails. The Ukraine must, in the course of a very short period of time, set examples for the organization of large-scale socialized farming." 76

(6) The plenum passed a special resolution condemning the Right Opposition for having "declared that the tempo of collectivization that has been undertaken is unrealistic," that the "material and tech-

72 Ibid., p. 504.
73 Ibid., pp. 528, 532-33.
74 Ibid., p. 509.
75 Ibid., p. 535.
nical prerequisites are absent and that there is no desire on the part of the poor and 'middle' peasantry to go over to collective forms of land ownership." It also expelled Bukharin from the Politburo for having "slandered the Party with demagogic accusations" and for having "maintained that the 'extraordinary measures' had pushed the 'middle' peasant toward the kulak." 77

That the Party's "extraordinary measures" met with stiff opposition in the countryside is evident from the fact that, on November 16, 1929, the government promulgated a special decree rendering aid to persons and farms which had "suffered from kulak terrorism." The preamble to the decree recorded for the first time that the "tremendous growth of state and collective farms . . . had provoked the strongest resistance on the part of the kulaks." 78

Finally, on December 27, 1929, Stalin made an important theoretical statement on the course of the events in his speech, "Problems of Agrarian Policy in the USSR," at the First [and only] Conference of Marxist Agricultural Economists, in which he dispelled all possible doubts. Would the leading role of the Socialist towns—or the role of industry in transforming agriculture—be sufficient, he asked, "to cause the countryside, where small-peasant farming predominates, to follow spontaneously the towns in socialist construction? No, it is not sufficient. . . . The socialist town can lead the countryside, in which small-scale farming predominates, only by introducing collective and state farms and by transforming the countryside after a new socialist pattern." 79

The abrupt change in the Party's agricultural policy in 1929, it seems, is not explainable by mere reference to the theory and facts of low productivity and capital formation propensity of the over-populated, land-hungry, small-scale farming. Traditional comparisons

77 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, II, 543.  
78 SZ SSSR, 1929, No. 71, Art. 673. That the Party's "extraordinary measures" were not to the liking of peasants from the very beginning is evident from the November plenum's resolution which stressed that "above all else, it is necessary to bring about a decisive break in improving labor discipline in the collective farms" and to "fight against the squandering of property (livestock and equipment) on the part of the new members joining the collective farms." KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, II, 527, 529.  
79 Stalin, Problems of Leninism, pp. 394-95.
of Russian peasant farming with the less overpopulated and therefore more productive Western European, or the extensive-type American farming, are, of course, meaningful, but they are nonetheless threadbare—and one-sided. Today it is known, for instance, that Japan, in the Bunkyu and Meiji eras (1861-1912), succeeded in accumulating enough capital for a rapid industrialization entirely from internal sources, mostly at the expense of her dwarf-scale but intensive farming—and without a British Enclosure Act or Soviet collectivization. Even though, as far as is known, no other country in the world paralleled Japan's experience, it still cannot be gainsaid that the intensification of farming methods harbors considerable potentialities. Overpopulated, small-scale farming is a real problem only in those countries which completely lack modern industry and cannot import fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, quality seed, electrical motors, and hand-operated machinery. As some Japanese examples prove, mechanization has been possible even on dwarf-size farms. It is a fact that neither tsarist Russia nor the USSR under the NEP had tried to apply intensive methods of farming before rejecting them as inadequate and turning entirely to the extensive methods which characterize large-scale and collective farming. According to Soviet sources, in tsarist Russia, even on small-scale peasant farms, grain yields could and did increase between 1861-70 and 1901-10 by as much as 45 per cent. Yields increased during the NEP, too, in 1924-29 surpassing by 22 per cent on the average the yields of 1901-10. And that there might have been still room for further progress is evident from the fact that the NEP yields were only one third those in Western Europe at the time.


84 *Agrarnyi vopros i krest'yanskoe dvizhenie: Spravochnik* (Moscow, 1935), 1, 7 (a publication of the International Agrarian Institute).
and one half those in China, notwithstanding the latter’s extremely overpopulated and tiny-scale farming.85

Thus, what NEP agriculture needed—irrespective of the rate of accumulation and industrialization determined upon by Stalin’s faction of the Party—was enlightenment, intensification, and, of course, voluntary co-operativization. But, once the Party decision was taken, the progress of agriculture was unquestionably too slow. The question then is whether the tempo might have been accelerated without the measures that were resorted to. Some Western specialists agree that it would have been possible, had it not been for the Party’s stifling social policies, for example, the restrictions on the kulak farms, which were at the time the most productive.86

The Soviet attitude toward the well-to-do kulaks requires a special study.87 It seems to constitute not merely a political or ideological problem but also anthropological and psychological problems which cannot be fully explained without reference to ethnically Russian traditions. After all, neither in the Eastern European nor Chinese “people’s democracies,” where compulsory collectivization is now almost complete, were the kulaks physically “liquidated as a class.” To be sure, prior to and during collectivization various economic and legal restrictions were imposed on them—some of their land was confiscated under the agrarian reform laws, and some of them were shot or exiled when they resisted—but during collectivization the “people’s democracies” did not use the slogan nor follow a policy of “liquidating” all kulaks by deporting them “as a class” to the concentration

85 Academia Sinica, Institute of Economics, Chung-kuo chin-tai ching-chi-shih t'ung-chi Tzu-liao hsüeh-chi (Peking, 1955), p. 322. This reference to the Chinese source is due to Mrs. L. Holubnychy. Despite the fact that Soviet collectivized agriculture is extensively mechanized today, while Chinese agriculture, with its intensive methods of farming, is not mechanized at all, grain yields in China still average one third higher than in the USSR. See PRC State Statistical Bureau, Ten Great Years (Peking, 1960), p. 121.

86 See, for example, Timoshenko, Agricultural Russia, p. 93; O. Auhagen, “Die neueste russische Agrargesetzgebung: Bauernwirtschaft oder Agrarsozialismus?” Berichte über Landwirtschaft (Berlin), No. 2 (1929); but compare G. Méquet, “Le problème agraire dans la révolution russe,” Annales d'Histoire économique et sociale (Paris), April 1930.

87 Some brief clues can be found in my articles “Kurkuli” and “Komitetey nezamozhnykh selyan” in Entsyklopediya Ukrayinoznavstva, Vol. II, Book 3, though they relate only to the Ukraine, where the conflict between the kulaks and the poor was less intense and more artificial in origin than in Russia.
camps, as in the Soviet Union in 1929-30. Perhaps Marx was not talking nonsense when he remarked that the Communist revolutions in different countries "will take a form more brutal or more humane, according to the degree of development of the workers themselves." Since nothing can be found in Marx to suggest such a treatment of kulaks as was accorded them in the USSR, one must look into the peculiarly Russian conditions and traditions for explanation. Perhaps Russian Communists, especially those of peasant origin, could not but hate the kulaks, for such tradition had existed for centuries in the obshchina and mir.

NEP agriculture failed to meet the Party's needs, it seems, not only because those needs were exorbitant but also because the incentive policies of the Party were unenlightened. Agricultural taxation during the NEP was first insufficiently progressive and then suddenly turned excessively oppressive on the best farmers and the most productive areas. The inequity of the geographic distribution of the agricultural tax burden, for instance, was set forth in 1928 by Dobrohayev, a leading public finance expert of the Ukrainian Gosplan; his calculations showed that, while the gross output of Ukrainian agriculture amounted to 20 per cent of that of the USSR as a whole, the agricultural tax collections there regularly reached 26-27 per cent of the USSR total.

Nor were government price policies, under the prevailing conditions of free-market economy, rational. The well-known agricultural-industrial "price scissors" continued to be wide open throughout the

---


89 Marx, "Vorwort zum ersten Auflage," Das Kapital (Hamburg, 1872), I, 6.

90 See for instance, G. T. Robinson, Rural Russia under the Old Régime (New York, 1949). In some Russian obshchiny it was a usual practice to burn down the houses of one's neighbors if they grew richer than the rest of the village, and such actions were legal by the decision of the mir; while periodic equalitarian repartition of the land was a traditional method of liquidating the kulaks.


92 V. Dobrohayev, "Oblozhienie i dokhodnost' sel'skogo khozyaistva," Khozyaistvo Ukrainy (Kharkiv), No. 10 (1928), p. 149. Dobrohayev accused Moscow of "subjective political considerations" in respect to the Ukraine in fixing such unequal tax burdens.
period of the NEP, so that, in 1927-28, the purchasing power of grain, according to rough estimate, was only 40 to 50 per cent of that in the prerevolutionary period. In addition, two other irregularities were growing at the time: (a) the differential between the government procurement prices and those of the free market and (b) the differential between the government procurement prices on certain classes of commodities. In 1927/28, in the USSR as a whole, free-market prices of grain stood 60 per cent above the government procurement prices, while in 1928/29 this differential increased to 100 per cent (in the Ukraine, even to 170 per cent). Furthermore, my calculations based on the official price statistics indicate that, from 1924/25 until 1928/29, the relative spread between the government procurement prices on grain and livestock products increased by fully 46 per cent; this means that livestock products became much dearer than grain as a result of deliberate government policy and, therefore, there should have been really no ground for surprise that peasants preferred to feed their grain to hogs and cattle or to sell it on the free market than to sell it to the government. It is also not surprising that, as a result of such price policies, the government contracting system, recommended by the Fifteenth Party Congress as an “element of the state planning and regulation of agriculture,” could embrace at the maximum only 30 per cent of the total area under crops in 1928/29.

Early in 1928 Stalin became apprehensive over the fact that government grain procurements had been slipping since October 1927, and that, by January 1928, the plan was underfulfilled by some 2,160,000 tons; he called this—actually, a small deficit—a “crisis” and declared that there was “danger” that the cities, the army, and the state warehouses might become short of grain.

Although it may be true that both gross harvest and total sales of

---

95 Lyashchenko, III, 257.
96 Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie, No. 2 (1930), p. 178. Further calculations show that in the case of grain vs. vegetable oils the price spread increased by 55 per cent.
97 KPSS v resolyutsiyakh, II, 362.
98 See, for example, I. V. Zagoskina, "Rol' kontraktatsii sel'skokhozyaistvennykh produktov v podgotovke masovogo kolkhoznogo dvizheniya (1928-29 gg.)," Istoricheskie Zapiski, XXXIX (1952), 8; also Timoshenko, Agricultural Russia, passim.
99 Stalin, Sochineniya, XI, 39.
100 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
grain in the country were decreasing,\textsuperscript{101} it was equally true that the
total output of all agricultural products, especially of livestock, was
on the rise: the gross output of all agriculture (in constant prices)
increased 2.5 per cent in 1927 and 2.4 per cent in 1928; the gross out-
put of livestock products increased by 5.5 and 2.3 per cent, respec-
tively; and the gross output of field cultures (zemledelie) decreased by
0.9 per cent in 1927, but increased again by 3.5 per cent in 1928.\textsuperscript{102}
This means that the over-all picture of agricultural production was
not bad at all.

True, there did develop an acute grain shortage in 1928 in the
steppe areas of the Ukraine,\textsuperscript{103} with the livestock herds reduced as a
result. A disequilibrium in the distribution of grain surpluses between
the producing and the consuming areas that had developed led to the
appearance of queues and the partial introduction of bread rationing
in several cities of Russia.\textsuperscript{104} But that there really was such a dramatic
danger of permanent shortages as Stalin implied is doubtful. And,
indeed, the plenary session of the CC VKP (B) held on April 11, 1928,
recognized quite clearly that “at the root of all these difficulties there
was an abrupt dislocation of market equilibrium,”\textsuperscript{105} while the next
CC plenum, held on July 10, 1928, added to this explanation “un-
favorable price relationships” and “mistakes of planning.”\textsuperscript{106}

Presumably, the removal of these simple causes of trouble was quite
within the Soviet government’s capabilities. And yet Stalin adopted
policies which only aggravated the disequilibrium in the economy

\textsuperscript{101} Grain harvests were officially reported to have been as follows: in 1926,
77,500,000 tons, in 1927, 75,800,000 tons, and in 1928, 73,300,000 tons; and total
sales of grain, 13,300,000, 15,700,000, and 13,700,000 tons, respectively. TsSU
SSSR, \textit{Itogi desyatiletiya,} p. 119; Gosplan SSSR, \textit{Sdvigi,} p. 157; and \textit{Planovoe
Khozyaistvo,} No. 4 (1932), pp. 76 and 93. It should, however, be taken into con-
sideration that the area under grain crops was also decreasing because of the shift
to technical crops that was being encouraged at the time. Timoshenko has ob-
served in his \textit{Agricultural Russia,} pp. 410-12, that the official grain statistics at
the time were not very reliable: the yields may have been higher than those
actually reported to the government. See also V. Holubnychy, “Government Statistical Observation in the USSR: 1917–1957,” \textit{The American Slavic and East Euro-

\textsuperscript{102} TsSU SSSR, \textit{Sel’skoe khozyaistvo SSSR: Statisticheskii sbornik} (Moscow, 1960),
P. 79.

\textsuperscript{103} On the situation in the Ukraine at the time see Timoshenko, “Soviet Agri-

\textsuperscript{104} KPSS \textit{v rezolyutsiyakh,} II, 395.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid.,} p. 372.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.,} p. 394.
and ultimately precipitated him into the decision to start compulsory collectivization. Instead of adjusting prices and stimulating the flow of grain into the deficit areas, he blamed "kulak sabotage" for all his difficulties and directed the Party to suppress it with all its force. The decision to "isolate" and "limit" the kulaks and to start an "offensive" against them was adopted by the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927.107 "Emergency measures were taken against them. Kulak grain hoarders were brought before the courts, by whose decision their surpluses were confiscated. One fourth of the confiscated grain was turned over to the village poor" as an incentive for their services in attacking the kulaks. It was as a result of these confiscations that "by the end of 1928 the state had adequate stocks of grain." 108 But Stalin celebrated a Pyrrhic victory. As a result of the campaign against them, during 1928 and 1929, the kulaks sharply curtailed production, reduced their land holdings and area under crops, and killed their livestock, thus trying to slip back into the next lower class of "middle" peasants, from which they had risen during 1923-26, when the government favored their growth. This ruin of the most productive farms was the major reason why in 1929 the gross output of Soviet agriculture declined by 2.4 per cent, with field crops dropping 0.9, and livestock products 5.8 per cent.109 Of course, another factor in this slump was the compulsory collectivization which appeared toward the end of the year as both the cause and the effect of this crisis.

However, before Stalin was precipitated into the decision to collectivize, he had attempted, though unsuccessfully, to alleviate the grain situation by launching a huge project of state grain farms ("grain factories"). On July 11, 1928, a plenary session of the CC VKP (B) resolved to confiscate what it called the "free lands" of the nomads in Kazakhstan and to build there, as well as in the steppes of the Ukraine, North Caucasus, and Volga, a series of giant grain farms.110 By 1932, they were supposed to cultivate from 10 to 12 million hectares of land and to deliver to the state more than 1.6 million tons of grain.111 Much money and equipment were spent on this project, but little,

107 Ibid., p. 352.
108 History of the CPSU, p. 425.
109 TsSU SSSR, Sel'skoe khozyaistvo SSSR, p. 79.
111 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, II, 466.
if anything, came of it. In 1929, the land in both old and new state farms comprised only 1.5 million hectares, and in 1930, 3.9 million.\textsuperscript{112} The productivity of arid lands was low. Finally, the government decrees of August 25 and November 28, 1931, admitted that the project was a waste.\textsuperscript{113} The failure may have been evident even after the 1929 harvest, and, hence, it may have been another factor that contributed to the decision to collectivize.

In view of the fact, however, that even the Central Committee had twice admitted that the cause of the "grain problem" in 1927 and 1928 was merely a market disequilibrium (and this implied that there was really no danger of lasting shortages inside the country), the question arises, what, then, apart from the possibly erroneous appraisal of the situation, might have been the true cause of Stalin's apprehensions. From Stalin's published papers it comes out consistently that it was the export of grain that worried him most. For example, while speaking at the Institute of Red Professors, on May 28, 1928, he complained that the export of grain decreased abruptly from 2,550,000 tons in 1926/27 to a mere 450,000 tons in 1927/28.\textsuperscript{114} And in 1929, it is known, grain export fell even more—to only 260,000 tons.\textsuperscript{115} The significance of these events is not yet fully known, but Gladkov, a contemporary Soviet historian of planning, has recently found that the reduction of grain export in 1927 produced a disastrous effect upon the import plans and the balance of payments and that this led to "a revision in the plans of industrialization."\textsuperscript{116} The plenum of the CC VKP (B) on July 10, 1928, resolved that the "accumulation of foreign exchange reserves depends to a large extent upon the magnitude of the export of agricultural produce,"\textsuperscript{117} while the plenum of November 10-17, 1929, which presumably approved the application of coercion in collectivization, resolved that "the task of a forceful development of the export industries of the national econo-

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Direktivy KPSS}, II, 251.


\textsuperscript{114} Stalin, \textit{Sochineniya}, XI, 83.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo}, p. 686.

\textsuperscript{116} I. A. Gladkov, \textit{Ot plana GOELRO k planu Shestoi pyatiletki} (Moscow, 1956), p. 144.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Direktivy KPSS}, I, 838.
my presents itself now in all its urgency.” 118 This, then, was probably the real cause of Stalin’s fear and ire—he was afraid that dwindling exports of grain would prevent him from carrying out his industrialization plans. But, at the time, exports were dwindling because of his own price and procurement policies and the destruction of kulak farming.

6

One concludes that Stalin’s decision to collectivize was ultimately determined by three objective variables: (a) the quantity and costs of agricultural procurements by the government, (b) the plans of industrial construction, and (c) the export-import plans. Of the three, (b) was heavily dependent on (c), and (c), in addition to dependence on the state of the world market, was directly dependent on (a), while (b) was also dependent on (a) for internal capital formation and the satisfaction of internal consumption. From what has been said above it must be clear that at the time Stalin felt compelled to accelerate collectivization by force because he thought he was short of the exportable agricultural surplus required to finance industrialization.

Stalin’s decision to industrialize at top speed, of course, looms over this whole period.119 His first significant statement on the problem of industrialization was made at the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925, when he proposed that the Soviet Union should be transformed from an agrarian into an industrial country in a way that would guarantee its independence from capitalist encirclement. In his speech he expressed clear awareness that such an objective implied a heavy program of capital investment, but he did not propose then any practical measures to accelerate capital formation and, on the contrary, assumed that the rate of industrialization would decline in time.120 By 1928, however, Stalin had moved to a position of demanding “maximum capital investment,” “rapid rate of growth” of industry, and “strenuousness in all our plans.” 121 Thus, when the decision to collectivize was adopted, the decision to industrialize at maximum speed had already been taken, and as such it must be

118 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, II, 505.
120 Stalin, Sochineniya, VII, 315.
121 Ibid., XI, 246.
accepted in our discussion. (It is of great importance, however, that as Erlich has just recently established,\textsuperscript{122} at the time the decision to industrialize was debated and adopted, collectivization was not even foreseen.) The only pertinent question here, then, is whether or not Stalin’s collectivization plans were closely and rationally integrated with the carrying out of his industrialization plans. And the answer is definitely negative.

Although, there is still no satisfactory comprehensive, empirical study of the early Soviet industrialization and the First Five-Year Plan, a few brief but shrewd analyses were made shortly after the publication of the official report on the completion of the I FYP. Almost unanimously they observe that neither the original planning nor the execution of the plan was in the hands of fully qualified economists and technicians. The I FYP was a crash program of a dictatorial regime; it undoubtedly produced notable results, but only amidst universal chaos and havoc, and with complete disregard of costs and efficiency.\textsuperscript{123}

First of all, most researchers note that there was really no planning in the normal sense of the word during the First Five-Year Plan or before it. The “annual control figures” for the period 1925/26–1929/30 were not obligatory to anybody, and practically it did not matter whether or not they were realized.\textsuperscript{124} The first draft of a long-term plan was produced in March 1926. From then until April 1929, when the Sixteenth Party Conference adopted the final version of the I FYP, several government agencies had drawn up, and the Party had rejected, eight additional FYP drafts—altogether ten five-year plans in three years.\textsuperscript{125} The planning of agricultural production was first undertaken as late as 1931.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{122}Erlich, p. 177.


\textsuperscript{125}Gladkov, p. 164.

The methodology of planning was in all respects underdeveloped. For instance, as late as 1932, a Ukrainian economist openly raised for the first time the problem of the economic analysis of new capital constructions. He declared that there was “not a single theoretical work” in the USSR at the time which would “summarize and explain the practice of drawing up plans for new construction.” He published statistics in support of his criticism that throughout the USSR, at least in 1930-1931, “most new enterprises were being built without any blueprints” (proyekty)—here meaning, of course, not the technical, engineering blueprints but economic estimates and cost accounts.127

Under such conditions, capital and other resources were, undoubtedly, wasted on a large scale, and these losses multiplied the demand for capital. Moreover, it is now well established that, in practice, little, if any, attention was paid in the course of the I FYP to the “optimum” five-year program of investments adopted in April 1929. Only the annual and quarterly investment plans128 subsequently adopted by the Party in the form of special crash programs, with progressively stepped-up goals, were more or less obligatory.

Lokshin, an outstanding Soviet historian of industrialization, alludes to an acute shortage of capital that made itself felt at the beginning of the I FYP.129 If so, this was the direct cause of the decision to collectivize. But Lokshin’s reference is not quite certain. On the other hand, there is no doubt that, as a result of the decision to collectivize, all investment plans were changed upward. The November 10-17, 1929, plenum of the CC VKP(B) stated that, “taking into account the apparent turn of the majority of the peasants to the collective-farm movement . . . capital investments in the national economy [in 1929/30] must amount to about 13 billion rubles (as against 8.5 billion in 1928/29 and 10.2 billion provided for in the five-year plan), of which 4 billion rubles are to be allotted to the planned industry and electrification (instead of 2.8 billion provided for in the five-year plan).”130 As a result of the first “successes” of collectivization, in the spring and summer of 1930, the Party took a series of decisions to construct huge projects which were not foreseen in the

128 Gladkov, p. 186.
129 Lokshin, p. 188.
130 KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh, II, 505.
five-year plan adopted in 1929. Lyashchenko lists these projects, put into operation by 1932, as follows: Azovstal Steel Combine, Pervouralskii Steel Pipe Plant, Novotul'skii Metallurgical Plant, Moscow Tool Factory, Gorky Machine Tool Plant, Kharkiv Tractor Plant, Saratov Harvester Plant, "and a number of others." In addition, the Sixteenth Party Congress resolved in July 1930 to start all-out construction of the "second coal and metallurgical base" of the USSR in the Kuzbass.

These investment decisions radically altered the FYP and put a sudden tremendous strain on all Soviet resources. This was immediately noticed by many observers abroad. The new construction starts increased every year: whereas in 1928 uncompleted construction consumed 31 per cent of annual investment, by 1933 its share increased to a full 76 per cent. Capital was thus "too widely dispersed" and "scattered all over the economy," and this "hindered the completion of construction on time" and endangered the fulfillment of the output quotas. As a result, as the I FYP period advanced, more and more capital was urgently needed to finish what had been begun.

This inference rests not only on the literature of the period but also on the following two analytical tests: (a) if we divide the annual rates of growth of the fixed capital (osnovnye fondy) in industry by the corresponding annual rates of growth of the gross industrial output, we find that the resulting marginal capital/output ratios greatly increase over the period; (b) similarly, large increment in the

---

131 Lyashchenko, III, 280.
132 KPSS v rezolyutsiakh, II, 587.
134 Lyashchenko, III, 280.
135 "Zavdannya IV kvartalu" (editorial), Hospodarstvo Ukrainy, No. 9, (1932), p. 6.
136 While in 1928 and 1929 fixed capital in Soviet industry increased by 14.7 and 18.4 per cent respectively, the output of industry grew by 19.0 and 20.1 per cent. This means that each 1 per cent of the increase in output required 0.77 per cent in 1928 and 0.92 per cent in 1929 increase in capital. The capital/output ratios were, thus, going up. However, in 1932 and 1933, fixed capital in industry had to be increased by 22.4 and 30.2 per cent respectively in order to attain corresponding increases in production of only 14.6 and 8.2 per cent. In other words, capital/output ratios grew even more, to 1.53 and 3.68 in 1932 and 1933 respectively (data from Lokshin, p. 152, and Ryabov, p. 111). The shortcoming of these statis-
marginal capital/output ratios is noticeable, if we divide the annual rates of growth of net capital investments in industry by the annual rates of growth of the gross industrial output.\textsuperscript{137} Although both tests have their methodological and statistical limitations, the results may still serve, it seems, as crude indications of reality, implying that the effectiveness of capital investments over the period of the I FYP was diminishing, while the requirements of capital input to support the growth of output were increasing.

Demand for capital being insatiable,\textsuperscript{138} presumably all possible means were brought to bear upon all resources of Soviet economy to squeeze as much from them as possible. In this connection, demand for exportable and resalable agricultural produce must have been particularly intense.

Though many students of Soviet industrialization recognize in passing the importance of agricultural exports in early Soviet capital formation,\textsuperscript{139} there is still no good comprehensive study of the subject. Statistics for such a study, however, seem to be quite abundant both in Western and Soviet foreign-trade sources.\textsuperscript{140} Although a preliminary tally of the data on Soviet agricultural exports shows that their statistics consists in the fact that the output data for all given years as well as the fixed capital data for 1928 and 1929 are in constant 1926/27 rubles, while the fixed capital data for 1932 and 1933 are in current rubles; the latter may have slightly inflated the capital/output ratios for these two years, but probably not so much as to alter the trend discerned.

\textsuperscript{137} This type of capital/output ratio comes out as follows: 1929, 1.95; 1930, 2.59; 1931, 3.55; 1932, 2.73 (data from Ryabov, pp. 34, 169). Limitation consists in the fact that output is given in 1926/27 rubles, whereas capital investments are in current rubles. An additional limitation is, of course, the unknown “circulation period” (lead time) of investments, that is, the time until they actually become productive. However, these aberrations may not be so great as to affect the general tendency of the capital/output ratios to rise.

\textsuperscript{138} I skip discussion of the demand for labor as more self-evident and less problematic, though it was, of course, a significant factor in the history of industrialization and collectivization.


\textsuperscript{140} For Soviet sources, see especially \textit{Vneshnyaya torgoulya SSSR za Pervuju pyatiletku: Statisticheskii obзор} (Moscow, 1933); \textit{Vneshnyaya torgoulya SSSR za 20 let: 1918–1937 gg.} (Moscow, 1939). The impact of the world depression upon the Soviet I FYP deserves a careful study.
total value during the period of the I FYP came to only 4 per cent of the total Soviet capital investment in the economy (all in current prices, presumed to be comparable), the percentage does not indicate the significance of these exports, for their real weight lay elsewhere, in the fact that they paid for some 42 per cent of all Soviet imports, or for more than 60 per cent of the imports of machinery alone. Imported machinery, as it is well known, played a significant role in Soviet industrialization, comprising 32.5 per cent of all new equipment installed in the USSR in 1927/28, and still 17.8 per cent in 1931.141 There were also substantial alternative cost savings from such imports, if we take into account the fact that, at least in the Ukraine, industrial prices in 1927 were officially estimated to have been, on the average, 2.5 times higher than in the world market.142

Of no less, and possibly even greater, importance was the transformation of agricultural supplies into capital in the domestic market. Except for the sketchy book by Ryabov, cited above, there are no studies of the internal capital formation in the I FYP era.143 Ryabov computes that industry as a whole contributed only 36.1 per cent of all financial resources of the I FYP; he keeps silent on the contribution of agriculture, but adds that turnover tax produced 35.2 per cent of all capital funds.144

From the few studies of turnover tax that are available, it is known that, during the period 1930-34, more than half its revenues originated in the procurement of agricultural produce and the sales of food industry combined.145 It is, unfortunately, impossible to isolate the direct contribution of agriculture. It may be guessed, however, in connection with Ryabov's estimates of all capital formation, that the direct contribution of agriculture through the turnover tax must have amounted to not less than 25 per cent of all capital revenue of the I FYP. One thing is certain: All payments of turnover tax by the agricultural procurement agencies constituted a real contribution of

142 *Bil'shovyk Ukrayiny*, No. 4 (1929), p. 15. The source is not clear, however, on whether these "industrial prices" refer to capital or consumer goods, or both.
143 A dissertation on the I FYP capital formation in the Ukraine is at present being written by Z. L. Melnyk at Michigan State University.
144 Ryabov, pp. 137–38. On p. 140 he notes, however, that in 1929 agriculture provided 35.1 per cent of the national income of the USSR.
agriculture to the country's capital formation—real in the sense that it was a deduction from agriculture's income, an underpayment of the agricultural factors of production, rather than a mere absorption of inflated purchasing power, as some writers contend.146

7

Collective farming as an institution in the system of Soviet capital formation probably evolved in Stalin's and his followers' minds from the debates over the 1924 proposal of the Trotskyites to finance industrialization by extracting a "tribute" from the peasantry and the small shopkeepers. This doctrine found its clearest expression in the writings of E. Preobrazhensky, who suggested that state industry "exploit" the "colonies" around itself (by which he meant private economy) by means of a monopolistic rate of exchange with them—paying low prices when buying agricultural produce and raw materials and charging high prices when selling them its own products. The resulting monopolistic profit, which Preobrazhensky called "primitive socialist accumulation," should then be used to finance the construction of new industry.147

The weakest spot or, rather, the unfinished part of this model was its assumption that this sort of exchange with individual, independent private enterprises was at all possible under free market conditions. During 1927-29 Stalin learned from practice that it was not.148 Accord-

146 Western students of the Soviet economy who analyze it on the basis of the precepts of welfare economics are, of course, by no means in agreement with this interpretation. For the approach of this school to the Soviet turnover tax, see F. D. Holzman, _Soviet Taxation_ (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), and A. Bergson, _Soviet National Income and Product in 1937_ (New York 1953), pp. 56. For other than the welfarist interpretations of the turnover tax, see L. de Carbon, "Signification économique et portée financière de l'impôt soviétique sur le chiffre d'affaires," _Revue de science et de législation financière_, October-December 1954; H. Devillez, "L'impôt sur le chiffre d'affaires en Russie soviétique," _Revue de science et de législation financière_, January-March 1936; P. Haensel, "Public Finance in the USSR," _Taxes_, September-December 1938; A. Bachurin, "K voprosu o přibyli i naloge s oborota v SSSR," _Voprosy Ekonomiki_, No. 3 (1954), and the discussion of this paper in subsequent issues.


148 See Timoshenko, _Agricultural Russia_, pp. 92, 178, 440ff.
ing to Preobrazhensky's model, Stalin ordered a reduction of agricultural purchase prices in 1927 and kept them on a low level up to 1928. In order to enforce these low prices, the government proceeded to monopolize the purchase of grain and other products in the hands of a smaller and smaller number of government purchasing organizations, thus trying to eliminate the competition among them as well as between them and the private traders. This policy failed at once, however, because peasants simply refused to sell their grain to the government at low prices. As a result, in 1928 procurement prices had to be raised a little. Instead, Stalin tried to push his new idea—contracting for the peasants' sales in advance. As has been mentioned above, this experiment failed, too, and for the same reason, the peasants' economic independence, their ability to avoid the government's monopsonistic exploitation by curtailing production or refusing to deal with the government at all. It was after these failures that Stalin arrived, in 1928, at the ingenious conclusion that all one had to do was to destroy the peasant independent economy and in its place "establish a system whereby the collective farms will deliver to the state and co-operative organizations the whole of their marketable grain under penalty of being deprived of state subsidies and credits."

He had such an idea in mind, then, even before he decided on compulsory collectivization and, hence, probably had set himself this goal in taking the decision. (In fact, he revealed this clearly later, in his speech at the First Conference of Marxist Agricultural Economists in December 1929, he declared that the existing free-market "equilibrium relations" between the government and the peasantry must be ended and agriculture must be subjected to centralized planning.)

Stalin returned to the subject in April 1929 in his speech "The Right Deviation in the VKP (B)" delivered at a plenary session of the Central Committee. In discussing the charges of the Bukharinites that he was pursuing a policy of extracting a "tribute" from the peasantry, he declared:

In addition to the ordinary taxes, direct and indirect, which the peasantry is paying to the state, it also pays a certain surtax in the form of an overcharge on consumer goods, and in the form of low prices received for agricultural produce. Is it true that the supertax paid by the peasantry actually exists? Yes, it is. What other designation do we have for this supertax? We

also call it "the scissors," "drainage" of resources from agriculture into industry for the purpose of speeding up industrial development. Is this "drainage" really necessary? Everybody agrees that it is, as a temporary measure, if we really wish to maintain a speedy rate of industrial development.151

Stalin spoke in this case of the peasantry in general and did not refer to collective farmers, and this statement has therefore been interpreted by some Soviet writers as unrelated to collectivization and applicable only to the period of the NEP. But the "drainage" continued after collectivization, and became even more intensive than under the NEP. While during 1930-32 arbitrary requisitioning of grain and other produce prevailed in the newly formed collective farms (with the government, it seems, paying nothing for the deliveries inasmuch as the collectives were in debt to it for advances of credits and machinery), beginning on January 19, 1933, a new system of compulsory deliveries of produce at fixed prices came into effect. When by the decree of May 6, 1932, collectives were permitted for the first time to sell their surpluses in the open markets at free prices (after all obligations to the government had been met), the enormous divergence between market prices and the government procurement prices was legally revealed. According to official statistics, market prices for grain in 1933 were 20 to 25 times the fixed prices for obligatory deliveries, and in 1935 still 10 to 15 times.152

Thus, the economic rationale of collective farming is plain. Collective farming did away with the economic independence of the peasantry in its relations with state monopoly (monopsony). Collective farms were subjected to (a) centralized state planning, (b) thorough Party and government controls, (c) obligations to deliver to the state fixed quotas of produce at exorbitantly low prices, and (d) the use of state-owned machinery at an additional payment of a rent in kind. Production costs in the collective farms were not computed until 1956, and the remuneration of members' labor amounted to what was left after the government took its share.

Although this system stifled most incentives and caused productivity to be very low, it also furnished the government with cheap surplus

151 "The Right Deviation in the VKP(B)," ibid., p. 326.
agricultural produce which could be resold at high prices in the cities and abroad. The monopsonistic profit from this operation, in the form of the turnover tax on procurements, came into the state treasury to be used in financing industrialization, armaments, and the emoluments of those who established and guarded this system.

New York
The Agrarian-Industrial Dichotomy in the Ukraine as a Factor in Soviet Nationality Policy

ROBERT S. SULLIVANT

Although assimilation of non-Russian peoples has been a major aspect of Russian nationalities policy under both tsarist and Soviet rule, there have been wide variations in the form it has taken in different periods and in different places. It is the purpose of this paper to trace its progress in the Ukraine during the Soviet period and to suggest some conclusions about Soviet nationality objectives.

I

At the time of the Revolution, the Ukraine's population was ethnically predominantly Ukrainian. The comprehensive 1926 census reported that Ukrainians comprised 80 per cent of the population, while Russians totaled only 9 per cent, Jews 5 per cent, and scattered ethnic groups the remainder. The ethnic groups were not uniformly distributed: Ukrainians were most numerous in the northern and western districts; Russians were concentrated in the east—particularly in the Donbas—and along the Black Sea littoral. Ukrainians were a majority in almost every region, but their margin was small in some areas, such as in the districts around Stalino, Luhansk (Voroshylov-hrad), Odessa (where they were actually a minority), Melitopil, and Mariyupil (Zhdanov).

More striking than the regional variations in ethnic distribution were the differences between urban and rural populations. Ukrainians were clearly a rural people: in 1926 nearly 90 per cent of them lived in the countryside. Jews, on the other hand, were heavily concentrated in the cities, and Russians were nearly equally divided between urban and rural areas. The countryside was dominated by Ukrainians, who comprised 87 per cent of the inhabitants, while the cities were dominated by Russians and Jews, who together comprised 48 per cent of the inhabitants, slightly more than the 47 per cent who were
Ukrainians. The urban concentration of Russians and Jews was especially marked in the largest, industrial areas. In the major centers in the Donbas, for example, 61 per cent of the population was reported as Russian in 1923. In a few cities Russians comprised as much as 70 to 80 per cent of the population.

The position of the Ukrainians was further weakened by the considerable number who had lost their Ukrainian ties under tsarist rule and had come to regard themselves for all practical purposes as Russians. There is no single reliable index of the extent of this assimilation, but an indication is to be found in the number of Ukrainians and Jews who had come to accept Russian as their principal language. According to the 1926 census, nearly a quarter of the Ukraine's Jews and 5 per cent of its Ukrainians had abandoned their native tongues and spoke chiefly in Russian. The process was especially marked in the cities. Among urban Ukrainians 24 per cent were by 1926 using Russian, while among rural Ukrainians the figure was only 2 per cent. If these Russian-speaking groups are included in the Russian category, it appears that Russians comprised 15 rather than 9 per cent of the Ukraine's population and that Russians actually outnumbered Ukrainians in the cities (44 per cent against 36 per cent). In the eastern industrial centers the numbers of Russians were correspondingly greater.

Thus, when the Bolsheviks came to power in the Ukraine, they were confronted with an area which was overwhelmingly Ukrainian in its rural districts but was increasingly Russian in its urban areas and above all in its heavy industrial centers, concentrated in the east and south. Originally they had included large numbers of Ukrainians and Jews but had become more uniformly Russian under tsarist rule and under the Russification pressures in the cities. The countryside, on the other hand, despite tsarist assimilation policies, had shown a

1 Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR, otdel perepisi, Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1926 goda (Moscow, 1927), XI, 8–50.
2 Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie, otdel demografii, Trudy, Vol. XX: Itogi vsesoyuznoi gorodskoi perepisi 1923 g. (Moscow, 1924), Part IV, pp. 40–51.
3 This indication is less reliable in the case of the Jews, many of whom adopted Russian but kept their identity as a separate cultural group. In the case of the Ukrainians linguistic assimilation was accompanied by a considerable shift in group identification.
4 It is noteworthy that the assimilation rate among urban Ukrainians (24 per cent) was almost precisely that of the Jews (25 per cent), suggesting that assimilation was an urban phenomenon, relatively unrelated to ethnic group.
surprising resistance to Russian influence and had remained basically Ukrainian. As a result, there was a division in the Ukraine between Russians and Ukrainians which accompanied and magnified the division between industrial workers in the cities and peasants in the countryside.

II

In the period immediately following the Revolution, Soviet leaders tended to view these ethnic divisions in terms of the problem of winning control of the Ukraine. It is not surprising that the Bolsheviks sought support chiefly in the largest urban areas in the east, for here were the bulk of the Ukraine's industrial workers—the logical allies of the Bolsheviks—and here too were the majority of the Ukraine's Russians, untroubled by the national hostilities that led Ukrainians, including Ukrainian socialists, to opposition. Russian elements at once came to dominate the Ukrainian Soviet government, and they sought to maintain a privileged position for Russians and to preserve, even to expand, tsarist Russification. For example, Khristian Rakovsky, the first head of the Ukrainian government, attacked at that time suggestions that Ukrainian be established as a state language.5 Throughout the first years, until April 1923, the government seemed determined to assimilate Ukrainians into Soviet Russian life with little regard for the local language, customs, or traditions.

Moscow leaders, however, were less willing to support so stern a Russification program. In a manner not unlike that of the leaders of present-day colonial powers, they showed themselves more sympathetic to the aspirations of the local people—even nationalist and separatist aspirations—than were the Russian settlers and assimilated non-Russians living in the Ukraine. As Lenin observed on one occasion, "it is known that assimilated non-Russians always overdo in the matter of hundred-percent Russian attitudes."6 Perhaps the central authorities were influenced by Marxist internationalism and by Lenin's oft-repeated view that nationalism in any form was harmful, particularly the nationalism of an oppressing country such as Russia.7

Clearly they were concerned that the Russification program being pressed in the Ukraine would alienate a large bloc of people essential to the success of the Revolution. In 1919 a Party resolution chastised the Ukrainian government, noting that it had failed to conduct itself with the necessary “tolerance and prudence” toward the Ukrainian national movement. In 1921 Stalin demanded that Soviet life in the Ukraine and other border regions conform to the national complexion of the region and that organs of state power function in the local language, drawing their personnel from the local population. In December 1922 Lenin attacked Russification pressures in the strongest way, insisting that the problem had become the most serious one confronting Soviet leadership and that it was better “to stretch too far in the direction of complaisance and softness toward the national minorities, than too little.”

These criticisms culminated in the first half of 1923 in the adoption of a strong program aimed at halting the Russifying practices of the Ukrainian government and supporting local institutions. The Ukrainian language was to be introduced into all Party and government work; Russian nationalists were to be removed from leadership posts and replaced with Ukrainian leaders; a great campaign was to be inaugurated, teaching the Ukrainian language to those who did not know it, expanding the use of Ukrainian rather than Russian in schools, and generally enlarging Ukrainian cultural facilities of every kind. The program was given the label “Ukrainization” and was to transform the Ukraine from a Russified and Russian-dominated republic into a distinctly Ukrainian, albeit of course Soviet, republic. It was apparently anticipated that Russians living in the Ukraine would one day lose their national identification and become absorbed linguistically and culturally into a relatively uniform Ukrainian society.

For a brief period strenuous efforts in this direction were made. Ukrainian language centers were established in Party and government institutions, schools were shifted to Ukrainian, newspapers and pub-

---

9 Ibid., pp. 391–97.
10 Quoted in Pipes, p. 276.
lishing houses began to emphasize Ukrainian rather than Russian publications, citizens were encouraged to use Ukrainian in the courts, and in government and Party offices. But almost at once powerful opposition developed, spearheaded by the Ukraine's entrenched Russian minority. The Ukrainization program, it was charged, was as discriminatory against the Russians as the earlier tsarist Russification had been against Ukrainians. Furthermore, the program had allegedly fallen into the hands of Ukrainian nationalists who worked under its protection to spread their counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet separatist propaganda. A more balanced program was required if the revolution in the Ukraine was to be safeguarded and if Russian and Jewish minorities were to be protected against Ukrainian chauvinism.12

Early in 1926 the dispute over Ukrainization was taken directly to Moscow. Oleksander Shumsky, Ukrainian Commissar of Education and leader of the Ukrainian "nationalist" Bolsheviks, insisted in a personal interview with Stalin that despite Party resolutions assimilation pressures of the tsarist era remained dominant in the Ukraine. A tremendous resistance to recognition of the Ukraine's distinctive culture and language had developed within the Russian or Russified wing of the Party, he declared, revealing itself in a subtle but steady refusal to support Ukrainian-language programs and in a prejudice against native Ukrainians, who were denied leadership posts in the government, Party, and trade-unions. The opposition of these people could hardly be overcome, he explained, because they comprised a majority of Party members in the Ukraine and occupied controlling positions everywhere. If Ukrainization was to be successfully carried out, stronger support from the center was required as well as a shift in republic leadership to local people committed to the program.

In his reply Stalin dismissed Shumsky's complaint and called for a considerable lessening of the force of Ukrainization. Russifying, assimilating tendencies were surely to be opposed, he agreed, and leaders and cadres removed when they would not accept the program. But the pace of Ukrainization could not be hurried, local workers were not yet able to replace Russian and Russified leaders, and the program required the most careful safeguards to ensure that it should

not become oppressive of Russian and Jewish minorities or fall into the hands of anti-Russian, anti-Soviet nationalists. Differences between the Russian and Ukrainian cultures were negligible and were not to be emphasized or exaggerated. Russia, as the citadel of Leninism and the world revolutionary movement, provided the example to be emulated by other peoples. Russian cultural influences in the Ukraine were salutary and were not to be attacked.13

As was to be expected, Shumsky was shortly relieved of his Party and government posts and was disavowed in the Ukraine by Russians and Ukrainians alike. Although the Ukrainization program was not dropped, it was no longer pressed with vigor. In 1927 a new statute on language use was adopted, giving Russian virtually equal status with Ukrainian: both languages were to be taught in the schools, both were to be used by government agencies, and efforts to force Russians to use Ukrainian were to be abandoned.14 In a Party resolution of the same year it was announced that what was needed was a "battle on two fronts"—against Russian chauvinism and assimilation practices on the one hand and against counterrevolutionary Ukrainian nationalism on the other.15 Apparently Ukrainians were to be allowed to develop their language and culture without stigma or restraint, and Ukrainian institutions were to be accepted as republic institutions. But Russians and Jews were to be equally free and were not to be embarrassed or disadvantaged by their refusal to accept Ukrainian ways.

III

If the "battle on two fronts" represented a compromise between the Ukrainian and Russian factions of republic leadership, it soon showed itself an unsatisfactory one. The difficulty arose in the cities. Here was the center of Bolshevik power in the Ukraine—the majority of Party members; the trade-unions; governmental, industrial, and educational leaders. But the cities were more Russian than Ukrainian, and pressures at the republic level were overwhelmingly weighted toward Russian rather than Ukrainian institutions. How, nationalist Ukrainians asked, was the republic to be distinctly Ukrainian, if

13 Iosif V. Stalin, Sochineniya (Moscow, 1946-51), VIII, 149-54.
14 "Zakon pro rivnopravnist' mov na Ukrayini," Visti Vseukrayins'koho Tsentral'noho Vykonauchoho Komitetu, July 8, 1927.
15 "Zayava TsK KP(b)U do Vykonkomu Kominterna" (June 1927), Visti, July 5, 1927.
leadership was to come from the cities and if the cities were to be left as Russian centers and were not to be forcibly Ukrainized?

The problem was further complicated by the changes which occurred during the late 1920s and early 1930s. Under the industrialization and collectivization plans which were pressed in these years the population of the Ukraine's urban and industrial areas began to grow. In part the increase consisted of Russian technicians and industrial managers assigned to the Ukraine to implement the new programs. These groups enlarged the Russian segment of the urban population and considerably strengthened Russian influence. But at the same time Ukrainian peasants—probably more numerous than the Russian technicians—also flocked to the cities as they were uprooted by collectivization and the mechanization of agriculture and found themselves surplus labor in the countryside. To Ukrainian nationalist Bolsheviks—led now by the influential Mykola Skrypnyk—it was unacceptable to confront these Ukrainians with the Russian culture dominant in the cities and to subject them to the same Russifying, assimilation pressures found under tsarist rule. Again it seemed essential that the cities be Ukrainized.

The official Party position on the question had first been enunciated by Stalin at the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (March 1921). "It is clear," he stated, "that although Russian elements still predominate in the cities of the Ukraine, in the course of time these cities will inevitably be Ukrainized." In 1926 he reaffirmed this view, modifying it, however, by suggesting that the process would be a "long, spontaneous, natural" one that could not be forced. Increasingly, emphasis came to be placed on the slow, voluntary nature of the process. In 1927 a Russian leader in the Ukraine, Yu. Larin, expressed a typical complaint that Ukrainization was unfair to the Russian city workers: Russian films were no longer being shown in the cities; the workers could not participate in trade-union and Party meetings because they were conducted in Ukrainian.

16 Mykola Skrypnyk estimated that 1,300,000 new workers moved to the Donbas in the first two years of the First Five-Year Plan. By 1930, 51.5 per cent of the workers were Ukrainian although only 44 per cent were able to speak the language. Skrypnyk, Statti i promovy (Kharkiv, 1931), II, Pt. 2, 251–53, 374–79.
17 Stalin, Sochineniya, V, 49.
18 Ibid., VIII, 149–54.
19 "Ob izvrashcheniyakh pri provedenii natsional'noi politiki," Bol'shevik, III (December 31, 1926), 50–58; IV (January 1, 1927), 59–69.
In 1929 Skrypnyk suggested a compromise program which he called "voluntary Ukrainization." Russians in the cities would be allowed to use their language as widely as they saw fit but would be educated to the advantages of Ukrainian as the official language of the Republic and would be encouraged to learn it, initially as a secondary tongue, but ultimately as a primary one. For the moment the Skrypnyk compromise was accepted despite the opposition of Russians living in the Ukraine.

Gradually the suspicions of Moscow leaders increased. The collectivization shock of the early 1930s, when Ukrainian peasants resisted Soviet farm programs on a grand scale, emphasized anew the critical importance for the Bolsheviks of the Ukraine's urban areas with their Russian elements. There is little evidence that Ukrainian nationalists played any important role in stimulating peasant unrest. But the identification of Ukrainians with rural areas was so close as to give pause to Soviet leaders. Here, they foresaw, were the elements necessary for the development of a powerful peasant-nationalist rebellion. Demands for decentralization and localism, expressions of national sentiment, support of the Ukrainization program itself seemed now treasonous. One after another, Ukrainian nationalist subversive organizations were "uncovered." By 1933 Stalin had begun to identify Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists with the difficulties in the countryside and to demand sharper restrictions on Ukrainization. By 1934 the chief supporters of the program—Skrypnyk among them—were removed from influence, and it was resolved to emphasize "proletarian internationalism" and "Soviet solidarity" rather than the stimulation of local national forms, and above all to recruit to leadership posts "tried and tested persons educated in the Bolshevik spirit" rather than ethnic Ukrainians of uncertain political reliability.

The new approach suggested almost a reversal in policy. For the cities, pressure on Russians and Jews to shift to Ukrainian was to be dropped and leadership left in the hands of Russians; the cities were

---

20 Skrypnyk, II, Pt. 2, 113-17, 156-59.
21 Brotherhood of Ukrainian Statehood, Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, Union of Ukrainian Youth, Center for Counterrevolutionary Work in the Rural Economy of the Ukraine, Ukrainian National Center, etc.
23 P. P. Postyshev and S. V. Kossior, Soviet Ukraine Today (Moscow, 1934), pp. 95-96.
to remain the essentially Russian islands they had been at the time of the Revolution; assimilation pressures were to be accepted and even strengthened as Ukrainians fell under the cloud of disloyalty and a premium came to be placed on familiarity with the Russian language and on acceptance of Russian ways. For the rural areas, Ukrainian ways were to be tolerated but were not to be set off against Russian, and the greatest effort was to be made to bring the two into harmony. The Ukrainization process, it was suggested, had been basically completed and was in future to be largely abandoned.

IV

In the following years Russifying pressures in both urban and rural areas continued to grow. In 1938 a statute was adopted on the matter of Russian language instruction in the schools. Its purpose was to ensure that all Ukrainians, including those with no more than four years of schooling, would be able to converse fluently in simple Russian and to read and write the language in an elementary way. Increasingly, the Russian language was glorified as superior to Ukrainian, not only as Lenin's tongue and the language common to the whole Soviet Union but as the bearer of an advanced, revolutionary, proletarian culture. The pressure exerted earlier to induce writers and artists to work with the Ukrainian language and with Ukrainian themes was replaced by attacks on nationalist tendencies and by support for Ukrainians using the Russian language and Russian themes.

World War II provided a further motive for Russification. National unity and solidarity seemed essential in the face of the German advance. As the war progressed, Stalin became convinced that only the Russian people were wholly committed to defense of the Soviet Union and that the other peoples, including Ukrainians, were at best unenthusiastic and at worst actually treasonous. The problem was aggravated by the absorption into the Ukraine of new districts in the west—districts which before the War had belonged to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. The inhabitants of these districts were in general more strongly nationalist and less willing to accept Soviet rule than the inhabitants of other parts of the Ukraine. The impulse to emphasize Russification programs was increased.

24 Visti, June 17, 1938.
Gradually the Russification program centered on two traditional approaches. First, use of the Russian language was fostered even in areas such as the western Ukraine where it had previously been of small or no importance. Work in the higher schools was shifted from Ukrainian or Polish to Russian; meetings of Party and government bodies were conducted in Russian; Russian became the common language for reports and lectures. Second, greater numbers of Russians or Russified and urbanized Ukrainians were assigned to leadership posts in traditionally Ukrainian areas as in the Russian centers. Precise figures are elusive, but it seems clear that in the period after World War II many thousands of such workers were dispatched to the countryside, chiefly from the great urban complexes in the east. Their influence was most strongly felt in the western Ukraine, where local, native Ukrainians found the highest positions closed. The shifts resulted above all in a considerable strengthening of urban influences in the rural areas. Because urban attitudes were so largely Russian, the shifts tended to increase the rate and extent of assimilation.

V

With the death of Stalin in 1953, the most extreme of the Russification programs were denounced and modifications introduced. Initially the changes were sponsored by Beria, who insisted that the Ukrainian language be given greater emphasis and that local cadres be assigned leadership posts. Apparently at Beria’s instigation, the Party leader in the Ukraine, L. G. Mel’nikov, was charged with sanctioning Russification, particularly in the western districts, and was removed from his post. Subsequently, as Beria in his turn was ousted in Moscow, less emphasis was given “localization,” but the program as a whole was not dropped. Evidence of continued interest was shown by the reporting in 1953 and 1954 of figures on the ethnic composition of schools, accompanied by statements praising Leninist national policy because it “fully guaranteed . . . the possibility of teaching the children of the workers in their own language.”

28 P. G. Tychina (P. H. Tychyna), in Pravda Ukrainy, August 8, 1953. Tychyna noted that of the 30,000 schools in the Ukraine nearly 3,000 were being conducted
Ukrainian Minister of Culture, K. Z. Lytvyn, noted with favor the steady growth in the number of specialists, teachers, and technicians trained from the local population in the western Ukraine and assigned to work there.29 The statements were modest but noteworthy because they represented the first efforts since the Ukrainization period to emphasize greater Ukrainian participation in the educational and leadership life of the Republic.

More significant were figures made public at the end of 1956 in the newspaper Pravda Ukrainy, in an article praising the steady growth in the national rights of the Ukrainian people and the improvement in the numbers of Ukrainians serving as Party and government leaders.30 The status of the Ukrainian language in the Republic's schools was illustrated by figures comparing the number of schools in which instruction was being carried on in each of the languages used in the Republic:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of Instruction</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>24,977</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>4,008</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30,063</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Student enrollment in each category of language school was:

in Russian. Lytvyn reported the following percentages of students of Ukrainian background in the higher schools:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figure for 1953 is for candidates of the higher schools. K. Z. Litvin (Lytvyn), Rastsvet kul'tury sovetskoi Ukrainy (Kiev, 1954), pp. 36, 38.

29 Litvin, p. 68.


31 The discrepancy in the totals was not explained but presumably resulted from schools for which information was not available.
The figures were significant both for the picture they painted of the language situation in the Ukraine's schools and, more broadly, for the conclusions they suggested on the whole problem of Ukrainization and assimilation.

First, the figures indicated a remarkable decrease in the number of schools teaching in languages other than Ukrainian or Russian. Apparently the old policy of the Ukrainization period of encouraging even small minorities to retain their linguistic identity had been abandoned. Newspapers published in languages other than Ukrainian or Russian had virtually disappeared.32 Taken as a whole, the evidence presented seems conclusively to demonstrate that the minorities were being deliberately removed or assimilated into Ukrainian-or Russian-language groups. Apparently the practice of the 1920s of transferring Jews to Yiddish schools, for example, or of establishing separate Bulgarian or Belorussian schools was no longer being followed. It seems likely also that the practice of establishing separate raions and soviets for local minorities had been abandoned, as well as the use of languages of other than Russian and Ukrainian in the courts and government offices. The implication was strong that in the future the Ukraine was to be a bilingual Republic.

Secondly, the figures suggested that, despite the Ukrainization work of the 1920s and the opposite Russifying pressures of the late 1930s and 1940s, the old division of the Ukraine into an urban area predominately Russian and a rural area predominantly Ukrainian remained basically unchanged. The Russian-language schools, the figures indicated, had an average enrollment of 341.6 students, while the Ukrainian-language schools enrolled only 152.7. In part the difference reflected the fact that the Ukraine's higher schools—larger than the

32 In 1956 only .4 per cent of the newspapers published in the Ukraine were in languages other than Ukrainian or Russian. Ibid.
lower schools—were more often Russian than were the lower schools. In part the difference reflected the concentration of Russian-language schools in the cities and towns, where the schools were larger than in the countryside. In either case the figures suggested in a general way that the Ukraine's rural areas remained linguistically Ukrainian while the cities remained linguistically Russian.

The linguistic development of the Ukraine's schools may be reconstructed as follows. After the Revolution a great effort was made to shift schools in predominantly Ukrainian areas to the Ukrainian language. The campaign was pressed most strongly in the years from 1923 to 1925; and, since Ukrainians were predominantly a rural population, it is not surprising that the campaign was most successful in the rural areas and hence in the lower-level schools, which were virtually the only educational institutions outside the cities. By 1925, 71 per cent of the primary and incomplete secondary schools in both urban and rural areas had been changed over to Ukrainian. In the higher schools and in the lower schools in the cities, however, the problem was complex: enrollment was to a great extent Russian; available textbooks were Russian; there were difficulties in the practical task of conversion and strong opposition pressures from teachers and Russian leaders. Consequently, conversion proceeded slowly, and the controversy it engendered played a major role in the Ukrainization disputes of the years after 1925. Apparently there were some gradual successes, but the successes led in turn to greater opposition, and by the early 1930s the program had been basically dropped. Subsequently, most of the gains were lost as many of the schools were re-established as Russian institutions. It was the extension of this Russifying program to the higher schools of the western Ukraine—where there were few Russians and, hence, little justification for the program—which served as the excuse for the supposed intervention of Beria in the Ukraine following Stalin's death.

A comparison of the 1925 and 1956 figures on school enrollment indicates that in the rural areas, in contrast to the cities, Russification pressures had not led to any significant decrease in the use of Ukrainian in the schools. On the contrary, the impression is given that a moderately consistent policy was followed of establishing only Ukrainian-language schools. In the period between 1925 and 1956

33 Litvin, p. 32.
the percentage of Ukrainian-language schools—urban and rural combined—increased from 71 per cent of the lower schools to 83 per cent of all schools. Since the postrevolutionary program of converting schools to Ukrainian had been carried basically as far as it was to go by 1925, the increase suggests that virtually all schools created after 1925 were Ukrainian. The supposition seems not unreasonable, since the Bolshevik program of expanding educational facilities gave emphasis, in the early years, to the rural areas where few schools existed. That the program achieved impressive results is indicated by a comparison of the 1926 census figures with the 1956 school figures: in 1926, 86 per cent of the rural population spoke Ukrainian; in 1956, roughly the same percentage of the rural schools were teaching in Ukrainian. The figures suggest that Stalin and his successors alike agreed that, whatever the language program for the cities, the Ukrainian character of the countryside was to be maintained.

Thirdly, the percentage of students enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools, when compared with the percentage of Ukrainians in the population as a whole, provides a measure of the extent to which Ukrainians had been assimilated under Soviet rule prior to 1956. By 1956 the population of the Ukraine was about 76 per cent Ukrainian (in 1959 it was 76.8 per cent). Since only 69 per cent of the students were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools, perhaps some 10 per cent of Ukrainian families were sending their children to Russian-language schools. These families may be assumed to represent the main body of the Russified Ukrainians. Inasmuch as few Russian schools were to be found in the countryside, apart from a few exclusively Russian districts, such families were undoubtedly concentrated in urban areas.

From the foregoing it seems reasonable to conclude that although Soviet language policy may have been successful at one time in prompting Russians and Jews to learn Ukrainian and at another time in prompting Ukrainians to learn Russian, it has not altered basically the natural pattern of language use either in the cities or in the rural areas. In the early period, during the 1920s, language policy was identified with Ukrainization; non-Ukrainians were forced or induced to study Ukrainian, and government and Party agencies, the press, and the schools were shifted in a modest way to Ukrainian. The program achieved no real success, however, in converting the Republic's urban population to Ukrainian as its primary tongue. It
was this failure which aroused first Shumsky's and then Skrypnyk's ire, prompting them to demand a more severe language program with the objective of transforming the Ukraine ultimately into an exclusively Ukrainian republic. The decision of central leaders to avoid pressing in an active way for such a transformation meant that the large cities would remain as predominantly Russian centers.

In the later period—the 1930s and 1940s—the situation was reversed as the Russian language came to be stressed. The program resulted in a considerable increase in the number of Ukrainians moderately fluent in Russian. But, as with Ukrainization, little success was achieved in converting the Ukraine's rural population to Russian as its primary tongue. It seems doubtful that central leaders meant to require such a conversion, although the Russification measures adopted by Stalin after World War II suggested that such a program was in the offing. In any case, Stalin's successors repudiated these measures, supporting the preservation of Ukrainian language use in those areas where Ukrainian was the generally accepted tongue.

Under these conditions it is not surprising that there was a steady increase in the number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Inasmuch as Russian was the common tongue for the USSR and the accepted language for Union organizations and agencies, there was a considerable premium on its use, particularly by those who hoped to rise to high positions in the Party, the government, industry, or even the professions and the arts. Moreover, once the decision had been made that the Ukraine's cities would not be forcibly transformed from Russian to Ukrainian centers, the premium placed on Russian-language use had grown. As the industrialization and urbanization programs proceeded under the Soviet five-year plans, Ukrainian peasants were drawn to the cities where they were received not by the Ukrainian culture Skrypnyk had hoped to establish, but by the Russian culture which had historically predominated. Regardless of official state policies, these Ukrainians were confronted with informal economic and social pressures—pressures similar to those experienced by minority groups in all societies—which led them, if not in the first generation, then in the second, to accept Russian as their primary tongue. In the countryside, where such pressures did not exist, there was no corresponding shift. The critical official decision was the rejection of Skrypnyk's plea for Ukrainization of the cities. Once this decision was made, Russification proceeded natu-
rally as a product of sociological pressures and as a consequence of
the advantage enjoyed by Russian as the USSR's common tongue.
The extent of Russification was more a measure of the Ukraine's
urbanization trend and of the growing mobility of the USSR's popula-
tion than of influence exerted by official Russifying policies.

*DePauw University*
Patriotism, "Bourgeois Nationalism," and the Nationality Policy of the USSR after Stalin

ALFRED D. LOW

In the Soviet view, the October Revolution set an end to national oppression by burying all discriminatory policies on ethnic and religious grounds and ushering in individual and national freedom and equality. It liberated the numerous national minorities living in the interior as well as border regions of the Russian Empire and, in the aggregate, forming at that time a majority of its population. All nationalities were given either national statehood or autonomy. The government and the Communist Party laid down a broad program providing for economic and cultural advancement of all Soviet nationalities; it called for the creation and development in all national republics of industry, including heavy industry, for reorganizing agriculture on a "socialist basis," for carrying out a cultural revolution, and for large-scale training of cadres from the working class and the national intelligentsia. "Our Party," Khrushchev claimed in his address to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, has "succeeded in removing the mutual distrust which existed among the peoples in tsarist Russia and in uniting all the peoples of the Soviet Union by bonds of mutual friendship." 1

To exemplify the tremendous progress which has taken place in the national republics, Soviet spokesmen usually put first emphasis on the rapid increase of industrial output, comparing it with the pre-revolutionary level of production. Mukhitdinov, addressing the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959, pointed especially to the eastern republics of the USSR, "where the working masses have leaped forward from patriarchal, feudal relations and colonial slavery to socialism." 2 Uzbekistan's gross industrial output in 1958 was said to be seventeen times greater than in 1913, Kazakhstan's forty-four times,

Azerbaijan’s fourteen times, Georgia’s thirty-five times, Kirgizia’s fifty times, Tadzhikistan’s thirty-one times, and Turkmenistan’s twenty times. Successes in the development of culture are likewise declared to be “stunning.” Illiteracy, it is claimed, has been virtually wiped out. Under the Soviet regime, forty nationalities have created their own writing systems and developed their own languages and networks of schools and higher educational institutions; research institutes in the Union republics are said to have been steadily expanded, and numerous academies of sciences established.³

During his lifetime Stalin, credited with most Soviet achievements, real and imaginary, was also given credit for conceiving the Soviet nationalities policy, the main foundation of which had actually been laid by Lenin. Even at Stalin’s funeral in March 1953, Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov still praised Stalin’s contributions to the solution of the nationality question. Malenkov not only hailed Stalin as “the great theoretician of the national question” but also gave him credit for having overcome the “economic and cultural backwardness of peoples who were formerly oppressed” and for having united them into one “brotherly family,” a view echoed also by Molotov. Nonetheless, in an early communiqué after Stalin’s death, the Soviet rulers—fearful not only because of the general dissatisfaction on economic and political grounds but also because of the particular grievances of the numerous nationalities of the USSR—admitted that their “most important task” was “the prevention of any kind of disorder and panic.” At the funeral all three speakers pointed to the “need for strengthening the Soviet multinational state.” “With the friendship among the peoples of our country,” said Malenkov, “we need fear no enemies, domestic or foreign.” In the same vein Beria urged the necessity of a “firm union of all the Soviet national republics in the system of a single great multinational state.”⁴ In a moment of crisis and anxiety the Bolshevik leaders bared their doubts as to the exist-


⁴ All funeral speeches quoted from Pravda, March 10, 1953.
ence of genuinely fraternal feelings between the Russians and the nationalities of the USSR and as to the latter's loyalty to the Soviet state.

Soon afterwards, on April 1, Pravda published a retraction of the charges that had been made in the case of the "doctors' plot," a fabrication combined during Stalin's last days with a violent press campaign against "cosmopolitanism" and Zionism. In an editorial five days later, Pravda asserted that the very core of Soviet ideology was "friendship of peoples" and that Soviet communism was "intolerant of any and all forms of social and national oppression." It was "the ideology of the friendship of peoples which has triumphed in our country and won a complete victory in the Second World War over the imperialists' ideology of brutal nationalism and race hatred." The editorial seemed designed to wipe out the impression created by the recent excesses of Great Russian nationalism and its frightening offshoots, anti-Semitism and racism, which to many, including Communists, must have appeared strange borrowings from vanquished fascism. "It is only in capitalist states," Pravda asserted, that reactionary exploiting classes "whip up national passions."

In the months after Stalin's death the relaxation of the most stringent controls in the Soviet Union was accompanied by a de-emphasis of the primacy of the Russian nationality and by greater encouragement of some of the aspirations of the national minorities. In June Pravda Ukrainy pointed to "distortions of the Leninist-Stalinist nationalities policy of our Party," for instance, "converting to the Russian language the teaching in higher educational institutions."

The nationalities problem in the USSR in 1953, tied up as it was with the internal struggle for power preceding and following Stalin's death, was linked not only with the "doctors' plot" but also with the Beria episode. After his arrest Beria was accused of "bourgeois nationalism," of working against the "friendship, unity, and brotherhood of our people," and of aiming at the secession of certain border republics. In addition, it was charged, his "contemptible gang" had wished to "destroy our international-fraternal ties with the peo-

6 Pravda, April 6, 1953.
7 Pravda Ukrainy, June 18, 1953.
people's democracies" and "sow distrust among peoples." If, as some have surmised, Beria favored a genuinely federalist policy for the Soviet nationalities within the USSR, he must have changed his earlier views, since in the 1930s he had advocated the most ruthless suppression of his native Georgia and extreme centralization.

Whether or not Beria in 1953 stood for the "liberalization" of Soviet nationality policy, his fall was not accompanied by a move toward thoroughgoing centralization. The "thaw" which set in after Stalin's death, the general relaxation of controls, and the desire of the ruling group to appease and win over the broad masses of the population led to a "liberalization" also in the nationalities policy. This trend seemed to reach its climax in Khrushchev's momentous denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress. Among the numerous accusations, Khrushchev indicted Stalin for his inhuman and senseless deportation in 1943 and 1944 of several Soviet nationalities.

The de-Stalinization campaign, stepped up thereafter, had far-reaching repercussions at home and abroad. Khrushchev's speech was the long awaited signal for the satellites and the border republics of the USSR to give vent to their accumulated opposition sentiments, not merely anti-Soviet but also anti-Russian. Fears were aroused that the de-Stalinization campaign had backfired, that it had dangerously undermined the ground upon which the Soviet structure rested, and Khrushchev, forced to reverse himself to some degree, began to extol Stalin's statesmanship and positive contributions, among them his leadership of the Party's struggle against "bourgeois nationalists." Since "bourgeois nationalism" in Soviet parlance often means separatism, Stalin, in spite of the continued criticism, was now being credited with the preservation of the Soviet multinational state. The Party left no doubt that it was determined to uphold his legacy in the field of nationality policy.

The suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956, coupled with the internal Soviet struggle for power, reversed the trend toward "liberalism" in nationality policy. Increased emphasis on the Russian element as compared with the other peoples of the USSR

---

8 Pravda, Feb. 18, 1956.
and deprecation of foreign influences—features familiar from the Stalinist era, though no longer exhibiting the same extremes—characterized the latest turn. Revealing in this respect is the June 1957 issue of Voprosy istorii. The former editors of the journal, it was said, had greatly exaggerated the "importance of foreign influences on the development of social ideas" in Russia and had failed to take into consideration "the progressive significance of the unification of the areas of Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Far East with Russia."11 Their "error" had been to underestimate the Russians both as compared to Western nations (they had not lagged behind the West in the realm of social ideas, it was declared) and as compared to the other nationalities of the Russian Empire (for the Russians led them in every field and in most ways had greatly benefited them).

The internal struggle for power immediately after Stalin's death ended in June 1957 with Khrushchev's victory over his principal challengers, the former Premier Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich—the "anti-Party group." Whether the nationality problem was actually one of the live issues in this fight or whether Khrushchev merely made it appear so in order to claim credit for a more "liberal" nationality policy, the adherents of the "anti-Party group" were accused of having "shown signs of chauvinism and of mistrust of the ability of the peoples of the national republics to cope with statewide tasks."12 Khrushchev's victory was said to have led to the further consolidation of "friendship among peoples" and their unification around the Party.

In 1959 the Twenty-First Party Congress was told that government and Party measures over the past five years had "further enriched the theory and practice of Lenin's nationality policy." Khrushchev was said to "deserve" special recognition for his "role and initiative" in familiarizing himself with the life in the Central Asian and Baltic republics, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, and Belorussia; "he always discovers the key to a further advance of the economy and culture"13 of the national republics. Like Stalin earlier, Khrushchev, having attained power and anxious to give it the appearance of "legitimacy," aimed at the laurels of a Marxist theoretician, again in the field of nationality policy.

13 Ibid.
The Congress was also told that some Soviet nationalities deported by Stalin during the war and dispersed over the USSR, to wit, the Balkar, Kalmyk, Chechen, Ingush, and Karachai peoples, had been restored to their former status. To the Soviet nationalities Khrushchev wished to appear as one who had rectified the wrongs committed by Stalin.

At the same time, Stalin's stress on the primacy of the Russian nationality in the Soviet realm has in general been continued. (After the Second World War, Stalin in a famous toast hailed the Russian nationality as the "most outstanding" nation in the USSR—4—-a truthful statement in more than one respect and, by implication, also an admission that the nationality problem, all claims to the contrary, had not yet been solved.) Since 1953 the Russian nationality has continued to play the role of the "elder brother" of the Soviet nationalities, and is considered the culturally most advanced and most progressive ethnic element in the USSR. No indication has been given when the "younger brothers" are to catch up.

The bestowal of lavish praise upon the Russian people has come to demonstrate Soviet patriotism. While so-called kowtowing to bourgeois culture and the West is castigated, servility to the Russian nationality is still extolled as a token of loyalty to the Soviet state. In 1958 a Lithuanian Party member praised "the beneficent effect of our Party's nationality policy," of which Soviet Lithuania was held to be "a striking example." The Russian people had given "tremendous aid to all the peoples of our country." "Until the victory of the October Revolution man's history held no instance of a great people extending tremendous unselfish aid to small peoples in all spheres of economic and cultural development."15 No wonder, then, that Western critics of Soviet Russia's nationalities policy who dare compare this noble and unselfish policy with Western colonialism are taken severely to task.16

At the Twentieth Party Congress, one delegate after another from various Soviet republics and autonomous republics expressed the "undying gratitude" of his people or his nationality to the Party and

14 Ibid., May 25, 1945.
16 See Pravda, Feb. 16, 1956, on C. Manning's works on the Ukraine; Voprosy istorii, April 1958 (quoted in CDSP, August 27, 1958), on W. Kolarz and R. Pipes; and Pravda, March 18, 1956, on the work Soviet Empire by O. Caroe.
the Russian people. Mustafayev of Azerbaidzhan praised "the great Russian people" for having "performed a great service in improving the economy and culture of the national republics of the Soviet Union." Muratov of the Tatar Autonomous Republic expressed appreciation to the Party and government for their "constant concern" and for the way Comrade Khrushchev and "other members of the Central Committee's Presidium have corrected us in a paternal manner." The working people of Dagestan were "eternally grateful to the glorious Communist Party, to the great Russian people."17 And in 1959 Mukhitdinov, addressing the Twenty-First Party Congress, credited the "mighty Russian people" for the "harmonious"18 development of national relations in the USSR.

These panegyrics are, of course, no novel feature in the political, social, and cultural life of the Soviet Union, but are in the Stalinist tradition. Just before Stalin's death Kommunist had published an article paying glowing tribute to the Russians; "The leading, unifying, cementing, and directing force in the family of peoples of our land is their elder brother, the great Russian people." "The Russian people have made the greatest contribution to world civilization, to world culture and to the history of the revolutionary liberation movement. We must indefatigably educate our people and our youth in a spirit of respect and love for our elder brother, the great Russian people."19

National haughtiness of the Russians, covertly encouraged by the ruling group, takes numerous forms. It expresses itself not only in extolling the history, culture, and general achievements of the Russian nationality and placing them far above the accomplishments of other nationalities, but also in giving special recognition to the Russian language in extravagant terms. "Among all the peoples of our homeland," Mukhitdinov told the Twenty-First Congress, "the Russian language enjoys tremendous respect and love."20 The Russian language has played a great role in helping the peoples of the Soviet Union "to absorb the advanced culture of the world, particularly Russian culture." Russian is declared indispensable for the study of

17 Pravda, Feb. 21, 1956.
19 Kommunist, No. 3 (Feb. 1953), pp. 64-88; quoted in CDSP, July 18, 1953, pp. 8-11.
science, for modern technology, and for higher education in general. Furthermore, the study of the Russian language has helped the peoples of the USSR in "internationalism" and helped to develop friendship among them.\textsuperscript{21} Russian, all nationalities are frequently reminded, is, of course, the language of the "great Lenin"\textsuperscript{22} and of the Russian proletariat. If Russians extol their contribution to world civilization, not to mention their contribution to the multinational Soviet state, and glory in their historic and cultural achievements, they are not accused of national narrow-mindedness. If, however, the other Soviet nationalities dare to voice similar views, they are charged with national conceit and "bourgeois nationalism."\textsuperscript{23} Some measure of national hauteur is also manifested by the widespread ignorance concerning the Soviet national republics. This ignorance apparently extends even to non-native teachers in the schools of the national minorities. \textit{Uchitel'skaya Gazeta} revealed in 1956 that Russian-language teachers in the "national schools" "frequently [did] not know the students' native language as they should."\textsuperscript{24}

That national sensibilities are often hurt is indicated by repeated reference to Lenin's admonishment to show great consideration "to the interest of various nations."\textsuperscript{25} Khrushchev's appeal to take into consideration "the national characteristics and aspirations"\textsuperscript{26} of all Soviet peoples and Mukhitdinov's praise of the nationality policy of Lenin—"sensitive and considerate to an unexcelled degree"—are revealing. Lenin is said to have "severely condemned" the slightest manifestation of a "nihilistic, contemptuous, snobbish attitude to national characteristics and sensitivities."\textsuperscript{27} Such contemptuous attitude on the part of Party and state officials must be fairly widespread to deserve public condemnation.

The totalitarian regime freely dispenses praise and blame, criticizing officials and others in the RSFSR as well as in all other republics. Yet a criticism of officials of the Soviet republics of necessity assumes a national character, being mostly criticism by Russians of the failures and shortcomings of frequently non-Russian officials and peo-

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Pravda}, Feb. 21, 1956.
\textsuperscript{23} See \textit{Literaturnaya Gazeta}, Dec. 23, 1957.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Uchitel'skaya Gazeta}, Sept. 12, 1956, pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{25} V. I. Lenin, \textit{Sochineniya} (4th ed.), XXXIII, 349.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Pravda}, Feb. 15, 1956.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Ibid.}, Jan. 31, 1959.
pies. On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaidzhan, Khrushchev in a major speech in Baku in 1960 felt even on this festive day constrained to speak "not only [of] pleasant things" but also of "disagreeable matters" and to point to the "dark sides" of "your republic." "Your republic has been regularly failing to meet the state plans and its socialist pledges for the production and sale of cotton." Azerbaidzhan was in "last place in the country in raw cotton yield. . . . Evidently you do not hold this crop in high esteem." There were also "grave shortcomings" in other fields. But Khrushchev assured his listeners, "I think the criticism contained in my remarks will suffice and that you will take good note of it and draw fitting conclusions." 

On October 28, 1960, Izvestiya severely reprehended the Council of Ministers of the Kirgiz Republic for giving insufficient attention to an earlier warning. "The lesson had done no good," sounded the leading daily's stern verdict.

Contradictory as Lenin's nationality policy was, he had nevertheless shown "enormous attentiveness" to the national minorities and had never, in theory, espoused the doctrine of the primacy of the Russians in the Soviet Union. Though Khrushchev claims to follow Lenin's nationality policy, his is actually a continuation of the policy of Stalin. As under Stalin, the Communist Party, the real source of power in the USSR and arbiter also of Soviet nationality policy, is predominantly Russian in composition. In view of this make-up, Khrushchev's pledge to the national minorities that the Party would always pay "profound attention" to their problems could not have been entirely reassuring to them.

Although the Soviet Communist Party has always included non-Russian members, most Soviet nationalities—with the notable exception at times of Georgians, Armenians, and Jews—have been heavily under-represented. Stalin's designation of the Russian people in

28 Ibid., April 26, 1960.
31 Lenin, XXXIII, 349.
33 Ibid.
1945 as the "guiding force" in the USSR points to the circumstance that the Russian element has continued to dominate the Communist Party, the real powerhouse in the Soviet Union. The non-Russian members of the CPSU are at present not only a minority, but, having been co-opted into the Russian ruling elite, they are the most highly assimilated in their national group, those most devoted to the Russian orientation and "leadership," and among the national cadres those least likely to feel and profess attachment to their national group and to be its genuine representatives and bona fide spokesmen.

"Bourgeois nationalism," the "nationalism" of the minority peoples, is not the only national deviation. Lenin, and also Stalin as late as 1930, warned against the national deviation of "Great Russian chauvinism." Yet the time is long past when, of the two national "deviations," Great Russian chauvinism was officially declared to be the greater menace. It is local "nationalism," "bourgeois nationalism," especially of members of the border nationalities, which has long been labeled the greater peril to the Soviet Union. That the danger of "bourgeois nationalism" has at times been inflated or even invented, in order to accuse real or potential opponents of the ruling group of the crime of separatism and treason, was admitted by Khrushchev in his anti-Stalin speech in 1956 when he referred to the "Mingrelian nationalist organization which supposedly existed in Georgia."

The current use of the designation "national nihilism" rather than "Great Russian chauvinism" is revealing. Both these "deviations" show disdain for the national minorities and their culture and slight their interests and claims. The word "nihilism," however, is likely to be less damaging to Russians than the words "Great Russian chauvinism."

Dangerous as "bourgeois nationalism" is, "national nihilism," the "denial or belittling of national culture, wholesale condemnation of the national past," is also fraught with perils for the Soviet state. "In Lithuania, for instance, some officials of the ideological front, under the guise of criticism of the bourgeoisie, had embarked on the path of condemnation and complete rejection of all of the achieve-

36 Ibid., p. 476.
37 Quoted in Wolfe, p. 196.
ments of the Lithuanian people and the Lithuanian intelligentsia in the years of bourgeois rule.” Such practices, if unchecked, are likely to drive the embittered and frustrated national intelligentsia, the natural leader of its people, into determined opposition.

The “correct” teaching of the history of the Russian people and of the other nationalities in the USSR before and after the October Revolution is a matter of vital and constant concern to the Soviet rulers. To inculcate the right kind of patriotism, that is, loyalty to the USSR in her entirety, the utmost care is taken to stress those elements in the history of the national minorities, especially the border nationalities, which tend to emphasize their close ties with the Russians, their past and present community of interests, and to minimize their differences or hostility. Russian national pride is always encouraged. But national pride of the border nationalities in their own past is permitted only if and as long as it contributes to the strengthening of the multinational USSR. If it threatens to weaken the Soviet Union, it is denounced as nationalism, specifically as bourgeois nationalism.

“The struggle against bourgeois ideology,” writes a contributor to Voprosy istorii, “has been and continues to be the foremost task of our historians.” While this historical journal denounces “the utter untenability of any sort of . . . Eurocentric . . . chauvinist or nationalist theory,” the teaching of history in the USSR is definitely and deliberately focused on the Russian people. Its purpose is to develop Soviet patriotism, the “love of the motherland.”

The native historians of the border nationalities are repeatedly accused of idealizing the historic past. “In certain of our [Armenian] writers and artists,” wrote Literaturnaya Gazeta in 1957, “a tendency to idealize the past,” to indulge, for instance, in a “kind of cult of ancient architectural monuments,” to romanticize “ancient Armenian towns” had become evident. Mukhitdinov held that “here and there we see signs of national narrow-mindedness in literature, arts, and historiography.” In his opinion, those selected as national heroes of the past were frequently not correctly chosen, and besides, the recent period was neglected, if not entirely ignored.

Seldom, and then in a rather circuitous way, have influential writ­ers such as the historian Pankratova critically pointed to Great Rus­sian nationalism and chauvinism—and this only after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, in a period marked by relatively great bold­ness. Pankratova held that Russian textbooks and scholarly works on the history of individual peoples “neglect [the fact] that tsarism brought the peoples cruel oppression and held back their political, economic, and cultural development. It is common knowledge that Lenin called tsarist Russia a ‘prison-house of peoples.’ Only the Oc­tober Revolution destroyed this prison.” “It would be a grave mis­take to whitewash tsarism and to justify its colonial policy in the outlying areas of the Russian Empire, which were inhabited pre­dominantly by non-Russian peoples. Regardless of whether they were conquered or joined Russia voluntarily, all non-Russian peoples were subject to arbitrary rule, the lawlessness and excesses of Russian gen­erals and officials in the national regions annexed by Russia.” It is necessary, Pankratova went on, “to have a regard for progressive events in the history of large and small peoples and to continue the struggle on two fronts—against great power chauvinism and local na­tionalism, for these are two sides of the same coin.” Yet this ad­monition to steer away both from “great power chauvinism and local nationalism,” to avoid the pitfalls of both and to consider them equal “dangers,” has, on the whole, not been heeded, either during Sta­lin’s later years or since his death. Great Russian nationalism, long respectable, has become identical with Soviet patriotism, while the “nationalism” of the border nationalities is looked upon suspiciously.

In spite of the cultural strait jacket imposed on all nationalities, the Soviet nationality policy encouraged at least the linguistic de­velopment of the various peoples in the USSR. At the Twentieth Party Congress Khrushchev made it clear that Stalin’s nationality policy in the cultural-linguistic areas would be continued: “Far from erasing national differences and peculiarities, socialism, on the con­trary, assures the all-around development and flourishing of the . . . culture of all nations and peoples.” Pravda, commenting on the reso­lutions adopted by the Twentieth Party Congress, reiterated that so­cialism “does not eliminate national differences and characteristics,”

but, on the contrary, it ensures the "flowering" of the economies and cultures of all nations and nationalities.43

While national culture, in accordance with and within the narrow limits of the Party program, "national in form, socialist in content," has generally flourished, natural assimilation of individuals of the national minorities has by no means been discouraged, but often rather helped along. The growing adoption of the Russian language throughout the USSR, the cultural and technological superiority of the Russians and the relative backwardness of many of the other nationalities of the Soviet Union, coupled with the rewards held out to those among the native intelligentsia willing to accept and support Russian pre-eminence, have increased the assimilation of the non-Russian nationalities on the group as well as the individual level. This assimilation has been fostered in the USSR.

Yet while the non-Russian peoples are encouraged to follow the ways, and even adopt the language and culture, of the Russian nationality, the Russians themselves are warned not to relinquish or dilute their own national individuality. Assimilation in the USSR is clearly a one-sided process. In view of the continually proclaimed leadership of the Russian ethnic element in the economic, cultural, and scientific fields, assimilation of the Russians to less developed

43 Ibid., Feb. 15 and 25, 1956. An exception, however, are the Jews. Deeply rooted anti-Semitism in Russia in the nineteenth century had affected even revolutionary circles, though not Lenin. Suppressed and outlawed after the October Revolution, anti-Semitism, first surreptitiously and then openly encouraged, returned gradually with the rise of nationalism under Stalin. At the time of the purges, a *numerus clausus* sharply reduced the number of Jews in the Party, the government, and the diplomatic service and limited their admission to higher educational institutions. In 1948, after the establishment of Israel (to the creation of which the Soviet Union had contributed through support in the United Nations), Stalin became increasingly suspicious of the loyalty of the Jewish ethnic element and drove toward the total destruction of the Jews as a distinct cultural, ethnic, and religious group. Jewish cultural institutions were closed and abolished, Yiddish writers terrorized, and many of them shot; by the end of 1948 only a few synagogues were left open in the entire USSR. The death of Stalin removed possibly worse dangers to the Soviet Jews. But the main lines of Stalin's policy of ethnic-cultural genocide of the Jewish people have been well upheld since. In his anti-Stalin speech in 1956, Khrushchev, listing the injustices committed by Stalin against a number of Soviet peoples, significantly omitted the Jews. The Soviet Jews are still destined to "cultural extinction." See E. Goldhagen, "Communism and Anti-Semitism," *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1960, p. 43; and S. M. Schwarz, *The Jews in The Soviet Union* (New York, 1951).
nationalities would be only a retrogression. Still it is feared and opposed.

Sovetskaya Rossiya, for instance, discussing a meeting of the Russian Republic Composers’ Organization, stressed its “multinational” character; the “dynamic flourishing of professional musical composition today is striking to anyone who becomes more closely familiar with the beautiful national music of the Tatar, Chuvash, Bashkir, and other autonomous republics.” Then follows a serious warning: “Russian composers must not forget, however, about the danger of a broadening concept of the national element in the Russian music wherein the national element begins to be diluted. A tendency to obscure the deep roots of Russian folk music and the whole original complex of the living traditions of Russian music is noticeable among some of our composers. Such cosmopolitan tendencies among a small part of our young composers are especially alarming.” Russians are warned against succumbing either to alien influences originating in the bourgeois West or to cultural influences emanating from their own “younger brothers” in the USSR.

The contradiction between permitting the development of national culture and prohibiting “nationalism” as well as other incongruities of Communist nationality policy had baffled Lenin’s contemporaries and have continued to puzzle many Communists during the Stalinist era. According to Khrushchev in 1956 “some comrades” were still “confused” in their interpretation of the nationalities question, especially about the relationship between “Soviet patriotism and internationalism.” Some comrades, “unfortunately,” believed that “love of one’s motherland contradicted international solidarity of the working people and socialist internationalism.” Socialist internationalism made Soviet patriotism not obsolete and superfluous, as some apparently held, but rather a basic premise and requirement. Coupling patriotism with socialist “internationalism” corresponds, of course, to several interests of the Soviet Union, which must find a way of reconciling not only Russian nationalism with the continued existence and flourishing culture of other Soviet nationalities, but also love of the USSR in her entirety with help to “internationalism.”

44 Sovetskaya Rossiya, April 2, 1960, p. 3.
45 See Low, p. 127.
46 Pravda, Feb. 15, 1956.
All this is part of Stalin's legacy in the nationality field, and there has been no significant re-evaluation of the meaning of concepts like "patriotism," "internationalism," "nationalism," and "cosmopolitanism" since Stalin's death. Patriotism is to inculcate devotion and loyalty on the part of all nationalities to the Soviet state, and internationalism, by prohibiting and suppressing internal national differences within the Soviet multinational state and stressing the common objectives of all socialist states in the orbit of the USSR, forms the intellectual and propagandistic basis for the further expansion of "socialism" in the world. "Nationalism," allegedly shaped by the ideology of the former ruling bourgeoisie, is said to put forth merely selfish policies which are detrimental to the USSR as a whole as well as to the masses of the people of the border republics.

Cosmopolitanism, different from the noble connotations of the word in the English and many other languages, is defined as a movement having no roots anywhere, knowing no devotion to country—the USSR—and no conception of the debt owed to the motherland nor, of course, to the government. The cosmopolitan, attached to Western culture, is still accused, as he was under Stalin, of underestimating the true value of Russian civilization. Moreover, cosmopolitanism, it is held, merely fosters an excessively critical individualism. In conclusion, patriotism and internationalism are held to strengthen the multinational Soviet state, while cosmopolitanism and nationalism are believed to weaken and destroy it.

Soviet spokesmen vacillate between denials of the survival of "bourgeois nationalism" to any significant degree—prompted by the desire to demonstrate the progress already made—and by frequent reference to it, especially in a moment of crisis—to explain the difficulties encountered, and to find a whipping boy. That a spirit of national opposition is alive, whatever its goals, is testified to by the Party's and government's frequent appeals to rear the working people "in a spirit of implacability toward survivals of bourgeois nationalism, toward the resurgence of backward reactionary views and their artificial propagation under the guise of 'national traditions.'"47 Mukhitdinov, though claiming that it had been a "long time" since any "large-scale survivals of nationalism have existed in our country," warned

that the struggle against survivals of the past, "especially of a nationalist character," must be "constant and unflagging."48

Opposition to Moscow centralism may range from the desire and preparation for secession to dissatisfaction with the progress made and to mere lack of gratitude and appreciation for the concern, hard work, and accomplishments of the government and Party. While the Soviet leaders extol the great strides made by the national republics and the benefits bestowed upon them during the Soviet rule, the peoples of the republics, especially the youth, appear to have taken the economic growth for granted, without feeling especially indebted to the Party or the Russians for this development. Mikoyan, while in Turkmenistan, tried to impress upon his audience that the achievements in their national republic were "the fruits of Lenin's nationality policy."49 The border nationalities, however, seem to attribute economic betterment, such as has occurred, to their own hard work rather than to the paternalistic policy of the Russians. Bulganin's complaint in Tadzhikistan is rather revealing: "But the young people who did not know the former conditions, the former Tadzhikistan, are not, it seems, always aware of what has taken place and how significant the changes are."50

Though, according to Pravda, leading local Communists of Estonia held that her rapid economic development dated only from the time "she became part of the USSR," they did not wish to "conceal the fact that we still find backward people among the population of our republic as well as individual instances of nationalist-minded persons who sometimes believe the hostile propaganda against what is dearest to us, the friendship of peoples."51 But it is not only in the border regions acquired more recently, either before or after the Second World War, that dissatisfaction and receptivity to "hostile" criticism seem widespread and "backwardness" not yet overcome. In Armenia, for instance, according to Literaturnaya Gazeta, some "individual writers" had misunderstood the nature of Party criticism of the cult of the individual and had "sweepingly denied the positive role of I. V. Stalin and of everything that was done under Stalin." When criticism unleashed by Khrushchev reached the border repub-

50 Ibid., Dec. 16, 1956.
51 Ibid., Feb. 4, 1959.
lies, it gained menacing momentum, especially after the havoc produced in Hungary and Poland. Not only Stalin but the Soviet nationality policy itself was then questioned. Some Armenian writers were "guilty of attack on the Leninist national policy of the Communist Party" and showed it in a distorting mirror. That the nationality policy was correct could of course never be doubted. "Our party's nationality policy," asserted Snieckus at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, "is consistent and correct"; it was only "some workers" who made "mistakes and distorted national policy." By maintaining that only individuals might err or fail—bureaucrats, national deviationists, and the like—but never the Party, the custodian of a "correct" nationality policy, the ruling group leaves open a safety valve to divert national embitterment and prevent an explosion.

Khrushchev took note of the economic grievances of the Soviet republics and the border nationalities when, addressing the Twentieth Party Congress, he referred to "occasional criticism" of Soviet nationality policy, as manifested, for instance, in the striking income differential of collective farms and farmers in the various republics. Since he prescribed no remedy—but merely suggested that in future the economic committee of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet act as an "inter-nation, inter-republic agency" to study "more carefully" the economy of each republic and that any measures pertaining to the encouragement of production be carried out "with the knowledge and approval of all Union republics"—it may be assumed that grievances based upon unequal compensation in the republics are still current.

Khrushchev also took note of the criticism that the "distribution of budget funds" among the Union republics was unfair. Basically, he replied, these funds were distributed "correctly," but serious thought ought to be given to "enhancing" the role of the republics in this matter also. "Some comrades complain that there is still a lack of due order in the distribution of funds for public education, health services, housing and cultural service constructions, municipal improvement, etc. As a result we sometimes have utterly inexplicable discrepancies in the proportion of these allocations for certain re-

54 Pravda, Feb. 15, 1956.
Any unjust distribution of funds "violates the basis of fair relations—equal conditions for all." As correction, Khrushchev asked for "a general principle of distributing budgetary funds, a principle applying to all," "completely objective indexes"—admittedly, then, nonexistent at the time! It is of interest to note that such criticism as he reports was ostensibly directed not at the Russians, was based not on invidious comparison of progress between any given national republic and the RSFSR but rather on a comparison of the economic growth of, and benefits derived by, "neighboring republics."

Khrushchev's promise in 1956 of an "even development of the economy and culture of each nation of the country" and the assurance given to the Twenty-First Party Congress that the Seven-Year Plan guaranteed "the evenly planned advance of all the country's socialist nations toward communism" were apparently designed to counter the foregoing criticisms.

Official criticism at the Twenty-First Party Congress of a "tendency to autarky, i.e., the creation of a self-contained economy in the republics," as "harmful and dangerous" to the country as a whole as well as for each nationality, is indicative of the Party's over-all economic policy and its definite subordination of the republics' demands to its own centralist policies. "Individual officials" who had tried to strengthen the economic establishment of their respective republics and nationalities were accused of failing to understand the importance of all-Union economic needs and working, "under the pretense of desiring the comprehensive development of the economy," toward a goal where "everything will be 'their own,' that is, local."

Autarky of the Soviet republics was not the aim when, at the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev presented his plan for decentralization and for extending the powers of the Union republics, in order to solve certain difficulties in production and administration. Khrushchev left no doubt as to the continued importance and "necessity" of the "central planning principle." While thus keeping an economic and political strait jacket on the individual republics, Khrushchev proclaimed that this policy would further strengthen "the sovereignty of each republic and the mutual trust among re-

55 Ibid., Feb. 21, 1956.
publics” and boldly announced that “petty tutelage of the Union republics is impermissible.”

The Seven-Year Plan, adopted in 1959, promised a more effective utilization of the resources of all national republics and an especially high rate of development of the productive forces in the eastern regions of the USSR. While strategic-geographic and economic considerations may have been the primary motivation behind the latter decision, its effect upon Soviet nationality policy will obviously be far-reaching.

The planned further industrialization and greater agricultural specialization of the Soviet republics are likely to increase their mutual economic interdependence, especially with the RSFSR, and also to reduce the industrial gap between the center and many still heavily agricultural border regions. Implementation of the plan, of necessity requiring trained manpower, will mean further colonization of the border republics by Russians (and Ukrainians)—who are already credited by Mukhitdinov with having been “enormously instrumental in raising the economic and cultural levels of all the eastern republics”—and will thus continue to change the ethnic composition of the national republics, in some cases reducing the former majority nationality to a minority. However opposed the “sovereign” nationalities of the border republics may be to a shrinking role in their “own” state, yet with diverse interests among themselves and isolated as they are vis-à-vis the Russian nationality, they count for little against the interests of the entire USSR as interpreted by the ruling group and embodied in the plan.

It was disclosed in 1960 that the number of people of Kirgiz nationality had substantially declined in the Kirgiz Republic in consequence of immigration from other republics, “particularly during the Patriotic War and the postwar period in connection with the relocation of a number of industrial enterprises and also the start of new construction.” Thus the percentage of Kirgiz in the total population had decreased from 52 in 1939 to 41 in 1959. Similarly in 1956, O. V. Kuusinen had revealed that the national composition of the Karelo-Finnish Republic had changed in the past sixteen years, with the Karelians, Finns, and Vepses constituting “only one fourth

57 Ibid., Feb. 15, 1956.
of the total population of the Republic, while other nationalities, primarily Russian, comprise three fourths."60 This radical change in the ethnic make-up of the Republic was given as the reason for lowering her status; "at her own request," she was transformed into the "Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic,"61 a transformation which can hardly have been reassuring to her sister republics.

The even harsher fate which befell some Soviet nationalities during the Second World War—the mass deportation in 1943 and 1944 of the Karachai, the Kalmyks, the Chechen-Ingush, and the Balkars, including even "all Communists and Komsomols without any exception"—Khrushchev denounced in 1956 as "monstrous acts" of Stalin. The Ukrainians, according to Khrushchev, escaped the same fate "only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them." No Marxist-Leninist nor any man of common sense, concluded Khrushchev, could "grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, and old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons."62 While denouncing Stalin, Khrushchev remained, however, ominously silent on the deportation of the Tatars of the Crimean Republic and the Volga Germans, apparently holding this dispersion to be justified. At the Twenty-First Party Congress it was revealed that the national autonomy of the Chechen, Ingush, Kalmyk, Balkar, and Karachai ethnic units had been restored.63

Concluding his reports to the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev promised to continue to combat "all manifestations of bourgeois ideology, including nationalism."64 On another occasion he admitted that, as far as relations of "our peoples" were concerned, there were "still many shortcomings" to overcome and warned that "we must not grow complacent."65 If, after more than four decades of Soviet

60 Pravda, July 17, 1956.
61 Ibid., July 15, 1956.
62 Quoted in Wolfe, pp. 190, 192.
63 In the summer of 1960 the Council of the Ministers of the USSR and the Party Central Committee sent a congratulatory telegram to the Chechen-Ingush cabinet and their Supreme Soviet praising the "unbreakable friendship of the peoples of the USSR." Pravda, June 5, 1960.
64 Ibid., Feb. 15, 1956.
rule, "nationalism," like other remnants of capitalism and "bourgeois ideology," is still a factor to be reckoned with in the USSR, the vaunted solidity of the Soviet multinational state appears to rest more on military power than on the mutual confidence of the Soviet peoples, trust in their "elder brother," the Russian nationality, or on their genuine equality, happiness, and loyalty to the USSR.

That the Soviet record contains a solid core of accomplishment is not to be denied. Among the national minorities there has been economic development, and the standard of living has been raised. In the cultural field the development of many languages has been encouraged—with the notable exception of Yiddish—and despite growing support to Russian also. Finally, increasing equality of opportunity for the individuals of national minorities has been provided.

Yet the USSR, all slogans to the contrary, was not established on the basis of genuine national self-determination but by superior military force of the Russian core led by the Russian-dominated Communist Party. Force, which has helped to create the multinational Soviet state, continues to hold it together and frequently bares its ugly features. On the debit side must be listed numerous arbitrary and revolting decisions—tied to the very system of totalitarianism—such as depriving some of the nationalities of their autonomous status (the very means of their continued national existence), the brutal dispersion of some Soviet peoples, in the case of the Jews discriminatory suppression of their cultural institutions and toleration of thinly veiled anti-Semitic agitation, and the imposition on all nationalities of Russian and Soviet forms of political, social, economic, and cultural organizations in such manner as to choke their national culture. Most heavily weighs the denial of what Lenin himself, in theory at least, considered the very essence of national equality—national self-determination, including the right to secession.

Youngstown University
The Ukrainian SSR in International Affairs after World War II*

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

In this article I propose to sketch how Ukrainian participation in international affairs was decided upon and examine the possible reasons. The implications of this development in the field of international law will not be dealt with here, nor will its possible impact upon Ukrainian national feeling in the Soviet Ukraine (the latter subject will be treated elsewhere).

The invitation of the Ukraine to the San Francisco Conference on International Organization, which was tendered by the Executive Committee of the Conference on April 30, 1945, following a unanimous decision of forty-seven nations, may have surprised many a student of international affairs. For had not the Ukrainian SSR in 1923, upon "joining" the Soviet Union, relinquished her right to foreign representation and thus left the community of formally and actually sovereign states? The evidence that has been made public does not permit us to draw a complete picture of the negotiations which preceded the event, but it suffices for a brief sketch.

Late in 1943 the Soviet government requested that the "Ukraine, Bielo-Livonian [Belorussian?—Y. B.], Moldavian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, and Karelo-Finnish Republics" be represented on the United Nations War Crimes Commission, "contending that these

* This study is part of a larger work on "Ukrainian Nationalism and Soviet Nationality Policy after World War II." The writer gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Penfield Traveling Scholarship Fund of the University of Pennsylvania (for the original draft) and the Rutgers Research Council (for the final revision). Professor Rupert Emerson, of Harvard University, critically read the first draft.

1 United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco), Documents, No. 30 (DC/5 [1]; April 27), p. 10 ff., and No. 42 (P/10; April 30). See also Vsevolod Holub (Holubnychy), Ukrayina v Obyednanykh Natsiyakh (Munich, 1953), pp. 29 ff.

2 On the international relations of the Ukraine from 1917 to 1923 see Roman Yakemitchouk, L'Ukraine en droit international (Louvain: Centre Ukrainien d'Études en Belgique, 1954), and John S. Reshetar, Jr., Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920 (Princeton, 1952).
entities were no less sovereign than the British Dominions and that their war sufferings gave them a moral right to representation.” This request was rejected by the other Allies—Great Britain and the United States. Two months later, February 1, 1944, after listening to a report by Molotov, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a law enabling the Soviet republics to enter into direct relations with foreign powers.

It was during the Conference at Dumbarton Oaks that Soviet Ambassador Gromyko suddenly raised the question of admitting all of the sixteen republics to membership in the United Nations (August 28, 1944). Great Britain and the United States showed “an attitude of reserve toward this proposal and anticipation of great difficulty from it,” and on August 31 President Roosevelt remonstrated to Stalin in a telegram. Stalin replied on September 7. What appears to be a part of his telegram has been quoted by Sherwood. It throws some light on the possible motives behind Gromyko’s suggestion:

You, of course, know that the Ukraine and Belorussia, which are constituent parts of the Soviet Union, are greater in population and in political importance than certain other countries which we all agree should belong to the number of initiators of the establishment of International Organization. Therefore, I hope to have an opportunity to explain to you the political importance of this question which has been brought up by the Soviet delegation at Dumbarton Oaks.

But, on the whole, the question seems to have been of minor importance so far as the Soviet Union was concerned; after August 28 it was brought up at Dumbarton Oaks only twice. On January 11, 1945,

---

3 Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939–1945*, Department of State Publication 3580 (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 318 n., referring to a British aide-mémoire of December 30, 1943. The first quotation is apparently taken from the memorandum; the second is a paraphrase by the American author.

4 See “The Conversion of the People’s Commissariats of Defense and Foreign Affairs from All-Union into Union-Republic Commissariats: A Report by Comrade V. M. Molotov in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Feb. 1, 1944,” and “Law on Granting Powers to the Union Republics in the Realm of Foreign Relations and on the Conversion, in This Connection, of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs from an All-Union to a Union-Republic Commissariat,” in *Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza v period Otechestvennoi Voiny* (Moscow, 1946), II, 66 ff.


6 Notter, p. 317.


8 On August 29 Gromyko indicated that his government would probably raise the
while reviewing the documents of the Conference Gromyko urged Leo Pasvolsky of the United States Department of State to give further thought to the admission of all sixteen republics. But sometime in January Soviet leaders abandoned their insistence on the admission of all constituent republics.

It was at the fourth plenary meeting of the Yalta Conference, February 7, 1945, that Molotov formally requested the inclusion of at least two, or perhaps three, but not all sixteen Soviet republics in the membership of the United Nations. The three named were the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Lithuanian Republics. The proceedings of the Yalta Conference that have been published by the Department of State do not reveal why the United States finally acquiesced in the admission of the two republics. One may surmise, however, that it was Churchill's support of Molotov's proposal that more than anything else helped to change the American attitude. With the backing of the Big Three, the Ukrainian SSR (as well as Belorussia) had no difficulty in being admitted to the United Nations.

subject again on another occasion; he mentioned it again, without discussing it, on September 27. Notter, pp. 318, 327.


10 US Malta and Yalta Papers, pp. 712 (Bohlen), 721 (Hiss).

11 On October 3, 1944, President Roosevelt had called Gromyko's proposal "absurd." See Notter, p. 333. See also the "Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State (Stetinius)," of November 15, 1944, in US Malta and Yalta Papers, pp. 48-49. For President Roosevelt's attempt to evade the issue at Yalta, see ibid., pp. 712 ff. and 722 ff.

12 The main reason why Churchill supported Molotov appears to have been British reluctance to be the only country with a multiple representation. In his speech Molotov had adroitly harped on old American fears of being outvoted by the British Empire. See W. S. Churchill, The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, 1953), pp. 357 ff.

13 A side aspect of the story which illuminates the nature of American politics is worth recounting here. Anticipating difficulties with "Congress and the American people" that might have arisen from granting the USSR three votes, President Roosevelt asked Churchill and Stalin for their support in case the United States would have to request two additional votes (February 10, 1945). Churchill and Stalin immediately agreed to do so. US Malta and Yalta Papers, pp. 966 ff. On March 29 the secret agreements on (a) admitting the two Soviet republics to the UN and (b) eventually giving the US two additional votes for the sake of parity with the USSR were leaked to the New York Herald Tribune. The American public, thereupon, seems to have become indignant not at the admission of Belorussia
Since attending the San Francisco Conference, the Ukrainian SSR has actively participated in a number of UN organs and agencies, with the conspicuous exception of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. In November 1947 she was even elected to the Security Council, albeit on the twelfth ballot, after the rival candidate, India, had withdrawn. Among the major actions of the Soviet Ukrainian delegation to the UN have been its appeals to the Security Council on behalf of the Nationalist Government of Indonesia and of the Greek Communist rebels, and Manuilsky's orations in the General Assembly on disarmament. A scanning of the accounts in the Soviet Ukrainian press (mainly Radyans'ka Ukrayina, Kiev) from 1946 to 1960 leaves the impression that the activity of the Ukrainian delegation to the UN does not differ in any significant way from that of the delegation of the USSR.

Outside of the United Nations, the Ukrainian SSR has been represented at a few postwar diplomatic conferences and has been a party and the Ukraine, but at the possibility of the US asking for more votes. Sherwood, pp. 876-77.

14 Including the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Control Commissions of the UN General Assembly (1948-49); The Economic and Social Council (1946) and the following of its commissions: Economic Commission for Europe (1946), Human Rights (1948- ), Statistical (1948- ), Population (1948- ); the ILO (1954- ), UNESCO (1954- ); furthermore, the Universal Postal Union (1947- ), the World Meteorological Union (1950- ), the World Health Organization (1946- ). In 1957 the Ukrainian SSR became a charter member of the International Atomic Energy Agency. United Nations Yearbook, 1946-47 through 1959. See also below for the Security Council and UNRRA.

15 See the “Appeal” of January 21, 1946 (in Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1946 g. [Moscow, 1952], p. 551); and the accounts of D. Z. Manuilsky’s activities July 1, 1948 (in Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1948 g. [Moscow, 1951], I, 301-4), and December 3, 1949 (in Vneshnyaya politika Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1949 g. [Moscow, 1953], pp. 621-26).

16 See the telegram of Manuilsky to the Secretary-General of the UN, Trygve Lie, August 26, 1946 (in Vneshnyaya politika . . . 1946, pp. 601-2), and Manuilsky’s speeches at the Security Council September 4, 1946 (ibid., pp. 605-14), and November 10, 1946 (ibid., pp. 614-23).

17 See for example, his speech at the Plenary Session of the UN General Assembly September 29, 1948 (in Vneshnyaya politika . . . 1948, II, 225-30).

18 For a differing conclusion see Holub (p. 57), who found that “quantitatively and qualitatively, elements stressing the nationality question predominate in the political speeches and actions of the representatives of the Ukrainian SSR.” This question can be settled only by a more elaborate content analysis than the present writer has yet had the time to undertake.
to a number of bilateral and multilateral conventions.\textsuperscript{20} She has, for example, participated in the making of peace treaties with Italy and the former allies of the Axis powers (Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland), and she has been guaranteed a seat at the eventual peace conference with Germany.\textsuperscript{21} On the other hand, she is not a party to the peace treaty with Austria, nor has she been invited to participate in a number of conventions that affect her interests directly and vitally (the treaties that were to legalize the incorporation of the formerly Polish and Czech provinces into the Ukrainian SSR and settle related matters).\textsuperscript{22} The incorporation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, on the other hand, was legalized in the peace treaty with Rumania, and Hungary renounced her claims to the Subcarpathian Ukraine in the sister treaty,\textsuperscript{23} both of which agreements were signed by the Ukrainian SSR.

The membership of the Ukrainian SSR in the United Nations Re-

\textsuperscript{20} In chronological order, as follows: (a) A bilateral treaty with the Soviet-sponsored Polish Provisional Government, of September 9, 1944. The agreement provided for the evacuation of Ukrainian population from the territory of Poland and of Polish citizens from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. See \textit{Ukrayins'ka RSR v mizhinarodnykh vidnosynakh}, ed. L. Kh. Palamarchuk (Kiev, 1959), pp. 193 ff. This source (a publication of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, Division of Political Science and Law) cites all agreements that the Ukrainian SSR concluded or acceded to, from 1945 to 1957. (b) The series of peace treaties signed in Paris, February 10, 1947, with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. See \textit{ibid.}, pp. 58 ff.; or \textit{UN Treaty Series}, Nos. 1:747 (Vol. 49, pp. 3 ff.), 1:645 (42:3), 1:644

\textsuperscript{21} Holub, pp. 73 ff.

\textsuperscript{22} The most important is the Polono-Soviet Treaty, signed in Moscow July 16, 1945, in which Poland ceded her eastern provinces to the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSRs. The text of the treaty is in the \textit{UN Treaty Series}, No. 1:61 (vol. 10, pp. 193 ff.); its ratification was announced in \textit{Vneshnyaya politika . . . 1946 g.}, p. 85. The precise course of the frontier was not settled until May 22, 1951, when the USSR and Poland signed a new treaty in Warsaw. In this treaty Poland ceded to the USSR a strip of territory near the river Bug, through which a Soviet railway line passed, in exchange for a strip of Ukrainian territory west of Drohobych. Populations were exchanged. The Ukrainian government, however, was not a party to this agreement (see \textit{New York Times}, May 23, 1951, and Holub, p. 71.) Nor was the Ukrainian SSR made a party to the three treaties on the regime of the Polono-Soviet frontier, all of which were directed against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The first was a secret accord of May 1947 between the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia (see \textit{New York Times}, May 13, 1947, p. 3). The texts of the two Polono-Soviet agreements of July 8, 1948, are under Nos. 575-76 in \textit{UN Treaty Series}, Vol. 37, pp. 25 ff. See also Holub, p. 70.

\textsuperscript{23} See Article I of both treaties.
lief and Rehabilitation Administration deserves separate mention, for it was as a recipient of UNRRA aid that the Republic had the most extensive relations with Western representatives since the early 1920s. (After the East-West split these relations were ended in August 1947.) Together with the Belorussian Republic, the Ukrainian SSR was admitted to membership in the UNRRA Council at its third session in August 1945, and on December 18, 1945, Mr. Herbert L. Lehman, Director General of UNRRA, and Mr. Anatoli M. Baranovsky, Member of the UNRRA Council for the Ukrainian SSR, signed an agreement stipulating the amount of aid and the conditions on which the Ukrainian SSR was to receive it. One of the conditions was that UNRRA inspectors would be free to travel all over the country and make contacts with Ukrainian citizens through their own interpreters, if necessary, to supervise the proper distribution of UNRRA supplies. According to two independent sources, this agreement was kept to the letter. At first, it is true, members of the UNRRA staff in Kiev were not allowed to make social contacts with the population, but later the regime let them see anyone they wished, provided they were accompanied by a "guardian angel" from the NKVD. As far as their official task was concerned, the UNRRA mission in Kiev found the Ukrainian government most cooperative in the efficient and proper distribution of UNRRA shipments, which totaled about 188 million dollars. There was one fly in the ointment: the UNRRA mission experienced difficulty in publicizing its work through the

24 The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Organization (New York, 1950), I, 4; and II, 233 (hereafter cited as History of UNRRA). The experiences of the UNRRA missions to the Ukraine and Belorussia are sketched in II, 231-56.

25 For the text of the agreement and explanatory letters see ibid., III, 332-37; also Ukrains'ka RSR, pp. 245 ff. In Art. I(a), UNRRA agreed to supply to the Ukr. SSR before July 1946 goods and services valued at $189 million.

26 To be inferred from Article V(a) of the agreement. See also John Fischer, Why They Behave Like Russians (New York, 1946), pp. 24-25. For a time Mr. Fischer was a member of the UNRRA mission to the Ukraine.


28 See the incident reported by Fischer, pp. 157-58.

29 The total of UNRRA supply deliveries to the Ukraine was $188,199,300 (History of UNRRA, II, 250). An interesting detailed breakdown according to major categories (but excluding $2.4 million worth of medical and sanitation supplies) will be found ibid., III, 490-93. On co-operation, see ibid., II, 231-56; Fischer, esp. Ch. 4 ("The Soviet Priesthood"), pp. 62-89; Marshall MacDuffie, The Red Carpet (New York, 1953). MacDuffie, chief of the UNRRA mission in Kiev in 1946, revisited the Soviet Union in 1953.
Soviet press. In 1947 UNRRA funds ran out, and the mission had to leave the country in August 1947. Before long Kiev was barred to foreigners—the hopeful start of direct contacts between the Soviet Ukraine and the West was thus brought to an abrupt halt—and was reopened only in 1953.

In view of the membership of the Ukraine in the UN and of the political and economic importance of the country, and perhaps also as a result of the encouraging experience of the UNRRA mission, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Ukraine has been considered twice in Anglo-American official circles. In August 1947 the British chargé d'affaires in Moscow “requested the Soviet government to transmit to the Government of the Ukraine a proposal that [the United Kingdom] and the Ukraine should exchange diplomatic representatives.” Neither this note nor a personal visit of the chargé d'affaires to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs proved of any avail—the Soviet government refused to allow the Ukraine direct diplomatic representation.

In 1952 Senator H. Alexander Smith, of New Jersey, and Representative Lawrence H. Smith, of Wisconsin, raised the question of the United States offering to establish diplomatic relations with both the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Republics. This time it was the

30 Fischer, pp. 53-54.
31 See the reply by Minister of State Younger to a written question by Major Beamish, M.P., in the House of Commons. The words are Younger’s. Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 5th Series, Vol. 472; House of Commons, Session 1950, March 1-24, written question No. 28.
32 US Congress (83rd Congress: 1st Session), House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Favoring Extension of Diplomatic Relations with the Republics of Ukraine and Byelorussia (Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on H. Con. Res. 58, July 15, 1953), pp. 77-78. Henceforth abbreviated as Hearing on House Concurrent Resolution 58.

Possibly as a consequence of the British diplomat’s visit to Kiev, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on December 16, 1947, passed a decree forbidding Soviet officials and agencies to have any contacts with foreigners, except through the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the summer of 1953, however, A. Barnovsky, then Ukrainian Foreign Minister, requested the UN Secretariat to address any communication to the Soviet Ukrainian government not to Moscow, as had been the practice before, but directly to Kiev. See Holub’s article on the competence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ukr. SSR in Vpered (Munich), December 1955, pp. 5-6; and S. S. Studenikin et al., Sovetskoe administrativnoe pravo (Moscow, 1950), p. 253.
33 “Certain preliminary inquiries” were made by Senator Smith in June 1952. See Hearing on H. Con. Res. 58, pp. 76 ff.
State Department that opposed such a move.\textsuperscript{34} While hearings on Representative Smith's resolution in favor of establishing relations were held in July 1953, it was never reported out of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In all justice, it must be said that the purpose of the move was unmistakably to embarrass the Soviet government by giving moral support to Ukrainian and Belorussian aspirations for independence and by exposing the "sovereignty" of those two republics for what it was worth.\textsuperscript{35} Most probably such an offer would have been rejected by the government of the USSR, if not by those of the Soviet Ukraine and Belorussia themselves.

Limited though the activities of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs may be (the Soviet Ukraine has, of course, no diplomats accredited abroad, and it was not until 1959 that the Ukrainian delegation to the UN established permanent mission headquarters in New York), the Ministry does exist. John Fischer tells us that, when the UNRRA mission arrived in Kiev in 1946, "the welcoming delegation included an assistant minister from the fledgling Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, resplendent in a tight-waisted gray uniform with silver shoulder boards and a gray lamb hat. He greeted us, somewhat euphemistically, as the 'first foreign ambassadors to the Ukraine.'"\textsuperscript{36} Besides the few formalities it performs when the Ukraine becomes a party to a convention, the purpose of the Foreign Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR seems to be primarily to provide personnel for the

\textsuperscript{34} Two letters from the Department giving the reasons for its opposition will be found \textit{ibid.} They are dated June 26, 1952, and March 13, 1953. The State Department gave four main reasons for their attitude: (a) the propaganda effects of U.S. diplomatic recognition could be negated by Soviet censorship and/or the two Republics rejecting the offer themselves; (b) the latter would reinforce the myth of their sovereignty; (c) establishment of additional U.S. missions in the USSR would be expensive; and (d) establishment of additional Soviet missions in the U.S. would arouse public hostility.

\textsuperscript{35} The resolution includes references to the "sovereignty of the Ukrainians and Byelorussians, which is in harmony with the ideas expressed in the Declaration of Independence of the United States" and the American "policy of liberation." \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 1 ff.

\textsuperscript{36} Fischer, p. 121.

MacDuffie mentions one other very rare facet of the Ministry's work. Leaving the country in 1946, he requested that the exit visa be issued by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, not by Moscow. After a long delay his request was granted. The visa he received bore the number 100,001, though he was positive that he had been the first person to have made such a request (p. 145).
Ukrainian delegation to the UN and its agencies and, secondly, to greet foreign dignitaries arriving in Kiev.\textsuperscript{37}

Mr. Fischer's impression of 1946 should be supplemented by that of a more recent visitor, Professor Aspaturian, who traveled in the Soviet Union in July 1958. He writes that "the principal function of the Republican Ministry is ceremonial, ornamental, and symbolic." It has no geographical area desks but possesses such functional divisions as "Political Affairs" (UN representation?), a Protocol and Consular Department, a Press Department, and possibly an Economic and/or Legal Department.\textsuperscript{38}

The question why a particular state has made a certain move under particular circumstances can seldom be answered without recourse to hypotheses. Several assumptions have been made to explain why Stalin granted a modicum of international representation to the Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics—which required amendment to the Soviet constitution. In February 1944 unidentified British diplomats who were queried by James Reston of \textit{The New York Times} viewed the amendment as (a) a device to increase Soviet voting strength in international bodies, especially vis-à-vis the British Empire; (b) a means of making the annexation of the Baltic countries more palatable; and (c) a convincing way of inviting other East European nations to join the multinational Soviet Union. Other factors regarded as important were (d) the strength of the idea of self-determination, especially in Georgia and the Ukraine, and (e) increased efficiency (on issues of lesser importance, the British diplomats thought, the Soviet government might prefer the constituent republics to negotiate directly with foreign powers, in order to alleviate the burden upon the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and thus increase the efficiency of Soviet foreign policy making). In the opinion of these diplomats, Stalin was neither so weak nor such a legalist as to amend the constitution solely for the purpose of obtaining extra votes.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37}In his foreword to the compilation \textit{Ukraïns'ka RSR v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh}, p. 13, Foreign Minister Palamarchuk says that the Ukraine has been visited by heads of state and outstanding political and non-official popular leaders from Albania, Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Hungary, India, Iran, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia; and by parliamentary delegations from Ceylon, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Indonesia, Norway, Rumania, and the United Arab Republic.

\textsuperscript{38}Aspaturian, pp. 166-67.

It was not until April 1945—fourteen months after this interview—that the two Soviet republics were finally admitted to the United Nations. But later interpretations of Stalin's policy have added little to the perspicacious earlier judgment—they have been only attempts to assign the proper weight to each of the factors listed. Three basic hypotheses have been advanced after 1944. The first hypothesis, which is implicit in the accounts of American policymakers—most clearly perhaps in the memoirs of Cordell Hull—assumes that the Ukraine and Belorussia were admitted to the United Nations in order to obtain two additional votes for the Soviet Union. The second hypothesis, which has been advanced by Aspaturian, is that Stalin anticipated concrete diplomatic benefits to accrue to the Soviet Union not only from multiple representation in the UN but also at various postwar conferences. In particular, Aspaturian stresses the utility of the multiple arrangement in making the absorption of the Western Ukraine, Western Belorussia, and, above all, the Baltic Republics look better in Western (chiefly, American) eyes. The third hypothesis, which has been held independently by authors as diverse as a Ukrainian refugee scholar (Holubnychy) and an American editor and publicist (John Fischer), is that, although Stalin gained two extra votes by having the two republics admitted to the UN, it does not follow that his main motive was to obtain these votes—a "far weightier," perhaps the exclusive, reason was the necessity or, at least, the expediency of placating anti-Soviet Ukrainian feelings in 1944-45.

The argument in favor of the first assumption (that the USSR desired to gain additional votes in the UN) would run as follows: Since the Munich Conference at the latest, the Soviet Union had become deeply suspicious of the motives of the Western Allies and their instrument, the League of Nations. The delay in establishing the second front reinforced this old feeling. It is against this background of Russian suspicion (the argument continues) that Gromyko's unexpected proposal at Dumbarton Oaks must be viewed. To quote W. H. McNeill:

The U.S. wished that all nations which had signed the United Nations Dec-

40 See also US Malta and Yalta Papers and Sherwood.
41 Fischer, pp. 118 ff.
42 Holub, Ukrayina, pp. 8 ff., esp. pp. 15-16. Yakemtchouk, pp. 23 ff., cites both considerations ("la question des nationalités et la politique internationale") without weighing their relative importance.
laration of January 1942 should become members, together with eight other nations which were not at war with the Axis. Six of these were Latin American republics; and to the Russians this proposal must have seemed like a device for packing the Assembly with American puppets. The principle upon which the Russians wished to base the new international organization—a continuation of the wartime Grand Alliance—would have excluded states which had taken no part in the war. Consequently, they opposed the admission of nonbelligerents. When the Americans showed signs of insisting, Andrei Gromyko, the head of the Russian delegation, announced that each of the sixteen republics, too, should have separate representation in the Assembly.43

In other words, the timing of Gromyko's proposal strongly suggests that, at least on August 28, 1944, when this issue was raised, the Soviets were concerned with counterbalancing American influence in the Assembly. When President Roosevelt emphatically opposed the Soviet "absurdity"44 and when the British, too, showed an attitude of "reserve," the Soviets scaled down their demands to three, or at least two, additional votes. Another point to buttress this contention is made by Aspaturian: In 1945-46 the Soviet position in Eastern Europe was not yet wholly assured, and Stalin was, therefore, greatly interested in any additional support in the United Nations.45

Yet, however plausible at first sight, this first assumption is open to several criticisms. The request for the admission of all sixteen Soviet republics to the UN in August 1944 was preceded by the constitutional amendment of February 1944. The question of creating an international organization to succeed the League of Nations had admittedly been debated since late 1943. But in February 1944 was the UN as much in the minds of Soviet planners as in those of Americans? Were there not other, more compelling reasons why Stalin had the constitution amended? The hypothesis that Stalin wanted additional votes in the Assembly seems to imply that he, like President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, viewed the United Nations as a promising instrument for creating a new world order. But the evidence indicates the opposite: Stalin did regard the UN as a not unimportant "meeting ground for the great opponents,"46 but he was far from overestimating

43 McNeill, p. 506.
44 See note 11 above.
45 Aspaturian, p. 113.
the organization's effectiveness in changing the tone and mode of international relations. Hence, runs the counterargument, the number of Soviet representatives in the UN was a matter not to be ignored, but hardly the only reason for demanding the admission of two constituent republics. In support of this, we may refer to Stalin's speech of November 6, 1944, which illustrates his traditional, "Realpolitik" approach toward international organization. In that address Stalin said that the UN should primarily be an organization that would be able to prevent aggressive nations (read "Germany") from attacking peace-loving nations (read "the USSR") and asserted that such an organization would be effective only if the Big Powers remained in agreement among themselves.47

Furthermore, it may be argued that the Soviet Union did not really expend much effort for obtaining the admission of all sixteen republics, that Gromyko's proposal at Dumbarton Oaks was not meant to be taken seriously, that it was a trial balloon rather than a working proposition. It may be pointed out that the whole issue was raised at that conference only three times, and quite briefly at that. While in his telegram of September 7, 1944, Stalin referred to the "political importance" of the whole question, he explicitly mentioned only two Soviet republics, the Ukraine and Belorussia. Did he do so because he realized from the beginning that he had not the slightest chance of obtaining sixteen additional votes? But why single out those two republics and not, for example, Georgia or Armenia? It is true that as late as January 1945 Gromyko referred to the "extreme importance" of admitting all sixteen republics to the UN, but the occasion for the statement was a review of Dumbarton Oaks documents prior to Gromyko's departure for Moscow for new instructions.48 Finally, at Yalta when, as an afterthought, Roosevelt requested Stalin's support... It is groundless Utopianism to think that the United Nations or any other international organization can now be utilized as the instrumentality to achieve world solidarity directed toward commonly shared goals and ideas" (ibid.). A. Z. Rubin­stein in his "Selected Bibliography of Soviet Works on the United Nations, 1946-1959," American Political Science Review, LIV (December, 1960), 985-91, touches briefly upon more recent attitudes of the regime, which have remained essentially the same.

48 See above, pp. 148-49.
for two extra votes for the United States should circumstances warrant his asking for them, Stalin agreed, apparently with no further ado. Had Stalin really cared about a larger number of votes in the Assembly for himself, the argument goes, he would have opposed American parity right then and there.49

Summing up the pros and cons, we find that the first hypothesis, while explaining one reason for Stalin's insistence upon the admission of two Soviet republics to the UN—his desire to obtain additional votes—exaggerates its importance.

Aspaturian's argument—the "second hypothesis"—is more persuasive because, like that of the British diplomats, it takes more factors into account. On the issue of UN representation he feels that more significant than the increased numerical strength was the "psychological comfort, procedural advantage, and legal precedent for future action" that the admission of the Ukraine and Belorussia afforded the USSR.50 He also seems to imply that in late 1944 and early 1945 Stalin foresaw the advantage of having more votes at peace conferences. Aspaturian makes the point that "were it not for the separate admission of Belorussia and the Ukraine, the British Commonwealth would have numerically dominated the Commissions [for the individual Axis satellite states], although the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the war in Eastern Europe."51

But, above all, Aspaturian sees in the Soviet constitutional amendment of February 1, 1944, an instrument for facilitating territorial expansion. The timing of the amendment seems to indicate this strongly. On December 31, 1943, a pro-Communist National Committee of Poland had been set up, five days before the Soviet troops crossed the Polish boundary of 1939. One of the members of that Committee was the Polish Communist writer Wanda Wasilewska, then married to the Ukrainian dramatist Alexander Korniychuk. On February 7, that is, less than a week after the adoption of the amendment, Korniychuk was abruptly relieved of his post as Deputy Foreign Commissar of the USSR, appointed Foreign Commissar of the Ukrainian

49 Holub, *Ukrayina*, pp. 15-16. Aspaturian, p. 23, points out that Stalin knew it would have been politically risky, if not constitutionally impossible, for the United States to engage in "frivolous experimentation with multiple representation in foreign affairs." The present writer is not convinced that Stalin knew so much about American politics.

50 Aspaturian, p. 113.

SSR, and ordered to start negotiations with the Polish National Committee, including his wife. As was to be expected, the Polish Committee agreed to the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into the Ukrainian SSR. The amendment was also designed to help persuade President Roosevelt to accept the incorporation of the Baltic republics, to counter the expected opposition from American citizens of Baltic descent, by demonstrating that those republics might also have "independent" international representation. This is why at Yalta Molotov and Stalin suggested the admission of Lithuania to the UN, and this is why the Soviet Union tried hard to have separate Baltic representatives appointed to the satellite peace conferences of 1946-47. Rebuffed by the Western powers on both these counts, Soviet Russia resorted to the expedient of attaching the foreign ministers of the Baltic republics to the Soviet delegation at the peace conferences.

Aspaturian's argument has the merit of the multi-causal approach; it comes to grips with a real concern of Stalin's in 1944 (how to make the incorporation of additional territory more palatable to Western, chiefly American, statesmen), and it does explain why Stalin pressed the issue of international representation not for all Soviet republics but for only two located in the western part of the USSR. If one could demonstrate that the cultural and political relations of the Eastern European satellites with the Ukraine and Belorussia are more extensive than those with the USSR as a whole, credence would be lent to a most provocative corollary assumption: International representation has been given precisely to those republics in order to offer to the satellites an inducement to enter the USSR in the distant future. But while the second basic hypothesis plausibly explains the diplomatic benefits derived from the constitutional amendment, it may slight the advantages which would accrue to the regime in its domestic policy. Here we must turn to the third hypothesis, namely, that Stalin's moves in 1944 and 1945 were prompted by his difficulties in the Ukraine.

What positive evidence is there to indicate that there is a link between Ukrainian nationalism in 1944 and 1945 and the admission of the Ukrainian SSR to the UN? Molotov's speech in the USSR Su-

52 Ibid., p. 65. By July 13, 1944, the USSR may have realized the farcical aspect of the negotiations between Korniychuk and Wasilewska, and Korniychuk was replaced by Dmitry Manuilsky, who had succeeded him as Foreign Commissar of the Ukrainian SSR.

53 Ibid., pp. 78, 199.
preme Soviet of February 1, 1944, and a remark which Stalin made in a conversation with President Roosevelt at Yalta and which the latter passed on to his Secretary of State, Stettinius, are referred to in the attempt to establish such a link.

In explaining the constitutional amendment of 1944, Molotov adduced the following reasons for granting the Soviet republics greater powers in the realms of defense and foreign relations: (a) the political, economic, and cultural development of the republics—their growth resulting from the Leninist-Stalinist nationality policy; (b) the greater power of the Soviet Union as a whole; (c) the large extent of Soviet diplomatic relations during the war, raising questions which would touch upon "quite a few specific economic and cultural needs of the Union republics and which could not be dealt with to the full extent by the all-Union representations abroad";54 (d) the interest of the Soviet Union as a whole in "extending international relations and strengthening the co-operation of the USSR with other countries"; and, finally, (e) the contribution of this action, made possible by the successful Leninist-Stalinist national policy, toward the moral victory of progressive men over Fascism.

Upon analysis, the motif of the speech appears to be the strength of the Soviet Union as a result of applying the "Leninist-Stalinist national policy." It is with nationality policy that Molotov starts elucidating the reasons for the changes. At another crucial spot—the end of the main body of the speech—he quotes from Stalin's address at the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution (November 6, 1943):

All the peoples of the Soviet Union have unanimously risen to the defense of their native land, justly considering the present Patriotic War the common cause of all toilers, regardless of nationality and creed. Now even the Nazi politicians themselves [have come to] realize how hopelessly foolish their speculations upon creating dissension and conflicts between the peoples of the Soviet Union have proved. The friendship of the peoples of our country has survived all the hardships and trials of war, it has been tempered in the common struggle of all Soviet peoples against the Fascist invaders.55

From the evidence available today we know that Stalin's and Molo-

55 Quoted ibid., p. 76. The italics in the second sentence are mine, the following are Stalin's.
tov's protestations of the friendship of the peoples expressed an ideal rather than the current state of affairs. The Chechen-Ingush and the Crimean Tatars had proved so disloyal that in the same year 1944 their autonomous republics were dissolved and the inhabitants deported to the East. If we can trust Khrushchev's account, Stalin would have dealt equally with the Ukrainians had he known where and how to deport a people of forty million. Five days after Molotov's speech in Moscow, February 5, 1944, those assembled at a "meeting of the intelligentsia" in Kiev, including the Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, M. Hrechukha, issued an appeal to the Ukrainian underground to surrender. There followed an official appeal "To the Members of the So-Called 'Ukrainian Insurgent Army' and 'Ukrainian National Revolutionary Army,'" of February 12, 1944, which was signed, among others, by Khrushchev himself. Finally, addressing the session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet which amended the constitution of the Republic in line with Molotov's proposal (March 1, 1944), Khrushchev launched into a long diatribe against "Ukrainian-German nationalists." It may thus be argued that a basic reason for the constitutional changes of February 1, 1944, was precisely an attempt on the part of the regime to conceal the cracks in the "friendship of the Soviet peoples" because this façade was useful in its foreign policy as well as in its dealings with the non-Russian peoples within the Soviet Union.

This hypothesis has been indirectly confirmed by a Soviet author and is wholly consistent with Stalin's remark at Yalta. In his article


58 A leaflet headed "Narode Ukrayiny!" (People of the Ukraine!) which was to be dropped from airplanes. A copy is preserved in the archives of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council in New York ("Prologue").

59 A large poster addressed "Do uchasnykiv tak zvanikh 'UPA' ta 'UNRA.' " A copy is kept in the same archives.

60 An abridged version of the speech was printed in Moscow's Bol'shevik (the central theoretical organ of the Party), XX, No. 6 (March 1944), 7-35, under the title "The Liberation of Ukrainian Lands from the German Conquerors and the Next Tasks of Reconstructing the National Economy of the Soviet Ukraine." Unfortunately, since the Kiev press was not available for the period, the companion speeches could not be consulted.
on the "International Representation of the Ukrainian SSR" E. L. Kurishkov interpreted Khrushchev's standard explanation of the constitutional amendment as follows:

The adoption of the historic law by the USSR Supreme Soviet had great significance in unmasking the anti-popular, treacherous character of bourgeois nationalism and cosmopolitanism, and especially Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism. Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists have endeavored to weaken the power of the Soviet state... to kindle separatist and national-deviationist tendencies and movements. They have made efforts to weaken the political, economic, and cultural bonds between the Soviet republics, to tear asunder the close union of socialist nations.

The changes in the USSR connected with the enlargement of the rights of the Soviet republics were a mortal blow to the Ukrainian nationalist band...61

This may be an interpretation from the perspective of 1954, when the article was written, but it does not appear implausible in the light of other evidence on Ukrainian nationalism in 1944-45. It should also be borne in mind that Soviet scholars may have access to materials not available in the West.

The final piece of evidence in support of the "nationality trouble" hypothesis is a somewhat cryptic reference by President Roosevelt to a remark made by Stalin at Yalta. In Stettinius' account of a conversation with the President on the day when Molotov first raised the issue of two or three additional votes (February 7, 1945):

In reviewing the entire matter of additional seats for the Soviet Union, the President told me that evening at Yalta that Stalin felt his position in the Ukraine was difficult and insecure. A vote for the Ukraine was essential, the Marshal had declared, for Soviet unity... The President had been indignant at the Soviet request at Dumbarton Oaks for votes for each of the sixteen republics. He had told me it would be just as logical for us to ask for forty-eight votes. However, he told me that from the standpoint of geography and population he did not believe there was anything preposterous about the Russian proposal for two extra votes for the Ukraine and White Russia.62

As the Stettinius papers have not been released for publication in the U. S. Department of State collection of Malta and Yalta docu-

61 Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, Visnyk, XXV, No. 5 (May 1954), 54.
ments, it is hard to put this remark of President Roosevelt's into its proper context. It seems that he had a private talk with Stalin; possibly this was the conversation Stalin had in mind when, in his telegram of September 7, 1944, he expressed his desire to have an opportunity to explain to President Roosevelt the political importance of the question (see page 148). Stalin may have exaggerated his difficulties in order to make it more palatable for Roosevelt to change his mind, but his statement was by no means unfounded if read against the background of difficulties in the Western Ukraine.

But proponents of the "nationality trouble" hypothesis face several difficulties. First of all, the admission of the Ukraine to the UN was coupled with that of Belorussia. But it is harder to prove the existence of a strong nationalist movement in Belorussia than it is in the Ukraine or the Baltic States. A possible answer would be that Stalin preferred not to single out the Ukrainians for that favor, since his feelings toward them were somewhat less than cordial. Secondly, it has been argued very plausibly that, whenever negotiations reached a difficult stage and the other side was about to block any further concessions, Stalin invoked domestic difficulties with the Ukrainians. Stalin had used this technique in his talk to German Ambassador Count von Schulenburg sometime in 1940; now he used it as an argument against President Roosevelt in the talk reported by Secretary Stettinius. As summed up by Aspaturian: "While Stalin's problems with the Ukrainians were real enough, he was putting them to use in the service of Soviet diplomacy. In negotiations, a statesman finds it useful to have a source of internal pressure allegedly beyond his control to use as a bargaining lever." The third difficulty with the argument that it was primarily Ukrainian nationalism which induced

63 On September 27, 1944, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party passed a resolution about the shortcomings of political work among the population in the western provinces of the Ukraine. It is summarized in an editorial in Bol'shevik, XX, No. 17–18 (September 1944), 6 ff. On November 27, 1944, the Soviet Ukrainian government is reported to have issued a second appeal to surrender addressed "To the Population of the Western Provinces of the Ukraine." See O. Orlenko, Bol'sheviky u borot'bi z ukrayins'kym revolyutsiyno-vyzvoly'nym rukhom (Lviv, 1946), pp. 11, 21. An underground brochure, most probably authentic. Spot checks have indicated it to be reliable.


65 Aspaturian, p. 71.
Stalin to grant the Ukrainian and the Belorussian SSR representation in the UN is that all the Soviet documents previously cited refer to friction in the newly incorporated Western Ukraine, not the larger and more important central and eastern areas of the country. But a careful study of the political developments under German occupation has revealed that eastern Ukrainians were susceptible to the brand of nationalism imported by their fellow-countrymen from the West.66

Thus, while suggestive evidence in support of the "nationality trouble" hypothesis is relatively easy to obtain, conclusive proof requires a more careful and elaborate analysis than can be undertaken in this article. Such an analysis in depth is greatly hampered by the lack of local central and eastern Ukrainian data for the years of World War II, especially the crucial year of 1944. A study of the interrelation of Ukrainian national feeling and Stalin's decision to create a modicum of international representation for the Ukraine would necessarily envisage a series of questions: Was there in 1944 a gathering threat of Ukrainian action (for instance, the formation, when circumstances permitted, of a nationalist government supported by the Western Allies and inevitably hostile to the USSR) which the Soviet government sought to avert by its concessions of February 1, 1944? How were the measures of the Soviet government publicized in its appeals to the Ukrainians of various regions? How were any anti-Soviet nationalist aims publicized, especially those involving Ukrainian representation abroad? Closely linked to the question of access to pertinent data is the problem of motivation. Assuming that Soviet Ukrainians are interested in being represented at the UN, how shall we gauge the degree of their interest?

To conclude, after surveying the history of the admission of the Ukrainian SSR to the UN and briefly describing her diplomatic activities in the UN and other areas, an attempt was made to determine the reasons for her admission, starting with the interpretation of the constitutional amendment of 1944 by British diplomats. All the factors cited in this interpretation help to explain Stalin's policy in 1944, but in the writer's judgment factors (b) and (c), to wit, the disguise of territorial expansion in Eastern Europe and the standing invitation to East Europeans to join the USSR were the foremost reasons, to be followed by the internal factors (d) and (e), namely, the strength of

the idea of nationalism in the Soviet Union and the greater efficiency and coherence resulting from giving the constituent republics a small outlet onto the international scene. Paradoxical as it may sound, I should put the role of the two republics in the UN as the last consideration; until after Stalin's death the USSR did not pay much attention to the United Nations except as a meeting ground for the big powers. In summary, the truth appears to lie somewhere between the second and the third of the hypotheses as characterized above. Stalin's difficulties in the Ukraine were "real enough" in 1944-45, but so were the benefits which he hoped to derive from the admission of the Soviet republics to international councils in the United Nations and elsewhere.

*University of Delaware*
The problem of two member-nations of the USSR, the Ukraine and Belorussia, as subjects of international law, is the theme of numerous articles in newspapers and journals and of several books. This literature may be divided into three groups:

(1) In the field of diplomatic history, the discussion has concerned the motives of the government of the USSR in extending the powers of the republics to include the international sphere and in demanding membership in the United Nations for two of these republics.

(2) In the political field, discussion has centered on the proposed exchange of envoys with the Ukraine and Belorussia versus removal of both republics from UN membership.

(3) In the field of international law, studies have been made of the nature and substance of the powers of the two republics under international law and of their right to membership in the UN and exchange of diplomatic representatives.

This article is confined to a single narrowly delineated matter: the two named republics (particularly the Ukrainian SSR) as subjects of international law, excluding related problems such as the juridical structure of the USSR as a union of states, the sovereignty of its members, and their right of secession.

1. Positive Law. During the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–23), the representatives of the Ukrainian and Georgian Republics insisted that they retain their Commissariats (Ministries) for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, but they could not withstand the centralizing pressure of the Russian Communist Party: both departments were placed under the power of the USSR, and thereafter these republics enjoyed no rights under international law. It was only after an amendment of the Union Constitution dated February 1, 1944, and subsequent amendments of the republic constitutions that the union republics regained, de jure, their foreign
relations and defense prerogatives. Two amendments were introduced in the USSR Constitution. The first, in Art. 14 (a), which defines the jurisdiction of the Union in foreign policy, was the addition of a phrase stating that these powers include “regulation of the general order of the relations of union republics with foreign states,” and the second was the addition of Art. 18-a, reading: “Each Union republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them, and to exchange diplomatic and consular representatives.”

Article 14 (a) is a typical empowering, and not a material, norm: constitutional law merely prescribes who has the power to decide the order of foreign relations of the republics, and leaves the determination of its content to administrative law. Since Soviet administrative law, with a few exceptions, remains uncodified, this problem must be studied from such sources as textbooks of administrative law.

Soviet literature on this subject is laconic. For example, a 1950 textbook of administrative law cites Art. 14 (a), adding that the republic “ministries of foreign affairs are guided by instructions of governmental organs and executive organs of the USSR and of the union republics, as well as of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.” A 1946 textbook of administrative law states that foreign representatives visiting the USSR on military and foreign-trade matters must deal with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs exclusively and that other foreign representatives may deal with republic ministries of foreign affairs.

Pursuant to a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of December 16, 1947, all governmental institutions of the USSR may enter into contact with institutions abroad as well as with foreign representatives on the territory of the USSR only through the Union Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no mention of any exceptions with regard to republican ministries of foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the

1 Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR (1938—iya' 1956 g.g.) (Moscow, 1956), p. 29; Istoriya sovetskoi konstitutsii (v dokumentakh), 1917—1956 (Moscow, 1957), p. 829.
3 Sbornik zakonov, p. 169.
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR informed the Secretary-General of the UN in 1953 that in future all communications to the Ukrainian Government should be addressed directly to that Government, and not, as theretofore, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. The separate permanent delegation of the Ukrainian SSR to the UN, an organ of the Ukrainian Government, also, obviously, has direct relations with the United Nations. Direct foreign relations on Ukrainian territory are purely a matter of courtesy; these include, for example, the visits paid to the government in Kiev by heads of foreign states and other foreigners.

Both textbooks of administrative law referred to above state that the diplomatic representative of the USSR "performs, in the country of his assignment, general supervision of the activities of all governmental institutions, enterprises, and service personnel of the USSR and of the union republics," and that it is their duty to inform him of all their important undertakings. This supervision is apparently intended to extend over any permanent diplomatic representatives of the union republics in foreign countries, if and when they existed.

The Ukrainian delegates to the UN, it may be noted, are always close to the chief of the USSR delegation.

Article 18-a, as we have seen, (a) recognizes the general right of these republics to international relations, and (b) specifies two definite powers: (1) the right of legation and consular representation, and (2) the right to conclude international treaties; the right to membership in international organizations can be deduced from the latter.

According to the Constitution, this right accrues to all Union republics but not to autonomous republics, which are integral components of Union republics. Only two republics, however, the Ukrainian and Belorussian, actually exercise the right to conclude treaties, to be members of international organizations, and to be parties to international agreements, but even these two republics do not avail themselves of the right of legation or consular relations. We leave aside the question whether the right of representation in the UN should be considered a partial exercise of the right of legation—limited to multilateral relations, but excluding bilateral relations.

Let us compare the status of these two republics of the USSR with the status of other nations with limited powers. The only federation

several members of which (three) had the right of legation was the Second German Reich during the period from 1871 to 1918. States under a protectorate have no such right, and vassal states, as distinct from sovereign states, have exchanged representatives of a lower grade, with the title of “diplomatic agent.” The British Dominions began to exercise the right of legation at a very late date.

In the matter of the right of members of federations to conclude treaties, it is to be noted that in most cases this is the exclusive competence of the federal authorities. In other cases the range of material treaty competence is limited to member-states and to some extent to definite matters (the present Federal German Republic) or to specified matters of little importance (Switzerland). Some federations reserve the right to confirm treaties concluded by members (Germany). Only in a few federations do member-states conclude treaties through their own organs and not through the federal organs (Switzerland). A distinction should be made between the constitutional general power to conclude treaties and the right provided for in some constitutions of empowering a member by federal legislation to conclude a single treaty (this is a delegation of federal power).

As this brief comparison indicates, the powers of the Ukraine and Belorussia in the field of foreign relations, although limited by USSR constitutional and administrative law, are relatively broad. A reservation may be made from a different point of view: The crux of the problem in practice may lie not in the Union control over the execution of these powers but in the Union control over these nations as a whole. But this problem is not within the framework of this article.

If a member of a federation is to be a subject in international law, it is necessary for the member to have the proper power recognized by the federal constitution. Is a constitutional provision alone sufficient? Opinion is divided among the few international lawyers who have expressed themselves on the subject. Soviet authors believe that a constitutional provision suffices. S. Krylov stated: “The law [of February 1, 1944] clearly confirms that the Soviet republics are subjects of international law.” The matter was even more clearly stated by Tunkin. In the course of the UN International Law Commission’s work on the codification of diplomatic law, the Austrian scholar A. von Verdross raised the question whether mention should be made of members of federations who enjoyed the right of legation. Tunkin answered: “As stated by Mr. Verdross, the question whether a mem-
ber-state of a federation has the right of legation depends on the federal constitution and is not a question of international law.” Von Verdross’ position had been previously stated in a monograph on the subject. In his opinion, a member of a federation “becomes a partial subject of international law as against third states which recognize it.” A middle position is also possible. Some international lawyers (particularly French) distinguish between the “joissance” and “exercise” of international legal personality.

To put this theoretical question aside and return to the pertinent facts, it must be remembered that the Ukrainian and Belorussian republics (1) are members of the United Nations and of other specialized international organizations, (2) have participated in international conferences, (3) have signed international treaties, (4) were recognized as belligerent nations during World War II in that they were admitted to the 1946 Paris Peace Conference and signed the peace treaties concluded in 1947.

2. Membership in the UN and Recognition: Practice. One assumes that membership in the United Nations, as previously in the League of Nations, would provide its members with a permanent and broad international status. Such membership amounts to the collective and simultaneous recognition of a state by the major portion of an organized international community. It follows that the recognized state would gain an objective status. Nevertheless there developed a tendency, at first in isolated cases only, to limit recognition to the scope of the international organization.

In the League of Nations, Switzerland assumed the attitude that


6 Alfred von Verdross, in Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1946), p. 218; also see his Derecho internacional público (Madrid, 1957), pp. 93–94; a similar opinion is expressed by Kunz, p. 382. In this article we treat the USSR as a federation, leaving aside the question of whether it really comes under this notion in view of the right of secession.

admission to membership was not tantamount to recognition by its members. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia sent the following note to the newly admitted Baltic states on Jan. 5, 1922: "As the League of Nations Assembly decided on Sept. 22, 1921, to admit Estonia (Latvia, and Lithuania, respectively) to the League of Nations, I have the honor to inform you that the Government of Czechoslovakia has decided to recognize Estonia as a sovereign and independent nation." Yugoslavia went even further: a Yugoslav note dated Sept. 7, 1926, expressing a readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Estonia and Latvia, stated that the two nations, as members of the League, had already been recognized by all the other members.8

Rejection of the Colombian reservation by the League of Nations Council provided indisputable evidence of a connection between admission to the League and recognition by other members. Colombia was willing to join the League in 1920, but with the reservation of non-recognition of Panama who had seceded from Colombia in 1903 with the support of the United States. The further practice of the League—the admission of Ireland, Sept. 10, 1923, Iraq, Oct. 3, 1932, Egypt, May 26, 1937—conclusively disqualified the Swiss thesis. Contemporary legal theory took the same position. Its variants are expounded by the present writer elsewhere.9

8 Quoted from Malbone Graham, The League of Nations and the Recognition of States (Berkeley, 1934), p. 72. The opinion is sometimes encountered that the League of Nations Assembly postponed the admission of the Baltic nations from 1920 to 1921 because they had not been recognized by the great powers in 1920; the actual reason was a fear that these small nations, which at that time had not been recognized by Soviet Russia, would not be stable. See Ch. Rousseau, Derecho internacional público (Barcelona, 1957), p. 286.

R. Erich was the only author of that period to express the opinion that only states, and not colonies or dominions, achieved automatic recognition on admission to the League. He wrote: "The fact that two nations are members of the League does not imply that they must maintain diplomatic relations of a general and regular nature, or negotiate treaties." In the opinion of Graham, reservations about the automatic recognition of dominions was a result of the fact that European jurists were not acquainted with the decentralization of the British Empire. They were unable to reconcile themselves to the new form of international relations practiced at Geneva because they limited state relations to already accredited diplomatic channels and regarded treaty making as the only form of international obligation.10

The solution arrived at by the League of Nations was discarded by the United Nations. The UN Charter does not specifically invest any of its organs with the power to grant recognition. Rousseau points out that "the same consideration as that shown by the practice of the League of Nations could apply to the admission of such new states to the UN as the Philippines, the Ukraine and Belorussia (Charter members), Pakistan (Sept. 30, 1947), Burma (April 19, 1948), Israel (May 11, 1949), and Indonesia (Sept. 28, 1950); and that consequently the position of the Arab states in opposition to Israel is fairly weak." It should be noted, however, as Rousseau also mentions, that a trend is appearing in the administrative practice of the United Nations which contradicts the heretofore dominant concept, a trend which limits the juridical scope of admission. Such is the tenor of the Secretary-General's Memorandum of March 8, 1950, concerning the

---

The opinion is growing stronger that recognition by the UN means no more than collective recognition by an international body with no implication of individual recognition by member-nations. There are also authors who attach only relative or limited value to the recognition of a state by the UN. This line of argument is partly founded on the position of the San Francisco Conference (May 3, 1945) which rejected the Norwegian proposal demanding for the UN the right to deprive new states and governments of selective recognition.

This background provides the framework for a proper evaluation of the narrowed American interpretation of the recognition of the Ukraine and Belorussia; it is significantly expressed in the following incident: On December 9, 1953, the Pan-American Ukrainian Committee asked the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada these two questions: "Has the Government of... extended recognition to the Ukrainian SSR?" and "Has the Government of... extended recognition to the present government of the Ukrainian SSR?" The Canadian Government refused to answer the questions; the other two did not.

The British answer was:

There has never been any question of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom according separate recognition to the Ukrainian SSR. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom recognizes the USSR of which the Ukrainian SSR is a part. The Ukrainian Republic and the Byelo-Russian Republic, which is also part of the Soviet Union, are separate members of the United Nations.

The American answer was:

The United States Government has never extended recognition to the Ukrainian SSR as a separate entity. The United States established diplomatic relations on November 16, 1933 with the USSR of which the Ukrainian SSR is a constituent republic. ... The United States Government has not extended recognition to the present government or any other government of

11 The memorandum of the Secretary-General, of March 8, 1950, states: "The members have therefore made clear by an unbroken practice that (1) a member could properly vote to accept a representative of a government which it did not recognize, or with which it had no diplomatic relations, and (2) that such a vote did not imply recognition or readiness to assume diplomatic relations." See Ch. Rousseau, op. cit.; also P. Reuter, p. 199.
UKRAINE AS A SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

the Ukrainian SSR as a separate entity. The Ukrainian SSR was a part of the USSR at the time the United States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government. You are doubtless aware that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is among the original members of the United Nations. The United States agreed to its admission without taking the position that it was to be considered an independent state for other purposes, such as bilateral relationships among states."\(^{13}\)

It is noteworthy that both documents refer to the membership of the Ukrainian SSR in the United Nations, although the request of the P.A.U.C. did not mention this; both governments were obviously aware that in speaking of recognition such a conclusive fact should not be ignored. In the British answer, the word "separate" in the first sentence can be interpreted in one of two ways: either the United Kingdom did not recognize the Ukrainian SSR separately from the USSR, or it did not recognize the Ukrainian SSR by a separate act. Looking for a clue within the context we can see that the following sentence favors the first interpretation, and the last sentence favors the second. In 1924, when the United Kingdom recognized the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian SSR did not enjoy international legal competence, and hence only the USSR could be recognized as an entity; the constitutional amendment of 1944 obviously provided no basis for separate recognition of the Ukraine or any other Union republic. If the Ukrainian SSR was separately recognized, it could only have been by some conclusive act; such an act could be inferred from the British reply to consist of the admission of the Ukraine to UN membership.

The U.S. Department of State formulated a different attitude from that of the United Kingdom in express language: it is the kind of recognition referred to by Rousseau. The American reply seems to contain the formulation of a doctrine of so-called functional recognition, i.e., recognition for a specific purpose. As opposed to *de facto* recognition which was always a temporary solution, planned for a short period, the American concept of recognition "for a purpose" implies a condition of permanency; as applied to the two Soviet republics, this condition has lasted since 1945 and the authors fail to mention whether and how it could terminate.

\(^{13}\) The texts have been obtained from the Ukrainian Central Representation in Argentina and were published by the present writer, with comments, in the *Suchasna Ukraina*, No. 22 (Munich, 1954).
3. Membership in the UN and Recognition: An Appraisal. The innovation contained in the doctrine of “recognition for a purpose” is not an argument against it. As W. Friedmann has shown in his book, *Law in the Changing Society*,[14] the contemporary international community is undergoing more radical changes than any other type of social institution. For this reason the emergence of new legal concepts is completely justified *a priori.*[15] One notable change is the formation of a great number of international organizations. A new branch of international law is needed to study the new problems, not the least of which is the effect that admission to membership in an international organization will have on recognition at large.

According to Paul Reuter, “international organizations are required to seek an objective standard of the existence of a state or government; but they can do so only within the range of their competence, i.e., on a limited scale; and this competence is not free from political fortuity.” In reference to organizations of the United Nations type, Reuter says: “In an organization which is associated with an advanced integration, it is indispensable for admission to imply recognition.”[16]

In our opinion, it is essential to stress such a difference between the United Nations and other international organizations, but we would formulate it somewhat differently. Recognition “for a purpose” is possible in admittance to membership in a specialized organization (UNESCO, FAO, etc.) because its purposes are narrowly defined. This is impossible, however, in the case of organizations which have broad purposes and consequently invest their members with broad powers and duties. In order to fulfill such purposes, the members of a universal organization must possess broad and more or less full international legal personality, which could scarcely be granted with limitations and for specific purposes.

This opinion was formulated by the prominent French international jurist, Georges Scelle, in reference to the League of Nations as early as 1921. Scelle believed that admission to the League of Nations was tantamount to collective recognition on the part of all members for two reasons: firstly, it would be purposeless to assume that members could enter into factual and legal relations with other members in

---

16 Reuter, p. 199.
the League, and, simultaneously, deny them international legal personality or competence to engage in such relations; secondly, according to Art. 10 of the Covenant, members of the League mutually guaranteed each others' territorial integrity and political independence, and it would be illogical to assume that these guarantees could be given to a state which was simultaneously denied recognition.17

A similar opinion has been expressed by the American international jurist, Q. Wright, in reference to the United Nations. In criticizing the UN Secretary-General's Memorandum of March 8, 1950 (also criticized by Reuter and Rousseau as we have already noted), Wright states: "Admittance to the United Nations implies, of course, much more than recognition of statehood, because it adds to the rights and duties of a state under general international law, the rights and duties of a Member under the Charter; but articles 2 (1) and 4 make it clear that every Member is regarded by the UN as a sovereign state with a position under general international law equal to that of other sovereign states." This, however, is not merely a normal recognition on the part of a certain number of states (i.e., members of the UN), but a general recognition. It takes place when "important states which are in an important degree affected by the status in question, have expressly recognized that status or . . . can be presumed to have acquiesced by refraining from an explicit declaration of non-recognition." He adds that in doubtful cases the Court should decide which states are so unimportant or of little interest that their recognition or non-recognition need not be taken into account. General recognition may be achieved by one of two methods: either by the sum total of individual recognitions or by admission to the UN as a new member. (Or, in the event of an unconstitutional change of government in a state which is already a member, by the acceptance of credentials from the new government.) According to Wright, general recognition is not identical with a sum total of individual recognitions. The traditional doctrine is that recognition of one state by another constitutes, as regards a third state, res inter alios acta, i.e., recognition by 99 states has no effect on the 100th state which withholds recognition. Wright's "general recognition" provides the recognized state with an objective status; it is binding on all states (including

those which withhold individual recognition), on the international courts, and on international organizations.  

Wright's opinion differs from the concept of recognition "for a purpose." It seems, according to the latter, that any state could fragmentize the institution of recognition by recognizing some states for one purpose and others for another, an additional step towards undermining the authority of international law in an already "disunited" world.

It may be alleged that a state is permitted to act illogically. Nevertheless, non-juridical sanctions urge the exercise of simple "common sense." Senseless domestic laws often lead to conflict and sometimes to chaos; they must be repealed or amended, and sometimes they fall into disuse without formal repeal. Under international law, a hastily concluded agreement may become unworkable for the purpose for which it was made and lead to dangerous situations. If two legal norms cannot be reconciled, one must yield to the other.

Scelle points out that the duty of respect for the independence and territorial integrity of states cannot be reconciled with the right to refuse recognition granted by the League of Nations or the United Nations. Two outstanding examples of such a conflict are Colombia's refusal to recognize Panama, and the Arab states' refusal to recognize Israel. In the first case the provision of the League of Nation's Covenant prevailed. Colombia was forced to recognize Panama's independence in order to stay in the League. In the second case, the Arab states overtly refuse to abide by the pertinent articles of the Charter. They do not recognize Israel as a member of the UN, and with arms in hand they await the time when they can, in the words of the Charter, "use force against the territorial and political integrity" of Israel. Despite their disregard of the Charter, no sanctions have been applied against them. It may be assumed that in this case at least, the said norm has ceased to operate.

There is another conflict involving the problem of recognition which has similar, although not so far-reaching consequences—the hostility between the Communist and democratic worlds. Jurists


20 A special question is whether admission to the UN implies recognition by the states which voted against it as well as by the states which voted for it.
and students of political science who follow the relations between
the two blocs, classify the condition as either peaceful coexistence,
subject to peacetime law, or as cold war, a condition midway between
peace and war, subject to no specific legal category.\(^{21}\)

Reuter, in his examination of peaceful coexistence from the legal
viewpoint, discusses the causes which narrow relations between states
with different domestic orders. He concludes that the presence of
Communist states in the international community “narrows the pos­
sibilities for the universal development of international norms; many
of them have a legal effect on relations only between non-Communist
states.”\(^{22}\)

The absence of a common norm of recognition can be explained
more simply if the existing condition is defined as midway between
peace and war. A high degree of unanimity among states is required
to accept generally binding norms and universally recognized situa-
tions and competences. It is equally difficult to realize such unanimity
during both types of conflict, that waged by all accessible means (war),
and that carried out without resort to armed action (condition mid­
way between peace and war). Such an absence of agreement between
two antagonistic camps became evident during World War II in the
simultaneous appearance of two governments for the occupied coun-
tries: “Quisling” governments appointed by the occupying power, and
governments-in-exile recognized by the Allies.\(^{23}\) In the course of a
cold war such occurrences are more frequent: we can cite recogni-
tion of Communist North Vietnam by Communist China at the time
when Vietnam’s government had no permanent seat; recognition of
the Algerian government by the Arab states; recognition of the exiled
Prime Minister of Laos by the Communist and some neutralist states;
recognition of two different territorial governments in the Congo.
Another type of disunity has developed—the appearance of parallel

\(^{21}\) Some examples of practical difficulties appearing in the process of peaceful
coexistence are considered in the present author’s articles: “Les conventions mul-
tilatérales entre l’universalité et l’intégrité,” Revue de Droit International (Genev e,
Prologue, No. 2 (1959), pp. 30–41. See also El orden internacional en un mundo

\(^{22}\) Reuter, pp. 133–137.

\(^{23}\) See Halajczuk, Los estados conquistados ante el derecho internacional (Univ.
de Buenos-Aires, Instituto de Derecho Internacional, publicación No. 3) (Buenos Aires, 1950), pp. 79–140.
governments in states partitioned by the Iron Curtain; each pretends to represent the whole country and is officially recognized by one or the other of the antagonistic parties. In the UN the results of the cold war became manifest in lengthy mutual blocking of candidates for membership, in the survival of Nationalist China (Formosa) as the sole representative of China, and in the attitude of the United States towards the membership of the two Soviet republics.

4. Doctrine. The voluminous literature on the problem of the present international legal position of the Ukrainian SSR provides many answers to questions such as: Is the Ukrainian SSR a state, is it a subject of international law, should it be a subject of international law, does it have UN membership, can it engage in bilateral diplomatic relations, etc. These questions are dealt with in a spate of bibliographic material ranging from a few monographs (von Verdross, De Visscher, Dolan) to incidental and sketchy considerations. In the further course of this survey we will group the more or less similar opinions systematically, omitting minor differences in details.

We know of only one comprehensive and systematic formulation of the view that the Soviet republics cannot be considered subjects of international law, an article by Edward Dolan, in which the following syllogism is set forth: (1) only a federation as a whole is a subject of international law, its individual members are not; (2) the USSR is a federation; (3) therefore its members, the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR, cannot be subjects of international law, and hence, members of the UN.24 Many other writers are of similar opinion, although they do not present their views so systematically. In a brief summary, their chief arguments are these: members of federations are not subjects of international law (Korowicz); the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR are not independent states, but are controlled by the government of the USSR (Goodrich); they are not sovereign (Fenwick); they cannot be considered states in the normal meaning of the term (Wilcox); they do not meet the criteria of statehood (Charpentier); they lack the status of statehood (Gould); the USSR is a single state (Lysyi, Korowicz); the USSR is a decentralized, but single state

UKRAINE AS A SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Wheare); Ukrainian and Belorussian membership in the UN renders them subjects of international law, but does not provide them with the character of statehood (Charpentier); their membership gives the Soviet Union triple representation in the UN (Fenwick, Wilcox); it is an anomalous situation (Fenwick, Gould); they have no more right to UN membership than the members of any other federation (Korowicz).25

Other authors maintain on the contrary that the Soviet republics are states, either non-sovereign (Maurach, Danko), or formally and/or partially sovereign (Yakemtchouk, Holubnychy, Stachiv). Some jurists believe that sovereignty is not an appropriate criterion in determining whether a state can be a subject of international law (Paul de Visscher). From the standpoint of their membership in the United Nations, the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR are sovereign states (Wright), and in relation to other states they are independent subjects of international law (von Verdross, cited by Ross); they have been internationally recognized (de Lapradelle); they have international status (Towster); they have international personality (Kunz and Bollini Shaw); separate Ukrainian citizenship should be recognized (Ruiz Moreno).26

The negative opinions are all based on the premise that members of a federation cannot be subjects of international law, all other arguments being deduced from the first. The opponents of this opinion use the inductive method which leads them to directly opposite conclusions. From this point of view, the admission of the two Soviet republics to the United Nations introduces a precedent with far-reaching consequences for federalism in general: members of federa-


tions cannot be denied the right of international legal personality (Huber), and parts of a state could be considered individual states under international law (Burdeau).27

5. Historical Criteria. In order to determine whether membership of the two Soviet republics in the United Nations is justified, it is first necessary to consider whether this membership constitutes their sole attribute of international legal personality, or only one of them, albeit the most noticeable. International jurists frequently base their opinions on incomplete information in this respect. Of the authors cited in opposition, only Gould refers to the conclusion of peace treaties by the Ukrainian and Belorussian SSR in 1947; he states that this act “extended the scope of their international personalities beyond the limits of UN membership.”28 He fails to mention, however, such an important factor in the determination of legal status as the right of secession (despite the fact that from the standpoint of present politics this right is a mere “paper” right). Inadequate knowledge of the history of the Ukraine gives rise to yet another objection to her international personality. This refers to the definition and interpretation of the term “federation.”

According to the Spanish author M. Garcia-Pelayo, a federation can be established by either (1) a union of theretofore independent states, e.g., the North American States or the Swiss Cantons; or (2) constitutional amendment of the state’s structure, e.g., Mexico or the USSR. Alexandrowicz has called federations of the first type “contractual,” and of the second, in which he includes the USSR, “administrative.” Scelle was probably thinking along the same lines when he said that the Ukraine had obtained “artificial statehood” at the

27 Huber, see footnote 9; Georges Burdeau, Traité de Science Politique, Vol. 3 (Paris, 1949), p. 448. Bibliographical data on other authors are presented in footnote 9; only Kunz’ standpoint needs to be explained. To substantiate his thesis (an a priori negation of the international subjectivity of federations’ members), Dolan refers to Kunz’ classical work on interstate unions (Staatenverbindungen, published in Stuttgart as early as 1929). However, in his work of 1952 referred to in footnote 5 (pp. 381–382), Kunz expresses an entirely opposite view: “There exist territorial commonwealths of nations which are not sovereign and are subjects of domestic law, but have a partial international personality; this was the case with British dominions which are now normal sovereign states.” Of Ukrainian jurists, none, except Lysyi, denies the Ukrainian SSR international personality. See also M. Stachiv, “UN Membership of Nations Dominated by Communists,” The Ukrainian Quarterly, No. 1 (1955), pp. 14–23.

28 Gould, p. 201.
request of the USSR, just as the Philippines had at the request of the United States.\(^{29}\)

Some international jurists base their conclusions on precisely this kind of conjecture when dealing with the problem at hand. Gould emphasizes that the Ukraine and Belorussia had not been independent in the past, as for example Bavaria had been prior to 1871. (As noted above in reference to the Second German Reich, Bavaria retained the right of legation until 1919.) Charpentier expresses a similar conjecture. In his opinion "the membership of the Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics in the UN is juridically based on the amendment of the Soviet Constitution of February 1944 which authorizes member states to maintain direct external relations; legally, this was a bargain struck by the Big Three at Yalta, but it is unfounded in fact." Fenwick reaches a similar conclusion: "The admission of Belorussia and the Ukraine as separate members of the UN presents an anomalous situation in that neither of the two states, if they can be called such, possessed any degree of international personality previous to their admission to the UN."\(^{30}\)

The positive opinions of Verdross, de Visscher, Huber, and Burdeau are no more than statements to the effect that there are no grounds for refusing international legal personality to all members of a federation "en bloc." It does not follow, however, that this personality accrues automatically to all North American, Mexican, Venezuelan, and Brazilian states, Swiss cantons, and Canadian, Argentine, and Australian provinces.\(^{31}\)

R. Olesnicki seeks the criterion of international legal personality in constitutional law, noting that the Soviet Constitution recognizes the international legal competence of its member-states, whereas the American Constitution does not.\(^{32}\) This opinion is correct, but it does not exhaust the problem: it explains why Texas could not become


\(^{30}\) Gould, p. 201; Charpentier, p. 163; Fenwick, p. 139.

\(^{31}\) Dolan, *op. cit.*, p. 635, used this *reductio ad absurdum* as an argument against the membership of two Soviet republics, saying that either these two republics should be excluded from the UN, or all members of all federations should be granted admission.

a member of the UN today, but it leaves the question open as to what would happen if the American constitution were amended in a manner analogous to that of the Soviet constitutional amendment of 1944. The American international jurist Sohn believes that in this event the admission of individual states or groups of states would then be possible.33

We take two possible criteria into account: the national and the historical. Among international jurists, Guggenheim and Verdross believe, and, in our opinion, rightly so, that a nation organized in the form of a state is a subject of international law, but that a state in the sense of an administrative body is not. Hence the conclusion may be drawn that since the Ukrainian nation exists, and the Texas nation does not, the UN (which is called an organization of nations, and not of states34) should include the Ukraine, but not Texas.

The application of the historical criterion is most obvious in the works of Gould, especially in his comparison of the Ukraine and Belorussia with Bavaria. A similar approach with a different application can be found in earlier writings. For example, Albert de Lapradelle believed that a state should be the product of a nation, and for this reason opposed the resolution of the Berlin Conference which created the so-called "Congo Free State." The opinion of the Finnish international jurist Erich is similar: state power must be based on national will and consciousness without which a state is an artificial product. For a state to be born, even if it be non-sovereign, a creative act is required on the part of the human community. The act must be its own and spontaneous. In every instance the national element should take advantage of the opportunity to create a state. In our time public authority must be of spontaneous origin—a state must come from within. It cannot be established from without, even if considerable forces favored its establishment.35 This idea can be exemplified by the rise of Manchu-Kuo and the Philippines. Manchu-Kuo is a classic example of an artificially created state, established as it was by a unilateral act of the Japanese Government without any local demand or pressure. In contradistinction, the United States con-

33 Sohn, op. cit., p. 80.
35 Albert de Lapradelle, as quoted in footnote 9; Erich, op. cit., pp. 443-444, 448-449.
sent to the emancipation of the Philippines under the pressure of a local movement for independence.

Proceeding in this way from the legal-normative to the legal-historical plane, we see that the Ukraine (as well as the three Transcaucasian republics) effectively seceded from Russia and maintained her status as an independent state for a period of about three years from November 19, 1917 to November 20, 1920. In like manner Georgia maintained her independence from May 26, 1918 to May 16, 1921, Armenia from May 28, 1918 to February 12, 1920, and Azerbaidzhan from May 28, 1918 to April 28, 1920. Their effective existence was objectively confirmed by international recognition. The Ukraine, for example, was recognized by 25 states, 19 *de jure*, 4 *de facto*, and 2 in a doubtful form; in particular, the Ukraine was collectively recognized by the Central Powers (First Treaty of Brest of February 9, 1918), as was Armenia by the Allied Powers (Treaty of Sevres, 1920). Following the loss of their independence as the result of military conquest by Soviet Russia, all these republics, forceably converted into Soviet republics, retained their formal character as separate states and their international legal personality until 1923. The Ukrainian SSR enjoyed this personality on a broader basis than any of the other republics, exercising the right of legation and entering into a number of international agreements.

Thus the USSR, to use the terminology of Alexandrowicz, is a contractual, and not an administrative federation, based on an agreement concluded among the first Soviet republics on December 30, 1922, much as the United States came into being by agreement among the thirteen original states. With the exception of Texas and California, however, no subsequent American states were at any time independent; they came into existence through domestic laws of the United States passed by the Congress. The Central Asian and Moldavian Soviet republics came into existence in a similar manner, following the formation of the USSR, through the decision of the central government. On this basis the members of the USSR may be divided into two categories:

(1) Formerly independent states that were joined to the USSR by

---

36 B. Halajczuk, *El estado ucranio del siglo 20* (Buenos Aires, 1953), pp. 93–94; unfortunately this is the only publication which attempts to systematize the material pertaining to the recognition of the Ukrainian state in 1917–20. For documentation on recognition by Russia see pp. 39–51, and by other nations, pp. 53–79.
force of conquest which in turn may be subdivided into (a) the signatories of the agreement of December 30, 1922, i.e., in addition to Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the three Transcaucasian republics (at that time merged into the Transcaucasian Federative SSR), and (b) the three Baltic republics, incorporated long after, in 1940.

(2) Republics established in an administrative manner, i.e., the five Central Asian republics, and the Moldavian SSR.

It should be added that the legal-historical division coincides to a certain extent with a national designation. Each republic in the first category corresponds to a nation and was created by the national group at one time or another. Each republic in the second category was established in accordance with the political plans of the government in Moscow. The so-called Moldavian SSR is directed against Rumanian national unity, and the Central Asian "nations" play similar, although more complicated parts, in relation to the Turkic nations and Iran.

The present constitution of the USSR recognizes no difference between the two categories of Soviet republics, but the legal-historical difference is obvious. On the one hand, states have been created by internal legal acts, and, on the other, regimes have been established by armed intervention in the territory of neighboring states. In the first instance, new states have been formed, in the second (as in the case of the satellites), existing states have undergone a transformation.

Such a transformation is clearly defined in the work of Markus which is the first essential study of the Soviet republics prior to their incorporation in the USSR in 1923 to make use of historical documentation and legal qualification of historical facts. He shows that the first Soviet Ukrainian government considered itself the government (naturally of the proletariat or "workers and peasants") of an already existing state, i.e., the Ukrainian People's (or Democratic) Republic. What had happened is what is referred to in international parlance as a "change in government."

37 Towster (pp. 112-113) presents interesting considerations concerning the artificial inception of autonomous republics.
The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows:

According to the opinions of some of the authors cited, the Ukrainian SSR was established on the basis of domestic Russian law within the framework of the federalization of a single Russian state, much as the province of São Paulo was made a state as a result of the federalization of Brazil. The present Ukrainian SSR was never the state of the Ukrainian people, nor was it a subject of international law; its international legal personality was a gift presented to Stalin by his two allies at Yalta.

Actually, however, the Ukrainian SSR is a state established in 1917 by the Ukrainian people which first lost its independence (1920), and then its international legal personality (1923). The Ukrainian SSR is what remains of the formerly independent Ukrainian state. The constitutional amendment of 1944, admission to membership in the UN, and the Peace Conference, merely signify the restoration of some of the competences of which the Ukrainian state had been forcibly deprived. The principle of state continuity, regardless of changes in

40 For elements of these views cf. Towster, pp. 94–95, 103–104. They were elaborated into a juridical theory by Krystyna Marek, a Polish specialist in international law, in her book *Identity and Continuity of States in International Public Law* (Geneva, 1954). She rejects the legal continuity of independent Poland prior to 1939 and the present satellite state, saying that independent Poland continues to exist headed by its government-in-exile in London, whereas the contemporary Polish state is a new formation founded in 1944. Marek's theory may be considered a systematization of the views expressed by international jurists among enslaved peoples, specializing in the question of the "existence in law" of effectively annexed states. The present author in his book *Los estados conquistados ante el derecho internacional*, pp. 53–78, presented a brief outline and critical analysis of these views.

41 It is interesting to note that the same reasons were presented in the note of the Kiev government, dated April 10, 1945, requesting admission of the Ukraine to the UN: "The Ukrainian SSR, on the basis of its Constitution of January 30, 1937, and the constitutional revisions and amendments adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on February 1, 1944, has recovered the right which it formerly had and which it voluntarily ceded to the USSR in 1922, to establish direct relations with foreign states, to conclude agreements with them, and to have independent representations at international conferences and bodies set up by the latter." Quoted by Hans Aufricht, "Principles and Practices of Recognition by International Organizations," *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 43 (1949), p. 697. On the same ground, Krylov stated that in 1923–1944, the Soviet republics preserved their status as subjects of international law "à l'état latent" (Krylov, *op. cit.*, p. 457). Markus, having defined the concept of sovereignty, recognizes that "le revirement constitutionnel de 1944 pourrait justifier l'interprétation, selon laquelle la souveraineté des républiques fédérées
government, and even in status, must be taken into consideration in an evaluation of the membership of the two republics in the UN.

*Universidad Catolica Argentina*
*Buenos Aires*

"se trouvait à un état potentiel ou, d’après Krylov, à ‘l’état latent’" *(op. cit., p. 260).*
Die Sowjetukraine und die europäischen volksdemokratischen Länder (1958-1960)

BORYS LEWYTZKYJ

Der nachstehende Überblick über die kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen der Ukrainischen SSR zu europäischen volksdemokratischen Ländern beschränkt sich auf eine Registrierung der wichtigsten Ereignisse dieser Art, vornehmlich im Zeitraum 1958–60.

Eine allgemeine Auflockerung brachte unter der Parole "Für erweiterte Rechte der Unionsrepubliken!" auch eine Belebung der Verbindungen zwischen den einzelnen Republiken und dem Ausland mit sich. Im Falle der Ukraine mehrten sich 1956 unter der Intelligenz, ja sogar bei den örtlichen Parteifunktionären, die Stimmen, welche auf Beseitigung der Schranken für direkte Beziehungen der Ukraine zum Ausland gerichtet waren.1 Obwohl die Ukrainische SSR bereits seit 1944 ein eigenes Außenministerium hat, ist ihre Aktivität in internationalen Organisationen, und vor allem in den Vereinten Nationen, viel größer als bei der Entwicklung auswärtiger politischer Verbindungen zu ihren unmittelbaren Nachbarn. Erst in jüngster Zeit wurde neben dem bereits zur Stalinzeit bestehenden Generalkonsulat der Volksrepublik Polen im April 1958 ein Generalkonsulat der VR Tschechoslowakei in Kiew eröffnet.2

Der illusorische Charakter der "selbständigen" Politik der Sowjet-


2 Nach dem Stand vom 1. Januar 1960 leitete Generalkonsul Wanda Michalewska
ukraine auf internationalem Gebiet braucht hier nicht besonders unterstrichen zu werden. Die ziemlich intensiven kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen der Ukraine und volksdemokratischen Ländern können als eine "sublimierte" Form politischer Bestrebungen der ukrainischen Intelligenz, der Partei- und Staatsbürokratie betrachtet werden, auf internationalem Gebiet eine Rolle zu spielen. Die Auswertung der sowjetukrainischen Presse und eine Konfrontierung der dort enthaltenen Angaben mit der Wirklichkeit rechtfertigen die These, daß das sowjetische Regime den Unionsrepubliken letztthin auf diesem Sektor gewisse Initiative und Bewegungsfreiheit zugesteht.


Diese Angaben aus dem gesamtsowjetischen Bereich sind wichtig, um die neue Situation in den ukrainisch-ausländischen kulturellen Verbindungen zu beleuchten. In dieser Republik bestand seit etlichen Jahren eine "Ukrainische Gesellschaft für kulturelle Verbindungen mit dem Ausland" (gegenwärtiger Vorsitzender—K. S. Lytwyn). Seit der WOKS-Reform entstehen in der Ukraine immer neue Filialen verschiedener sowjetischer Freundschaftsgesellschaften, in denen jeglicher Initiative zur Pflege ausländischer Beziehungen ziemlich umfangreicher Spielraum zugestanden wird. Derzeit bestehen ukrainische Filialen folgender sowjetischer Freundschaftsgesellschaften:


Alle Angaben stützen sich auf die laufende Auswertung der sowjetukrainischen
Ukrainische Filiale der Sowjetisch-albanischen Freundschaftsgesellschaft (seit Dezember 1958; Vorsitzender—M. K. Bilohurow, Journalist, Chefredakteur der “Prawda Ukrainy”)

Ukrainische Filiale der Sowjetisch-bulgarischen Freundschaftsgesellschaft (seit Dezember 1958; Vorsitzender—O.N. Schtscherban’, Vizepräsident der Akademie der Wissenschaften der Ukrainischen SSR)

Ukrainische Filiale der Sowjetisch-deutschen Freundschaftsgesellschaft (seit Dezember 1958; Vorsitzender—I. K. Bilodid, Volksbildungsminister der Ukrainischen SSR)

Ukrainische Filiale der Sowjetisch-polnischen Freundschaftsgesellschaft (seit Oktober 1958; Vorsitzender—M. T. Ryl’s’kyj, führender Schriftsteller); mit Unterfilialen in Lemberg (seit Januar 1959; Vorsitzender—M. S. Kich) und Tscherkassy (seit September 1960)

Ukrainische Filiale der Sowjetisch-rumänischen Freundschaftsgesellschaft (seit November 1958; Vorsitzender—K. F. Dankewytsch, bekannter Komponist)

Ukrainische Filiale der Sowjetisch-tschechoslowakischen Freundschaftsgesellschaft (seit November 1958; Vorsitzender—S. A. Kowpak, stellvertretender Vorsitzender des Präsidiums des Obersten Sowjets der Ukrainischen SSR); mit einer Unterfiliale in Smila (seit November 1959)

Ukrainische Filiale der Sowjetisch-ungarischen Freundschaftsgesellschaft (seit Dezember 1958; Vorsitzender—K. F. Moskalez, sowjetischer Spitzengewerkschaftsfunktionär)


Presse aus eigenem Archiv. In der Ukraine bestehen noch Filialen sowjetischer Freundschaftsgesellschaften mit der VR China, Frankreich, Italien und Österreich.

samten Ostblock statt. In Polen wurde Franko als ein Vorkämpfer der ukrainisch-polnischen Freundschaft dargestellt, und seine Verbindungen mit polnischen Politikern und Schriftstellern wurden betont.


4 Dort war übrigens zu lesen: "Wir in Polen sind für verschiedene Richtungen, verschiedene künstlerische Anschauungen, wir sind für Vielseitigkeit der Kunst, unsere Diskussion hat bei Tschechen, Jugoslawen und Ungarn ein Echo gefunden. Es wäre gut wenn auch die ukrainischen Künstler ihre Meinung zu dieser Angelegenheit kundtun würden."

5 Über den Stand der kulturellen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Sowjetukraine...
VR ČSR. Die ukrainisch-tschechoslowakische Zusammenarbeit wurde dadurch intensiviert, daß in der Ostslowakei eine ziemlich starke ukrainische Volksgruppe besteht, die eine kulturelle Tätigkeit, auch in tschechischer und slowakischer Sprache, entfaltet. Das kulturelle Zentrum dieser Gruppe, Prešov, verwandelte sich in ein Verbindungs­glied zwischen der Ukraine und der ČSR. Verhältnismäßig eng scheinen die Beziehungen zwischen westukrainischen und tschechoslowakischen Schriftstellern zu sein. Einen Schritt zu deren Vertiefung bildete unter anderem ein Treffen zwischen 18. und 24. Oktober 1958, das mit einer Erklärung über die Zusammenarbeit in tschechischer, slowakischer und ukrainischer Sprache am 24. Oktober in Ushhorod abgeschlossen wurde.6


VR Ungarn. Die Intensivierung der Beziehungen zwischen der Ukraine und der VR Ungarn in jüngster Zeit lässt sich in zwei Etappen einteilen. Für die erste von ihnen war die “Ukrainische

194 THE ANNALS OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY

6 Die Erklärung ist u.a. in der literarischen Zeitschrift Showten’ (Lemberg) vom Dezember 1958, S. 152, veröffentlicht.
7 Nach A. F. Kistschenko, Tschechoslowatschtschyna sawerschuje budiwnytswo sozialismu (Kiew, 1959), S. 43 u. 44.


9 Darüber schrieb auch I. Romantschenko in *Showten*, Nr. 5 (1958), S. 145–51.


**VR Albanien.** Im August 1959 wurde als erste größere Veranstaltung zur Vertiefung der albanisch-ukrainischen Freundschaft die "Albanisch-ukrainische Freundschaftswoche" in der VR Albanien abgehalten. Zahlreichen Berichten in der sowjetukrainischen Presse ist zu entnehmen, daß dies der erste Schritt Kiews war, die Albanische Öffentlichkeit über die Ukraine zu informieren. Ministerrat und ZK der KP der Ukraine erhielten aus albanischen Regierungs- und Parteikreisen Grußbotschaften mit der Bitte, die kulturellen Beziehungen zwischen Kiew und Tirana zu erweitern. In allen größeren Orten
Albaniens fanden Vorträge über ukrainische Wirtschaft und Kultur, sowie eine Photoausstellung über die Ukraine statt.


Die Wirtschaftsverbindungen zwischen der Sowjetukraine und volksdemokratischen Ländern sind im Rat für gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe—COMECON—festgelegt. Im Rahmen der durchgeführten Spezialisierung der Maschinenindustrie der Partnerstaaten erfolgte auch

¹¹ Ekonomika Radvans’koji Ukrainy (Kiew), Nr. 4 (1959), S. 55.


5. Die ukrainischen Volksgruppen in volksdemokratischen Ländern. Bei der Entwicklung der Beziehungen zwischen der Ukraine und Polen, der ČSR und Rumänien spielt eine bedeutende Rolle die Tatsache, daß sich in diesen Republiken eine ukrainische Volksgruppe befindet und die Ukraine bis zu gewissem Grade Anspruch auf deren kulturelle Betreuung erhebt.


München
Representation of Nationalities and Occupations in the Soviets*

PETER H. JUVILIER

During the elections of 1958–59, 1,810,859 deputies were elected to the soviets: 1378 deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet; 5312 deputies to 15 Union-republic supreme soviets; 2506 deputies to 19 supreme soviets of autonomous republics; and 1,801,663 deputies to 57,366 local soviets.¹

The complex hierarchy of soviets, which combine working administrative and more decorative elected representative organs, has evolved far since the soviets originated in 1905. Then they were primarily decentralized strike-coordinating committees. They reappeared in 1917 as competitors for power with the Provisional Government. Although under control of the Communist Party in the 1920s as organs of government, they remained forums for national and factional debates, debates which reflected both disputes within the Communist Party and incompletely monolithic control at local levels. But since the Great Purges of the 1930s and the establishment of the 1936 Soviet (once “Stalin”) Constitution, the soviets have been docile “levers and transmission belts” of Party policy at all levels.

What are the patterns of selection and election at the various levels of this hierarchy of soviets? Expressed in terms of the nationalities and occupations of the deputies, what do these patterns mean? Are

*The writer would like to thank Miss Ksenia Horoshak and Mr. Robert Lewis of Hunter College for assistance in some compilations.

¹ To the local soviets were elected: 19,010 to 139 territorial (kraevye), provincial (oblastnye) and regional (okrzhnye) soviets; 184,254 to 3,896 district (raionnye) soviets; 184,159 to 1,655 city (gorodskie) soviets; 68,251 to 390 city borough (raionnye v gorodakh) soviets; 1,224,590 to 48,292 village (sel’skie) soviets; 121,399 to 2,994 industrial settlement (poselkovye) soviets. Data on republic and local soviets are taken from the brochure Sostav deputatov verkhovnykh sovetov sovetskih, autonomnykh respublik i mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya 1959 g. (Moscow, 1959); henceforth referred to as Sostav. Of the 139 territorial, provincial, and regional soviets, about 126 are territorial or provincial, and the others soviets of the national regions (natsional’nye okruga). Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu (Moscow, 1960), p. 47.
they merely the chance outcome of Party preoccupation with procuring loyal candidates?

THE USSR SUPREME SOVET

Deputies were elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1937, 1946, 1950, 1954, and 1958. Under the 1936 Constitution, the Supreme Soviet replaced the original Union parliament, the unwieldy, indirectly elected USSR Congress of Soviets and its bicameral Central Executive Committee.

The Supreme Soviet, “highest organ of state power of the USSR,” has sole authority to legislate. This apparent separation of powers is vitiated, however, and unopposed Party control over lawmaking is enforced because:

(1) Many important normative acts are issued not as laws of the Supreme Soviet but as decisions of the Party Central Committee, the government, or the Party and government jointly.

(2) All branches of the government work under the guidance of the centralized Communist Party, which is the constitutionally established “leading core of all organizations, both public and state” (Article 126, USSR Constitution).

(3) Top Party and governmental leaders sit also in the Supreme Soviet as deputies (although it is true that ministers do not sit on the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet).

(4) Although extremely democratic appearances have been maintained in elections since 1937, when for the first time direct, secret, universal franchise replaced the indirect, open, class-discriminatory franchise under the 1918 and 1924 constitutions, the “bloc of Party and non-Party candidates” for deputies to the soviets runs unopposed, with only one candidate to a constituency. The Party-approved candidates fail to gain the necessary majority of votes only in scattered cases of election to the local soviets. Its general direction of the election campaigns and its leadership in the nomination of candidates is not denied by the Party: “The Communist Party, closely bound to the people, places itself at the head of all the work of the Soviet people during the election campaign, insures by its wise policy the electoral victory of the bloc of Communist and non-Party candidates.”

Nikita Khrushchev told three official American observers of the 1958

2 B. P. Kravtsov, Verkhovnyi Sovet SSSR (Moscow, 1954), p. 120.
elections to the Supreme Soviet that they were "quite right" to conclude that the party organization plays a major role in the selection of candidates.\(^3\)

Not only are Soviet writers frankly proud of the *Gleichschaltung* of their political life, but they are quite specific about the subordinate policy-making role of the Supreme Soviet. On the eve of the 1958 elections, the Chairman of the Council of the Union reaffirmed Party leadership in the Supreme Soviet, confirming that the Party makes the basic policy, which is then given force of law by the Soviet parliament: "Legislation and all activities of the highest organ of state power of the USSR proceed under the guidance of the Communist Party. . . . On the basis of Party directives, Soviet laws establish concrete means by which to achieve the goals which the Party sets for the Soviet people." \(^4\)

True to the prevailing form of Communist parliamentary systems is the absence in the halls of the Supreme Soviet of any opposition sentiment, spontaneous debate, decisive voting. Rather, sessions feature set speeches laced with propaganda, criticism of administrative officials, minor requests for help to the localities, with the rule that all "decisions are adopted unanimously on literally all items of the agenda." \(^5\)

The position of the deputy today is well summarized in the acceptance speech of Honored Metallurgist I. I. Chursinov, a foreman of the Pervouralsk Pipe Factory, following his nomination as candidate for deputy in the 1958 elections to the present USSR Supreme Soviet: "A deputy is the servant of the people, he must honestly and steadfastly carry out the will of the people, the mandate of the voters. I give the word of a Communist that I will be a faithful servant of the people; I will not deviate one step from the line of our own Communist Party." \(^6\) Thus, deputies are servants of the people only as they serve the Party by so being, by not deviating "one step from the line of our own Communist Party."

What does national, class, and occupational representation mean


in a bound parliament under such conditions, when policy is predetermined and "Communist deputies are the directing force in the Supreme Soviet as they are in all other organs of state power of our country"?7

Nationalities in the USSR Supreme Soviet. As part of the effort to place their policy toward the nationalities in the best possible light, the Communists set up two chambers with equal power in the Supreme Soviet. And they provided that while one chamber, the Council of the Union, would be elected on the basis of population, the other chamber, the Council of Nationalities, would be elected on the basis of national-territorial subdivisions.

What is meant by "representation" in the Council of Nationalities? It may be representation as depicted in (a) Soviet theory, (b) Soviet law, (c) numerical comparison of the national composition of the Council of Nationalities and the population, or (d) non-Soviet decision-making analysis (which may be disregarded here; as mentioned above, such analysis shows that, in the light of the political monopoly of the Party and the restricted nature of proceedings at sessions of the Supreme Soviet, the various interests—occupational and national groups—in Soviet society have small direct influence on legislation in the Supreme Soviet).

In theory, the Council of the Union represents what Stalin called the "common interests" of all the toilers of the USSR. The Council of Nationalities, said Stalin, represents the "special interests" of the nationalities into which these toilers may be classified.8 Representation by the two chambers (as corporate entities) of the "toilers" and of nationality groupings (as corporate entities) is even more directly expressed in the official university textbook on Soviet government, according to which the USSR Supreme Soviet "represents both the people as a whole and its nationalities."9

In law, the 1936 Constitution provides that deputies be elected to the Council of the Union from electoral districts, each of 300,000 inhabitants (in practice their size varies around this figure). Deputies must report to the voters from their own districts. The voters may recall them and elect others before the four-year term is up—as yet

7 Kravtsov, p. 51.
an unused provision. Here, then, the actors in the parliamentary stage play are *deputies* of the constituents who “elected” them, that is, who approved the single choice of candidate put to them. For the Council of Nationalities, similarly, the actors depicted in the law are the deputies from the single-member constituencies in national-territorial subdivisions of the USSR who together comprise the delegations from those subdivisions. At a given level all subdivisions have equal numbers of constituencies, and therefore equal delegations, regardless of population: 25 deputies from each Union republic, 11 from each autonomous republic, 5 from each autonomous province (*avtonomnaya oblast’*), and one from each national region (*natsional’nyi okrug*). This nonproportional representation is faintly reminiscent of the equal representation for all states in the United States Senate, but, therefore, unequal representation of the citizens within the states.

*Numerical* representation is defined here merely as the degree to which the aggregate proportions of various nationalities among the deputies in one or both chambers, regardless of where they were elected, correspond with their proportions among the population at large, regardless of where the members of a given nationality group reside. Deputies to the Council of Nationalities from a given national subdivision are as a rule not of a single nationality any more than are their constituents. When, then, we speak here of “Russians,” “Georgians,” and others in the Council of Nationalities, we mean *all* Russians, Georgians, and so forth, in that chamber regardless of where they were elected. The delegation of 25 deputies from the Georgian Republic to the Council of Nationalities, for example, consists mostly of Georgians, judging from their names. But it includes, apparently, at least one Russian, at least one Armenian, one Azerbaidzhanian or Ossetian, and other non-Georgians. Moreover, none of the 25 electoral districts in the Georgian Republic is likely to be entirely homogeneous in national composition. For the republic as a whole, the 1959 census reported the population as consisting of 64 per cent Georgians, 11 per cent Armenians, 10.1 per cent Russians, 3.8 per cent Azerbaidzhanians, 3.5 per cent Ossetians, and so on.

Because of the equal delegations from comparable national-territorial units, the twelve non-Slavic nationalities after which republics

---

11 *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu*, p. 18.
have been named, and many other non-Slavic groups as well, have been numerically over-represented in the Council of Nationalities, while the three Slavic nationalities after whom Union republics have been named—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians—have received much lower numerical representation there. The twelve non-Slavic nationalities just mentioned made up 13.5 per cent of the population in 1959, but a much higher proportion, 44.3 per cent, of the deputies elected to the Council of Nationalities for 1958–62. Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians added up to 76.3 per cent of the population in 1959, but only 33.1 per cent of the deputies in the Council of Nationalities. Thus, the proportion of Slavs in the Council of Nationalities was less than half the proportion of Slavs in the total population, while the proportion of the twelve non-Slavic nationalities mentioned was more than three times their proportion in the general population.

In the Council of the Union, however, Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians have been moderately over-represented numerically. They numbered 82.2 per cent of the deputies elected to the Council of the Union for 1958–62, and 76.3 per cent of the population in 1959. But when the two chambers are taken together as the entire membership of the Supreme Soviet, the Slavs are still considerably underrepresented numerically.

It is as yet impossible to move from the broad picture of numerical representation of nationalities in the chambers or Supreme Soviet as a whole to more detailed comparisons at the level of republics or smaller national-territorial subdivisions. There are no published figures for proportions of nationalities in the Supreme Soviet within the individual delegations to the Supreme Soviet from the republics, autonomous republics, autonomous provinces, and national regions. Nor do the census figures so far published reveal the national composition of the population in these national-territorial subdivisions. The Ingushes (a Caucasian mountain people who were deported for suspected disloyalty during the war and rehabilitated in 1956–58) are a case in point. We can say no more about the numerical representation of this people than that it is, as are some other minor non-Slavic groups, enormously over-represented numerically in the Council of Nationalities. Two Ingush deputies were elected to that chamber in

12 Ranked by size they are: Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Azerbaidzhans, Armenians, Georgians, Lithuanians, Moldavians, Latvians, Tadzhiks, Turkmens, Estonians, Kirgiz.
1958. Since there are 106,000 Ingushes in the population (1959), each deputy represents numerically and hypothetically, but not in electoral law, 53,000 Ingushes. But the 147 Russians in the Council of Nationalities must be compared with 114,114,000 persons in the USSR whom the 1959 census called Russian—one deputy for every 777,000 Russians in the USSR.13

But we cannot deduce numerical representation of only those Ingushes who live in the recently re-established Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic. First, we cannot be sure that the two Ingush deputies come from that republic, since we are not told their names—and therefore cannot compare them with the election results. Second, it is apparent from data on nationalities in the republic and local soviets that unknown numbers of Ingushes live scattered in at least six republics outside the RSFSR, where the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic is located.14

Whatever the facts about legal, theoretical, and numerical representation of nationalities in the Supreme Soviet, no special pleading for nationalities is heard in open sessions of that body. Deputies will mention their nationalities only to praise the policies of the Soviet regime toward them. If help is asked in the Council of Nationalities, or administrators criticized for incompetence, this will take the same form in both chambers, save that in the Council of the Union reference will be made to republics, cities, and provinces, while in the Council of Nationalities, the administrative or material help will be asked for republics, cities, and autonomous republics or autonomous provinces. These requests would have special national significance only if the national composition of the national-territorial subdivisions and of the delegations from them to the Supreme Soviet were considerably more homogeneous. Even then, the requests would not compare with the debates on national cultural autonomy which oc-


14 Sostav, pp. 12-13, 22-23, 74, 75, 77, 81, 82, 85.
curred in the soviets and the ranks of the Party in the 1920s and early 1930s.

The first special organizational bow to the nationalities came in February 1957, when the Economic Commission of the Council of Nationalities was established. The Economic Commission exists alongside the four regular standing commissions: Foreign Affairs, Credentials, Budget, and Legislative Proposals (there are four similar commissions in the Council of the Union), of which only the Budget and Legislative Proposals Commissions exercise minor decision-making functions.15

When Khrushchev proposed the formation of the Economic Commission to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, he envisaged it as a forum for settling disputes between Union republics on such matters as relative farm incomes. It would be able, he said, to make a comparative study of the economy of each republic because it would be a "multi-national, inter-republic organ, able to compare the situation in the various republics and to make well-rounded decisions. . . . This commission, composed of influential representatives from each republic and top-flight economists who know the republics, could study the labor costs of the different crops."16

Members of the commission have indeed been "influential." Of the thirty-one members of the commission as elected in 1957 for the first time, all but one were state or Party officials, and after the Supreme Soviet election in March 1958, all but two. Most numerous on the commission in 1958 were secretaries of republican party central committees (11), first secretaries of provincial committees (5), and chairmen of councils of national economy (sovnarkhozy) (4).17 The chairman since 1957 has been Olha Ivashchenko, a secretary in the Ukrainian Party Central Committee. The other thirty members come two from each of the fifteen Union republics (from the Ukrainian SSR,


a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic and the first secretary of Luhansk Province Party Committee).

The mandate of the Economic Commission of the Council of Nationalities as outlined in its statute and explanations to the deputies was broader than Khrushchev suggested in the above citation. The commission is to help correct discrepancies in the economic, social, and cultural development of the Union republics so as "to combine the interests of the Union republics with the interests of the nation as a whole." There were to be proposals for measures to be adopted in individual republics on the basis of comparative studies of development within the republics. Moreover, members of the Commission were to report to the Council of Nationalities on nation-wide economic plans coordinated with the economic and cultural needs of the republics.

Preliminary results of its work as reported in Soviet sources indicate that the Economic Commission has been a modest reflection of the general attempt by the Party to institutionalize at the legislative level, but without infringements on its monopoly of final policymaking, its "Leninist principle of combining centralized guidance with increased initiative and independence of local organs in matters of economic and cultural construction." 20

The Council of Nationalities differs from the Council of the Union as far as non-occupational features of the membership are concerned, not only because it has higher representation of national minorities but also because it has consistently contained higher proportions of non-Party members, deputies under 40 years old, deputies without higher education, and women (Table I). It should be noticed, however, that in both chambers, the percentage of women is the only ratio which has steadily increased. Proportions of Party members started to drop in 1954, and proportions of those with higher education and over 40 years of age decreased in 1958—reflecting the infusion of more workers and peasants and "non-officials" which will be discussed below.

**Table I.**

**SELECTED TRAITS OF THE DEPUTIES IN THE TWO CHAMBERS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET 1938–58 (per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age:</strong> per cent over 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Union</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Nationalities</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Full and Candidate Party Members</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Union</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>76.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Nationalities</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education:</strong> higher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Union</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Nationalities</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Union</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Nationalities</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>27.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*b*Zasedaniya Verkhovnogo Sověta SSSR (pervaya sessiya vtorogo sozyva), 12–19 marta 1946 g.: Stenograficheskii otchyt (Moscow, 1946), pp. 26–32, 38–42.


*e*Pravda, March 19, 1958.

Classes and Occupations in the USSR Supreme Soviet. Not only the national origins of the deputies are made into symbols of what the Party would like to have believed about the Soviet system. That about one out of four deputies is a woman, for example, “clearly reflects the position of . . . the women of our country,” who “on the basis of complete equality with men participate actively in all phases of the economic, cultural, public, and political life of the country.”

Because of the short and infrequent sessions of the Supreme Soviet, most deputies spend at least 90 per cent of their working time in their regular occupations elsewhere. These occupations determine their class membership in Soviet society, which has been divided since Stalin’s formulations of 1936 into working class, peasant class, or intelligentsia, which is labeled not a class but a “stratum.” Officially given per-

centages of workers and peasants among the deputies have been referred to perennially as proof that the composition of the Supreme Soviet "bespeaks the triumphs of thoroughgoing socialist democracy" (1938) or "clearly reveals the essence of Soviet democracy as genuine democracy for all the toilers" (1960). The percentages of workers and peasants, however, are actually lower than they appear in Soviet propaganda. Often either class origin has been substituted unannounced for class membership, or classifications in terms of occupation have been juggled (for example, by including collective farm chairmen among collective farm peasants [kolkhozniki] in 1958). The official Soviet classifications do not check with proportions of classes which may be derived from listings of occupations of the deputies. The gap between claim and reality has, however, narrowed recently (Table II).

Table II.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTUAL CLASS COMPOSITION OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET COMPARED WITH OFFICIAL FIGURES 1954 and 1958 (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a See Table III.

Actually deputies can be divided into four groups (Table III), which in 1958-62 consisted of (a) a "power elite" of Party and state officials, 39.2 per cent, and (b) a managerial-professional elite, 27.8 per cent, making a total white collar "intelligentsia" class of 67 per cent of the deputies; (c) collective farm peasants (including brigadiers and

machinery operators), 13.2 per cent; and (d) workers (including foremen and some state farm personnel), 19.8 per cent.

Table III.

WORKERS, PEASANTS, AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE TOP SOVIET BODIES OF THE USSR elected 1934–58 (per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Eighth Congress of Soviets</th>
<th>USSR Supreme</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934a</td>
<td>1937b</td>
<td>1950b</td>
<td>1954b</td>
<td>1958b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>19.8d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farm peasants</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>67.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Power elite&quot;</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional elite</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b Derived from Table IV.
c Includes foremen and brigadiers.
d Includes state farm workers.
e Includes farm machinery operators and brigadiers.

If discrepancies between these proportions and the official data on classes exist, and granted that the regime is not satisfied with the real class statistics based on present occupation, then why did it not simply alter the composition of the Supreme Soviet so that actual and desired class statistics would coincide? Then there would be no need for confusing the class issue in order that the Supreme Soviet may appear as the “living embodiment of the moral and political unity of Soviet society.”

The failure further to decrease the representation of officials and professional people and increase that of workers and peasants so as to equate them with official claims finds plausible explanation in the theory of T. H. Rigby that the social status of various groups in the USSR determines their relative representation in the Supreme Soviet.

Perhaps the regime has not wanted to sacrifice all for democratic symbolism because of a somewhat incompatible second aim pursued in selection of candidates for deputy. The most plausible explanation seems to be that there is a certain prestige attached to being a deputy, that nomination to the post of deputy is an honor where the office of deputy seeks the man, and not vice versa, and that there are many officials and professionals to be honored.

Deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet are a highly elite group not only in fact but also in propaganda. Election campaign agitation hails the lives and accomplishments of the future deputies, "best of the best, the most worthy sons and daughters of the Soviet people, who have in practice shown their devotion to the socialist motherland," as models after which the voters should shape their own lives.25

Full and candidate members of the Communist Party now number 76 per cent of the deputies, almost as high as the percentage (85) of those decorated with orders and medals. High Party membership and the presence among the deputies of "outstanding statesmen of the Communist Party and the Soviet state," intones an official text on Soviet government, "testify to the full and unbounded confidence of the Soviet people in the Communist Party and the Soviet government."26

Even the simplified class statistics already presented reveal what may be patterns of changing official status of various social-political groups. While Stalin lived, more than four-fifths of the deputies were members of his "new Soviet intelligentsia." But after Stalin the proportion dropped by 20 per cent—interestingly enough, not in the 1954 Supreme Soviet, but in 1958, by which time Khrushchev had assumed top leadership. State and Party officials lost ground in 1954 and 1958, although now still nearly four out of every ten deputies are officials (including military). For the first time in the history of the Supreme Soviet, the proportion of professional intelligentsia dropped off in 1958.

It is quite possible that those in charge of setting occupational quotas for the 1958 Supreme Soviet—and there is little doubt that such quotas were set—were guided by the Communist Party's policy

26 Umanskii, p. 254.
of extolling manual labor, concretely improving the status of the workers and peasants by raising lower pensions and minimum wages, condemning the contempt for manual labor prevalent among the increasingly class-conscious white-collar stratum, launching school reforms aimed at increasing practical training in school and funneling most secondary school graduates into at least two years' work before they could get into day college. All these are aspects of Khrushchev's policy of moderate "leveling."

If analysis of membership in the Supreme Soviet is carried into more detail according to the occupations of the deputies, other informative patterns are revealed within the four broad categories of deputies mentioned above: officials, professionals, workers, and peasants (Table IV). Among the deputies will be found:

Table IV.

OCCUPATIONS* OF DEPUTIES TO THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET
(approximate percentage
of total membership)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1937b</th>
<th>1950b</th>
<th>1954c</th>
<th>1958d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The &quot;Power elite&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Officials of Party, State and Public Organizations)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party*</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomol</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade-union</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet and ministry</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police, security, internal affairs</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procuracy and courts</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL &quot;POWER ELITE&quot;</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Results are not exact because of possible differences among methods of categorization in the sources, and the unknowns in some years.


c From lists of nominated and registered candidates in Pravda, February 8-20, 1954, and Izvestiya, February 7, 9-17, 1954; list of deputies elected (without occupation), Pravda and Izvestiya, March 18, 1954.

d Pravda, March 19, 1958, lists of deputies elected for the term 1958-62, including their occupations.

e Includes premiers and other ministers when they are also top Party leaders, as well as editors of such publications as Pravda.
NATIONALITIES AND OCCUPATIONS IN THE SOVIETS

### Working in Industry and Other Non-Agricultural Branches of the Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Managers, engineers, technicians</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen, brigadiers, workers</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL NON-AGRICULTURAL</strong></td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Agricultural Managers, Specialists, Workers, Peasants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collective farm chairmen</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTSs and MTSh directors, state farm chairmen</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agronomists, specialists, administrators</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State farm workers</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farm peasants</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL IN AGRICULTURE</strong></td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Intellectuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scientists, academics, doctors</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers in elementary and secondary schools</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writers, artists, etc.</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL INTELLECTUALS</strong></td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Unknown and others

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Includes chairmen of village soviets.

*Repair Tractor Stations.

*Machine-Tractor Stations.

(1) Virtually all Party leaders: members of the Central Committee and its Presidium (up to 1952, Politburo) and Secretariat (and up to 1952, Orgburo)\(^{27}\)

(2) Virtually all the following officials, many of whom are in the Central Committee: first secretaries of Party committees of the Union

---

\(^{27}\) Deputies elected in last two elections are listed in *Pravda*, February 7, 1954, and March 19, 1958; Central Committees elected are listed in Leo Gruliow, ed., *Current Soviet Policies* (New York, 1953), pp. 236–42 (for 1952 results), and XX Sezd, II, 500–503 (for 1956 results). Although Central Committees and new Supreme Soviets were not elected in the same years, high correlation between membership in the Central Committee and in the Supreme Soviet is clear when a check of the above sources shows that 95 per cent, at least, of those who were full members of the Central Committee in both 1952 and 1956 were elected also as deputies in 1954.
republics and autonomous republics, chairmen of the councils of ministers of the Union republics and autonomous republics, chairmen of the presidiums of the supreme soviets of the Union republics

(3) Most of the first secretaries of provincial and territorial Party committees (the most numerous single group of officials in the Supreme Soviet); and, among non-official deputies, chairmen of Union-republic academies of science

(4) A sizable proportion of chairmen of presidiums of supreme soviets of autonomous republics; members of the USSR government (ministers, etc.)

There have been significant changes in representation of the following official and non-official groups in the Supreme Soviet:

(1) State and Party officials (decreasing proportion). The least decline has been in Komsomol and trade-union officials, greater in officials of the soviets and ministries, greater still in military personnel, and greatest of all in police officials, with the only gain since Stalin being in officials of the procuracy and courts (from 2 in 1950 to 4 in 1954 and 1958). The number of USSR ministers among the deputies fell to one in 1950, rose to virtually all in office at the time of the 1954 elections, and fell moderately in 1958. Forty chairmen of the new (1957) regional councils of the national economy (sovarkhozy) were elected in 1958.

(2) Workers (increasing proportion). A sharp increase in 1958 over 1954 occurred possibly for reasons mentioned earlier, in connection with Khrushchev's revisions in social and economic policy.

(3) Peasants (increasing proportion). There has been a dramatic increase from about 17 among 1316 deputies in 1950 to 84 in 1954 and over 180 out of 1378 deputies in 1958, when for the first time since

28 The dramatic decrease for the police does not mean that the security police are not still important in the USSR. Yet police—ministers of internal affairs and state security, etc.—who made up a solid phalanx of 61 in the Supreme Soviet elected in 1937, at the height of the purges, with their "iron Commissar of the Interior, Comrade Ezhov," numbered only 15 in 1954, and only 3 in 1958 (former Chairman of the Committee of State Security, General Serov, and the ministers of internal security of Azerbaidzhan and Belorussia, but not the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Dudorov). Members of the procuracy and the courts were always less numerous than policemen until 1958, when as in 1954 there were four (USSR Procurator General Rudenko, procurator of the Belorussian Republic, the chairmen of the Supreme Courts of the Lithuanian and Kirgiz Republics) but only three policemen.
1937 peasants outnumbered collective farm chairmen, and the total agricultural sector as a result received much higher representation.

(4) Intellectuals (increasing, then decreasing proportion). The aggregate proportion of the professional intelligentsia increased up to 1954, then appreciably declined in 1958—merely a reflection, it seems, of the first decline in official status of the white-collar class since Stalin's purges of the thirties.

Clearly, it would be foolhardy to try to make precise measurements of status of various groups from the above data. Yet, if relative representation of each occupational group in the Supreme Soviet (proportion in the Supreme Soviet divided by proportion in the population) indicates, at least approximately, its relative status in the eyes of the Communist Party, the proportions in Table IV permit such an approximate ranking to be made, after comparison with proportions in the working population.\(^{29}\) The rankings emerge: (a) Party leaders, (b) republic and provincial Party chiefs, (c) state and military officials, (d) professional intelligentsia, (e) workers, (f) peasants.

**SUPREME SOVIETS OF THE UNION AND AUTONOMOUS REPUBLICS AND THE LOCAL SOVIETS**

Supreme Soviets of the Union and autonomous republics are lower, unicameral counterparts of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They are elected also for four-year terms, the last time on March 1, 1959. In the elections, 5,312 deputies were returned to the 15 Union-republic supreme soviets. The basis of representation varied from one deputy for 150,000 inhabitants (RSFSR) and one for 100,000 (Ukraine) to one for 5000 (Kirgiz, Tadzhik, Armenian, and Turkmen Republics). The largest supreme soviets are those of the RSFSR (835), the Ukraine (457), Kazakhstan (450), Uzbekistan (444), and Belorussia (407). The smallest is that of Estonia (125).\(^{30}\)

The supreme soviets of the 19 autonomous republics, which form subdivisions within some of the Union republics, received 2,506 deputies. These soviets vary in size from 220 deputies (Bashkir) to a low of 66 (Nakhichevan).\(^{31}\)

---

\(^{29}\) *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu*, pp. 583–84.

\(^{30}\) *Sostav*, p. 7; *Konstitutsiya (osnovnoi zakon) SSSR; Konstitutsii (osnovnye zakony) soyuznykh sotsialisticheskikh respublik* (Moscow, 1956), pp. 41, 75, 104, 132, 167.

\(^{31}\) *Sostav*, p. 17.
Soviets from the Supreme Soviet down to the village level have little or no policy-making power in practice. Local soviets, have, of course, many local governmental responsibilities. But policies are set within the Party hierarchy. State administration of these policies is entrusted not to the full soviets, which meet infrequently, but to councils of ministers outside the soviets at republic levels, and to executive committees forming part of the soviets at the local level. There seems to be some participation of the deputies in minor revisions and seeing to the execution of decisions in permanent commissions of the supreme soviets, and in checking up on the state of public services in the analogous commissions of the local soviets.32

Nationalities in Republic and Local Soviets. Comparison of proportions of the nationalities in the soviets with their relative weight in the population, republic by republic, is the basis here for judging how well each nationality is represented numerically in the soviets. To complete the picture, of course, it would be necessary to know the proportion of nationalities in the executive organs of the soviets, the governments, and the Party hierarchy, as well as in all leading posts.

Russians are under-represented numerically in the Union-republic supreme soviets and local soviets (aggregated) of all republics save the RSFSR (where the proportion of Russians among the deputies approximates the proportion of Russians among the inhabitants), Moldavia (Russians slightly over-represented in the supreme soviet and under-represented in the local soviets), Belorussia and Lithuania (Russians over-represented in the supreme soviet).33 Ukrainians are over-represented more widely than are the Russians: at both levels in the

32 Aspects and limitations of the functions of ordinary deputies and the extent of their participation in the local governmental and policy-transmitting work of the executive committees of the soviets are described from the Communist point of view in the increasing literature on local government in the USSR, such as Yuridicheskii spravochnik deputata mestnogo soveta (Moscow, 1960); Polozheniya o postoyannykh komissiyakh mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya (Moscow, 1958); Polozhenie o postoyannykh komissiyakh mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya Ukrainskoi SSR (Kiev, 1957); M. G. Kirichenko, Vysshie organy vlasti soyuznykh respublik (Moscow, 1958); E. I. Kozlova, Ispolnitel'nye komitety gorodskikh sovetov (Moscow, 1960).

33 The national distribution of deputies in the republic supreme soviets and local soviets is taken from Sostav, pp. 12-13, 70-85. Data on proportions of leading nationalities in the population of each republic are taken from Narodnoe khozyais-tvo SSSR v 1959 godu, pp. 16-20.
Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia; and at the republic level in Turkmenia and Tadzhikistan. They are under-represented in Latvia.

Only one of the 15 republic nationalities, the Belorussian, is under-represented in its own republic and local soviets, while in Kazakhstan, where Russians outnumber Kazakhs, 42.7 to 30 per cent of the population, Kazakhs outnumber Russians in the republic and local soviets by approximately these ratios in reverse (46.2 per cent to 35.1 per cent in the republic supreme soviet).

Jews are one of the problem nationalities. They are under-represented almost everywhere, usually by large ratios, save in the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. Here are some percentages of Jews in the soviets, compared with percentages in the population: in the RSFSR, 0.12 in republic supreme and 0.36 in local soviets (0.7 in population); in the Ukraine, 0.22 and 0.52, respectively (2.0 in population); and in Georgia, none and 0.15, respectively (1.3 in population).

Poles fare little better. In Belorussia they make up 6.7 per cent of the population, yet only 0.98 per cent of the deputies in the supreme soviet, with none listed for the local soviets—although some possibly in the 2.96 “others.” In Lithuania, the percentages are 8.5 in the population, 2.87 in the supreme soviet and 6.16 in local soviets. In Latvia, one finds none listed for local soviets, and 1.5 per cent in the supreme soviet, for 2.9 per cent of the population.

Germans are another problem nationality. But this brings us to the question of the autonomous republics which were abolished during the war.

Wartime deportations of nationalities in the USSR first drew high-level Russian condemnation in a large forum during Khrushchev’s secret speech of February 24–25 to the Twentieth Party Congress. Khrushchev deplored as “monstrous acts” the obliteration of the Kalmyk, Chechen-Ingush, and Balkar (part of the Kabardino-Balkar) Autonomous Republics and the Karachai Autonomous Province, and the deportation of the respective nationalities with its attendant “misery and suffering.” He did not mention the deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans.

In January 1957 the government initiated the return to their homes of those peoples whose deportation Khrushchev mentioned, and the formation of the Chechen-Ingush and Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republics and the Karachai-Cherkess and Kalmyk Autonomous Provinces. Subsequently the Kalmyk Autonomous Province became an autonomous republic, but not in time for the 1958 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Special elections to their supreme soviets were held, it appears, in the Chechen-Ingush and Kalmyk Autonomous Republics in 1958 instead of 1959.

Germans, not represented in the USSR Supreme Soviet after the deportations, had made up 1.57 per cent of its Council of Nationalities elected in 1937, as against 0.84 per cent of the population of the USSR (before the 1939 annexations).

Interestingly, Germans were elected in 1959 to Union-republic and local soviets. Four were elected to the 450-member Kazakh Republic Supreme Soviet (fifth out of fourteen national groups); and one each to the Kirgiz and Tadzhik Supreme Soviets. To the Kazakhstan local soviets, 1540 (1.9 per cent) of 81,186 total deputies were elected, and 86 (0.49 per cent) of 17,493 in Kirgizia. A scattering of German deputies was elected in the RSFSR (15), the Ukraine (34), and Estonia (1). The percentage of Germans out of all deputies (0.093) elected to local soviets is far below their percentage of the USSR population (0.725).

These data for Germans elected to the soviets seem to indicate that they are now heavily concentrated in Kazakhstan and Kirgizia.

Classes and Occupations in the Republic and Local Soviets. Union republic and autonomous republic supreme soviets have similar averages of Party members, college graduates, and women among their deputies (Table V). Between the republic and the local level, and on

---


37 Sostav, p. 17.

38 Towster, p. 399; Pervaya sessiya, 1938, p. 67.

39 Sostav, pp. 12, 13, 71, 72, 81, 85; Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1959 godu, p. 13.
### Table V.

SELECTED TRAITS OF DEPUTIES TO THE REPUBLIC AND LOCAL
SOVIETS, 1959\(^a\)

(per cent, except where noted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Aut.</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep. Rep.</td>
<td>All(^b)</td>
<td>Province, District</td>
<td>City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territory,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Absolute No. of Soviets | 15 | 19 | 57,366 | 139 | 3896 | 1655 | 48,292 |
| Absolute No. of Deputies | 5312 | 2506 | 1,801,663 | 19,010 | 184,254 | 184,159 | 1,224,590 |
| Age 40 & over | 61.1 | 59.5 | 39.5 | 54.8 | 42.3 | 46.7 | 37.0 |
| Full and Candidate Members of Party | 70.4 | 68.5 | 45.0 | 62.3 | 58.6 | 52.5 | 41.0 |
| With Higher Education | 41.9 | 41.2 | 11.2 | 34.8 | 21.3 | 22.4 | 6.7 |
| Women | 32.3 | 32.4 | 38.3 | 36.5 | 38.2 | 39.4 | 38.1 |

\(^a\) *Sostav deputatov verkhovnykh sovietov soyuznykh, avtonomnykh respublik i mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya* 1959 g. (Moscow, 1959), *passim.*

\(^b\) This column ("All") contains, in addition to the four categories shown to the right in the table, the city borough and industrial settlement soviets.

Down to the village soviets, the proportion of deputies over 40, of Party members, and of college graduates decreases, and the representation of women increases. But average Party membership does not drop lower than the 41 per cent at the village-soviet level, varying in the hierarchy of soviets, then, from 76 to 41 per cent.

Comparison of classes and occupations of the lower soviets with those of the USSR Supreme Soviet may be risky because the detailed statistics on occupation of deputies of the lower soviets, all summed up in the Soviet pamphlet *Sostav deputatov verkhovnykh sovietov soyuznykh, avtonomnykh respublik i mestnykh sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya* (1959), are not so reliable or unambiguous as those compiled for the USSR Supreme Soviet from lists of candidates or elected deputies.
Table VI.

WORKERS, PEASANTS, AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN THE REPUBLIC AND LOCAL SOVIETS ELECTED 1959a
(per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union Rep.</th>
<th>Aut. Rep.</th>
<th>Local Province, District</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Village Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasantsb</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligentsia</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Power elite&quot;</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Data from Table VII.
b This column ("All") contains, in addition to the four categories shown to the right in the table, the city borough and industrial settlement soviets.
c Calculated as collective farm peasants minus collective farm chairmen (see Table VII). Collective farm chairmen are included in the category of Intelligentsia—Professionals.

Table VII.

OCCUPATIONS OF DEPUTIES TO THE REPUBLIC AND LOCAL SOVIETS, 1959a
(per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Union Rep.</th>
<th>Aut. Rep.</th>
<th>Local Province, District</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Village Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Officials</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komsomol Officials</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade-Union Officials</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in Soviet Organs</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Workers in State and Public Institutions and Organizations</td>
<td>——</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a Data from Sostav, passim.
b This column ("All") contains, in addition to the four categories shown to the right in the table, the city borough and industrial settlement soviets.
If the Soviet statistics in Table VII are accurate, they merit greater study than is possible here. They describe occupational representation in the republic supreme soviets elected in 1959 which is similar to that in the USSR Supreme Soviet elected in 1958, with the principal exception of the very high percentage of officials in the autonomous-republic supreme soviets (45.1 versus 39.2 in the USSR Supreme Soviet). Percentages of officials and total agricultural sector of the Union republic supreme soviets, in fact, tally almost exactly with those in the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Below the republic level, soviets are elected, of course, from areas with increasingly specialized economic and political conditions. Averages for each level reflect local conditions, especially below the provincial level. Thus, 60.7 per cent of deputies to village soviets work in agriculture, while 60.7 per cent of deputies to city soviets work in non-agricultural production, and over half the deputies to the district soviets also work in agriculture. The largest single groups are the collective farm peasants in village soviets (56.6 per cent) and the workers in city soviets (43.9 per cent). The high representation of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>20.6</th>
<th>18.2</th>
<th>18.8</th>
<th>23.2</th>
<th>14.7</th>
<th>43.9</th>
<th>12.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military Personnel</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise Directors and Shop Chiefs</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers and Technicians</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants, Total inc.</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coll. Farm Chairmen</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directors of RTS and State Farms</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agronomists and Other Agricultural Specialists</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientists and Scholars</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians and Other Medical Workers</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers in Elementary and Secondary Schools</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writers and Artists</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
professional intelligentsia in the villages includes mainly teachers and doctors.

Official statements and election results lead to the conclusion that neither loyalty nor nationality nor merit nor occupation alone govern the choice of deputies, except in the minority of cases involving exalted political or scientific rank, in themselves guarantee of election. Rather, in most cases, people are selected whose attributes best serve Party purposes in given localities at given levels of soviets. And representation has, of course, limited meaning in such a manipulative context.

There is little doubt that the Communist Party, which openly proclaims its control of elections to the soviets, sets approximate quotas for specific nationalities, occupations, and so on, at each level and for each region. The composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet is publicized in a manner intended to symbolize attributes of the Soviet system which the Party wishes people at home and abroad to accept as true: for example, national unity and brotherhood; much greater democracy than in capitalist countries, whose parliaments are monopolized by members of “exploiting classes” or their “lackeys”; “moral and political unity of Soviet society”; solidarity of the people with the Party and the government; and equality of women. The Party has some difficulty reconciling class symbolism of democracy in the composition of the Supreme Soviet with the need to honor many high officials and intellectuals.

Finally, it must be remembered that for keys to change within centers of policy-making in the USSR, one must go beyond the subject matter of this essay, into the makeup of central Party and state bodies which control the soviets. Representation in the soviets tells more about Party policies than it does about who makes them.

Hunter College
Since the late 1930s, when the Ukrainian question assumed major importance in German-Soviet relations, world attention has been focused on the considerable area of the Ukraine, its population, which forms one of the most numerous national units of Europe, its extensive natural resources, and its important industry. From the political standpoint, most attention has been directed to the nature of the ties between the Ukraine and Moscow. The existence of national distinctions between the Ukrainians and the Russians and the political significance of these distinctions have understandably constituted the principal subject for investigation for most scholars in America and Western Europe concerned with Ukrainian affairs.¹

Understandable as the concentration upon the Ukraine as a national unit in the USSR has been, it has perhaps reduced the attention which might have been given to Ukrainian political affairs as a major segment of general Soviet political development, quite apart from questions of nationality. In number of members, the Communist Party of the Ukraine (CPU) is the largest division of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In a Soviet discussion of aspects of Party history which need special attention, the Ukrainian, Moscow, and Leningrad branches have been ranked together as "extremely large Party organizations" concerning which no works were available in 1956.²

The Party organizations in the "two capitals" have obviously been key elements in the chronic struggle for power within the Soviet regime, and by and large have received adequate treatment in West-

¹ This is true both of strictly political studies such as Basil Dmytryshyn's Moscow and the Ukraine (New York, 1956) and the present writer's Ukrainian Nationalism (New York, 1955), and of studies of cultural developments such as George Luckyj's Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine (New York, 1956) and Friedrich Heyer's Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine (Köln-Braunsfeld, 1953).
² "XX Sezd KPSS i zadachi issledovaniya istorii partii," Voprosy istorii, No. 3 (March 1956), pp. 3-12.
ern analyses of politics in the USSR. The crucial role of the Ukrainian Party has not always been equally well recognized. Until the 1950s the complex development of relations between the Russian Bolsheviks and Ukrainian parties had scarcely been explored in studies in Western European languages. Now the important works by John S. Reshetar, Iwan Majstrenko, and Jurij Borys go far toward filling this gap. In the near future Columbia University Press will publish an impressive work (which the present writer has been privileged to read in manuscript) by Robert S. Sullivant dealing with the entire period of Soviet rule in the Ukraine, but most detailed on the 1920s. Michael Luther is also preparing a work dealing with Ukrainian Communism in the 1920s.

The period prior to 1933 is one in which the principal interest of Ukrainian Party politics attaches to the struggle with "national deviation" in its numerous forms. Consequently, the Party history of this period is essentially an extension of the study of the distinctions between Moscow and the Ukraine mentioned above, although a careful examination of the Ukrainian Party conflicts may significantly illuminate the struggle between Stalin and his opponents of the "Left" and the "Right" oppositions as well. In the later 1930s, on the other hand, while echoes of national tendencies still appear, the focus of interest shifts to the role of the Ukrainian Party apparatus on the all-Union political scene. Until recently the vital role of the Ukrainian Party in the intensification of the Great Purge in 1937 was unrecognized. In 1954, however, Hryhory Kostiuk published an analysis of the very scattered evidence in Soviet sources and émigré accounts on the role of the Ukrainian apparatus leaders (particularly Pavel P. Postyshev) in the opposition to Stalin at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Party. In 1956 the importance of Postyshev in this intra-Party struggle was dramatically confirmed by Nikita Khrushchev in his secret

3 The Ukrainian Revolution (Princeton, 1952).
5 The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine (Stockholm, 1960).
6 The Fall of Postyshev (New York, 1954). See also Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine (New York, 1961) by the same author. While I am inclined to attach somewhat less importance to nationality factors as influencing the actions of the Ukrainian Party leaders (after 1933) than does Mr. Kostiuk, I am in general agreement with his conclusions.
speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. But as early as 1953 the key position of the Ukrainian Party opposition to Stalin was suggested by the recognition given Hryhoriy Petrovsky, who had been consigned to obscurity at the same time that Postyshev and other leaders were removed from office.\(^7\) The early rehabilitation of Petrovsky—possibly at the instance of Lavrentii Beria—suggests that the reappraisal of Ukrainian Party history of the late 1930s may have a direct bearing upon present rivalries in the CPSU, and consequently merits the closest attention.

It is in the period since the Great Purge, however, that the Ukrainian Party organization assumes a very special position as a key to the development of the entire CPSU. Part of this importance is due simply to the fact that we can study the Ukrainian Party with greater facility and accuracy than almost any other branch of the CPSU. The fact that the Ukraine was occupied in its entirety by the Germans means that there the Iron Curtain which sealed off most of the USSR between 1938 and 1953 was temporarily lifted. Many important German reports on political conditions in the Ukraine were made public in connection with the Nuremberg trials. The numerous émigrés who left the Soviet Ukraine during the war have provided valuable memoir material. In addition, the Ukraine has apparently been the subject of a larger number of special studies in the Soviet Union than have comparable areas. This is true of books on the partisan movement, and also of regional Party organization studies. Most of the latter works, still unpublished, are available only in the Lenin Library, but it may be hoped that some Western students will be able to examine them there.\(^8\)

Despite the significance of these special sources, much the most

\(^7\) Petrovsky (who died recently) was apparently the only political leader disgraced in the Great Purge who survived Stalin. As far as I can determine, Petrovsky was never mentioned in the Soviet press between 1938 and 1953. However, in the libel suit brought by Viktor Kravchenko against certain French writers and publications, a Soviet witness, endeavoring to refute the plaintiff’s charge that the leaders of the Ukrainian Party had been purged, stated that Petrovsky was working in Moscow. *Le Procès Kravchenko: Compte Rendu Sténographique* (Paris, 1949), I, 534.

\(^8\) See my “Clues to the Soviet Political Archives,” *Russian Review*, XVI (April 1957), 47–52. The most important Soviet book on the Ukraine during World War II is M. Suprunenko, *Ukraina v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine Sovetskogo Soyuza, 1941–1945 gg.* (Kiev, 1956); several other important studies have been published in *Ukrayins’kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal.*
important body of material for study of the Ukrainian Party remains the daily press. American libraries (particularly the Library of Congress and the New York Public Library) have almost complete files of the principal republic-level newspapers published in the Ukraine since 1938, except for the months immediately preceding the fall of Kiev to the Germans and following its recapture by the Soviet Army. While the coverage provided by the Kiev press would be much extended if we possessed files of the principal provincial papers as well, the available material is sufficient to provide a day-to-day outline of CPU activities, and particularly to trace the careers of the more important Party officials. Except for the Moscow press, no comparably complete Soviet newspaper files are available.9

The value of the “central” newspapers (those of all-Union scope published in Moscow) is much reduced by the fact that the central bodies of the CPSU met very irregularly during Stalin’s lifetime, and even when they did meet their sessions were reported scantily, if at all, in the press. Union-republic Party organizations, on the other hand, met with comparative regularity:

In local Party organizations the violation of the Leninist norms of Party life was not the same as in those units of the Party apparatus which Stalin influenced directly. . . . Before and after the war, conferences of province (oblast’) and territory (krai) Party organizations, congresses of Communist parties of the Union republics, and plenums of Party committees were held more or less regularly. The congresses, conferences, and plenums collectively discussed and solved most important problems of economic and cultural work, and sharp criticism was directed at leading Party workers.10

The major purpose of the assertion quoted above, it would appear, was to improve the record of Khrushchev’s faction in the Union-Republic Party organization as compared to that of his Presidium rivals associated with the central apparatus. In fact, however, the statement is generally correct. Between 1938 and 1953 four congresses

9 On materials on Ukrainian politics, see Jurij Lawrynenko, Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy toward the Ukraine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1917–1953 (New York, 1953). Files of the principal newspapers published in other Union-republic capitals are relatively complete (in the Library of Congress) for the period after World War II, but are extremely fragmentary for the prewar period; Leningrad newspaper files are generally fragmentary.

of the CPU were held, as compared to two of the CPSU; much more important, the plenums of the CPU Central Committee met on the average almost four times a year. Discussions at the congresses, and particularly at the plenums, provide a great deal of material on Ukrainian Party activities. In particular, reports of plenum discussions which indicate topics discussed and the participants, provide clues to the relative prominence of CPU Central Committee members and the special subjects with which they were concerned. While there is less direct evidence of criticism of Party leaders at these meetings, it does seem that the “oligarchy” of Central Committee members, especially the powerful provincial first secretaries, took part in “collective discussion and solution” of major problems.

As the above passage from Kommunist indicates, this type of “Party regularity” also prevailed in other republics. In many, however, meetings of Party bodies appear to have been less frequent than in the Ukraine, or at least were less consistently reported. Moreover, the considerable size and diversification of the Ukraine, especially in economic matters, make its Party operations more representative of the USSR as a whole than is the case with the smaller republics. Among the USSR republics, only in the Ukraine are there provincial secretaries whose authority approaches in scope that of the major provincial secretaries in the Russian Republic (RSFSR), which does not have a fully separate Party organization.

Then, too, the Ukrainian Party is especially important as an area of study because of its association with Khrushchev. It may be expected that Khrushchev developed or learned in the Ukrainian Party many of the practices he now follows in the CPSU as a whole. Indeed, it may well be that one major reason why Khrushchev is acceptable to the Party leaders who have supported him against his rivals is the example of conducting an “oligarchic” form of Party direction which he set in the Ukraine. Careful study of the Ukrainian organization

---

11 See the list in Ukrayins'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal, No. 3 1958. A check against the original notices of plenums in the Ukrainian press indicates, however, that the list omits the plenum of December 1947 (when Khrushchev was re-elected first secretary after having been temporarily displaced by L. M. Kaganovich) and the plenum of June 1953 (when O. I. Kyrychenko replaced L. G. Mel'nikov as first secretary). In addition, the list omits some data concerning certain plenums which it mentions. Consequently, the careful researcher will still find it necessary to turn to original press notices in examining the activities of the Ukrainian Party plenums.
may, therefore, help in understanding the significance of many steps which Khrushchev is now taking.

At the same time, it should be noted that a large part of Khrushchev’s support has been derived from earlier associates in the Ukraine. These include persons not members of the Party apparatus, such as Ivan A. Serov, Chairman of the Committee on State Security during a crucial period of Khrushchev’s rise to power, who headed the Ukrainian NKVD just before the war. More important are the numerous Ukrainian Party officials who went on to prominent posts in the all-Union Party before Khrushchev became First Secretary of the CPSU in 1953; for example, Leonid L. Brezhnev went from the secretaryship of Dnipropetrovsk Province to a succession of important posts in other republics and in the central Party organization. Still more significant are the many Ukrainian Party officials who have been transferred to key posts in the RSFSR since Khrushchev established his general primacy in 1955. Careful study of the Ukrainian Party organization not only makes it possible to trace such instances of transfer, but provides essential details concerning the backgrounds of the officials transferred.

In addition to its absorption in the central power struggle, the Ukrainian apparatus has had certain unique experiences which make study of it rewarding. The territorial expansion of the USSR in 1939 and subsequent years entailed a very considerable expansion of the activities of the Soviet state and Party apparatus, and the use of special techniques to impose the Soviet system upon the hostile populations. As a great part of the new territories were annexed to the Ukrainian SSR, these developments are more clearly revealed by study of the Ukrainian Party than by examination of any other segment of the CPSU. Other specific experiences of the Ukrainian apparatus are related to World War II. The war affected the entire Party organization of the Soviet Union, but it struck the Ukrainian segment with particular force because all of the Republic was at one time or another under German occupation. The Ukrainian Party faced in acute form the problems of evacuation of industry, reassignment of apparatus personnel, and reintroduction of Soviet control after reconquest. The special attention which Khrushchev and other leading Party and NKVD figures devoted to the Ukrainian partisan movement is also very revealing, as is the relation of Khrushchev and his lieutenants—such as Oleksiy I. Kyrychenko—to the military com-
mands in which they served as political officers. The present writer has dealt with many of the topics just discussed in a recent book. In this study the primary focus is upon the organization of the Party and state apparatus, the careers of its personnel, and the interplay of forces in the directing group.

Much more remains to be done in examining the entire relationship of the Ukrainian apparatus to the Soviet regime as a whole, particularly in the direction of economic affairs. A thorough study of agriculture in the Ukraine would be especially useful for the light which it would throw upon Khrushchev's experience in this field and his ideas for agricultural reorganization. Similarly, an intensive study of the industrial management in the Ukraine, especially the relationship of the managerial class to the Party officials, would be very valuable. The fact that some of the most important early moves in industrial "decentralization" (notably the formation of Union-republic ministries of coal and of steel production) were made in the Ukraine is undoubtedly significant. Conversely, that the formation of councils of national economy (sovnarkhozy) led to the establishment of fewer units than there are provinces in the Ukraine, in contrast to the RSFSR, where the numbers almost coincided, is scarcely accidental, and deserves careful investigation.

There is a crying need for an annotated translation of Khrushchev's speeches. While the present writer does not regard Khrushchev as an absolute dictator, he has unquestionably exercised more influence upon the course of Soviet affairs than any other individual in the past thirty years, excepting only Stalin and perhaps Zhdanov. In spite of the generally stereotyped nature of Khrushchev's pronouncements during Stalin's lifetime, much can be learned from them. They should be subjected to content analysis to determine the relative emphasis which he gave to the matters he discussed, and the origins of his turns of phrase and figures of speech should be traced. Publication of a complete collection of Khrushchev's speeches is planned.


in the USSR, but it seems highly likely that that version will be expurgated. Using texts in Ukrainian newspapers (many available only in the Ukrainian language), an objective scholar could compile a fairly complete collection of Khrushchev's public speeches during the period 1938–49.

Special studies should be made of certain key periods in the Ukrainian political history of the past twenty years. Prominent among them are the Zhdanovshchina, with its special impact on Ukrainian cultural affairs, and the overlapping period of Kaganovich's tenure of the First Secretaryship of the Ukrainian Party. Not only are these periods significant in themselves, but hints by Khrushchev indicate that they have a direct relevance for power rivalries in the USSR.

Examination of the relationship of the Ukrainian state and Party apparatus to the European satellites of the Soviet Union might be very valuable. The Ukrainian SSR borders on four satellites—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania—while no other Union republic has a common frontier with any European satellite except with either Poland or Rumania. Because the present Soviet Ukraine contains territory which at one time or another belonged to each of the four states mentioned, fairly prominent members of the Ukrainian apparatus were once members of the Polish Communist Party (or its subsection, the Communist Party of the West Ukraine), the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, the Hungarian Communist Party, and probably the Rumanian Communist Party. Their early ties to these parties, and the probable continuation of such special relationships, should be carefully investigated by scholars familiar with the languages of the satellites as well as Ukrainian and Russian. Questions such as the possible role of the Transcarpathian provincial apparatus in facilitating the suppression of the Hungarian rebellion of 1956 should also be studied.

The Ukrainian apparatus appears to have assumed a special position in relation to Rumania. The Moldavian SSR is regarded as a sort of model for the "socialist development" of Rumania. In turn, the Moldavian SSR is to some degree under the "patronage" of the Ukrainian organization, as is indicated by the succession of important Ukrainian officials, such as Brezhnev and Zynoviy T. Serdyuk, who have become First Secretary of the Moldavian Party. In addition to

this indirect link through Moldavia, the Ukrainian apparatus has been directly connected with Rumanian affairs through the selection of two recent Soviet ambassadors to Rumania, Leonid G. Mel’nikov and Aleksei A. Epishev, from among Ukrainian Party leaders. Probably a more intensive examination of this relationship, including the use of Rumanian sources, would reveal other significant links.

While Western scholars have increasingly become aware of the significance of the Ukraine, they have occasionally been repelled by the superficiality of some treatments of Ukrainian affairs. This circumstance, it seems to the present writer, has contributed to a neglect of the very great potential of Ukrainian studies as a means for investigating general phenomena of Soviet political life. It is hoped that the suggestions contained in this essay will be helpful in pointing out ways in which this potential can be realized.

*University of Wisconsin*
Soviet and Satellite Sources on the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

LEW SHANKOWSKY

During and following World War II, active resistance in the Ukraine, against both the Nazi and the Soviet occupation forces, consisted of two elements: first, the military branch of the movement, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA—Українська Повстанча Армія), divided into operation groups, tactic sectors, battalions, companies, and platoons; second, the underground network organized on a territorial basis, carrying out various operations behind the lines, such as security patrolling, reconnaissance, logistics, communications and liaison, medical service, and political propaganda. The UPA proper existed until 1946, when its Military High Command ordered that most of the insurgent detachments be disbanded and transferred to the underground network. Although this marked the formal termination of the functions of the UPA, in the Ukraine the name UPA has been applied also to the armed underground and is still used by Ukrainian émigrés and in Western literature. This popular name will be used in this article, too, for both the UPA and underground activities.

For the genesis and history of the UPA, which it is impossible to present here even in outline, readers are referred to the several studies published in recent years.1 The Soviet and satellite materials which a Western researcher may use to advantage are first-hand accounts by

---

those who fought against the UPA, press material published during the struggle, and, finally, recent analyses by Soviet or satellite writers who have used some insignificant documentary and archival material for the first time.2

The Soviet and satellite memoir literature is pretty poor—often a cross between eyewitness recollections and pure fiction. For study of the UPA during the German occupation the memoirs of Petro Vershyhora3 and Dmitrii Medvedev4 are of special importance. Among other Soviet memoirs which concern this problem are those of Sydir Kovpak5 and, to some extent, of Anatoliy Shyyan6 and A. Fedorov.7

2 In the book by the Polish historian General Ignacy Blum, Z dziejów Wojska Polskiego w latach 1945–1948 (Warsaw, 1960), the documentary material occupies 152 pages. For the documents on the UPA, see esp. pp. 264–72. There is also a book of documents on the Kraków trial of 1947, in which one of the charges brought against the leaders of the Polish nationalist underground was that of co-operation with the UPA: Proces krakowski: Niepokólczycki, Mierzwa i inni przed sądem Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw, 1948).

3 Vershyhora (in Russian Vershigora), born in 1905 in Moldavia, graduated from the Odessa Conservatory and worked as actor and producer in theaters and movies. In 1942–43, as a colonel of the Red Army, he was with the General Kovpak Red Partisan Brigade as its intelligence chief. The title of Hero of the Soviet Union was conferred upon him in 1944, and, with the rank of major-general, he was appointed commander of the Red Partisan Brigade whose particular task was fighting the UPA in western Volynia. He has written of his personal experiences in Lyudi s chistoi sovest'yu (Moscow, 1951; available also in Ukrainian and English translations), hereafter cited as Vershigora I; and “Reid na San i Vislu,” Novyi Mir (Moscow), XXXV, No. 2 (February 1959), 3–79, and No. 3 (March 1959), 24–110, hereafter cited as Vershigora II, No. 2, and II, No. 3, respectively. See also his “Pereprava,” Dnipro (Kiev), XXXV, No. 1 (January 1961), 15, for a short biographical sketch.

4 Col. Dmitrii Medvedev (1898–1954) was commander of a Soviet diversionist detachment in the Western Ukraine in 1942–44. His memoirs have been published under the titles Sil'nye dukhom (2d rev. ed.; Moscow, 1957), henceforth referred to as Medvedev (first published in 1952); Eto bylo pod Rovno, and Na beregakh yuzhnogo Buga, the latter two being of little importance here. In 1953, despite his services to the Beria apparatus, for some reason Medvedev fell into disfavor. On January 24 of that year Vinnyls’ka Pravda published a vitriolic review of his book Na beregakh yuzhnogo Buga in which he was accused of “falsification” and of representing various slackers as Soviet underground fighters. After Beria’s fall, however, Medvedev was “rehabilitated,” and the newspapers and magazines which had published deprecatory reviews of his book recanted. For example, see Zhouten’ (Lviv), No. 11 (1955), pp. 119–21.

5 Sydir Kovpak, Vid Putsylva do Karpat (Kiev, 1946); also available in Russian. Published in English under the title Our Partisan Course (London, New York, Melbourne, 1947).

6 Shyyan, Partyzans’kyi kray (Kiev, 1946).

7 Aleksei Fedorov, Podpol’nyi obkom deistvuet (Moscow, 1950); also in Ukrainian translation (Kiev, 1952).
Polish-language accounts include books by Jan Gerhard and Mikołaj Kunicki ("Mucha"). A number of briefer memoirs which appeared in magazines and newspapers will be mentioned in the following pages. In these Soviet and satellite memoirs the UPA is, of course, adversely treated, but they nevertheless serve to clear up some doubtful facts.

Press items published at the time of the struggle are the largest part of Soviet and satellite source material about the UPA. They record, for instance, descriptions of actions against the UPA, official communiqués and appeals, including appeals by captured insurgents to their former companions in arms or to private citizens, confessions of captives, reports on conferences and meetings called by the Soviet authorities (at these meetings certain facts were given concerning the action of "the bands"), signed pieces by journalists and other writers, and various propaganda materials. The satellite press contained more material of this kind than did the Soviet press. A considerable amount

---

8 Gerhard, _Łuny w Bieszczadach_ (Warsaw, 1959). The book contains information on the organizational structure of the UPA according to documents preserved in the Archives of the Ministry for National Defense in Warsaw.

9 Kunicki, _Pamiętnik "Muchy"_ (Warsaw, 1959). The author, a Pole, was commander of a Soviet partisan unit which fought the UPA in 1944 and 1945.

10 The case of Kuznetsov and his assassination of the German officials in Rivne (Rovno) may best illustrate the point. Using the German source material, Armstrong (p. 156) referred to the Rivne killings as performed by Ukrainian nationalists. Medvedev's memoirs, however, contain disproof. He writes that diversionary action against the UPA was the chief task of his group. Marching through the forests and villages of Volynia, the group often masqueraded as a UPA unit (Medvedev, pp. 397, 403ff.), thus provoking the Nazis to bloody reprisals against the Ukrainian population, especially the Ukrainian nationalists. Medvedev's group was particularly successful in Rivne, where one of his scouts, N. I. Kuznetsov, tricked the Germans into believing that the top German officials in the headquarters of the Reichskommissariat Ukraine whom he had assassinated were actually killed by Ukrainian nationalists (Medvedev, _ibid._, pp. 284–85). Medvedev's figure of 36 Ukrainian nationalists shot in reprisal is, however, much too low; actually there were over a thousand prisoners shot on October 15, 1943. Kuznetsov was later taken prisoner by the UPA and shot. See Lebed', _UPA_, pp. 70–71, and Medvedev, pp. 470–71. See also Shankowsky, pp. 675–77. Recently a monument was erected in honor of Kuznetsov in Rivne on the public square bearing his name ("Legendarnomu rozvidchykovi," _Molod' Ukrayiny_ [Kiev], February 3, 1961, p. 4).

11 Soviet newspapers carried descriptions of Soviet "Chekist-military operations for the liquidation of bands" (such was the official appellation for actions against the UPA). For example, the January 14, 1945, issue of _Vil'na Ukrayina_, a newspaper appearing in Lviv, reported the liquidation of a "large band" in the Radekhiv area in December 1944, and an "operation" against the UPA battalion of "Khmara" in the Carpathian Mountains, on January 7, 1945. The contention of the paper that "Khmara" was killed in this action, is not true.
of material on the UPA was published in 1944–50 in the Western Ukrainian oblast newspapers Radyans'ke slovo (Drohobych), Prykarpats'ka Pravda (Stanyslav), Radyans'ka Bukovyna (Chernivtsi), Vil'na Ukrayina and L'vovskaya Pravda (both Lviv), Vil'ne zhyt'tya (Ternopil), Radyans'ka Volyn' (Lutsk), Chervonyi prapor (Rivne), and, to some extent, Zakarpats'ka Pravda and Sovietskoe Zakarpate (Uzhhorod). Still more material of this kind was published in the raion newspapers, of which there were 233 in the Western Ukraine in 1947. Among these important sources of material on the UPA are the city paper of Kolomyya, Chervonyi prapor, and the Komsomol paper of Lviv, Lenins'ka molod'. However, little of this material is accessible in the West, since oblast and raion newspapers are, as a rule, not sent abroad. A great deal of material about the UPA in the years 1945–47 was printed as “throwaway sheets” by the newspapers of republic scope published in Kiev. These papers are available in Western libraries but not the “throwaway sheets,” which were printed only for the western areas of the Ukraine and were not included in the copies of the newspapers distributed in the central and eastern areas of the Ukraine or sent abroad. It may be assumed that news of the UPA struggle was printed in this form to keep it from spreading in the central and eastern areas of the Ukraine.  

Some materials from the USSR press were reprinted in Ukrainian Communist newspapers in the United States and Canada, and are thus available. In addition, these newspapers printed letters to the editor from the Ukraine which contained certain relevant facts.

The final group of sources is the research work of Soviet and satellite authors. The lampoon form has, as a rule, been used by Soviet

12 The printing of the “throwaway sheets” was discontinued after 1947, since news of the UPA resistance spread widely across the Ukraine anyway. The news was carried back to the central and eastern areas by the starving kolkhoz people who had come to the Western Ukraine (not yet collectivized) looking for food for themselves and their families from the peasants there. Of this pilgrimage it is said in a 1960 Soviet source: “It is high time to examine objectively the negative effect that the 1946 drought had on the later collectivization in the Western Ukraine. At the time of the drought a great number of people came to the western areas looking for bread. This fact was used by Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists in their anti-kolkhoz agitation.” I. Kh. Sas, “Vysvitlennya sotsialistychnoho budivnytstva v zakhidnykh oblastyakh Ukrayins'koi RSR,” Ukrayins'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal (Kiev), IV, No. 4 (1960), 105.

13 Sets of the following for 1944–60 are particularly worth perusing: Ukrayins'ki shchodenni visti (later Ukrayins'ki visti; New York), Ukrayins'ke zhyt'tya (Toronto), and Ukrayins'ke slovo (Winnipeg).
writers on the subject of the UPA, and, in fact, the whole resistance movement. A very important item is the lampoon by Volodymyr Byelyayev and Mykhaylo Rudnytsky, which V. Sarbey, in the foreword, calls a “documentary study” written in “historic and journalistic” style.14 This general lampoon style marks even those writers who have published under the sponsorship of scholarly institutions and have dealt with problems requiring documentary and scholarly treatment, for instance the numerous works on the collectivization of agriculture or the progress of industrialization in the western areas of the Ukraine.15

The Polish sources are superior to the Soviet. In the analyses of the UPA by the Polish General Ignacy Blum (who has an M.A. degree in history), despite the generally negative treatment, certain facts are acknowledged which Soviet sources try to distort. In the Polish sources the mistakes and failures of the Poles in the fight against the UPA

14 Sarbey in Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, Pid chuzhymy praporomy (Kiev, 1956). Byelyayev, an import from Leningrad, is a Soviet “expert” on Ukrainian nationalism and the Ukrainian Catholic Church. He prepared a scenario for the anti-religious and anti-Catholic film Ivanna, which was shown in 1959–60. Among the most productive anti-UPA pamphleteers are Yaroslav Halan, Yuriy Mel’nychuk, Bohdan Dudykevych, Petro Kozlanyuk, Yuriy Smolych, Oleksa Poltoratsky, poets Dmytro Pavlychko, and Rostyslav Bratun'.


Difficulties in the industrialization of the Western Ukraine have been presented in numerous monographs, including V. Petrushko, Rozvytok promyslovosti zakhidnykh oblastey Ukrainy (Kiev, 1958). For our topic, the following articles are of importance: N. S. Hurladi, “Deyaki pytannya vykhovnoyi roboty sered robitynychoyi ta selyanskoyi molodi zakhidnykh oblastey URSR v roky pershyh pislyavenevyh potyrichky,” Naukovi zapysky Lvivs’koho Politekhnichnoho Instytutu, XLVII, No. 1 (1957), 61–82; I. P. Bohodyst, “Pidnesennya politychnoyi aktyvnosti trudyashchikh u borot’bi za zmitnennya radyans’koho ladu v zakhidnykh oblastakh Ukrains’koyi RSR (1944–1950),” Ukrayins’kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, III, No. 6 (1959), 55–66. See also N. S. Polonevskaya, “Vovlechenie zhenshchin zapadnykh oblastei Ukrainy v stroitel’stvo narodnogo khozyaistva 1946–1950 gg.,” Nauchnye zapiski L’vovskogo Torgovo-Ekonomicheskogo Instituta, VI (1958), 156–65.
are admitted, and an attempt is made at a certain objectivity in analyzing events.\textsuperscript{16} Czech sources, on the other hand, are full of fantastic inventions about the UPA and the Ukrainian resistance movement that go far beyond the distortions of Soviet authors.\textsuperscript{17}

Illustrative of the tendency in Soviet and satellite sources to discredit the UPA and the whole Ukrainian resistance movement is a passage in Vershyhora's memoirs in which an Armenian Communist, a deserter from the UPA to the Soviet partisans, explains the essence of the UPA:

"The most important thing is their hatred of the kolkhoz. It is easy to understand why—in the kolkhoz the kulak sees the embodiment of his death. This is the cause of his hatred of Soviet rule and the Communists. But the Soviet rule was introduced by the Russians, and it seems to the Ukrainian kulaks that the kolkhoz is purely Russian, a Russian national invention. Consequently, their kind of nationalism is class nationalism."\textsuperscript{18}

Soviet propagandists take for granted that the UPA is hostile to the working classes, and therefore they avoid anything that might point to ties between the UPA and the Ukrainian people. Even the name "UPA" can seldom be found in Soviet sources.\textsuperscript{19} A significant example can be found in the memoirs of Vershyhora. Describing a march of General Kovpak's partisan brigade through territory in the hands of the Ukrainian insurgents, Vershyhora tells of a cross-examination of several insurgents who were seriously wounded and half-conscious. In delirium one of them sang a passage of a Ukrainian resistance song: "Forest is our father, night is our mother, rifle and sabre our whole

\textsuperscript{16} See Blum, pp. 87–131, 200, 214–15, 240, 252–73. See also his "Udział Wojska Polskiego w walce o utrwalenie władzy ludowej: Walki z bandami UPA," \textit{Wojskowy \mbox{przegląd} historyczny} (Warsaw), IV, No. 1 (1959), 3–29 (hereafter referred to as Blum II).

\textsuperscript{17} See for example, Vaclav Slavik, \textit{Pra\v{r}a tvář banderovců: Akce B protiv civilní sítí} (Prague, 1948). A film was made on the basis of this book. Also full of outright fantasy—alleged support of the UPA by the Vatican and Catholic bishops for instance—is a work published by the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (authors A. Svoboda, A. Tuchkova, and K. Svobodova), \textit{Zagovor Vatikana protiv ChSR}, known to me in the Russian translation (Moscow, 1950).

\textsuperscript{18} Vershigora II, No. 3, 47.

\textsuperscript{19} One of the rare exceptions is L. O. Leshchenko, "Proloh chy epiloh," \textit{Ukrayins'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal}, II, No. 6 (1958), 139. However, Leshchenko had no choice. He was answering a Polish journalist who not only used the appellation UPA but thought of it as an "embodiment of Ukrainian patriotism." See Kajetan Czarkowski-Golejewski, "Ukraine—Not an Internal Problem of the USSR," \textit{Prologue}, New York, II, No. 4–5 (1958), 53–57.
family . . .”

But Vershyhora purposely omitted the final line of the song, which contains the three letters UPA: “Cossack, leave the girl and go to the UPA—burpgun is your sweetheart now.” Vershyhora often uses the noms de guerre of insurgent commanders—Mukha, Gonta, Bul’ba. He also mentions the surname of a Ukrainian leader in the war of the years 1917–20, Symon Petlyura, and the surname of one of the leaders of Ukrainian nationalism, Stepan Bandera. But the UPA is never mentioned. Instead, Soviet sources use designations such as Bul’bivtsi, Mel’nykvitsi, Banderivtsi, formed from the surnames of various leaders. The main purpose of these methods presumably was to show that the UPA was a private affair of chieftains not supported by the people.

Concerning the attitude of the Ukrainian people toward the UPA, Soviet and Polish sources disagree. Blum admits that the superior strength of the Polish army and police was in the beginning unable to cope with the UPA because of the wide support the UPA received from the Ukrainian people. For the complete liquidation of the UPA on Polish territory, he writes, it was necessary not only to use forces tenfold stronger—60,000 (with enormous technical superiority) against 6,000—but also to carry out the so-called “Operation W,” that is, a complete evacuation of the Ukrainian population from the Lemky and some other regions, in order to deprive the UPA of the support of the people.

Once even Vershyhora referred to the scope of the insurgent movement and its ties with the Ukrainian people but only to give his own “dialectical explanation” of it: An argument was brewing between a regular partisan officer, a captain, and a zampolit (deputy commissar) named Mykola. The captain was a Russian, Mykola a Ukrainian.

“. . . What is it, this—Banderovshchyna? Look how many of them are armed. We lick one company and right away another one turns up. They look like full-strength regiments, the peasants, a whole nation . . .”

“Where did you see the nation?” said Mykola thoughtfully.

“Well, what about the villages? Who came out with clubs, old Berdan rifles, and pitchforks? Who defended the villages?” The captain bristled.

20 Vershigora I, p. 389.
21 Ibid., pp. 239–42, 392–403, 426, passim.
22 See Sarbey’s introduction to Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, p. 18.
23 Blum II, 29.
24 Ibid., pp. 19ff.
"Oh you simpleton! Of course, self-defense with clubs—but against whom? Have you read the instructions of Honcharenko? or the orders of their commander in chief Klym Savur? It's obviously a Fascist program. . . .

Other Vershyhora guerrillas give a more detailed explanation to the phenomenon of the UPA:

"Then this is—the Ukrainian Vendée," said Semen Tutuchenko.
"Vendée or not, it doesn't matter, but it's a new Fascist version of counter-revolution," corrected Tokar', the battalion commander.
"Plus the fifth column," added Brayko.
"Plus Makhnovshchyna," said Kul'baka, bending his finger.
"Plus the Vatican," said Tutuchenko.
"Plus a provocation organized by the Gestapo—butchery among Ukrainians and Poles," added Voytsekhovych.
"Well, and maybe also our failures and mistakes . . ." said our osobist lieutenant Zhurkin, as usual with a little touch of criticism. . . .
"But there is still one advantage," said I [Vershyhora], in quite an indifferent voice. "Where the Banderivtsi are, there are almost no German-Fascist armies. . . ."

Different explanations of this statement are possible. At the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944 the situation was such that large areas in the north-west of the Ukraine were controlled by the UPA, the German occupation forces having been driven away. This was the Partizanengebiet, through which the Germans passed only with a large armed convoy. But apparently this was not what Vershyhora wished to tell his readers. He implied, rather, that the Germans had told the UPA to occupy an extensive area so that the UPA would have to take over the fight against the Red partisans and, thus, relieve the Germans. He underlined the fact that in order to defeat the Red

25 Col. Honcharenko was the nom de guerre of Leonid Stupnytsky, Chief of Staff of the UPA group “North.” This officer will be referred to later.
26 Col. Klym Savur was the nom de guerre of Dmytro Klyachkivsky, commander of the UPA group “North,” killed in battle in 1945. He was not, however, glavkom (commander in chief), as Vershyhora supposed. See Shankowsky, p. 735.
27 Vershyhora II, No. 2, pp. 63-64.
28 Osobist is the Russian slang term for a member of the Osobyi Otdel (OO), an officer of the Commissariat (Ministry) for State Security, responsible for recruitment of informers and secret police work within the armed forces and in Soviet institutions, schools, factories, and elsewhere. In the Army (or partisan) units, he was subordinate not to the commander of the unit, but to his own chain of command.
29 Vershyhora II, No. 2, pp. 63-64.
partisans the UPA collaborated with the German occupiers. More evidence as to how this question is treated in Soviet sources will be adduced later.

Soviet authorities benefited from the brutal policy of the Germans on the Soviet territories they occupied. It is, therefore, not strange that the Soviet saboteur mentioned earlier, N. I. Kuznetsov, did not kill Erich Koch, Reichskommissar of the Ukraine, during a personal meeting at Rivne. On the other hand, the appearance of an organized Ukrainian resistance movement must have made Moscow uneasy. Moscow never underrated national resistance movements and their potentialities. We may assume that one of the assignments of the numerous Soviet partisan and saboteur detachments sent to the UPA territory was to learn all about the Ukrainian national resistance movement, its aims, activities, methods, and potentialities.

To the north of the Western Ukraine (which in the years 1942-43 was the center of UPA activities) came Soviet partisan detachments under “Generals” Fedorov of the Chernihiv district, Fedorov of the Rivne district, Saburov, Ivanov, and Naumov and a host of smaller detachments subordinate to the “Ukrainian Partisan Staff” headed by an NKVD general, Timofei Strokach. In 1943 “General” Vasilii A. Begma was sent to the Rivne area to direct the Soviet underground organization.

In his memoirs Vershyhora writes that Semen Rudnev, political commissar of General Kovpak’s partisan detachment, received secret directive of the TsK VKP(B), forwarded by the War Council of the Voronezh front, entitled “On Our Relations with the Ukrainian National Partisan Detachments.” The directive stated that “the leaders of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists are German agents, enemies of the Ukrainian people,” that “some rank and file members of these

30 For a description of Kuznetsov’s audience with Koch, see Medvedev, pp. 201–5.
31 The so-called Ukrainian Partisan Staff headed by the veteran Chekist Strokach, a lieutenant-general of the security police and former Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, was created in June 1942, and was subordinate to the Central Staff of Partisan Movement headed by Lavrentii Beria. Concerning Beria’s role and that of the NKVD (or NKGB) in the Soviet partisan movement, see Armstrong, p. 140, and Shyyan, p. 148.
32 Begma (born in 1906) was in 1943 appointed first secretary of the underground Party committee (obkom) in the Rivne region of Volynia. See Begma, “Zaklyatye vragi ukrainskogo naroda,” Pravda Ukrainy (Kiev), November 15, 1944, pp. 2–3. A volume of Begma’s memoirs is to be published in 1961.
detachments sincerely wish to fight the German occupation but are deceived by the bourgeois nationalists who have wormed themselves into their positions of leadership." Further on we learn that General Kovpak’s large partisan detachment had special assignments: a quick march to the Carpathian Mountains, demolition of the petroleum industry located in the Sub-Carpathian region, establishment of an army base in the mountains for the Red partisans who would then open a second front against the Germans. But at the end of 1942 and beginning of 1943, when the large detachment was on the territory occupied by the UPA, it found itself sometimes in a very distressing situation. The Soviet partisans were very often shelled and ambushed; smaller partisan sections were liquidated; their reconnaissance units either did not obtain any information at all from the inhabitants or were given false leads. Once Vershyhora himself almost perished at the hands of an insurgent in an embroidered shirt—in other words, a Ukrainian. Vershyhora remarks: “Before, we passed through territory occupied by our adversaries the Germans. There we always considered nighttime favorable for our partisan actions, but with the Banderivtsi we are more sure of ourselves in the daytime.” Marching through the territory of the insurgents in the first half of 1943 (when the UPA was not yet unified), Kovpak’s detachment met various “bands,” of which Vershyhora said, “Some fight with the Germans, others pretend to fight, still others collaborate with our mortal enemy and [at the same time] try to get in touch with us.”

Quite often Vershyhora speaks of negotiations with the Ukrainian partisans. He states that during the negotiations with General Kovpak’s staff the UPA representatives agreed to let General Kovpak’s

33 Vershigora II, No. 3, p. 43.
35 Vershigora I, pp. 381, 383–85, 388. For the typical Soviet partisan difficulties in reconnoitering among the Ukrainian population (which refused to give the Soviet partisans even the names of neighboring villages), see a very characteristic detail in Shyyan, pp. 160–61.
36 Vershigora I, p. 391.
38 See *ibid.*, pp. 241–42, 396, 398–99; II, No. 2, pp. 38, 45. The reference to negotiations with the UPA commander Berkut (II, No. 2, 38) is particularly interesting in that it confirms that the “tragic death” of the Commander of the First Ukrainian Front of the Soviet Army, Marshal M. F. Vatutin, was caused by Berkut’s detachment (cf. Shankowsky, p. 718; also *Ukrainian Resistance* [New York: Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, 1949], pp. 88–89). Heretofore Soviet propaganda
detachment pass through the territory occupied by the UPA. General Kovpak's staff decided against such a step, fearing an ambush on the part of the UPA and also not feeling strong enough to break through this territory by use of arms. Kovpak therefore decided to go around the dangerous territory, marching far to the east. This long march was the reason why he did not fulfill his orders but came too late to the Carpathian Mountains. The Germans awaiting him had enough time to prepare themselves for attack; as a result Kovpak's detachment was almost completely wiped out.

In this light the assertion in a Soviet source that the march around the UPA territory was a heroic achievement on the part of General Kovpak is unfounded. The justification, in this same source, of the march of Kovpak's detachment through the Zhytomyr and Kiev areas as necessary for the formation of a Soviet partisan movement in the Zhytomyr forests is contradicted by another Soviet source which tells how in this district, at this time, the UPA disguised itself by pretending to be Red partisans. The fact that the Zhytomyr district was at this time a center of UPA activities was confirmed even by the first of these authors: "Banderiwtshi bands rule our district—loot the villages and murder the inhabitants. And where are the real partisans? They are not in our forests yet." General Kovpak's partisans did appear in the Zhytomyr forests, but soon returned to Galicia. The UPA allowed them to cross the Horyn river and on the whole tried to avoid any serious fighting with them. Vershyhora himself confirms this:

had not disclosed the fact that Vatutin was severely wounded in the UPA ambush and died of wounds received in this encounter.

39 Vershigora I, pp. 239-42.
40 Ibid., II, No. 2, pp. 7-8. Vershyhora is incorrect in his account of the disintegration of Kovpak's group in the Carpathians in July-August 1943. He writes of an encirclement of the group by German and Hungarian regiments totaling some 26,000 men, but many of the regiments listed (p. 7) existed only in his imagination; for example, the "14th SS Division 'Galicia,'" for which recruitment had at that time just begun in Galicia (see Armstrong, pp. 169ff.). "General" Krueger, whom Vershyhora has placed in command of the German-Hungarian battle group (II, No. 2, p. 7), was only a Gestapo officer and chief of SD Aussendienststelle in Stanyslav.
42 Mykola Karplyuk, "Osinni nochyi," Zhvaten' (Lviv), VI, No. 7 (1956), 32-33.
43 Slyn'ko, p. 54.
We march freely through the steppe in the daytime without even hearing one shot. But when we enter the forest, immediately woodpeckers begin to peck with their machine guns. . . . Upon entering the Kremenets' forest, grenade throwing began. This was an outpost of an unknown enemy. They fired not with the intention of stopping us but in order to warn their own men.\(^45\)

After Kovpak's defeat the Ukrainian Partisan Staff (headed by General Strokach) chose the former reconnaissance chief of his detachment, Petro Vershyhora, a Ukrainian, who had survived the defeat, as a commander of a new detachment which had special saboteur responsibilities to carry out against the UPA.

At the end of 1943 General Vershyhora's detachment set out over the old partisan routes, toward the Volynia and the Polissya areas. After the defeat of one of the insurgent battalions, important documents of the UPA fell into Vershyhora's hands. Among these documents were the orders and instructions of Colonel Honcharenko, based on the oral directions of Klym Savur, whom Vershyhora considered the Commander in Chief of the UPA. According to these instructions, detachments of the UPA were not to enter into combat with advancing sections of the regular Soviet Army but were to wait until "the Army passes further west, then to start activities in the rear." On the other hand, the instructions required very clearly that the "hardest warfare" against the Soviet partisans continue "without let-up." It "is possible," it was explained, "to differentiate between the regular army and the partisans by their outward appearance: the regular army wears shoulder pieces on their uniforms while the partisans have only red ribbons pinned to their caps."

Thereupon, in order to move more freely on the territory of the UPA, Vershyhora ordered his partisans to carry out an "operation disguise"—sewing shoulder pieces on their uniforms and pretending to be the regular Soviet army.\(^46\) On January 21, 1944, Vershyhora marched to a territory where "the Banderivtsi bands were numerous" and where "small partisan groups were unable to do any work." The reason was that Ukrainian insurgents "knew the territory well and

\(^{45}\) Vershigora I, p. 426.

\(^{46}\) Vershigora II, No. 2, pp. 67–68. For confirmation of this account, see Begma, p. 2, who quotes an order by Eney (the pseudonym of the commander of a UPA group in the region of Rivne) providing that his partisans should let the Red Army units pass, then attack isolated groups of NKVD and Red partisans.
had agents and contacts in all villages. . . . They were skillful in wiping out our small groups in a cruel way . . . and they had a special yen for our first-class machine guns."\(^\text{47}\)

Vershyhora states later that on UPA territory Honcharenko's instructions were carried out in the beginning and his detachment (passing for a section of the regular Soviet army) was not attacked. The reconnaissance of the detachment passed without any difficulties through the villages where Banderivski garrisons were stationed and wounded partisans were discharged.\(^\text{48}\) But after a few days some doubts must have occurred to the UPA staff, because Honcharenko himself went to the village Mosyr (Mosur) where Vershyhora's detachment was stationed, to see "the Red Army," as Vershyhora writes, "with his own eyes." According to Vershyhora's account, Honcharenko was caught by the Soviet partisans while he was trying to shower a "special" section of the detachment with grenades, and after cross-examination was shot.\(^\text{49}\)

During the stay at Mosyr, Vershyhora's partisans prepared an "operation" against the UPA forces in the western Volynia region. These forces consisted of an UPA officers' school ("Lisovi Chorty") and of the detachment commanded by Antonyuk-Sosenko comprising seven line companies, one cavalry troop, and one Uzbek group.\(^\text{50}\) According to Vershyhora, this "operation" ended with the complete defeat of the "picked Bandera troops" (the officers' school) and the encirclement of Antonyuk-Sosenko's detachment (the nucleus of this detachment did break away). In Vershyhora's account, the defeat was due to the poor fighting quality of the "select troops," and to the be-

\(^{47}\) Vershigora II, No. 2, p. 61.

\(^{48}\) Ibid., No. 3, pp. 33-34, 36.

\(^{49}\) Ibid., pp. 39-40. Honcharenko (nom de guerre of Col. Leonid Stupnytsky, first Chief of Staff of the UPA and later Chief of Staff of the UPA group "North") disappeared with his son without trace in 1944, while on the march to the Carpathians. It is doubtful, however, that he was caught by Vershyhora's partisans while on a personal intelligence mission in their stronghold. Vershyhora's biographical data on Col. Honcharenko (II, No. 2, p. 68) are also false. Vershyhora portrays Honcharenko as a former corporal in the Polish army and a Roman Catholic. In fact, Stupnytsky, a former cavalry officer of the Russian Tsarist army, served with the Ukrainian army in 1920-21 and was commander of a cavalry brigade in its last raid in 1921. He was a Ukrainian of Greek Orthodox faith, and had been appointed major-general in the UPA.

\(^{50}\) Vershigora II, No. 3, pp. 67-68.
trayal by an Armenian UPA group and also by a Soviet officer who was an instructor in the officers’ school.\textsuperscript{51}

Nothing is known about the defeat of these “picked troops” of the UPA from other sources. On the contrary, it is known that UPA troops drove Vershyhora’s detachment away from the western Volynia region. Vershyhora indirectly acknowledges this in later chapters of his memoirs when describing the death of Sasha Koleshnikov.\textsuperscript{52} It is also known that with the approach of the Soviet regular army the officers’ school was transferred with its instructors (mostly former Soviet officers) to the Carpathian Mountains, where they continued their activities. The defeat of the officers’ school actually occurred much later (October 1944) as a result of betrayal of one of the school instructors, a former Soviet officer (Katso, an Ossetian).\textsuperscript{53} Did Vershyhora confuse the two events or deliberately create a legend which overrated his achievements? It is interesting that he admits his activities with the UPA had kept his detachment from fighting the Germans. If he had not been so concerned with the UPA, he says, he could have accomplished various strategic tasks such as destruction of a large German airfield at Bila Pidlyas’ka. The advance of the regular Soviet army was made more difficult by the airplanes of this airfield.\textsuperscript{54}

Vershyhora deals at length—and for obvious reasons—with the acting commander of the Ivan Bohun detachment of the UPA, Porfir Antonyuk (\textit{noms de guerre} Sosenko and Klishch).\textsuperscript{55} The name of this commander was mentioned in a discussion at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on March 1, 1944, as proof of UPA collaboration with the Germans.\textsuperscript{56} It is true that Commander Antonyuk had entered into an agreement with units at the rear of the German army in order to get arms for the UPA—in violation of the strict orders of the Supreme Commander of the UPA forbidding any negotiations with the Germans. Neither Vershyhora nor any other Soviet author writes of the fact that on March 6, 1944, an UPA court-

\textsuperscript{52} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 101-2.
\textsuperscript{53} For an eyewitness account see Z. Semeniv, “Druhyi vypusk starshyn’s’koyi shkoly UPA ‘Oleni,’” \textit{Do Zbroyi} (Munich), V, No. 17/30 (1952), 23-24.
\textsuperscript{54} Vershigora II, No. 3, pp. 61, 70-71.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 33, 43, 67, 69.
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 50, 71.
martial sentenced Antonyuk-Sosenko to death. The sentence was car­ried out the next day.\(^{57}\)

During World War II, both the German and the Soviet occupation forces carried on propaganda against the UPA, accusing it of working for the other side. “Listen to this, Ukrainian people! Moscow gives orders to the OUN!”\(^{58}\) proclaimed leaflets of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, an SS Obergruppenführer and police general, delegated by Himmler chiefly to fight against the “Ukrainian bands.” “From secret orders and instructions that have fallen into our hands, we learn that the Kremlin Jews are connected with the OUN, while the OUN pretends to fight Bolshevism. Among the OUN leaders there are Moscow agents who carry out the orders of the bloodthirsty Stalin and his Jewish bodyguards.”\(^{59}\) An official appeal issued by the government of the Ukrainian SSR at almost the same time “to the inhabitants of the temporarily occupied regions of the Ukraine” reads: “The German bandits are not your only enemy! Your enemy is also the Ukrainian-German nationalist gang. The whole bunch of these Bandervytzhi have sold themselves to Hitler and are helping to enslave our people, our Ukraine. . . . They are already forming armed detachments, enticing people into them by saying that they are going to fight the Germans. Do not believe them.”\(^{60}\) This appeal was signed by M. Hrechukha, O. Korniyets’, and N. Khrushchev.

The UPA began to be charged with collaboration with the Germans at the end of 1943, at the time the Soviet army was driving the Germans out of the Ukraine. A characteristic phrase of this propaganda line was “Ukrainian-German nationalists,” which was coined by Khrushchev himself in his Kiev speech on the occasion of the capture of the city on November 27, 1943. He repeated the phrase in his speech to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR on March 1, 1944.\(^{61}\) It was immediately picked up by the Soviet propaganda ap-

\(^{57}\) Lebed’, *UPA*, p. 73.

\(^{58}\) Orhanizatsiya ukrayins’kykh natsionalistiv (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), leading force and organizer of the UPA.

\(^{59}\) Quoted in Lebed’, *UPA*, p. 101.

\(^{60}\) Ibid., pp. 63–64.

\(^{61}\) N. S. Khrushchev, “Osvobozhdenie ukrainskikh zemel’ ot nemetskikh zakhvatichkov i ocherednye zadachi vosstanovleniya narodnogo khozyaistva Sovetskoj Ukrainy,” *Bolshevik* (Kiev), No. 6 (March 1944), pp. 15–16; also published as a separate pamphlet in Ukrainian and Russian, Kiev, 1944.
paratus. The historic background for this propaganda line was provided by the historian Kasymenko. In the western areas of the Ukraine the expression was popularized by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, D. Z. Manuilsky, who used it while addressing a huge gathering of teachers of the western areas at Lviv on January 6, 1945. The propaganda attack against the "Ukrainian-German nationalists" was carried by the whole Soviet press and radio. The decisions of the May and November plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the KP (B)U and the September plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP (B) in 1944 refer to the struggle against the "Ukrainian-German nationalists."

Meanwhile the government of the Ukrainian SSR had issued an official appeal "to the members of UPA-UNRA," and during the entire year kept circulating it—in the form of leaflets and posters—on the territory where the UPA was active. This appeal urged the UPA detachments either to pass over to the Red Army or the Red partisans or to surrender their arms. The decisions of the September plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP (B) on "the stepping-up of ideological-political work in the western areas of the Ukraine" initiated a special propaganda campaign against the UPA on a very large scale. It is described in great detail by a contemporary Soviet writer who calls the campaign "intensifying the political activity of the workers in the struggle to strengthen the Soviet regime in the western areas of the Ukraine." Terrorist detachments composed of former Soviet partisans, NKVD troops, and "detachments for war with banditry" of the NKGB began an attack on the UPA simultaneously with the

62 Ol. Kasymenko, "Ukrayins'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty—naylyutishi vorohy ukrayins'koho narodu," Radyans'ka Ukrayina (Kiev), December 18, 1944, p. 2. Kasymenko is at present director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR.

63 Manuilsky, Ukrayins'ko-nimets'ki natsionalisty na službi v fashyst's'koiy Ni-mechchyny (Kiev, 1946).

64 Ukrayins'ka Narodna Revolyutsiyna Armiya (Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army).

65 Khrushchev, pp. 15–16; Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, p. 194; Lebed', UPA, pp. 69–70. An original copy has been preserved in the Archives of the Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Central Liberation Council (New York).

66 Bohodyst, pp. 56–66. The resolutions of the CC VKP(B) state: "Without the total and final exposure of the Ukrainian-German nationalists and without liquidation of their influence, the reconstruction of the national economy would be impossible." For the text, see Bol'shevik (Kiev), No. 17–18 (1944), p. 7.
From the descriptions of this fight in Soviet literature we can judge the fervor with which the struggle was carried on on both sides.

In the Ukrainian newspapers of December 1, 1944, an “Appeal to the Population of the Western Areas of the Ukraine” called upon “those who [had] lost their way and fallen into the snares of the German agents, into organizations such as OUN, UPA, UHVR, Banderivtsi, and Mel'nykiutsi’” to come out “from the forests and their hiding places and report to the Soviet authorities with their ‘confession of guilt.’” The appeal differentiated between those “gang leaders” who, in one guise or another, served the Germans and “the majority who wanted to fight the German usurper in order to free their land and their country and for that reason joined an organization they believed to be fighting the Germans.”

At the time the appeal was published, the People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Lieutenant General Vasyl’ Ryasnyi, instructed the security organs (subordinate to him) to allow all the soldiers of the UPA and of the underground who reported and confessed their guilt to do any civilian work and not to call them to account for their past actions. This policy line was upheld many times by both Party and government leaders. The last of such appeals was issued as late as February 11, 1956.

The last strong charge against the UPA for supposed collaboration with the Germans was made on October 28, 1945. At a meeting of Party and government officials in Kiev, Khrushchev proposed a toast (just as Stalin did at a banquet for Soviet officers at the Kremlin on May 24, 1945) to honor the Russian people. Of the so-called “Ukrainian-German nationalists” he said: “Contemptible traitors to


68 For one of the many examples, see the poem “Pisnya komsomoltsiv 1944 roku” by the Soviet Ukrainian poet Rostyslav Bratuń, who was a participant in the struggle, in the collection of his verses Ya syn Ukrainy (Kiev, 1958), pp. 111-13.

69 Ukrayins’ka Holovna Vyzvol’na Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council).

70 See Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, pp. 194-195.

71 According to Bohodyst, pp. 57 ff., at the same time 32,619 Communists were sent to the western regions of the Ukraine to counteract the UPA.

72 Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, p. 194. The Soviet authorities issued eight appeals to the UPA or “remnants of the Ukrainian nationalist bands” asking them to surrender. See Shankowsky, “Istoriya vos’my zveren’,” Svoboda (Jersey City), Nos. 58-63, March 28–April 4, 1956.
their own country, they aided the German Fascists to oppress our people. When the Germans were done for, the Ukrainian-German nationalists attempted to hinder the restoration of the nation's economy. They babbled something about a so-called 'independent' Ukraine, trying to cover up their ties with the Germans. But everyone knows that the Ukraine is a free Soviet country where everything belongs to the Ukrainian people."

Yet the Ukrainian people knew that many soldiers of the UPA and members of the underground organization OUN were in German prisons and concentration camps, and they could hardly forget the frightful public executions of UPA and OUN members by the Germans which had taken place on city squares.

Probably such propaganda was carried on primarily for foreign consumption. The Soviet government wished to create the impression that the struggle against the UPA after World War II was nothing more than the "purging of Hitler collaborators in the Ukraine." The aim was partially achieved.

All "operations" against the "Ukrainian-German nationalists" were until 1946 personally directed by Khrushchev. The sweeping repressive measures taken in retaliation for UPA agitation at the time of the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet in February 1946 failed to liquidate UPA resistance. It was at this juncture that Lazar Kaganovich was sent to the Ukraine to take over Khrushchev's post (that of First Secretary of the KP(B)U, on March 4, 1947).

When in December 1947 Khrushchev once again became the First Secretary of the KP(B)U, he was no longer responsible for the struggle against the UPA. The USSR Ministry of State Security in Moscow was now in charge of the liquidation of the UPA, and Lieutenant General Mykola Koval'chuk, Minister of State Security of the Ukrainian SSR, was given this assignment. On December 30, 1949, an appeal


74 For example, Sydney Gruson, correspondent of The New York Times, wrote about the UPA that "it reaches even into the Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Baltic republics of the Soviet Union, but Soviet charges that it is based on pro-German and Fascist elements which sided with the Nazis seem to be true and it cannot be doubted that this prevented it from having a general appeal" (The New York Times, June 13, 1946).

75 At that time the UPA waged a propaganda campaign for boycott of the election. See Bohodyyst, p. 59.
was issued over his signature “to the remaining members of the bands which have been broken up in the western oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR.” 76

It was at that point that the UPA image underwent a change in official Soviet propaganda. After the defeat of Hitler’s Germany, it was pointless to keep linking the UPA with the Germans. By 1948, save for a Czech source which asserted that the UPA was directed by a “secret German General Staff as a sixth column in the struggle against the Soviet government,” 77 the old line had been dropped. The Vatican was chosen as the new culprit, probably because the struggle against the UPA went hand in hand with the struggle against the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Western Ukraine. One Soviet source has stated that after the defeat of the Fascist Germans the Uniate Church became attached to the nationalist underground gangs and, “together with the bourgeois nationalists, began to set fires, commit sabotage, and murder Soviet people.” 78

In the years 1948 and 1949 in Lviv two murders were committed which greatly aroused public opinion. First, the Reverend Havryil Kostel’nyk, one of the initiators of the so-called “reunification of the Ukrainian Catholic Church with the Russian Orthodox Church,” was murdered by an unidentified young man as he was leaving the church on August 28, 1948. Soviet propaganda laid the crime to the Vatican, which had allegedly been showing how vengeance fell upon traitors to the Catholic Church. 79 The second case was that of Yaroslav Halan, who, according to Soviet information, was killed on October 24, 1949, by Mykhaylo Stakhur in collaboration with an underground

76 For the text, see “The Commander of the UPA Has Fallen in the Battle against the Bolsheviks” (editorial), The Ukrainian Quarterly (New York), VI, No. 4 (1950), 296–98. Compare with Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, p. 203. The latter authors do not mention the name of Lt. Gen. Koval’chuk, who, as Smersh commander at the HQ of the 4th Ukrainian Front during the war, was a close accomplice of Beria and of Gen. V. Abakumov.
77 Slavik, p. 9.
78 L. Kyzya and M. Kovalenko, Vikova borot’ba ukrayins’koho narodu proty Vatikanu (Kiev, 1959), pp. 221–22. The authors engaged in the investigation of the Ukrainian-Vatican relations are, however, not able to make distinction between “encyclopaedia” and “encyclical” (ibid., p. 222).
79 “Yes, the Popes of Rome know how to revenge,” exclaimed Yaroslav Halan after Kostel’nyk’s death (Halan, Tyvory, II [1953], 469). The organ of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukrainian language, Pravoslavnyi visnyk, published in Lviv, reported in issue No. 7, 1957 (p. 217), the names of four more priests allegedly killed by the Ukrainian underground.
group headed by Roman Shchepansky, son of a priest, as was another member of the group, a student named Ilariy Lukashevych. This group was exposed by the security organs, brought to trial in Lviv, and sentenced to death.\textsuperscript{80} The trial as well as the court proceedings conducted in Lviv and Ternopil were represented in Soviet propaganda as a trial of Vatican agents who conducted terrorist acts against the initiators of the “reunification of the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church.” The alleged leader of this movement was the Vatican-appointed Reverend Denys Lukashevych, father of Ilariy Lukashevych.\textsuperscript{81}

Thus the Vatican was blamed for the activities of the UPA in the years 1949 and 1950. Czech and Soviet sources even mention a special agent sent by the Vatican to the UPA—the Reverend Tomyslav Kolakovsky, who, according to these sources, was welcomed in the Carpathian Mountains with great pomp by Stepan Bandera.\textsuperscript{82} The UPA raids in Czechoslovakia were supposedly conducted under the protection of bishops and priests;\textsuperscript{83} what is more, by Vatican command, the UPA left Poland and went to the Ukraine to “continue sabotage and terror against the Soviet rule and to hinder socialist reorganization in the countryside.”\textsuperscript{84} According to Soviet sources, the Vatican was especially interested in the UPA opposition to such “reorganizations.”\textsuperscript{85} This interest was brought to the attention of the whole Ukraine through the film \textit{Nad Cheremoshem}, based on a book of the same title by Mykhaylo Stel’makh.\textsuperscript{86} The film shows that the UPA resistance to collectivization in the Hutsul area in 1948 was directed

\textsuperscript{80} For the circumstances of Halan’s death and the trial of his killers, see Kyzya and Kovalenko, p. 224; and Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, pp. 176–77. See also S. I. Kovalev, ed., \textit{Istorya papstva i inkvizitsii: Kratkii spravochnik-putevoditel’ po muzeyu istorii religii i ateizma} (Moscow, 1959), pp. 176–80.

\textsuperscript{81} \textit{Vil’na Ukrayina} (Lviv), October 17, 1951; also Kyzya and Kovalenko, pp. 225–26.

\textsuperscript{82} Kyzya and Kovalenko, pp. 228–29; and Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, pp. 173–74. The fabrication is evident in light of the fact that since his release from the Nazi concentration camp in Sachsenhausen in 1944, Bandera was not even for a day in the Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{83} D. E. Mikheivich, \textit{Ocherki po istorii katolicheskoi reaktsii} (Moscow, 1955), pp. 378–79.

\textsuperscript{84} D. I. Pokhylevych, \textit{Pidryvna diyalnist’ Vatikanu v krainakh narodnoyi demokratiyi} (Lviv, 1953), p. 42.


\textsuperscript{86} Stel’makh, \textit{Nad Cheremoshem} (Kiev, 1952; also in Russian, Kiev, 1952).
by Vatican agents who had their headquarters high in the Carpathian Mountains in a Catholic monastery.87

In the Western Ukraine the population of Bukovyna, Volynia, and Polissya is Orthodox. And yet a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, Mariya Myketey, stated in 1960 that the Ukrainian population in the Bukovyna region which was in favor of the kolkhoz was in 1948 still being terrorized by Banderivtsi.88 In a Soviet book about a stronghold of Orthodoxy in Volynia, the Pochayivs'ka Lavra, we read: "The Father Superior of the Pochayivs'ka Lavra, Prokip Ivashchuk, beginning in 1946–47, had very close ties with the OUN and for this was sentenced by a Soviet court." Further:

The Banderivtsi cutthroats who, directed by foreign imperialists, committed unprecedentedly brutal deeds in the Western Ukraine received a great deal of support from the Pochayivs'ka Lavra. Father Superior Myroslav Shymansky from 1950–51 on had close ties with the remaining OUN underground and supported the Banderivtsi gangs. After the defeat and liquidation of the gang Father Superior Shymansky was brought before a Soviet court, tried, and punished for his great crime.89

Thus, according to this Soviet source, the heads of the Orthodox Pochayivs'ka Lavra were in no way discomfited by the fact that the UPA received orders from the Vatican.

The presence of "Ukrainian-American" and the "Ukrainian-Canadian" nationalists in the UPA in Volynia in the years 1942–43 is mentioned by Medvedev. These "Ukrainian nationalists brought up in the taverns of Berlin, in pubs and bars of Ottawa and Chicago, persons without a passport, without a homeland, subjects of the international black market, rascals, ready to sell themselves to the Gestapo or the Intelligence Service or the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other espionage organization," spoke a language which was "a mixture of Ukrainian and German," difficult to understand. Another feature which marked these men was their "manicured fingernails which were considered by these bandits a sign of special refinement."90

87 Reviewing the film in Iskusstvo Kino (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1954), pp. 73–78, A. Poltoratsky called the film "characteristic of the struggle which went on in the western oblasts during the early postwar years, and to some extent is still going on at present."
88 Myketey, "Knyha virnyi suputnyk," Zhovten* (Lviv), X, No. 11 (1960), 150–52
89 V. P. Andriyevsky, Pro Pochayivs'ku Lavru (Kiev, 1960), pp. 35–36.
90 Medvedev, pp. 80, 82; see also pp. 405, 426.
Byelyayev and Rudnytsky declare that the American imperialists became sponsors of the UPA very early:

Even during the days when the Soviet artillery was concentrating its fire on Berlin, the archives of the German Gestapo and espionage center, together with all the lists of secret German-Fascist agents, were taken on trucks to Schwarzwald (West Germany). There in an out-of-the-way thicket a motor transport headed by prominent Gestapo men met an American transport of Studebakers behind whose wheels sat the henchmen of the American espionage CIC. All the Gestapo and Abwehr materials were carefully taken down from the German trucks and loaded on the American trucks. American intelligence had taken possession of Hitler's and Himmler's materials in order to conduct a secret war against the USSR. United States intelligence took under its wing groups of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who were also used by the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency in West Germany, Reinhardt Gehlen.\(^91\)

A British journalist, Ralph Parker, in his book *A Plot against Peace*, published in 1949 in Moscow, told how the American consul in Bratislava aided UPA detachments to cross the mountains of Czechoslovakia to meet their “new bosses of the American intelligence” organization.\(^92\) Similar reports were spread by the already mentioned book of Slavík and a film *Operation B*, which was based on this book.\(^93\)

In reality, in the struggle against Moscow and Moscow’s East European satellites—Poland and Czechoslovakia—the UPA was left quite alone and had to depend on its own strength. This fact is indirectly acknowledged by Soviet writers themselves in that they speak of “Anglo-American” commissions, but not of aid, to the UPA. “With the consolidation of Soviet power and with socialist reorganization,” writes Bohodyst, “the defeat of the remaining gangs of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists who after World War II entered the service of the Anglo-American imperialists and on commission of the latter continued subversive work in the Western Ukraine had special importance.” The defeat was made possible, Bohodyst writes, “as a result of successful collectivization, [by virtue of which] all class roots of the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists were destroyed.” The Sixteenth Conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party (January 25–28, 1949)

\(^91\) Byelyayev and Rudnytsky, p. 208.
\(^92\) Known to me in the Russian translation, *Zagovor protiv mira* (Moscow, 1949).
mentioned in its resolutions that as a result of all-round collectivization "the kulaks have been liquidated and a decisive blow thereby dealt to the remaining bourgeois nationalists, the bitterest enemy of the Ukrainian people." In particular, collectivization in the Western Ukraine deprived the UPA of food supplies on which it depended.

However, the completion of collectivization in the Western Ukraine and the liquidation of the UPA, according to the Soviet press, did not mean the end of activities of underground members. In March 1954 at the Eighteenth Conference of the Ukrainian Communist Party O. I. Kyrychenko warned all party organizations in the Western Ukraine that they should "constantly be prepared to carry on a struggle against the remaining OUN members, not allow them into the kolkhozes, factories, or schools where they could carry on their work. Constant vigilance is the most important requirement for all party groups." It was stated in a 1959 article that "the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists changed the methods of their hostile activities against the Soviet regime; they began to infiltrate various Soviet institutions such as economic organs, cultural and educational institutions, and schools in order to save the remaining members of the OUN and to harm the Soviet people."

From time to time the Soviet press mentions instances of the detection of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," of infiltration from abroad, and of the detention of dangerous state criminals at the border (even the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, A. Brovkin has written on this last subject). In May 1954 Ukrainian newspapers printed a communiqué of the Army Tribunal of the Kiev Army Command about the death sentence of Vasyl' Ostapovych Okhrymovych, one of the leaders of the OUN and a member of UHVR. According to this communiqué, Okhrymovych was sent by American intelligence into the Ukraine in order to "collect information and to prepare and execute acts of sabotage and terror." Until the day of his arrest Okhrymovych tried to carry out these instructions, "and many times he spoke by radio with the American espionage center which is located in West Germany."
Recently a campaign has been conducted to discredit the UPA and Ukrainian nationalism by staging public trials against former, and present, members of the nationalist underground. The defendants have been charged with heinous crimes. In the four or so trials reported in the Soviet press, all the defendants have been sentenced to death. In these trials fictitious or real members of the Ukrainian underground are accused of extreme sadism—torturing, throwing people still alive into blazing houses, hanging children on their Pioneer ties, filling wells with the bodies of their murder victims. "Even the darkest epoch of the history of man—the Middle Ages—cannot show examples of such brutal sadism as the acts committed by the monstrous gangs of the Western Ukraine," writes one reviewer of a new book of Soviet Ukrainian poetry which depicts the "assassins" of the UPA.

Soviet propaganda has paid much attention to the so-called "Derman' tragedy." According to Yuriy Mel'nychuk, in the village of Derman' (Mizoch raion in Volynia) in 1957 a well was discovered filled with sixteen bodies of persons who were murdered in 1944–45 by Ukrainian nationalists. At the end of 1957, when four Ukrainian underground members were tried in Mizoch for this crime, they were accused of having killed more than four hundred persons. The same story (filling wells with corpses) was later repeated in the trials of other underground men in Chervonoarmiys'k and Belz.

99 Pravda Ukrainy, March 20 and October 24, 1957; and, March 8, 1959. See also Rostyslav Bratun', "Zvynuvachuyemor" Literaturna hazeta, March 3, 1959, p. 4. For the trial of an UPA battalion commander in Poland, see Franciszek Blajda, "Problemy historii najnowszej: Kurenny Zelezniai," Tygodnik Powszechny (Kraków), July 31, 1960, pp. 1–2.
100 In fictional form, the case of an "American spy" who was caught is presented in Myroslav Fedchyshyn, "Plata za zradu," Radyans'ka Ukrayina, June 7, 1957, p. 4. See also Petro Hurinenko, "Mala maty syna," Dnipro, XXXII, No. 6 (June 1958), 68–75.
101 Mariya Myketey, p. 151.
103 Mel'nychuk, "Dermans'ka trahediya," originally published in Zhovten', 1957, and included in his collection of lampoons, Koly krov kholone v zhylakh (Kiev, 1960). Mel'nychuk is at present a member of the UN delegation from the Ukrainian SSR. See also Pravda Ukrainy, March 20, 1957.
104 See Pravda Ukrainy, October 24, 1957.
105 See Bratun', p. 4; also Pravda Ukrainy, March 8, 1959. Soviet propaganda never recognizes the slightest possibility that these crimes might have been com-
Soviet newspapers also write about connections that exist between the nationalist underground groups and various illegal organizations—Catholic, Orthodox, sectarians—notably the *Yehovisty* (Jehovah's Witnesses), an illegal movement that is supposed to exist in the Ukraine (according to the Soviet press). For example, a former OUN member, M. Hutsulyak from Kuty raion in the Stanyslav oblast, who had been sentenced for anti-Bolshevik activities and after his release had become a member of the *Yehovisty* (said to have administrative headquarters in Brooklyn, New York), according to the Soviet press, stated at his trial: "It is all the same to me with whom I work against the Soviet regime. The OUN no longer exists now, but there is the *Yehovisty* organization which carries on a struggle against the Soviet government, and this will do for me." 106 In another case the Russian Komsomol magazine wrote about a former OUN member, Zynoviy Karas', who had been ordained as an Orthodox priest and given a parish in Kazakhstan. There he organized an underground group of Ukrainians and Kazakhs and maintained connections with the underground in the Western Ukraine. He was ordered to arm the group and in trying to do so he asked for help from a former member of the underground, a woman, who meanwhile had become an agent of the security organs. 107 As a result Karas' was caught. 108

mitted by Red partisans or Soviet sabotage detachments, which very often pretended to be Ukrainian insurgents, by Polish terrorist groups, or by any of the German punitive detachments composed of former Red Army soldiers of various nationalities.

In their memoirs Medvedev and Vershyhora occasionally mention in passing the shooting of their Ukrainian captives (Medvedev, pp. 337–40; Vershyhora, II, No. 3, 69). Vershyhora (I, p. 403) relates the episode of Uncle Mykyta, who on the basis of an agreement between the UPA and General Kovpak came to transport wounded insurgents from Kovpak's camp and was murdered by the Red partisans for no reason at all. The book by M. Kunicki, commander of a Soviet partisan detachment who was instructed by General Strokach and later by General Saburov to operate against the UPA in the Western Ukraine, is a frightful document. He writes frankly that his detachment, pretending to be a section of the UPA, committed anti-Ukrainian provocation. They devastated a few raions in the Western Ukraine, burned whole villages, burned Ukrainian insurgents. The commander himself arrested both the guilty and innocent and sent them to the NKVD. The detachment terrorized the Ukrainian people in Volynia, the Kholm (Chełm) area, and Galicia (Kunicki, pp. 430–33).


107 G. Aksel'rod, "S krestom i kastetom," *Yunost* (Moscow), No. 6, 1959. See
Fiction and poetry did not stand aside from these campaigns. At the Fourth Congress of Ukrainian Soviet writers in March 1959, M. Bazhan summarized the efforts of Ukrainian Soviet literature to expose bourgeois nationalists, especially the activity of the Ukrainian underground. After praising the authors Yaroslav Halan and Yuriy Mel’nychuk, Bazhan said:

The treacherous underground activities of the Banderivtsi gangsters and their bloody deeds have aroused the just anger of the Ukrainian people. The truth about these brutes is told in the poem of Dmytro Pavlychko “Assassins” which is full of hatred. . . . The disgusting Banderivtsi underground—those “independent holes” so excellently satirized by the unforgettable Ostap Vyshnya—are also described by Ivan Tsyupa in his . . . novel Nazustrich Doli. The third part of Stepan Chornobryvets’ trilogy, which has a subject similar to that of Ivan Tsyupa’s novel, analyzes even more in detail the crimes of the Banderivtsi underground. Among the brutal Banderivtsi gangs the part of the “propagandists and ideologists” was played by men like the character Avhustyn Zolotolykyi portrayed by Chornobryvets’ or . . . Koshevs’kyi in Dmytro Derech’s novel Križ’ Teneta.

To Bazhan’s list some additions can be made: Vadym Sobko’s novel in which the UPA struggle against collectivization and the resistance also Yuriy Mel’nychuk, “Vidpovid’ fanatytki,” originally in Vil’na Ukrayina (Lviv) and in Literaturna hazeta (Kiev), No. 5, 1957, p. 4; republished in his collection of pamphlets Poriddya yudy (Lviv, 1958).

See also D. L. Pokhylevych, “Uniati i yikh reaktsiyna rol’,” Komunist Ukrayiny (Kiev), No. 7 (1959), pp. 77–82; and Digest of the Soviet Ukrainian Press, III, No. 9, 23–24.

“Vbyvtci,” in Pavlychko, Bystryyna (Kiev, 1959; also in Russian, Moscow, 1959).

Vyshnya, Vybrane (Kiev, 1954; also in Russian, Kiev, 1951). Ostap Vyshnya is the literary pseudonym of the popular Ukrainian humorist Pavlo Hubenko (1889–1956), who himself was tried and exiled as a “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist,” spent more than ten years in Soviet concentration camps, and was returned from exile only in 1944 with the obvious purpose of using his humorous talents against the UPA. Vyshnya coined the term “Ukrainian independent hole” in ridiculing the UPA underground bunkers.

Tsypa (p. 409) quotes an obviously fabricated anti-collectivization leaflet of the UPA: “Soon the Americans and the British will come to us! We shall not wait long! People, do not join the collectives!” It is worth noting that the most carefully guarded secret in the Soviet anti-UPA arsenal is that of the real program and ideology of the UPA, despite the fact that the Soviets undoubtedly have underground publications in their archives.


to recruitment of Ukrainian youths into factory schools (FZN) are described, the previously mentioned novel of Mykhaylo Stel'makh (Nad Cheremoshem), works by Ihor Muratov, Valentyn Rechmedin, Vasyl' Bol'shak; there are also the numerous essays, reports, memoirs, and feuilletons of Yaroslav Halan, Yuriy Mel'nychuk and Petro Kozlanyuk.

Occasionally Soviet critics caution against misrepresentation of the UPA resistance. For example, one reviewer wrote of a novel by Valentyn Rechmedin: “It is a relief to see that V. Rechmedin did not use the already very irksome methods of degrading our enemies; he did not present stupid and grotesque caricatures.”

Of the fiction about the problem of UPA infiltration, the most interesting is a detective novel written in Russian by Vadim Peunov showing the struggle of the security organs with the Ukrainian underground in the Western Ukraine. For a long time the security organs have been unable to cope with the sabotage and terrorist organization because the leader—Drobot, chief of the provincial health department—was a member of the Party and recipient of a Soviet order. This man, known in the underground as Korshun, had been sent by the UPA during the war to join the Red partisans, win their confidence, and obtain a high post from which he could work for the good of the underground organization. Korshun had carried out his commission very well, and for a long time he was the leader of the under-

---

116 Rechmedin, Koly zakypala krov (Kiev, 1958). Other works of this kind are Nikolai Dalyokii, Ne otkryvaya litsa (Lviv, 1956), Volodymyr Bablyak, Vyshnevyi sad (Kiev, 1958), Dmytro Bandrivsky, Pid synimy horamy: Zapysky vchytelya (Kiev, 1955). The third chapter of Bandrivsky’s book is entirely devoted to the struggle against the UPA.
117 Bol’shak, “Nad Zbruchem—sontsel!” Prapor, No. 4 (April 1960), pp. 15–64; No. 5 (May 1960), pp. 6–45. The author calls his work a “documentary story” and devotes it to the Soviet “celebrity” and friend of Khrushchev, the Ukrainian corngrower, Yevheniya Dolynyuk. According to Bol’shak, Dolynyuk repeatedly had trouble with the Ukrainian underground.
118 In addition to the Mel’nychuk writings already cited, lampoons are collected in his Sluhy zhovtoho dyyavola (Lviv, 1957); reviewed by Konvisar, “Zaprodantsi vysluzhuyut’sya,” Radyans’ka Ukrayina, September 17 and 19, 1957.
ground without any suspicion on the part of the Soviet security organs.120

A play on the same subject, “Black Dragon” by Vasyl' Mynko, was published in 1958 by the Komsomol magazine Dnipro. The black dragon is a nationalist infiltrator, Ihor Shevchuk. Having been commissioned by his organization, he obtained the post of a club chairman and in this position tried to recruit people to “hostile subversive work,” namely, to spy and get information about the top secret buildings being constructed in the Haydamaky forest. The infiltrator is shown as a rather charming young man—he is handsome, possesses a good knowledge of Soviet literature and music, captivates the girls, and gets them to fall in love with him. Ihor recruits into his organization former kulaks who have returned from Siberia and former prisoners who had once agreed to work for the Germans. These people betray him. Ihor Shevchuk formulates his credo in a talk with one of his recruits: “My ideal is to see a free and flourishing Ukraine. This is the reason why a struggle is necessary in order to stop the humiliation of the Ukrainians and destroy all that is called communism.”121

Prologue Research and Publishing Association
New York

120 Vadim Peunov, Poslednee delo Korshuna (Stalino, 1955).
Allgemeine Probleme des internationalen Privatrechts der Sowjetunion*

ANDREAS BILINSKY


Von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus setzt sich die sowjetische Lehre mit der "kapitalistischen" Auffassung über das IPR auseinander. Sämtlichen westlichen Begriffsbezeichnungen des IPR wohne das formalerechtliche Moment inne. Die westlichen Autoren setzten sich über


Ich möchte außerdem auf einige sehr interessante Abhandlungen von W. M. Korezkij (Ukrainer) hinweisen, der zu den besten sowjetischen Experten des IPR gehört: Otscherki meshdunarodnogo chosjajstwennogo prawa (Charkiw, 1928); "Ogoworka o vzaimnosti w meshdunarodnom tschastnom prawe", Westnik sowetskoj justizii, Nr. 19 u. 20 (1925); "Ogoworka o publitschnom porjadke w anglo-amerikanskoj sudebnoj praktike po delam, za tragi wajuschtschim interesy SSSR", Utschenyje sapiski Char'kowskogo juriditscheskogo instituta, Lief. 1 (1939); Otscherki anglo-amerikanskoj doktríny i praktiki meshdunarodnogo tschastnogo prawa (Moskau, 1948); Obschtschyje prinzipy w meshdunarodnom prawe (Moskau, 1957).
den permanenten Klassenkampf, der in Wahrheit das IPR ins Leben gerufen habe, hinweg, und beschäftigten sich mit der Frage, welche Rechtsordnung bzw. welches Recht im Fall einer Kollision verschiedener Rechtsordnungen anzuwenden sei. In Wirklichkeit ginge es bei den Bedingungen des internationalen Wirtschaftskampfes nicht um die Abgrenzung zwischen den Rechtsordnungen oder um das "Grenzrecht", sondern um das Bestreben der imperialistischen Staaten, die eigene Rechtssphäre möglichst weit auszudehnen und dadurch ganz bestimmte Vorteile im Außenhandel für sich zu sichern. Das bourgeoise IPR bilde einen Bestandteil des bourgeoisen Rechts überhaupt, das die Interessen des internationalen Kapitals im Kampfe gegen die Arbeiterklasse verträge.¹

Die sowjetische Lehre über das IPR trägt ein politisch gefärbtes Gepräge. Das IPR sowie das Völkerrecht bildeten nur noch den Überbau der Wirtschaftsverhältnisse und spiegelten in dem Sinne die Außenpolitik der Sowjetunion wider.² Der politische Charakter des IPR wurde besonders durch den sowjetischen Völkerrechtler Krylow betont. Er betrachtete daher das IPR als einen organischen Bestandteil des Völkerrechts, weil hinter jeder an dem internationalen Verkehr beteiligten Person stets ihr Staat stünde. Ein Zivilstreit könne sich daher zu jeder Zeit in einen Konflikt zwischen den Staaten auswachsen.³ Eine andere Auffassung vertrat Pereterskij, und zwar die, dass das IPR ein selbständiger Teil des Zivilrechts sei.⁴ Diese Auffassung übernahm Lunz und entwickelte sie in seinen Aufsätzen in den juristischen Fachzeitschriften, sowie in seinen Lehrbüchern.⁵

Die Meinungsverschiedenheiten in der sowjetischen Lehre sind auf die Tatsache zurückzuführen, dass es in der Sowjetunion nach dem


² Lunz, Meshdunarodnoje tschastnoje prawo (1959), S. 33.

³ Vgl. Diskussion im Institut für Rechtswissenschaft, Sowetskoje gosudarstwo i prawo, Nr. 8 (1955), S. 121 ff.


Die Diskussion betraf auch die Problematik des IPR in Beziehungen zwischen den Ostblockländern und zu der "kapitalistischen Um-


Der Inhalt des sowjetischen IPR wird jedoch durch die Kollisionsnormen nicht erschöpft. Zu diesen gehören alle Rechtsnormen, die (a) die Zivilrechtsverhältnisse der Ausländer in der UdSSR und der Bürger der UdSSR im Auslande regeln, (b) bestimmen, welches Gesetz (bzw. durch das Gesetz welchen Landes) die Zivilrechtsverhältnisse geregelt werden sollen, die im Auslande entstanden sind und in der UdSSR verwirklicht oder in der UdSSR entstanden und im Auslande verwirklicht werden sollen, (c) die prozessualen Rechte der Ausländer in der UdSSR und der sowjetischen Bürger im Auslande festlegen.8 Zum IPR gehören also die Kollisionsnormen, die die Frage regeln, welches Recht auf ein Rechtsverhältnis "mit internationalem Element" anzuwenden sind, und die Normen, durch die die Rechtsfähigkeit der Ausländer geregelt wird.9 Die letztgenannten Normen werden aus dem Grunde zum IPR gezählt, weil die Frage,

7 Lunz (1959), S. 23.
8 Pereterskij und Krylow, S. 10.
9 Lunz (1949), S. 10; Lunz (1959), S. 19.
welches Recht angewendet werden soll (Kollisionsnormen), nur dann auftauchen kann, wenn die Rechtssfähigkeit eines Ausländer durch eine "direkte" Norm des Staates anerkannt wird. Wird sie nicht anerkannt, so entsteht keine Kollision.

Unter dem Rechtsverhältnis mit einem internationalen Element versteht die sowjetische Lehre ein Rechtsverhältnis, in dem ein Ausländer als sein Beteiligter (Subjekt) auftritt oder wenn sein Objekt eine sich im Ausland befindende Sache ist oder wenn sich die juristischen Tatsachen, mit denen die Entstehung, Veränderung oder Beendigung der Rechtsverhältnisse verbunden ist, im Ausland abspielen.10


Die Fragen des Personalstatuts der Ausländer in der UdSSR werden durch Art. 8 der Einführungsverordnung zum ZGB der RSFSR und die entsprechenden Verordnungen der anderen Unionsrepubliken sowie in einigen Sondergesetzen geregelt. Die Anwendung ordnung von Beschränkungen für Angehörige solcher Staaten, die die Sowjetangehörigen ihren Angehörigen nicht gleichstellen und ihre Rechtssfähigkeit einschränken (Vergeltungsrecht) wurde durch besondere Verordnungen geregelt, wie z.B. durch den Beschluss des Rates der Volkskommissare vom 26.11.1935 "Über das Vermögen der Ausländer, die auf dem Gebiet der UdSSR keinen Wohnsitz haben". Ausserdem gibt

10 Lunz (1949), S. 7 ff.
es in der UdSSR eine Reihe von Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die die Rechte der Ausländer in der UdSSR beschränken.


Zu den Quellen des IPR werden auch die Verfassung der UdSSR und die Verfassungen der Unionsrepubliken gezählt. Nach den Bestimmungen dieser Verfassungen wird die Frage entschieden, inwieweit die Anwendung des ausländischen Rechts mit der öffentlichen Ordnung der UdSSR vereinbar ist.

Falls im sowjetischen Kollisionsrecht Lücken bestehen, so werden sie nach Art. 4 des ZGB der RSFSR und den entsprechenden Artikeln der anderen Unionsrepubliken entschieden. Art. 4 des ZGB der RSFSR weist das Gericht an, dass es bei Nichtvorliegen entsprechender Gesetze und Verordnungen nach den allgemeinen Grundsätzen der Gesetzgebung und der allgemeinen Politik der Arbeiter-Bauern-Regierung zu entscheiden hat. Lunz schliesst aus der Bestimmung des Art. 4, dass bei der Entscheidung über die Rechtsverhältnisse "mit einem ausländischen Element" in den meisten Fällen das sowjetische Recht zur Anwendung kommen soll, soweit das Kollisionsrecht nicht direkt auf das ausländische Recht als massgebendes Recht verweist.12

Dem Prinzip der Gesetzesanalogie wird im sowjetischen IPR eine große Bedeutung beigemessen. Ihre Aufgabe ist, die bestehenden Gesetzeslücken zu schliessen. So ist z.B. die Vorbehaltsklausel, d.h. der Grundsatz, nach dem das ausländische Recht nicht anzuwenden ist, wenn dadurch die Grundlagen der sowjetischen Gesellschaftsordnung gefährdet werden, in Art. 4 des Kodexes der Handelsseeschifffahrt ausgedrückt. Diese Regel gilt jedoch für das ganze sowjetische Kolli-

11 Wedomosti Werchownogo Soweta (WWS) SSSR, Nr. 23 (1958), Art. 345; und Nr. 1 (1959), Art. 2.
12 Lunz (1959), S. 51-52.
13 Ebd., S. 53.
Gesetzesanalogie vor, so wird die Sache nach dem Prinzip der Rechtsanalogie, d.h. nach der oben erwähnten Bestimmung des Art. 4 des ZGB der RSFSR entschieden.


14 In Polen besitzt das Gesetz über das IPR vom 2.8.1926 auch heute seine Gültigkeit; in der Tschechoslowakei wurde das IPR durch das Gesetz vom 11.3.1948 kodifiziert.
legt worden. Darüber hinaus bestehen zwischen den einzelnen Ländern des Ostblocks bilaterale Konsularabkommen und Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen der Personen mit doppelter Staatsangehörigkeit.¹⁵

¹⁵ Tschechoslowakei—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 31.7.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 1 [896], Art. 4)
Konsularabkommen v. 5.10.1957 (ebd., 1958, Nr. 17 [912], Art. 288)
Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 5.10.1957 (ebd., 1958, Nr. 17 [912], Art. 289)

DDR—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 28.11.1957 (GB der DDR, 1958, Teil I, Nr. 19)
Konsularabkommen v. 10.5.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1957, Nr. 21 [888], Art. 529)

Bulgarien—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 12.12.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 9 [904], S. 528). Der Text des Abkommens wurde in einer Sonderbroschüre veröffentlicht.
Konsularabkommen v. 12.12.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 7 [902], Art. 140)
Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 12.12.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 7 [902], Art. 141)

China—SSSR
Konsularabkommen v. 23.6.1959 (WWS SSSR, 1959, Nr. 51 [983], Art 276)
Rechtshilfeabkommen liegt nicht vor.

Polen—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 28.12.1957 (Dziennik Ustaw, 1958, Nr. 32, Pos. 147)
Konsularabkommen v. 21.1.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 9 [804], Art. 208)
Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 21.1.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 9 [904], Art. 209)

Rumänien—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 3.4.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 21 [916], Art. 329)
Konsularabkommen v. 4.9.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 5 [900], Art. 102)
Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 4.9.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr 5 [900], Art. 103)

Albanien—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 30.7.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1959, Nr. 10 [942], Art. 72)
Konsularvertrag v. 18.9.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 9 [904], Art. 204)
Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 18.9.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 9 [904], Art. 205)

Ungarn—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 15.7.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 35 [930], Art. 423)
Konsularabkommen v. 24.8.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 1 [896], Art. 1)
Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 24.8.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 1 [896], Art. 2)

Mongolei—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 25.8.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 35 [930], Art. 424)
Konsularabkommen v. 25.8.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 35 [930], Art. 425)
Abkommen über die Regelung der Staatsangehörigkeit von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 25.8.1958 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 35 [930], Art. 426)

Nord-Korea—SSSR
Rechtshilfeabkommen v. 16.12.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 5 [900], Art. 93)
Konsularabkommen v. 16.12.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 4 [899], Art. 83)
Einige Fragen des IPR wurden in den Friedensverträgen mit Italien, Rumänien, Bulgarien, Ungarn und Finnland, die am 10.2.1947 unterzeichnet wurden und am 15.9.1947 in Kraft getreten sind, geregelt.

(c) Das internationale Gewohnheitsrecht. Das internationale Gewohnheitsrecht wird auch durch die sowjetische Lehre zu den Quellen des IPR gezählt, vorausgesetzt, dass es durch den Sowjetstaat sanktioniert worden ist.


Das Verhältnis zwischen den Lebensverhältnissen und den Rechtsverhältnissen in der sozialistischen Gesellschaftsformation ist ein Teilproblem des Verhältnisses zwischen "Basis" und "Überbau". Das sozialistische Recht ist ein Mittel der Verwirklichung der Politik der

Abkommen über die Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen von Personen mit doppelter StA v. 16.12.1957 (WWS SSSR, 1958, Nr. 4 [899], Art. 84).

16 Martin Wolff, Das Internationale Privatrecht Deutschlands (dritte Auflage; Berlin, 1954).

Kommunistischen Partei, indem es das Verhalten der Menschen durch die Rechtsnormen regelt. In der Rechtsnorm ist ein Hinweis darauf enthalten, was für ein Verhalten von den an gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen Beteiligten erwartet wird.18

Die regelnde Einwirkung der Rechtsnormen kommt darin zum Ausdruck, dass sie den staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Organisationen, den Staatsfunktionären und einzelnen Bürgern Pflichten übertragen, d.h. dass sie die Notwendigkeit für ein bestimmtes Verhalten schaffen, das sich aus der in der Rechtsnorm enthaltenen Forderung ergibt und durch staatlichen Zwang gewährleistet wird. Die Rechtsnormen gewähren auch einzelnen Bürgern und Organisationen Rechte, d.h. es wird ihnen die durch den staatlichen Zwang gewährleistete und sich aus den Pflichten anderer Personen ergebende Möglichkeit gegeben, auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise zu handeln und insbesondere von einer oder mehreren Personen ein bestimmtes Verhalten zu verlangen.19

In jedem Rechtsverhältnis kommt also der Wille der Beteiligten und zugleich der Wille des Staates bzw. der Klasse zum Ausdruck, und zwar in der Weise, dass der Wille der Beteiligten durch den Staatswillen determiniert ist. Primär ist nicht das Lebensverhältnis, das durch das Recht geregelt werden soll, sondern primär sind die Rechtsnormen und Rechtsverhältnisse, die die Autonomie der an einem Rechtsverhältnis Beteiligten von vornherein bestimmen. Diese Auffassung bestimmt auch die Eigenart des sowjetischen IPR, in dessen Mittelpunkt ein Lebensverhältnis, das zugleich ein Rechtsverhältnis ist, steht.

5. Über die Begriffe "Rechtsfähigkeit" und "Handlungsfähigkeit". Die Spezifik des sowjetischen Begriffes "Rechtsverhältnis" ist auch für die sowjetischen Begriffe "Rechtsfähigkeit" und "Handlungsfähigkeit" bestimmend. Die sowjetische Lehre distanziert sich von solchen abstrakten Begriffen wie "natürliche Person", weil dieser Begriff für das "bourgeoise" Recht typisch sei, das durch derartige Abstraktionen die ökonomische und politische Ungleichheit der Rechtssubjekte maskiere.20 Die "bourgeoise" Lehre ziehe eine Tren-


Diese Auffassung kommt im Art. 4 des ZGB der RSFSR und den entsprechenden Artikeln der ZGB der anderen Unionsrepubliken zum Ausdruck:

Zum Zwecke der Entwicklung der Produktionskräfte des Landes wird von der RSFSR sämtlichen Bürgern, die durch das Gericht in den Rechten nicht beschränkt sind, die zivile Rechtsfähigkeit verliehen. Das Geschlecht, die Rasse, die Konfession, die Abstammung haben keinen Einfluss auf den Umfang der zivilen Rechtsfähigkeit.


Aus dem Inhalt des Art. 4 des ZGB der RSFSR, der die Möglichkeit der Beschränkung der Rechtsfähigkeit vorsieht, ergibt sich, dass die Verleihung der Rechtsfähigkeit den Bürgern der UdSSR gleichbedeutend ist mit einer generellen Zulassung der Bürger zur Ausübung der ihnen durch den Staat verliehenen Rechte. Da Art. 4 des ZGB der RSFSR die Rechtsfähigkeit der sowjetischen Bürger betont, taucht dadurch die Frage nach der Rechtsfähigkeit der Ausländer auf oder m.a.W. die Frage, inwieweit die Ausländer durch den sowjetischen Gesetzgeber zum sozialistischen Rechtsverkehr zugelassen werden.

Beachtenswert ist, dass die Frage der Rechtsfähigkeit der Ausländer in der UdSSR durch keine Gesetze geregelt ist. Über diese schliesst man aus dem Inhalt des Art. 8 der Einführungsvorschriften zum ZGB der RSFSR, der lediglich die "Rechte" der Ausländer in der UdSSR behandelt. Nach diesem Artikel werden die Rechte der Angehörigen der ausländischen Staaten, mit denen die Sowjetunion Abkommen getroffen hat, durch die Bestimmungen dieser Abkommen geregelt. Absatz 2 dieses Artikels lautet:


Aus dieser Bestimmung wird in der sowjetischen Lehre der Schluss gezogen, dass die Ausländer die gleiche Rechtsfähigkeit besitzen, wie

22 Ebd., S. 153.
23 Die Fassung dieses Artikels ist veraltet, besonders dieser Teil, in dem von der Eröffnung und dem Erwerb von Handels- und Industrieanrechten die Rede ist.


Die Frage der Handlungsfähigkeit der Ausländer ist in den ZGB der Unionsrepubliken expressis verbis nicht geregelt. Das ZGB der RSFSR bestimmt, dass die Handlungsfähigkeit einer Person im vollen Umfange mit Erreichung der Volljährigkeit, d.h. des 18. Lebensjahres beginnt (Art. 7). Daraus, dass in der obigen Bestimmung der Ausdruck "Person" gebraucht wird, schliesst Pereterskij, dass die Bestimmung des Art. 7 auch für Ausländer, die auf dem Gebiete der RSFSR ihren Wohnsitz haben, gilt.

24 Pereterskij und Krylow, S. 77-78.
26 Pereterskij und Krylow, S. 78.
27 Ebd., S. 70.
28 Ebd., S. 78.
Von dem "sowjetischen Nationalregime" als einer Regel für die Frage der Handlungsfähigkeit der Ausländer sieht das Sowjetrecht dann Ausnahmen vor, wenn diese Fragen durch einen Staatsvertrag anders geregelt wurden. Nach den Rechtshilfeabkommen mit den Ostblockstaaten (1957–58) wird die Handlungsfähigkeit der Angehörigen der Vertragsstaaten nach ihrem Heimatrecht bestimmt. An diesem Beispiel ist die Tendenz der Sowjetunion ersichtlich, auf die Angehörigen der "bourgeoisen" Staaten das sowjetische "Nationalregime", d.h. das sowjetische Recht, auszudehnen, während die Handlungsfähigkeit der Angehörigen der Ostblockstaaten nach ihrem Heimatrecht beurteilt wird, weil dieses Recht bereits "sozialistisch" sei.


7. Die Rechtsstellung der sowjetischen Bürger im Ausland. Die Sowjetunion dehnt ihr "Nationalregime" auf Ausländer aus, wenn die Gegenseitigkeit verbürgt ist, d.h. wenn die Rechtsordnung des betreffenden Staates den sowjetischen Bürgern die Rechtshfähigkeit verleiht, und zwar nicht nur dann, wenn ein Sowjetbürger auf dem Gebiete dieses Staates seinen Wohnsitz hat, sondern auch dann, wenn dort seine Rechte und Interessen, die sich auf die Rechtsordnung dieses Staates gründen, entstanden sind. Der Umstand, dass diese Rechte in der Sowjetunion nicht anerkannt werden (z.B. Erwerb eines Grundstücks), ist ohne Bedeutung. Die sowjetischen Konsuln sind verpflichtet, die Rechte der sowjetischen Bürger im Ausland zu gewährleisten.


31 Lunz (1949), S. 158.
32 Pereterskij und Krylow, S. 81; Lunz (1949), S. 163.
33 Pereterskij und Krylow, S. 81.
34 Lunz (1959), S. 132-33.

Fasst man das Problem von dieser Seite an, so muss man einem der führenden sowjetischen Experten für das IPR, Lunz, zustimmen, dass die Fragen des Personalstatus, zu dem er die Fragen der Rechtsfähigkeit, Handlungsfähigkeit, der persönlichen Rechte, Ehe- und Familienrechte sowie Nachlassrechte rechnet, durch das sowjetische IPR äußerst unbefriedigend und lückenhaft geregelt seien und einer Systematisierung und Ergänzung bedürften, was nur durch eine Kodifizierung beseitigt werden könne. Bis jetzt hat die sowjetische Lehre und Praxis den Problemen des IPR, die mit dem Aussenhandel zusammenhängen, unter Vernachlässigung anderer Probleme des IPR besondere Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt.

Der Ruf nach Kodifizierung des IPR entspricht der gleichen Forderung auf allen anderen Gebieten des Sowjetrechts. Man geht von dem Standpunkt aus, dass durch die staatlichen Kollisionsnormen über die Frage des Beteiligungsumfangs der Bürger und Organisationen an dem internationalen Verkehr entschieden wird. Die Forderung nach Kodifizierung des IPR ist somit ein Anliegen der Rechtssicherheit der Bürger in ihren internationalen Beziehungen privatrechtlicher Natur. Das Gebiet des IPR war bis jetzt durch die Politik beherrscht. Es gibt zur Zeit keine Anzeichen, dass die Politik be-

35 Ebd., S. 136.
36 Lunz, "Osnovnyje kollisionnyje woprosy sowetskogo semejnogo i nasledstven-nogo prawa". Utschenyje sapiski WIJuN, Lief. 2 (1941), S. 95–96.
37 Lunz (1959), S. 153.
38 Ebd., S. 157.
40 Lunz (1959), S. 148.
reit ist, die "privaten" internationalen Beziehungen den festen Kollisionsregeln zu unterwerfen und auf eine bestimmte Bewegungsfreiheit in diesen Fragen zu verzichten.

Aus den oben genannten Gründen würde es schwer fallen, über die Anknüpfungsgrundsätze im sowjetischen IPR zu sprechen. Man kann vielmehr von einer Grundsatzlosigkeit des sowjetischen IPR und von seinem ausgesprochen pragmatischen Charakter sprechen, was sich aus den nachstehenden Ausführungen ergibt.

Die Behauptung mancher westlicher Autoren, die Sowjetunion knüpfe in Bezug auf die Fragen des Personalstatus an die *lex patriae* an, soweit es sich um die sowjetischen Staatsangehörigen handele, und an die *lex domicilii*, wenn es sich um die Ausländer in der UdSSR handele, um sich sowohl die Sowjetbürger mit dem Wohnsitz im Ausland, als auch die Ausländer mit dem Wohnsitz in der Sowjetunion zu unterstellen, lehnt Lunz als unergänzt ab. In Fragen der Handlungsfähigkeit der Sowjetbürger knüpfe die sowjetische Praxis an das Heimatrecht, d.h. das sowjetische Recht an. Über die Handlungsfähigkeit der Ausländer in der UdSSR werde nach dem sowjetischen Recht entschieden, wobei der Anknüpfungspunkt nicht die *lex domicilii*, sondern die *lex loci actus* sei. Bei der Beurteilung der Ehevoraussetzungen werde an das sowjetische Recht angeknüpft, soweit es sich um die Ehe der Sowjetbürger und um die der Ausländer mit dem Wohnsitz in der UdSSR handele.

In Fragen der Ehescheidung verlange jedoch die sowjetische Praxis keine Anknüpfung an das Heimatrecht, wenn es sich um Scheidungen von Sowjetbürgern im Auslande handele. In diesem Fall sei der Anknüpfungspunkt nicht die *lex patriae*, sondern die *lex loci actus*.


\(^4\) Ebd., S. 157.

Aus dem obigen Beispiel ist die Tendenz des sowjetischen IPR ersichtlich, keine Konzessionen an das "bourgeoise" Recht zu machen mit Ausnahme von Fällen, in denen die Anerkennung bzw. Anwendung dieses Rechts für die UdSSR günstig ist. Die Lehre macht von solchen Ausdrücken wie *lex patriae*, *lex domicilii*, *lex loci actus*, *lex fori* usw. häufig Gebrauch, jedoch sind das blosse Ausdrücke, hinter denen sich als Grundsatz das "Nationalregime", d.h. eine Kombination von Territorialprinzip und Nationalprinzip verbirgt. Die An-

\(^{42}\) Lunz (1949), S. 306.
wendung des "bourgeois" Rechts betrachtet man als eine Sache der Gefälligkeit oder Bequemlichkeit und nicht als eine Rechtspflicht.


In den einzelnen Fragen richten sich die Abkommen nach folgenden Grundsätzen:

Für die Fragen der Handlungsfähigkeit ist das Heimatrecht massgebend (Art. 24 des Abkommens zwischen der UdSSR und Albanien, Bulgarien, ČSR, Rumänien, Ungarn, VR Korea, der Mongolischen VR und Art. 22 mit Polen).

Für die Fragen der Feststellung und Anfechtung der Vaterschaft sowie Fragen der Ehelichkeit des Kindes gilt als Anknüpfungspunkt das Heimatrecht des Kindes nach seiner Geburt (Art. 26 der Abkommen der UdSSR mit der ČSR, Bulgarien, Albanien; Art. 25 mit der DDR; Art. 27 Abs. 2 mit Korea; Art. 27 mit Rumänien und Ungarn; Art. 26 mit der Mongolischen VR).

Das Rechtsverhältnis zwischen einem unehelichen Kinde, seiner Mutter und seinem Vater bestimmt sich nach dem Heimatrecht des Kindes (Art. 27 der Abkommen mit Bulgarien, Korea, Albanien, der ČSR, der Mongolischen VR; Art. 26 mit der DDR; Art. 28 der Abkommen mit Rumänien und Ungarn, Art. 32 des Abkommens mit Polen).

Die persönlichen und Vermögensbeziehungen zwischen den Ehegatten bestimmen sich: a) wenn einer der Ehegatten auf dem Territorium des einen Vertragsstaates und der andere auf dem Territorium

43 Lunz (1959), S. 158.
des anderen Vertragsstaates seinen Wohnsitz hat und beide die gleiche Staatsangehörigkeit haben—nach ihrem Heimatrecht; b) wenn einer der Ehegatten Angehöriger des einen Vertragstaates und der andere des anderen Vertragsstaates ist, so wird das Gesetz des Staates angewandt, auf dessen Territorium sie den gemeinsamen Wohnsitz haben oder hatten (Art. 22 des Abkommens mit der DDR, Art. 29 des Abkommens mit Polen).

In Ehescheidungssachen haben die Gerichte das Recht ihres Staates anzuwenden, wobei allerdings diese Sachen zur Kompetenz der Gerichte desjenigen Staates gehören, dessen Staatsangehörigkeit die Ehegatten zur Zeit der Klageerhebung besitzen. Haben die Ehegatten ihren Wohnsitz auf dem Gebiete des anderen Vertragsstaates, so sind die Gerichte dieses Staates zuständig. Ist einer der Ehegatten Staatsangehöriger des einen Vertragsstaates und der andere des anderen und lebt der eine auf dem Gebiete des einen Vertragsstaates und der andere auf dem Gebiet des anderen, so sind die Gerichte beider Staaten zuständig (Art. 23 des Abkommens mit der DDR; Art. 30 des Abkommens mit Polen). In diesen Fragen wird also an die lex patriae und lex fori angeknüpft.

In Verschollenheitsfragen sind die Behörden des Staates des Verschollenen zuständig. Von diesem Grundsatz sind allerdings Ausnahmen vorgesehen, und zwar können die Behörden des einen Vertragsstaates den Angehörigen des anderen Vertragsstaates für verschollen oder für tot erklären. Bei Verhandlung dieser Sachen haben die Behörden das Recht ihres Staates anzuwenden (Art. 29 der Abkommen mit der ČSR, Bulgarien, Korea, Mongolischen VR, Albanien; Art. 24 des Abkommens mit der DDR; Art. 27 des Abkommens mit Polen; Art. 25 des Abkommens mit Ungarn).


Vergleicht man die Abkommen zwischen der UdSSR und den übrigen Ostblockstaaten mit den Abkommen zwischen den Ostblockstaaten mit Ausnahme der UdSSR, so bestehen grundsätzliche Unterschiede nur im Erbrecht. In diesen Fragen legen die Abkommen zwischen der UdSSR und den Ostblockstaaten unterschiedliche Anknüpfungspunkte bezüglich der Mobiliar- und Immobiliarerbfolge fest. Im
ersten Fall wird das Heimatrecht des Erblassers, im zweiten Fall die *lex rei sitae* angewandt.

Im Gegensatz dazu machen die Rechtshilfeabkommen zwischen den Ostblockstaaten mit Ausnahme der UdSSR keinen Unterschied zwischen dem beweglichen und unbeweglichen Vermögen und knüpfen hinsichtlich des ganzen Vermögens des Erblassers an das Heimatrecht des Erblassers an.\(^4\)

10. Die positive Kollision. Kommt ein Lebensverhältnis mit zwei Staaten in Berührung und betrachtet jeder von beiden Staaten nach seinem Kollisionsrecht seine Rechtsordnung für dieses Verhältnis für massgebend, so liegt eine positive Kollision vor. Für diesen Fall gilt in der UdSSR die Regel, dass der Richter stets nur das sowjetische Kollisionsrecht anzuwenden hat. Er darf nicht die Wirkung der sowjetischen Gesetze aufgrund fremder Kollisionsnormen einschränken.\(^4\)


12. Die Anwendung des ausländischen Rechts. Verweist die sowjetische Kollisionsnorm auf die Anwendung des Rechts eines fremden Staates, so wird dieses Recht in vollem Umfange, d.h. sowohl das Gesetz als auch das Gewohnheitsrecht und die Judikatur, angewandt. Das Gericht hat das fremde Recht so anzuwenden, wie es durch die Gerichte

\(^{4\text{Ausführlich darüber in der Abhandlung von Lunz }O\text{ sogiaschenijach meshdu }\text{europejskimi stranami narodnoj demokratii po wsaimnoj pomoschtschi w grashdanskich delach (Moskau, 1958).}}\)

\(^{4\text{Pereterskij und Krylow, S. 48-49.}}\)

\(^{4\text{Ebd., S. 50.}}\)


47 Pereterskj und Krylow, S. 54.
49 Ebd., S. 212.
Die sowjetische Lehre lehnt die lex fori als ein Kriterium für die Lösung der Konflikte der Qualifikationen ab, weil dieses Kriterium zur Entstellung der sowjetischen Rechtsbegriffe und Institutionen durch die ausländischen Gerichte führen würde. Zugleich aber vermeidet sie eigene Vorschläge zur Lösung der Qualifikationskonflikte vorzubringen. Man schenkt der Konzeption der Deutschen Martin Wolff und Leo Raape Beachtung (lex causae), ist jedoch der Meinung, dass, solange es ein universelles Kriterium für die Auslegung des sachlichen Rechts nicht gebe, von einem universellen Kriterium für die Auslegung der Kollisionsnormen keine Rede sein könne.

14. Vorbehaltsklausel. Art. 4 des sowjetischen Handelsseeschifffahrts- gesetzes lautet folgendermaßen:

In Fällen, in welchen aufgrund des vorliegenden Artikels die Regeln des Handelsseeschifffahrtsgesetzes keine Anwendung finden, kann das Gericht ausländische Gesetze anwenden, soweit sie der sowjetischen Gesellschaftsordnung nicht widersprechen.

Durch eine ausgedehnte Anwendung des Analogieprinzips im sowjetischen IPR besitzt die obige Bestimmung den Charakter einer Generalklausel. Die sowjetische Vorbehaltsklausel hat einen ausgesprochen politischen Sinn.


Im sowjetischen Schrifttum wird behauptet, dass in der Sowjetunion von der Vorbehaltsklausel nur sehr selten Gebrauch gemacht werde. Es würde schwer fallen, die Richtigkeit dieser Behauptung zu

50 Ebd., S. 210.
51 Ebd., S. 213.
52 Ebd., S. 234.
überprüfen, da kein entsprechendes Material vorliegt. Es genügt aber, auf die fast unumschränkte Anwendungsmöglichkeit dieser Klausel hinzuweisen.

Außerdem ist zu beachten, dass die Vorbehaltsklausel verdeckt dem sowjetischen IPR innewohnt. Sie äussert sich darin, dass das sowjetische Recht nur in ganz seltenen Fällen das fremde, insbesondere das "bourgeois" Recht zur Anwendung kommen lässt. Außerordent kann in Fällen, in denen es das fremde Recht zulässt, durch Berufung auf die Vorbehaltsklausel die Anwendung des fremden Rechts ausgeschlossen werden.

_Institut für Ostrecht, München_
Book Reviews


Although several years have passed since the publication of John A. Armstrong’s study of the Ukrainian independence movement during World War II, the work has lost nothing of its importance or current interest.* Mr. Armstrong is at present preparing a revised, updated edition of his book, which is expected to appear in 1962.

Armstrong’s book, which originated as a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University and was published under the auspices of Columbia’s Russian Institute, is written from two different viewpoints, that of historian and that of political scientist. The study therefore breaks into two clearly distinguishable sections of unequal length. Chapters 1–7 give a picture of the development of the Ukrainian independence movement during World War II; the remaining chapters, 8–11, about one third of the total text, analyze the attitudes of various groups and segments of the Ukraine’s population toward the issue of “nationalism” and draw certain general conclusions.

The first question which arises is one of terminology. What does the word “nationalism” mean? The author defines nationalism as “a movement aiming at the establishment of an independent state” (page 4). This follows usage in English-speaking countries. However, a certain confusion is created because the author has also to deal with “nationalism” in another, more restricted, partisan sense—namely, in reference to the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The author is primarily interested in Ukrainian nationalism in the larger meaning, but he devotes considerable space to the

OUN-brand of nationalism, inasmuch as this party played a leading role in the events described. To differentiate between the two meanings of the word, Armstrong capitalizes "Nationalism" and "Nationalists" when referring to the OUN movement; he also suggests that the term "integral nationalism" might be employed here.

In the historical part of the work, the author is at his best when he writes about political developments, such as German policies in the occupied Ukraine, Ukrainian reactions to the Vlasov venture, the 1940 split in the OUN, and the subsequent rivalry of the Mel'nyk and Bandera factions. The discussion of the changes undergone by the "integral nationalists" of West Ukrainian origin, under the impact of the meeting with Soviet realities, may be singled out as a particularly successful section.

Armstrong's fairness and objectivity are best shown by his treatment of Ukrainian "integral nationalism." For an author raised in America's political tradition, it would have been easy to condemn summarily a movement which displayed certain totalitarian features. Without whitewashing, the author tries to do justice to a phenomenon produced by a world very different from his own. He draws attention to the "general deterioration in the quality of political groups in Eastern Europe during the period between the two world wars" and to the fact that "the denial of moderate demands of Ukrainian national expression by the ultranationalist governments of Poland, Rumania, and later Hungary produced an extreme reaction" (page 279). He shows the romantic and "voluntarist" character of the OUN ideology, as well as the movement's "ruthlessness" and "general blunting of moral sensibility," particularly visible in sordid factional struggles. "There remained, however, strong elements of liberal and democratic, as well as Christian, principles. . . . Formal learning, respect for established authority, individual decision, and popular choice were never completely absent from the real workings of even the most radical groups" (page 23). A definite asset was the "flexibility" of at least a part of the Ukrainian "integral nationalists" which enabled them to adjust themselves to the challenge created by the opening of the Central (Soviet before 1939) Ukraine. Their greatest redeeming virtue was "energy and bravery." "If ever a group was ready to fight against seemingly hopeless odds, it was the OUN. A few thousands of inexperienced and ill-equipped young men not only set out to supersede the gigantic Soviet apparatus, but dared to challenge the apparently indomitable German war machine as well. In a world in which timidity in the face of advancing tyranny is often the rule, such courage offsets many shortcomings" (page 283).

Another example of the author's freedom from preconceived ideas is his approach to the question of "collaboration" with the German occupier. There was a time when "collaborators" would have been condemned by
Western observers as "quislings." It is a definite merit of Mr. Armstrong's book to demonstrate that many of those who took up overt social and cultural activities or administrative positions during the German occupation, although technically "collaborators," were actually serving and protecting their people as best they could.

Generally speaking, Ukrainian nationalism was active during the German occupation on two different planes. One was the underground network and armed resistance movement, as represented by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The other was work done openly, with the toleration of the German authorities. The position which the Nazis left to such "legal" activities was extremely uncertain. Only in those geographical areas which did not come under the jurisdiction of the "Reichskommissariat Ukraine" were there real opportunities, and even there the character of the work had to be nonpolitical—although in the background there was always the political motivation. The respectable achievements of such bodies as the Ukrainian Central Committee in Galicia or, at the opposite end of the Ukraine's territory, the municipal government of Kharkiv proved that, given certain minimum conditions of growth, Ukrainian nationalism was capable of serving as an organizing and constructive force.

The picture Armstrong offers is incomplete in that a third area of activity, the Ukrainian forces working on the Soviet side, is omitted. At first it was usually only accident or luck which determined whether one escaped the well-planned Soviet evacuation (which was to include all people prominent in administration, economic life, and culture) or was driven eastward. After a few months, when German policy was fully revealed, any motive for deliberate defection disappeared. One did not need to be a Communist to convince oneself that, under the given conditions, the victory of Soviet Russia was a lesser evil than the victory of Nazi Germany. There was definite Ukrainian cultural work going on in Moscow and Ufa, where the Soviet Ukrainian government, the Academy of Sciences, and other organizations resided temporarily, and this work cannot be a priori dismissed as Communist blandishments. This means that the scope of the whole Ukrainian problem, as well as the totality of potential forces of Ukrainian nationalism, was wider than the book indicates. In discussing the social background of active nationalists in the Central Ukraine, Mr. Armstrong sees them represented mostly by intellectuals (scholars, writers, teachers, journalists) and members of the so-called "technical intelligentsia," as contrasted with the conspicuous lack of men with administrative experience. But administrators of Ukrainian nationality were included in the great trek eastward. There was nothing in the German attitude which could both allay their personal apprehensions and appeal to their Ukrainian patriotic instincts—to assume, as I do, that these instincts existed among a part of the Soviet
Ukrainian officials. Hitler, indeed, took care to make Stalin's task as politically easy as possible.

In the chapter on the underground and the UPA a serious gap in the author's source material occurs. He had access to some Ukrainian press publications which appeared under the German occupation and which were a mine of information about German policies and social and cultural trends of the time. Naturally these papers, published under stringent censorship, did not carry information about the activities of the underground. However, there was also a fairly well developed underground press. These papers are today to be found in Western countries in several private collections. Mr. Armstrong consulted only a few stray copies of underground publications which seem to have come his way more or less accidentally. Greater use of these sources would have certainly made the chapter on the underground and the *maquis* more substantial. For instance, the author does not give sufficient weight to the very striking success of the OUN organizers in the Donbas and the coastal cities of the South—the most industrialized and "cosmopolitan" part of the Ukraine, which previously played only a marginal role in the nationalist movement.

In addition, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939-1945* does not completely fulfill what the title seems to promise. Actually the story, so far as the Ukrainian scene is concerned, breaks off in 1944 with the return of the Soviet forces about a year before the end of the war. The last chapter of the historical section deals with developments in the Ukrainian community in Germany and not with developments in the Ukraine itself. Nobody, of course, can prescribe to an author the chronological limits of his study. Armstrong's treatment, however, is apt to invoke in the reader's mind the impression that the Ukrainian resistance movement collapsed immediately after the ending of the Nazi occupation. The opposite is true. The virulence of the Ukrainian *maquis*, now directed exclusively against the Soviet regime, even increased in the last stage of the war, and operations continued up to about 1950.

So far as the reviewer can judge, there are only minor and insignificant factual mistakes in the work (misspelling of names, mistranslations of some Ukrainian phrases, and the like). However, some historically false interpretations occur, mostly in the introductory chapter, "The Emergence of Nationalism." As modern Ukrainian history is still largely an unexplored field, the writer is here deprived of reliable guides for background material. In treating Polish-Ukrainian relations and Polish minority policies before 1939, for example, the author largely follows Raymond L. Buell's *Poland: Key to Europe* (3d ed.; New York, 1939), an able and objective journalistic account but certainly not a comprehensive scholarly treatment of the subject.

In describing the origins of the OUN, Armstrong says, "In their terrorist
underground activity during the late twenties and early thirties, which included especially assassination of Polish officials and Soviet representatives, the Ukrainian groups modeled themselves on movements like the Russian *Narodnaya Volya*" (page 22). Some structural and psychological parallels between old Russian revolutionary Populism and the more recent Ukrainian revolutionary Nationalism are undeniable, but they can be explained by the tendencies inherent in any underground conspiratorial movement. A sociologist could probably induce a number of similarities from other areas, such as Italy, Ireland, or the Balkan countries. But it is not true that "integral nationalism" in the West Ukraine of the interwar period modeled itself on the pattern of Russian revolutionary organizations of the 1870s. Russian Populism, although drawing its support also from Ukrainian territories in the Russian Empire, had no direct contemporary repercussions in nineteenth-century Galicia. Before World War I the Ukrainian movement in Galicia was working through the framework of the Austrian constitution; it was strictly (even timidly) legalistic, and it was led by men of moderate views who abhorred revolutionary violence. "Integral nationalism," which emerged in the 1920s, was a new thing, an outcome of the shock caused by World War I and the lost war of independence, a result of great unfulfilled hopes and of an unconceded defeat; finally, as also stressed by Mr. Armstrong, it was a reaction against a vexatious and oppressive Polish regime which treated Ukrainians as second-class citizens in their homeland. The example which was actually followed by the OUN was not Russian but Polish. It is very natural to try to learn from a successful rival. Józef Piłsudski, the chief architect of Polish independence, started his political career as a terrorist. Within the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), he was head of a special group called "Organization of Combat." After Piłsudski became, in 1926, a quasi-dictator of Poland, the country was flooded with literature glorifying his early exploits. These writings were avidly read by Ukrainian Nationalists and certainly influenced the make-up of their budding movement. The present reviewer has heard from a reliable source that Piłsudski's own reminiscences on the "expropriation" at Bezdany (in 1908, a brilliantly organized hold-up of a train carrying Russian Treasury cash) were obligatory reading in the training of OUN recruits.

In the last section of *Ukrainian Nationalism*, where the author speaks as political scientist rather than as historian, the chapter titles (for example, "Nationalism and the Church," "Channels of Nationalist Activity," "Nationalism and the East Ukrainian Social Structure," and "Social Variations of Nationalism") indicate the direction of the research undertaken for the book. These pages contain a wealth of information and many an acute observation.

In the author's definition, West Ukrainians are those who before 1939
lived outside the Soviet Union, and "East" Ukrainians are those who lived inside. The author takes it for granted that the outlook of the former was, during the period treated in the book, basically "nationalistic," in the sense that the people definitely preferred an independent national state to any alternative political solution. The Central and East Ukraine presents, in Mr. Armstrong's opinion, quite a different picture.

There he sees an authentic nationalist movement. It took mainly two forms, one due to initiative from the West Ukraine, the other native to the territory itself. Although at the outset, upon arrival from the West, the OUN "task forces" committed some serious blunders because of insufficient familiarity with Soviet conditions, they also soon obtained a measure of local support. This support grew steadily as the OUN organizers adjusted their tactics and program to the requirements of the new environment. Many young men from the Central and East Ukraine joined the OUN units. But also, without any stimulus from the West, nationalist forces were stirring all over the Central and East Ukraine. These groups were not so tightly organized as the OUN underground network. In each city and district the direction of the movement was in the hands of small informal circles of persons who during the years of Soviet rule had remained in touch and had learned to trust each other. Their political outlook was nonpartisan, but generally they professed allegiance to the tradition of the democratic Ukrainian Republic of 1917-20. These men, who did not join the OUN, preferred to work legally through the channels of those institutions which were tolerated by the Germans: the Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the local press, welfare organizations, and so on. "Ukrainian nationalism was the only dynamic anti-Communist movement which was able to carry on extensive propaganda in the East Ukraine under German occupation. It possessed a body of devoted followers to serve as its organizers; it was capable of arousing enthusiasm and exacting sacrifice." However, continues the author, the nationalist movement did not reach deeply in the popular masses, it was not representative of the people as a whole. "The essential mass remained uncommitted" (pages 287-88).

Mr. Armstrong tries to establish something like a "hierarchy of values" which would express the order of preference of the Central and East Ukrainian population in their political decisions, and arrives at the following result: (1) "physical survival," (2) "economic welfare," (3) "stable and orderly government, including a measure of freedom for the individual," (4) "equality of persons, with some form of popular participation in government," and (5) "national expression in culture and perhaps in government" (page 282). Aspirations toward "national expression" are not denied, but they are believed to have, so far as the masses are concerned, low priority.

In commenting on Mr. Armstrong's statement, one must distinguish be-
between the factual basis and the superstructure of interpretation. By and large, the author has ascertained the facts with objectivity. A few regrettable omissions are probably not of major importance for the general conclusions. However, the logic of the reasoning which leads the author from the facts to the conclusions is not always above reproach. The methodology implicit in Mr. Armstrong's argument can be challenged in two respects: it does not use comparative standards, and it does not pay sufficient attention to the dynamic aspect of the phenomena.

It is true that, in 1941 and the few subsequent years which form the period of Mr. Armstrong's study, the masses in the Central and East Ukraine were in a politically amorphous condition. But the expression used by the author when he speaks of their "uncommitted" attitude is misleading. It suggests to the reader a situation in which a citizen has a relatively free choice—let us say, that of a voter in a democratic country—but in which he remains uncommitted, because he still cannot make up his mind. It is hardly necessary to argue that this was by no means the actual situation in the Ukraine. After years of suffering under truly terrible conditions the people were as if stunned. What the Ukraine needed was a brief breathing-spell, in which to gather the country's forces; but immediately on the footsteps of the Russian Communist terror followed the German Nazi terror.

The author tacitly assumes that the order of priorities, which reflects a situation of extreme tension, would remain valid under more "normal" conditions also. This assumption is quite unwarranted. One has the right to ask: If citizens of other countries do not regard "physical survival" as the supreme political value, is this not simply the result of the lucky circumstance that in those countries a minimum of personal security is already taken for granted? Under conditions in which any civic initiative literally spells danger to life, the mass often remains politically "uncommitted." But a substance which looks immobile in "deep-freeze" can take on quite a different appearance once a "thaw" starts. A question which a political scientist ought to put to himself in connection with Ukrainian nationalism is this: Given a modicum of freedom of political choice, in what direction would the Ukrainian people move—toward a national state or, say, toward some form of "all-Russian" political structure?

The years of the Second World War offer a valuable test case in that they presented the most adverse and discouraging conditions for the expression of Ukrainian nationalism. Think only of the Soviet and Nazi terror and extreme material privations (Ukrainian cities were literally starving and freezing to death), in addition to the international set-up. Other countries also suffered cruelly under the German occupation. But even in their darkest hours, the morale of the Poles, Serbs, Greeks, and Norwegians, for example, was lifted up by the awareness that they were members of a great
coalition fighting a common enemy and that momentary reverses would not deflect the final issue. The resistance movements in all occupied countries were, of course, substantially aided by the Allies. The position of the Ukrainians was unique in that they had absolutely no outside support and encouragement, were politically isolated and, from 1941 on, had to struggle on two fronts simultaneously, against the two greatest powers of Europe and against the two most ruthless and cruel systems the world has ever known. All these handicaps notwithstanding, the Ukrainian will to national independence was demonstrated with a strength which bears comparison with the struggle for liberation of other submerged nations. One may still argue, as Mr. Armstrong does, that those actively engaged in nationalist activities formed only a minority of the Ukraine's total population. But all political movements, nationalist included, are always spearheaded by active minorities. In the case of the Ukraine the presence of an active and devoted minority, plus a mass which, if uncommitted, was at least receptive, clearly spells the general direction of the movement. Two additional factors must be taken into account: First, even Communism had to make important concessions to Ukrainian nationalism, to speak of the Soviet Ukraine as an independent national state, only federated with Russia, to appeal to Ukrainian patriotic symbols. Second, there was no political movement in the Ukraine which was simultaneously anti-Communist and pro-Russian. All this leads to one conclusion: The only alternative to the existing Soviet system in the Ukraine was an independent national state. This conclusion conforms with the universal trend of our times toward the emancipation of dependent and colonial peoples.

The relationship between the Central and West Ukraine has also to be considered. If nationalism appeared politically more crystallized in the latter, the reason was that in the central and eastern sections national consciousness, although it had for decades risen with elemental force, was there prevented from being organizationally channeled. After all, Ukrainians in Austria, and even later in Poland, enjoyed a freedom of press and association which never existed in the other sections, either under tsarist or under Communist rule. However, the representative personalities and the great molding ideas of the modern Ukraine originated mostly in the Central and East Ukraine. (Even "integral nationalism," which is by many regarded as a West Ukrainian current par excellence, had as its spiritual mentor and chief ideologist an East Ukrainian writer.) One of the central themes of modern Ukrainian history is continuous interaction on the east-west axis. An assessment of the potentialities of Ukrainian nationalism which does not give full consideration to this fact neglects the inherent tendencies of the Ukrainian historical process.

It is noteworthy that, in discussing various West Ukrainian territories,
Armstrong places the national awareness of Volynia and Transcarpathia (Carpatho-Ukraine) approximately on a level with that of Galicia. He is right in doing this; for instance, Volynia served as the base of operations of the Ukrainian *maquis* (the Ukrainian Insurgent Army). And yet the relatively high level of national consciousness in these two territories was the result of a very recent development; before 1914 Volynia (then in Russia) and Transcarpathia (then in Hungary) were among the most backward of all Ukrainian lands, and they were hardly touched by the movement of national regeneration. The fact that the outlook of these territories did undergo such a profound change in the course of but one generation should be pondered by those who slight the dynamic aspect of Ukrainian nationalism.

In the course of his research Armstrong assembled a great deal of first-hand evidence: documents, published and unpublished, files of contemporary newspapers, obscure émigré pamphlets, and numerous first-hand accounts through interviews in Europe and in this country. The author has sifted this heterogeneous material with discernment and critical acumen and has reduced it to one clear pattern. As his work was a pioneering expedition into still uncharted territory, it is not surprising that there are shortcomings, but they do not detract from the overall value of the book. Especially praiseworthy is the spirit of integrity and objectivity in which the author approaches his subject. Mr. Armstrong knows how to unite critical detachment with human understanding. His judgment is usually well-balanced; if it errs sometimes, it is rather from excess than from lack of caution—and of the two extremes this is preferable. Mr. Armstrong's book represents a contribution of durable value to the American literature on Eastern Europe.

*La Salle College*

Ivan L. Rudnytsky


No serious student of Soviet affairs will deny that Stalin's power was made possible by application of mass terror to an extent previously unknown in modern history. The country which seems to have suffered most severely from the Stalinist system is the Ukraine. Hryhory Kostiuk, a Ukrainian scholar and eyewitness to many of the events he describes, has succeeded in writing a convincing record of an eventful and tragic decade of recent
Ukrainian history. Although some may disagree with Kostiuk on the interpretation of certain events and the motivation he attributes to Soviet leaders, objective historians cannot but appreciate the factual evidence he has accumulated.

The study consists of two main parts, "Stalinist Centralism and the Ukraine" and "The Consolidation of Stalinism in the Ukraine." The author links Stalin's policies in the Ukraine to the violent struggle inside the Party over the nationality problem. "The struggle arose from the relationship between the national republics within the Union, and the existence of much national deviation and opposition in the Communist parties of these republics" (page 1). Stalin's decision "to build socialism in one country" involved the utmost development of industrial production and a crash program of forced collectivization of agriculture, a program requiring "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class." "In declaring war on the peasants, Stalin simultaneously initiated his first major move against the Ukraine, where the tradition of individual farming was especially strong" (page 5). The Ukrainian peasantry offered massive resistance to collectivization by sabotaging the Five-Year Plan, wrecking machinery, slaughtering cattle, hiding grain, and fleeing from the villages to the cities. Stalin was able to break the resistance of the Ukrainian peasantry only by brutal terrorism, which resulted in the devastating famine of 1932-33 in the Ukraine. Kostiuk's account of the famine would have been much stronger if he had attempted to establish how many peasants died during this genocide. His dismissal of the problem with the generality that the "famine . . . in the spring and summer of 1933 had swept millions of peasants to their graves" (page 66) seems insufficient. The reviewer is well aware of the complexity of such an undertaking (the numbers estimated in Ukrainian émigré literature vary from 2½ to 7 million), but the problem deserves expert analysis.

The Communist Party of the Ukraine, which did enjoy a certain degree of autonomy until the year 1932, was put to a severe test by the failures of the collectivization drive. Stalin used these difficulties as one of several pretexts to destroy the Ukrainian Party as one of the real or potential opposition groups in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin succeeded in suppressing the independent leanings of the CP(B)U between the Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference (July 1932) and the Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union CP(B) (January 1934), at which "local nationalism" was designated as the chief danger to the Soviet state. Even before 1932 there were severe clashes in the CP(B)U in connection with various "nationalist deviations," for instance "Shumskyism" and the repercussions of the conflict in the Communist Party of the Western Ukraine. The conflicts occurred because, from the day of its creation, two forces had existed in the Communist Party of the Ukraine. "One of the forces was that of the native Ukrain-
ian Communists who were convinced of the value of their own contribution to the growth of their country; the other was that of the Russian 'centralist and bureaucratic' elements which were often resented as aliens by the first group" (page 24). It is important to remember that the national-minded group in the CP(B)U included not only Ukrainians. In addition to such prominent Communists of Ukrainian nationality as Skrypnyk, Shumsky, Khvyl'ovy, Kulish, Lyubchenko, Kotsyubynsky (the son of the prominent Ukrainian writer Mykhaylo Kotsyubynsky), it counted among its supporters several Jews (Yakir, Ravich-Cherkassky, Kulyk, Lifshits, Feldman, Hurevych), Russians (Popov, Volobuev, Shvedov), Germans (Shlikhter, Bon, Yohansen), Poles (Skarbek, Shmayonek, Kvyatek), and members of other nationalities (page 76). The representatives of the national trends in the Communist parties in non-Russian republics, particularly in the Ukraine, often were the true internationalists.

The Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference, which was attended by Stalin's two emissaries V. Molotov and L. Kaganovich, revealed two opposed positions on the problem of collectivization. Molotov and Kaganovich declared that failures of the collectivization drive were results of errors committed by the Ukrainian Communists. The Ukrainians, however, contended that "kolkhoz gigantism" (extreme extension of collectivization), unrealistic plans from Moscow, and the flight of young peasants from the villages were the reasons for the disaster (page 20). The "historic decisions" of the Central Committee of the All-Union CP(B) dated January 24, 1933, included a special resolution on the Ukrainian Party organization, stating bluntly that the CP(B)U had failed to discharge its obligations in connection with collectivization (page 27). Together with this verdict came the appointment of P. Postyshev to the post of second secretary of the CP(B)U and of first secretary of the Kharkiv Oblast Committee. The new boss of the CP(B)U conducted a ruthless purge of the Ukrainian Communists.

Postyshev did not come to the Ukraine alone. He was accompanied by a large detachment of "strong, experienced Bolsheviks" and a new chief of the Ukrainian GPU, V. A. Balitsky. They conducted a far-reaching purge of the Ukrainian Party organization. According to incomplete returns up to October 15, 1933, 27,500 members of the CP(B)U were expelled from the Party. In 1934 Sukhomlyn told the Seventeenth Party Congress that in the four oblast Party organizations (Kiev, Odessa, Vinnytsya, and Donets) 51,713 (out of a total of 267,907) members of the CP(B)U were purged (p. 61). In 1933 two prominent Ukrainian national Communists committed suicide—Mykola Khvyl'ovy (May 13) and Mykola Skrypnyk (July 7). Postyshev also activated a ruthless purge of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Kostiuk touches on these problems only in the most general terms.

The final consolidation of Stalinism in the Ukraine was accomplished by
means of mass trials of Ukrainians representing almost every sector of public and cultural life and accused of membership in as many as fifteen Ukrainian nationalist underground organizations. The first widely publicized trial was held in 1930. The defendants, forty-five intellectuals and scholars of democratic leanings, were charged with participation in the illegal clandestine organizations Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU—Spilka Vyzvolennya Ukrayiny) and Union of Ukrainian Youth (SUM—Spilka Ukrayins'koyi Molodi). These organizations did exist. The author is correct in stating that the purpose of the trial was to discredit the old generation of Ukrainian democrats as well as their followers among younger people. His following statement that the SVU organization “had never existed in terms of the purpose of which it was accused” (page 89) is, however, not well grounded.

The “uncovering” of a mythical Ukrainian National Center (Ukrayins'kyi natsional'nyi tsentr) in 1931 was aimed at discrediting former Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionaries, Professor Mykhaylo Hrushevsky in particular. The Union of the Kuban and the Ukraine (Soyuz Kubani i Ukrayiny) and the All-Ukrainian SR Center (Vseukrayins'kyi eserivs'kyi tsentr—orhanizatsiya ukrayins'kykh eseriv) were fabrications of the secret police. A great many Ukrainian patriots were sentenced and deported for alleged conspiracy as members of these organizations.

With the step-up of mass terror by Postyshev, graver charges were made against the Ukrainian “underground” organizations. The additional “groups” uncovered—the fictitious Counterrevolutionary Sabotage Organization, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO—Ukrayins'ka Viys'kova Orhanizatsiya), the Polish Military Organization (POW—Polska Organizacja Wojenna), the All-Ukrainian Borotbist Center (Vseukrayins'kyi borot'bists'kyi tsentr), the Ukrainian White Guard Terrorist Center (Ukrayins'kyi tsentr bilogvardiytsiv-terorystiv)—were accused of sabotage, diversionary acts, and terrorism. The trial of the “members” of the last “group” named was one of the most horrible examples of Soviet judicial procedure. A visiting session of the Military Board of the Supreme Court of the USSR in Kiev, from December 13 to 15, 1934, tried thirty-seven Ukrainian intellectuals for “organizing terror against officials of the Soviet government.” Twenty-eight were sentenced to death and shot forthwith. Most of them had never in their lives had a weapon on their hands. The conviction was based upon the “confession” of the poet Vlyzko, who was deaf and dumb. Professor Zerov, an armchair scholar and noted translator of classical poetry, was likewise tried and sentenced with a group of fellow critics and poets for “terrorist” activities. The trials of the Bloc of Ukrainian Nationalist Parties (Bl'ok ukrayins'kykh natsionalistychnykh partyi), 1932–36, the Trotskyite Nationalist Terrorist Bloc (Trots'kists'ko-natsionalistychniy terorystychniy bl'ok), 1935, the Ukrain-
ian Trotskyite Center (Ukrajins'kyi trotskits'kyi tsentr), 1936, and the Nationalist Fascist Organization of the Ukraine (Natsionalistychna fashystivs'-ka orhanizatsiya Ukrayiny), 1935–37, were, like the others (with one exception), held in secret. The sole purpose of the trials was to destroy the political and intellectual leaders of the Ukrainian nation.

After having faithfully carried out the directives of Stalin in the Ukraine, Postyshev experienced the fate of his victims, and was purged. The reasons for his fall will long remain a matter of speculation. The “Vorkuta version” of his doom presented by Kostiuk (pages 118–22) may or may not be true; it is one of several versions. To assert, as Avtorkhanov does, that Postyshev was deposed because of his “sympathy for the Ukrainians” (page 117) means to leave the ground of responsible research and resort to the devices of “Soviet affairs astrology.” Soon after Postyshev’s removal from the Ukraine, Stalin administered the final blow to the Central Committee of the CP(B)U. In August 1937 he sent a special commission consisting of Molotov, Ezhov, and Khrushchev to the Ukraine to enforce submission and acceptance of his rule. Khrushchev was to be “elected” secretary of the CC CP(B)U. The Ukrainian Communists refused, for the last time. Molotov presented the alternative—all the members of the Central Committee should go to Moscow to discuss the pending problems.

Panas Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of People’s Commissars, decided to commit suicide. The result of the negotiations between the CC of the CP(B)U and Stalin soon became obvious. Of sixty-two members and forty candidate members of the Ukrainian CC, only two men (P. F. Kryvonos and M. O. Dyukanov) remained at large. The chaos that followed the mass arrests of Ukrainian Communists was so great that the CC of the CP(B)U and the Ukrainian government simply ceased to exist for the time being. It is noteworthy that the fate of the Ukrainian Communists in Moscow at this time was well known to Tito when he broke with Stalin and refused to go to Moscow upon Stalin’s invitation. This fact is implied by Tito’s biographer Vladimir Dedijer in his book Tito (New York, 1957, p. 359).

On January 28, 1938, Stalin assigned a new first secretary of the CC of the CP(B)U. It was Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, at that time merely an obedient apparatchik. Like Stalin, he and his associates sought the support of Russian nationalists in destroying any vestiges of self-government and individuality in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

The tragic failure of the Ukrainian Communists was due to their acceptance on faith of the Bolshevik guarantee of “the right of self-determination” and to their close collaboration with the Russian Bolsheviks. In the critical moment the Ukrainian Communists found themselves deserted by their people (page 144). “The fulfillment of the requirements of Stalin’s plan
took nine years (1929 to 1938). During that time industrialization and collectivization were accomplished, the dictatorship of Stalin was firmly established, and the political, cultural, and economic autonomy of the Soviet republics was abolished. All of these measures were achieved at the expense of millions of human lives, accompanied by purges in the ideological leadership of the Party and the destruction of native Communist cadres in the non-Russian Soviet republics" (page 141).

Kostiuk gives us several interesting details based upon his own experience in Soviet concentration camps (pages 30, 118–19, 150). His work is not completely free of unproven assertions, for instance, that “Kaganovich . . . had, during his stay in the Ukraine [1926–28], acclimatized himself to Ukrainian life” (page 31). Of Kaganovich it is known that he exercised his power to the full to liquidate the Ukrainian intelligentsia. For the record it should be stated that H. Kozak was not, as asserted (page 89), a general of the Ukrainian Galician Army.

Kostiuk’s study of Stalin’s rule in the Ukraine sheds light not only on its subject proper but also on the general question of Stalin’s policies in a non-Russian Soviet republic. The nationality policy of the Soviet regime during Stalin’s reign is unfolded by Kostiuk in a careful and detached manner. John S. Reshetar states in his foreword: “While much has been published on the infamous Moscow purge trials of 1936–38, nothing has been written prior to this study of the no less significant Ukrainian trials which were fabricated in order to provide a pretext for the physical destruction of a substantial part of the Ukrainian nation’s intellectual cadres” (p. viii). There is one important difference between the Stalinist purges in Russia and those conducted in the Ukraine: While both resulted from Stalin’s struggle for absolute power, the purges in the Ukraine were based primarily on national affiliation taken in the political sense, as demonstrated by the fact that many non-Ukrainians were among those tried for “Ukrainian nationalism.” This is clearly shown by Kostiuk.

The book taken on the whole is a useful contribution to the understanding of the ten most tragic years of modern Ukrainian history.

King's College
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania

Jaroslaw Peleski


The Soviet “episode” in the history of the East European nations represents not only an attempt to create a new social and economic system but also a gigantic and tragic experiment on human beings. Marxist ide-
ology originated in criticism of the failure of early capitalism to solve adequately and at the proper time those social and economic problems which had arisen with industrial development. Marx still remained to a great extent in the tradition of European humanist thought. His criticism of capitalist society was nurtured by his indignation against social injustice, against the economic deprivation and moral degradation of millions of human beings. The capitalist system was, in his opinion, the cause of the "estrangement" (alienation) of man from his true human nature. Yet, aiming to save the individual, to restore his true social nature, Marx at the same time reduced the human being to a mere reflection of economic and social conditions and virtually denied the universal validity of such values as freedom, justice, and human dignity.

The Russian Bolsheviks of our days, completely divorced from humanistic thinking, are with iron logic bringing about the Communist utopia at the sacrifice of the human being. Instead of the Marxian fully developed "free personality in a free society," the New Soviet Man is being shaped into a slave-robot of the totalitarian state, blindly obedient to the Party and police apparatus, hating all enemies, ready to execute any order, devoid of personal opinion or personal moral conscience.

Not only the entire educational system and the youth organizations but also literature, the press, radio—all life in the USSR is oriented toward this goal. Closed frontiers, censorship, and restrictions on the movement of persons and ideas separate the objects of this experiment from any disturbing external influences.

What are the results? Is the Soviet citizen truly a new kind of human being? What is he like? How does he think? A group of scholars affiliated with Harvard University undertook to investigate the problem by utilizing the opportunity afforded through the thousands of refugees from the USSR who have come to live in the West.

In 1956 three of the investigators, Clyde Kluckhohn, Alex Inkeles, and Raymond A. Bauer, published part of the results of this investigation in their book *How the Soviet System Works*. Further results are presented in the book under review.

The material was collected through questionnaires and interviews conducted among 2718 refugees. The sample of persons was carefully selected in order to obtain results most representative of the population of the USSR. The authors were fully aware of the likelihood of bias among émigrés and did what was possible to reduce the effects of misinformation from this source. Chapters 1–3 deal with methodology, the remainder (4–15) with various aspects of Soviet life and ways of thinking and behavior of Soviet citizens. The image of the "Soviet citizen" that emerges is completely different from that presented by Soviet propaganda. It is the image of a normal human being with strengths and weaknesses, with many unsatisfied
personal needs, with religious and nationalist feelings still alive (despite the efforts of the Soviet state to eradicate these "prejudices"), a person who is not at all loyal to the Party and the Communist idea, but rather hostile to them. The authors analyze the forms and the sources of this hostility and try to estimate its strength among different social groups. According to their evidence, the strongest opposition to the Soviet system is to be found in the lowest social class, that is, among the peasants. As one goes up the social ladder, more and more people tend to see also positive aspects of the system to which they owe probably their own social ascent. The Soviet educational system and socialized medicine are generally spoken of with favor.

Six chapters dealing with the "round of daily living" treat such aspects as "occupational stratification and mobility," "making a living," "getting an education," and "patterns of family life." In the last part of the book the authors analyze the sources of cleavage in Soviet society, arriving at the conclusion that Party membership or nonmembership creates the sharpest division—much sharper than class differences or hostility along nationality lines.

Many of the authors' statements are identical with the observations of other people who once lived in the USSR or visited it and later made their impressions public. However, what we have here is not subjective impressions of an individual, but the testimony of hundreds of different persons, testimony weighted and screened by thorough statistical methods. To the present reviewer the result of this investigation is both a great personal success for the authors and an achievement of American sociology, which now has a well developed tradition of work in the crossfield of "personality and culture," including studies from distance of societies in which there is no possibility of field surveys. Certain conclusions, however, are open to question.

In the discussion of the nationality problem (in this study limited to the Ukrainian problem because the other nationalities were insufficiently represented among the émigrés) the authors conclude that the reactions of the Ukrainians are determined "first and foremost" by their status as Soviet citizens and only quite secondarily by their nationality. And yet, when the subject of nationality is brought up, a substantial proportion of the Ukrainians interviewed revealed strong nationalist feelings. Evaluating the significance of the ratio of the Ukrainian respondents with strong nationalist orientation (one third) to those with strong antinationalist orientation (one third; the rest undecided), the authors reach the conclusion that "the idea of Ukrainian independence would tend to meet both significant support and opposition on all levels of the society" and, consequently, that "the idea of Ukrainian separatism could be expected to win neither overwhelming support nor rejection from Soviet Ukrainians."
In the reviewer's opinion, social science based exclusively on the statistical approach to social phenomena has limitations which render uncertain the pragmatic value of such an appraisal. There are some aspects of social process which cannot be revealed in objectively verifiable statistical terms. It is difficult to measure which idea is more highly charged with potential action at a given moment. Events of the past illustrate this point clearly. If social scientists had investigated the force of nationalist "separatist" feelings in the Ukraine of 1914, they would certainly have come to the conclusion that they did not exist at all. But three years later the Ukraine set up an independent state and defended it against both Red and White Russians. To take another example, a statistical investigation of the political opinions, particularly the nationalist aspirations, of many African or Asian nations twenty-five or fifty years ago, when they were still colonies of Western powers, would hardly have enabled the scholar to predict the subsequent historical development, that is, the struggle of these colonies for independence. If the authors of *The Soviet Citizen* were to explore the attitudes of their Ukrainian respondents during their later life abroad, probably they would notice a significant difference among the groups into which they broke down their respondents. The strongly nationalist group consists of persons of political acumen, a highly developed sense of social responsibility, and readiness for action and sacrifice. Those who are indifferent to the national idea or are opposed to it usually limit their life to the private sphere, being concerned primarily with their own comfort. It is noteworthy that, despite encouragement and support from non-Ukrainian groups, they have not been able to organize themselves in a political group. On the other hand, the national-minded Ukrainians amaze observers with their activity in all fields—scientific, cultural, political, educational. This situation gives an idea of the dynamic forces of various groups, forces which are not revealed, or not fully revealed, by a merely statistical approach.

The authors of the present book think that nationalist sentiments among the nations of the USSR may wane—in the Ukrainian SSR, specifically, for the reason that the family and the influence of the Autocephalous Church are getting weaker. The authors mistakenly consider the Autocephalous Church one of the principal sources of Ukrainian nationalist aspirations. In reality this Church should be viewed not as a source but rather as one of the manifestations of the Ukrainian national movement which transcended the political into the religious sphere. In the estimate of the authors, the nationalist aspirations of the Ukrainians will weaken, unless large-scale persecution or marked discrimination occurs. The reviewer is inclined to assume that just the opposite is happening. That the slight "liberalization" of the Soviet system after Stalin's death contributed to an intensification of Ukrainian national feeling can be inferred from the
current Soviet press. The world-wide independence movement among colonial peoples also probably influences the attitude and aspirations of nations in the Soviet bloc.

The present book is based on a study of the opinions of Soviet citizens who were raised and lived in the USSR before the Second World War. Their projections and predictions for the future the authors express in very general and cautious terms. An even more cautious attitude is to be recommended to readers of the book in drawing practical conclusions from the data presented.

New York

C. Y. Bohdan


Of the several eastern boundary lines suggested for Poland at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919–20 (demarcation lines of General Barthélemy, General Botha, and others), the one bearing the name of the British Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon has left a lasting trace in recent diplomatic history. It was proposed first on December 8, 1919, and again in Lord Curzon's note to the Soviet government on July 12, 1920. The line was drawn according to the ethnic distribution of Poles, on the one side, and their eastern and northern neighbors, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians, on the other. Although it had been accepted by Poland at a very critical point in the Polish-Soviet war, the line that has since been called the Curzon line did not serve as basis for the new Polish-Soviet border as delimited at Riga in March 1921. By that time the Polish military situation had considerably improved, and Poland was able to extend its eastern border deep into Ukrainian and Belorussian territories.

More or less forgotten since the Riga Treaty, the Curzon line again entered the focus of attention at the time of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in 1939. Romain Yakemtchouk's study is devoted to the problem of the Curzon line in German-Soviet and, later, in Polish-Soviet and Allied-Soviet relations.

It was during the crisis of 1938, when the Soviet government moved to obtain transit through Poland to Czechoslovakia, that the Poles became aware of Soviet aspirations to modify their western boundaries. This aim was even more obvious on the eve of the German-Polish war in the Soviet-Allied negotiations, in which “the right of passage” for Soviet troops was the focal point.

This reviewer does not share the view that the Poles' refusal to accord
this right induced the USSR to make a deal with the Germans instead of an alliance with Britain and France against Nazi Germany. The crucial fact seems to be that Ribbentrop's offer gave the USSR territorial advantages, at the expense of Poland, which it could never hope to get from the Allies. The Soviets preferred the new division of spheres of influence with Germany reflected in the subsequent boundary arrangement of September 29, 1939.

Worthy of note is the substantial difference between the arrangement in the secret protocol of August 1939 and the later boundary delimitation. According to the first agreement, Lithuania was to fall into the German sphere. But then the Soviet Union proposed to exchange Lithuania for Polish territory to the east of the Vistula up to the Curzon line. Yakemtchouk reports all these vicissitudes of Soviet-German secret diplomacy, but does not interpret them.

To let Lithuania remain in German hands meant to face an anti-Communist Baltic state on the German side, and this could have had a detrimental effect on the sovietization of Estonia and Latvia. On the other hand, if substantial Polish territory were to be apportioned to the USSR, Moscow would have to follow its nationalities policy, that is, create an illusory Polish Soviet republic. Incorporation of a part of ethnic Poland on this basis would have added to the difficulties which the Soviet government already faced because of the Balts, Belorussians, and Ukrainians in the attached or to-be-attached areas. The USSR also preferred to cast the whole blame for an anti-Polish policy on the Germans alone, although its own moves had greatly contributed to the Polish debacle.

The new German-Soviet boundary ran approximately along the Curzon line. After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war the Soviet government did not renounce its territorial gains under the previous agreements with Germany which had led to the fourth partition of Poland. There are indications that Stalin was inclined to accept some changes during the Soviet-Polish negotiations in December 1941, but the Polish government-in-exile categorically refused to discuss the matter of boundaries (pages 63–64).

The question of the USSR's western boundaries arose in the course of British-Soviet and American-Soviet relations during the war. From December 1941 on, the USSR insisted that the boundaries of 1941 (roughly the Curzon line) should be recognized. Again the main Soviet argument was the ethnic one. The British accepted this point of view as early as 1942, and influenced the United States to approve of it in 1943. The Teheran Conference secretly sanctioned the Curzon line as the future Soviet-Polish boundary, with territorial compensation for Poland in Eastern Prussia and Germany. The Polish government in London was not informed about this arrangement, and, hoping for American backing, kept objecting vigorously to a compromise settlement with the USSR.
According to Yakemtchouk, it was the failure of the Poles to accept what had already been given to Stalin by Churchill and Roosevelt that made Moscow create a Communist Polish government, the so-called Lublin Committee. This opinion was expressed in 1947 by a Polish diplomat, Professor W. W. Kulski ("The Lost Opportunity for Russian-Polish Friendship," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1947). At that time, when a democratic-communist coalition in Czechoslovakia was still effective, this interpretation was somewhat realistic. But after the Prague *coup d'état* in 1948, it became obvious that Moscow would not permit any kind of government disobedient to her. In 1957 Yakemtchouk should have been more critical in respect to Kulski's opinion of 1947.

The Lublin Committee, later the Polish provisional government, in opposition to the London government, acknowledged the Soviet territorial claims in a treaty of August 1945. Of course, inasmuch as the Yalta agreement had already met Stalin's demands, the Polish-Soviet treaty was a mere formality. The Curzon line with some insignificant rectifications in favor of the Poles (5–8 kilometers) again became the eastern boundary of Poland.

The author points out that in all its moves to secure the territories in question, the USSR used no arguments of strategy or power politics, but advanced solely ethnic considerations ("the reunion of Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians with their kin"). This point is illustrated by Mr. Yakemtchouk with several interesting details. After a certain semblance of autonomy in international relations was conferred on the Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics in February 1944, the Ukrainians were allowed to negotiate treaties with the Polish provisional government on population exchange. In addition, at a session of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow in 1944 the Ukrainians urged the incorporation into the Ukrainian Republic of certain regions located on the Polish side of the Curzon line. The Polish Communists, who had accepted the line as the basis of the border delimitation, objected. It is not known whether or not all this was prearranged by Moscow in order to impress the Polish government abroad.

Yakemtchouk has dealt with his problem objectively. His study is well documented, balanced in judgment, written with spirit. Here and there, however, the language tends to be somewhat journalistic, for example, "laisse-t-on l'Europe orientale devenir cosaque" (page 27), "le diabolique projet d'instituer un second gouvernement polonais" (page 64).

In the opinion of the reviewer, it would have been desirable to give a more extensive historical background to the Curzon line problem in 1919–20. The statistics on page 8 do not reflect exactly the national composition of Poland between the wars. Of the population of Poland in 1931, Ukrainians constituted at least 18 per cent, not 10.4 per cent (this figure covers only the Ukrainian Catholics), and Belorussians approximately 5 per cent (Ortho-
dox and Catholics). As to the minor boundary modification on February 15, 1951, the areas affected are inaccurately defined as the Chełm and Sokal sectors (page 118). In fact, a small area south of Peremyshl (Przemyśl) containing the town of Ustryky Dolishni was given to Poland for a similar area near Sokal, which went to the USSR. We also would question Yakemtchouk's identification of the "Western Ukraine" with Eastern Galicia. For the period 1939-44, the term "Western Ukraine" covered all the Ukrainian territories previously in Poland.

Notre Dame University

Vasyl Markus


Oleksander Biletsky, Professor of the Universities of Kharkiv and Kiev, Regular Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR since 1939 and of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR since 1958, and Director of the Taras Shevchenko Institute of Literature since 1939, occupies a leading position in learned circles of the Ukrainian SSR and is dean in the field of literature.

Born in Kazan, on November 2, 1884, Biletsky studied at the University of Kharkiv, and subsequently taught there and at the University of Kiev. For his student work "The Faust Legend in Connection with the History of Demonology," he was awarded a gold medal. His interest in classical and Western European literature continued. In addition to his studies of Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound*, Shakespeare, and French romanticism, he wrote articles on Dante, Ada Negri, Quevedo, Cervantes, Swift, Walter Scott, Dickens, Byron, H. G. Wells, Leses, Molière, Chateaubriand, Victor Hugo, Alphonse Daudet, George Sand, Goethe, Henri Barbusse, Homer, Aristophanes, Ovid, Juvenal, Lucretius, and others.

Among Biletsky's extensive writings on literary theory and analysis are the studies "In the Workshop of the World Artist" (1923), the preface to the translation of R. Müller-Freinfels' *Poetics* (published in Kharkiv in 1923), and "The Problem of Synthesis in the Study of Literature" (1940). He also produced interesting reviews and articles on Ukrainian writers of the nineteenth and twentieth century, particularly the Modernist lyric poets O. Oles', M. Voronyi, P. Tychyna, and M. Ryl'sky.

In the light of this body of work—as well as the circumstance that Biletsky managed to come unscathed out of the stormy and, as he himself has said, tragic years from 1929 to 1937, when Ukrainian writers were being
silenced—the publication of his selected works at the present time commands special attention.

The subtitle, "Collected Writings on Problems of Ukrainian Literature," limits the scope of the selection to a small area of Biletsky's interests. All twenty-five surveys, literary portraits, and journalistic articles contained in the two volumes were, as the author himself notes, "either introductions or prefaces to Ukrainian and Russian editions of our classic and modern authors or addresses [delivered] in institutions of learning and lectures in colleges." Volume I begins with an article, entitled "O. I. Biletsky," by Mykola Gudziy who speaks of "the exceptional breadth of his [Biletsky's] scholarly interests, his many-sided erudition and avid curiosity about everything connected with world literature, beginning with antiquity, through the Ukrainian, Russian, and Western European Middle Ages and modern times, and ending in Ukrainian literature." Among the facts mentioned in Gudziy's article, it is noteworthy that Biletsky never finished his study of the poetry of Simeon Polotsky; he worked on it for many years but published only fragments of the "extensive book planned." The title of one of his works published in Russian, Starinnyi teatr v Rossii [The Old-Time Theater in Russia] (Moscow, 1923) "was given at random by the Moscow publishing house of Dumnov which brought it out; the book deals in the main with the Ukrainian folk and school theater in the seventeenth and eighteenth century." Gudziy fails to explain why, out of the several volumes planned for the Khrestomatiya z istoriyi zakhidnykh literatur [Readings in the History of Western Literatures], only the third volume appeared (in 1931), why his extensive article written in 1932 on "The Literature of Ancient India" never appeared in print, nor why an anthology of ancient Indian literature translated by Pavel Ritter and edited by Biletsky never came out.

The selected works of Biletsky under discussion contain, in the first place, survey articles: "Paths of Development of Ukrainian Literary Scholarship before October" (1958), "Studies of Literature and Literary Criticism during Forty Years of the Soviet Ukraine" (1957), and "The Situation and Problems in the Study of Old Ukrainian Literature" (1959). These articles, together with the following "Problems of Soviet Studies of Franko" (1956), in effect constitute a comprehensive survey of Ukrainian literary studies of the nineteenth and twentieth century. The most valuable of these, in wealth of material, is the first article, on "pre-October" studies, despite its attack on Kulish and other "representatives of Ukrainian nationalism" who, on the question of the origin of Kievian literature, had argued "in favor of the 'primacy' and seniority of Ukrainian literature" and defended the "theory of the single stream" and the "non-bourgeois" and "classless" character of the Ukrainian nation. Branding the "scholarly inadequacy" and harmfulness of "bour-
geois-nationalist ideas” about the “single stream,” Biletsky excludes Serhiy Yefremov’s *Istoriya ukrayins’koho pys’menstva* [History of Ukrainian Literature] from the realm of scholarship on the grounds that it is “merely a document of militant nationalism of the early twentieth century.” The survey, based, as the author declares, on Marxist-Leninist principles, ends —invoking Lenin—with the statements that “only through an accurate knowledge of the culture created by the entire development of mankind, only through refashioning it,” can proletarian and socialist culture be established, and that “what is primarily needed is a precise knowledge of the scholarly heritage of the pre-October studies of literature,” with the proviso that “it must be assimilated critically.”

The second survey in the collection, “Studies of Literature and Literary Criticism during Forty Years of the Soviet Ukraine,” attempts the impossible—a “dialectical” description of these pursuits at a time which is recorded in history for its ruthless extermination of the leading Ukrainian personalities in the field of culture and science. Giving credit to certain organizational and research achievements of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences (allegedly founded in 1919, in fact in 1918) and admitting “the continued value” of the material in some of the works published by the Academy (by V. Ryezanov, S. Hayevsky, V. Peretts, D. Abramovych, S. Bohuslavsky, and M. Voznyak), he brands the Academy for the “bourgeois-nationalist line” pursued by Hrushevsky and Yefremov, and condemns not only the books of Yefremov, Hrushevsky, and Voznyak on the history of Ukrainian literature for their “stylized” material made to fit “nationalist concepts” but also the “vulgar-sociological” attempts of the “new synthetic works” of O. Doroshkevych, A. Shamray, and V. Koryak. Biletsky ignores the extent of the injury inflicted on Ukrainian scholarship of the 1920s and 1930s; he mentions only a few of the studies on nineteenth-century Ukrainian classics written by specialists who were later persecuted (P. Fylypovych, O. Doroshkevych, A. Muzychka, and V. Petrov) and merely hints at the general havoc in the statement that “Soviet Ukrainian studies of literature were carried on in the process of a long and hard struggle.” He covers the period of the most oppressive purges in this field with the statement that “during the years 1936–38 personnel was recruited, plans were drawn up, and the way cleared for work.” The first half of the “forty years of the Soviet Ukraine” thus disposed of, Biletsky lists the rather poor literary production of the second—in his evaluation, truly Soviet—period and ends his survey on a note of hope that “continued leadership of the Party, active intervention in literary life, cooperation and unity with scholars of the brotherly republics will help literary criticism and literary studies to take a prominent position in the literary process.”

Without arguing with this hope of Biletsky, it must be noted that this
very article of his is a notable example of such active intervention by the
Party in literary scholarship. The article is a third version of a survey by
Biletsky which had been published first as a separate booklet by the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Press, Kiev, 1957, under the title *Ukra-
yins'ke literaturoznavstvo za sorok rokov (1917–1957)* [Ukrainian Studies of
Literature during Forty Years (1917–1957)]. A comparison of this booklet
with another (second) version, which was published in the second volume
of the collective *Istoriya Ukrayins'koi literature* [History of Ukrainian Lit-
erature], 1957, pages 440–58, and which subsequently, with some further
changes, became part of the book *Vid davnyny do suchasnosti*, indicates to
what extent this “interference of the Party” was operating in the deletions,
changes, insertions, and understatements in this small work of Biletsky him-
self.

The third article in the volumes under consideration, “The Situation
and Problems in the Study of Old Ukrainian Literature,” is similar in its
basic line. It had originally been published in *Materiyaly do vyvchennya
istoriyi ukrayins'koi literature* [Materials for the Study of Ukrainian Lit-
erature], Volume I (Kiev, 1959), pages 48–59. Proceeding from the thesis
that in the Ukraine “the first decade following the Great October [Revo-
lution] was, as we know, a time of ruthless class warfare for the Marxist-
Leninist method in science, a period of theoretical literary arguments and
discussions, and the beginning of Ukrainian Soviet literature,” Biletsky
rates unfavorably the works of Hrushevsky and Voznyak on the history of
old Ukrainian literature, accusing both of “nationalist tendencies” which
deprive their work of scholarly value. Biletsky also gives a poor rating to
the “ill-fated” textbook by Koryak, *Narys istoriyi ukrayins'koi literature:
Literatura peredburzhuazna* [Outline of the History of Ukrainian Litera-
ture: Pre-bourgeois Literature] (first edition, 1925), which cannot be re-
garded as a scholarly work at all. The next page and a half contain a dry
list of works on old Ukrainian literature or, rather, a selection only—“those
still of some value”—and with the reservation that all this “was merely a
continuation of the traditions of bourgeois scholarship.” Without a word
about what happened to the researchers of the 1920s, and without explain-
ing why the study of old literature was completely liquidated in Ukrainian
scholarship, Biletsky immediately proceeds to the 1930s and finds that during
that period “research in the field of old Ukrainian literature was shelved”
and that this “temporarily moribund branch of scholarship” was kept alive
only by S. I. Maslov, O. A. Nazarevsky, P. M. Popov, and a few younger
men who worked in the field of Ukrainian literature of the middle period.
Following the mention of this sorry state in the study of old Ukrainian lit-
erature, Biletsky bolsters his spirits with the “renewed activities” in the
Department of Old Literature in the Institute of Literature of the Acad-
emy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR; he sets up directives for "Marxist-Leninist research" in this field, and for the next four pages argues with the method, attitude, and conclusions of *Istoriya ukrayins'koyi literatury* [History of Ukrainian Literature] by Dmitry Čiževsky, published by the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S. The fact that Čiževsky's work was published compels Biletsky to appeal to Soviet scholars "to counter the bourgeois histories of old Ukrainian literature with a new basic work, built on the foundation of the Marxist-Leninist method of social sciences," and to reiterate that "it would be a great mistake to believe that studies of old literature are not needed today or that they mean an abandonment of modern problems."

Of the next five survey articles—"The Ihor Tale and Ukrainian Literature of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century," "Rusalka Dniestrova," an article detailing the kind of research needed on Franko, another on Ukrainian prose of the first half of the nineteenth century, and "The Beginnings of Ukrainian Dramatic Literature in the Ukraine"—the last is especially valuable; it was written in 1923 when the author had a different approach to literature.

The second group of works included in the two volumes under review consists of literary portraits and characterizations of the works of individual writers: Ivan Nechuy-Levytsky, Panas Myrnyi, Ivan Franko (two articles), Yakiv Shchoholiv, Pavlo Tychyna, and Maksym Ryl'sky. The first, entitled "Ivan Semenovych Levytsky (Nechuy)," mainly an attempt to "rehabilitate" this writer, who had been accused of "bourgeois nationalism" and "hostility toward Russian culture," at the same time furnishes many interesting and little-known facts of the writer's life. In another piece Biletsky expresses satisfaction that Shchoholiv, who had been "chased out by the vulgar sociologists," has "again been made part of the history of Ukrainian literature." The articles about Franko and Ryl'sky are very interesting, as is the article about Tychyna, in which the author is not afraid to mention Tychyna's image of "the mournful mother" who walks "the golden fields of the Ukraine," although he completely ignores Tychyna's third collection of poems, *Instead of Sonnets and Ottava Rima* [*Zamisť sonetiv i oktáv*].

The third group—journalistic articles—is devoted to the "unity of the two brotherly literatures, Ukrainian and Russian," a problem which, according to Gudziy, Biletsky "has long regarded as one of the most fundamental in his research." As a matter of fact, as the bibliography included in this book indicates, he became concerned with this problem only after twenty-six years of scholarly work, in 1937, when, amidst the raging Ezhov terror, he published dozens of articles on Pushkin and Maxim Gorky and their relations with the Ukraine and Ukrainian literature. This endeavor
probably saved Biletsky from the persecution suffered by his colleagues, even dedicated Marxists. We must also assume that Biletsky had been able to survive the Postyshev period because at first he stopped publishing altogether (nothing at all of his appeared in 1933) and then in 1934 suddenly began writing (in both Ukrainian and Russian journals) on such surprising subjects as “Literary Criticism and Literary Policy of Marx and Engels,” “K. Marx, F. Engels, and the History of Literature,” and “World Literature in the Works of Marx and Engels.” His study of the “classics of Marxism” was, according to Gudziy, decisively conducive to Biletsky’s “ideological-theoretical maturity” in that these works “armed him with Marxist ideology and opened to him the road of a Soviet scholar.” When all this took place, Biletsky had passed the quarter-century mark in his career.

In the third group of articles the titles themselves speak for the contents: “Roads to the Development of Ukrainian-Russian Unity,” “Pushkin and the Ukraine,” “Gogol and Ukrainian Literature,” “The Russian Prose of T. H. Shevchenko,” “Lesya Ukrayinka and Russian Literature of the 1880s and 1890s,” and even “Kiev as Depicted in Fiction.” In these articles Biletsky draws a good many far-fetched conclusions. In the first, elaborating on the “continuous growth of cultural ties and cultural relations of the two nations,” he enumerates those who came to Moscow one after another—“from Kiev, Theophan Prokopovych, Simeon Polotsky, Dmytro Tuptalo, Stefan Yavorsky, and many others”—but is unable to name a single cultural leader from Moscow who came to Kiev in return. Also quite far-fetched is the parallel he finds between “the great Ukrainian writer” Lesya Ukrayinka and “the great Russian writer” Gorky; the similarities he cites may be found in many other writers, and frequently in a more literal form.

A group apart in these volumes consists of articles on the relation of Ukrainian literature to other literatures: “Franko and Indian Literature” (1956), “Dramas by Lesya Ukrayinka on Classical Subjects” (1929), “Shevchenko and Western European Literature” (1939), and “Ukrainian Literature among the Other Literatures of the World” (1958). While at pains to intersperse attacks on the “bourgeois nationalists” for their alleged attempts to erect a wall between Ukrainian and world literature, Biletsky demonstrates that the works of Ukrainian writers share the themes and trends of other literatures and that Ukrainian literature makes a contribution of unique and lasting value. In the conclusion of the last article, the author quotes Pavlo Tychyna:

Я єсть народ, якого Правди сила
Ніким звойована ще не була.
Яка біда мене, яка чума косила!
(I am the people, whose power of Truth
No one has ever conquered yet.
What evil, what pestilence has mowed me down!
Yet my power has waxed full again.
To live—I never ask for anyone's consent.
To live—I will break all chains.
I grow stronger, I gather my forces,
For I am alive.)

This quotation can well apply not only to Ukrainian literature in relation to world literature, but also to the struggle for independence and the right to its own individuality which it is waging in competition with Russian literature, and in resistance to the annihilating trend of the Communist regime.

The persistent suppression of free thought and free scholarship is evident in the bibliography included in this two-volume edition of selected works of Biletsky. Despite his privileged position and his unconditional adherence to Party directives for scholarly work, despite the fact that he made his start in Russian scholarship, published in Russian exclusively during the period 1909-22, and even now publishes in both Ukrainian and Russian (out of a total of 446 items in the bibliography, 256 were published in Ukrainian and 190 in Russian)—nevertheless, the bibliography fails to list some of his scholarly work published before 1932. One omission is his article "In Search of a New Form for the Short Story," published in Shlyakhy mystetstva (No. 5, 1923, pages 59-63), in which he appraised favorably the short stories of Mykola Khvyl'ovyi and compared the innovations of Khvyl'ovyi with those of Pil'nyak. Also missing is the article on Sonyashna mashyna [The Sun Machine] by Volodymyr Vynnychenko (Krytyka, No. 2, 1928, pages 30-42), in which he considered this work of Vynnychenko against the background of utopian novels of world literature. For some unknown reason, the bibliography also omits his work "Simeon Polotsky and Ukrainian Literature of the Seventeenth Century," which was published in the Jubilee Symposium in honor of Academy Member D. Bahaliy by the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Kiev, 1927.
West European and American Doctoral Dissertations on the Ukraine (1945-60)

JOSEPH DANKO

There are at present available two special bibliographies of West European and American doctoral dissertations on Eastern Europe, one compiled by Gerhard Hanusch and the other by Jesse J. Dossick. The first lists 2546 dissertations on Eastern Europe accepted by West European and American universities during 1945-60. The second lists 960 doctoral dissertations accepted by the universities of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain up to 1960. Dossick’s work is limited to these three countries, while Hanusch's, although covering more countries, does not cite some thirty dissertations on the Ukraine accepted by different Pontifical universities. A short survey of doctoral research on Ukrainian subjects in Austria and West Germany in 1945-57 has been prepared by Olexa Horbatsch.

The present bibliography includes 215 doctoral dissertations and Habilitationsschrifte, dealing with the Ukraine in whole or in good part, which were accepted by the universities of Western Europe and North America during 1945-60. Most of these dissertations were approved in Germany (55 at German universities and 53 at the Ukrainian Free University at Munich), Austria (30), Italy (27), where many graduate students from the Ukraine found themselves at the end of World War II and where they completed their studies. France is represented by 4 dissertations, Sweden by 5, and Finland by 1.

In respect to Great Britain, where the doctoral degree was first introduced by Oxford University in 1917 (Dossick, page 20)—and where only 9 theses on the USSR (none of them on the Ukraine) were defended before 1945—this bibliography in effect covers the whole period up to 1960. For the United States the following 5 theses concerning the Ukraine and approved by American universities before 1945 were found: (1) Wasyl Halich, “Economic Aspects of Ukrainian Activity in the United States,” State University of Iowa, 1935; (2) Andrei Popovici, “The Political Status of Bessarabia,” George Washington University, 1928; (3) Stephen W. Mamchur, “Nationalism, Religion and the Problem of Assimilation among Ukrainians in the United States,” Yale University, 1942; (4) Samuel Koenig, “The Culture and Institutions of the Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia,” Yale University, 1935; and (5) Carl A. Lefevre, “Gogol’s First Century in England and America (1841-1941),” University of Minnesota, 1944.
After World War II, 4 British, 6 Canadian, and 30 American dissertations relating to the Ukraine have been accepted—an increase signifying an upsurge of interest in Eastern Europe. In the United States the increase in the number of dissertations and the extension of the range of subject areas covered after World War II have been facilitated by more systematic and intensive acquisition of Slavic materials by major research libraries. In addition, a considerable amount of documentary material seized by the Germans fell into Allied hands during World War II. The exchange of academic personnel between the United States and the Soviet Union has opened another avenue for expansion of research. So far, however, this exchange has been limited mainly to the universities of Moscow and Leningrad. Also, in the acquisition of publications, whether by exchange or purchase, although there has been a relative increase in materials originating from the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR, monographs and, particularly, serial publications, such as *Pratsi, Naukovi zapysky,* and *Dopovidi,* of universities of the Ukraine are still scarce, incomplete, or entirely lacking in most university and research libraries of the United States.

Most dissertations included in this bibliography are in the fields of history, church history, language, and literature. Yet there are many areas in these very fields that might profitably be investigated; for example, the history of institutions, legal history, and church-state relations offer a rich field for investigation. Such comprehensive fields as economic geography, economic history, economic planning, finance, demography, constitutional law, local government, the political and economic role of the Ukraine in the Soviet system, public health, and the sociology of different social strata and professions are almost untouched. Not a single doctoral thesis has been produced on such subjects as theater, theatrical life, or modern music during the last fifteen years.

As stated, this bibliography includes dissertations and *Habilitationsschrifte* devoted primarily or substantially to the Ukraine. In the latter category, borderline cases make decision difficult. The compiler has tried to follow the middle road and does not claim that the judgment is correct in every instance. Nor is it claimed that the list is complete. For the last two years especially, there are certainly omissions, since indexes and bibliographies for this period are incomplete or not yet available.

The material is arranged in thirteen subject groups. The description of individual items includes author's name, title of dissertation, name of school,1 place, date of defense, and number of pages. If it is known that

1 For Germany and Austria, only the place is indicated, without the name of the university. In the case of Berlin, the Freie Universität Berlin is always indicated to distinguish it from the Humboldt Universität. Similarly, the Ukrainian Free University, Munich, is indicated to distinguish it from Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität.
the dissertation has been published, the fact is indicated. No special effort has been made, however, to track down this information. Most of the dissertations defended at various Pontifical universities in Rome were verified by the Reverend J. Khoma, S.T.D., to whom the compiler wishes to express deep gratitude.

The bibliography has been prepared on the basis of published bibliographies and indexes of dissertations of different countries and individual universities. The list of bibliographical tools on which this bibliography is based will be found at the end.

_Columbia University_

**ECONOMICS AND AGRICULTURE**


Education

Geography and Natural Sciences
22. Oleksyshyn, Ivan. Rozmishchennya i stratyhrasia miotsens’kykh vidkladiv na Pivnichnomu Podilli i Pivdenniy Volyni. Ukr. Free Univ., Munich, 1946. 26, 3 pp. (See also next entry.)
23. Oleksyschyn, Johann. Verteilung und Stratigraphie des Miozän in Nordpodolien und Südwohlhynien. Innsbruck, 1947. 26 pp. 6 maps. (Published under the same title, Innsbruck: Universitätsverlag Wagner, 1952; 39 pp., illus., map.)


**History**


33. Donnert, Erich Wilhelm. Untersuchungen zur Beurteilung der Slawen in der schriftlichen Überlieferung des deutschen Frühmit-
318 THE ANNALS OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY


77. Stokes, A. D. Russo-Bulgarian Relations in the Tenth Century. Cambridge University, 1959.


JOURNALISM


LANGUAGE


122 [Veröffentlichungen der Abteilung für slavische Sprachen und Literaturen des Osteuropa-Instituts (Slavisches Seminar) an der Freien Universität Berlin, herausgegeben von Max Vasmer, Bd. XV].


LAW


120. Yurchenko, Oleksander. Ideolohichni i pravni zasady derzhav-
DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS ON THE UKRAINE


LITERATURE


133. Hrycaj, V. “Das Waldlied” von Lesja Ukrajinka und die “Ver-
326 THE ANNALS OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY

sunkene Glocke" von Gerhart Hauptmann: Vergleichende stoff-
134. Kasack, Wolfgang. Die Technik der Personendarstellung bei
Nikolaj Vasilevič Gogol. Göttingen, 1957. (Published with the
same title, Wiesbaden, 1957; pp. vii, 170 [Bibliotheca slavica].)
Munich, 1949. 58, 43 pp.
Munich, 1951. 149 pp.
lished with the same title, Nürnberg: Verlag Hans Carl, 1958;
62 pp. [Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft,
Vol. II].)
139. Lewitter, Lucjan Ryszard. A Study of Academic Drama in Rus­
sia and Ukraine in the 17th and 18th Centuries, with Special Ref­
140. Luck, Irene. Beitrag zur Erforschung des "Igorliedes." Göttingen,
1951. Pp. iii, 89.
141. Luckyj, George S. N. Soviet Ukrainian Literature: A Study in
Literary Politics (1917–84). Columbia University, New York,
1953. (Published with the title Literary Politics in the Soviet
pp. x, 323 [Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University].)
142. Łysiak, Julian. Archaisms in Poetical Works of Taras Shevchen­
143. Mykulovych, Mariya. Vplyv poeziyi Horatsiya na ukrayins'kykh
144. Pohorets'kyi, O. Vplyvy antychnykh literatur u pys'menstvi
145. Romanenchuk, Bohdan. Modernistic Trends in Ukrainian Lit­
erature, 1900–1923. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia,
146. Ruzicka, Rudolf. Der Verbalaspekt in der altrussischen Nestor­
chronik: Ein Beitrag zur Ermittlung seines Entwicklungsstandes
im Altrussischen. Leipzig, 1956. Pp. x, 186 (Published with the
same title, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1956 [Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Veröffentlichungen d. Instituts für Slawistik, No. 14].


**Medicine**


**Music**


**Philosophy**


**Sociology**


THEOLOGY AND CHURCH HISTORY


181. Holowackij, Romanus. De Šeminario Vilnensi SS. Trinitatis,


194. Lentsyk, Vasyl'. Moskva y ukrayins'ka katolyts'ka Tserkva v
205. Rudnytskyj, Romualdo Antonio. Controversie giuridiche sorte
Sources
(including only the most comprehensive works used)


Obituaries

IVAN MIRTSCHUK

On May 2, 1961, died in Munich, while hospitalized awaiting an operation Professor Ivan Mirtschuk, for many years President of the Ukrainian Free University in Munich. He was a member of the Ukrainian Free Academy, Chairman of the Philosophical-Historical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, a member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, of the Academy of Antiquity in Munich, member and associate of many other scholarly institutions and organizations.

Mirtschuk's death deprived the Ukrainian scholarly life of one of its organizers, a man whose intellect, energy, and personal connections contributed essentially to the fact that Ukrainian scholarly institutions, particularly the Ukrainian Free University, were continuously in contact with Western scholarly circles.

Ivan Mirtschuk was born in Stryi, Western Ukraine, on June 18, 1891. In 1914 he was awarded a Ph.D. degree from the University of Vienna. In 1921 he qualified for the teaching of philosophy in the Ukrainian Free University of Prague, in 1925 was appointed associate professor there, and in 1930 full professor. In 1926–45 he also lectured at other universities in Prague, Münster, Berlin, and Königsberg, as well as in the German Higher Economic School.

In 1926 Mirtschuk became a research associate at the newly founded Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin, and in 1931 the President of this Institute.

It was mostly due to Mirtschuk's efforts that, after the sovietization of Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian Free University resumed its activities in Munich. Just as he had worked devotedly in the 1930s for the development of the Ukrainian Scientific Institute in Berlin, now he concentrated on the building up of the Ukrainian University in Munich.

Having a thorough philosophical background, Mirtschuk as a scholar was primarily interested in the typology of cultural history. Purely philosophical problems he treated only in his early works. The paper "Fundamentals of Greek Ethics" reviews Greek ethical theories from the Sophists to Aristotle. The author makes a rather cautious attempt to evaluate the ethical views of the ancient Greeks from the standpoint of a modern philosopher. This approach is typical of Mirtschuk's works in the field of
pure philosophy: although he did not elaborate his original philosophical standpoint, he was not merely a commentator on other philosophers; his writings attempt an analysis from the standpoint of a modern man.

Mirtschuk devoted much attention to the problems of Kantian philosophy (see "Metageometriya i teoriya prostoru u Kanta," Zbornyk of the Ukrainian Free University, Prague, Vol. II, 1924; translation of Kant's Prolegomena into Ukrainian with a preface and comments by the translator; and other works). As a specialist in this field, Mirtschuk belonged to the German Kant Society and was associated with the publication Kantstudien.

Problems of the national types of philosophical thinking was the subject in which Mirtschuk was most interested and which he treated in many of his publications. Of special interest are his "O słowiańskiej filozofii," Przegląd filozoficzny, Warsaw, Vol. 30, No. 2-3, 1927, and "Die slavische Philosophie in ihren Grundzügen und Hauptproblemen," Kyrios, Königsberg, Heft 2, 1936.

With his usual cautiousness Mirtschuk approached the methodologically complicated and as yet inadequately treated problem of the characteristics of the thinking of various nationalities. In his first works in the field, Mirtschuk summarized common traits in the philosophy of Slavic peoples: a lag of philosophical thought behind all other aspects of spiritual life and a lack of independence and originality in philosophical theories. In his opinion, this underdevelopment is attributed to adverse conditions (such as the fact that for centuries some Slavic peoples had been deprived of statehood), to political suppression (Russia), and primarily to insufficient continuity of the spiritual traditions of individual peoples and to an inadequate exchange of ideas among Slavic peoples. Although there are no great thinkers of Slavic origin, rather wide circles in Slavic societies are interested in philosophy, and Slavic folk cultures reveal elements of philosophical thinking. Philosophy acquires a popular character among the Slavs, while it loses its refinement, becomes practical, and aims at realization in everyday life. Mirtschuk observed this practicality in many Slavic peoples, notably in Masaryk's views (see, for instance, "Philosophische Elemente in der Weltanschauung Masaryks," Arbeiten der Ukrainischen Freien Universität, Prague, 1930, "Filosofiya Masaryka," Students'kyi Visnyk, Prague, 1931).

Mirtschuk was of the opinion that interpenetration of philosophy and religion is a typical Slavic feature which is best manifested in the Poles. The emotionalism of the Slavic nature is incompatible with the rigorous thinking required by philosophy. Emotionalism replaces the regulation of law by Christian love and thinking acquires an emotional touch. The polarization of feelings, love and hate, is found by Mirtschuk in the writings
by Mickiewicz, Lesya Ukrayinka, Tolstoy, and Dostoevsky. Messianism is interpreted by Mirtschuk also as a characteristic feature of the Slavic mind ("Der Messianismus bei den Slaven," Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur der Slaven, Bd. VI, Heft 2–3, Breslau, 1930; Geistesgeschichtliche Voraussetzungen der Theorie des III. Rom, Munich, 1955; "Mesiyanizm Lypyns'koho," in the collection Lytyns'kyi yak ideoloh i yak polityk, Uzhhorod, 1931, and others).

In his early works Mirtschuk postulated the thesis that Slavic messianism does not imply a sense of the superiority of Slavs over other peoples, but an idea of devoted service and fraternity. Later, after scrupulous research, Mirtschuk revised his view and came to the conclusion that one may refer only with qualifications to common features of Slavic messianism. Then Mirtschuk became interested in analyzing differences in Weltanschauung between the Russians and Ukrainians. In his works on the demonic ideas of these two peoples ("Das Dämonische bei den Ostslaven," a paper presented in 1936 at the Brussels International Congress on the History of Religion, later elaborated in the booklet Das Dämonische bei den Russen und den Ukrainern, Augsburg, 1950), Mirtschuk seeks to explain the differences in the Weltanschauung of the Russians and Ukrainians in the fundamentals of their world perception. He attributes what he calls the pessimism of the Russians to their ideas on the omnipotence of demons, and what he calls the optimism of the Ukrainians to their belief in the supremacy of good spirits over demons.

Contrasts in the world perception characteristic of certain nations Mirtschuk also sees existing in the sphere of their essential philosophies. This idea is elaborated in the work "Tolstoj und Skoworoda—zwei nationale Typen," Abhandlungen des Ukrainischen Wissenschaftlichen Instituts in Berlin, Berlin, Bd. II, 1929. There are many similarities between Tolstoy and Skovoroda. Both thinkers emphasized the interconnections between philosophical theories and everyday life. They both put stress on religion, looked for the truth and rejected the false in life. However, it was Tolstoy alone who characteristically manifested a destructively revolutionary radicalism toward church, science, faith, nation, and family. Like Skovoroda, Tolstoy saw that the free will of man is limited and took this fatalistically, while Skovoroda was an optimist and voluntarist. Tolstoy aspired to the Kingdom of God on earth, while Skovoroda saw it in heaven only. Hence Tolstoy was afraid of death, but Skovoroda's spirit was composed when he faced death. While Tolstoy failed to achieve a harmony between his personal life and his philosophy, Skovoroda succeeded. Both were teachers by vocation, but while Tolstoy idealized the fundamental nature of man, Skovoroda was a realist. Tolstoy's contempt for science contrasts with Skovoroda's great appreciation of knowledge.
In his work "Asiatic Aspects in Russian History" (unpublished), Mirtschuk gave a critical evaluation of Euroasianism. He analyzed facts underlying Euroasian views on the "sense" of Russian history and came to the conclusion that Euroasianism as a political concept has lost ground among émigrés, but has a timeless continuity as an aspiration of Russian man.

Mirtschuk's essays are always in some way related to the key problems of our times. However, the author was very cautious and preferred, rather than formulate conclusions, to supply material from which readers might draw their own conclusions.

A great merit of the late Professor Mirtschuk was his popularization of Ukrainian culture in Western Europe, especially in Germany. This he did for forty years, publishing numerous books and articles. Of special importance is the book *Handbuch der Ukraine*, 1941, edited and in part written by Mirtschuk. There were two German and one English edition of this book. The next link in this work was his book *Geschichte der ukrainischen Kultur*, 1957, which he revised for a forthcoming English edition.

Juriş Bojko

**DMYTRO HALYCHYN**

Dmytro Halychyn, an outstanding member of the Ukrainian-American community, President of the Ukrainian American Congress Committee, died on March 26, 1961, in New York.

Halychyn was born on October 20, 1895, in the Rohatyn district of the Western Ukraine. He graduated from a gymnasium in Rohatyn. As an officer of the Ukrainian Army, he took part in the military operations against the Communist invasions of the Ukraine. After the defeat of the Ukrainian democratic forces, he emigrated to Western Europe and completed his studies at the University of Vienna.

He came to the United States in 1923 and became active in Ukrainian organizations here. In 1933 he was elected Secretary-General of the Ukrainian National Association, and from 1950 to the day of his death he was President of this organization.

Dmytro Halychyn who held the cultural endeavors of Ukrainian intellectuals in high esteem, showed an unfailing interest in the work of the Academy and supported many of its undertakings. He was a member of the Academy's Foundation.

L.D.
OLEKSANDER MORHUN

On January 17, 1961, Oleksander Mykhaylovych Morhun died in Dornstadt, Germany, at the age of eighty-five. A specialist in folk handicrafts, he had been active in the public life of the Ukraine, particularly in promoting the co-operative movement there.

Morhun was born on July 22, 1874, in the Poltava region. After his graduation from the Second Kiev Gymnasium, he entered St. Volodymyr University in Kiev and became associated with the nationalist-minded group of the student revolutionary movement. At the time of the repressions he had to leave the university and went abroad. In 1900 he was graduated from Heidelberg University.

From the early 1900s up to the Revolution of 1917 Morhun was active in zemstvo works, first at the Myrhorod District Zemstvo, then at the Poltava Provincial Zemstvo. Morhun, like many of his generation who had formerly been revolutionary-minded, now tried to find legal possibilities for the realization of his ideas. He worked in the field of education and promoted the organization of co-operatives and the development of handicrafts and folk art.

During the Communist period, Morhun worked for the Ukrainian handicraft co-operatives as a specialist in folk art. In the 1930s he was a professor of the Kharkiv Co-operative Institute.

After World War II, Morhun lived in Western Germany. He was a professor at the Ukrainian Higher Economic School in Munich, a full member of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences, and a member of the curatorium of the Ukrainian Free University.

He left many publications in Ukrainian, mostly pertaining to the handicrafts in the Ukraine.

L.D.
Chronicle

During the period from April 1, 1960, to March 31, 1961, the following lectures were delivered at the plenary sessions of the Academy:

May 21, 1960  Memorial meeting honoring the memory of the late Yaroslav Chyz, chairman of two commissions of the Academy.
  • Reed Lewis: “Yaroslav Chyz’s Work for the Common Council for American Unity”
  • Stepan Ripetsky: “Life and Public Activities of Yaroslav Chyz”
  • Joseph Lichten: “Yaroslav Chyz: The Man and his Work”
  • Semen Demydchuk: “The Activities of Yaroslav Chyz as Chairman of the Commission for the Study of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations”


October 16, 1960  Conference commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the introduction of collectivization of agriculture in the Ukraine
  • Alexander Archimovych: “The Systematic Falsification of Data on the Harvest of Crops in the USSR”
  • Vsevolod Holubnychy: “Thirty Years of Collectivization in the Ukraine”

December 10, 1960  Omelyan Pritsak: “The First Mongolian Viceregent in the Ukraine”

December 15, 1960  Zbigniew Brzezinski: “Impressions from a Trip to the Ukraine”

February 25, 1961  Conference reviewing the work of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine among the Ukrainian Prisoners of War in Freistadt, Germany, during World War I
  • Opening address by Volodymyr Doroshenko
  • Rev. K. Danylenko-Danylevsky: “National-Cultural
and Political Work of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine in the Freistadt Camp"

- Pavlo Dubrivnyi: "The Formation of the Gray Division in the Camp and its Participation in the War for Liberation in the Ukraine"

February 26, 1961 Conference marking the Shevchenko Centennial
- Opening address by George Y. Shevelov
- Ivan Korovytsky: "The Centennial of Shevchenko's ABC Book"

March 12, 1961 Conference marking the Shevchenko Centennial
Yuri Lawrynenko: "Shevchenko and Kulish"

March 19, 1961 Grand Conference in Honor of Taras Shevchenko sponsored by the Shevchenko Scientific Society in America and the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.
- Volodymyr Miyakovsky: "Shevchenko and the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius"
- Wasyl Lew: "Shevchenko's Works Written after his Return from Exile"


The following lectures were held under the auspices of the sections and commissions of the Academy in New York City:

**LITERARY AND PHILOLOGICAL SECTION**

June 4, 1960 Gregory Kostiuk: "Mykola Plevako and his Scholarly Heritage"

**HISTORICAL SECTION**

December 4, 1960 Bohdan Krawciw: "Maps of the Ukraine in the Mazepa and Post-Mazepa Period"

**ANCIENT HISTORY SECTION**

June 5, 1960 Levko Chikalenko: "The Beginning of Abstract Art"

November 20, 1960 Yuri Perkhorovych: "The Oldest Records of Volhynia: Mons Pevka—Povchynian Mountain"
December 24, 1960  B. Zahaykevych: “Olbia in the Light of Recent Studies of Soviet Archeologists”

COMMISSION FOR STUDY OF THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY UKRAINE AND THE SOVIET UNION

May 7, 1960  Vsevolod Holubnychy: “Recent American Studies of the People’s Economy of the USSR and the Experience of the Exchange of Delegations”


October 2, 1960  Ivan L. Rudnytsky: “The Ukraine Today as Seen from Prague”


November 27, 1960  Yaroslav Bilinsky: “The Political Significance of Articles Referring to Languages in the New School Laws of the USSR and Ukrainian SSR”

December 11, 1960  Yaroslav Pelensky: “Political Ideas of Mykhaylo Hrushevsky”

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SECTION


February 24, 1961  Mykola Denysyuk: “The History of my Publishing Enterprise (Poland, Austria, Argentina, Canada, and the U.S.A.)”

BIOLOGICAL SECTION

August 18, 1960  Myktya Chyhryntsiv (University of Caracas): “Specific Features of the Food Industry in Tropical Countries”

October 8, 1960  Natalya Osadcha-Janata: “Plants Mentioned in the Bible”

PHILOSOPHICAL SECTION

THE ANNALS OF THE UKRAINIAN ACADEMY

ECONOMICS AND LAW

February 18, 1961  Kost Varvariv: “Concerning the Question of the Status of the Ukrainian SSR in the Framework of International Law”

March 26, 1961  Volodymyr Trembitsky: “The Ukraine and Federalistic Conceptions of Central and Eastern Europe”

GROUP OF FINE ARTS


November 26, 1960  Damian Horniatkevych: “Recent Works of the Artist Lev Gets”

January 29, 1961  Yaroslav Turkalo: “Impressions from a Trip around the World”

COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF UKRAINIAN-JEWISH RELATIONS

February 10, 1961  Solomon Schwarz: “Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during World War II”

COMMISSION FOR THE PRESERVATION OF THE LITERARY HERITAGE OF VOLODYMYR VYNNYCHENKO

March 5, 1961  Meeting commemorating the tenth anniversary of Vynnychenko’s death

• Opening address by Gregory Kostiuk

• T. Kobzey: “A Diplomatic Action of Vynnychenko prior to World War II”

• Vasyl Chaplenko: “Images of Vynnychenko and Other Active Participants in the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917 as Portrayed in Yuri Smolych’s Novel The Wide Dnieper is Roaring”

GROUP OF THE ACADEMY IN DENVER, COLORADO


October 22, 1960  Bohdan Vynar: “Impressions from a Trip to Europe in Summer of 1960”
December 17, 1960  T. Kropyvyansky: “Mykhaylo Orest: His Life and Creative Works”


March 18, 1961  Opening address by Kornel Krupsky
- Mariya Halun-Blokh: “Impressions from a Trip to the Ukraine in Spring of 1960”

Group of the Academy in Detroit, Michigan


March 25, 1961  Grand Conference commemorating Shevchenko’s Centennial sponsored by the Academy group in Detroit, Mich., and by the Shevchenko Scientific Society
- Opening address by Bohdan Lonchyna
- Myron Dolnytsky: “National Element in Shevchenko’s Creative Works”
- Yevhen Pereyma: “Shevchenko in Žeromski’s ‘Dzien­nik’”
- Vasyl Vytvytsky: “Relations between Shevchenko and Musicians—Composers and Performers”
- Stepan Chorniy: “Shevchenko and the Soviet Reality”
- Concluding Remarks by Mykhaylo Ovchynnyk

Group of the Academy in Washington, D.C.

March 12, 1961  Grand Conference commemorating Shevchenko’s Centennial sponsored by the Academy group in Washington, D.C., and the group of the Shevchenko Scientific Society
- Panteleymon Kovaliv: “Shevchenko from the Standpoint of History”
- Petro Odarchenko: “Shevchenko’s Traditions in Ukrainian Literature”
- Oleksa Povstenko: “Shevchenko’s Funeral”
A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The following transliteration system has been used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>а</td>
<td>а</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>б</td>
<td>б</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>в</td>
<td>в</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>г</td>
<td>г</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>д</td>
<td>д</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>е</td>
<td>е</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ж</td>
<td>ж</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>з</td>
<td>з</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>и</td>
<td>и</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>й</td>
<td>й</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ий</td>
<td>у</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>й</td>
<td>к</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>к</td>
<td>л</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>м</td>
<td>м</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>н</td>
<td>н</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>о</td>
<td>п</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>п</td>
<td>р</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>р</td>
<td>с</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>с</td>
<td>т</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>т</td>
<td>у</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>у</td>
<td>ф</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ф</td>
<td>к</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>к</td>
<td>ц</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ц</td>
<td>ч</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ч</td>
<td>ш</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ш</td>
<td>щ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>щ</td>
<td>я</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>я</td>
<td>ю</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ю</td>
<td>ь</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ь</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Vol. III, No. 3 (9), 1953. *One dollar and fifty cents.*


Vol. IV, No. 3 (13), 1955. *One dollar and fifty cents.*


**IN PREPARATION:**


*Orders may be placed with The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, Inc., 206 West 100 Street, New York 25, N. Y.*