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*Deceased.
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From the Editor

This volume mainly presents a selection from the work that political scientists — both members and non-members of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States — have done on the Ukraine and related subjects. We are fortunate that an eminent sociologist and an eminent jurist consented to join the group of invited contributors. The issue opens with two comparative articles in the historical vein: the late Eugene Pyziur draws a fascinating, original parallel between the concepts of nation in the work of Edmund Burke and of Taras Shevchenko, and Ihor Kamenetsky shows the similarities and differences in the treatment of Slovenia and Western Ukraine under German occupation in World War II. The next two articles deal with aspects of the contemporary Soviet Union: the late sociologist Alex Simirenko offers us a most interesting paradigm for the study of social control in a Socialist society, while Yaroslav Bilinsky writes on the concept of the Soviet People and its implications for Soviet nationality policy. The next four articles present aspects of the Soviet Ukraine. Jeff Chinn has explored some of the changing demographic characteristics of the population of the Ukraine — a subject that is important for any thorough study of that country. Andreas Bilinsky, a jurist, has elucidated for us a little known aspect, viz., the legal citizenship of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Finally, we offer two articles on contemporary politics in Soviet Ukraine and Ukrainian nationalism: Kenneth C. Farmer surveys politics and culture after Stalin, while Grey Hodnett analyzes in detail the views of Petro Shelest, the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party organization in Kiev from 1963-72 and full Party Politburo member in Moscow from 1964-73, who was dismissed from his positions for his Ukrainian autonomist views.

The editor is keenly aware of the fact that this particular issue of the Annals is more than a year overdue. Many unforeseen circumstances have contributed to this. The Executive Board of the Academy and the editor personally would like to thank the contributors and the subscribers for their great patience and continued faith.

In the spring of 1980 the Executive Board made the decision to
continue publishing *The Annals* and to bring them out more frequently. The next issue, which is in preparation, is being edited by Hryhory Kostiuk and Bohdan Rubchak. It will be dedicated to the work of the Ukrainian writer, dramatist, and political leader Volodymyr Vynnychenko and will be largely based on the papers given at the Vynnychenko Conference at the Academy in April 1980. Further issues are in preparation.

The transliteration used in this issue is a simplified version of that employed by the Library of Congress (please refer to the table on p. 9). After much experimentation, the editor has decided that there is simply no way to transliterate the Ukrainian letter ĵ adequately: yi and ii both look complicated and may be misleading, to boot. We are, therefore, asking our readers — and our printer, too, — to bear with our leaving the Ukrainian ĵ a ĵ in English, dieresis and all. On the other hand, we have gone rather far in simplifying the spelling of Ukrainian geographical names: thus, we have printed Lviv, instead of the more precise L'viv. The Ukrainian versions of geographical names have been used (Lviv, instead of Lvov), except when the older form (or a Russian version) has been firmly established in English (thus, Kiev, instead of Kyiv).

Last but not least, it is great pleasure to acknowledge the help received from many quarters. The editor would like to especially thank Mr. Maksym Pyziur for permission to print the article of his late father and Mrs. Cheryl Kern-Simirenko for authorizing the publication of the work of her late husband. A colleague of the editor, Professor Paul Dolan, of the University of Delaware, advised him on a point of American constitutional law. Professor Yi-Chun Chang, of the same University, helped him with Chinese geography. The publication of this issue has been made possible by the estate of the late Mr. Alexander Pashko, M. A. — its executors deserve the thanks of all the readers. All the members of the Academy’s publications committee whose names appear on the inside cover have helped in innumerable ways. After the death of Professor Iwan Zamsha, Professor William Omelchenko, of Hunter College, has gladly taken on such chores as compiling the Chronicle, negotiating with printers, and many others. Mr. Alexander J. Motyl, M. A., the Assistant Copy Editor, has conscientiously checked the quotations and references. Particular recognition is due to Mrs. Margaret Pyle Hassert, Assistant Director of the University of Delaware Writing Center and Lecturer in its English Department. Working closely with the editor, she has taught him that there is more
to lucid English than is dreamt of in many an author's philosophy. All these persons — named and unnamed — deserve our cordial thanks, without the burden of ultimate responsibility, which is the editor's alone.

December 1980

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

TRANSLITERATION TABLE

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NOTE: Essentially this is a simplified Library of Congress system. Please note also that personal and place names with an established spelling in English need not be transliterated (e.g., Kiev, Trotsky).

1 After ж, ч, ш and щ, ё - о
Taras Shevchenko and Edmund Burke: Similarities and Contrasts in their Ideas of Nation

EUGENE PYZIUR*

One way to start an uncommon subject — and a brief comparison of the political ideas of Shevchenko with those of Burke is such — is to explain how it originated with the author. This article is the re-editing and expansion of the Eighth Annual Shevchenko Memorial Lecture which I delivered in the Spring of 1973 at Alberta University in Canada. The choice of this topic was not easy for me since I am not a Shevchenko scholar but a political scientist whose narrower field is political theory. True, as is the case with most educated Ukrainians, I was brought up on the poetry of Shevchenko. And, when young, because of the unsurpassable musicality of Shevchenko’s language, I committed to memory a great deal of it, although I am not particularly able to memorize. As his close friend and great contemporary Pan’ko Kulish poignantly remarked in his eulogy at Shevchenko’s funeral: “The whole vigor and grace of our language was revealed solely to him and to no one else.”1 Since I have an innate tendency to observe and to ponder about political phenomena, I paid primary attention to that portion of Shevchenko’s poetry which abounds with political elements. It can hardly be disputed that the central place in this type of Shevchenko’s poetry is occupied by his hortatory poem commonly referred to as the “Poslaniie-Epistle.” Its full title in English translation reads: “To the Dead, the Living and the Unborn Fellow-Countrymen of Mine in the Ukraine and not in the Ukraine My Friendly Epistle.”2 When rereading it during my youth, I must admit

*Deceased, see obituary this issue.

1 Pan’ko Kulish, Tvory, Vol. 6 (Lviv, 1909), p. 495.
that I was impressed by the fact that in such a relatively brief poem so many fundamental issues pertaining to the political situation of the Ukraine were considered and dealt with with such dynamic and explosive force. Moreover, I was especially impressed by the title. In my youthful imagination I wondered how something might simultaneously be addressed to those who are dead, to those who are alive, and to those who are to be born. I have to say that at that time I did not ascribe to its title any specific and concrete meaning. I considered it to be just an emblematic and extremely ornate phrase, and, of course, I fully ascribed its authorship to Shevchenko himself.

When my adolescent years had passed, I parted, though not entirely, with Shevchenko's poetry, busying myself with my academic studies which eventually concentrated on political theory. In my view, familiarity with political theory is a necessary pre-condition for a better understanding and evaluation of Ukrainian political thought, the latter being my eventual field of scholastic concentration. Thus, for years I have done research pertaining to Viacheslav Lypynsky's political ideas. Of Polish origin, Lypynsky (1882-1931) began to think of himself as Ukrainian in his adolescent years and turned out to be undoubtedly the greatest and the most profound modern political thinker the Ukrainians have ever had as well as the foremost representative of European conservative thought in this century. While elaborating his own complex and all-embracing political doctrine, Lypynsky, like other outstanding intellectuals, had recourse to the ideas of various great political thinkers. Hence, when continuing my research on his doctrine, I had to turn to studying numerous Western political thinkers because I presumed that some of them had had an influence on Lypynsky's thought. Of course, Edmund Burke could not have been bypassed. After all, Burke is generally considered the founder of modern conservatism, as is Lypynsky of Ukrainian conservatism. When studying Burke's political treatise *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, which the British Burkean scholar Alfred Cobban calls the "most influential political pamphlet ever written," I did not encounter any specific borrowings by Lypynsky from Burke except those parallels which must appear and be common to two authentic conservative thinkers. But, while reading the *Reflections*, I suddenly ran into something which astounded me and turned my

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thoughts to Shevchenko. The thing that caused this was Burke’s
definition of “nation”*. In an abridged form it stands as follows. “... As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations... it [nation] becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.”4 When I encountered this, my mind instantly recalled the title of Shevchenko’s “Poslaniie-Epistle” — “To the dead, to the Living and the Unborn Fellow-Countrymen...” The similarity with Burke’s formulation seemed to me to be too striking and too close to be ascribed exclusively and merely to an accidental parallelism. Since then, I have been inclined to think that Shevchenko coined the title of his poem under either the direct or the indirect influence of Burke’s definition of the nation. This is also my answer to the question of how I arrived at the topic of my Shevchenko Memorial Lecture and, in turn, at the subject-matter of this essay.

Do I possess proof for this rather bold presumption? In spite of my extensive efforts, I must admit that I am not in possession of such a verification and that right now I even harbor a considerable doubt as to whether I will ever succeed in finding it.

The interpretative literature on Shevchenko’s “Epistle” is not negligible. The Ukrainian scholars who dealt with this poem are Pan’ko Kulish, Omelian Ohonovskyi, Mykhailo Drahomanov, Vasyl’ Shchurat, Iaroslav Hordyns’kyi, Omelian Tsiysk, A. M. Andrievs’kyi, Leonid Bilets’kyi, and, most important of all, Stepan Smal-Stocki, who wrote an extensive essay on the “Poslaniie-Epistle.”5 Only three

*Throughout the article, when the author refers to Burke’s concept of “nation,” a more precise nomenclature would have been “nation-state.” — Ed.


of these authors commented upon the remarkable title of this poem. The first to attempt to evaluate the title was Pan'ko Kulish. He interpreted it in an allegorical way — the term “dead” referred to those Ukrainians to whom patriotic feelings were alien; the term “living” defined Ukrainian patriots.

Omelian Tsisyk’s interpretation of the title differs somewhat from that of Kulish. His understanding of the “dead” and the “living” is identical with that of the latter. But he also considers the “unborn” as those whose national awareness might still reawaken. Of all interpreters of Shevchenko’s poetry, Professor Smal-Stocki deals most extensively with the title of “Poslaniie-Epistle.” His explanation is rather complex and, perhaps for this reason, not without some ambiguity. He is of the view that Shevchenko, when using the words “Fellow-Countrymen of Mine,” had exclusively in mind the Ukrainian upper class, i. e., the gentry. The word “dead” Smal-Stocki interprets metaphorically: these are the gentrymen (dvoriany) who are disposed neither to national consciousness nor to moral integrity. The terms “living” and “unborn” he understands literally. However, as I mentioned before, he does not expand them to all the Ukrainian people.

Although I did not find confirmation from the Ukrainian scholars that Shevchenko had formulated the title of the “Poslaniie-Epistle” under the influence of Burke, I wished at least to answer the following question: were Burke’s *Reflections on the Revolution in France* translated and published in Russian before Shevchenko wrote his “Poslaniie-Epistle”, i. e., before the year 1845? It is well known that they were published in French and German within two years after their appearance in London in 1790. However, even in this humble effort, success escaped me. In spite of relatively extensive checking of such authoritative Russian bibliographical sources as Vengerov, Sopikov, and the Russian Biographical Dictionary, as well as the published catalogues of such libraries as the British Museum and the American

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6 Kulish, op. cit., p. 492 ff.
7 Tsisyk, op. cit., p. 204
8 Smal-Stocki, op. cit., p. 109 ff.
Library of Congress, I was unable to find any mention of the translation of Burke's *Reflections* in Russian. Nevertheless, my impression that Shevchenko was directly or indirectly familiar with Burke's definition of nation has not completely faded away. To support it, I refer to the arguments of such an eminent Slavic scholar as the late Professor Dmytro Chyzhevsky. In his essay "Shevchenko and Religion," Professor Chyzhevsky makes the presumption that Shevchenko wrote his poem "Mariia" under the influence of David Strauss's study, *The Life of Jesus*, a book well-known, or rather notoriously known, in Russia in Shevchenko's time. In defense of his thesis, Chyzhevsky states: "Shevchenko could not have read Strauss's book because it was inaccessible to him due to its language [German] but he could easily retain in his memory its 'thematic' details on the basis of conversations about it."\textsuperscript{10} As is well known, Strauss's *Life of Jesus* was anathema in Russia. This was not the case, however, with Burke's *Reflections*. The latter basically defended the *status quo* against the revolution which ended in the Napoleonic invasion of Russia. In his very reliable study, *The Spirit of Russia*, Thomas Masaryk states: "In Alexander's day occurred the restoration in France and the reaction in the other European states. The influence [on Alexander I] of such men as Owen, Fourier, and Saint Simon was replaced by that of such men as Burke, de Bonald and Gentz."\textsuperscript{11} As a matter of fact, the tradition of Burke in Russia goes even further back to the time of Catherine the Great, with whom Burke exchanged letters.\textsuperscript{12} Thus, there existed no reason for a barrier of censorship against the reading, translation, and publication of Burke's works in Russia.

\textsuperscript{12} Burke's letter to Catherine II on November 1, 1791, in spite of the generous compliments addressed to her, had as one purpose the objective of shaming her into living up to her promises. She had been lavish in promises of support to the *émigrés* of the French Revolution, but little material aid had been forthcoming. Hence, in this letter we find such a remark: "Madam, it is dangerous to praise any human virtue, before the accomplishment of the task which it imposes on itself." In Burke's letter to Captain Thomas Mercer of February 26, 1790, he considers absolute rule a lesser evil than mob rule: "I hate tyranny, at least I think so, but I hate it most of all where most are concerned in it. The tyranny of a multitude is a multiplied tyranny... I go to the full length of my principle. I should think the government of the deposed King of France, of the late King of Prussia, or of the present Emperor, or the present Czarina [Catherine II], none of them perfectly good people, to be far better than the government of twenty-four millions of men, all as good as you..." See *The Correspondence of Edmund Burke*, ed. by Alfred Cobban and Robert A. Smith, Vol. 6 (Cambridge, 1967), pp.441-445 and 92-98.
For almost seventeen years Shevchenko lived in St. Petersburg, at that time not only the official capital of the Russian Empire but its intellectual center also. Anything of whatever intellectual importance that happened in the West almost instantly reverberated in St. Petersburg. Shevchenko, because of his innate intellectual curiosity as well as his omnivorous reading, although rather a self-taught man, amassed a staggering amount of knowledge. For proof of this, it is enough to read his Diary or his correspondence.

Since Shevchenko’s breadth and depth of knowledge is not the topic of this essay, the following may serve as a quick confirmation of his extensive knowledge. Shevchenko was thoroughly familiar with the novels of Eugène Sue, and he supplied an accurate evaluation of his literary works in his letter to Princess Barbara Repnina. Drahomanov mentions that Shevchenko studied French and that his study was interrupted by his arrest, adding reproachfully: "It is clear that Shevchenko . . . did not attach much importance to the French language." But, if I understand one of the entries in his Diary correctly, it seems that he understood French pretty well. Regardless of the fact whether or not and, if so, to what extent Shevchenko possessed a command of the French language, it is certain that Burke’s Reflections, either in the original or in French translation, were generally available in Russia at his time. And, as in the case of Strauss’s The Life of Jesus — to repeat the observation of Professor Chyzhevsky — in the case of the Reflections, Shevchenko “could retain thematical details on the basis of conversation” and especially retain in his memory such a unique and auspicious definition of nation as that of Burke.

15 Under the date of September 2, 1857, Shevchenko narrates the following event in his Diary: on the way from his exile, while travelling on the steamboat all those assembled in the captain’s cabin started to converse about literature. Soon Shevchenko proposed to read in the Russian translation by Benediktov the poem of Auguste Barbier, “The Feast of Dogs.” Then the original was read, and he states: “All reached the unanimous conclusion that the translation was better than the original.” To understand this literally then means that Shevchenko participated in this decision, too. Yet, without understanding the French language he could not. See T. Shevchenko, Tvory, op. cit., Vol. 9, p. 124.
At this point, it is worth mentioning that, while on his second journey in the Ukraine, Shevchenko was in close contact with the members of the semi-clandestine organization, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. The political platform of this organization, Knyhy bytiia Ukraïns'koho narodu, in its fifty-first and fifty-second articles, as if echoing Burke's ideas, emphatically condemned the French Revolution for its anti-Christian attitude. Yet, in Shevchenko's poetry, loaded with explosive rebellious spirit and scathing sarcasm against the tsars and their followers, there is no reference to the Great French Revolution. There is, so far as I know, only one disapproving reference to the Great French Revolution in his novel Prohul'ka z pryiemnistiu ta i ne bez morali. However, Shevchenko's poetry contains a laudatory reference to the leader of the American Revolution, George Washington. Hence, his omission of reference to the French Revolution in his poetry seems to be not merely accidental.

Concluding my explanatory introduction to the subject of this article, I would wish to say that, although I do not have valid proof, I am inclined to think that Shevchenko formulated the title of his "Poslanie-Epistle" under the influence of Burke's definition of nation. The phrase is so unique that it cannot be ascribed to pure

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17 In his biographical novel Prohul'ka . . . , Shevchenko recorded the following reflection: "The hamlet of Lysianka is of great importance to the history of the Ukraine. This is the homeland of Mykhail Khmel, the father of the glorious Zynovii Bohdan Khmelnytsky. It has also become famous, if one is to believe the local old men, because it was here, in 1768, that Maksym Zalizniak 'celebrated vespers' for the Poles and Jews that were no worse than the 'Sicilian Vespers.' But if all such events that are unworthy of human memory, are to be considered 'glorious', then not only Lysianka [but] every village, every plot of land would be renowned in the Ukraine, especially on the right bank of the Dnieper. If in nothing else, in this my dead countrymen did not yield a bit to any European nation whatsoever; and in 1768 they outdid the St. Bartholemew's Massacre and even the First French Revolution. In one thing, however, they differed from the Europeans. Among them [the Ukrainians], all these bloody tragedies were the work of the entire nation and never occurred as the result of the whims of some villain, such as Catherine de Medici, [a development] Western liberals not infrequently have permitted to take place in their countries." See T. Shevchenko, Tvory, op. cit., Vol. 8, p. 182 ff.; emphasis added.

The Soviet Ukrainian literary critic F. Ia. Pryima tendentiously interprets this reflection of Shevchenko's as his positive attitude toward the great French Revolution. See F. Ia. Pryima, Shevchenko i rossiis'kyi vzvol'nyi rukh (Kiev, 1966), p. 64.
18 T. Shevchenko, Tvory, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 29.
coincidence, although the latter possibility is not to be entirely excluded. When using the phrase, in my opinion, Shevchenko understood it as Burke did, not as Kulish, Tsisyk, and Professor Smal-Stocki interpreted it. Therefore, although his "Epistle's" cutting edge is primarily turned against the landed gentry in the Ukraine, it is potentially addressed to the entire Ukrainian nation.

Finally, this question may be asked: Does this presumptuous and brittle link between Shevchenko and Burke entitle me to draw a comparison between the Weltanschauung of these two outstanding personalities, especially concerning their concepts of nation? Frankly, it is a matter of opinion. That there exists no tangible proof for asserting that there was a direct and noticeable influence of Burke's thought on Shevchenko's political ideas appears to be beyond doubt. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the interpretation of Shevchenko's literary creativity has revolved too much around the narrow horizons of Russian-Polish relations and influences. Other influences than these were not negligible. Hence, I do not think that my approach will result in an exercise in futility. Since I am not a Shevchenko scholar, I intend to analyze primarily his "Poslaniie-Epistle" and not his entire literary or even poetic contribution. Moreover, I intend to analyze it almost exclusively from the standpoint of political theory and stress the similarities as well as the contrasts of the political ideas of Shevchenko and Burke.

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Let me start with a very brief comparison of the literary profiles of these two towering personalities before I turn to their political views and attitudes and, eventually, to their ideas of the nation. Edmund Burke (1729-1791) was simultaneously a "practical politician" and an unsystematic political philosopher. For this reason, he was "regarded as somewhat of an anomaly" and was "treated accordingly by other politicians during his life and by philosophers after his death." Taras Shevchenko (1814-1861) was a poet, but his poetry was to such an extent permeated by what may be generally defined as the "political imperative" that any attempt to reduce him solely to a leading literary personality would be an obvious Procrustean surgery, condemned to

19 Cobban, op. cit., p. 38.
failure. Since Burke was a political writer and Shevchenko a poet, their media of expression vary entirely. Hence, in spite of the saturation of Shevchenko's poetry with the political element, we cannot search in it for that formal exactitude of political ideas which we expect and usually find in a political treatise. As a poet, Shevchenko expressed his ideas in such literary devices as images, allegories, metaphors, intuitive impressions, symbolic allusions, pathos, exaltations, sarcasm. Burke's prose, although it too used literary devices, was far more explicit in its statement. An authoritative scholar on Burke, Professor Connor O'Brien, giving an account of the resourcefulness of Burke's prose, states in the preface to the recently re-published *Reflections*:

His grace and strength are best manifested in the lyrical buoyancy with which he moves from one manner, and from one level of intensity, to another. He can soar from invective and irony to the height of romantic pathos . . . or . . . he can move in the course of a single sentence from a pastoral tenderness in the opening, onto a conclusion of Radamanthine irony . . . No other orator or political writer either before or after him has his combination of qualities, his wide range of articulate emotion, his intuitive grasp of social forces, his capacity for analytical argument, his pathos, fantasy and wit and his power to marshall all these, through a superb command over the resources of language, toward ends clearly discerned and passionately desired.20

Anyone familiar with Shevchenko's poetry should readily agree that all the elements of eloquence found in Burke's prose overflow in Shevchenko's poems, even in those on political themes. Since Shevchenko's eloquence was couched in a poetical form, the exact meaning of his thought was somewhat dulled. But the relative bluntness of his ideas was compensated for by the power they derived from being wrapped in superb poetry, so melodious and rhythmic in its simplicity that learning it by heart is diversion rather than exertion.21

21 I have to stress emphatically that by my remark I am not indirectly suggesting that it is always easy to grasp the meaning of Shevchenko's poetry. On the contrary, in numerous cases it is extremely difficult. In his case, the intellectual and the poet are neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily the same. Shevchenko's poetry, that of a creative genius, condemns a one-sided interpretative approach to instant failure and makes an all-embracing interpretation an impossibility.
After this summary excursion into their media of expression, let me turn to Burke's and Shevchenko's political ideas. These were complex; moreover, as is to be expected, they underwent evolution. Hence, my brief review of them must be characterized by utter simplification, stopping, I hope, at the brink of distortion. It is an indisputable fact that Burke's political theory was a revolt against the ideas of Aufklaerung, of the Enlightenment. As Alfred Cobban succinctly defined him, Burke "was also a philosopher of unreason in the great Age of Reason."2 The political theory of the Age of Enlightenment concentrated its attention on institutions, contracts, forms, while it tended to neglect custom, conventions, and all things which lacked institutional expression. The result of putting the formal before the real was that the principles supporting existing institutions and the motives responsible for their action were deduced analytically, usually without appeal either to history or to the directly experienced reality of human existence. From such an approach, a peculiarly abstract, even somewhat bare logic was supposed to substitute for the political wisdom gained from history. The age of the Enlightenment saw human existence as being rooted not in a historical context but rather in metaphysical truth. To such a philosophy, Burke determinately grafted his own: truth and justice are not extramundane phenomena stored in a metaphysical heaven but are the vital principles ever at work in the life of mankind and nations and are only to be found by observing life itself. According to Burke, history and tradition are primarily the storehouse for an observation of life. Hence, he applied the historical idea also to the nation. In such an attitude rested Burke's modest yet obvious anti-intellectualism, the mistrust of pure speculative thought and of its creators and worshipers — an attitude characteristic of many authentically conservative men.

In view of the widespread obscurantism in the spiritual life of the eighteenth-century Russian Empire, large doses of the Enlightenment could have only a beneficial effect on the Russian cultural atmosphere. Yet the Enlightenment was rather an unwelcome guest in Russia. Shevchenko's formative years coincided with the age of Romanticism. The latter eventually culminated in the cult of unrestricted individualism and of nature worship, in adulation of primitivism, in religious mysticism, in a revolt against political authority as such, in

22 Cobban, op. cit., p. 75.
disrespect for social convention, as well as in the exaltation of the physical passions. On the whole, these extremes of Romanticism remained alien to Shevchenko’s thought. Shevchenko had his own kind of reasoning; its base was neither deductive rationalism nor an instinct-exalting romanticism but a playing by ear, based on experience. Thus, for him, as for Burke, neither truth nor justice were metaphysical manifestations. They were immanent values; as such, they were to be approached concretely and not abstractly. Hence, his stern reminder to his fellow-countrymen in “Poslaniie-Epistle” was:

And in foreign climes
Do not seek, do not ask for
That which no man finds
In heaven above . . .  

Rejecting revolt against convention for the sake of revolt as well as unrestricted individualism, Shevchenko was prone to dispersed, spontaneous, and caustic anti-intellectual outbursts. “Eggheadism” is symbolically represented in his poetry by a “stocky German” (kutsyi nimets’), although personally he had friendly relations with those Germans whom he had known and one of his poems “Ivan Pidkova” is dedicated to his dear friend V. I. Sternberg. Moreover, in his novels Germans as a rule are presented as highly cultured people who, while living on their estates, have “correct” relations with the Ukrainian plain people even though they are serfs.24 Hence, Shevchenko’s derogatory remarks against Germans are to be interpreted in most cases as an outlet for his feelings against an arrogant intellectualism.

Nor did Shevchenko approve of subjective individualistic theories. He condemned them directly in his own preface to the second edition of his Kobzar, stating “they are confabulating about some individualisms, or something else to such an extent that tongues are turning numb.”25

All of Shevchenko’s utterances against intellectualism and individualism cease to be the expression of some kind of obscurantism — as

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24 Such is Anton Karlovych and his wife in Shevchenko’s novel Muzyka, Prechlel in Mandrivka . . . and Karl Hirt in Blyzniata. See Shevchenko, Tvory, op. cit., Vols. 7, 8.
25 Quoted in Smal-Stocki, op. cit., p. 96
Drahomanov interpreted them — once they are put into the proper context of his socio-political philosophy. Immediately preceding his time, political philosophy had been built upon individual rights, contracts, and the unlimited power of reason. Shevchenko began at the other end — with demands for social justice and moral obligations founded in religion and the patriotic duties rooted in the existence of the Ukrainian nation. The great value of Shevchenko's thought lies in the fact that he attempted independently the same task which Burke had: to remind his fellow-countrymen that a nation is not a confused multitude of isolated individuals but is rather a community of destiny, providing a predetermined framework for the fulfillment of the individual's life. Above all, Shevchenko wished to inspire the political realm with a cosmic spirit and to teach his fellow-countrymen again the dire realities of social life. Therefore, Drahomanov's observations that Shevchenko's views about justice and liberty were "obsolete and narrow-minded" and that the main defect of his thought lies "in the absence of the idea of progress" were the result of a far-reaching misunderstanding of Shevchenko's Weltanschauung. Shevchenko's ideas were permeated by a metaphysical vision anchored in religion and tradition; they were in a sense ageless. And, since Shevchenko considered human reason as only one among numerous factors for directing the existence of man, there was no place in his philosophy — as in Drahomanov's — for a positivistic belief in an unlimited historical progress of mankind due to advances of reason. Such an idea would sound too naive against the total background of Shevchenko's views. Change he recognized as inevitable, since nothing in progression could rest on its original plan.

Since Shevchenko considered truth and justice to be immanent values, his attention was preoccupied with the historical past of his country, and his poetry abounded with historical themes. True, neither Burke nor Shevchenko were professional historians immersed in painstaking research; they were rather historians by grace of intuition corrected by reason. Yet both may justly be considered as

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26 In his pamphlet "Chudats'ki dumky pro ukraïns'ku natsional'nu spravu" Drahomanov stated on account of "Poslaniie-Epistle": "Similar disdain for the 'science of the stocky German' to which was opposed [our] 'own wisdom' dictated those well known pronouncements of Shevchenko in his 'Poslaniie' which are truly stupid; and precisely because of their stupidity which sanctifies the laziness of our reason, they became as popular as Bakunin's exclamations against bourgeois sciences and schools." See M. Drahomanov, *Vybrani tvory*, op. cit., p. 266.

27 Ibid., p. 166 ff.
representatives and even co-founders of historicism. Professor Luckyj, in his study *Between Gogol and Shevchenko*, reaches the following conclusion: "Shevchenko's continued concern with the meaning and direction of Ukrainian history was a severe limitation to his universality."\(^{28}\) To this, I would wish to say the following: whether or not Shevchenko's abandonment of "continuous concern with the meaning and direction of Ukrainian history" would have contributed toward the expansion of his universality is a conjecture which, in my opinion, lies beyond empirical proof. On the other hand, my own conjecture is not so entirely beyond such proof. My opinion is that, without Shevchenko's passionate and deep concern with the meaning and course of the Ukrainian historical process, the emergence of a powerful, critical historiography would be hard to imagine; that we obtained the historical school of Antonovych, expanding eventually into the most influential school of Hrushevsky, for this circumstance we are essentially indebted to Shevchenko. Pan'ko Kulish, in spite of his later erratic switches in his evaluation of the poetico-historical heritage of Shevchenko, came very close to the truth when, in his article written shortly after the poet's death, he stated:

Shevchenko [was] our poet and first historian. Shevchenko was the first to put the question to our mute common mounds and to ask them what they were. An he was the only one who received from them an answer as clear as God's word. Shevchenko was the first to come upon the idea of what our historical past was and for what reason it would be cursed by succeeding generations. There was once Konysky and his *Istoria Rusov*, which, like some embellished curtain, kept our past out of sight until Shevchenko tore and shredded this curtain.\(^{29}\)

And the founder of our critical historiography, Volodymyr Antonovych, acknowledged the fact that, because of his intuitive historicism, Shevchenko's poetry rendered rather correctly the spirit of the Ukrainian historical process.\(^ {30}\) Thus, by reinstatement of interest

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\(^{28}\) George S. Luckyj, *Between Gogol and Shevchenko* (Munich, 1971), p. 156. Although I am a stranger in the world of literature, I am tempted to remark that Shevchenko's universality is beyond doubt, while on the other hand far from being acknowledged. To my knowledge, no other great poet exemplified in his poetry such polarization as well as affinity of boundless love and bottomless hate, of unconditional forgiveness and vehement wrath, a fact first indicated by the Russian literary critic K. Chukovsky in his essay "Shevchenko." See *Russkaia Mysl*, No. 4 & 5, 1911.

\(^{29}\) Kulish, op. cit., p. 490.

\(^{30}\) Smal-Stocki, op. cit., p. 104.
and of respect for history and tradition, Shevchenko restored the memory and eventually the national identity of the Ukrainian nation, without which the people inevitably must hibernate as an amorphous and formless ethnic mass.

In tandem with his concern for the historical past of the Ukraine went Shevchenko's respect for tradition. His poetry for the most part was filled with a rebellious, revolutionary spirit directed against the existing social and political reality, and his evaluation of the leading Ukrainian historical personalities was often critical to the point of sarcastic scorn. Even such a towering figure as Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky was not spared Shevchenko's condemnation for concluding an alliance with Muscovy which eventually led to Russia's domination over the Ukraine. Yet, in spite of such a critical evaluation of the historical past of the Ukraine, Shevchenko's respect for tradition remained basically unimpaired. Let me limit my supporting argument to just one quotation taken from his novel *The Twins*. On its first page we find the following observation:

And indeed — after proper consideration — if for the sake of a worthless piece of silver we fail to respect the sacred commands of tradition, then what will become of us? We will turn into some kind of Frenchmen or — God forbid — stocky Germans; and not a trace will remain of our national character or physiognomy. But I believe that a nation without its own traits, peculiar solely to itself, characteristic solely of itself, resembles a bowl of porridge — and not very tasty one at that.31

This quotation, so pregnant in meaning, can be supported by a long series of verses, expressing a similar opinion. Unlike Shevchenko, Burke had immeasurably less reason to be critical of the historical past of Great Britain. As to tradition, it is hardly necessary to remind ourselves what a central place was assigned to it in his political thought.

Still another similarity between these two men is easily observable. Perhaps because of their intuitive historicism and the wisdom gained through respect for tradition, perhaps for other causes not easy to pinpoint, both men possessed an almost superhuman instinct for perceiving the direction in which history was about to move, and the feeling of great forces shaping present and future events reached in them the level of the prophetic. Professor O'Brien narrates an

interesting experience: when his undergraduates read the *Reflections*,
they readily assumed that they had been written at much later stage of
the French Revolution than was actually the case.32

Shevchenko's unceasing anxiety and alarming warnings that the
situation of the Ukraine could be incomparably more gloomy in the
future than in his own time, that the fate of the Ukrainian nation
might reach the proportion of political calamity if no fundamental
change should take place in his lifetime makes his poetry as
contemporary today as it was in his own day:

*It is all one to me indeed, if I*
*Live in Ukraine or live there not at all, . . .*
*But while I live I cannot bear to see*
*A wicked people come with crafty threat,*
*To lull Ukraine, yet strip her ruthlessly*
*And waken her amid the flames they set —*
*By God, these wrongs are not all one to me!*33

This anticipation was expressed in 1847. As a matter of fact, the
Ukraine has been living for decades in the times of its fulfillment. Or
we may turn to Shevchenko's prognostication in the "Poslaniie-
Epistle," addressed to the gentry in the Ukraine who were primarily
concerned with the preservation of their own privileged position at the
cost of the exploited serfs, and compare Shevchenko's warning with
the ruin and the vengeance that was inflicted on them about seventy
years later in the days of the Russian Revolution:

*Come to your senses! Human be,*
*Or you'll meet calamity!*
*And very soon the people's chains*
*Will by the people broken be.*34

Numerous prophetic foretellings, scattered throughout
Shevchenko's poetry, were confirmed by successive historical events.
When one compares the span of time separating Shevchenko's
prophesies from the time during which these events took place, then
Burke's historical clairvoyance may seem rather short-termed.

C. H. Andrusyshen & Watson Kirkconnell (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964)
p. 297.
However, as there are parallel similarities between the political views of Shevchenko and Burke, there are also opposing differences. If enumerated fully and elaborated adequately, the differences between their political temperaments and attitudes, ideas, and values might even overshadow the similarities. For the sake of balance, let me deal summarily with them as I did with the similarities in their political views. The fundamental difference between Burke and Shevchenko — from which the other diversities of views evolved — lies in the fact that Burke was a convinced conservative and therefore basically a defender of the status quo. As a Whig, he desired the maintenance of the aristocratic oligarchical order, a system not entirely without merit, though it had conspicuous defects. He was also a defender of monarchy, although by no means of absolute monarchy. The latter he unconditionally refused to recognize as a legitimate form of government. Since he considered the privileged position of the English aristocracy as desirable as well as deserved, he became a root-and-branch opponent of even the most moderate parliamentary reform, rejecting any extension of the franchise. For Burke, those born to the purple could stay at the top without justifying their worthiness; those born beneath had to pass a vigorous test if they were to rise to eminence. As an antirevolutionary, Burke developed his own counter-revolutionary doctrine in defense of the ancien régime which had been for a long time irreparably rotten. To be sure, on the other hand he admitted as fundamental premises that we all must obey the great law of change and that "a state without the means of some change is without the means of its conservation."  

In contrast, Shevchenko condemned the existing socio-political reality of the Russian Empire not only unconditionally; one may even say that he saw in the Russian autocracy an incarnation of cosmic evil. He viewed the privileged positions of the aristocracy and gentry, whether of Russian, Polish, or Ukrainian origin, and of the Tsarist bureaucracy as parasitical and tantamount to the negation of fundamental social justice. Above all, Shevchenko was concerned with the wretchedly poor lot of the serf-peasantry and considered their uncured and licentious treatment by the landlords as a betrayal of the true God, as the negation of the Christian ethics and love hypocritically preached by the official Church. His poem ominously entitled "Prayers" starts with such a defiant stanza:

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35 Burke/O'Brien, op. cit., p. 106.
Send to those boundless traffickers in blood,
The Tsars of earth, their ducats and their dollars
And shackles aptly forged!

Send to the heads and hands that toil amain
Upon this earth, so looted and despoiled,
The impulse of your strength!36

And in his “Zapovit — Testament,” which obtained the status of the second anthem of the Ukrainians, we read:

When from Ukraine the Dnieper bears
Into the deep blue sea
The blood of foes . . . then will I leave
These hills and fertile fields —
I’ll leave them all and fly away
To the abode of God,
And then I’ll pray . . . But till that day
I nothing know of God.37

Such bold invocations could not derive from a man of conservative disposition. They too obviously smolder with a rebellious temper. They can be understood only as a call to an abrupt change of the existing order, eventually as a summons to revolution, not only to a national revolution, namely, a struggle for the independence of the Ukraine but also to a social revolution.

Is then Shevchenko, as the contemporary Soviet interpreters of his prophetic words invariably assure us, the bard of a radical revolution and for this reason separated from Burke by an unbridgeable abyss? Not entirely, in my view. In spite of the opposite stands of these men on the issue of social revolution, there still exists something which links them together. This link is their unreserved esteem for liberty. For both of them, liberty is the one of the supreme values — the liberty of men and of nations. As Cobban put it: “At least five separate rebellions against authority can be cited as meeting with Burke’s specific approval: the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the American War of Independence, the struggle of the Corsicans for their freedom, the attempt of the Poles to preserve their national independence, and the various revolts against the minions of Warren Hastings in India.”38

Above all, dearest to Burke’s heart was the cause of his Roman

38 Cobban, op. cit., p. 100.
Catholic fellow countrymen in Ireland. Professor O'Brien is inclined to explain Burke's unreserved commitment to freedom in a way which I would — permitting myself to traverse the terms of analytical psychology — express as the phenomenon of a "split of his national personality" due to his Irish background. Whether such an argument explains Burke's commitment to freedom in a satisfactory way, I am rather inclined to doubt. I may counterpose Gogol's case. He too suffered from a "split of national personality" due to his Ukrainian ethnic background and the intensity of his split greatly surpassed that of Burke. In spite of it, Gogol eventually turned into an archreactionary, defending unreservedly autocracy, orthodoxy, and serfdom. Burke's commitment to liberty must have had more solid anchoring than just his Irish background. Therefore, it was not always the counter-revolutionary Burke that seemed the most important. Throughout the last and this century, liberal as well as conservative minds were nourished by him. Therefore, his brand of conservatism never flirted with reaction. Unlike de Maistre or de Bonald, Burke had "reason to know how a revolutionary might feel" because for him the source of "revolution and counter-revolution" existed "not only in the world at large but also within himself." "No man . . . has a right to arbitrary power" — this principle enunciated by Burke in his defense of the Indian rebellion is one of the cornerstones of Burke's political philosophy. He considered any attempt to erect arbitrary violence into a principle as the most hideous crime. On whichever side it might chance to arise, the principle of despotism was always an enemy and a revolt against it was justified, more — even a duty. Hence he condemned the tyranny of the mob and the despotism of a ruler with equal severity.

The case of Shevchenko is similar, though in reverse. Because of his involvement with the historical past of the Ukraine and his respect for tradition as well as his deep yet peculiar sense of religiosity, Shevchenko had reason to know how a Ukrainian conservative might feel. For him, too, the forces of revolution and conservation existed not only in the world at large but also within himself. Hence, Shevchenko is not to be classified as a radical rebel for whom the revolution for the sake of revolution is an end in itself.

40 Burke/O'Brien, ed., op. cit., p. 28 ff.
41 Ibid., pp. 67, 76.
Risking the chance that my words may easily be misunderstood, yet searching for a succinct description, I would define Burke as a non-conformist rebellious conservative and Shevchenko as a defiant conservative rebel. Such rare specimens are presumably the most interesting human types. Their feelings and minds exemplify force and profundity. They are in revolt against mediocrity. And, unlike radicals or reactionaries, while opposing the existing situation, they do not blindly jump into utopia. They are men of imagination, not just fantasy. They can neither produce nor tolerate clichés or shibboleths.

The purpose of the preceding was to level the ground for dealing with Burke’s and Shevchenko’s idea of nation. If this topic is to be analyzed adequately and explained fully, it would command a rather extensive presentation. The scope of this essay does not permit such one; hence—bare essentials.

Burke, although a loyal monarchist, intuitively sensed that the age of dynasties was gradually passing away, that the monarchical principle alone was increasingly less able to provide a permanent and solid basis from which the existing states could withstand the passing storms. Thus, he saw, long before most of his contemporaries, the power and the right of that force of national sentiment which eighteenth-century theorists and politicians preferred to ignore. To quote Alfred Cobban once more: “Though the fact had been there for centuries, Burke has the honor of first stating in definite form the theory of nationality.”

Thus, to Burke the Irish problem was a conflict between an alien government and the whole nation. He condemned the partitioning of Poland unreservedly, in spite of the fact that in his opinion the Polish nobles excelled in folly. In the case of the British-American conflict, he defended the cause of the American colonists and called repeatedly for reconciliation. In the case of the uprising of the Indians against Warren Hastings’ oppressive rule, he saw a fully justifiable rebellion:

The whole country rose up in rebellion, and surely in justifiable rebellion. Every writer on the Law of Nations, every

43 Cobban, op. cit., p. 130.
44 Ibid., Chapter 4, “Corsica and Poland,” pp. 107-11.
45 Edmund Burke, Selected Works, W. J. Bates ed. (New York, 1960), Chapter 1, pp. 43-244.
man that has written, thought, or felt upon the affairs of
government, must write, know, think and feel, that a people so
cruelly scourged and oppressed, both in the person of their
chief and in their own persons were justified in their
resistance. They were roused to vengeance.46

Hence, logically he asserted that "a nation is not an idea only of
local extent and individual momentary aggregation, but it is an idea of
continuity which extends in time as well as in numbers and in space.
And this is a choice not of one day or one set of people, not a
tumultuary and giddy choice; it is a deliberate election of ages and of
generations."47 It was Burke alone, and not the theorists of "social
contract," who comprehended that a new system was needed and the
force that would be called into aid was to be the force of nationality.
Events moved on in the course he had foreseen. The remaining history
of the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars was a vindication of
the truth of the real sources of the strength of nations. With the principle
of popular sovereignty ascendant, the Age of Nationality arrived and is
still, or rather increasingly more, disturbing the world.

Turning now to Shevchenko, attention should be paid at the start to
the following fact: he had to answer two additional questions which
Burke was spared from facing. First of all, Shevchenko had to answer
whether in his own time the populace of the Ukraine could claim the
status of distinct nationality. His second problem was: if the answer to
the first question was affirmative, did the Ukrainian people have the
right to national self-determination or were they condemned to be but
the bricks in the construction of alien empires? The positive answer to
both these questions is to be found already in the "Poslaniie-Epistle,"
a poem which he wrote at the early age of thirty-one. The word
"Poslaniie," which is borrowed from the Old Slavonic, can be
rendered best in modern terms as "manifesto" and not "Epistle."" Though
couched in poetic form, the "Poslaniie" is the first and
perhaps the most important political manifesto in modern Ukrainian
literature because it unequivocally states that the Ukrainian people are
a distinct nation and as such, are entitled to their own statehood.
Although it is written in the form of poem and not in the form of a
political document or tract, when combined with the rest of

46 The Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke, rev. ed., Vol. 11 (Boston, 1867),
p. 281.
47 Ibid., Vol. 7, p. 95. (Boston, 1866).
Shevchenko's political poetry, its main political tenor remains undisputably clear. As a matter of fact, Burke did not reason as a scholar in search of a scientific solution; and Shevchenko, an innate poet, even less so. Forced by the exigencies of life and by the stormy march of historical changes which he sensed more deeply and far ahead of his contemporaries, Shevchenko spoke rather as a national prophet.

His answer to the question of whether the Ukrainians are a nation was contained in the very title of the “Poslaniie-Epistle”: “To the Dead, the Living and the Unborn Fellow-Countrymen of Mine in the Ukraine and not [residing] in the Ukraine.” Hence, as in the case of Burke, the nation is a long chain of generations and not an “individual momentary aggregation.” It is determined by the circumstances of history, occasions, tempers, dispositions and moral and civic habits of the people which disclose themselves only over a long space of time. Once a nation exists, in this concrete case the Ukrainian nation, then, according to Shevchenko, it is rather of secondary importance whether its individual members dwell on its territory or not. By moving to foreign lands, a Ukrainian does not exit from his own nation, and his loyalty to it remains an undiminished obligation.

Since, however, about half a century separated him from Burke's time and thought, Shevchenko's concept of nation is not identical with Burke's. For Burke, a nation could as well as should be divided into clearly distinct and separated corporation-classes. According to Burke, what turned a people into a nation came largely from their long experience of common political institutions in which men had willingly cooperated. The distinction between state, considered as a terminal political organization, and nation, as a terminal societal community, was somewhat de-emphasized, though not blurred, in Burke's thought.

Shevchenko was the son of a people who, in spite of tremendous sacrifices, had missed achieving statehood. For this failure — and this fact must emphatically be stressed — Shevchenko put the primary blame on the shortcomings and short-sightedness of his “dead and living fellow-countrymen!” Only then were his blasting accusations turned against the alien enemies, primarily the Russians. He considered three events of Ukrainian history as especially tragic: the Pereiaslav treaty, the battle of Poltava, and the destruction of the
Žaporozhian Sich, each of them increasingly deepening the Ukraine’s enslavement to Russia. According to the former principle, the most impetuous accusations found in his “Poslaniie-Epistle” are not turned primarily against the Russians themselves but against the Russophile Ukrainian landowning gentry. These gentry are mercilessly condemned for two reasons: their inhuman treatment of their fellow countrymen who were their serfs and their voluntary denationalization. When one evaluates his scathing lashes against the landed gentry from the point of view of the contemporary theory of nation, it becomes rather obvious that Shevchenko’s idea of nation on some points differs clearly from that of Burke. According to Burke, a nation is a “partnership of generations” — but, one may ask, are the plain people included in this partnership? One gets the impression from Burke’s writing dealing with the problem of nation that the masses are an unsubstantial element of a nation. In the case of Shevchenko, there is clearly noticeable the powerful impact of democratic ideas. A nation, to be considered as such, should possess a high degree of social homogeneity. Hence, its individual social strata should not be separated from each other by castelike walls, since the precondition of the existence of a modern nation is the presence of intercommunication between various classes and different individuals.

On the other hand, Shevchenko’s idea of nation ought not to be understood as that of an ethnically distinct aggregation socially leveled to the dimension of an almost classless society. Shevchenko cannot be viewed as being solely a champion of the cause of the oppressed masses — the profile built for decades by the interpretation which remains, with slight modifications, the only one permissible in the Soviet Union. For the sake of objectivity, it must be stated that such an opinion is in disagreement with Shevchenko’s own well-documented views. What Shevchenko demanded was the abolition of the privileged position of the gentry and the elimination of serfdom, along with the uplifting of the social well-being of the masses. He did not advocate

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48 In the Soviet Union Shevchenko was given the dubious honor of being enrolled into the ranks of the so-called revolutionary democrats. What this term means exactly is not easy to say. Perhaps the bull’s-eye is momentarily hit if this term is to be interpreted in the simplest way: those who lived before the foundation of the Bolshevik Party and about whom Lenin expressed himself approvingly. Therefore, Herzen is considered to be a “revolutionary democrat” but not his close friend Bakunin, who outpaced completely the former in the field of doctrinal as well as practical radicalism.
the complete elimination of the upper strata of Ukrainian society because he was too well aware that a people deprived of its own elite is reduced to an amorphous mass and ceases to be a nation. Thus, in his other poems he was forgiving toward the *hetmans* and the Cossack nobility for their one-sided, sometimes egoistic class policies, provided that their main motivations for political actions were directed toward the preservation of or struggle for the independence of the Ukraine.

What is, however, most striking and equally surprising is the fact that Shevchenko correctly anticipated the role of the middle class in nation-building. While still in his Siberian exile, although already pardoned, he was mapping his artistic plans for the future, recording them in his *Diary*. He came to the conclusion that the lost years of banishment undercut his potentialities as a painter and that the most promising field of art which remained for him would be etching. He consoled himself that to be “a good etcher means to spread the beautiful and the enlightening among the people. . . to be useful for the people and serve God” — and that because of etching the masterpieces of art are not exclusively accessible to the rich.\(^4^9\) He extended his musing into a profound sociological as well as fatidical observation:

> Does our tiny upper class have any importance whatsoever from the viewpoint of nationality? None, it seems. The middle class, however, is a huge and, unfortunately, semi-literate mass. [The middle class] is one-half of our people; it is the heart of our nationality.\(^5^0\)

In view of the absence of Ukrainian statehood, Shevchenko's criteria applied to a nation are somewhat closer to those of Herder than of Burke. No wonder — Herder's ideas pertaining to nationality were household words in Eastern Europe, especially in the Ukraine because of his generous compliments expressed toward Shevchenko's country.\(^5^1\) Shevchenko's idea of nation strongly emphasizes the cultural-linguistic factor:

> Read, study and discern,  
> And from the foreigner learn,  
> But do not your own disdain.

\(^{5^0}\) Ibid., p. 34.  
\(^{5^1}\) Volodymyr Sichynsky, *Ukraine in Foreign Comments and Descriptions from the VIth to XXth Century* (New York, 1953), p. 156.
... All the tongues you know
Of the Slavonic peoples... every one
Of them. But of your own —
Nothing!...

we read in the "Poslaniie-Epistle."52

Returning to Herder, it must be said that the political aspect of nationality did not much appeal to him. Herder’s interest in nationality was almost exclusively cultural.53 Not so, however, with Shevchenko! Although the Ukrainian nation was stateless and enslaved, it definitely possessed its own political weight and dynamics. Like any other nation, the Ukrainian was a terminal community entitled to command effectively the loyalty of its fellow-countrymen and to override the claims both of the lesser communities within it — here foremost the claims of the corporation of gentry — and of those which cut across it or potentially enfolded it within a still greater entity — in the case of the Ukraine, the Russian Empire. His ideas of nation rather approached the well-known concept of the French scholar Ernest Renan, formulated in his classical essay "What is a Nation?" published in 1882, i.e., about forty years after the "Poslaniie-Epistle" was written. A nation for Shevchenko, as for Renan, is foremost a community of destiny. It is a body and soul at the same time. It is a great solidarity created not by momentarily measured interests but by sentiments and sacrifices which have been made in the past and which its members are ready to make in the future. It presupposes the past, but it resumes itself in the present by a tangible fact, namely, the clearly expressed desire to continue life in common without a forceful interference of other nations. For Renan and for Shevchenko also, the heritage of glory and grief is one of the most powerful cementing factors, the basis for self-identification of a nation. To quote Renan: "Common suffering unites more than common rejoicing. Among national memories, sorrow has greater value than victories, for they impose duties and demand common effort."54 A great deal of what Shevchenko wrote may sound like poetic variations on Renan's theme. It is enough to mention how often his poetry uses the visible symbol of common national sorrow, the graves on the steppes of those who had fallen in defense of their fatherland.

54 Ernest Renan, "What is a Nation?", in World Politics, ed. by A. Lijphart (Boston, 1971), p. 89.
When viewing the Ukrainian people as a distinct nationality, in the process of transforming itself into a modern nation, Shevchenko drew the next conclusion. The Ukrainian people have the right to shape their own political destiny independently. Thus, Shevchenko's epoch-making role in modern Ukrainian history lies in the fact that he was the first one who with titanic force raised the idea of statehood of the Ukraine as a basic warranty of the existence and the protection of the interests of the nation. This idea and demand organically saturates all of his poetry:

... When will we greet
Our own George Washington at last
With the new law of righteousness?
Oh, there's no doubt that day we'll see!\(^5\)

However, the road to independence of the Ukraine was blocked by the existence of the Russian Empire. Again, Shevchenko was the first representative of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to promulgate the unconditional demand for the struggle against the Russophile orientation, considering that simultaneous loyalty to the Russian Empire and the Ukraine was a *contradictio in adjecto*; either loyalty excluded and negated the other. Yet, with the pronouncement of "Official Nationality" as an ideological basis for the Russian Empire during the reign of Nicholas I, the days were coming to a close when the Ukrainian upper class could still regard, as it had before, the Russian Empire as a family of nations in which Ukrainian as well as the imperial aspirations might be satisfied. To this fateful dilemma, Shevchenko counterposed his own answer, full of defiant might and vehement determination, shocking even some of his contemporary friends. In his "Testament" he declared:

Oh bury me, then rise ye up
And break your heavy chains
And water with the tyrants' blood
The freedom you have gained.
And in the great new family,
The family of the free,
With softly spoken, kindly word
Remember also me.\(^6\)

Mykola Kostomarov, in his "Remembrance about Two Painters," written in the year of Shevchenko's death, recorded:

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 183.
Taras Hryhorovych read me his unpublished verses. I was scared... I saw that Shevchenko's muse tore the curtain away from people's lives. It was frightening and sweet, painful and delightful to look inside. Taras's muse broke some dam... It will be easy to enter into this subterranean cave after fresh air fills it... Pity, the bold poet! He forgets that he is the only a human being.\(^{57}\)

Who knows? — perhaps what instinctively frightened Kostomarov was the fact that Shevchenko's poetry awakened in his mind an inkling that an idyllic vision of the Russian Empire as a cofraternity of nations was over. Hence, if the national identity of the Ukrainian people was to be preserved and enhanced, a bitter, fateful struggle loomed as preordained and inevitable. Count Orlov, the chief of the secret police who interrogated Shevchenko during his arrest, proved on one point to be a more competent Shevchenkologist than some Ukrainian ones when, in his report to Nicholas I, he reached the following conclusion:

... By the help of these popular poems ideas may be sown which will strike roots — ideas that the time of Hetmanshchyna [the autonomous Ukrainian Cossack order abolished by Catherine II in 1781] was a fortunate period, that its possible return would be a restoration to happiness, that the Ukraine eventually may exist as an independent state.\(^{58}\)

Once Shevchenko's poetic intuition whispered to him the idea of an independent Ukraine, the same intuition had to define his attitude toward the instrument of achieving it — political power. There are numerous pronouncements on this point in Shevchenko's poetry. But probably in no other case is it so difficult to translate his poetic images, allegories, and metaphors into a more concrete and plain language. This is, no doubt, an important topic in itself, and only after an extensive and painstaking research can a more conclusive answer be given. Here, tentatively, the following may be said: on the point of political power Shevchenko experienced a noticeable ambiguity. On the one hand, his puritanical passion for truth and social justice compelled him to approach political power with suspicion.\(^{59}\) But this

\(^{57}\) Quoted in Mykhailo Vozniak, Kyrylo-Metodiivs'ke Bratstvo (Lviv, 1921), p. 129 ff.

\(^{58}\) Ibid., p. 4.

\(^{59}\) As a momentous and prolific illustration of such an attitude, two of his very short verses, "The Prophet" and "Owls," can be considered; see T. Shevchenko, The Poetical Works, op. cit., p. 382 ff. Similar examples can be extended by reference to his other poems. An even more emphatic pronouncement can be referred to — not in poetry but in conversation — quoted in la. Polons'kyi, Spohady pro Shevchenka. Polonskyi writes: "I
ambiguity toward political power retreated fully when the independence of the Ukraine or the liberation of oppressed people were at stake. In such cases, his attitude toward political power was an unreservedly positive one. He realized as no other Ukrainian before or long after him that the Ukrainian people, in their fateful and decisive struggle for their own freedom, could not ignore the instrument of political power. The “Poslaniie-Epistle” clearly stated that “one’s own truth is one’s own house” could be achieved only when in “one’s own house” also “one’s own power and freedom” would be present.\(^6\) As a further confirmation of Shevchenko’s intuitive affirmative attitude toward political authority, we ought to consider his often expressed longings for times when *panuvala Ukraina*— when “the Ukraine dominated.” His expressions, figurative as they may be, when put into the context of his entire political philosophy are to be interpreted as saying that he had no aversion to political power, granted it was a national power harnessed into the creation of social justice as well as the protection of human dignity in its own country.

There is a need to deal with Shevchenko’s attitude on this point because the majority of the commentators on the “Poslaniie-Epistle” considered it to be almost nothing else but the reflection and poetic incarnation of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood’s ideology. The direct embodiment of the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood’s political doctrines are the *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People*. The latter undoubtedly look upon political power, at its best, as a residue of human atavism which is predestined essentially to fade completely with the victory of Christian fraternity and Panslavic solidarity, and, at its worst, as a source of the moral depravity of man and society. The plans of the Panslavic Federation proposed by the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood disregarded the ethnic-national principle as the federation’s basis. Within the proposed Slavic Federation, the

\(^6\) Vozniak, op. cit., p. 83 ff.

remember that once at a soirée at Bilozerskyi’s, the editor of the journal *Osnova*, Shevchenko supported the idea of a visiting Slav from Galicia that any politics was amoral, that it was because of political consideration that all kinds of injustice had always been committed and that from them all the misfortunes of nations and peoples were derived and that it would have been best for a state, therefore, to have no politics at all.” Quoted in G. Y. Shevelov, “The year 1860 in Shevchenko’s Work,” *Taras Ševčenko, 1814-1861: A Symposium*, op. cit., p. 95. The recollection of Polons’kyi may raise a doubt as to whether he rendered Shevchenko’s opinion correctly. Shevchenko was too aware of the fact that state and politics are inseparable. Another matter would be to demand the abolition of the state as such; by itself a utopian idea, yet the basic precept of the anarchist doctrine.
Ukraine was to be divided into two federal political entities, or two federal states: the northern and the southern.61

Shevchenko constantly saw the Ukraine as one political unit, though, because of his poetic form of expression it would be futile to attempt to establish on this basis his image of the territorial dimensions of the Ukraine. And, although in his poetry there are to be found references—not numerous—to Panslavic solidarity, the latter did not prevent him from condemning unconditionally the Russophile orientation. As Iulian Okhrymovych rightly observed, Shevchenko, for the sake of the idea of the independence of the Ukraine, forgave the *hetmans* their aristocraticism; on the other hand, for the sake of democracy, he would not forgive his contemporaries Russophilism.62 The differences on these issues indicate that his political views deviated from those of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. Thus, Shevchenko, like Burke, though not insensitive to the currents of his age, developed his convictions independently and often in advance of the time and views of those who supposedly influenced him.

Viacheslav Lypynsky, who was mentioned in this essay as the founder of Ukrainian conservative ideology and whose idea of nation was closer to Burke’s notion than that of Shevchenko, summed up succinctly and masterfully the role of Shevchenko in the national revival of the Ukrainian people when he said:

Let us not forget that the great peasant son, Shevchenko, received all his spiritual culture and national consciousness not from the peasantry but from the Ukrainian “repentant nobility.” And that his greatness and genius manifested themselves in the fact that he replaced the impotency and tearfulness of the “repentant nobility” that suffuse the Ukrainian national world view with his elemental force and energy.63

In closing, I cannot help remarking that the tragedy of Shevchenko’s political heritage as well as the tragedy of the Ukraine lies in the fact that the realization of this forceful national ideology had passed on to a no less lacrimose and “repentant” Ukrainian intelligentsia.

61 Ibid., p. 33 ff.
A comparison of the Nazi occupation policy in the areas of Slovenia and Western Ukraine (the "District of Galicia"), is justifiable on several accounts. First of all, both areas are relatively small in size and population, both are mainly Slavic in nature, and both have experienced long-term German cultural influences dating back to the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, of which they were a part until 1918. Also, it may be observed that in both of these areas a small but well organized and relatively prosperous German minority resided that was referred to by various Pan-Germanic groups as the outpost of German colonization schemes in the East.

1 The designation "Western Ukraine" may be used in a broad sense and also in a narrower sense. In broad terms, it primarily applied to those territories which the Soviet Union incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine in the fall of 1939, following the outbreak of the German-Polish War on September 1, 1939. These territories were inhabited by a population that in the majority represented Ukrainians, and they consisted of Eastern Galicia, and Western Volhynia. The USSR accepted the Polish possession of these territories in the Peace Treaty of Riga (1921) following the Polish-Soviet War of 1920. On September 17, 1939, the Soviet Government, insisting that the Polish State had ceased to exist, claimed these territories back referring to them as "Western Ukraine."

In a narrower sense, the term "Western Ukraine" applied to Eastern Galicia, which, between the years 1772 and 1918, belonged to Austria, and which on November 1, 1918, proclaimed her independence as the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. After a short Polish-Ukrainian war, Poland had effectively occupied Galicia by June 1919, and, with the exception of a short period of Soviet occupation of this territory in 1920, Poland exercised jurisdiction over Eastern Galicia till September 1939 (an area of 55.7 thousand square kilometers and 5.4 million people, according to the census of Dec. 9, 1931).

In this article, the designation "Western Ukraine" is used in the narrow sense, interchangeably with the name "Eastern Galicia" and "District Galicia," which was the official name for this area under the German occupation from August 1941 to July 1944.

2 Concerning Pan-Germanic ideas among the Germans in Galicia, see the article: "Das Deutschum in Galizien" in Deutsche Arbeit (Monatsschrift für Galizien und Bukowina), Vol 13, No. 7 (April, 1917), p. 451 (in German Foreign Office, Bonn, Abt. A, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes; Österreich, 94, Bd. 24, No.133684). Also, see a report of the German Consulate in Lwow (Lemberg), dated Aug. 4, 1916, concerning
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In Slovenia, which borders on the German-speaking territory of Austria, these claims even took the form of many ethnic confrontations, and tensions between the members of the Slovenian intelligentsia and the representatives of the German minority there, particularly during the last stage of the existence of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and during the period between the two world wars. In Galicia, such tensions arose occasionally between the German minority and the politically dominant Polish element. On the other hand, the Ukrainian-German relations in Galicia seemed to be "correct," and even friendly, as both nationalities frequently found themselves allied in legal actions against some encroachment of the Polish administration on behalf of their cultural rights.

At the time of Hitler's preparations for an eastward expansion, neither area figured as an official German irredenta, and their inclusion in the early Nazi Lebensraum schemes was by no means certain. It is known that the Nazi planners considered the Balkan Peninsula (to which the Germans referred as "South-Eastern Europe") an unsuitable region for a large-scale rural Germanic colonization, because of its predominantly mountainous terrain and arid land. Besides, the vicinity of the Balkan states to the Italian sphere of influence made the German annexationist policy in this direction inadvisable, as long as Italy remained a major ally of the Third Reich.

Within this context, Hitler's claim that his conquest and dismemberment of the Yugoslav State in April 1941 was not planned but induced by the sudden challenges of Balkan power politics was probably sincere. Still, we may wonder if, even under the "Stimmung des Deutschtums in Galizien" (Feelings for Germandom in Galicia), Ibid., No. C1911. Concerning Pan-Germanic ideas among Germans in Slovenia, see Helmut Carstanjen, Die Untersteiermark: Eine politische Aufgabe an der Südostgrenze des Grossdeutschen Reiches (Marburg, Steirischer Heimatbund, Führungsamt II und Reichspropagandaamt Steiermark, N. D. (Only for Official Use), pp. 7-10, and Dušan Biber, Nacizem in Němci v Jugoslaviji, 1933-1941 (National Socialism and the Germans in Yugoslavia, 1933-1941) (Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Založba, 1966). Also: Dušan Biber, "Die jugoslawisch-deutschen Beziehungen von 1933 bis 1941," Sonderdruck aus dem Internationalen Jahrbuch für Geschichts-Unterricht, Band 9/1963/64 — Deutschland — Jugoslawien (Braunschweig: Albert Limbach Verlag, 1965), pp. 88-89.

3 Doc. "Führer, No. 36". Record of the Conversation between the Führer and the Croatian Leader of State, Dr. Pavelić, on June 7, 1941. Documents on German Foreign Policy, June, 1941 (4691/46809-19) in the Archives of the Institute of Narodnogo Gibanja, in Ljubljana. Hereafter, the Archives will be referred to as I. N. G. L.
circumstances of friendly relations with the Third Reich, Yugoslavia would have been in a position to keep its Slovenian territory intact had Hitler won World War II. The activities of the Foreign Bureau of the NSDAP and of the German organizations affiliated with it were so intensive in Slovenia, even before the outbreak of the war, and they were so determined to assume the leadership over the German minority there that some German territorial claims on behalf of at least parts of Slovenia appeared likely.4

Unlike Slovenia, the Western Ukraine was located more strategically within the main path of the Nazi expansion in Eastern Europe, and it is difficult to imagine how this area could have escaped the fate of becoming a part of the German Lebensraum, should the German war plans ultimately have been realized. However, in the early stages of the German eastward expansion, the status of the Western Ukraine was ambiguous, and it changed frequently. This was partially due to the fact that in planning their march eastward, the Nazi leaders anticipated all kinds of international complications and were looking for possible temporary allies from various quarters.

Alfred Rosenberg, who referred to the Western Ukraine as the Piedmont of the Ukrainian movement for independence, suggested as early as 1926 the creation of an independent Ukrainian state allied with Germany, which would act as a counterbalance to the Poles and the Russians during the German expansion eastward.5 In 1933, when the National Socialist Party came to power, Rosenberg, then Director of the Foreign Relations Bureau of the Party, felt compelled to reconsider the German potential allies in Eastern Europe. Facing the possibility of a preventive war against Nazi Germany by Poland and the Polish Western European allies, he suggested appeasing the Poles by making them, rather than the Ukrainians, partners in the Nazis' eastward expansion. The new German orientation not only implied leaving the Western Ukrainians to their fate, but also it suggested a support for the implementation of the political ambitions of the Poles in the Soviet Ukraine, should they decide to join the Nazis' anti-Soviet

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5 Alfred Rosenberg, Der Zukunftsweg einer deutschen Aussenpolitik (Munich, 1927).
Some concrete measures to gain over Poland to this design were taken in 1934, 1935, 1938, and the beginning of 1939, and they had the obvious endorsement of Hitler. But outside of the normalization of Polish-German relations following the Polish-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1934, such designs proved to be unsuccessful. The Polish government was highly sceptical about the final outcome of such a partnership. With the failure to win over Poland, as well as the opposition of Britain and France to the Lebensraum designs, Hitler decided to advance his eastward expansion by making a deal with Stalin, this time at the expense of Polish and Western Ukrainian national interests.

The fourth scheme of the Lebensraum order and potential alliances emerged when the Polish ethnographic territory was already in German possession and when Western Ukraine and Belorussia had become parts of the Soviet Union. Rosenberg was entrusted by Hitler in the spring of 1941 to prepare the political and administrative guidelines for the new territories to be seized from the Soviet Union in the pending action, “Barbarossa.” The scheme which he suggested opened up Poland, the Baltic States, and the Great Russian territory in Europe to the Nazis’ colonization plans and Germanization designs. At the same time, he recommended the creation of a Ukrainian State controlled by the Germans, which, together with the anticipated Northern Caucasian Federation, would help, for the time being, to consolidate the Nazi conquests in Eastern Europe. Rosenberg considered such concessions to some Eastern European nations as limited and temporary in nature, which by no means would make them exempt from the claims of the German Lebensraum aspirations when the previously mentioned territories would be settled. It took Hitler almost a month after invading the Soviet Union to take a stand on Rosenberg’s proposals. Elated by the initial successes of the Eastern campaign, Hitler outlined the guidelines of the German policy in the occupied parts of the USSR, which was void of political concessions to any nationality within the Soviet multi-national empire. In a conference on July 17, 1941, with Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel, and Goering, he rejected, among others, the idea of a Ukrainian State, while he specifically earmarked two territories which Rosenberg had

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planned to include within the Ukrainian state as areas of early German colonization: "The Crimea must be cleared of all foreigners and settled by Germans. In the same way, the old-Austrian Galicia must become a *Reichsgebiet.*"

Some months earlier, in April 1941, after occupying Yugoslavia, Hitler made a similar arrangement for Germanization of that part of Slovenia that was to become within a short span of time an integral part of the "Third Reich." More specific than in the case of Galicia, Hitler assigned a time table to the Gauleiter of Styria, within which not only was occupied Slovenia to become an integral part of this German province, but also all vestiges of non-German culture had to disappear and the majority of the inhabitants had to be assimilated as a part of the German national community.

In both cases, the anticipated Germanization of Galicia and occupied Slovenia was linked with symbols of the former Austrian rule, probably in order not only to emphasize the historical continuity and the German historical claims to these areas, but also to rekindle the dormant sympathies of the local population for more relaxed Austrian times and to gain more voluntary cooperation. Thus, the annexed parts of Slovenia were linked with the former Austrian provinces of Styria and Carinthia, and the created District of Galicia was intended to evoke the Crownland of Galicia under the Habsburg Dynasty. Within these trappings, however, the merciless objectives of the *Lebensraum* policy were on their way to realization.

As in other Nazi occupied portions of Europe that were earmarked as *Lebensraum*, the two particular areas under consideration were under the two major authorities insofar as the "Germanization" procedures were concerned, namely, those of Heinrich Himmler and the German civilian administration. Himmler's authority in colonization and Germanization policies emanated from the Fuehrer's decree calling into existence the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of...
Germadom in the fall of 1939, of which Himmler became the first Commissioner, and of which he remained the chief supervisor till the end of the Third Reich. In combination with his control over the German police and the SS Organization, he built some new parallel organizations, such as the Race and Settlement Office and the Lebensborn Organization ("Well of Life"), and he infiltrated some party and governmental agencies with his SS men, like the SD (Security Service) and the Ostministerium, all of which helped him to gain the preponderance of power in the areas earmarked for the Nazi Lebensraum. However, the Nazi civilian administrators, like Hans Frank, Governor-General of the Generalgouvernement, Waechter, Governor of the District of Galicia, Uiberreither, Gauleiter of Styria, and Rainer, Gauleiter of Carinthia, were entrusted with many similar tasks similar to those of Himmler, which occasionally led to an overlapping of efforts and conflicts arising from different primary concerns and responsibilities. Himmler's establishment was more concerned with the controlled disruption of political, social, and economic patterns, so as to pave the way for building a new Nazi society in the East in the future. The administrators were held responsible, to a much greater degree, for the economic productivity of the territory under their jurisdiction, which was unfavorably affected by Himmler's measures of deportation, extermination, and other Lebensraum measures.

This dual set of authorities further provided a fertile soil for personal rivalries and a competition among the authorities and personalities involved. Also, as objectives often were contradictory in nature, they could not be carried out efficiently. However, the Nazi Party discipline and the overpowering ideological objectives provided sufficient common denominators for action, and the ideological considerations, though sometimes delayed and watered down, had a tendency to take precedence.

9 Documents of the International Military Tribunal (henceforth: I. M. T., Doc.), No-4059. Also, Joseph Ackermann, Heinrich Himmler als Ideologe (Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1970), pp. 195-231. The subsequent I. M. T. documents cited without a particular volume number refer to the German documents and affidavits prepared for various Nuremberg trials but not actually included in the published Trial volumes. The author used them in one of the US Document Depositories, the Mid-West Inter-University Library, where they were identified only by the general code markings of the Nuremberg documents.
COLONIAL SETTLEMENT AND GERMANIZATION POLICY IN SLOVENIA AND THE DISTRICT OF GALICIA

Even though it is obvious that German-occupied Slovenia and Galicia were earmarked as primary German colonization areas at approximately the same time (in the spring and summer of 1941 respectively) and that some rudimentary German settlement took place in both of them, we cannot fail to observe some significant differences in the methods and timing.

In the case of those parts of Slovenia that were to be incorporated into the Third Reich, there was an open frontal attack on the identity of the Slovenian people. Assuming that the size of the Slovenian population under German control was manageable and that a divided Slovenia would be in no position to offer serious resistance and could not count on immediate support from their neighbors, Hitler took for granted that the majority of the Slovenians would passively accept the prospects of Germanization in the German-annexed areas and that they would reconcile themselves to the deportation of the Slovenian intelligentsia and other "undesirable" elements. Further, there was a wide-spread belief among the Germans in Styria and Carinthia that the average Slovenian, or "Wend," as they referred to him, was not nationally conscious, while he had been permeated by German culture through centuries and that, consequently, he would consider it as natural and even flattering to be admitted to a neighborly dominant nation. Apparently operating on the assumption that about two-thirds of the Slovenians in Lower Styria and Southern Carinthia would be integrated into the German nation,10 more or less peaceably and inconspicuously and not wishing to create antagonism by treating harshly some of their "kinsmen" whom they might find unacceptable for assimilation purposes, they decided upon a compromise solution.

10 Already in April, 1941, the Nazi authorities estimated that 220,000 to 250,000 inhabitants of the German occupied part of Slovenia would be deported eastwards as "unsuitable" for Germanization, either on racial grounds or on a political basis. Research paper of Dr. Tone Ferenc, Director of the Institute of Narodnogo Gibanja, Ljubljana, "The Mass-Resettlement of the Population in Yugoslavia during the Second World War and the Unsuccessful Plan of Slovenes in Poland," p. 12. The paper was presented during an international symposium on the German Resettlement Policy during World War II, in Lublin, Poland, Fall 1972. Available at INGL. See also: German Document, "Richtlinien für die Aussiedlung fremdvölkischer Elemente in dem Gebiet der Südsteiermark," Marburg, April 18, 1941, in Archives of I. N. G. L.).
Instead of executing them or sending them to extermination camps, the most severe measures they took against members of the Slovenian intelligentsia or other persons declared racially unacceptable or politically unreliable, consisted only of a confiscation of property and of their deportation to Serbia or Croatia. When, later on, Serbia and Croatia became inaccessible for purposes of deportation, the bulk of Slovenians deemed ineligible for assimilation were left in their places of habitation. Members of the Slovenian intelligentsia and those labelled as “nationalistic Slovenes” were deported to the Old Reich to be placed either in labor camps or re-education camps.  

Yet even though unprovoked physical destruction or biological weakening of the Slovenian nation were not widely practiced under the German occupation, the Nazi authorities did not rely on a spontaneous or gradual Germanization of the “Wends.” The Slovenian population in these areas was notified that unless they applied for admission to a Styrian or Carinthian Folk Association respectively and were actually admitted, and unless they mastered the German language within the next five years, they would lose their jobs, and their property, and would face deportation. This warning was accompanied by a wholesale onslaught on the Slovenian language, culture, and institutions, regardless of their political, educational, cultural, economic, or professional nature.

The steps that followed aimed at destroying the vestiges of Slovenian cultural identity by removing Slovenian inscriptions from the public places, by turning Slovenian town and village names into German names, by confiscating Slovenian publications, by dissolving all Slovenian organizations, and by destroying the entire Slovenian educational system.

The most essential device for the Germanization of the indigenous

11 Dr. Ferenc, op. cit., p. 25. He mentions that 300 nationally conscious Slovenian families were deported to the Old Reich for Germanization.
population was seen by Nazi leaders in the planned massive German public school system designed for Slovenian children and adolescents up to the age of eighteen, as well as in evening courses for the adult Slovenian population. The Germanization, combined with ideological indoctrination, was expected to begin as soon as possible, along with a massive enlistment of Slovenian youth aged ten to eighteen into the Nazi-sponsored German Youth Organization, the Deutsche Jugend.¹⁴

In the District of Galicia, such direct Germanization methods were not applied. The reason for this different treatment lay, first of all, in the German lack of interest in the assimilation of the majority of the population, combined with a desire to avoid a unified resistance of the nationalities in Galicia that were much larger here than in Slovenia.¹⁵


¹⁵ There is little doubt that the Nazi leaders, in pursuing their idea of the destruction of the nations living in the area claimed by them as the Lebensraum, wanted to avoid a mass resistance of a scope they would not be able to control during the war. In this connection, the size of a nation or the possibility of solidarity and cooperation among the threatened Lebensraum nations were factors that determined how far the Lebensraum policy should be applied.

It seems obvious that the absence of the Nazis’ frontal assault on Ukrainians as a nation was partially determined by their number. Even though only about 3.5 million Ukrainians lived in the “District of Galicia,” they represented only 10% of the Ukrainians surrounding Galicia, and, as the activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army have indicated, the artificial borders drawn by the Nazi leaders to split the Ukrainian people, proved of little avail to stop a coordinated resistance. Also, in spite of the traditional antagonism between Poles and Ukrainians, there existed a possibility of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation against the Germans, and it is known that several attempts, however unsuccessful, were made by the Polish and Ukrainian underground leaders to cooperate. The Nazi leaders had no intention of promoting the chances of such an alliance by pushing their “living space” policy to an extreme.

On the other hand, with only 800,000 Slovenians in Lower Styria and Krain, and hardly more Slovenians living under the Italian and Hungarian occupation, the wholesale Germanization and deportation policy in this area appeared feasible to Hitler and his lieutenants. The Nazi restraints, whenever they entered the picture, were dictated by the limitations of power politics rather than by moral principles or norms of international law. This is reflected, among other sources, in a political evaluation of the “New Order” in the East by a German University Professor in Poland, P. W. Thompson, dated October 19, 1942, I. M. T. Doc. 303-P. S.
Nevertheless, even in the SS-Organization plans concerning the resettlement of 85% of Poles and 65% of Ukrainians to Western Siberia after the war, some portions of the non-German population in the District of Galicia were to be absorbed into the ranks of the “master race.”

The figures on the planned deportation of certain nationalities were not revealing in regard to how certain regions inhabited by a given nationality would be affected by it. Himmler, for example (while going through the “General Plan East” submitted to him on June 2, 1942), commented that the Germanization of the Generalgouvernement and Lithuania would have to be connected with the deportation of the entire population inhabiting this area.

The deportations, in the SS terminology, however, had various meanings. Thus, a reference to the “resettlement of Jews further East for working purposes” actually was a coded expression for the annihilation of the Jewish population. “Deportation” also could mean the transfer of the unwanted population to the “dumping areas” that were the big reservations for cheap and primitive labor. Finally, it could mean that those segments of a foreign population viewed by the Nazis as suitable for Germanization were earmarked for deportation to the Old Reich or to some other German colonization areas, where, it was believed, their Germanization would be more effective and reliable with their traditional roots and environment being cut off. There are some indications that all three of these meanings of “deportation” were considered or tried out in the Nazis' treatment of the local population in the District of Galicia. Thus, a policy of deliberate physical destruction or indirect measures toward this end, known in the Nazi terminology as “biological weakening” of certain nationalities, played a prominent role in the Nazi policy in Galicia. This was due also to the fact that Galicia, unlike Slovenia, had a large

17 “General Plan Ost” was prepared under the direction of Professor Meyer-Metling, who was working on rural planning at the University of Berlin and in the Planungs-und Zentralbodenamt des Stabshauptamtes, a subdivision of the RKFDV (Reich Commission for the Strengthening of Gernandom) that provided practical proposals for German colonization of Eastern Europe, including the extent of the deportation of the local population.
Jewish minority, and its liquidation on the initiative of the SS Organization had already started during the late summer of 1941. The physical reduction of the Ukrainians and Poles was less massive in scale and less direct than that of the Jews, although it passed through some similar stages. This policy first took such forms as severe restrictions on food supplies, medical and sanitary facilities, freedom of movement, transfer of food from food surplus areas to food deficiency areas, and a hampering of relief actions in case of an outbreak of diseases, epidemics, and natural disasters. Some individuals marked as leadership types or as political activists were sent to concentration camps or were executed. This affected especially persons from the circles of the intelligentsia, under the pretext that they were extreme nationalists or communists. Further, the Nazi authorities, in the spirit of instructions issued by Himmler, tried to take advantage of the multi-national composition of the population of Galicia by playing up one national group against the other, thus providing opportunities for a mutual decimation among them. While the attempts to entice the Poles and Ukrainians to pogroms against the Jews in Galicia proved to be largely disappointing according to the German Secret Service reports, the feuds between the Polish and Ukrainian underground movements produced a higher number of Polish and Ukrainian casualties, particularly during the years 1943 and 1944.

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19 According to the Polish census of December 9, 1931, the Jewish population in Galicia amounted to 1.4 million, representing 9.8% of the total population number there.

20 I. M. T. Doc. 303-PS. Among others, the urban policy in the Generalgouvernement was affected by the Nazis’ undernourishment policy. According to Heinz von Streng, the average daily caloric intake amounted to 814 in the cities of the Generalgouvernement. See his work Die Landwirtschaft im Generalgouvernement (Tübingen: Institut für Besatzungsfragen, 1955), p. 8. Von Streng refers here to the period from Sept 1, 1940, to September 1, 1943. On the Nazis’ food restriction policy, consult also Ihor Kamenetsky, Hitler’s Occupation of Ukraine (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957), pp. 40-41.

21 “Himmler’s Reflections on the Treatment of the Peoples of Alien Races in the East” (a blueprint that became the basis for the SS policy in Eastern Europe), I. M. T. Doc. No. 1880.


23 Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), pp. 202 and 204. The attitude of the majority of the Aryan population in the District of Galicia (as in the neighboring “Reichskommissariat Ukraine”) towards the Nazis’ mass extermination of the Jews was a passive one (Hilberg, op. cit., pp. 202-03), which during the first two years of the German occupation reflected the general
when the underground activities in Galicia picked up strength.24

The method of "biological weakening" also included forced labor in Germany. Ukrainians and Poles from the District of Galicia, together with other workers from the Generalgouvernement, were treated similarly as the Ostarbeiter (Eastern Workers), mostly in a brutal fashion. They were exposed to hazardous jobs,25 kept undernourished, socially humiliated, and severely restricted in their freedom of movement.26 Besides the obvious debilitating effect which such treatment had on the individuals involved, this policy was expected to cut down the birth rate of the nationalities involved, by a separation of the sexes, by a prohibition of marriage, and by forced abortions in case of female workers.27

situation of the relations among the three major ethnic groups, the Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, in the District of Galicia. This circumstance, as Hilberg observes correctly, favored, on balance, the Nazi executioners. It must be added also that Galicia, like the other occupied Eastern territories was under a terrorist totalitarian control, and the Nazi authorities officially threatened those who helped Jews to hide or escape with a summary execution. Direct cooperation with the Nazi authorities in actions against the Jews was rare and practised mostly by some marginal, opportunistic segments of society. Among them were those who volunteered to join the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and then were ordered to participate in the execution of the Jews, or those (both Ukrainians and Poles) who volunteered for various agencies of the German Police (See Pan’kivs’kyj, op. cit., pp. 400-407).

On the other hand, there were also cases of aid to Jews by the non-Jewish population. The most open defiance against an incitement of the Ukrainian population to pogroms was voiced by the Metropolitan of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Galicia, Andrei Sheptyts’kyi, in his pastoral letter to the clergy and the faithful. Also, he wrote a protest letter to Himmler condemning the Nazi authorities for their use of the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police for the execution of the Jews, and he secretly advised the church authorities under his jurisdiction to help Jews to find hiding places or to escape wherever possible. John A. Armstrong, Ukrainian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 2nd ed., p. 173. Also, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine after World War II (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964), pp. 402-404. Certain branches of the Ukrainian and Polish Central Aid Committee in Galicia provided coordinated aid to the imprisoned Jews. Bilinsky, op. cit., p. 404.

The roots of the Ukrainian-Polish violent conflict in Galicia in the years 1943 to 1944 must be traced to causes deeper than just a divisive German or Soviet policy. It is interesting that these bloody feuds became significant and widespread at the time when the German withdrawal from Ukraine became imminent. In essence, they reflected the inability of the Polish and Ukrainian undergrounds to agree whether Galicia (and also Western Volhynia and Polissia) should belong to the Polish or the Ukrainian independent state. It is true, however, that the nature of the Nazi occupation policy helped to lower the moral standards and that the decline of humanitarian considerations influenced the methods used by the Polish and the Ukrainian partisans.

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27 I. M. T., Doc. no. 1803.
It is true that the condition of the Ukrainian workers from Galicia eventually was somewhat improved, because of the intervention of the Ukrainian Central Committee in the Generalgouvernement, but this was merely a salvage effort during the last years of the German war struggle, which by itself does not represent a basic change of German policy.28

The biological reduction measures and the nature of the planned large-scale resettlement schemes suggest that only a small portion of the population in the District of Galicia was expected to join "Germandom." This may be deduced from the methods and criteria of assimilation used, as well as from some quantitative data applicable to the Generalgouvernement, in particular to the District of Galicia. The most direct method used for inducing the people to join "Germandom" was, in most cases, the individualized process of asking them to register voluntarily as ethnic Germans on the Volksliste.29 Acceptance into the ranks of ethnic Germans was based on successful passage through the appropriate commission, in which an established proof of blood relations to some German ancestors or good racial characteristics were prerequisites. The success of the office responsible for this procedure was a very modest one. Between the summer of 1941 and August 1943, only 11,500 persons registered as ethnic Germans,30 which is not an impressive number if we consider that the Poles and Ukrainians combined amounted approximately to five million people.31 The small number of persons registered on the Volksliste seems to be the result of the lack of interest of those to whom the options were open rather than to a tough screening method on the part of the Commission. It must be emphasized in this connection that amidst the feelings of an intense nationalism that was permeating the Ukrainian and Polish population at this time, to change one's nationality by becoming an ethnic German (Volksdeutscher) carried with it a considerable social ostracism. When the underground

29 Himmler's File, Folder 57, Drawer 401, in Hoover Institution. See also: Pan'kivs'kyi, op. cit., pp. 404-07.
30 Koehl, op. cit., p. 189.
activities became intensified and widespread in Galicia, ethnic Germans were exposed to all kinds of retributions, including the death penalty, if they were perceived to be renegades or "Nazi collaborators."

This cool behavior of the population is interesting, however, if we consider that the status of ethnic Germans upon registration was combined with many advantages. It meant generous German rationing cards, access to special stores and restaurants, preferential jobs, and, in general, more protection from the abusive powers of the German police, including possible deportation to forced labor camps in Germany. Even though the number of those registered as ethnic Germans more than tripled between August 1943 and March 1944 in Galicia, which reflected a certain eagerness of those involved to get safer and faster transfers westward as Galicia was becoming increasingly affected by a treacherous guerilla warfare and also was coming within closer reach of the "liberating" Red Army, still only a relatively insignificant fraction of the population submitted to the open devices of Germanization.32

Besides these individualized procedures of Germanization based on voluntary options by those interested, the Nazis also used some indirect and unpublicized methods for Germanization which they applied to select groups among the Ukrainian and Polish population. The earliest attempts of this kind were applied to Ukrainians from Galicia after the defeat of Poland, following the September 1939 military campaign. Many Ukrainian POW's had fallen into German hands, and the German authorities thought it advisable to screen some of them in regard to their racial qualities for possible Germanization. They applied this screening procedure with some practical objectives, by training them as skilled workers in those areas of the German economy where there was a need for them. The procedure applied to Ukrainian civilian workers from the Generalgouvernement as well.33 During the time of the existence of the District of Galicia, the selection was limited to the Transit Camp of the German Labor Office (the

32 Waechter, Governor of the District of Galicia and SS-Brigadeführer and Reichsführer of the SS, Oct. 20, 1943. Himmler's File, Box No. 10, Folder 31. Also, the letter from the Reichsstatthalter im Reichsgau Wartheland to Reichsführer SS, February 23, 1944, Himmler's File, orange Folder, Drawer # 8, Folder No. 319. See also in the same folder the statistics in "Die Aufgliederung der in Galizien und Lublin befindlichen Deutschen," pp. 58-61. All of the above mentioned sources are located in the Hoover Institution.

33 I. M. T. Doc., No-1600, p. 13.
Arbeitsamt in Lviv). Himmler issued a further directive for a racial screening of the Polish leadership elite, applicable also to the leaders of the Polish resistance captured by the German police. According to this directive, it was worthwhile and possible to convert to "Germandom" first of all those individuals who indicated good racial qualities, as this would strengthen the Germanic race by enriching it with leadership qualities. Secondly, the Third Reich had much more to offer to individuals with such qualities than the inferior races of the East, and a conversion would be eagerly accepted by the individuals involved. Thirdly, it would help to weaken the resistance, as these individuals otherwise might be drawn to the resistance movement.

There was a parallel order in the directives of Himmler concerning the deportation of the Slovenian intelligentsia (mostly educators, the clergy, and community leaders). For similar reasons, they were to be subjected to racial investigations, and then racially acceptable individuals were to be sent for Germanization to the Old Reich.

In relation to the Ukrainian population in Galicia, the most massive indirect attempt of Himmler and his establishment to deprive this district of its potential future leadership occurred in the spring of 1943, with the creation of the SS-Division Galicia. These combat forces were formally presented to the Ukrainians as a voluntary unit that was supposed to bolster the defenses against Soviet Russia in the East and that was to help Ukrainians to secure "their proper place" in Hitler's "New Europe." For Himmler and his associates in the leadership of the SS Organization, the SS-Division Galicia, besides its anticipated military value, represented an opportunity to extract from an ethnic group those believed to be the better racially qualified persons with superior leadership characteristics, who sooner or later were supposed to be deported from Galicia. Thus, insofar as Himmler was concerned, no political concessions were or should be forthcoming to Ukrainians as a result of this project. The cultural concessions in this military unit, such as a partial use of the Ukrainian language, the availability of Ukrainian military chaplains, and provisions for Ukrainian

34 I. M. T. Doc., 221-L.
35 National Archives, Washington, D. C., Document RVD/13. Hereafter, the Abbreviation N. A. W. will be used for the National Archives.
36 Der Reichsführer der SS, Reichskommissar für die Festigung des deutschen Volkstums K6/3b2/ Berlin, July 7, 1941, "Richtlinien für die Aussiedlung fremdvölkischer Elemente aus Südkärnten," located in I. N. G. L.
recreational programs, were to be kept to a minimum and were not considered to last in the long run. The Governor of the District of Galicia, Dr. Waechter, and a small group of young SS officers within SS headquarters were in favor of changing Hitler's ruthless policy toward the non-Russian nationalities in the USSR, hoping that the inclusion of some Eastern European nationalities in the SS combat units might contribute to such a change, but, in actuality, no such change in policy did occur.

Within this context it is safe to assume that the SS Organization viewed the SS-Division Galicia as a potential part of the Germanic elite forces of the future SS State, rather than as a political concession to Ukrainian rights for national self-determination. If we follow the logic of the Nazis' Germanization plans, we see that, in essence, this Division offered another opportunity for the assimilation of Ukrainians serving within its ranks, and possibly also for the members of their families.


38 One of the interesting pieces of evidence indicating that the creation of the SS-Division Galicia did not enter the level of political schemes, insofar as the top leadership was concerned, is Hitler's surprise expressed on March 23, 1945, concerning the fact that the SS-Division Galicia existed at all. He considered its existence politically and militarily inexpedient and ordered Himmler to disarm it, which the latter tried to do. This incident at the very last stage of war reconfirms a notion that the creation of this Division had no bearing on Hitler's plans concerning Galicia and that there were no plans submitted to him in connection with the creation of such a combat unit with the intention to liberalize his view on behalf of the Ukrainian self-government. H. Stein, Hitler's Elite Guard at War, 1939-1945: The Waffen-SS (Ithaca, N. Y., 1966), pp. 185-87. John Toland, The Last 100 Days (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 272. Wolf-Dietrich Heike, Ukrains'ka Dyviziia "Halychnyna": Istoriia sformuvannia i boiovykh dii u 1943-45 rokakh (Toronto: Brotherhood of Former Soldiers of the 1st Ukrainian Division UNA, 1970. Zapysky Naukovoho Tovarystva im. Shevchenka, Vol. 188), pp. 169-77.

Finally, it must be added that the Ukrainian promoters of this military unit did not count primarily on Hitler's political concessions in return for military assistance. After Hitler's defeat at Stalingrad, there was an increasing expectation among the Ukrainians in Galicia that a situation similar to that at the end of World War I might develop, in which the major powers struggling for control of Eastern Europe had disintegrated and the smaller nations had organized military formations and good relations with the Western Allies, which aided them in asserting themselves as independent political units. The Ukrainians, like the Poles, expected that history would repeat itself, and this, among other reasons, explains the Ukrainian insistence on the one important concession that they got, namely, that the SS-Division Galicia would be used exclusively on the Eastern Front. Kubijovyč, Entsyklopediia . . ., op. cit., p. 589, and Torzecki, op. cit., pp. 293-294.
It is interesting to note that the enlistment and the removal of the volunteers to German training camps within a safe distance from Galicia\textsuperscript{39} occurred only a few months from a planned large-scale population transfer from Galicia, involving mostly the Ukrainian population. This transfer aimed at accommodating and resettling ethnic German evacuated from the Caucasus and from the Balkans, particularly along strategic frontiers and lines of communication.\textsuperscript{40} The deported population from the rural areas was to be resettled in so-called marginal lands somewhere in the northeast outside of Galicia. In anticipation of an outburst of resistance action, it was convenient for the SS establishment to have safely under their control a high percentage of the potential leaders or resistance fighters in this area.\textsuperscript{41}

The patterns of a selective Germanization in Galicia, especially among the Ukrainians, also may be related to the Nazis' educational policy in this area. Unlike Ukrainians in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, and the Polish parts of the Generalgouvernement, the Ukrainians in Galicia were permitted only ten Gymnasien, the equivalent of the European preparatory schools for higher education. This number was far below the demand for such schools and far below the number of Gymnasien authorized in Galicia under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and under the Polish government.\textsuperscript{42} All attempts by the Ukrainian Central Aid Committee and the local residents of Galicia to secure more schools of this nature remained without success. The German authorities were more generous, however, when it came to permits for schools of a vocational orientation. Also, they opened university courses in such technical fields as medicine, pharmacy, and veterinary studies.\textsuperscript{43}

This policy coincided with the Nazis' guidelines indicating how to

\textsuperscript{39} The transports with the volunteers for the SS-Division Galicia started to roll on July 18, 1943, to the training camps located in Poland, the Czech Protectorate, and Germany. Pan'kiv's'kyi, op. cit., pp. 241-50.

\textsuperscript{40} I. M. T., Trial, Vol. XXIX, p. 605. See also: "Wächter, Gouverneur und SS-Brigadeführer an Reichsführer SS," (Oct. 20. 1943), Himmler's File, Box No. 10, Folder 319.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid. Himmler's File.

\textsuperscript{42} In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before World War I, there were 46 Gymnasien (prior to the outbreak of W. W. I) in Galicia. In 1937/38 there were 138 Gymnasien in Galicia under the Polish rule. Even though in the overwhelming number of them the official language of instruction was different from Ukrainian, these Gymnasien were open to Ukrainian children. Kubijovyč, Entsyklopediia..., op. cit., on the following pages respectively: pp. 929; 945; 952.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., p. 952.
treat the population in areas earmarked for the German Lebensraum, if the majority of them was found to be largely unsuitable for assimilation. Liberal education, which had characterized the curriculum of the Gymnasien, now was considered potentially dangerous in the East, as it was believed to be conducive to the creation of potential leaders for the resistance movement. The Nazis made a limited exception from this rule in regard to the Czechs, whose Gymnasien graduates were expected to become Germanized by being sent to study at German universities. It is possible that, because of the selective nature and the very limited number of graduates from the approved Gymnasien in Galicia, the Nazi authorities thought they would be in a position to control the growth of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, while creating some potential candidates for Germanization among them.

On a less elevated level, Galicia was affected by other provisions for Germanization. On July 7, 1941, a special order was issued, applicable to the whole Generalgouvernement, concerning the racial screening of girls between the ages of sixteen and twenty years of age, to be sent to work to Germany with the provision that those who would be found racially acceptable would be marked for household work in the Reich, with prospects for their eventual Germanization. This order was supplemented later by a personal order from Hitler, dated October 9, 1942, which specified that 400,000 to 500,000 selected Ukrainian girls and women between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five should be deported for household duties to Germany for the purpose of an eventual Germanization. This order apparently applied to the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine and the Generalgouvernement, even though there is no indication how these quotas were to be distributed between the two administrative units. Still another group was singled out for racial evaluation and possible Germanization, namely, children from orphanages or children whose parents had been lost during the war or were in the process of being deported.

The above mentioned examples describe a method to which the Nazis referred as "microselection" within the context of their Lebensraum policy. It meant a second screening, wherever possible, of those groups or nationalities that originally had been declared as
undesirable for assimilation. Not only was this method designed to boost the number of citizens (of "scattered Germanic blood," as the Nazis referred to them), for the future Germanic empire, but also it was supposed to weaken the backbone of potentially defiant nations whose land eventually was to be taken over by the Germans or whose identity was to be destroyed.

The microselection was applied to Slovenia and Galicia, although under somewhat differing circumstances, and in each case it was accompanied by large-scale resettlement plans, attempts to neutralize the intelligentsia as a political force, and attempts to create a political disorientation among the masses. The implementation of these projects reveals many factors which the Nazi Lebensraum planners did not anticipate.

**THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE NAZIS' OSTPOLITIK AND THEIR RESULTS IN SLOVENIA AND GALICIA**

The purpose of the Nazis' Ostpolitik was primarily based on the realization of Lebensraum designs in which the circumstances of war were to be used as an excuse for unconventional measures in those areas of Eastern Europe that had been earmarked for Germanization. But the war in the East had been calculated as a Blitzkrieg of a short duration, whereas the war in the West had been seen as a limited defensive war, ultimately ending with a peace treaty and a recognition of German war gains.

Such expectations proved to be illusory with the protracted war against the Soviet Union and with the weight of pressure in the West after the United States joined the war. In view of this situation, even though Himmler and his establishment formally held the upper hand over the German civilian authorities in the East, some limitations on the scope of uprooting and destroying the indigenous population had to be imposed; their value in terms of economic exploitation had to be upgraded, at least temporarily. Another restraining factor on the policy of Lebensraum was the strength of the resistance movements in some areas of Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Hitler and Himmler did not mind some sporadic, isolated cases of resistance or local uprisings in the East, wherever they could be utilized to serve as a pretext for "punitive measures" such as the decimation or removal of an unwanted population. What they did want to avoid by all means was an undue commitment of their forces in those areas that were only
of marginal interest to them, such as the Balkans, and they tried to prevent wider conflagrations, such as those related to national uprisings behind their front lines.

The Slovenian case clearly reveals to what degree and under what circumstances the original Lebensraum measures were modified for the duration of the war. Bent on an assimilation of two-thirds of the Slovenian population in occupied Slovenia and on resettling the remaining one-third eastward in Serbia and Croatia, the Germans were confident that they had sufficient means to enforce this project during the war, as the population was relatively small and no serious resistance was expected from them.

When the Yugoslav Communists started a nation-wide uprising in July 1941 which proved to be beyond the capability of the Germans to suppress, Himmler and his associates who dealt with the Germanization of Slovenia started to curtail and to "liberalize" their policy of deportation. They did this on the assumption that the deportations had been a main cause for the Slovenians' part in this uprising, and that a backing of their cause by some other nationalities of Yugoslavia had brought about a dangerous and explosive situation which originally had not been anticipated. In view of this re-evaluation of the circumstances, Himmler ordered in a circular letter on August 25, 1941, that, after having deported 18,067 Slovenes and having forced across the border to the Italian-occupied part of Slovenia another 17,000, further deportations would have to cease until the end of the war. Also, a further removal of the Slovenian intelligentsia would have to be re-checked and redirected.47 Some of them were to be motivated to become Germans, if they were related to Germans by blood, or if their racial evaluation was very good or good.48 If they were to be deported from Slovenia, however, their destination was not to be Croatia or Serbia but the Old Reich, for, as Himmler argued, the German nation should profit from an enrichment by such elitist elements rather than some foreign nations. It is interesting to note that, in spite of the circular letter in which he ordered stoppage of deportation in the Balkans (including Slovenia), he still ordered three hundred Slovenian

47 Der Reichsführer-SS, Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums, Berlin, July 7, 1941: "Betrifft: Richtlinien für die Aussiedlung fremdvölkischer Elemente aus Südkärnten" in I. N. G. L.
48 Ibid.
families deemed racially acceptable but strongly conscious of their Slovenian nationality to be deported to the Old Reich for eventual Germanization.\textsuperscript{49} This example confirms again the racial determinism that permeated the Nazi policy of \textit{Lebensraum} and that usually took precedence when it came to the treatment of the population, whether the persons involved sympathized with the National Socialist cause or were unsympathetic or even hostile toward it.

\section*{Slovenia and Galicia in the Nazis' Resettlement Schemes}

The Nazi occupation policy during World War II was in many cases unprecedented because of the \textit{Lebensraum} objectives and the methods by which these objectives were to be achieved. Hitler insisted that the territories desired for inclusion in the German \textit{Lebensraum}, first of all, would have to be "Germanized," but that this did not apply to the conquered peoples if they were considered as racially or otherwise "undesirable." The Nazi ideologists considered most of the nations inhabiting Eastern Europe (which was the area specified as the main Germanic settlement area) as "racially inferior" or "alien." The logical implications, therefore, were that Hitler had to plan a forced mass-resettlement or mass-annihilation on a scale unprecedented in history and that simultaneously he had to plan an equally forced mass-colonization of "Germanic peoples" in order to fill the vacuum.\textsuperscript{50} Conscious of the fact that such an unprecedented and barbaric policy might bring about public resentment abroad and at home, the Nazi leaders felt that the atmosphere of war and the feeling of a national emergency and solidarity would induce the German people to accept such a policy more easily as indispensible and temporary. It was Hitler's contention that, if some unusual precedents could be established during the war, it would be much easier to follow up his ideas during times of peace.\textsuperscript{51}

As in many other forms of the \textit{Lebensraum} policy, the resettlement schemes followed some general guidelines toward the nationalities that were to be affected by it. One of them was to weaken an

\textsuperscript{49} Tone Ferenc, "Die Massenvertreibung . . .," op. cit. (note 10, above), p. 25.


anticipated resistance and to divide opposing powers by drawing some artificial rigid frontiers that not only would separate the nations threatened by the Nazi colonization measures and annihilation policy but also would split the established nations themselves. Such a policy, it was assumed, would diminish the danger of a unified resistance when the Lebensraum theory was implemented on a large scale. The Ukraine, for example, was divided into a military occupation zone, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the territory ceded to Rumania (Northern Bukovina and Transnistria), and the District of Galicia, which, although formally attached to the Generalgouvernement, remained de facto separated from the other districts of the Generalgouvernement by the so-called boundary along the River San. Slovenia was also split, in three parts: one area was placed under Italian occupation (including the capital of Ljubljana), and two others came under the administration of the Gauleiter of Styria and the Gauleiter of Carinthia respectively. This splintering of nations in a territorial sense was supposed to be supplemented by an encouragement of disunity and a division of the people into ethnic groups, by such means as utilizing, wherever possible, traditional hostilities, parochial attitudes, and the vanity of local leaders.

The resettlement authorized during the war had as one of its objectives to divide and to weaken the potential resistance elements of the nations whose presence was considered undesirable on the territory earmarked as the German Lebensraum. Basically, two different kinds of settlement were tried in connection with this objective: the belt type settlement and the pearl-string colonization.

The belt-type approach aimed at adding some additional barriers of a tangible nature to the established frontiers, meant to divide and to isolate the nations in question. The native population was supposed to be evacuated from such frontier regions, and suitable German colonists were expected to be settled in their place. After some time, these frontier belt-settlements were expected to move inward, preferably from at least two sides, and, in this vise-like movement, the isolation of the native population (Einkapselung) would be intensified, until the time when the native population would cease to

52 The District of Galicia was formally attached to the Generalgouvernement on August 1st, 1941.
53 I. M. T. Doc., NO-1880.
exist as a distinguishable ethnic unit. Such frontier belt-settlements were planned along the German-Italian demarcation lines of occupation in Slovenia and also on the eastern and western frontiers of the District of Galicia. They were, however, only partially implemented, and not very successfully, because of the unstable political situation in these areas and a lack of a sufficient number of settlers qualified and willing to be settled there. In German-occupied Slovenia, only a fragment of the anticipated frontier settlement was completed, with a resettlement of the so-called Gottscheer Germans from the Italian-occupied part of Slovenia to the Sava and Sotla river zones located in the frontier district of German-occupied Slovenia. Between the beginning of November 1941 and November 16, 1942, 37,000 Slovenes were removed from these frontier districts, and 12,000 Gottscheer Germans were resettled there.

In a similar fashion, and for an identical purpose, the District of Galicia was supposed to be sealed off from the predominantly Polish districts of the Generalgouvernement bordering it on the west. A step in this direction was taken by the deportation of the Polish and Ukrainian population from the frontier zone of the neighboring District of Lublin — the countryside in the vicinity of the cities of Zamosc, Tomasziw, and Hrubeshiv. Between the fall of 1942 and the summer of 1944, 110,000 to 120,000 Jews, Poles and Ukrainians were removed, to be replaced by 25,000 German settlers. A similar colonization belt was planned in the eastern part of the District of Galicia (the outermost eastern district of the Generalgouvernement). A mass evacuation of the Ukrainian population from the eastern boundary of the Generalgouvernement and a colonization of this area by German settlers were meant to separate the Catholic and Western-educated Ukrainian from their Orthodox Eastern Ukrainian brothers.

This plan, scheduled for the fall of 1943, may be related to still another project of colonization known as the bowling alley, or pearl-string, colonization. It was an improved version of that initiated by Himmler in 1939 but abandoned, based on the method of stronghold settlements in some important areas of the Lebensraum, amidst a
surrounding native population. The improved version relied on the concept of establishing defensive settlements along the important roads of communication. One such communication artery from Cracow to Zhytomyr to Kiev, representing a planned West-East super-highway and a direct railway line, was to be safeguarded by the protective German colonist settlements, corresponding to the already mentioned pearl-string colonization scheme. This plan was approved in Hitler's headquarters in August 1942, and its implementation would have meant the establishment of German protective settlements across the District of Galicia.

There are evidences that the preparatory measures in this direction were taken by the German authorities following this decision. Some land measurements were made by the German authorities in the District of Galicia, which were generally interpreted by the local population as the beginning of a seizure of their land and an eventual resettlement. There is also documentation that an extensive deportation of the Ukrainian and Polish population was planned from the countryside in the summer of 1943, but that the raid of the Kovpak partisans and the activization of the Ukrainian and Polish national underground movements in Galicia at this time forced the Nazi planners to postpone such resettlement until the end of the war.

But while the scheme of German colonization along the eastward border of the District of Galicia and the pearl-string settlements in this connection were never realized, one island of German colonists emerged in Galicia that originally had not been anticipated. This involved the farm holdings of Galician Germans, most of whom left for Germany in the course of the German-Soviet population exchange following the common division of spoils of war after the liquidation of the Polish state. The statistical data indicate that the Nazi authorities induced 51,000 Galician Germans to leave for Germany in the years 1939 to 1940, following the Soviet-German Treaty concerning the population exchange from the territories of the former Polish state, split between these two countries. This repatriation, which hardly left any German colonists behind in Galicia, was followed up by the influx of the Lemky, the Western-most Ukrainian ethnic group, living close to the Ukrainian-Polish ethnic border. Many members of this

59 Himmler's File, 266, "Letter from Himmler to Governor H. Frank, No. 55/6."
group who found themselves under German occupation in September 1939 opted for an opportunity to move to Soviet-occupied Galicia, and those among them who were peasants were settled on lands vacated by the German colonists.\(^{60}\) Most of the Lemky peasants found their eastern venture disappointing, and they took advantage of the outbreak of the German-Soviet War to return to their original homelands.\(^{61}\) The land which they left behind in Galicia was claimed by the Germans authorities, who reserved it as the future German stronghold in Galicia. It was then partially settled by the ethnic Germans from Volhynia and Bosnia, where, because of an intensive partisan warfare, the scattered German settlements were endangered. Altogether, 700 German families were settled by August 1943, next to 200 Bosnian families and 1,500 Volhynian Germans.\(^{62}\) In his memo to SS-Obersturmbannführer Brandt, Waechter reports that the remaining land was saturated by the influx of 14,000 Caucasus Germans, evacuated in the process of the German retreat on the Eastern front during the spring of 1943. About 6,500 of these Germans were settled on the remaining former farmland of Galicia Germans. Waechter strongly opposed Himmler's suggestion for further acceptance of the evacuated ethnic Germans from the East, insofar as it meant a continued colonization in the District of Galicia. He pointed out that further settlements would require moving the local population without being in a position to offer them substitute land — a move that, under the given established political situation and security circumstances in the District of Galicia, would not be advisable at all.\(^{63}\)

In spite of the provisionary way of settlement of ethnic Germans (evacuated from the Soviet Union proper) in Galicia and in the Polish and Baltic territories, the SS agencies responsible for this task considered the newly established colonies as more or less permanent. Even if these territories should be temporarily overrun by the Red Army, they argued, the evacuated German colonists could return again

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\(^{61}\) Wächter's letter, ibid.

\(^{62}\) Ibid.

\(^{63}\) Ibid.
to their newly acquired homesteads after the German army reconquered this area. Some even saw some advantage in a prolonged warfare between the German and Soviet armed forces in these areas, because, as they assumed, the unwanted local population would be decimated or dislocated in the process of this struggle, and this would make the German task of extending those homesteads for German colonization even easier.\textsuperscript{64}

CONCLUSION

The German occupation policy in Galicia and Slovenia indicates several different approaches to Germanization, based partially on different racial classifications and partially on different German estimates concerning the feasibility of a frontal assault in a pursuit of their objectives. Still, there were many similarities in the working policy concerning the German Lebensraum in Galicia and Slovenia.

Both in Galicia and Slovenia these similarities in policy arose from the same objectives: making the areas German in the shortest possible time, and using the circumstances of war to make some substantial progress in this direction. In an effort to accomplish these objectives, the Nazi authorities, as we have observed, tried to discourage or eliminate opportunities for political thinking, political education, and political activities that would, in their judgement, inevitably bring up the question of the future of the native ethnic groups. In the Slovenian case, this meant a physical separation of the Slovenian intelligentsia from the Slovenian people, by means of deportations and a wholesale substitution of the Slovenian cultural and educational facilities and pursuits by German ones. In multi-national Galicia, differentiated methods were applied that favored the Western Ukrainian over the Jews and the Poles, as well as over the majority of their kinsmen in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine. In addition to these divisive tactics, the depoliticization of Ukrainians was pursued in a more subtle and indirect way. The Nazi authorities weakened the intelligentsia by selective arrests and a drastic curtailment of studies in

what they considered the liberal education fields. Further, they made it difficult for the Ukrainian intelligentsia of Galicia to communicate with their kinsmen living in the Reichskommissariat and in Western and Central Europe. Although the members of the Western Ukrainian intelligentsia were permitted to remain active in the public sector, their energies were directed to such apolitical issues as social welfare, vocational education, and local problems, all of which were meant to divert them from seeing the fate of their people and themselves as a whole. There is also a strong indication that such alleged German bonuses as the permission for some Ukrainian students from Galicia to study in Germany, or the creation of the SS-Division Galicia, had, among others, the purpose of removing the better educated and leadership personalities before the large-scale resettlements of the Ukrainians from this area began.

The same basic restrictions, although without the bonuses, were applied to the Poles, while the Jewish population, deprived of its property and confined to the ghettos, was, in the Nazis' judgment, under safe control and could not offer a serious resistance as the "final solution" was approaching.

Even though only one-third of the Slovenes under the German occupation (in comparison to 65% Ukrainians and 85% Poles) were supposed to be removed from their homeland in the process of its Germanization, Slovenia felt the actual brunt of such deportations more intensively than any other European nation. Despite the fact that its quota of deportees was relatively small in comparison with the other earmarked nations, like Poland, Belorussia, Ukraine, and Czechoslovakia, it was, nevertheless, implemented to a greater degree than elsewhere. It is estimated that one out of ten Slovenians under the German occupation was affected by the deportations.65 On the other hand, the Nazi policy in Slovenia was somewhat softened by the German abstinence from a deliberate and unprovoked genocide because of racial considerations. In Galicia, the direct mass execution of the Jews was combined with various devices of "biological weakening" of the Ukrainians and the Poles. Both in Slovenia and in Galicia, we witness the typical Nazi devices in their attempt to isolate

65 According to statistics provided by Dr. Ferenc, op. cit., pp. 29 and 41, around 80,000 Slovenes had to leave the part of Slovenia annexed by the Third Reich between the years 1941 and 1944.
their target nations in a selected area from unwanted contacts by means of belt-settlements.

The Nazi authorities showed some awareness of the limitations of their power by not trying out their all-out solution on the Ukrainians in Galicia, at least during the initial stage of their rule. Probably they feared repercussions that might arise in a confrontation with a nation that was relatively large and strategically and economically important. Such restraints were absent when they staged the wholesale liquidation of the Jews and the mass-Germanization of the Slovenes, because the Nazis considered that those groups were isolated, relatively small, and, therefore, manageable. But it is apparent also that neither the declining fortunes in the theaters of war nor the fierce guerilla warfare in Galicia and Slovenia changed the Nazis' basic determination to view these territories as areas of future colonization.

Altogether, the Nazi occupation in Slovenia and Galicia represents an example of a totalitarian type of imperialism that was aiming at the extinction of the national identity of those peoples inhabiting the occupied areas, while it ignored completely the criteria of international law and humanitarian restraints established by civilized nations. The motivation for this policy came entirely from a predetermined abstract ideology that simply omitted the question of whether the population in a given Lebensraum area was friendly or hostile to Germany, or was in any position to endanger the German people. Significantly, it also ignored the question of whether or not the Germans themselves were interested in settling in these areas.

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66 I. M. T. Doc., No-1880; 221-L; and 303-PS.

67 There is evidence that the general attitude of the German people was lukewarm or antagonistic toward the Nazis' exhortation to consider accepting the life style of the peasant, especially in the occupied Eastern territories, claimed as superb or essential for the well-being of the fatherland. The Nazis' confidential statistics indicated before and during the war an increase of the Landflucht (migration to the cities), especially among the young people. The influx of Germans from the Old Reich into the annexed Polish Western Provinces was insignificant in terms of numbers, and, from the standpoint of the Nazi ideology, those who came were the wrong type of persons, as they were looking for administrative and business type of positions rather than for rural homesteads. See Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 348, and David Schönbaum, *Hitler's Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939* (New York: Scribner's, 1966), pp. 159-86. Regardless of these trends, Hitler wanted to force German rural colonization for ideological purposes. Paetel, op. cit., p. 646, and Schechtman, op. cit., p. 343.
Further, we can observe the patterns of the Nazi occupation policy in the use of rational plans in connection with assimilation procedures, population transfers, classification of races, and the annihilation of a great number of innocent people. Utilizing the circumstances of war, the Nazis took the external situation as an excuse for changing the racial, ethnic, and social structures of certain population groups under their domination.

In our modern age, characterized by a growing global interdependence and its impact on international relations, the expansionism of the Nazis and the nature of their occupation policy may serve not only as a reflection on the past, but also as a warning for the future.
A Paradigm for the Study of Social Control
In a Socialist Society*

ALEX SIMIRENKO†

In the field of social and political studies the appearance of certain books has foreshadowed a dramatic transformation of ways of looking at and analyzing the world. In this century, such has been the fate of E. A. Ross's *Social Control*, Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* and Talcott Parson's *The Social System*. More recently in the field of Communist studies, this distinction belongs to Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Power: USA/USSR*. The authors viewed the Communist Party as the rise of a distinctly new profession and drew conclusions based on general knowledge of the professions. This was a remarkable achievement since at that time the study of professions and the professionalization process had just entered its more technical phase of development. Located at the forefront of new ideas, the study has not received due recognition for this original and daring contribution. In a recent session at Yale University, dedicated to the critical reassessment of Brzezinski and Huntington's work, William Taubman recognized its "pioneering and provocative" nature, but he failed to appreciate its most brilliant innovation.

It is Brzezinski and Huntington's singular achievement to have demonstrated that professional political intervention creates, with

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†Deceased, see obituary this issue.

time, a whole new social system. In this sense, it is probably more correct to use the term “professionalized” politician or politics, instead of “professional,” since the evidence seems to indicate that the Party is still in the process of professionalization. In this paper, further application of Brzezinski and Huntington’s analysis provides an opportunity to restate the advantages of such an approach. For one, it allows for an objective, neutral, and calm look at Communist systems. For a second, it takes advantage of the accumulating Western knowledge of professional organizations and professional conduct. Finally, it permits Soviet area specialists to contribute to the knowledge of professional behavior and thus remain a more integral and indispensable part of the social sciences.2

SOCIAL CONTROL AS A SOCIOLOGICAL PROBLEM

Nineteenth-century sociologists generally conceived of social control as akin to the maintenance of social order, social bond, or solidarity. In this view, the term was almost synonymous with the study of society and was not conceived as a separate field of study. It was E. A. Ross who gave it a distinctly modern meaning, identifying social control with a conscious direction of human conduct and identifying the specific instruments of political and ethical control.3

Although social control has remained as a special field of study to the present day, some authors have given it a new focus. Don Martindale, formulating a distinctly “social behaviorist” orientation, asserts that “the essence of social control lies in the formation, maintenance, and carrying through of decisions binding on the community.”4 A recent work by Morris Janowitz, however, reflecting a distinctly functionalist orientation, differentiates between the study of social organization and social control. Social control is identified as “a perspective which focuses on the capacity of a social organization to regulate itself; and this capacity generally implies a set of goals rather than a single goal.”5 Despite such departures, most sociologists have

continued to define social control along lines similar to the definition first formulated by Ross. The best example of this is found in the definition by Theodorson and Theodorson in their excellent dictionary of sociology: "Any social or cultural means by which systematic and relatively consistent restraints are imposed upon individual behavior and by which people are motivated to adhere to traditions and patterns of behavior that are important to the smooth functioning of a group or society."  

The definitional problems of American sociologists, as reflected in the above examples, are largely due to the nature of our own society, in which social control must necessarily encompass various cultural, social, and political influences. In the case of the Soviet Union, however, we have the conquest of a society by an organized group, which redefines the problem of social control into a programmed professional concern. The maintenance of social control is central to the organization, since failure will mean the demise of the organization. This does not mean that historically determined cultural factors are no longer significant and should be ignored, but rather that they become submerged and overshadowed by organizational concerns. Cultural processes become significant in national crises, such as World War II, when the Party disintegrates and loses control.

Although societies with professional political intervention can be expected to have a distinct system of social control, in all societies social control is maintained through a combination of at least three major processes: 1) Legitimation, 2) Compliance, and 3) Morale. In the case of professional intervention, whether it be in the case of the Party, the military, or the church, compliance seems to be elicited through a dual-compliance system, normative and coercive in nature. The processes of legitimation, compliance, and morale are interwoven into a single system: (1) legitimation is based on a new system of inequality which rewards individuals with client characteristics; (2) normative compliance is achieved by developing the personality suited to a client; (3) coercive compliance is most successful with persons with client personalities because they can be easily intimidated; and (4) morale is kept by maintaining and supporting the individual’s role as a client.

In the present analysis of the Soviet system of social control, distinctions are drawn between 1) the mechanisms of social control, 2) the instruments of social control, 3) the outcome of social control, 4) the agents of social control, 5) the agencies of social control, and 6) the groups whose special location makes them difficult to control by means of professional intervention. This scheme is summarized in the following Diagram. (See page 72).

**LEGITIMATION**

Legitimation is a term borrowed from Max Weber with reference to the establishment and maintenance of a particular system of domination.\(^8\) Legitimation is a process of explanation, justification, acceptance, and sustenance of unequal arrangements of class, status, and power. Reinhard Bendix put it well in interpreting Weber on this point: "Like all others who enjoy advantages over their fellows, men in power want to see their position as 'legitimate' and their advantages as 'deserved', and to interpret the subordination of the many as the 'just fate' of those upon whom it falls. All rulers therefore develop some myth of their natural superiority, which usually is accepted by the people under stable conditions but may become the object of passionate hatred when some crisis makes the established order appear questionable."\(^9\)

The advocacy of class warfare by Marx, as well as its practical application by Lenin, Stalin and others, has been and remains the most important device in the Party's bid for legitimation. In the name of class warfare, the Party justifies its subjugation of the economy and its regulation of inequality. The specific forms and direction of the economic transformation of the country by the Party has always been affected by two primary considerations: 1) establishment of effective control over the competing sources of power and their eventual elimination; and 2) transformation of the role of the citizen into that of a client.\(^10\) In the first instance, the successful neutralization of the

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<td>&quot;Ladder&quot; Society</td>
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<td>Morale</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>Insulation</td>
<td>Client Maintenance</td>
<td>Professional Agents of Insulation</td>
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power of traditional classes and interest groups is a precondition for the survival of professionalized politics. In the second instance, the transformation of Soviet people into clients of the Party professionals also necessitated changes in the economic resources available to them. For both of these reasons, the establishment of a truly classless society must also remain a genuine goal for those Party members who desire a fully professional Party.11

The basic principle of economic subjugation by the Party is the transformation of the ascription-oriented, vertically located groups with uneven advantages of class, status, and power (i.e., class society), into horizontally placed and achievement-oriented occupational groupings (i.e., "ladder" society12). Although it is quite true, as Stanislaw Ossowski has pointed out, that Stalin's characterization of Soviet society as one containing "non-antagonistic classes," was a contradiction in terms from the point of view of either Marxism or Leninism, Ossowski himself conceded that Stalin's concept was meaningful when viewed from the perspective of Adam Smith and his characterization of social classes on the basis of different types of property and sources of income.13 In Stalin's eyes no class or stratum occupied a privileged position, not even the workers, no matter what the rhetoric. He saw them as different groups of clients, calling for special treatment, in the way that physicians distinguish between different categories of patients and priests between different categories of parishioners, but all of them being identified as mortals and sinners. Stalin perceived the Soviet "class" system as a horizontal rather than a vertical phenomenon and stressed the fact that neither the two classes nor the stratum of the intelligentsia were capable of carrying on a conflict or of expressing an open antagonism, except at the explicit direction of the Party.

Subjugation of the client is carried out by what Jan Szczepanski calls a "regulated inequality,"14 or what Ossowski has described as an introduction of "non-egalitarian classlessness."15 Unequal economic

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15 Ossowski, op. cit., pp. 100-118.
rewards are offered to various groups of clients, as the need is calculated, for the purpose of morale, stimulation of a particular area of the economy, control of a particular national group, or the production of some other value as evaluated by Party functionaries. Although much has been made of Article 12 in the 1936 Soviet Constitution (now Article 14 in the 1977 Constitution) rewarding each worker "according to his work," rather than the Marxist "according to his need," the correct statement would be "according to his appraisal by the Party." A bureaucratically imposed occupational hierarchy promotes cleavage between clients and facilitates control over them.

Societies as large and complex as the former Russian Empire, which the Communists have conquered, cannot be manipulated at will without at the same time creating new forms of social life which are undesirable to the Party and which were not anticipated by it. While the pre-Revolutionary class system was successful in controlling horizontally located groups, such as villagers and nationalities, it was unsuccessful in maintaining control over vertically located classes found in large cities. The opposite turned out to be the case in the Soviet Union, which has been unsuccessful in integrating its horizontally located groups. One explanation for this phenomenon is that class hierarchies tend to stratify vertically, while ladder hierarchies tend to stratify horizontally.\textsuperscript{16}

Although there is sufficient evidence of stratified inequality between the village and the city, by the admission of the Party and Soviet sociologists\textsuperscript{17}, data for national and regional stratification is anecdotal and irregular. An excellent work on the subject is that by Vsevolod Holubnychy\textsuperscript{18}, who cautiously concluded that, although more research is necessary on the subject, certain unexplainable economic differences between the republics do exist. Holubnychy also quotes Khruschev's 1956 address to the 20th Party Congress, which seems to suggest that Khruschev himself was baffled by the evidence:

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\textsuperscript{17} G. Glazerman, "Economics of the Country and Social Policy of the CPSU," \textit{Pravda}, June 18, 1971, pp. 2-3; and Ju. V. Arutunian, \textit{Opyt sotsiologicheskogo izuchenia sela} (Moscow: Moscow University Publisher, 1968; for translation see \textit{Soviet Sociology}, Vol. 10, Nos. 1-4 [1971-1972]).
\end{flushleft}
Some comrades have complained that there is as yet no proper system of determining allocations for public education, health services, housing construction, and the building of cultural and service establishments, city improvements, etc. As a result, we sometimes have a wholly inexplicable gap between the appropriations for some of the republics. Can such a state of affairs be regarded as normal? Of course not, primarily because it violates the basis of fair relations; equality for all.\textsuperscript{19}

More recently, we have evidence from the 24th Party Congress, where the decision was made to improve educational facilities in order to eliminate regional variations. In a televised address in October 1971, Brezhnev spoke to a gathering of 4,000 merit students assembled at the Kremlin and "called for a more even distribution of professorial talent, which tends to concentrate in the big universities of Moscow and Leningrad." In Brezhnev's own words, quoted by the \textit{New York Times}: "we will evidently have to think about ways of insuring a more uniform staffing of higher educational institutions with qualified research and teaching personnel."\textsuperscript{20}

A superficial reading of Soviet materials often suggests that Party officials are talking out of both sides of their mouths, speaking out against inequality for reasons of propaganda while at the same time sponsoring it. The evidence, however, is that the ideology supporting regulated or organized inequality has not wavered since Marx. What is most bothersome to the Party is an unregulated and uncontrolled stratified inequality, because it destroys the legitimacy of the regime. Statements such as those of Khruschev and Brezhnev, quoted above, and of countless others suggest that the situation of unequal opportunities is not being swept under the rug. The most fascinating recent statement on the subject came in the form of a paper delivered at the Eighth World Congress of Sociology in Toronto by M. N. Rutkevich, President of the Soviet Sociological Association and Director of the Institute for Sociological Research in Moscow. Rutkevich proposed the thesis that the major "new" source of integration in a mature socialist society, such as the Soviet Union in the 1970s, was essentially to be found in the "planned and controlled instead of spontaneous," elimination of stratified inequality such as

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, p. 104.
that which exists between the villages, towns and districts, and "even regions in some place."\textsuperscript{21}

**NORMATIVE COMPLIANCE**

Normative compliance is accomplished by socializing and nurturing a special personality type conducive to manipulation by a professional. Theodore Caplow, in studying the process of socialization in its historical and comparative perspective, concluded that there are fundamentally few modes of socialization and that "there is much less variation in the form of the process than in its content."\textsuperscript{22} Caplow isolated eleven principal modes of socialization: schooling, training, apprenticeship, mortification, trial and error, assimilation, co-optation, conversion, anticipatory socialization, screening, and nepotism. Without a doubt, more than one of these modes plays a significant part in producing the personality most readily shaped into a compliant client. There is certainly a great need for more studies on the subject, which, incidentally, could be carried out in the West without the necessity of going into socialist countries.

It is possible to assert, however, on the basis of Erving Goffman's study of patients and inmates in total institutions, that the most important mode of socialization in the Soviet Union is that of mortification. A person to be socialized into the world of total institutions is immediately pressured to change into a client totally dependent upon the professional staff for all of his or her needs. In Goffman's words:

> The recruit comes into the establishment with a conception of himself made possible by certain stable social arrangements in his home world. Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped of the support provided by these arrangements. In the accurate language of some of our oldest total institutions, he begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self. His self is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified.\textsuperscript{23}


*Sociology and the Present Age* (Moscow: Soviet Sociological Association, 1974).


Goffman's study, of course, describes the rapid transformation of individuals with personalities formed elsewhere and under different circumstances. Individuals born into the system acquire their personality characteristics in a more gradual and subtle fashion, with a series of smaller shocks along the way. Certain cushioning occurs as parents try to protect their children from these shocks for as long a period as possible, and, in the experience of this writer, the older children in turn protect their parents from finding out that these shocks have already taken place. The abasements and degradations of the self which take place in the process of mortification are all contained in the official Soviet theory of character education. This theory, as it has been clearly summarized by Bronfenbrenner, is remarkably open on this point:

1. The peer collective (under adult leadership) rivals and early surpasses the family as the principal agent of socialization.
2. Competition between groups is utilized as the principal mechanism for motivating achievement of behavior norms.
3. The behavior of the individual is evaluated primarily in terms of its relevance to the goals and achievements of the collective.
4. Rewards and punishments are frequently given on a group basis; that is to say, the entire group benefits or suffers as a consequence of the conduct of individual members.
5. As soon as possible, the tasks of evaluating the behavior of individuals and of dispensing rewards and sanctions is delegated to the members of the collective.
6. The principal methods of social control are public recognition and public criticism, with explicit training and practice being given in these activities. Specifically, each member of the collective is encouraged to observe deviant behavior by his fellows and is given opportunity to report his observations to the group. Reporting on one's peers is esteemed and rewarded as a civic duty.
7. Group criticism becomes the vehicle for training in self-criticism in the presence of one's peers. Such
public self-criticism is regarded as a powerful mechanism for maintaining and enhancing commitment to approved standards of behavior, as well as the method of choice for bringing deviants back into line.\textsuperscript{24}

Although these are essentially ideal socialization principles, some of the basic points have been verified in Bronfenbrenner's research in the Soviet Union, and, consequently, Bronfenbrenner himself tended to assume that the system functions in the way that it was intended to function. The evidence, however, whether that offered by Soviet educators or by Bronfenbrenner, is not so clear on the subject. In particular, it is not certain that the family is surpassed early as the "principal agent of socialization." Most of the 12-year-olds studied by Bronfenbrenner were either institutionalized or lived in dormitories, and many of them came from broken homes.\textsuperscript{25} Furthermore, these children were studied in a classroom situation, controlled and watched by the professional agents of socialization. The discovery that Soviet children are adult — rather than peer — oriented prompts Bronfenbrenner to jump to the questionable conclusion that the educational and socializational effort to build loyal and well behaved citizens was successful. Bronfenbrenner accomplished this by ignoring the existence of hundreds of adult subcultures in the Soviet Union. Based on Bronfenbrenner's data, a contrary conclusion can be reached, suggesting that adult orientation is fostered by Soviet families who, as members of particular subcultures, are willing and able to protect their children from the complete control of the state. Adult orientation as a sub-cultural phenomenon would also explain more sucessfully Bronfenbrenner's other findings, such as the fact that Soviet children are reluctant to ask questions about things that they do not understand, the relative importance of manners, the relative importance of playing instead of doing something useful in spare


time, and the reluctance to ask for help in case of need. These characteristics have been compared with those of American, English, and Swiss children.²⁶ Perhaps most important is the finding that propriety is more important to Soviet children than telling the truth; "the results showed that Soviet youngsters placed stronger emphasis than any other group on overt propriety, such as being clean, orderly, and well mannered, but gave less weight than the subjects from the other countries to telling the truth and seeking intellectual understanding."²⁷

This is not to suggest that the family is an effective rival institution to the professional agencies of socialization but that it has some influence in delaying the process of mortification for a few years and cushioning its effects. Nor is the family the only agency performing such a task. Perhaps even more important is the cushioning function performed by street corner or neighborhood gangs in the Soviet Union. Although such gangs are completely ignored by Bronfenbrenner, he does offer indirect evidence of the existence of some rival agencies of socialization with the discovery that unlike boys, Soviet girls are completely adult-oriented. Neighborhood gangs tend to be male-oriented, which may explain the above disparity between sexes. In the experience of the present writer, it was the corner gang which formulated a negative attitude towards the Pioneers and ridiculed anyone who failed to take the red kerchief off his neck upon leaving the schoolyard. It was also the corner gang's assumption that Pavlik Morozov, the so-called hero of Pioneers, was hardly human for denouncing his father and that he met his just fate. In a sometimes untenable account of his childhood experiences, Yevtushenko credits the corner gang with an important influence on his personality:

My education was left to the street. The street taught me to swear, smoke, spit elegantly through my teeth, and to keep my fist up, always ready for a fight — a habit which I have kept to this day.

The street taught me not to be afraid of anything or anyone — this is another habit I have kept.

I realized that what mattered in the struggle for existence was to overcome my fear of those who were stronger.²⁸

²⁶ Rodgers, Bronfenbrenner, and Devereaux, loc. cit., p.36.
Yevtushenko’s claim would be more believable had he said that the street corner gang had taught him some of the tricks of how to control, avoid, and overcome fear of authority figures, which is indeed one of the important functions of Soviet gangs. This fascinating aspect of gangs' function is yet to be studied.

**COERCIVE COMPLIANCE**

In sociological studies of social control and of compliance, coercion is most often viewed as a last resort. This is just as true in the work of E. A. Ross as in that of Talcott Parsons. Even in the work of Amitai Etzioni, who conceives of some organizations, such as combat units, of being structures which are based on dual compliance, priority is still given to the normative aspects of social control:

The application of the two powers, normative and coercive, is segregated in time in such a manner that the two powers conflict as little as possible. Normative power is applied first; only when this is or seems to be ineffective is there a resort to coercive power.\(^{29}\)

On the societal scale and in reference to societies with professional intervention, the distinction between normative and coercive compliance is purely analytical and inseparable in reality. The dual compliance structure is designed to bring about the formation of special type of personality capable of assuming the role of a compliant client. Thus, the process of individual mortification cannot be successfully separated from an added element of violence in the form of intimidation.

The well documented case of Soviet political terror, especially in the recent writings by Barghoorn, Levytsky, Roy Medvedev, and Solzhenitsyn,\(^{30}\) seems to be related to the earlier phase of professional

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intervention, meaning the time when the art of mortification was not as yet well developed. As Brzezinski already put it in 1962, instead of terror, "organized coercion performs the function of enforcing societal conformity."31 It is more proper to talk in terms of intimidation, because, on the level of personality formation, we are dealing with a complex kind of fear which is only in part related to concern for individual safety. Much more effective is a threat to withdraw certain professional services which would lead to war, famine, epidemic, or, in more personal terms, stigmatizing of the individual, leading to the withdrawal of those conditions which make it possible to maintain overt propriety, so important even to 12-years-olds.

Mortification and intimidation are used to develop a special type of client personality with the following major characteristics: 1) a person who recognizes his dependence on the services of an expert; 2) a person with limited individual objectives or goals, except for those which experts may be ready to assign him or her; and 3) a person with careerist orientation in a situation of high morale and a malingerer in a situation of low morale. Gennady Shmakov and John Malmstad describe this type of personality more graphically:

This is the "totalitarian mind," with its familiar characteristics: the tendency to "escape from freedom," the pervasive social passivity, an underdeveloped sense of self and individual worth, the absence of a personal sense of moral obligation.32

From a different perspective, there is the monumental study of Vera Dunham, in which Dunham characterizes the Soviet "meshchanin" as the typical personality.33 This is an apt way of describing an ideal client.

Just as pursuit of legitimation has created certain basic undesirable and uncontrollable forms of social life, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that a system based on mortified personalities tends to be inefficient in harnessing its productive and creative forces. Erving Goffman anticipated this state of affairs in his description of total

institutions by asserting that mortified individuals are likely to resist the view of themselves imposed by the professionals:

... we find that participants decline in some way to accept the official view of what they should be putting into and getting out of the organization and, behind this, of what sort of self and world they are to accept for themselves. Where enthusiasm is expected, there will be apathy; where loyalty, there will be disaffection; where attendance, absenteeism; where robustness, some kind of illness; where deeds are to be done, varieties of inactivity. We find a multitude of homely little histories, each in its way a movement of liberty. Whenever worlds are laid on, underlives develop.34

Compare Goffman's "underlives" to the Soviet "underlives" as described by Shmakov and Malmstad:

A surface symptom of the price paid for this repression is Russia's mass alcoholism. It is less noticeable perhaps in Moscow or Leningrad than in the provincial cities, especially in the industrial centers; in the countryside it has assumed staggering dimensions. . . .

Alcoholism also helps to reinforce social passivity and makes political manipulation easier. Drunkenness is a form of protest that can be tolerated not only by the rulers but by the ruled: watch how a Russian crowd instinctively joins to protect drunks on the street when they go too far. . . .

Despite the sporadic and half-hearted "campaigns" against alcoholism and other "transgressions" of labor discipline — . . . — something like an unseen conspiracy exists between the regime and the masses (that is, the workers and the peasants; the complicity of the intelligentsia is somewhat different). Many understand that they are the indispensable base of "Soviet power" and that little can or will be done to them. Absenteeism, slipshod workmanship, and shirking, all represent the most obvious signs of this cynical "anything goes" mentality. The regime suits most Russians very well. Most are already accustomed to their current low standard of living, they know they can work at half-strength without fear of dismissal. The constant shortage of labor — no longer the result of the war, but of inefficiency — further guarantees job security.35

MORALE

The maintenance of morale under conditions of professional intervention is synonymous with the maintenance of an ideal client. Some parts of the activity are similar to what Michael Gehlen calls political socialization, but the maintenance of morale covers more than politics and has a more focused program than the achievement of legitimation. Since the inducement of morale is deliberate, achieved more by the blocking, intercepting, and distorting of messages and communications, it is proper to speak of insulation as the main instrument of the process. In Theodore Caplow's definition of the term, "the concept of negative interaction or insulation implies the deliberate resistance of the parties to each other's influence and it is quite meaningful, although it should be kept in mind that some degree of positive interaction will probably be observed at the same time."

A Western observer called upon to evaluate the effectiveness of the Soviet system of agitation and propaganda is generally either baffled or forced to give a "yes and no" answer to the question. One of the best evaluations has been provided by Alan Little:

The policy is to eliminate any views contradicting the official position on any subject and to create popular support for the Communist Party by repeating a uniform and slogan-like message in as many ways and as many times as possible.

The convictions of people in the USSR are believed to be less affected by official propaganda than is usually claimed by the Soviet leaders. The obviously artificial and controlled nature of Soviet propaganda, contradicting the facts of life, arouses widespread distrust. Nevertheless, the reiterations leave a lasting impression, exclude other facts from public discussion, and show the citizen exactly what he must say if he is to survive — much less "prosper."

The value of Little's discussion is that in describing Soviet propaganda as dull, boring, repetitious, and dogmatic, which it is, he

refrained from ascribing this state of affairs to the mediocrity and inefficiency of the Communist propaganda machine. Little perceived that agitation is expected to fulfill a very special function: not to impart knowledge, but to prepare an ideal client.

A lay client is not asked to appreciate or understand all the intricacies of the professional ideology, but rather to accept the practice of professionalized politics and that of other professionalized vocations as a mystery, which only a few chosen and dedicated specialists are called upon to pursue for the client's own benefit. Agitation and the mechanism of insulation in general prepares a client to accept the judgments of professionals and to recognize who among them has been assigned a higher ranking by the profession.

An ideal client is one who realizes the importance of the professionals' skills yet who has no basis upon which to judge the performance of the professional.39 In this respect, the most difficult client is the intellectual who possesses the knowledge upon which such judgments can be made but who is not under Party discipline to keep this knowledge within the circumscribed professional group. This explains the Party's attempt to enroll all the top intellectuals. As is well known, such a solution to the problem is not always successful and is well reflected in many of Sakharov's statements, including:

The views of the author were formed in the milieu of the scientific and scientific-technological intelligentsia, which manifests much anxiety over the principles and specific aspects of foreign and domestic policy and over the future of mankind. This anxiety is nourished, in particular, by a realization that the scientific method of directing policy, the economy, arts, education, and military affairs still has no become a reality.40

During the trials of Yuri Galanskov and Alexander Ginzburg, accused of illegally publishing underground materials, 738 people signed their names, individually and collectively, protesting the trial. In this group, the occupations of only 38 people remained unidentified. Of the 700 known occupations, 45 per cent were

academics, 22 per cent were people engaged in the arts, 13 per cent were engineers and technical specialists, 9 per cent were teacher, physicians, lawyers, and publishing-house workers, and 5 per cent were students. Only 6 per cent of the total were composed of workers below the strata of the intelligentsia.41

Having done all they can to inform their clients of their qualifications and their dedication to the task of scientifically running the country, it seems that professionalized politicians have little choice but to conclude that non-compliance is due either to mental incompetence, cultural backwardness, or foreign agitation. Insulation of the client from dissident communication and influence presents a major concern to the agents of insulation. But it is still only one of many concerns involved in building morale. Since the dependence of the client upon the professional tends to increase in periods of crisis, one major concern is the maintenance of crises, sometimes deliberately provoked.

It is also important for all professionals, not only for the purpose of retaining their dominant position but also for maintaining client morale, to cover their mistakes. Here one can paraphrase Frank Lloyd Wright by saying that, while a physician buries his mistakes and an architect plants ivy to hide his, a professionalized politician rewrites history.

CONCLUSION

It is a truism to say that the realities of the world do not necessarily exist for the convenience of any professional organization and it is the task of the professionals themselves to find a successful formula for solving problems caused by horizontal stratification, malproductive and malfunctioning individuals, as well as by passive and active forms of resistance to assuming the role of compliant client. Failure to do so will spell the doom of professionalized politics and the system of life upon which it is based.

Attempts at new solutions for the above problems will have to come from the professional agents of subjugation, socialization, violence, and insulation. Major controversies about how to resolve these

problems are already generating inter-professional tensions between Party professionals (the Apparatchiki) and members of other professions. Although current popular literature in the West seems to view official Soviet life as a sort of political and social ice age, a close reading of Soviet sociological literature suggests that inter-professional tensions are heating up.

If this reading of current events in the Soviet Union is not entirely mistaken, it can be suggested that our most fruitful understanding of stability and socio-economic change would result from a more careful study of Soviet professions and their inter-dynamics. Some of these professions have been studied in considerable detail, although rarely from a technical sociological perspective. The study of the inter-relationship of the professions, however, has been almost entirely ignored. What is important is that we can also profit from the intra-and inter-professional studies conducted in the West and contribute to this knowledge in return.

The Concept of the Soviet People and its Implications for Soviet Nationality Policy*

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

In 1971, from the podium of the 24th Party Congress, Leonid Brezhnev fully sanctioned the concept of the Soviet People, which had already been mentioned by Nikita Khrushchev at the 22nd Party Congress in 1961 and somewhat timidly included in the Central Committee’s Theses on the Centennial of Lenin’s Birth.1 The concept figured prominently in the 50th anniversary celebration of the Soviet Union in 1972 but was not explicitly repeated in Brezhnev’s speech at the 25th Party Congress in 1976. Dozens of books and articles have been written on that concept in the Soviet Union.2 Nevertheless, some nine years after Brezhnev’s imprimatur, the bold question may be raised whether there is a substantial difference between the new concept of the Soviet People and the older one of the Peoples of the Soviet Union. Is the Soviet People something more than a tautology?

In this article the usage of the concept will be traced, and reasons will be sought to explain why Brezhnev emphasized a term in 1971 that Khrushchev had mentioned only in passing in 1961. The writer will also try to establish the full meaning of the term and to tease out the implications for Soviet nationality policy in the late 1970s. However, no attempt will be made to cover the Soviet theoretical discussions on the problem of nations and nationalities exhaustively.

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1 See the body of the article for citations.

2M. P. Kim and V. P. Sherstobitov in their book list 70 secondary works — see Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut istorii SSSR (M. P. Kim & V. P. Sherstobitov, main eds.), Sovetskii narod — novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost’ liudei: stanovlenie i razvitie (Moscow: “Nauka,” 1975), pp. 512-515. If all related works are included, the bibliography swells to hundreds of items (see ibid., pp. 483-518).
THE USAGE OF THE CONCEPT

In his authoritative article on the Soviet People in the third edition of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, S. T. Kaltakhchian writes that the theoretical approach to the concept was developed at the 1971 Party Congress. He is right, but only in a restricted sense.

The popular expression “Soviet People” is not new. Lenin is said to have used similar words in 1919, when, in a speech to the Red Army, he pointed to the willingness of Soviet people (*sovetskie liudi*) from various nationalities to defend the young Soviet republic.4 “Soviet People” (*sovetskii narod*) was also a vague formula invoked during World War II to inspire the population to defend their common Soviet Fatherland.5 But it is correct to say that this emotive usage lacked theoretical underpinning.

Kaltakhchian is a little misleading, however, when he implies that the theoretical concept originated at the 1971 Party Congress. Khrushchev did briefly elaborate on the term “Soviet People” in his speech on the new Party Program at the 1961 Party Congress, in the introductory part of his speech on the Party Program:

In the USSR there has been formed a new historical community of various nationalities (*natsional'nostei*) which have common characteristics, viz., the Soviet People (*sovetskii narod*). They have a common Socialist Fatherland — the USSR, a common economic base — the Socialist economy, a common social class structure, a common world view — Marxism-Leninism, and a common goal — the building of Communism, [as well as] many common traits in their mentality (*dukhovnom oblike*), their psychology.6

Khrushchev’s statement can be regarded as establishing a proto-theory of our concept. But, in a most puzzling way, Khrushchev did not

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develop his concept of the "Soviet People" in the section of his speech where it would have mattered most, in his commentary on the nationality problem. Nor does the concept appear in the nationality section (Part 2, Section IV of the Party Program itself. In his commentary on the section on nationalities in the Program Khrushchev said:

In the draft Program the course has been set (vyrazhen) for the further economic and cultural flourishing (rastsvet) of the Soviet republics, and even closer and more all-around rapprochement (usestoronnoe sblizhenie) of nations in the process of advanced building of Communism.

...  

In our country there is taking place the process of the rapprochement of nations, their social uniformity (odnorodnost') is intensifying. In the course of the advanced (razvernutogo) building of Communism will be achieved the complete unity of nations. But even afterwards, when Communism will have been basically achieved, it would be premature to issue declarations on the merger (o sliianii) of nations. As is [well] known Lenin repeatedly pointed out that state and nationality differences will exist a long time after the victory of Socialism in all countries.\(^7\) [First emphasis in the original, second emphasis added.]

The 1961 Party Program contains many assimilationist details, such as the loss of the former significance of the republican boundaries and the acquisition by the Russian language of the status of the common language of international (mezhnatsional'ngo) communication and cooperation among all the peoples of the USSR.\(^8\) But the Program stops short of clearly endorsing the concept of the Soviet People, which Khrushchev himself had adumbrated in the introduction to his speech on the Party Program. The key sentence in Part 2, Section IV of the Program ("The Party's Tasks in the Field of Nationality Relations") reads:

The advance building of Communism signifies a new stage in the development of nationality relations in the USSR, which is characterized by further rapprochement of nations and the achievement of their complete unity (polnogo edinstva).\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Ibid., p. 7 c + d.


\(^9\) Ibid., pp. 115-116.
In the immediately preceding sentence there is reference to common traits in the psychology of Soviet people (used in the plural, sovetskikh liudei), but throughout the entire nationality section of the Program there is not even a hint of "Soviet People" in the singular (sovetskii narod). Curiously enough, the Party Program does contain an oblique reference to the "Soviet People" (sovetskii narod) in its last section (Part 2, Sec. VII) on the Communist Party. The opening sentence of that section reads:

As a result of the victory of Socialism in the USSR, the strengthening of the unity of Soviet society the Communist Party of the working class has been transformed into the vanguard of the Soviet People, has become the party of the entire people, has extended its directive influence (napravliaushche vliianie) into all directions of public life (obshchestvennoi zhizni).\(^{11}\)

In the Party Statutes of 1961 the same reference appears in a more lapidary form ("The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the experienced fighting vanguard of the Soviet People . . .").\(^{12}\) The term "Soviet People" did not appear in the 1952 Party Rules.

Almost two years later, in the June 1963 issue of Kommunist, two well-known advocates of a more rapid integration of the Soviet nationalities, P. Rogachev and M. Sverdlin, published an article on the "Soviet People — A New Historical Community . . ." They specifically referred to Khrushchev's words in the introduction to his speech on the Party Program. The article was printed most prominently — it was run as a lead article immediately following the editorial — and its publication was evidently timed to precede the Central Committee plenum on ideology, which was convened June 18-21, 1963.\(^{13}\) But the plenum did not endorse the thesis of Rogachev and

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 115.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 134.


\(^{13}\) P. Rogachev & M. Sverdlin, "Sovetskii narod — novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost' liudei, " Kommunist, 1963, No. 9 (June), pp. 11-20. Rogachev, a Russian, has been identified as head of the Department of Philosophy and Scientific Communism at the Volgograd Civil Engineering Institute and a specialist in historical materialism. His collaborator Sverdlin, a Jew, is the head of the Department of Marxism-Leninism at the Volgograd Medical Institute and a specialist in the philosophy of science. See Grey Hodnett, "What's in a Nation?, " Problems of Communism, Vol. 16, No. 5 (Sept.-October 1967), p. 4 n.
Sverdlin; the editorial in the next issue of *Kommunist* talks about "the fraternal friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union."  

At his first Party Congress in 1966, Brezhnev also avoided the concept of the Soviet People. On the other hand, he did not use the code word "flourishing" (*rastsvet*), which would have meant the development of the individual peoples. He emphasized the rapprochement of the peoples of the Soviet Union instead. But, most importantly from our point of view, he did not dot the i's as Rogachev and Sverdlin had suggested that Khrushchev should do in 1963. The key sentence in Brezhnev's relatively brief four paragraphs on the nationality question in 1966 reads:

The Party and all Communists, irrespective of their nationality, are called upon to unceasingly work so that there should continue to take place an all-around (*vsemernoie*) rapprochement of the peoples of the Soviet Union, that their friendship and brotherhood may grow, that their economic, cultural and spiritual ties may become tighter and more multifaceted (*mnogoobraznymy*).  

Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone pointed out that, as late as September 1969, an editorial in *Kommunist* denied that merger was the operative goal of Soviet nationality policy. Wrote *Kommunist*:

The rapprochement of Soviet nations and their internationalist unity should not be regarded as the merger. The removal of all national differences is a long process, which cannot be achieved except after full victory of communism in the world and its firm establishment.  

The Central Committee of the CPSU used the theoretical concept of the Soviet People (which implies some kind of merger) for the first time in late December 1969, in its theses on the celebration of Lenin's centennial. But his was done in a somewhat indistinct and off-handed

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manner. Thesis 10 develops the idea that “V. I. Lenin characterized Socialism as a period of gradual destruction of classes and the establishment of social equality.” In the middle of that long Thesis No. 10, we learn that the solution of the nationality question had been regarded by Lenin as “an important prerequisite of social equality.” Three paragraphs below, the Soviet People is defined as “a principally new, multinational community of people, a Socialist union of all toilers of the USSR — industrial workers, workers in agriculture and in the cultural field, people of physical and mental labor, which [union] furnishes a social basis for a multinational state of all the people (obshchenarodnogo).”\(^{17}\)

The concept of the Soviet People was finally endorsed explicitly by Brezhnev at the 24th Party Congress in 1971. Speaking of Leninist nationality policy, “the policy of equality and the friendship of peoples,” and referring to the recent 50th anniversaries of some Soviet republics and the forthcoming Golden Jubilee of the Soviet Union itself, Brezhnev paid tribute “to the great Russian people, above all”:

> Its revolutionary energy, selflessness, diligence, deep internationalism have rightly brought it the sincere respect of all the peoples of our Socialist Fatherland.\(^{18}\)

Then Brezhnev gave a seemingly balanced view of Soviet nationality policy:

> The Party will continue to strengthen the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, will methodically realize the Leninist course toward the flourishing of Socialist nations and their gradual rapprochement (postepennoe sblizhenie).\(^{19}\)

Finally he announced:

> During the years of building Socialism in our country there has emerged a new historical community of human beings — the Soviet People. In joint labor, in the struggle for Socialism, in the battles for its defence new harmonious relations between classes and social groups, among nations and nationalities have been born. Our people (nashie liudi) are welded together

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17 "K 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Vladimíra Ill’icha Lenina: Tezisy [TsK KPSS],” \(Pravda\), December 23, 1969, p. 2.
19 Ibid.
CONCEPT OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE

by the community of Marxist-Leninist ideology, of the lofty goals of building Communist society. This monolithic unity (*splochnnost*) the multi-national Soviet People has demonstrated by its labor, its unanimous approval of the policy of the Communist Party.20 [Emphasis in original.]

The lengthy tribute to the Russian people drew continuing (*prodolzhitel'nye*) applause, as did some references to Socialist internationalism. The definition of the new historical community, the Soviet People, however, did not: the official record refers to mere applause (*aplodismenty*). It is also significant that virtually none of the republican Party Secretaries who spoke after Brezhnev took up the concept of the Soviet People, even though some of them echoed Brezhnev's praise of the Russians.21 Two slightly discordant notes were sounded in the speeches of Mzhavanadze, of Georgia, and of the veteran Lithuanian Communist leader Sniechkus. Mzhavanadze spiked his Congress speech with references to the friendship and brotherhood of Soviet peoples and then proceeded to talk about Georgia's cultural ties not only with Russia but also with the Ukraine and with the Baltic republics. In other words, he did not flatter the "great Russian people" — he did not use that code phrase at all. On the contrary, he cast doubt on the privileged position of the Russians.22 Sniechkus was more diplomatic. He did thank the great Russian people for the economic aid that had been extended to Lithuania, but in his discussion of nationality policy he injected the term "chauvinism," which is an old Soviet code word for Russian nationalism.23

Since the Ukrainian Party leader Shelest was soon (in May 1972) replaced by Shcherbitsky and then (in April 1973) brutally attacked an anonymous book review for national narrow-mindedness,24 and since

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20 Ibid.
21 Most explicitly, the Russians were praised by Brezhnev's Kazakh protégé, Kunaev (*Pravda*, April 1, 1971, p. 4 e). Fulsome in their praise also were Rashidov, of the Uzbek SSR (*Pravda*, April 2, p. 2a) and Usubaliev, of the Kirghiz SSR (*P.*, Apr. 4, p. 7 c); somewhat more restrained was Kochinian, of Armenia (*P.*, Apr. 2, p. 6 e).
22 *Pravda*, April 2, 1971, p. 3.
23 *P.*, April 3, p. 5 d.
both Shelest and Shcherbitsky spoke at the 1971 Party Congress, it is interesting to point out that neither of them clearly endorsed Brezhnev's concept of the Soviet People. Shelest, who was the second discussant of Brezhnev's report (following Grishin, of the Moscow Party organization), did use the term Soviet People twice, but on both occasions it was done in a context which robbed the concept of its full meaning, or diluted the Soviet People ("a new historical community of human beings" — Sovetskii narod) to Soviet people (i.e., Soviet society — Sovetskoe obshchestvo, Sovetskie liudi). Closest perhaps to Brezhnev's meaning did Shelest come when he exclaimed in the second but last paragraph of his speech: "Every year our magnificent Fatherland [i.e., the Soviet Union — Y. B.] is growing mightier and mightier. The new achievements of the Soviet people give joy to our friends."25 [Emphasis added.] Furthermore, in the middle of his speech he praised Brezhnev for planning further increases in the living standards of the Soviet people.26 But that Shelest did not clearly support Brezhnev's concept of the Soviet People appears obvious from a passage in the beginning of his speech:

All our achievements and victories are the result of the further strengthening of the moral and political unity of the Soviet society (Obshchestva), of the union between the working class and the collectively farming peasantry, of the fraternal friendship of the peoples of our multinational Fatherland — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (Applause.)27 [Emphases added.]

Had Shelest fully agreed with Brezhnev, he could have easily — in this important context — used the code term "Soviet People" instead of the traditional one of "Soviet society." But not only did he avoid Sovetskii narod completely in that paragraph, but he talked of the fraternal friendship of Soviet peoples instead.

At the time of the 1971 Party Congress Shelest's position in the Ukraine was already being undermined from above, so his barely hidden defiance of Brezhnev did not come completely unexpectedly. But Shcherbitsky, too, a politician close to Brezhnev, whom he fulsomely praised in his noteworthy speech at the 1971 Party Congress, then Ukrainian Prime Minister and Shelest's eventual successor as First Party Secretary, sidestepped the new concept of Soviet People. In

25 Pravda, April 1, 1971, p. 4 c.
26 Ibid., p. 3 h.
27 Ibid., p. 3 e (3rd paragraph of speech).
the middle of his speech, for example, he praised the Politburo and Brezhnev personally for improving the living standards of Soviet people (sovetskikh liudei). In the middle of the next paragraph he did aver that “the achievements of our republic [were] the result of heroic creative labor of the entire Soviet people (sovetskogo naroda).” This was both reminiscent of Shelest’s earlier statement to the Congress and seemed to approach Brezhnev’s concept of the Soviet People. But, in the very same paragraph, Shcherbitsky blunted the assimilationist point of sovetskii narod by preceding that single reference of his to Brezhnev’s idea with the more traditional moderate references to “the political and ideological unity of our society, the fraternity and friendship of all nations and nationalities.” That paragraph he ended with another reference to the “immoveable friendship of peoples.” For good measure he emphasized his anti-assimilationist stand in the next paragraph by praising the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government for taking constant care to ensure “the flourishing of all Union Republics, the welfare and happiness of all peoples of the Soviet Union.”

Despite the relatively cool reception of the concept of Soviet People by most non-Russian Party leaders, the concept was embodied in the Congress Resolutions, though in a very terse form.

The concept of Soviet People became a key element in the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union in 1972: it appeared in the Central Committee theses of February 1972 and was stressed by Brezhnev in his speech of December 21, 1972. An excerpt from the theses reads:

During the years of building Socialism and Communism in the USSR there has emerged a new historical community of human beings — the Soviet People. It has been formed on the basis of common property of the means of production, the

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28 P., April 7, 1971, p. 8 b. Shcherbitsky’s speech immediately followed that of USSR Prime Minister Kosygin.
29 P., Apr. 2, p. 4 h.
30 P., Apr. 10, p. 4 (Part III, Section 2): “In the process of building Socialism there has been formed a new historical community of human beings — the Soviet People.”
unity of economic, socio-political and cultural life, the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and of the interests and Communist ideals of the working class. There have been formed remarkable traits of the Soviet man: dedication to the cause of Communism; Socialist patriotism and internationalism; superior activity in his work and community and political affairs; intolerance to exploitation and oppression, national and racial prejudices; and class solidarity with the toilers of all countries. Generations of genuine internationalists, selfless fighters for Communism, have grown up. In the USSR have been created the indispensable material and spiritual (духовные) conditions for the further growth of the creative possibilities of every Soviet man, the all-sided development of the individual.31 [Emphasis in original.]

In his well-known 50th anniversary speech, Brezhnev declared:

On the basis of profound and multifaceted (всесторонних) social and political changes, which have occurred in the last half of the century, our community has risen to a qualitatively new level. Fulfilled has been the prediction of great Lenin who would stress that Socialism “was creating new, higher forms of human life” . . . As was noted at the 24th CPSU Congress, in our country there has been firmly established (утвердился) and has become an actual reality a new historical community of human beings — the Soviet People.32 [Emphasis in original.]

Brezhnev pointed out that the rapid economic and social development of each republic led to “the internationalization of our entire life”: the nationalities were becoming intermingled through migration (e.g., millions of Russians were now living in Kazakhstan), and the number of ethnic intermarriages was also increasing rapidly. A uniform Soviet Socialist culture had been created. The significance of the Russian language, which had become the language of intercommunication among all the nations and ethnic groups of the Soviet Union, had increased. In both the material and spiritual spheres, the preconditions for the further rapprochement of the peoples of the USSR were being established, and nationality barriers were crumbling.33 Brezhnev then delivered this pointed and somewhat one-sided warning:

33 Ibid., p. 3 b + c.
The further rapprochement of nations and ethnic groups of our country constitutes an objective process. The party is against the artificial forcing of [this process] — there is no need for this whatsoever, this process is being dictated by the entire course of our Soviet life. At the same time the Party considers inadmissible any efforts whatsoever to delay the process of the rapprochement of nations, to create obstacles to it under this or that pretext, to artificially strengthen the national particularity, because this would contradict the general direction of the development of our community, the internationalist ideas and ideology of the Communists, the interests of the building of Communism.34

Again, it is remarkable how few of the republican Party leaders developed Brezhnev's theme of the Soviet People, as had been the case at the 24th Party Congress. Closest to Brezhnev came the Armenian First Secretary Kochinian, not Aliev of Azerbaidzhan (possibly Aliev yielded the honor to Kochinian, who spoke after him). Kochinian said that Soviet society had entered upon another stage in its development, the advanced building of Communism. At that stage relations among the nationalities were characterized by further rapprochement of the Soviet peoples, the strengthening of economic cooperation, further mutual influences, and a mutual enrichment of cultures.35

Other republican leaders would use the term “Soviet People” in an emotive rather than analytical sense. Perhaps typical is the statement of Shcherbitsky, who had succeeded Shelest as Ukrainian First Secretary in May 1972:

Comrades! Great and magnificent is our Socialist family, whose name is the Soviet People.

... New generations have grown up. Each of them repeats with pride: “We are Soviet people (My — sovetskie liudi).”36

Shevardnadze, of Georgia, who had only recently (in September 1972) been appointed First Secretary of that republic, became lyrical. He pronounced his concluding toast “to the single mighty and great, the invincible and eternal Soviet People.”37 He had said nothing about the

34 Ibid., p. 3 d.
36 Pravda, Dec. 22, 1972, p. 6 g.
37 P., Dec. 23, p. 2 h.
Soviet People in the main body of his speech, however. Sniechkus, of Lithuania, remained rather cool, as he had in 1971. He did politely thank the other Soviet peoples and "the great Russian people, above all, for close cooperation and friendly aid in the building of Socialism and Communism." But then he talked about his Lithuanian people and the flourishing (protsvetanie) of Soviet republics and, unlike Shevardnadze, who had preceded him, he toasted not the Soviet People, but the glorious 50th anniversary of the USSR and the unshakable union of the brotherhood and friendship of peoples. He avoided the term "Soviet People" altogether, even in the non-analytical, emotive sense.\textsuperscript{38}

To conclude our survey of the usage of the concept, Brezhnev's speech at the 25th Party Congress in 1976, as well as his speech on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, should be noted. Brezhnev's speech at the 25th Party Congress is interesting in that it mentioned "the unshakable unity (nerushimoe edinstvo) of all classes and social groups, nations and ethnic groups of our country," but did not use the term "Soviet People," except very briefly in the popular, emotive sense.\textsuperscript{39} Michael Rywkin has shown that, at the Congress, Brezhnev's reference to the unity of Soviet nations was not repeated, except by Aliev of Azerbaidzhan, Kunaev of Kazakhstan, and Gapurov

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., p. 3 h. The other Republican Secretaries contributed as follows: Prime Minister Solomentsev for the RSFSR — single emotive ref. to Soviet People (\textit{P.}, Dec. 22, p. 6 c); Masherov, of Belorussia — single emotive ref. to Soviet People, one ref. to elder Russian brother (\textit{P.}, Dec. 22, pp. 6 e + 7 b); Rashidov, of Uzbekistan — the Uzbek SSR had prospered and flourished (rastsvet) in the great friendship of sovereign (!) republics, balanced by fulsome compliments to the great Russian people and a purple passage on the friendship of the Soviet peoples but not a single ref. to the Soviet People as such (\textit{P.}, Dec. 22, p. 7e, h); Kunaev, of Kazakhstan — thanks the great Russian people, refers to Soviet people in the plural (sovetskie liudi), praises the friendship of peoples (Dec. 23, p. 2 a + d); Rasulov, of Tadzhikistan — ref. to fraternal friendship of Soviet peoples only (December 23, p. 6 a); Usubaliev, of Kirghizia — single emotive ref. to Soviet People (Dec. 23, p. 5 c); Gapurov, of Turkmenistan — friendship of peoples only (Dec. 24, p. 2 h); Bodul, of Moldavia — pride in belonging to the great Soviet People which is not further defined (Dec. 23, p. 4 d); Voss, of Latvia — fraternal family of Soviet peoples, compliments to Russian people, no ref. to Soviet People as such (Dec. 23, p. 4 c + d); Käbin, of Estonia — toasts great Soviet People at end, does not mention in body of speech (Dec. 24, p. 3 d); and Aliev, of Azerbaidzhan — highly praises Russian people, then talks about the friendship of peoples (Dec. 23, p. 3 b + d).

\textsuperscript{39} F. "Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS i ocherednye zadachi Partii v oblasti Vnukrennei i Vneshei Politiiki: Doklad General'nogo sekretaria TsK KPSS tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva 24 fevralia 1976 goda," \textit{Pravda}, Feb. 25, 1976, p. 8 b (discussion of nationality affairs) and p. 2 (introduction, where he refers to the "labor of the Soviet People").
of Turkmenistan. The other republican Party Secretaries used less sweeping references (on the "brotherly," rapprochement-\textit{sblizhenie}, and "big brother" levels). Furthermore, three Secretaries (Bodiul of Moldavia, Kabin of Estonia, and Shevardnadze of Georgia) even injected provocative references to the \textit{rastsvet}, or flourishing, of individual peoples, and Shcherbitsky, of the Ukraine, and Masherov, of Belorussia, did not touch on the sensitive topic of nationality relations at all.\textsuperscript{40}

Brezhnev briefly returned to the concept of Soviet People in his speech at a special session dedicated to the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1977. He stated:

\begin{quote}
The equality, brotherhood, and the unshakable unity of the peoples of the Soviet Union — all these have become a reality.... A new historical community of human beings has been formed — the Soviet People. The ever-accelerating process of the rapprochement of nations permeates all spheres of life of our community.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{quote}

If, without immediately entering into the implications, we assume that the gist of the concept of Soviet People has been to hasten the socio-economic, political and, above all, the psychological integration of Soviet nations, we are struck by the fact that the concept itself has been advanced unevenly: it was hinted at by Khrushchev in the introduction but not developed in the main body of his speech; it is not to be found in the Party Program section on nationality relations, where we should have expected it to be, but in a general section on the Party, and then only in oblique form; it was suggested in a lead article in the Party’s foremost theoretical journal \textit{Kommunist} but was not accepted by the June 1963 Central Committee plenum; Brezhnev passed over it in silence at the 1966 Party Congress; it was then injected half-heartedly into the Theses on the Preparation of Lenin’s Centennial in 1969; finally, Brezhnev revived the concept at the 1971 Party Congress and during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union, only to softpedal it himself at the 1976 Congress, and then to briefly restate it at the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1977. What accounts for all these ups and downs of the term “Soviet People”? The explanation may lie in the fluctuations of internal and external Soviet politics.

\textsuperscript{40} M. R., op. cit., (note 35), pp. 5-7.
POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE FLUCTUATIONS IN THE USAGE OF THE CONCEPT

For all his customary ebullience, Khrushchev, who had already embarked upon an integrationist and assimilationist course in 1958, appeared not to be very sanguine about the feasibility of establishing the Soviet People in the foreseeable future. There is not a single reference to the politico-sociological concept of the Soviet People in his memoirs. (Though it is probable that some sections dealing with his successors have been cut out, it is less probable that Brezhnev would have deleted a Khrushchev reference to the Soviet People, unless, possibly, he himself wanted to take credit for the term, which, as we shall see later, does not appear very likely.) Khrushchev's mention of the Soviet People in the introduction to his speech may have been a colorful trial balloon that Khrushchev abandoned himself only a few hours later. Certainly in June 1963 Khrushchev would appear to have been too preoccupied with other, more pressing concerns: there was the bad harvest of 1962, the Cuban Crisis of October 1962, the even more controversial reorganization of the Party at the November 1962 Central Committee plenum, the showdown with Frol Kozlov in April 1963 over the May Day slogans, and the reappointment to the Secretariat of heir-apparent Brezhnev, together with the new promotion to that body of counter-heir Podgorny at the June 1963 plenum. In foreign affairs, there was the question whether or not to sign the nuclear test ban treaty.

Above all, there were the Chinese. In June and July 1963 an exchange of most vitriolic open letters over the signatures of the Chinese and the Soviet Party Central Committee took place. Indeed, the entire Party Program in a fundamental sense was the response to the earlier Chinese claims of having reached the stage of building Communism. The stakes were very high. In the pithy words of Khrushchev's memoirs:

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For years Mao Tse-tung has been spoiling for a fight. He has been looking for an opportunity to take control of the international Communist movement, and he knows that in order to do so he must challenge the Soviet Union. It doesn’t matter [what Soviet leader] he picks a fight with — Khrushchev or Petrov or Ivanov or Sidorov.45

Or, we may add, Brezhnev.

Brezhnev had also been rather preoccupied with the challenge from the Chinese, as can be seen from his numerous efforts to arrange a Communist world conference in order to condemn the Chinese. His efforts were only partly successful when at last the “International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties” was convened in Moscow in June 1969.46 In December 1966 the Central Committee had already appeared to give serious consideration to some form of military intervention in China. The border clashes of 1969 are well-known, as is the fact that in the summer of 1969 Soviet diplomats were taking soundings in Western capitals on possible reactions to a Soviet nuclear strike against China.47 But from 1964 through at least 1967 Brezhnev’s first priority was to consolidate his rule in Moscow. There are several indications that Khrushchev’s assimilationist policy has provoked considerable dissatisfaction in the non-Russian republics, and so Brezhnev decided not to press integration on all fronts at once but to spread some oil first on the choppy waters of nationality relations.

Even though the 1961 Party Program had stopped short of the concept of Soviet People, it had inspired a great number of articles and pamphlets by partisans of rapid cultural assimilation and socio-political integration, such as Akhed Agaiev, a Daghestani writer publishing in Russian,48 and the Ukrainian publicist I. Kravtsev.49 In the Ukraine, this provoked spirited rejoinders from the defenders of

48 See his article “V sem’e vol’noi, novoi: Zametki o vzaimoobogashchenii natsional’nykh kul’tur,” Izvestiia, Dec. 5, 1961, p. 4, in which the praises non-Russians who write their works in Russian, like himself.
49 See, e. g., his pamphlet *Razvitie natsional’nykh otoshenii v SSSR* (Kiev, 1962).
cultural and socio-political autonomy, both in the official media and in the underground: Buriak's pointed remark that national differences were not disappearing even in the era of sputniks;\textsuperscript{50} the officially sponsored five-day republican conference on the culture of the Ukrainian language in Kiev, February 11-15, 1968, which Soviet media belatedly tried to ignore or distort;\textsuperscript{51} Symonenko’s unpublished poem “To Our Kurdish Brothers”;\textsuperscript{52} Dzyuba’s famous polemical treatise \textit{Internationalism or Russification?}, which in December 1965 was submitted to Shelest, then First Party Secretary, and Sherbitsky, then Prime Minister of the Ukrainian SSR, and which probably had been written with some encouragement of high Party officials from Shelest’s circle;\textsuperscript{53} and, last but not least, the spirited defense of the use of the Ukrainian language at the Congress of the Writers Union of Ukraine in November 1966.\textsuperscript{54}

In Lithuania in 1963 a Lithuanian student was sharply reprimanded and probably punished because he had called the Party Program of 1961 a plan for the Russification of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{55} Of particular interest, especially in the light of the language demonstrations in Georgia in the spring of 1978, is the openly sarcastic attack on assimilation policy by the Chairman of the Writer’s Union of Georgia, I. V. Abashidze, at the Union’s Congress in March 1966. (Did the Ukrainian writers emulate


\textsuperscript{54} See the ringing appeal by young Ukrainian writer Victor Korzh: “Though we are internationalists, we will always remain Ukrainians,” \textit{Literaturna Ukraina}, Nov. 22, 1966, p. 3; as cited in V. Stanley Vardys, “Altes und Neues in der sowjetischen Nationalitätenpolitik seit Chruschtschows Sturz,” \textit{Osteuropa}, Vol 18, No. 2 (Feb. 1968), p. 84. See also Bilinsky, \textit{loc. cit.} (1968) (note 52), pp. 175-175.

\textsuperscript{55} See \textit{Komjaunimo tiesa}, Sept. 27, 1963, p. 3; as cited by Vardys, ibid., p. 88.
the Georgians in November 1966?) Said Abashidze: “The Soviet experience in cultural development of almost fifty years does not bear out the prognosis that had been made at the beginning of the 20th century [by Karl Kautsky, according to Abashidze], according to which the peoples and languages would merge into one nation with one language.” He declared truculently: “We will keep the national forms of the culture of our peoples until the final victory of Communism and we will pass them on to our descendants, our native language, above all. They may then decide whether they will still need them or not.”

Though the anti-assimilationists in the other republics did not engage in similar outbursts, V. Stanley Vardys discovered and documented their rumblings in the mid-1960s in areas as scattered as Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Daghestan, Estonia, and Belorussia. From the viewpoint of the central government, a particularly bothersome aspect of all these anti-assimilationist manifestations was that the spokesmen (e.g., Symonenko and Dzyuba) were frequently men who had been born under the Soviet regime and educated in good Soviet schools, not the proverbial old Kirghiz shepherds and Latvian fishermen whom modern life had almost passed by and who could be expected to harbor the remnants of the old nationalist mentality. In short, Brezhnev had to deal with what the Soviet sociologist Iu. V. Arutiunian and, more explicitly, Zev Katz have called the “new nationalism.”

Faced with all this opposition, Brezhnev decided upon a tactical retreat: the most irksome minor measures designed to restrict the autonomy of the republics were abolished, the major policies of economic and political integration were not. Within weeks of Khrushchev's overthrow, i.e., in November-December 1964, the Party secretly abolished its Central Asian and Transcaucasian Bureaus, established at the beginning of 1963, with the obvious intentions of undercutting the position of the individual republican parties, increasing central control, and hastening political integration on a regional basis. (Had not the 1961 Party Program declared that republican boundaries were losing their former significance?) Then, between December 23-30, 1964, the Central Asian Regional Economic Council was dissolved.

56 Zaria vostoka, March 10, 1966, p. 2; as cited by Vardys, ibid.
57 Ibid., pp. 84-85.
and the economic councils of the individual Central Asian republics were restored. On October 19, 1965, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR dissolved the so-called Virgin Land Territory, or *Krai*, which had been established December 26, 1960. Some Kazakhs had felt that the establishment of the Virgin Lands *Krai* undercut the provincial and republican administrations in the Kazakh SSR and that it facilitated the immigration of Slavic settlers. There were also rumors circulating that the Virgin Lands *Krai* would be detached from the Kazakh SSR and incorporated in the Russian SFSR. In 1965, a number of economic and cultural concessions were also given to the Balts. The most important of the latter was the permission granted in August 1965 to have an eleven-year curriculum in schools teaching in Lithuanian, Latvian, or Estonian (the normal curriculum in Soviet schools being limited to ten years).59

All those concessions and the basic uncertainty about his power position (it was not until late May 1967 that Brezhnev ousted Shelepin’s protégé, Semichastny, from the leadership of the KGB and several months later that he ousted Shelepin himself from the Secretariat) may have led Brezhnev to be somewhat conciliatory toward the non-Russian nationalities at the 1966 Party Congress. But his gestures did not extend to policy areas that really mattered, those of political and economic controls: the first wave of arrests among dissident patriotic Ukrainian intellectuals took place in late August and early September 1965 (that wave was the immediate cause for Dzyuba’s treatise), and in late September 1965 all the regional economic councils were dissolved and the Soviet economy recentralized.

What persuaded Brezhnev in late 1969 to throw the caution of 1966 to the winds and to advance the concept of the Soviet People, first somewhat offhandedly, in connection with the goal of social equality, and then openly and independently in 1971 and 1972? First of all, trite as it may sound, I would not underestimate the psychological pressure exerted by the big anniversaries — the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967, the Centennial of Lenin’s Birth in 1970, the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1972. Brezhnev may be pragmatic, but he is also inordinately vain. Second, the

“Prague Spring” of 1968 threatened the cohesion of Socialist Eastern Europe, and before long the cohesion of the Soviet Union might also have been called in question. Brezhnev weathered the Czechoslovak crisis surprisingly well. Dubček’s challenge appears to have provoked a lot of Russian patriotic fervor, bordering on chauvinism — there were only seven demonstrators on Red Square against the invasion. The border clashes with the Chinese in 1969 also appear to have incited the same fervor. The international Communist conference in June 1969 was not an unqualified success: it did not endorse a Soviet crusade against China and produced some open criticism of Soviet foreign policy by a few foreign Communist parties. But overall it was successful; 75 Communist parties attended that conference, only six fewer than were present at the world Communist conference in Moscow in 1960. In 1970 Brezhnev achieved a major diplomatic breakthrough with the signing of the treaty with West Germany, the culmination of more or less discreet contacts with Brandt going back as far as 1963. In domestic politics, too, Brezhnev’s position was more secure. In July 1970 Brezhnev dealt a major blow to the Podgorny protégé and fellow-Politburo member Shelest by foisting on him a KGB chief from outside the Ukraine. In short, in 1969-1970 Brezhnev had reasons to feel confident, despite the postponement of the 24th Party Congress to 1971 and the entire “mini-crisis” of 1970.

But what spurred Brezhnev on to advocate the concept of Soviet People? Though the evidence is merely suggestive, not to say speculative, I believe that Brezhnev may have been stung into action by the bold program of the dissident Democratic Movement of 1969, the strong rejoinder by dissident Russian nationalists, the Slovo natsii (The Nation Speaks) of 1970, and possibly Amalrik’s brilliant 1969 essay, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? There is also some suggestive evidence that the man pushing for a solution of the

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60 The only thorough exploration of the interrelationship between Soviet foreign policy and Soviet domestic politics (particularly nationality policy) in relation to the Czechoslovak question is that by Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra: Department of Political Science, Australian National University, 1970; Occasional Paper No. 6).


nationality question in the spirit of assimilation — though not necessarily under the label of Soviet People — may have been not Brezhnev himself, but the Stalinist conscience of the Party, Mikhail Suslov, a Russian of Old Believer stock.

It might be argued that the very last thing that Brezhnev wanted in Lenin’s centennial year was to allow the debate on the nationality question — within elite circles, to be sure, not in the public media — to be dominated by “The Democrats of Russia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic States” on the one hand and the “Russian Patriots” on the other. The first advocated major concessions to the non-Russian nations, including political self-determination by means of UN-supervised referenda. The latter praised the building of the Russian Empire and ridiculed the notion of the separation of the non-Russian nations. For good measure, the maverick historian and sincere Russian patriot Andrei Amalrik had written a brilliant pamphlet in which he outlined the unavoidable “deimperialization” as result of a long-drawn-out war with China. It seems to me that Brezhnev decided to open the ideological counteroffensive and recover the ground lost in the elite discussion by slightly refurbishing Khrushchev’s concept of Soviet People in the Theses on the Celebration of the Centennial of Lenin’s Birth. Another incentive for Brezhnev to act may have been that the more sophisticated and esoteric scholarly discussion on nationality policy was dragging on inconclusively (see Section III, below).

Suslov has been very harshly described in Volumes 7-8 of the Ukrainian Herald as a Russian chauvinist and author of the thesis of Soviet People. The public evidence does not bear out the latter


66 See Anonymous, “Partial Cooperation and Astute Diplomacy,” in The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8: Ethnocide of Ukrainian in the U. S. R., Spring 1974 (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1976), p. 27; also “Demographic Statistics Exposing the Colonial Policy of Moscow’s Occupation Forces in Ukraine,” ibid., p. 76. On the other hand, nowhere in Alexander Yanov’s books has Suslov been mentioned as a member of the Russian nationalist group, though Shelepin, Grishin, and Poliansky have been (Poliansky, incidentally, is an ethnic Ukrainian). See Alexander Yanov, Détente After Brezhnev: The
charge, but Suslov does appear to have been strongly involved in launching a major ideological campaign against non-Russian bourgeois nationalism in December 1971 (i.e., two months before the publication of the Theses on the 50th Anniversary of the Soviet Union) and he may also been involved in the attempted purge of one prominent non-Russian Party official.

Suslov gave a major address at the All-Union Conference of the Chairmen of Social Science Departments from December 21-23, 1971, immediately published in Kommunist. In the speech, Suslov devotes four vivid paragraphs to the nationality problem. He considers it as one of the three most acute questions in the sphere of socio-political development (the overcoming of the differences between urban and rural areas, between physical and mental labor, and the increasing rapprochement of the socialist nations).67 “The establishment and development of the multinational Socialist state has a universal historical significance,” avers Suslov. He continues:

The entire history of the development of national relations in the USSR is the history of the successive realization of Leninist nationality policy. The great Lenin had worked out the program of the Socialist solution of the nationality question — one of the sharpest (samykh ostrykh) and most difficult of [all] social problems.68 [Emphasis added.]

But Suslov does not mention the concept of Soviet People, even though that term had been endorsed by Brezhnev at the preceding 1971 Party Congress. Suslov uses the traditional formulae of “the flourishing (rastsvet) of Socialist nations and their gradual rapprochement (postepennoe sblizhenie), their growing together (splochenie),... the struggle against any manifestation whatsoever of nationalism and chauvinism, for proletarian internationalism and the friendship of peoples.”69 According to the interpretational canons of Sovietology, Suslov appears to have expressed implicit reservations about the concept of Soviet People.

Domestic Roots of Soviet Foreign Policy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1977) and The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR (same publ., 1978).


68 Suslov, ibid., p. 23; emphasis added.

69 Ibid., p. 24.
There is, however, some underground publications (samizdat) and similar evidence on the other side. Suslov may well have pressed for the further rapprochement of peoples at secret meetings. For instance, at the inadequately publicized November 1971 Central Committee plenum, Suslov is said to have demanded the resignation of Lviv Province Secretary Kutsevol. The Central Committee even passed an unpublicized formal resolution criticizing the work of the Lviv Party organization in combatting Ukrainian nationalist feelings. Suslov, however, did not get his way with Kutsevol, who, according to the Ukrainian Herald, was protected by his immediate superior, Shelest. The evidence, however, is too slim to attribute Brezhnev's emphasis on the Soviet People directly to Suslov. At most, Brezhnev was trying to stay a step ahead of Suslov.

Thus, it is not possible to pinpoint the person who inspired Brezhnev to endorse fully the concept of Soviet People in 1971 and 1972, nor the exact time when this was done. Probably it was not Suslov, at least not directly. It would also seem that the omission of a specific reference to the Soviet People at the 1976 Party Congress may be an indication that Brezhnev and his closest advisors did not feel very comfortable with the term. At the 1976 Party Congress Brezhnev was almost defensive in summarizing the recent Party effort to combat "isolated manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism." The adoption of the concept in 1971-1972 and the resulting accentuation of the assimilationist aspects of Soviet nationality policy would thus appear to be a response to the challenge from the Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Dubček's Czechoslovakia, and more directly, in the domestic sphere, to the challenge from the non-Russian autonomists and nationalists on one hand and the Russian nationalists on the other. I believe that the pressure from the latter may be more dangerous for Brezhnev and would like to consider them a little now.

On the extreme right of the Russian nationalists is former Komsomol

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70 "The General Pogrom," Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8, p. 126. When the Herald came out, the Central Committee resolution against the Lviv Party organization had not been mentioned in the Soviet press. Brezhnev did briefly refer to such a resolution in his 1976 Party Congress speech, however — see Pravda, Feb. 25, 1976, p. 8 b. I am also reminded of the statement by the late Vsevolod Holubnychy, a topnotch scholar with a "feel" for Soviet developments, that reportedly Suslov had been quite indignant when the 1970 population census data on languages had come in: Suslov had expected more Soviet citizens to speak Russian. That statement, alas, is not verifiable now.

71 Pravda, Feb. 25, 1976, p. 8 b.
Secretary Gennadii M. Shimanov, the reputed author of the 1970 manifesto *The Nation Speaks*. He writes:

> The Soviet Union is not a mechanical conglomeration of nations of different kinds . . . but a MYSTICAL ORGANISM, composed of nations mutually supplementing each other and making up, under the leadership of the Russian people, a LITTLE MANKIND — the beginning and the spiritual detonator for the great mankind.72

Shorn of its Russian Orthodox mysticism — and the capital letters — this seems a rather close paraphrase of the ideal of the Soviet People, of the “international significance” of the Soviet state. Sometime in late 1970 or early 1971 Brezhnev reportedly tried to curb the influence of the Russian nationalist group centered on the Komsomol paper *Molodaia gvardiia*. He threatened to have their spokesman Melent'ev expelled from the Party and the apparatus of the Central Committee. Melent'ev was indeed promptly dismissed from the Central Committee Staff, only to resurface as Deputy Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation and then to be promoted to Minister. At least, this is how Alexander Yanov presents it.73 On the other hand, A. N. Yakovlev who had publicly criticized the revival of Russian nationalism in a gigantic article in *Literaturnaia gazeta* November 15, 1972, lost his job as acting head of the Propaganda Division in the Party Secretariat and was appointed Soviet Ambassador to Canada, a clear demotion in Soviet political practice.74 It would seem to me that in 1970 Brezhnev tried to battle Russian “chauvinists” and got the worse in the duel. A nimble politician, Brezhnev then stole their thunder by capping the expected

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73 Yanov, op. cit. (1978), pp. 55-56. Yanov's story is a dramatic one, especially Brezhnev's reputed words at the conclusion of Melent'ev's audience with Brezhnev: “There is no place for you even in the Party, let alone in the Central Committee.” Alas, I could not locate Melent'ev's name among the full and candidate CC members nor even the members of the Central Auditing Commission in Herwig Kraus, comp., *The Composition of Leading Organs of the CPSU (1952-1976)* (Munich: Radio Liberty, 1976). In his letter to me of November 23, 1980, Dr. Yanov explained that Melent'ev could not be found in the lists of members of the Central Committee “because he worked in the Central Committee Apparatus, as a consultant to its Culture Section and also, possibly, carried out the duties of the Section’s Deputy Chief.” The technical term for the CC apparatus is the Secretariat.

74 Yanov, op. cit. (1978), pp. 56-60.
big celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union with his endorsement of the concept of Soviet People, which, by and large, is acceptable to both liberal and extreme Russian nationalists. An anonymous author in Veche is proud of having achieved a federation of peoples "in the Russian manner (po russki)" which is distinguished from both American and Chinese assimilation. He quotes Berdiaev on the "national unselfishness and willingness to sacrifice in the Russian nature, which is unknown to Western peoples." The tradition of universality (vsemirnost') of Russian man is being exalted, with a bow toward Dostoyevsky. Another nationalist author writes:

Russian history was characterized by the voluntary union of the peoples with Russia. . . . If it can be said that the Russian empire was maintained by bayonets, this was true only in the sense that Russian bayonets defended the outlands from the claims of cruel neighbors. Russia knew how to instill love for itself and this was the secret of its power.

The previously cited author in Veche is admittedly critical of rapid Russification due to the thoughtless policy of establishing a "Soviet nation." He also places the blame for rapid Russification on the excesses of Russified non-Russians such as Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, and Dzierzhinski. On the other hand, he finds some assimilation inevitable: a result of the interethnic migration engendered by socio-economic development and the personal ambitions of non-Russians who want a scientific and administrative career. But so long as the drive for a "Soviet People" does not proceed with undue haste and does not impinge upon the development of the "Russian nation," it is a drive that a Russian patriot can thoroughly approve of. This brings me to the subject: what exactly is the Soviet People; what are its theoretical and practical implications?

SOME THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Writing around 1976, the Soviet scholar S. T. Kaltakhchian has defined the Soviet People as follows:

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76 "Russkoe Reshenie . . .," loc. cit., p. 7.
77 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
[The Soviet People] is a new historical, social and international community of human beings that have a common territory, economy, a culture which is Socialist in content, a federal (soiuznoe) all-people's state, and a common aim — the building of Communism.80

More concretely, in his words:

The national community exists in an organic union (edinstve) with a higher, international community, and the representatives of any nation or ethnic group (narodnosti) of the USSR regard themselves, above all, as Soviet people (sovetskimi liud’mi).81

If consciousness is considered the key element of a nation in classical Western literature,82 does this imply that the Soviet People (narod) is really a new Soviet Nation (natsiia)? In scholarly language, narod appears a sufficiently broad term to "embrace various forms of ethncal communities (tribe, ethnic group [narodnost’], nation)."83 But in ordinary literary Russian the word narod, for all its emotive appeal, carries the connotation of something amorphous, indistinct, and politically incomplete, unlike the term natsia. Thus, the concept of the Soviet People appears to be ideally suited to opposite interpretations: restrictive and broad.

Apparently to counteract possible Western interpretations of the concept as license for forcible assimilation and to assure the Soviet nations that they would continue to exist for a long time, the same Kaltakhchian wrote in 1972 that the development of common Soviet traits among all Soviet people (liudei) did not mean that the people would be converted "into some kind of a new nation." The Soviet People had certain features that were similar to the characteristics of a nation (common territory, common economy, a common psychological make-up), "but this still did not constitute a national community, but represented the unity (edinstvo) of all nations and

80 Kaltakhchian, loc. cit. (note 3), p. 25 b. The copy was signed for the printer May 19, 1976.
81 Ibid., p. 25 c.
82 Wrote Rupert Emerson: "The nation is a community of people who feel that they belong together in the double sense that they share deeply significant elements of a common heritage and that they have a common destiny for the future." See his From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. 95.
ethnic groups of the USSR." In plain English, according to Kaltakhchian, the Soviet People was almost a Soviet Nation, but not quite. We have seen that this restrictive interpretation pleased the nationalist author in Veche.

But another Soviet scholar, M. I. Kulichenko, writing in 1971, had interpreted the Soviet People in a somewhat broader sense, i.e., to him the Soviet People was practically a nation. Admittedly, he did not say so explicitly. Wrote Kulichenko:

[The Soviet People] is a community of the international (mezhnatsional'nogo) type. But its essence must not be reduced only to the results of the rapprochement of ethnic, national characteristics of people. If already in the nation the social factor (sotsial'noe) plays a determining role in comparison with the ethnical, then in the Soviet People as a community the role of the social factors increases even more.

Under "social factor" Kulichenko understood representatives of different nations working together to build Socialism and Communism. He also wrote:

Basically, there have already been formed, there continue to develop and there are even emerging new, common characteristics of the nations and ethnic groups that make up the Soviet People: [viz.,] common territory; the unity of economic life, goals and interests; common features of the psychological make-up that are embodied in a single Marxist-Leninist ideology, in Soviet patriotism and Soviet internationalism, in the establishment and development of multinational Soviet culture.

Since all those characteristics are the traits of a nation, Kulichenko appears to be arguing that the establishment of a Soviet nation is practically achieved. He does not, like Kaltakhchian, assert that the characteristics of the Soviet People are merely similar to those of a nation — to him they are, by implication, identical.

To make matters worse, for a number of years before the official endorsement of the concept Soviet People, a somewhat inconclusive

84 S. Kaltakhchian, "Sovetskii narod — novaia istoricheskaia obshchnost' liudei," Pravda, March 17, 1972, p. 2 e. See also his article on "Natsiia" in B. S. E. 3, Vol. 17, pp. 376-76.


86 Ibid., p. 15.
debate on the concept of the nation had been waged in Soviet scholarly journals. Almost diametrically opposing viewpoints were expressed in the discussion. For instance, the opening article in the *Voprosy istorii* series was by the "aggressive denationalizers" Rogachev and Sverdlin, who in June 1963 had publicly suggested that Khrushchev should follow up on his concept of the Soviet People. In their 1966 article in *Voprosy istorii* they do not use that term, but they tend to redefine the nation in a thoroughly modern, "Socialist" way. They also stress the very significant (gromadnaia) role of the state in the formation of nations: "The separation of an ethnic group by state boundaries as a rule makes it impossible for those groups to coalesce into a single nation. . . . On the other hand, ethnic groups of the most varied origins, living in the framework of a single unitary state, frequently merge into a single nation." The import of their argument becomes clear: the nations of the Soviet Union, with the exception of the Russians, the Georgians, Armenians, Latvians, and Estonians, really have no deep roots, a conclusion they reach by adding to their definition of the nation the elements of the working class and the literary language. Furthermore, though their explicit reference to the merger of ethnic groups in unitary states into a single nation is taken from modern African politics, it wears a transparently Aesopian garb: if many of the Soviet nations are really ethnic groups in disguise, why should they not be merged into a single Soviet nation through the actions of the Soviet state, which is unitary *de facto*, if not *de jure*? The 1970 summary of the discussion by the editors of *Voprosy istorii* appears to support Rogachev and Sverdlin by emphasizing the unity of economic life as one of the most basic determining characteristics of the nation.

Against Rogachev and Sverdlin argues the Kirghiz philosopher M. S. Dzhunusov. If the former are interested in stressing the modern
characteristics of a nation and hint at the future merger of Soviet nations à la the consolidation of tribes in today's Mali, Dzhunusov, on the contrary, keeps emphasizing the deep roots of nations. In his words: "The nation is the highest form of an ethnic community, which has been established on the basis of either bourgeois or Socialist community relations."\(^{91}\) Those ethnic communities are quite stable, almost eternal.\(^{92}\) They only change forms: a tribe becomes an ethnic group, and an ethnic group grows into a nation, but it does not lose the characteristics common to all types of ethnic communities such as language, ethnic territory, ethnic self-consciousness.\(^{93}\) A nation should not be reduced to any of its components; more than twenty Latin American nations speak Spanish, but they feel themselves to be different ethnic communities.\(^{94}\) Dzhunusov is especially concerned about the overstrfessing of the economic factor. According to him, the Socialist economic development "simultaneously serves as the basis for the development of such a multinational community of human beings as the Soviet People and for the development of national communities (of nations and ethnic groups)."\(^{95}\) Secondly, the ethnic characteristics grow autonomously; they are not dependent on socio-economic processes. He writes:

The development of a nation is an integral process. It includes changes in the social as well as the {\textit{ethnic life}} of the nation. The development of the nation is expressed not only in the growth of industry and agriculture and in the progressive changes of its class structure, in the strengthening of national statehood, but also in the development of [its] language, of national self-consciousness, of national pride, etc.\(^{96}\) [Emphasis added.]

For good measure, he throws in the contention that, if, according to the 1959 population census, there were only 114.1 million self-declared Russians in the USSR but that as many as 124.3 million people declared Russian to be their native language, this merely proves that ethnic self-consciousness is a more stable factor than native language.\(^{97}\)

\(^{92}\) "We must suppose that the etnic boundaries will remain a long time after the disappearance of state boundaries" — ibid., p. 30.
\(^{93}\) Ibid., p. 24.
\(^{94}\) Ibid., p. 25.
\(^{95}\) Ibid., p. 27.
\(^{96}\) Ibid., p. 29.
\(^{97}\) Ibid., p. 30.
In short, Dzhunusov appears to be saying that ethnic communities, such as nations and smaller ethnic groups, have lives of their own and cannot be easily manipulated by economic policies and changes in the state structure.

Dzhunusov, a philosopher and a representative of a small Central Asian nation, may underestimate the impact of political forms on ethnic communities. Teresa Rakowska Harmstone is correct in stressing the importance of the Soviet federal system in providing a politico-administrative channel for the self-assertion of the national elites.98 The question of state forms has also been debated by Soviet lawyers: the radicals wanting to abolish the Soviet republics, the conservatives insisting on the continued usefulness of the federal framework.

P. G. Semenov starts off his interpretation of the 1961 Party Program by claiming that the three Party programs correspond to three approaches to the nationality question. The first pre-revolutionary program (of 1903, with the inclusion of selected documents from 1913 and April 1917) aimed at the establishment of the legal equality of the nationalities. The second program, of 1919, aimed at the establishment of actual socio-economic equality under Socialism. This task has been accomplished. Consequently, the third Party Program of 1961 cannot but take "the straight Communist approach — the achievement of an all-around (vsestoronnogo) unity of the Soviet nations with the inevitable perspective of their full merger."99 Faithful to his scheme, he claims that federal forms have already fulfilled their historical mission of safeguarding the "national" (i. e., ethnic) freedom — in the period of the advanced building of Communism, the true guarantor of the freedoms of the Soviet nations is the genuinely democratic nature of the Soviet political system. The only function left for the federal forms is to help develop the economies and cultures of the nations and ethnic groups of the Soviet Union. True, the merger of the Soviet nations should not be forced prematurely. But it is not far off; the merger of the nations will precede the withering away of the state, and the Soviet nations are already intermingling and assimilating.100 He concludes

100 Ibid., pp. 23-25.
his forceful article with the following sentence:

The mutual assimilation of nations essentially denationalizes
the national-territorial autonomies and even the union
republics, bringing Soviet society from that aspect as well
closer to the point where the full state and legal merger of
nations will become a matter of the foreseeable future. 101

Semenov did not use the concept of Soviet People, but he was laying
the groundwork for it by rationalizing the fast disappearance of the
existing Soviet nations in their Union and Autonomous Republics. As
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone has pointed out, the discussion on the
abolition of ethnically-based territorial units continued into the 1970s,
though in a somewhat more restrained form. 102

Semenov was answered rather sharply by the Armenian historian of
Soviet nationality policy, M. O. Mnatsakanian. Challenging the
predominantly assimilationist tendency of the Party Program, he
wrote an article in praise of increasing the rights of the Union
Republics in the past decade. He sharply attacked Stalin:

As he did in the period of the establishment of the USSR,
Stalin in his subsequent practical activity ignored the
objective historical tendency of Socialism in the nationality
question, viz., the all-around development of Socialist nations,
of their economies, cultures, languages, and their statehood.
Therein lie the roots of his mistakes in the nationality
question. 103

Since in 1963, when Mnatsakanian’s article was published, Stalin had
already been repudiated many times, this attack was probably directed
against living Stalinists in the nationality question. Without naming
Semenov — an indication perhaps that in 1963 Semenov had powerful
friends — Mnatsakanian rejects his theory of the withering away of
Soviet federalism:

Inasmuch as the state will wither away sooner than the
national differences will have been liquidated, it is quite
possible that after the withering away of the state the
federation will continue in existence for some time (kakoe to

101 Ibid., p. 25
103 M. O. Mnatsakanian, “Deiatel’nost’ KPSS po razshireniiu prav soiuznykh republik
(1953-1962 gg.),” Voprosy istorii KPSS, 1963, No. 10 (October), p. 4. Not only is this the
lead article in the issue, but it has been printed under the general title “Velikoe
desiatiletie” (The Great 10th Anniversary).
vremia), though no longer as a state union of nations. It will lose its political character, its sphere of action will extend only to the fields of economic and cultural interrelations of the Communist nations. And only then when the federation will have fulfilled its historic mission, i. e., when the national differences will have been liquidated, will the necessity of its existence fall away.  

An even stronger attack on Semenov was launched by a fellow jurist, A. I. Lepeshkin. Lepeshkin’s moderate approach is particularly important because ultimately Brezhnev followed him in maintaining the federal status quo. In 1963 Lepeshkin, a senior doktor of law (Semenov was only a kandidat) emphasized that, unlike Stalin, Lenin had been firmly committed to a federal solution after the October Revolution, although before April 1917 he had rejected federalism in principle.

Having thus established his authority, Lepeshkin rhetorically asked whether the federal form of statehood had already outlived its usefulness at the given stage of development (the advanced building of Communism). He answered in a way similar to the argument of Mnatsakanian:

Soviet federalism has by far not exhausted the tasks before it such as the further joining (splochenie) of all the peoples of our country, the strengthening of their international unity (edinstva), of mutual confidence and friendship among them. It would be incorrect to assume that Soviet federalism and, a fortiori, Soviet nationality (natsionaVnaia) statehood had already fulfilled their historical mission. The task of Soviet federalism as the national political form of state structure are inseparably linked to the tasks and functions of the state itself. Soviet federalism will be the absolutely necessary (neobkhodimym) institution of state structure as long as will exist the state, as long as will be preserved the particularities in the organization of the political and cultural life of nations and ethnic groups, which should neither be ignored nor blown out of proportion.

In the discussions of 1961-1963, we thus see contradictory prognoses for the future of nationalities: they will either wither away before the state (writes Semenov) or will last as long as the state (according to Lepeshkin) or may even outlive the state (Mnatsakanian).

104 Ibid., p.9.
106 Ibid., pp. 66-67.
In 1975 Lepeshkin, then a professor at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Institute of International Relations and an Honored Scholar of the Russian Republic, returned to the subject of Soviet federalism in an article in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*. That article is remarkable in several respects. First, he attacks Semenov by name, especially for his prediction that a unitary republic would replace the Soviet federation in the "foreseeable future." He even pokes fun at Semenov's arguments, saying that there had been Soviet authors as early as 1924 who had predicted the demise of Soviet federalism upon the establishment of the legal equality of nations and the liquidation of their actual inequality. Secondly, Lepeshkin expands on his 1963 assertion that Soviet federalism has not outlived its usefulness: federalism helps to complete the eradication of the remaining actual inequality among Soviet nations (a lot has been done, but there are still "unsolved tasks"); federalism helps to combat the remnants of national egoism, localism, and other negative phenomena ("Despite the solution of the nationality question, nationality relations remain in the community of developed Socialism"); and federalism helps in the "further flourishing of the Socialist culture of the peoples of the USSR." Third — and, from our point of view, this is a great disappointment — Lepeshkin does not come to grips with the concept of Soviet People, despite the fact that his article was published more than four years after the 1971 Party Congress. Must we conclude from this that the distinguished Soviet legal scholar regards the creation of a genuinely unified Soviet People as a very distant, possibly even an unattainable prospect, as something that the Germans call *Zukunfts Musik* (music of the future)? Is this also the true reason why Kaltakhchian refused to identify the Soviet People with a nation? To answer these questions, we must now turn to some of the practical implications of the concept.

**SOME PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS**

The practical implications of the concept of Soviet People are as vast as the entire field of nationality relations in the Soviet Union. An exceedingly rapid overview might be tried under three headings: the

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108 Ibid., pp. 5-8. On p. 6 he admittedly mentions the Soviet People offhandedly: "... The federal form of statehood [allows] as past experience has shown to take into consideration most fully the national specific economic interests of particular nations with the common economic interest and goals of the Soviet People as a whole."
attempted equalization of the socio-economic development of Soviet nationalities, assimilation, and political factors impinging on these two processes.

Iu. V. Arutiunian, a leading Soviet sociologist, concluded his article on the “Changes in the Social Structure of Soviet Nations” by asserting:

The major tendency in these changes [from 1926-1959] has been the creation of a socially homogenous society, a society without classes and national inequality, leading at the present stage of our development, as was noted at the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU, to the creation of a new historical community — the Soviet people — characterized by harmonious relationships among classes, social groups, nations, and nationalities.109[Emphasis added.]

The evidence shows that this is still an ideal rather than the reality. Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph S Clem point out that, with the exception of the Jews, who are the most heavily urbanized group in the Soviet Union, the Russians have consistently remained more urbanized than all the other nationalities from 1897-1970.110 The same authors have combined Tables 1, 3, and 10 from Arutiunian’s article on the nationality composition of the nonagricultural work force (in both physical and mental jobs) in the Union Republics from 1926 to 1959 in order to show the differential integration of the main Soviet nations into the modern economy. The data are not perfect; for instance, Arutiunian has not included figures on Lithuanians and Moldavians at all, and the 1926 and 1939 figures are lacking for Estonians and Latvians for obvious reasons, making comparisons over time impossible. But the remaining figures are significant.

To put the conclusions as simply as possible: outside the RSFSR, the share of the titular or eponymous nationality in the nonagricultural work force exceeded the proportion of people in such work from the

110 In Table 9.1, they give the percentage point difference in the level of urbanization of the Russians and other nationality groupings, 1897-1970. Temporarily, in 1926, the so-called mobilized Europeans (Estonians, Latvians, Armenians and Georgians) were slightly more urbanized than the Russians (by 3.9%). But in 1970 their urbanization rate was 10.0% behind that of the Russians. See Robert A. Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph C. Clem, Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970 (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 335.
entire republican population in only one republic, Armenia. In Armenia, in other words, in 1926, 1939, and 1959 there were relatively more Armenians engaged in the more modern and more profitable sectors of the economy than non-Armenians. In all other republics it was the other way round — the nonagricultural jobs disproportionately went to members of other than the titular nationality. Furthermore, in some republics (such as the Ukraine, Georgia, and Azerbaidzhan) the share of the titular nationality in nonagricultural work was increasing relatively fast, whereas in the overpopulated Central Asian republics such as the Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen, Tadzhik, and Kirghiz SSRs, the share of the eponymous nationalities was rising relatively slowly. Those latter republics were becoming industrialized, but the indigenous nationalities were gaining relatively few jobs in the process. The authors conclude:

One aspect of Soviet nationality policy . . . can be tested: the equalization of economic development in terms of industrialization in less advanced, non-Russian areas. Despite Soviet claims to the contrary, this long standing policy has not been achieved on a regional basis, and many of the industrial and other urban jobs in non-Russian areas have been taken by Russians and other "Europeans," so disparities are even greater than the available data would indicate. [Emphasis added.]

The situation for the non-Russian nationalities is a little better for college students per age group: considerable advances have been made. Still, when it comes to a significant endproduct of higher education, the number of scientific workers, we see that from 1950-73 Russians have strongly increased their share in the Soviet aggregate

111 Ibid., p. 339.
113 See Table 9.5 in Lewis, Rowland, Clem, op. cit., p. 341. See also the less precise data (not standardized by age groups) going back to 1927 in Nicholas De Witt, Education and Professional Employment in the USSR (Washington: National Science Foundation, 1961), Table IV-A-7 and supplement, pp. 650-57. See also Bilinsky, "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the USSR, 1917-1967: An Essay," Slavic Review, Vol. 27, No. 3 (September 1968), pp. 411-37.
from 60.9 to 66.7 per cent, mainly at the expense of the Jews (whose share dropped from 15.5 to 6.1 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, at the expense of the Georgians (down from 2.6 to 1.9 per cent), Latvians (down from 0.9 to 0.6 per cent), and Estonians (down from 0.8 to 0.5 per cent). The other nationalities increased in relative terms (e.g., the Ukrainians up from 9.0 to 10.9 per cent of the Soviet total).\(^{114}\) These few indices — urbanization, share in non-agricultural employment, students in institutions of higher learning and scientific workers — do not exhaust the indicators of socio-economic progress, but they do show that the Soviet People is not a socially homogeneous community as yet, and moreover, in certain aspects (e.g., non-agricultural employment) it may become less homogeneous over time.

One of the strongest arguments that can be marshalled by the advocates of the Soviet People — from Brezhnev down to Rogachev and Sverdlin — is the intermingling of nationalities through migration. The well-known Soviet scholar V. I. Perevedentsev, of the Institute of International Workers’ Migration of the USSR Academy of Sciences, frankly states: “Migration is one of the factors determining the flow of the ethnic processes.”\(^{115}\) He notes that ethnic assimilation proceeds most intensively in cities, a phenomenon he finds progressive. He concludes that migration has a tremendous significance in a process which is no longer limited to rapprochement but constitutes the “beginning of a process of mass merger (massovogo sliianiia) in an ethnic community that is wider than a nation.” (He undoubtedly means the Soviet People but does not say so explicitly). It is primarily the smaller peoples in the Autonomous Republics that are assimilating and disappearing (e.g., the Mordvinians and Karelians), but the processes of merger also affect the most numerous peoples — the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians.\(^{116}\)

Migration is not entirely spontaneous; an older Soviet specialist on nationality relations, historian T. Iu. Burmistrova, claims that in most instances it is planned from above. In her words:

Migration and the movement of people in most instances (glavnym obrazom) is implemented according to a definite


\(^{116}\) Ibid., pp. 39-40, quotation on p. 40.
state plan having the objective of ensuring [the supply of] a work force and skilled cadres to the enterprises and institutions with an All-Union (and sometimes also international) significance, of allowing for the reclamation of resources — i.e., ensuring the fulfillment of tasks for the realization of which there are insufficient local labor and financial resources (on the district, republican and other levels) and for which there exist insufficient scientific and administrative-political (organizatorskikh) cadres.\textsuperscript{117}

For whatever reasons, Soviet citizens have indeed been migrating on a large scale, notably the Russians, the Jews, and the Tatars. The migration of Russians is of particular significance because, as the dominant nation, they insist on the supply of good cultural services in Russian wherever they go, particularly in the cities of the non-Russian republics, leading in some cases to linguistic assimilation by the indigenous urban dwellers. This is possibly what Lewis, Rowland, and Clem had in mind when they wrote somewhat guardedly:

The interregional redistribution of Soviet nationalities involves many implications for Soviet society as a whole. First of all, it has affected the nationality composition of individual regions. Outstanding in this respect has been the impact of the redistribution of Russians. In virtually every region outside the traditional areas of Russian settlement, the Russian share of each region's population increased since 1897 and 1926. Also,... the migration of Russians has been to urban areas in particular, and this has involved additional implications.\textsuperscript{118}

The Russians migrating to the other republics have also been analyzed by Borys Lewytzkyj, who presents especially interesting data on the numbers of Russians in the total urban population of the republics in 1959 and 1970. The number increased slightly in the Ukraine (from 29.9 to 30.0 per cent), decreased slightly in Belorussia (from 19.4 to 19.3 per cent), decreased in all the Central Asian republics except Kazakhstan, where it grew from 57.6 to 58.0 per cent, and decreased sharply in all Transcaucasian republics. On the other hand, it increased sharply in Estonia (from 30.8 to 34.0 per cent) and in Latvia (from 34.5 to 38.0 per cent), though not in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{119} No


\textsuperscript{118} Lewis, Rowland and Clem, op. cit., p. 196.

\textsuperscript{119} See Table 3 in Borys Lewytzkyj, "Die Sozialstruktur der Hauptnationen der Sowjetunion als Indikator fuer die Nationalitaetenpolitik der USSR," in Kamenetsky, op. cit. (note 65), pp. 97-98.
wonder that the complaint against the influx of the Russians (and Ukrainians and Belorussians, too) is one of the key themes of the letter of the 17 Latvian Communists, of July-August 1971. There also seems to emerge a countervailing tendency to the assimilation engendered by the massive influx of Russians into the cities. The Soviet geographer V. V. Pokshishevsky states that the city is now the “carrier of the ethnos” in the USSR and that, besides assimilating, the city has also stimulated “a sharpening of ethnic awareness.”

Somewhat surprisingly in a country that has a rigid internal passport system, good complete figures on how many people of a given nationality migrated where at what time are not publicly available. We are forced to rely on estimates, e.g., that by Soviet ethnographer Bruk, that between 1959 and 1970 1.5 million Russians migrated into Central Asia and Kazakhstan and more than one million into the Ukraine. The 1970 population census asked only whether or not the respondent had moved to a new residence in the last two years, i.e., in 1968 or 1969. Based on those responses, fairly good but incomplete data on migration correlated with nationality have been published in a collective volume in 1976. The data show that in those two years alone 634,400 Russians moved into the Ukraine and 530,100 into Kazakhstan, out of a total of 1.6 million Russians who left their republic. Those 1.6 millions constituted only 18.9 per cent of all migrant Russians; most moved within the RSFSR. In percentages, the outmigration of Ukrainians and Belorussians was even greater: 27.8 or 28.1 per cent of all migrants of those nationalities in 1968-69. In those two years, 398,600 Ukrainians migrated into the Russian Republic and 91,700 into the Kazakh SSR; of the Belorussians, 75,900 moved into the RSFSR and 29,700 into the Ukraine. Since, unlike the Russians, neither the Ukrainians nor the Belorussians are provided with cultural services in their native languages once they leave their titular

republics, heavy migration does expose them to high risks of assimilation (as implied in Perevedentsev's argument).

Soviet authors have been increasingly using the term "assimilation," meaning by this mostly linguistic assimilation. A few of them, however, notably Kulichenko, admit that full assimilation, or change of national identity, is a very involved and uneven process, an insight that bears on the prospects of the establishment of the Soviet People. Writes Kulichenko:

If there occurs only a change in language and if in all other aspects a person continues to consider himself a representative of the nation of his ancestors, we find only one element of assimilation and not the main one at that. This is why, to take an example, in the country of the Soviets, according to the census results, it would have been more correct to speak only of elements of assimilation, the more so that not only do those elements have a natural character but that they are mainly to be found among persons who have lived a long time, sometimes for several generations, in other republics, separated from their people. On the whole, among peoples who have been living in a compact mass and who have had their national statehood, the processes of national development have basically shown stability. This is especially notable in the instance of republics and districts where industrial development has been less intensive and that have been less affected by migration. On a number of occasions in such republics and districts, the number of people who have declared the language of their nationality their native language has increased somewhat.\textsuperscript{124} [Emphasis added.]

Kulichenko is absolutely correct in not glossing over the complexity of the assimilation process. The American sociologist Milton M. Gordon has distinguished as many as seven stages in that process:\textsuperscript{125}

\textsuperscript{124} Kulichenko, loc. cit. (note 85), p. 23.

\textsuperscript{125} Adapted from Table 5 in Milton M. Gordon, \textit{Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins} (New York: Oxford U. P., 1964), p. 71. In the original instead of "other" the term "host" was used.
1. Change of cultural patterns to those of [other] society  
2. Large-scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of [other] society, on primary group level  
3. Large-scale intermarriage  
4. Development of sense of peoplehood based exclusively on [other] society  
5. Absence of prejudice  
6. Absence of discrimination  
7. Absence of value and power conflict

Kulichenko is also correct in empirical terms in pointing out that members of a nation living outside their titular republic are most subject to linguistic assimilation. This is not the place to expand on the voluminous literature on linguistic developments in the USSR. Suffice it to say that I would agree with the conclusion of Brian D. Silver's recent article that adoption of Russian as a second language is a matter of convenience, "a pragmatic adjustment to incentives and opportunities to learn Russian." On the other hand, adoption of Russian as a "native language" by self-declared non-Russians "may well connote a serious weakening or shifting of ethnic group loyalties." I have reservations, however, about Silver's conclusion "that abandonment of the traditional national language for Russian has not been measurably affected by language policies."

126 See the excellent dynamic (1959-1970) and comparable figures presented in Tables 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, 5.1, 6.1, 7.1, 8.3, 9.1, 10.2, 11.4, 12.4, 13.7, 14.8, 15.8, 16.5, and 17.1 in Katz et alii, eds., Handbook . . ., pp. 32, 57, 81, 104, 128, 150, 172, 198, 224, 247, 270, 297, 352, 374, 401, and 422.

In connection with the concept of the Soviet People, it must be mentioned that some impatient Soviet scholars and administrators who participated in a conference organized by the Soviet Central Statistical Administration suggested that in the 1979 population census the question about "native language" be dropped and a question about the basic language used in everyday life be substituted. Furthermore, the question about a second language was to be reformulated in such a way as to count as second language a language that the respondent did not speak "freely." This would have deprived the question about "native language" of its function as a secondary indicator of ethnic self-identification, would have allowed the census takers greater latitude in determining the language of everyday use, and might have led to a greater increase of the number of self-declared non-Russians habitually speaking Russian, i.e., another step forward toward the establishment of the Soviet People. The conference, however, decided that the switch from "native language" to "main language of everyday use" was "premature." Similarly, it was decided not to count a language as "second language" unless the respondent could speak it "freely." According to the official instructions, the census takers were to accept the declaration of the respondent as to what his or her "native language" was. Only in cases in which the adult respondent did not know how to answer the question were the census takers instructed to write down the language which he or she spoke best or which was usually spoken in the family. It looks as if the progress toward a more homogeneous Soviet People via the manipulation of census statistics has been somewhat delayed.

Ethnic intermarriages in the Soviet Union appear to be increasing. I will not enter into the debate between Wesley A. Fisher and Brian D. Silver whether it is basically endogamous marital behavior that leads to ethnic consciousness (Fisher's position) or the other way round (that of Silver). Of capital importance in our context is the finding of

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129 Isupov, loc. cit., p. 29; see also "Instruktsii o poriadke provedeniia vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 g. . . .," *same journal*, 1978, No. 5 (May), p. 35.

Soviet sociologist L. Terent'eva that mixed marriages involving Russian partners do not mean that, upon reaching the passport age of sixteen when nationality has to be declared by the teenager, the children of those marriages will all choose Russian nationality. She found that in Vilnius 52 per cent of the children of mixed Lithuanian-Russian families declared themselves Lithuanians and 57 per cent of the offspring of Latvian-Russian families in Riga chose Latvian nationality, whereas 44 per cent of the children of Ukrainian-Russian marriages in Kiev chose Ukrainian nationality, and as few as 24 per cent of the teenagers from Belorussian-Russian families in Minsk opted for Belorussian nationality.\textsuperscript{131} It would thus appear that marital assimilation is not immediately translatable into change of nationality identification by the children of ethnically mixed families. Some children will opt for the nationality of one parent, some for the nationality of the other, depending on the nationalities involved. In other words, these figures say something about the strength of national consciousness among the various non-Russian nationalities.

The next stage in assimilation is what Gordon calls identificational assimilation, or the change of one's self-declared nationality between the censuses. It would have been possible to document, for instance, that between 1926-1970 the decline in the number of Ukrainians living outside of the Ukrainian SSR is most probably due to many of them declaring Russian to be their nationality, partly under political pressure.\textsuperscript{132} But I would like to point out a most interesting proposal by Soviet ethnographer V. I. Kozlov which is directly relevant to the question of the Soviet People. In 1975 Kozlov complained that the Soviet census data on nationality were misleading in that they did not reflect the possible change of nationality in midpoint: one was either a Pole or Belorussian, but nothing in between. Furthermore, if persons of non-Russian ethnic origin declared themselves to be Russians, this was picked up by "bourgeois" authors in the West to prove a "Russification process." Kozlov proposed the introduction in the 1979 census of a new ethnic category — "Soviet nationality," which would have been analogous to the "undetermined Yugoslav" category that


\textsuperscript{132} Lewis, Rowland, Clem, op. cit. (note 110), pp. 219-220.
had been introduced in the 1971 census in that country. This would have been an excellent way to test the popular appeal of the concept of Soviet People. For whatever reason — I think because not many people would have opted for a Soviet nationality if given the choice between, say, Russian and Soviet, or Georgian and Soviet, — Kozlov’s proposition was not even officially discussed, as was the proposition on changing the question about language.

For reasons of space, I will be deliberately brief on the political aspects. “Soviet People” does make a somewhat subdued appearance in the 1977 Constitution of the USSR, in the preamble. In the seventh paragraph from the top we read:

This [developed Socialist community] is a community of mature Socialist communal relations in which based on the rapprochement of all classes and social strata, the legal and actual equality of all nations and ethnic groups, on their fraternal cooperation, there has emerged a new historical community of human beings — the Soviet People.

More meaningfully, the Soviet People is mentioned in the second sentence of Article 70, the introductory article in the section on the federal structure:

The USSR embodies the state unity of the Soviet People, welds (splachivaet) all the nations and ethnic groups in the objective of mutual building of Communism.

As is well known, the 1977 Constitution has not dissolved the Union Republics. It is not so well known that the symbolic language of the Constitution in favor of the republics has been strengthened a little between the draft of June 1977 and the final version of October 1977: the draft did not declare that the Union Republic is a sovereign Soviet Socialist state as does the Constitution in Article 76. The draft (in the old Article 75) termed the Union Republic a Soviet Socialist state and then said, in Article 80: “The sovereign rights of the Union Republics are protected by the USSR.” Both the draft (in Article 71) and the Constitution (in Article 72) contain the symbolic right of free

133 V. I. Kozlov, Natsional’nosti SSSR (etnodemograficheskii obzor) (Moscow: “Statistika,” 1975), pp. 256-61. Brian D. Silver has alerted me to such an attempt.
135 Ibid., Article 70, p. 4 b.
To motivate the decision of the Soviet leaders to maintain the status quo in federal relations, Brezhnev has fallen back on Kaltakhchian’s March 1972 distinction between the Soviet People and the Soviet Nation. He said in his speech of October 4, 1977:

In the USSR, as is [well] known, there has been formed a new historical community of human beings — the Soviet People. Some comrades — true, there are only few of them — have drawn from this incorrect conclusions. They are proposing to introduce into the Constitution the concept of a single Soviet Nation, to liquidate the Union and Autonomous Republics, or to sharply reduce the sovereignty of the Union Republics, depriving them of the right to leave the Soviet Union, their right to conduct foreign relations. In the same direction are the propositions to abolish the Council of Nationalities and to create a unicameral Supreme Soviet. I think that the erroneousness of such propositions is clear. The socio-political unity of the Soviet People does not at all signify the disappearance of national differences. Thanks to the consequent implementation of Leninist nationality policy, we have, having built Socialism, simultaneously — for the first time in history — solved the nationality question. The unity of the Soviet peoples is unshakable, in the process of building Communism their rapprochement is taking place, and the mutual enrichment of their spiritual life. But we would have entered a dangerous path had we started to force this objective process of the rapprochement of nations artificially. Lenin had insistently warned us against that, and we will not deviate from his commands.

This is not to ignore the excellent legal-political study by A. Shtromas who appears to have come to the opposite conclusion. Wrote Shtromas:

The new Soviet Constitution, by denying in fact sovereign rights of the Union Republics (or, if Article 72 [on the rights of secession of the republics] is to be taken into account, at least by reducing them to a mere token), has undermined this

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juridical reality, which means that it has substantially diminished the real potential in the area of the status and rights of the Union Republics.138

Shtromas, a Soviet-trained lawyer, vividly describes the efforts to amend the Constitution in the 1960s:

In the first half of the 1960s when a great deal of work had been done in preparing the draft of the new Constitution, the prevailing attitude supported abolition of the right of republics to secede. In many variations of the Constitutional draft, this right was dropped altogether. (This writer was at that time a member of several legal research institutes which participated in the drafting of the new Constitution and can bear testimony to this.) Nevertheless, it somehow unexpectedly reappeared in the final draft published by the Soviet media on June 4, 1977, and remained unaltered in the official text of the Constitution as adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 7, 1977.139

Professor Shtromas justly points to the fact that the assertion in Article 70 that the USSR is "an integral (edinoe) federal (soiuznoe) multinational state" is incompatible with the formula of secession; in his judgment, Article 70 had been drafted when it was still assumed that the right to secession would be withdrawn.140 I agree with Professor Shtromas that the sweeping claim in paragraph 12 of Article 73 that the All-Union Government can assume that "the disposition (reshenie) of other matters of All-Union importance" gives the central government a carte blanche that had no existed in the 1936 Constitution.141 The abolition of the right to have republican military formations, as formerly guaranteed by Article 18b of the 1936 Constitution as amended in 1944, and the dropping of the word "direct" from the right of the republics to conduct foreign relations (according to Article 18a of the previous Constitution, the republics could enter into such relations directly) both point in the direction of centralization.142 But I would disagree with Professor Shtromas that

139 Ibid., p. 267.
140 Ibid., p. 267.
141 Ibid., p. 270.
these provisions, so evident to experienced constitutional lawyers, define the content of the 1977 Constitution in the mind of the average Soviet citizen. To me, the Soviet Constitution is, above all, a political symbol, not much else. The opponents of the disappearance of the Union Republics and of the emergence of a synthetic Soviet People can point with satisfaction to the facts that the right of secession has been kept — in a legal vacuum or not, it exists; that the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet has been retained; and that from time to time there is mention of the "sovereignty of the Union Republics." What may ring hollow in Moscow, still makes beautiful music in Tbilisi and Kiev.

To end our sketch on somewhat dramatic notes: when, in the 1978 draft of the Constitution of the Georgian SSR, the 1937 provision about Georgian being the state language of the republic was watered down and at least hundreds, possibly thousands of Georgians protested the change, Shevardnadze reportedly made two appearances before the crowd, tried to reason with them in Georgian, and then told the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, which had just approved the change, that it had been deemed expedient to restore the old 1937 provision. In both Armenia and Azerbaidzhan, similar provisions about the language of the titular nationality being the "state language" of the republic were also retained.143 The three Transcaucasian republics remain the only republics in which there are constitutional provisions about state languages — three small steps back from the ideal of a homogeneous Soviet People.

But in good Leninist fashion, while retreating on symbolic matters, the Soviet government gave the screw of political repression four cruel turns. In February 1977 the Georgian Vladimir G. Zhvania was sentenced to death and later executed for setting off explosions in Sukhumi, Tbilisi, and Kutaisi in 1975 and 1976. According to a Western account, "dissident sources claimed that the accused was a Georgian nationalist protesting what he saw as the Russification of his republic."144 In January 1979, three Armenians were shot for having

caused the explosion in the Moscow subway in January 1977. The only one of the three that has been officially identified is Stepan S. Zatikian, who had been sentenced in 1968 to four years of labor camp for having participated in the founding of the National United Party, which advocated independence for Armenia.\(^{145}\) The very secretiveness of the closed trial, the deviousness of the authorities in not identifying Zatikian, who was arrested in November 1977, as a suspect in the bombing (in June 1977, anonymous terrorists had already allegedly confessed to the authorities that they had participated in the bombing), the very haste in which the sentence was pronounced and executed — all these circumstances have led the eminent Soviet Ukrainian dissident and now forced exile, General Petro Hryhorenko, to accuse the KGB of having fabricated another Nikolaev (Kirov’s assassin) case, with the difference that the “dead witnesses” would now be used against peaceful dissidents, including Academician Sakharov, who had publicly defended Zatikian.\(^{146}\)

**CONCLUSION**

A long article calls for a relatively brief conclusion. The concept of Soviet People is not a mere tautology. The earlier concept, that of the Peoples of the Soviet Union, implied a more balanced socio-economic and political development. The later concept of Khrushchev and Brezhnev has been designed to accentuate integration. Nevertheless, the limits of the new concept have become dramatically apparent in 1977, when Brezhnev publicly dissociated the Soviet People from the Soviet Nation and left the Soviet federal system without major changes. At approximately the same time, the decision was made not to change the definitions of nationality and the native language in the 1979 population census, as had been demanded by some scholars and administrators. It would appear that as in 1971, when the Party Secretaries of Georgia, Lithuania, and Ukraine virtually dissociated themselves from the concept of the Soviet People, serious opposition arose in the republics in 1976 and 1977, so that, to the surprise of some

\(^{145}\) Sheehy, ibid., pp. 1-5. See also the remarkable detailed *samizdat* expose by Malva Landa (with a preface by Academician Sakharov), *Stepan Zatikyan, Akop Stepanyan i Zoven Bagdasaryan prigovoreny k smertnoi kazni po sfal’sifitsirovannym obvineniiam* (Feb.-May 1979), AS no. 3676, in *Materiały samizdata*, No. 28/79 (August 20, 1979).

Soviet constitutional lawyers, the federal status quo was retained, together with the right to secession.

Evidently, the Soviet leaders are hoping that a strictly centralized economy and a *de facto* unitary political system, as well as migration and ethnic intermarriages that are touched off by the political and economic decisions, will strengthen the processes of assimilation in the long run, though not necessarily in the foreseeable future. Constitutional changes are relatively easy to make (except in Georgia), and census definitions can be changed even more easily. But do the Russians really want to merge with the rapidly growing Central Asian peoples? Do the Ukrainians really aspire to becoming Little Russians again and are the Estonians and Latvians really eager to be pushed out of their small but prosperous republics? Both Soviet scholars and politicians have come to realize that ethnic melting pots work better in theory than in practice. Furthermore, the theory of the Soviet melting pot also leaves much to be desired. At least three tendencies can be discerned: the radical-unitary, the conservative-federal, and one in between.

It appears to me that the concept of the Soviet People was officially adopted in the late 1960s and early 1970s, mostly under the impact of Russian patriotic fervor engendered by the prospect of the impending showdown with China, and partly also to steal the thunder of Russian nationalists, who in turn reacted to the challenge from non-Russian dissidents. By 1977 Brezhnev had publicly voiced his second thoughts: the USSR is still the Soviet Union; it has not been turned into Sovietia.
A careful examination of demographic patterns is an important, though often omitted, element of any sociological, political or economic study of a given population. Demographic trends sometimes cause, and often contribute to, both problems and accomplishments within a society. Most studies of such issues, however, fail to take into account the underlying population indices.

This article will examine the population of the Ukraine from a demographic point of view and will point to the sociological, political, and economic areas where the various demographic measures have relevance. While not trying to explore the implications of population changes in the Ukraine in recent years in depth, the article is intended to provide a basis for those wishing to pursue such social science research.

The demographic characteristics of any population change over time. This article will focus on the current demographic situation in the Ukraine and the trends that are apparent since the end of World War II. Demographic variables such as size, location, and movement of population, fertility and mortality, ethnicity, marriage, and education will be examined. Comparisons will be drawn with the USSR as a whole and various individual Union Republics. In most cases, however, the demographic indices in the Ukraine are similar to those in the other Slavic and Baltic republics.

The natural starting point for an examination of any population is its size. The population of the Ukraine was estimated to be 49.3 million people in 1977. Table 1 shows the growth of the republic's population in selected years from 1913 to the present. Also included in Table 1 are figures representing the percentage of the Ukraine's population that is urban and the percentage of the entire Soviet population that is living in the Ukraine.
Table 1
Population of the Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Millions</th>
<th>% Urban</th>
<th>As % of Soviet Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913*</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 c.</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 c.</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Within present borders


The population of the Ukraine has been growing at the slow but steady pace typical of Northern European countries and the Slavic and Baltic Soviet republics. The population in 1977 was 18% larger than in 1959 and 4.7% larger than in 1970. For comparison, the population of the RSFSR grew by 15% from 1959 to 1970 and by 4.2% from 1970 to 1977. The data in the table also show the tremendous population loss as a result of the World War II period. In addition to the actual loss, one must include the missing births from the World War II generation and the delay in family formation, when trying to assess how much smaller the Ukrainian population is today than it might have been.

The single most important indicator in evaluating demographic changes occurring in the Ukraine is the index of urbanization (61%). Although this figure includes many people who live in small towns classified as urban because of their non-agricultural economies as well

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1 *Narodnoe khoziaistvo RSFSR za 60 let* (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), p. 5.
as the evergrowing number of residents of major cities, it provides the key to understanding many of the other changes taking place. Urbanization involves a whole series of changes in the life style of the population, and thus the growth of the part of the population that is urban has a profound effect on other political, social, and economic indicators.

There is, of course, an upward limit beyond which this indicator cannot go, so continued urbanization at such a rapid pace should not be expected. Even the most urbanized nations of Europe have 20-25% of their populations living in non-urban settings. Since the Ukraine is one of the richest agricultural areas of the USSR, it should be expected to have a lesser degree of urbanization than the republics with less agricultural emphasis. That urbanization has proceeded so far in a republic with an important agricultural sector is notable. The RSFSR, for comparison, has 69% of its population concentrated in urban areas, while the USSR as a whole is 62% urban. All these figures are from 1977.

Although the category “urban” includes many people living in towns rather than major cities, the urban percentage has grown to a large extent because of the remarkable increase in the population of the largest cities since 1959. The entire population of the Ukraine was only 18% larger in 1977 than in 1959; during this same period, the number of people living in the eleven largest cities (those with populations over 400,000 in 1977) increased by 61%. Residents of these eleven cities now constitute 20% of the entire republic population, as compared to less than 15% of the Ukrainian population in 1959. There is no reason to think that the growth of these major cities, caused primarily by migration rather than by natural increase, will abate in the near future. Table 2 shows the sizes and rates of growth of these cities.

Kiev, the capital of the republic, is by far the largest city, with a population now in excess of two million people. Despite efforts to restrain the growth of Kiev by administrative restriction on migration, its rate of growth is greater than any of the Ukrainian cities listed above. Kharkiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhzhia (Zaporozh’e) also attempt to restrict in-migration.2

2 Personal interview, Kiev planner, 1974.
Growth of major cities, in spite of such administrative restraints, is largely the result of migration rather than birthrate. In 1970, for example, 109,000 people moved to Kiev, while only 58,000 left the city, causing the city to grow by 51,000 people. During the same year there were approximately 16,000 births and 8,000 deaths, resulting in a natural growth of some 8,000 people. Thus, 86% of the growth in 1970 was the result of migration to the city. Such data are typical for most major Soviet cities, so one would expect to find similar patterns in the other Ukrainian cities.

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3 *Vestnik statistiki*, no. 11, 1971, p. 78.
4 Calculated from *Narodnoe khozaiistvo Ukrainskoj SSR* (Kiev: Tekhnika, 1977), pp. 18-19.
Intense migration has a significant impact on the character of a city because migrants fall overwhelmingly into several specific demographic groups. The most significant of these is age. Most people who migrate are in their late teens and early twenties, that is, they have just reached working age. Women migrants tend to be slightly younger than men. Women most often migrate immediately after completing the eight- or ten-year school, while men typically complete their military service first. Most are single, and those who are married rarely have more than one child.

Migration often takes place in stages, with rural youth moving to towns and small cities and young people from these same towns or small cities moving into major metropolitan areas. Migrants to the major cities, therefore, are usually not young people from the collective farms.

Educationally, migrants to the major cities are neither typical of the young people in the city nor of their small town or rural peers left behind. Those leaving the small towns or rural areas tend to be the best educated young people, usually having finished the ten-year school. Those who did not finish secondary education are less likely to move. On the other hand, the migrants are not likely to have the secondary specialized or higher education that many urban young people have had. Consequently, they usually occupy semi-skilled rather than highly skilled jobs.

Education affects migration in two ways. Rural young people with the most education are often the most dissatisfied with the rural way of life. Their world, largely because of their secondary education, has become larger than the village, and their goals often cannot be satisfied within the village context. In addition, furthering their education is impossible in the village. Migration to an urban area is thus the only alternative if they wish to continue their education, and migration to a large city is necessary if their goals involve either higher or specialized education.

Growth of major metropolitan areas is thus largely caused by migration, and those who migrate tend to be young, rather well educated, and desirous of further educational opportunity. Migrants are therefore particularly well suited to fill the cities' needs for semi-skilled, skilled, and technical labor. So, while cities are attempting to restrict growth because of an inability to provide the housing, services, and amenities for an increasing population, they are at the same time
in need of the labor, skills, and ambition of the migrants.

A broader look at education in the Ukraine shows that the general level of educational attainment has risen steadily over the years. Table 3 shows the changes that have taken place from 1939 to 1959 to 1970 among different population groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
<th>Educational Attainment in the Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(per cent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Completed Higher Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Population over 10 Years of Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Population</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialists &amp; Employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least Some Secondary Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>Collective Farmers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>66.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From Table 3, one can see that the proportion of the population having completed higher education has grown rapidly over the last few decades. In 1970, 4% of the population of the Ukraine over 10 years of age had finished higher education, a rate almost double that of 1959. When one looks only at the employed population, the rate has more than doubled in the same period. Of those individuals classified as specialists and employees, fully one-fourth had completed higher education.

The progress being made in increasing the population's educational attainment is clear; however, when one views these same data from the opposite perspective, some obstacles to the development of a modern industrial and technical society can be seen. In 1970, 39% of the employed population had no more than a primary education. By 1976, this figure had been reduced to 22% of the employed population. If one differentiates by social class, one-third of the workers and 60% of the collective farmers had no more than a primary education in 1970.

While those people with secondary specialized education are probably qualified to fill a wide variety of skilled and technical jobs, those with "some secondary" education probably have few marketable skills. The rise in the general education level, however, is tied closely to the movement from rural areas and small towns to the cities. Education is an important motive for most of the young people who migrate. Many rural areas still have only eight-year schools; but even those with ten-year schools rarely have the facilities or staff to teach the technical skills needed for the further development of an industrial society.

The changing composition of the population is a consequence of the continuing urbanization and industrialization. Migrants in pursuit of greater opportunities move among the republics as well as within them. A look at the population of the Ukraine by nationality shows a continuing growth of the Russian population between the 1959 and 1970 censuses. The other noteworthy change is the decline in the proportion and number of Jews in the Ukrainian population. (See Table 4).

Russians have always made up an important part of the Ukrainian

From 1959 to 1970 the Russian population of the Ukraine increased by over two million people. Considering that the number of Ukrainians increased by only a little more than three million during this period, the growth of the Russian population in the Ukraine was quite substantial.

Table 4
Population of the Ukraine by Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Population (thousands)</th>
<th>% of Republic's Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>32,158</td>
<td>35,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>7,091</td>
<td>9,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belorussians</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavians</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greeks</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41,869</td>
<td>47,126</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Russians now constitute almost one-fifth of the republic's population and are overwhelmingly concentrated in the major metropolitan areas. The recent Russian migrants to the Ukraine share many characteristics with the migrants discussed above. However, many are more highly trained, having been assigned to factories and laboratories in the Ukraine after completing their education. Such movement is part of a conscious regime effort to place Russians in positions of responsibility in the non-Russian areas of the USSR. Ukrainians play a similar role in the Baltic and Central Asian parts of
the country, representing Slavic interests in non-Slavic areas. As the economy becomes even more developed and technical, one can expect even greater mobility among the republics, and with it even more Russians moving or being assigned to the Ukraine.

The number of Jews in the Ukraine was declining prior to 1970, and this decline in proportion and absolute number has continued. With the large increase of Jewish migration from the USSR in the 1970s, this drop has accelerated, since a significant portion of those Jews who left the Soviet Union were from the Ukraine. The proportion of most of the smaller ethnic groups has remained constant during the last two census periods.

Another feature of the demographic situation of the Ukraine is the imbalance that exists between men and women. In the 1977 estimate, as shown in Table 5, 54.3% of the population of the Ukraine is female, while 45.7% is male. This situation is similar to that found throughout the European part of the USSR. The loss of men during World War II is particularly evident when one compares the 1940 and 1959 figures. One must note, however, that the difference in life expectancy between men and women also plays a major role in the perpetuation of this gap.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 c.</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970 c.</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

One of the most interesting areas of demographic analysis involves the birthrate, and such analysis leads to a number of important socio-economic questions. The birthrate in the Ukraine is, once again, similar to that in the other European Soviet republics in that the crude birthrates (births/1000 population/year) has remained relatively constant since the mid-1960s. The birthrate in the republic fell from 27.3 births/1000 population in 1940 to 22.8 in 1950, 20.5 in 1960, and 15.3 in 1966. From 1965 to 1976, this rate fluctuated between 14.9-15.5 births/1000 population. The 1976 figure was 15.2 births/1000 population in the Ukraine (see Table 6).

Table 6

Birthrate, Deathrate and Natural Growth of the Population of the Ukraine

(per 1000 population)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Natural Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


For comparison, the RSFSR figures are slightly higher than those in the Ukraine. The birthrate fell to 15.7 births/1000 population in 1965
and has fluctuated between 15 and 16 since 1965.\textsuperscript{7}

An important point to note here is that we are dealing with “crude” figures, that is, figures per 1000 population per year. This figure does not account for the age of the population. A brief inspection of the deathrate illustrates this point. The deathrate (again per 1000 population) has been rising steadily since 1960. At the same time, life expectancy has increased slightly. Thus, we are dealing with an aging population. A larger portion of the population is falling into the ages where the deathrate is higher and, naturally, where the birthrate is lower. So, while the crude rates are useful in evaluating the overall birth-death-natural growth situation, they only tell part of the story.

The more precise method of evaluating the childbearing situation is the fertility index. This measure represents the number of births per year to women in the childbearing ages, generally considered to be 15-49. Not only does this index confirm a lower rate of childbearing, it also points out different childbearing behavior by age group (Table 7).

### Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>1958-59</th>
<th>1969-70</th>
<th>1975-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-49</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>150.9</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>162.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>110.1</td>
<td>111.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{7} \textit{N. kh. RSFSR}, p. 19.
Table 7 shows that the overall fertility index has fallen by 20% from 1958-59 to 1975-76. In other words, for each 1000 women within the childbearing ages, 20% fewer children are being born. Table 7 also shows an important shift in the age at which women are having children. Childbearing activity has grown substantially for the two five-year cohorts under 25 years of age. However, childbearing in the age cohorts over 25 has fallen even more drastically that it has grown in the younger cohorts, and this drop explains the decline in the overall rate.

Two related factors help illustrate this situation and its consequences. Most young women are marrying and having one or two children while they are relatively young. At the same time, the population as a whole, as well as the number of women 15-49, has been growing. However, this larger cohort of women 15-49 has been producing a relatively constant number of children, largely because of the sharp decline in third or more children (see Table 8).

Table 8
Births in the Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number Born (Thousands)</th>
<th>Births of Third + Children (Percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1135.0</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>844.6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>792.7</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>878.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>692.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>719.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>736.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>745.7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>719.6</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>736.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>738.9</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>747.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 1965 to 1976, the number of births has ranged from 692,200 to 747,100 per year. The fact that these figures are smaller than those prior to the mid-sixties will have consequences far into the twenty-first century. The most important implication of the absolute number of births in a given year lies in the number of people entering the workforce 18-22 years later. This year, for example, the generation born around 1960 is starting to enter the labor force. This 1958-62 generation is quite large in comparison to those that will follow. In fact, the generation now entering the workforce is larger than any cohort that will enter the labor force between the present time and the end of the century. Thus, 125-175,000 fewer people will reach working age in the Ukraine each year from the early 1980s until the end of the 1990s than have been reaching working age in the 1970s.

Such trends have a major economic impact. Much of the European part of the Soviet Union is now experiencing a labor shortage, especially acute in the urban areas. Major cities have more jobs available than people to fill them. The decreasing number of people entering the workforce can only exacerbate an already difficult economic situation. In addition, large generations will be reaching retirement age during the period when these relatively small generations begin to work. Such changes mean not only that more people will be leaving the workforce than entering it, but also that the portion that is working will have to support a disproportionately large non-working sector.

As seen from Table 8, a slowly growing total population is producing a relatively stable number of children. As these “children” enter the workforce, they also enter the prime childbearing years. Just as the number of people beginning to work will be low for the rest of the century, so will the number of women entering the years of greatest childbearing activity (18-25). And childbearing in the 1980s, obviously, will have an impact on the workforce in the early 2000s.

Also apparent from Table 8 is the sharply falling number of third or more children being born. As recently as 1955, almost 30% of all children born were entering families with at least two other children. By 1976, only 13.9% of all babies were being born to mothers with two or more children. Table 7, showing fertility by age, sheds some light on this situation. The number of children being born to each 1000 women between the ages of 15 and 30 is virtually identical in the three periods examined. Births to women over 30, however, have fallen by
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

over one-third. These older cohorts, quite naturally, are those most likely to be having third or fourth children.

These data, as well as those that follow representing family size, marriages and divorces, stress the extent to which family situations have changed in recent years. The average family size is now 3.4 for the entire population, with an average size of 3.3 in the urban areas and 3.6 in the rural ones. In addition, the number of single-person households has climbed from 4.5% of the population in 1959 to 6.4% in 1970. In urban areas, these households represent 6.9% of the population as compared to 5.8% in the rural areas.8

Marriage rates have fluctuated irregularly in the post-war period, both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of marriages per 1000 population. One would expect the size of the various age cohorts in a given period to be the best predictor of marriage rates. Given the demographic situation described above, one can reasonably predict that there will be fewer marriages in the 1980s, along with a smaller cohort entering the workforce and a smaller number of children being born.

Divorces, on the other hand, have increased dramatically both in absolute numbers and in rate per 1000 population. In fact, in 1976 there were 89 divorces for each 100 marriages.

Age at the time of marriage is another interesting indicator. In 1976, 77.5% of the men and 80.9% of the women who married were under the age of 30. However, only 5% of the men were under 20, while 30% of the women were under 20.9 Such data contain both good and bad news for Soviet demographers. Young marriages result in more children, which is a goal of the Soviet regime; on the other hand, teenage marriages in the Soviet Union, as in the United States, have a much greater chance of ending in divorce.

As is clear from Table 9, the number of divorces has increased phenomenally over the last twenty-five years in the Ukraine. This increase is consistent with the trends that have taken place in the rest of the USSR and in most developed Western nations. Changes in Soviet legislation in 1965 have made divorces much easier to obtain. The rate, however, was increasing even before the simplification of divorce.

8 N. kh. Ukr. SSR, p. 17.
Table 9

Marriage and Divorce in the Ukraine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Registered Marriages</th>
<th>Registered Divorces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number (thousands)</td>
<td>Per 1000 pop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>433.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>424.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>458.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>407.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>465.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>508.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>494.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>493.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>533.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>458.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


procedures. Duration of marriage seems to have little to do with this increase (see Table 10).

This remarkable growth in the number of divorces has led to a concomitant increase in the number of second marriages. While second marriages are increasing for both men and women of all age groups, there are interesting differences when we control for sex and age.

In 1970 in the Ukraine, 18.4% of all men were over 50, and 10.4% were over 60. Women over 50 constituted 28.4% of all women in the population, while those over 60 made up 16.8% of all women.10 The much greater number of women in the over-50 age group is the result

10 L. Chuiko, "Brak i sem'ia pozhibikh liudei (po dannim Ukr. SSR)," Pozhilie liudi v nashe strane (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), p. 27.
Table 10

Divorces by Duration of Marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Divorces</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>135.4</td>
<td>166.7</td>
<td>180.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Both of World War II and of greater female life expectancy.

Even with the much greater number of women in these age groups, older men were involved in many more marriages than older women. In 1970, 32,100 men and 25,300 women over 50 married. Of these marriages that took place in urban areas, about two-thirds of the men and one-half of the women were re-marrying.\(^1\)

According to these data, a 60-year-old man has an almost 10 times greater chance of marrying than a 50-year-old woman, and a 69-year-old man has 7.2 times more chance of marrying than a 50-year-old woman. Men in these age groups are married in the same proportion as are 26-year-old women.\(^2\) Thus, the much higher proportion of women than men in the older age groups and men’s proclivity for marrying younger women mean that most older widowed and divorced women remain single, while older single men are likely to remarry.

Only 4.4% of all families in the Ukraine are complex rather than

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 31.
nuclear; such families are usually formed when older people are widowed or divorced. The remaining parent (usually female) then moves in with his/her children. This situation lowers the number of people considered to be single (living without a family member). In the Ukraine, 19.2% of all widowed or divorced people live with the families of their children, with the urban figure being 17.4% and the rural figure 21.7%.\(^\text{13}\)

If we examine the situation of older single people by sex, we see that single women are more likely to be found in villages and single men in urban areas. But the villages in general have a much older population; as was discussed above, there is a substantial migration of young people from rural areas to urban ones.

The general age structure of the population of the Ukraine, as well as of the other Slavic and Baltic republics of the USSR, is rapidly changing. A greater portion of the population will be over 50 in the future than is the case today. The population is generally aging as result of the low birthrate and to a lesser extent because of an increase in life expectancy. This shift is much more noticeable in the rural areas because of the continued out-flow of the young population.

Another area of concern in a demographic analysis of a population is the deathrate. While the crude deathrate (deaths/1000 population/year) has risen in the last twenty years, this rise can be explained by the aging of the population. If a greater proportion of the whole population falls into the older age groups, then we would certainly expect more deaths to occur. However, when one looks at the deathrate and controls for age, several interesting trends can be noted:*\(^*\)

The above data show a dichotomous situation. The deathrate for the younger segments of the population has fallen steadily for the last two decades in each age group under 30. This drop can be attributed to improved prenatal and infant care and to an effective program of public health delivered through the school and workplace.

The situation for people over 30, however, is somewhat startling. The deathrate for each five-year age cohort has increased from 1958-59 to 1969-70 and again from 1969-70 to 1975-76. This increase has been particularly large for the age cohorts over 40.

\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., p. 35.

*Please see Table 11, next page.
### Table 11

Deathrate by Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1958-59</th>
<th>1969-70</th>
<th>1975-76</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By Age:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-19</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-54</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-59</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-64</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-69</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70+</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One explanation for this situation is the increased urbanization of the Ukraine. Urban life is in many ways more stressful than rural life; as the society becomes more urban, the consequences of this faster pace have a greater impact on the public health. Both heart and lung disease are on the increase in the Soviet Union as in the West, and the consequences of these problems can be seen fairly specifically in certain age cohorts.

Along this same line, urban life greatly increases women's participation in the workforce. When women participate equally with men and share the same stressful situations, they become subject to
many of the same health difficulties. Over time, such a change in societal roles has an impact on the mortality statistics.

The key to understanding the many changes occurring in the demographic situation of the Ukraine is urbanization. Urbanization means a different style of life, one that includes greater demands on both the individual and the environment, an increased technological and educational orientation, and a shift in sex roles and reproductive behavior. Urban areas become the center of complex economic development, drawing the young and ambitious to them. This movement of people changes not only the cities but also the rural areas from which the migrants come.

Each of these shifts has consequences far beyond the data collected in statistical yearbooks. The location and concentration of population influence both the potential for economic development and the need for social services. Changes in sex roles influence fertility, which affects immediately the need for day-care and schools and subsequently the availability of labor for industry. In addition, the fertility in one period determines not only the availability of marriage partners and the number of children born 18-25 years hence, but also the size of the cohort of pensioners that must be supported under a social security system some 60 years later. Thus, while one certainly must concede that a demographic investigation cannot explain all the social, economic or political issues with which a society must deal, it serves as the logical, yet often overlooked, first step in analyzing a broad range of problems that need to be confronted by every society.
The Citizenship of the
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

ANDREAS BILINSKY*

What is citizenship? The phenomenon of nationality or citizenship in the legal sense was unknown either in the antiquity or in the Middle Ages. But, when the absolutist countries became consolidated in the final stage of feudalism within a clearly defined legal order, there arose the need to regulate the position of the inhabitants of the state **by clearly defining their rights and duties vis-à-vis the monarch and the state. The juridically undetermined position of “subjects” of the feudal epoch could not automatically be applied to the relationships in the absolute state in the period of Enlightenment. Only the term “subject” and “His Majesty’s subjects” [*piddanstvo] ***remained, but their meaning changed radically. Gradually, the term “state allegiance” [derzhavna pry nalezhnist’] came into use, to emphasize that the residents of a state owed their loyalty to the state, not to the monarch personally, that they were not his “subjects.”

Only the French Revolution brought about important changes in the question of “state allegiance.” It did away with the absolutist state that had been constructed on the principle of estates, in which each estate had a different rank and enjoyed different rights. The Revolution proclaimed all subjects of the state equal before the law. An essential change occurred with respect to the underlying basis of the state’s power. In place of the formula of the absolutist ruler “The State is I” came the view “The State is All of Us.” The people were no longer the monarch’s “subjects,” but the co-architects of the state, the carriers

* Translated from Ukrainian by the issue editor.

** In most places, I have rendered the original derzhava by the English word “state.” The latter is used in the generic, not the US constitutional sense. When it was necessary to use the concept in the American constitutional sense, I have put the word “state” in quotation marks and translated derzhava as “country.” — Translator’s remark.

***Piddanstvo, or, literally, “subjecthood” in the original. I have tried to render the meaning by “His Majesty’s subjects,” which is somewhat tautological; but “citizenship” and “nationality” will not do in this context. — Translator’s remark.
of state power, free and equal “citizens.” The status of a member of society was regulated by the laws of the state: the laws established the rights and the duties of the citizens toward their country. Their political rights included the right to formulate, or to participate in formulating the will of the state or the general will, as Rousseau put it. In some countries, for instance, in Switzerland, this will has been established by citizens by means of plebiscites and referenda. In other countries, the will has been manifested largely by participating in the elections of representative state organs. Those elections are secret in order to enable the citizen to give his vote to a party or to a candidate freely, without outside pressure.

From the essence of citizenship it follows that being a citizen of two or more countries can lead to difficulties, especially when the two countries are in conflict with each other. For that reason double citizenship is not welcomed in international relations.

The comparative analysis of the legal status of citizens in different countries shows that the citizens’ rights and duties exhibit a certain common profile. Those rights include usually the following:

1. *Political rights*: the right to participate directly or indirectly in the exercise of state functions, i.e., active and passive electoral right [the right to elect someone and be elected oneself — translator], the right to take position in the political life of a given country, etc.;

2. *Fundamental civil rights and liberties*: for instance, citizens have the right to reside in the state’s territory; the state shall guarantee them unhindered and free residence in its territory;

3. *Care and services*: the state cares for its citizens, ensures their supply of food, establishes insurance against illness and old age; through its diplomatic and consular representatives the state is obligated to provide protection to its citizens living abroad.

These rights correspond to the citizens’ duties toward the state. They usually include the following:
1. In countries with universal conscription, every citizen must fulfill that duty;

2. In countries having juries, every citizen must fulfill his duty to serve on juries as well as to fulfill other obligatory public functions (e.g., appear as a witness at a trial);

3. The duty to bear the faithful allegiance toward one's country that follows from the view that the state is a community of citizens. Such a duty of loyalty is also expected of every family member toward his family, every member of an association or organization vis-à-vis that association. In practice, the question arises of what that duty means. After spirited discussions, the view has been accepted that the duty of faithful allegiance is identical with that of loyalty, i.e., with the duty to observe the laws of one's state. This duty is also incumbent on aliens who reside in the territory of a given country, from which it would follow that the duty of loyalty of one's own citizens has a moral rather than a legal character. Conflicts may occur, of course, if a state keeps discriminating against individual citizens of entire groups because they belong to a certain ethnic [natsional'nosty] or religious group.

4. For crimes that have been committed abroad, citizens can be legally prosecuted by courts of "their own" state. The laws of that state determine the legal status of their citizens beyond the state's boundaries, above all, in the area of so-called private international law. The questions of whether somebody has the legal capacity to act, can inherit, can marry, etc., are determined by the laws of his state.

In the question of acquisition of citizenship by real persons, the states are guided by certain objective criteria. Those objective criteria are designed to prevent the arbitrary granting or deprivation of citizenship by representatives of the state. In one type of country, there exists "the right of blood" (ius sanguinis), according to which the
offspring receive the citizenship of their parents. In other states “the right of the soil” (*ius soli*) prevails, in accordance with which a person acquires the citizenship of the state in the territory in which he has been born.

Already from this brief survey it is clear what great importance citizenship or nationality has in the relations between the state and its citizens. For that reason, the granting of citizenship is usually accompanied by a solemn act as, for instance, the handing out of an appropriate scroll. Where this does not take place, the citizenship of a person is noted in his passport, and the states keep an appropriate register of their citizens. The citizen who casts his vote in elections must prove his identity by showing a document of citizenship, which entitles him to participate in the elections.

The matter of citizenship is complicated in countries with a federal structure of government. There are federations with a double citizenship. In the US, for instance, citizens have both national citizenship and that of the appropriate “state” [called “residence”]. In Switzerland, citizens hold the citizenship of the federation and of the canton, which is their permanent place of residence. Such double citizenship makes sense only when there is a “territorial division of powers” in a country, i.e., only where there is no indivisible central power and where the powers (competences) between the federation and the federal unit are divided in such a way that the federal unit — the canton, the “state” — enjoy a distinct measure of self-government that is guaranteed by law. Where this does not exist, a federation is not a federation, and the citizenship of a federal unit is bereft of any juridical sense.

**THE CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP AFTER THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION**

The Bolshevik Revolution has injected into the existing concepts of citizenship certain elements which are clearly inconsistent with the traditional concepts. In their theoretical writings, Bolshevik authors introduce, step by step, the so-called class principle. According to this principle, it is not nationality that is fundamentally important, but membership in a class. Since, from the time of the Communist Manifesto of 1848, the concept of class has been integrated into the
doctrine of the Communist Party, and since, in turn, the Communist Party has insisted on a leading role in its relationship with the proletariat, a peculiar situation has arisen. The Bolsheviks, *qua* the "proletariat" that had been organized into a party, began to insist on loyalty not to the state but to the class and the Party. Class solidarity became a dogma for relations between nationalities ("proletarian internationalism"). After World War I new states — Finland, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, and others — were formed from the vast areas of the former Tsarist Empire. Each of them had its own "citizens." "Subjects of His Imperial Majesty" were no more to be found. Understandably, the Bolsheviks, too, could no longer refer to "Tsarist subjects." They adopted the class principle, which enabled them to interfere in the internal affairs of the newly established states and to organize in their territories a revolutionary movement according to the principles of class loyalty and solidarity. One part of the citizens — "the proletarians," "the toilers" [trudiašči], i.e., the workers, peasants, etc. — were to obtain the rights of the ruling class, and the other part — "the bourgeois and the landowners" — were to be liquidated. In the long run there was destined to arise on the ruins of the Tsarist Empire not some kind of a new Socialist state, but a somewhat vaguely defined international Socialist Commonwealth [Respublika].

Such a conception was reflected in the first Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR (UkrSSR) of 1919, which reads in part:

> Resolutely breaking with the past and attempting to destroy — together with the division of society into classes — national oppression and national enmity, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic declares her firm intent to enter into a Single International Socialist Soviet Commonwealth [Respublika] as soon as conditions for its emergence will be created. At the same time the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic declares her full solidarity with the Soviet Republics that are in existence already today and her decision to enter with them into a close political union for the purpose of waging a common struggle for the victory of the World Communist Revolution, and into closer cooperation in the building of Communism.

A similar euphoric atmosphere prevailed in Moscow, the seat of the Bolshevik leadership.
THE FIRST LAWS ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR

It looked as if, under such circumstances, there was no need to bother with questions of citizenship. Practice, however, showed that the governments could not do without the concept of "citizen." Among other provisions, the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR of 1919 stated that "citizens of the UkrSSR" of both sexes had the right to elect and be elected to the Soviets (Article 20). Such a right thus served only citizens of the UkrSSR, not Germans nor Poles who had no UkrSSR citizenship. The Constitution of the RSFSR of 1918 went even further and mentioned that it was within the power of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee to implement "the issuance of general decrees on the acquisition and loss of Russian citizenship and on the rights of aliens" in the territory of the RSFSR. In Article 20 the Russian Constitution declared:

Proceeding from the solidarity of the toilers of all nations, the RSFSR grants all the rights of Russian citizens to aliens who reside in the territory of the Russian Republic for the purpose of work [для работы] and who are members of the working class or the toiling peasantry, and recognizes the right of local Soviets to grant those aliens the right of Russian citizenship without any complicated formal procedures.

Although the 1919 Constitution of the UkrSSR kept silent on the question of UkrSSR nationality [державної принадлежности УРСР], one should not draw the conclusion that all questions of nationality were concentrated in Moscow (RSFSR), which exercised a de facto authority in the UkrSSR and did not want to transfer matters of citizenship to the jurisdiction of the UkrSSR. On the contrary, there really was a "bourgeois" Ukrainian state with its citizens. At that time the government of the UkrSSR was fictitious and was located outside the boundaries of the Ukraine. Precisely in order to cover up this fictitious state and to bid up its own price, the UkrSSR Government by its decree of March 11, 1919, set about regulating the matter of UkrSSR citizenship.¹

This decree recognized as citizens of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic

all former subjects of the Ukrainian State (that is, of the Ukraine under Hetman Skoropadsky — Author's remark) and all former subjects of the parts of the Russian Empire which had been separated from Russia who had come to reside in the Ukraine.\(^2\) The recognition of the Ukrainian republican (UkrSSR) citizenship was more precisely regulated by Paragraph 6 of the Rule [Polozhennia] "On Aliens in the UkrSSR and the Procedure of the Acquisition and the Loss of Ukrainian Citizenship."\(^3\) Ukrainian citizens were defined as persons born in the territory of the UkrSSR \textit{(ius soli !)}, even if their parents were foreigners, provided that upon reaching maturity they had not within one year declared their wish to acquire the citizenship of their parents or that of one of the parents in case of different citizenship.\(^4\)

The aim of this decree was hardly to separate the Ukraine from the Bolshevik center, as shown by the passage in the decree which says: "The citizens of all Soviet Republics (Russia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) are equal in their rights and duties to Ukrainian citizens."*  

The distinction between Ukrainian citizens and those of "other Soviet Republics" was thus glossed over. In 1922, as already mentioned, a Rule was published about aliens in the UkrSSR. It provided a very complicated procedure for relinquishing citizenship of the UkrSSR.\(^5\) At the same time, the RSFSR did not have a citizenship law of its own. The Decree of the RSFSR Central Executive Committee of April 1918 merely regulated the acquisition of Russian citizenship by aliens.

### THE ARMISTICE AND THE PEACE TREATY OF RIGA

Soon, in 1921, the practical significance of UkrSSR citizenship became evident. This was in connection with the "Pact of Provisional Peace and the Cessation of Military Action," which was concluded [in October 1920] between Poland on the one hand and Russia and the Ukraine on the other hand, and later in connection with the


\(^3\) SU USSR, Vol. 1922, No. 14, p. 237.


\(^*\)The inclusion of the Baltic republics appears surprising until one pauses to think that in early 1919 their independence (for the duration of the interwar period) was not yet firmly established. — Translator's remark.

conclusion of the final Riga Peace Treaty of [March] 1921. In the preliminary Pact in Article 3, it was said that "in concluding this Pact, both sides obligate themselves to include in the [future] Peace Treaty a clause on the option of Russian or Ukrainian and likewise of Polish citizenship, with the provision that to all who exercise that option will be granted all the rights without exception that will be given to the citizens of both sides by the [future] Peace Treaty." Again in Article 9, the promise was made that "both sides, in concluding this Pact, obligate themselves to insert into the Peace Treaty a provision concerning amnesty, as follows: Poland for Russian and Ukrainian citizens in Poland, and Russia and the Ukraine for Polish citizens in Russia and the Ukraine."

Later the Riga Peace Treaty fulfilled that promise. In Article 6 it was stated: "In case of the person exercising his option satisfying all the requirements set in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the state in favor of which the option is exercised has no right to deny to that person the acquisition of its citizenship, and the state in which the given person resides has no right to prevent that person from renouncing its citizenship."

Nevertheless, the criterion which was to govern the right of option of citizenship was left rather unclear. The ethnic or nationality classification was apparently to be decisive: i.e., an ethnic Ukrainian residing in the vicinity of Warsaw would acquire the right to declare that he wanted to become a citizen of the Ukraine, and the Ukraine did not have the right to refuse his choice.

**AFTER THE FORMATION OF THE USSR**

Prior to the formation of the USSR, citizens of the UkrSSR were not simultaneously citizens of the RSFSR or some other Soviet Republic. The existence of formal citizenship of the UkrSSR was to serve as a formal indication that the UkrSSR was an independent state. We know that as a result of various "agreements" with the RSFSR the sovereignty of the UkrSSR as an independent state was actually

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6 Both those documents were published in the Polish Legal Gazette: *Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Vol. 1921, No. 28, Position 121 and No. 49, Position 300.
reduced to a minimum, though in a formal legal sense in remained an independent country. Its complete subordination to the Bolshevik center in Moscow was carried out not by means of law, but through a de facto — predominantly military — subordination.

Those relations of a formal, legal independence, however, changed after the signing of an “agreement” to create the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In that agreement there are two articles that deal with the question of citizenship: Article 1, Paragraph (f), and Article 21. Article 1 of the agreement enumerates the powers of the supreme organs of the USSR. It includes among those powers “basic legislation in the field of Union citizenship as concerns the rights of aliens.” Article 21 establishes the principle that “for the citizens of Soviet Republics there is established a single Union citizenship.”

Both those principles later entered into the first Constitution of the USSR of January 31, 1924. But even before, in the course of the discussion on the draft Constitution, a conflict broke out, which allegedly had been provoked by “nationalist elements.” In her admirably solid work based on primary sources, S. I. Iakubovskaia refers to that polemical discussion. She writes that the representatives of the Ukraine and some other members of the Constitutional Commission proposed that, side by side with the article on single Union citizenship in the Constitution of the USSR, there should be reserved the right of republican citizenship. In submitting their proposal, Khristiian Rakovsky and Mykola Skrypnyk [from the Ukraine], as well as some other Commission members, kept insisting that Union citizenship be introduced only for relations with foreign countries but that Soviet inter-republican relations should be governed by the law on republican citizenship. Against this point of view Mikhail Kalinin, D. I. Kurskii, I. V. Stalin, and Georgii V. Chicherin spoke at the session of the Constitutional Commission of the Central Executive Committee. Kalinin tried to prove his position by arguing: “When I visited the mountain peoples [gortsy], I told them: you are not citizens mountaineers, you are citizens of a huge All-Soviet territory. In that territory all nationalities unite with each other; a new statehood is emerging; you are the citizens of a new state, the USSR, which has never existed in the world before. . . . I am, therefore, surprised that there should be any quarrel on that subject. Some persons here say that we agree with each other for the purpose of conducting external relations but do not agree in internal ones. [This agreement] in internal relations has more significance for the great
mass of peasants than the one in external relations.”7 From Kalinin’s words, it would appear that he regarded a Communist or Soviet great state as the matter of first priority, and that the claims of Union Republics did not even enter his consciousness. On the other hand, the representatives of the Union Republics were concerned lest those republics should lose their individuality in a great Soviet state.

Despite the objections of the Union Republics, the Constitutional Commission accepted the article on single Union citizenship. That article was thus included in the first Constitution of the USSR, which was formally ratified by the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR and thereby by all Union Republics. A separate Constitution of the UkrSSR was not approved for the time being — thus, without any interruptions, the Constitution of 1919 remained in force. Only the Ninth Congress of [Ukrainian] Soviets of May 10, 1925, called on the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee to “amend” the UkrSSR Constitution of 1919 to bring it into conformity with the Constitution of the USSR. Those changes were made gradually. Article 6 of the UkrSSR Constitution of 1919, which dealt with the question of the sovereignty of the UkrSSR and the powers of its central organs, was edited and retained in connection with the voluntary entry of the UkrSSR into the USSR.8 Paralleling Chapter II of the USSR Constitution “On the Sovereign Rights of Union Republics and on Union Citizenship,” Article 6 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR proclaimed:

The Ukrainian SSR enters into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as an independent contractual member. Its sovereignty is limited only to the extent specified in the Constitution of the USSR and [then] only in matters, which belong to the powers of the USSR. Beyond that extent the UkrSSR exercises its state authority independently.

Further, in the same article there were specifically defined the broad sovereign powers of the Republic. It was determined that among the powers of the USSR as personified in its supreme organs belonged: 1. “All questions bearing on administrative matters that have not been united in the USSR and which are resolved by the Union Republics

acting independently such as . . . (i) legislation on Ukrainian citizenship and naturalization, corresponding to the basic USSR legislation on the Union citizenship."

The amended text of the UkrSSR Constitution was ratified only by the Eleventh Congress of Soviets of the UkrSSR in 1929. It was given the following preamble:

Proceeding from the rights of the toiling and exploited people that have been proclaimed by the October Revolution and the fundamental principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, as well as the basic principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which had been elucidated in the UkrSSR Constitution of March 10, 1919, this Constitution establishes the basic goals and organizational form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which aims at the final suppression of the bourgeoisie and the destruction of the exploitation of man by man and the realization of Communism, under which there will be neither class divisions nor state authority.

This preamble sheds light on the very essence of the proletarian Constitution. Article 6 of that Constitution declares: "Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR are automatically (ipso facto) citizens of the USSR. In the territory of the UkrSSR the citizens of other Soviet Socialist Republics enjoy all the rights and carry out all the duties established for citizens of the UkrSSR."

POLEMICS ABOUT UNION AND REPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP

The ratification of the first Constitution of the USSR and its sanction of the principle of the "unity" of Soviet citizenship did not put an end to the polemics. At issue now was the content of that principle. It did not help that already, during the discussion on the draft Constitutional provision concerning a "single" Union citizenship, a Commission of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) had come out in favor of "single" USSR citizenship and had given appropriate reasons. At the same time, that Commission confirmed unambiguously that "the establishment of Union citizenship [did] not exclude republican citizenship."9 Over time, such an approach has given birth to the thesis that the

9 Iakubovskaia, op. cit., p. 242.
sovereignty of the USSR does not exclude the sovereignty of any of the Union Republics.

An impetus to the continuation of the discussion gave the draft decree on Union citizenship, which was finally adopted October 29, 1924. During the discussion of the draft two opposite tendencies emerged. The first tendency was openly "great power" oriented, i. e., extremely centralist. It ignored the rights of the Union Republics to grant their own citizenship. Its proponents argued that, with the establishment of a "single" Soviet citizenship, every citizen of the USSR enjoyed all the rights and had all the duties vis-à-vis the USSR, no matter in which of the Union Republics he happened to reside. The so-called republican citizenship was only a symbol without the slightest juridical content.

This approach also obtained scholarly backing. In 1924 there appeared the work of Professor S. A. Kotliarevskii, *The USSR and the Union Republics*. Kotliarevskii was a jurist of the old school; he had started his scholarly career in Tsarist Russia. Analyzing the principle of the "singleness" of the citizenship of the USSR, he showed that, given the citizenship of the USSR, republican citizenship was deprived of any juridical content and did not have any practical significance. He concluded:

> The attempt to preserve citizenship for the individual Union Republics is understandable from political considerations. It is as if it symbolized the independent existence of a given national republic. But if we look at it from the juridical viewpoint, is it not an anachronism under conditions of Soviet power?

Dismayed by such a theory, the representatives of the Union Republics started rebelling against this unprecedented emasculation of the citizenship of the Union Republics. They stated that the Soviet Union consisted of Union Republics and that there did not exist any territory which belonged to the USSR as such, without the Union Republics. If so, then the acquisition of USSR citizenship was conditional on first obtaining the citizenship of one of the Republics. An alien was first to be naturalized in a Union Republic; through that

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11 S. A. Kotliarevskii, *SSR i soiuznye respubliki* (Moscow, 1924).
12 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
naturalization he became a citizen of the USSR. The situation was thus analogous to that existing in Switzerland: the acquisition of citizenship in a canton entailed the acquisition of citizenship of the Swiss Federation. For these reasons the Union Republics proposed a separate procedure for the acquisition and the renunciation of republican citizenship. Republican citizenship was to be essential for USSR citizenship. They also proposed that republican citizenship should be distinctly formalized. A consequence of this would have been that the transfer from the citizenship of one republic to that of another republic was to be accompanied by certain formalities.\(^{13}\)

The central Party leaders took a negative stand toward the “separatist” tendencies of the Union Republics. Out of political considerations, however, they, too, could not accept the tendencies that had been [so bluntly] expressed in Kotliarevskii’s work. For what would have been the reaction to that tendency of the peoples which the USSR wanted to recruit for joining the new “federation” (the Baltic states, Poland, and others), before whom they wanted to extend rather rosy perspectives? For that reason, they condemned the first tendency as nationalist (“bourgeois nationalism”) and the second one as chauvinist (“great power chauvinism”). Definitive was to be the decision of the plenary session of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Central Committee in June 1923, in which the Party confirmed the following interpretation of Article 7 of Chapter II of the USSR Constitution: “The establishment of Union citizenship does not exclude republican citizenship.”\(^{14}\) Though the plenary session did not say “yea,” neither did it say “nay,” and in reality it endorsed the position of a “single” Union citizenship.

This coincided with the Bolshevik conception of building Socialism: the nationalization of all means of production, the preparation of a central directive plan for the national economy, central guidance of the plan’s implementation, the direct subordination of the total labor force to the Socialist government in Moscow, etc. Iakubovskaia is correct in her comment: “Such amendments were the result of political inevitability: a powerful central authority and the unity of the federal state were inevitable preconditions for building Socialism.”\(^{15}\)

\(^{13}\) This polemic is hinted at in Shevtsov, op. cit. (note 1), p. 74 ff.
\(^{14}\) Iakubovskaia, op. cit., p. 242.
\(^{15}\) Ibid., p. 241.
Such a "dialectical" solution allowed the Party to recognize the right of Autonomous Republics to grant citizenship, too. Article 17 of the "current" Bashkir Constitution reads, for instance: *

Every citizen of the Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic is a citizen of the RSFSR and the USSR. Citizens of the RSFSR and of all other Union Republics enjoy in the territory of the Bashkir ASSR the same rights as those enjoyed by citizens of the Bashkir ASSR.

Already then the problem was posed in such a way that allegedly the Union Republics did not lose their sovereignty after the formation of the USSR and that their republican citizenship constituted one of the attributes of their sovereignty. Those assertions violated even primitive legal logic. The jurists of the old school kept on proving that, as a consequence of the establishment of the USSR, the Union Republics had lost their sovereignty and that their citizenship lacked any juridical and practical meaning. The Party leadership regarded such statements as harmful to Party policy. It issued a directive to "Socialist" lawyers to develop new concepts of sovereignty, citizenship, etc. It is precisely there, in the practical needs of Party policy and not in the writings of Marx and Engels, that we have to search for the roots of "Socialist" law with its new, "qualitatively altogether different" concepts. All those Soviet scholars who had let themselves be guided by concepts of federalism that had been developed in "bourgeois federal states" were now fair game for Party critics. Denunciations of the "great power chauvinism" of Kotliarevskii also poured forth, because in his work he had drawn an analogy between "bourgeois federations" and the Soviet federal state. He had written: "Studying the tendencies which are emerging in the political life of the USSR, we must also not lose sight of the experience of foreign federations."16 By doing so, he is said "to have committed in this question a mistake of both principle and methodology, by drawing an analogy between the forms of proletarian and bourgeois federations and by not sufficiently stressing the conditions [in which those forms operate]. Those states are principally in opposition to each other, according to their class content. The difference in the class

* Reference is to the Bashkir ASSR Constitution before any of the changes that were brought about by the amendment of the USSR Constitution in 1977. — Translator's remark.
16 Kotliarevskii, op. cit., p.18.
character of the state also determines the principal difference of the very form of proletarian federation from the bourgeois one, determines the absence of contradictions between the sovereignty of a federal state and the sovereignty of the states and provinces which are its constituent parts."

To conclude, the sovereignty and citizenship of Union Republics are fictions that Party leaders find necessary in order to show the world's proletariat, the other Communist Parties, the candidates for "voluntary" annexation to the USSR, and, finally, the entire world that in the USSR the nationality question has been solved in an ideal way.

THE DECREE ON UKRAINIAN CITIZENSHIP.

The Rule on Union Citizenship was passed on October 29, 1924. Article 3 of this Rule provided that everybody living in the territory of the USSR was a Soviet citizen, unless he could prove that he was a foreigner. Thus, all stateless persons received Soviet citizenship, as did all aliens who could not prove that they were citizens of a foreign state. Those aliens who were able to prove their foreign citizenship but who resided and worked in the USSR were to enjoy all the rights of USSR citizens, because they were members of the "working class." Article 4 proclaimed that persons whose parents were USSR citizens had the citizenship of the appropriate Union Republics and ipso facto (i.e., through the Union Republics) they also enjoyed Soviet citizenship.

The Union Republics as such were mentioned in the Rule only twice: (1) the naturalization of aliens who lived in one of the Union Republics was to be performed through the Central Executive Committee of the given Union Republic; and (2) the renewed granting of citizenship to persons who had lost it was to be done either by the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or by the Central Executive Committee of the Union Republic. The Rule did not issue any directive to the Republics to the effect that, based on this rule, they should formulate their own rules on citizenship. The Constitution of the USSR of 1924, however, did introduce the principle that the USSR had the legal power only to establish "basic legislation in the field of Union citizenship concerning the right of aliens." This has meant that

17 Iakubovskaia, op. cit., p. 30.
each Union Republic is to regulate matters of citizenship herself, in accordance with the basic legislation on Union citizenship. Shevtsov states, however, that "republican laws in citizenship affairs, based on the above-mentioned Constitutional norm, were not adopted by the Republics." 19

This is not altogether accurate. It was the Ukrainian SSR which alone, May 13, 1926, adopted the "Rule on Ukrainian Citizenship and on Aliens." 20 The Ukraine thus kept fighting for its rights, courageously. That Rule was later included in the Administrative Code of the UkrSSR, accepted in 1927, in its Chapters 7 and 8. Durdenevskyi published the Rule in German in Zeitschrift für Ostrecht, Vol. 1928, no. II, p. 1391.

The Rule consisted of two sections. The first regulated the question of who was a citizen of the UkrSSR, outlined the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship, for its renunciation, and its loss. The second section was devoted to the problems of proving foreign citizenship, the rights and duties of aliens, the marriage of aliens in the territory of the UkrSSR with other aliens and with Soviet citizens, and the citizenship of children born into such marriages. According to Article 20, aliens residing in the UkrSSR were subject to the same laws and decrees of the UkrSSR Government as were UkrSSR citizens, with the specified exceptions. When a Ukrainian citizen married an alien, each of the parties retained his or her citizenship. The children born of mixed marriages were recognized as UkrSSR citizens, however, regardless of where they had been born, if one of the parents at the moment of the child's birth happened to be residing in the territory of the USSR. If one of the parents at the moment of the birth of the child was a citizen of the UkrSSR but both parents happened to be located outside the USSR at that time, the citizenship of the child was determined in agreement with the parents. Nonetheless that person, upon reaching majority, could acquire UkrSSR citizenship according to a simplified procedure, established by USSR laws. 21

The History of the State and Law of the Ukrainian SSR states that "Section II of the Rule on Aliens in the UkrSSR ceased to be effective by order of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee and the

19 Shevtsov, op. cit., p. 94.
Council of People's Commissars of the UkrSSR dated November 10, 1926, while any problems in connection with the legal status of aliens were to be resolved in conformity with the USSR laws on those questions."22 This is somewhat strange since all those questions had been regulated in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the Rule, which was contained in the Code of Laws Concerning the Family, Welfare, Marriage, and Civil Acts of the Ukrainian SSR of 1926. Those provisions were not deleted and formally remained valid until a new code was adopted, that is, until 1969.

Probably we are dealing here with a specific situation. We surmise that the appropriate UkrSSR authorities began to issue UkrSSR rather than USSR internal passports to aliens and that this provoked misgivings on the part of Moscow. The central authorities had to forbid their republican counterparts to issue passports that were based on the Rule on Ukrainian citizenship and probably told them to issue the documents "in accordance with USSR legislation." There are émigrés who remember those times. They should tell us what type of passports they carried in the 1920s; did those documents certify their Soviet (i.e., USSR) citizenship or their Ukrainian (UkrSSR) citizenship? This is a significant and interesting question.

Article 1 of the Rule stressed that UkrSSR citizens were citizens of the USSR, and that citizens of other Soviet Republics had all the rights and duties that had been established for citizens by USSR as well as by UkrSSR legislation. All aliens who were of legal age could petition to acquire UkrSSR citizenship. All aliens residing in the territory of the UkrSSR could obtain UkrSSR citizenship by action of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. Persons who had lost their citizenship could reacquire it by decision of the USSR Central Executive Committee or the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee. The UkrSSR citizenship could be renounced with permission either of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee or the USSR Central Executive Committee. A person renouncing UkrSSR citizenship made out a declaration addressed to the Administrative Section of the Area [okruhovy] Executive Committee, according to his place of residence.

22 Ibid., p. 492.
For lack of sources, it is difficult to say what fate befell the Rule on Ukrainian Citizenship in later years. It is a fact, however, that laws on USSR citizenship were passed three times: in 1930, 1931, and 1938. That last one is still in force.* No new law or rule on Ukrainian citizenship has appeared in the Union Republics, the Ukrainian SSR in particular. We have been able to show that, after the passage of the USSR citizenship law of 1938, a directive was issued to the Governments of the Union Republics “recommending” that they should put in order their republican legislation on citizenship. In this context, the decree of the Belorussian SSR was passed July 10, 1939, which annulled the Rule on Aliens that had been ratified by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Belorussian SSR of August 4, 1922.23 We assume that at the same time the 1926 Rule on UkrSSR citizenship was finally annulled.

The 1924 Law on USSR Citizenship had large loopholes, allowing various people to declare themselves as foreigners only so that they could leave the USSR. This was one of the reasons for the passage of a new law in 1930. But the new law hurt the Union Republics; according to the 1930 law, an alien could be given USSR citizenship without simultaneously acquiring the citizenship of one of the Union Republics. The granting of Soviet citizenship to foreigners who were living abroad and the renewed granting of USSR citizenship to or the renunciation of the citizenship by persons who lived outside the USSR were now made exclusive USSR powers, in contrast to the law of 1924, which provided for the exercise of alternative power by the Republics.

It appears certain that the limitation of the rights of the Republics provoked a certain reaction and gave the impetus for the adoption of a new citizenship law in 1931. In that law, the “injustices” of 1930 were removed, and the status quo of 1924 was restored. In addition, the 1931 law differently regulated the establishment of citizenship by means of birth, the change of the children’s citizenship when the parents changed theirs, etc.

Ostensibly linked to the new [Stalinist] Constitution of 1936, a new law was passed in 1938 defining USSR citizenship. Article 1 of that law

*See, however, Addendum below. — Editor’s remark.

repeats the principle that "every citizen of a Union Republic is a
citizen of the USSR." In addition, the law calls Soviet citizens all those
who have had their residence in USSR territory, unless they can prove
that they are foreign citizens. The law further determines that all who
had been subjects of the Russian Empire before November 7, 1917 (i. e.,
before the October Revolution) and had not lost their Soviet
citizenship, continued to remain Soviet citizens. Soviet citizens were
also those who had acquired USSR citizenship according to the
procedure established by law, i. e., by submitting an appropriate
petition themselves. Anyone who could not prove successfully that he
was either a foreign citizen or a Soviet citizen was now regarded as a
stateless person.

As far as the Union Republics were concerned, the law determined
that aliens were admitted to USSR citizenship upon submitting a
petition either by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or
— alternatively — by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
Union Republic in which they had their residence. But the power to
deprive someone of Soviet citizenship was exclusively that of the
USSR. The law comprised only eight articles and regulated matters of
citizenship less than precisely, with many gaps present. But any one of
those gaps gave the central organs of the USSR the right to decide
specific cases as they judged them appropriate (according to the
formula "We consider that . . . ").

Both the 1936 Constitution and the 1938 law on Soviet citizenship
took the position that every USSR citizen was simultaneously a citizen
of one of the Union Republics. The Union Republics were not given
the power to pass their own laws on citizenship — everything was now
concentrated in Moscow. Unresolved, however, remained the question
of when a USSR citizen acquired or lost the citizenship of one of the
Union Republics. The law does not regulate those matters. From the
Constitutions of the USSR and of the Union Republics it appears
unambiguously that the rights of citizenship are reciprocal, e. g., a
citizen of the RSFSR living in the UkrSSR enjoys the same rights as
does a citizen of the UkrSSR, and vice versa. In 1938 Kuznetsov wrote
in Moscow:

Every citizen of a Union Republic is at the same time a citizen
of the USSR; every time a citizen travels from one Union
Republic to another, he acquires the citizenship of the
Republic in which he arrives, while remaining a citizen of the USSR.24

This shows what cynicism and "nihilism" the citizenship of the Union Republics was subjected to then (and probably has also been subjected to until today). The citizens of Union Republics do not get any internal passports or other identity cards that show their republican citizenship: the Bureau for the Registration of Civil Acts [Zagsy] do not keep any records of citizens of a given republic. Thus, one can say that a citizen of the USSR travelling through all the republics becomes a citizen of each one of them as soon as he sets foot upon its territory. Today Shevtsov proposes to acknowledge "that the fundamental criterion for the recognition by Union Republics of Soviet citizens as citizens of a given Republic should be the permanent place of residence of the citizen."25 Probably he thinks that what really matters is where one is "registered" for residence. How else can one determine the "permanent place of residence"? Or should one make up a special section in the internal passports of the citizens?

In any case, after the country started on the five-year plans, the problem of republican citizenship lost its entire meaning. When the Western Ukraine, Bukovina, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, etc., were annexed to the USSR, decrees were issued giving Soviet citizenship to the population of those territories, but nowhere was it even mentioned that simultaneously they were acquiring Ukrainian, Lithuanian, or Estonian citizenship.

DE LEGE FERENDA

Already in the late 1960s there emerged in the Soviet Union the problem of how to modernize the law on USSR citizenship. The existing law of 1938 was very schematic and contained many loopholes. We know that at one of the highest state organs (probably, the USSR Supreme Soviet) a special commission was created to prepare the draft of a new citizenship law. Either in 1972 or 1973, the central Moscow press even mentioned that the very next session of the USSR Supreme Soviet would consider a new law on citizenship. But, when the session was convened, its agenda did not include even a hint

25 Shevtsov, op. cit., p. 68.
of a new citizenship law. It would appear that among the members of
the commission and perhaps between the commission and the political
leadership of the USSR, serious differences of opinion have existed
concerning certain problems of citizenship. We should not exclude the
possibility that those differences may have been caused by the question
of the citizenship of the Union Republics.

It is worth mentioning that since 1960 various Soviet legal scholars
have kept the question of Soviet republican citizenship alive. The
Armenian A. A. Esayan has proposed that in citizenship matters the
rights of the Union Republics be broadened and, concretely, that
Union Republics not only be confirmed in their right to decide on the
acquisition of citizenship, which right formally exists in accordance
with the USSR Constitution, but that they also be allowed to decide on
renunciation or deprivation of Soviet citizenship. Esayan writes that
the law on citizenship was adopted in 1938, i.e., during the period of
the "cult of personality," and has reflected a wholly unjustified
limitation of the sovereign rights of the republics.26 Can one imagine,
writes he, that a competent organ of a Union Republic should not be
given the right to deprive of citizenship this or that unworthy person?
Nationality is one of the attributes of the sovereignty of Union
Republics! The right to deprive someone of citizenship can
immediately be deduced from the fact of the sovereignty of Union
Republics which have entered the USSR.27

The reader might gain the impression that, speaking through
Esayan, the Union Republics have been demanding their sovereign
rights. Similar propositions, however, can be found in the writings of
other authors who are not supporters of the power of Union
Republics, as, for instance, in Zlatopol'skii,28 Kuchinskii,29 Shevtsov,30
and others. In all those writings there emerges one idea, viz., to give the
Union Republic the right not only to naturalize but also to
denaturalize. It should be emphasized that we are dealing here not with

26 A. A. Esayan, Nekotorye voprosy sovetskogo grazhdanstva: Voprosy naseleniia v
27 Ibid., p. 99.
28 D. L. Zlatopol'skii, Gosudarstvennoe ustroistvo SSSR (Moscow, 1960), p. 260. Also
29 V. A. Kuchinskii, "Belorussskaia SSR — suverennoe gosudarstvo," in Voprosy
obshchenarodnogo gosudarstva i prava v BSSR (Minsk), p. 31.
30 Shevtsov, op. cit., pp. 156, 158 ff.
the acquisition of citizenship of a Union Republic but of USSR citizenship, and not with the deprivation of Union Republican but of Soviet citizenship. Let us recall that in many unitary states, that is, in states that are not federations, not only the central but also the local organs have the right to naturalize citizens. No conclusion can, therefore, be drawn from this that by doing so the local organs are acquiring any sovereign rights whatsoever. This is a simple division of functions between organs of state administration. If some foreigner who lives in the UkrSSR wants to become a citizen of the USSR, it is hard to understand why his case has to be decided by the central organs in Moscow. As far as withdrawal of citizenship is concerned, those demands on behalf of Union Republics are very far-fetched, for practically such cases do not exist, and, if there had been such cases, each one of them would have had a political basis and, for that reason, a Union Republic could not have decided them according to its own discretion anyway.

Those demands may possibly have the hidden objective of balancing out the attack on the position of Union Republics. We would merely like to refer to Article 194 of the Code on Marriage and Family of the Ukrainian SSR of 1969, which reads as follows:

In accordance with the basic legislation of the USSR and of the Union Republics on Marriage and Family, a child, both parents of whom at the time of his birth were citizens of the USSR, is recognized as a Soviet citizen irrespective of where he was born.

Given different citizenship of the parents, one of whom at the time of the child's birth was a citizen of the USSR, the child is recognized as a USSR citizen provided that at least one of his parents at the time of birth was a resident of the USSR. If at that time both parents lived outside the USSR, the citizenship of the child is determined according to their agreement.31

Until 1969, the Code of Laws on Family, Welfare, Marriage, and Civil Acts of the Ukrainian SSR, that had been adopted May 31, 1926, was in force in the Ukrainian SSR. The content of Article 14 of that Code corresponds more or less to that of Article 194 of the new Code, with the significant difference that wherever Article 194 of the new Code uses the terms "USSR citizenship" or "citizens of the USSR," Article

31 Radians'ke pravo, 1969, No. 11.
14 of the old Code used the words "citizen of the UkrSSR," "UkrSSR citizenship," and "Ukrainian citizenship." Thus, while all kinds of things were being said aloud about the Union Republics — being sovereign states they should be given the right not only to grant Soviet citizenship but also to deprive persons of it — the citizenship of the UkrSSR was quietly deleted from the UkrSSR Code on Marriage and Family.

It is interesting to note, however, that Article 196 of the 1969 UkrSSR Code on Marriage and Family does mention citizenship of the UkrSSR:

When a marriage is being entered into or other civil acts are performed in USSR Embassies and Consulates abroad, laws of the Ukrainian SSR are being applied, if the interested persons are citizens of the UkrSSR. If the interested persons are citizens of different Union Republics or if their republican citizenship is not determined, then — with their consent — the laws of one of the Union Republics are applied, and, if such consent be lacking, this is done by decision of the official who is registering the civil act. [Emphasis added.]

How can this exception be explained? There is no All-Union Code of Family Law. All-Union Fundamentals of Legislation on Marriage and Family exist, but apart from this each of the Republics has its own family law. These codes allow for certain deviations from the norm. In Georgia, for instance, girls can marry at an earlier age than can females in the RSFSR. Thus, when a couple of Soviet citizens who are living abroad decide to marry in a Soviet Embassy, it has to be decided which Republic's laws are to be applied. For that reason, Article 196 of the UkrSSR Code on Marriage and Family states that laws of the UkrSSR should be applied in the case that the "interested persons are citizens of the UkrSSR." But how can they prove citizenship of the UkrSSR?

The new Soviet Constitution of 1977 regulates the citizenship question in its Article 33 as follows:

In the USSR there is established a single Union citizenship. Every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the USSR. The basis for and the order of acquisition and of loss of Soviet citizenship are determined by the law on Soviet citizenship.

USSR citizens living abroad enjoy the protection and patronage [pokrovitel'stvo] of the Soviet state.

As we see, there exists in this Article the mention that every citizen of
a Union Republic is a citizen of the USSR. The Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR might possibly regulate the problem of UkrSSR citizenship with somewhat greater precision. But I am not an optimist and do not think that there will emerge any true UkrSSR citizenship. In all likelihood today's status quo will be reaffirmed.

The tendency to liquidate the citizenship of the Union Republics completely has clearly emerged from the discussions on the draft of the new Soviet Constitution. It is true that in recent textbooks of Soviet constitutional law there is much talk about the USSR being a federal state and about the Union Republics being fully sovereign. But, in legal and historical journals and other serious sources, the idea is being established that, owing to the rapprochement and merger of peoples and ethnic groups [natsional‘nostei] and owing to the solution of the nationality question, Soviet federalism has reached the stage of withering away and one of transition to a unitary state. On the other hand, Lepeshkin takes a more "liberal" position. He writes that the federal system of the USSR has other goals in addition to that of solving the nationality question. That question "has already been solved" and thus from that particular point of view the Soviet federation has already become obsolete. But the Union Republics are also administrative units and, as such, are playing an important role in state administration. In other words, the Union Republics have become transformed into something like provinces.

We should not ignore the possibility that a connection exists between the degradation of the citizenship of the Union Republics and the new concept of the Soviet People. The Soviet People is, on the one hand, a legal and, on the other hand, a socio-political category. As a legal term, it is the name for the aggregation of Soviet citizens. In Western states, the totality of citizens of a state is called a "nation"; in the USSR, they are called the "people" [narod]. It is a difference in

33 For instance: P. G. Semenov in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1961, No. 12; I. M. Kislitsyn, in Voprosy teorii i praktiki federal’nogo stroitel’stva soiuza SSR (Perm’, 1969); E. V. Tadevosian, in V. I. Lenin o gosudarstvennykh formakh reshenii natsional’nogo voprosa v SSSR (1970), and in Sovetskaya natsional’naya gosudarstvennost’ (1972); M. I. Kulichenko, Natsional’nye otnosheniia v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvitiia (1972); and others.
34 "Sovetskii federalizm v period razvitogo sotsializma," A. I. Lepeshkin, in Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo, 1975, No. 8, pp. 3-12.
THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE UkrSSR

terminology. To the French nation belong all French citizens, regardless of their ethnic background and even without regard to whether or not they have mastered the French language. The same applies to the USA, Canada, the United Kingdom, etc. When the Soviet Union calls itself a Soviet state, then, naturally, the people of that state must have their name, too — the Soviet People.35

If Western terminology is to be applied, it must be said that the totality of Soviet citizens does create a "Soviet nation." But in Soviet terminology, "nation" has a different meaning, defined by Lenin and Stalin in their solutions to the "nationality question." Translating their terminology into Western usage, we may state that the Leninist "nation" corresponds to the Western concept of "nationality." "The multinational Soviet Union" is the Soviet state consisting of many nationalities.36 As understood in the Soviet Union, "nation" [natsiia] is an ethnic concept, and "people" [narod] a political one. Wrote Shchetinin, "Our Party not only does not force the rapprochement of nations, but emphasizes that the Soviet People does not constitute some new ethnic community, that the process of the rapprochement of nations and ethnic groups of the USSR, which will ultimately lead to their full unity, will be a long one."37 *

"Soviet People" thus refers to the totality of all Soviet citizens. If we admit that citizenship is the decisive criterion of membership in a "people," we have to say that, besides the Soviet People, there are as many "peoples" as there are Union and Autonomous Republics; for each one of them has its own citizens and its own citizenship, according to the Constitution. Does this not explain the negative

35 Writes B. V. Shchetinin: "Into this new historical community which is built on the common socio-economic and politico-state-legal system of Socialism, are joined all Soviet citizens without regard to their social origin and status, ethnic and racial characteristics, sex, education, membership in the Party and profession, residence, and their relation to religion," in his Problemy teorii sovetskogo gosudarstvennogo prava (1974), p. 7 ff. In this sense, the "Soviet People" is defined by many other Soviet theoreticians, in which process the concept is being glorified: it is a unique community, etc.

36 This terminology is not being used in the USSR consistently, as pointed out by M. P. Kim in Sovetskii narod — novaia istoricheskaia obschchnost' (Moscow, 1972), p. 6. In the face of all that confusion, Soviet scholarship, according to Kim, understands under the concept narod three human communities: the political, the ethnic, and the social.

37 Shchetinin, op. cit., p. 33.

* See also the article by Y. Bilinsky, "The Concept of the Soviet People and Its Implications for Soviet Nationality Policy," in this issue. — The Editor.
attitude to the citizenship of the Union Republic? In any case, all these are rather controversial issues. This may also explain why a new citizenship law has not seen the light of day as yet.

The Soviet Union is a maximally centralized state. The Union Republics have no matters which belong to their exclusive jurisdiction powers. For even the functioning of the UkrSSR Supreme Soviet is regulated by the Constitution of the USSR; the Constitution of the UkrSSR has copied those articles from the USSR Constitution. The Supreme Soviet of the UkrSSR accepts the budget of the UkrSSR — this appears to be the only exclusive power of the UkrSSR. Nevertheless, approval of the budgets of the Union Republics is, in turn, regulated by the All-Union law, which will remain in force even if there are no more Union Republics. The Union Republics have thus no exclusive powers of their own. For that reason, there is no need to rule that a person becomes a citizen of a Union Republic as a consequence of establishing his residence in the Union Republic. The situation could change drastically, of course, if some kind of decentralizing reform were to be made in the USSR. Then the Soviet federation would acquire real meaning. To-day, it is symbolism, pure and simple.

ADDENDUM

After I had completed this article, a new law “On USSR Citizenship” was passed in the USSR on November 30, 1978 (see Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Vol. 1978, no. 49, law no. 816, pp. 814-15). Article 1 of this law repeats Article 33 of the USSR Constitution, viz.: “Every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the USSR.” It adds to this:

The legislation of the USSR on Soviet citizenship consists of this [particular] Law, which, in conformity with Article 33 of the USSR Constitution, determines the [legal] bases and the procedure for the acquisition and the loss of Soviet citizenship, as well as of other legislative acts of the USSR. The legislation of a Union Republic determines [those] questions of Soviet citizenship which have been delegated to its jurisdiction by the Constitution of the USSR, that of the Union Republic, and this [particular] Law.

The “rights” of the Union Republics in the area of citizenship are mentioned in Articles 26, 27 and 28 of the “Law on USSR Citizenship.” Paragraphs 2 of Article 26 reads:
The decision on applications for obtaining the citizenship of a Union Republic and thus the citizenship of the USSR, submitted by aliens and stateless persons who permanently reside on the territory of the Union Republic, is made by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.

Paragraph 3 of the same article reads:

In cases of change of citizenship decrees are issued either by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet or by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic. Upon rejection of an application in citizenship questions it is those organs that make the appropriate decisions. [Emphasis added.]

Article 27, Paragraph 1 has a similar content: “Applications in questions of USSR citizenship are submitted to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, respectively.” [Emphasis added.] The content of Article 28 goes in the same direction: “The procedure for considering applications and representations [predstavlen'] in question of USSR citizenship is determined by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in citizenship matters that have been delegated to the jurisdiction of a Union Republic — by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.”

Only one conclusion can be drawn from these legal provisions: in questions of citizenship, the Union Republics have no real rights. If they have any rights whatsoever in this area, it is not in questions of their own citizenship, but only of the citizenship of the USSR. Since 1930, Union Republic citizenship has become simple farce. From that time on, there have been no laws at all on the citizenship of Union Republics. Nonetheless, the 1978 Law on USSR Citizenship has introduced a certain procedural change. Whereas the 1938 Law on USSR Citizenship had deprived the Union Republics of any procedural matters and had placed them under the exclusive jurisdiction of All-Union organs, the new law provides for the procedural competence of the organs of Union Republics, too — not as “sovereign states,” of course, but as simple administrative units.

A. B.
One of the peculiarities of totalitarianism is the politicization of nominally non-political spheres of life. On close examination, such politicization will be found to serve larger system needs and/or to reflect deep conflicts within the society. Our purpose here is to examine the politicization of culture — culture in the sense of creative pursuits that are valued over and above their everyday utility — in the Soviet Ukraine, in the context of Soviet nationality policies and problems.

The arts are among the most available and explicit vehicles for symbolism and the expression of politically relevant myths. It is for this reason that totalitarian societies have placed rigid control over literature, graphic arts, and the performing arts. Our specific concern, therefore, is with regime policies regarding the expression of symbols of national authenticity, as opposed to All-Union (or, as more frequently happens, explicitly Russian) themes in Ukrainian culture since the 20th Party Congress.

**POLITICAL MYTHOLOGY AND NATIONALITIES POLICY**

Both minority nationalism and communist "internationalism" in the Soviet context are mythic structures. Myths, as a general term, are propositions beyond empirical verifiability concerning the fundamental nature of social reality. Frequently, myths come to provide a rationale for the exercise of power or for inequalities of power and privilege. "Political myths" constitute that component

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of the total mythic structure of a society that deals with the distribution of power and benefits, the proper locus of authority, and the justification of its exercise. Thus, when a myth becomes institutionalized as the moral foundation of a set of political institutions, alternative myths will come to represent a challenge to the legitimacy of the system.

The Soviet nationalities problem, at root, is the failure to reconcile two conflicting political myths very prevalent in Soviet society. The first of these — the dominant political myth — is the myth of "proletarian internationalism." Opposed to it is the national myth, or, as we prefer to term it, the "myth of the national moral patrimony." The myth of proletarian internationalism holds that the principal political entity with which Soviet citizens identify is the class, not the nation, and that psychological identification with the nation will decrease as the society evolves toward communism. A crucial mytheme (or component myth) of proletarian internationalism, however, is the myth of Russian primacy: a firm belief in the Russian patrimony of the former Tsarist empire. Thus, Stalin's May 1945 toast to the Russian people evoked latent but quite firmly entrenched sentiments of Russian responsibility for the Soviet "family of nations."

The theme of Russian primacy early became more or less incorporated into Marxist-Leninist ideology through the doctrine of "friendship of peoples" (druzhba narodov): the projection into the distant past, through the rewriting of history, of Russian tutelage of the minority nationalities.

The "friendship of peoples" myth is a crucial pillar of support for the myth of Russian primacy, because it purports to belie and contradict the history of Russian conquest and colonial domination of non-Russian nationalities. The myth of Russian primacy comprises the following propositions:

1. The Soviet Union is a Russian enterprise. The basis of this is that the former Tsarist empire belong-

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ed to Russia and that the Russians took the initiative in forming and defending the Soviet Union.

2. The prerogative of rule thus belongs to Russians, and to unambiguously Russified members of other ethnic groups.

3. Russian culture and the Russian language are not only superior but inviolable.

4. The new culture and language that will coalesce as the eventual result of “drawing together” and “merger” (sblizhenie and sliianie) of the nations will be Russian culture and the Russian language.

5. This state of affairs is desired by the working classes of all Soviet nations.⁵

The myth of national moral patrimony — in direct contrast to proletarian internationalism — is the belief that national cultural diversity is worth preserving for its own sake, because national cultural forms and traditions represent a repository and a vehicle of an essential spirituality unique to the nation. The elements of the myth of national moral patrimony relevant to the politics of culture are those of the authenticity of national culture, traditions, and language, and the functions these serve for the differentiation of the national group from other groups, the preservation of identity, the expression of the national outlook, experience, and values, and the status of the national group within a large community of nations.

CULTURE AND HISTORIOGRAPHIC NATIONALISM

Much, if not most, of national culture draws its themes from history. Nationalism in culture, therefore — particularly when viewed in terms of political mythology — is closely related to the national historical experience.

⁵ The myth of Russian primacy is altogether distinct from Russian nationalism — both the neo-Slavophilism of Solzhenitsyn and the integral nationalism of Veche and Slovo natsii. It is clear that a myth of nationality based upon “blood” is incongruous with the merger of nations through Russification and Russianization — implemented through inter-republican migration, transfers, and intermarriage — which is the goal of Soviet nationalities policy and a definite part of “proletarian internationalism.”
All myths are backward looking. The employment of folklore motifs, the artistic representation of national "ways," the search for national "roots" in antiquity, and the striving for cultural "authenticity," all represent efforts to give expression to the myth of the national moral patrimony. It is, therefore, the interpretation of the past that forms the crucial nexus between national cultural expression and nationalities policy in the Soviet Union.

The sins of omission and commission that constitute historiographic nationalism, whether in the actual writing of history, or in belles lettres and other arts, have been set forth explicitly. These, it can be seen, are in effect proscriptions of revision of the myth of proletarian internationalism, and more especially, of the mytheme of Russian primacy:

1. The idealization of the past, particularly of the "patriarchal feudal past."
2. Underevaluation of the "progressive significance" of the joining of various peoples to Russia.
4. Underevaluation of "the friendly assistance and progressive role of the Great Russian people and the Russian proletarian vanguard."6

There have been four principal areas of contention in Ukrainian historiography. The first of these has been debate over the origins of the East Slavs, and over the patrimony of the city of Kiev. This question is crucial to the myth of Russian primacy and Russian tutelage, because it is indisputable that Kievan Rus' antedated the Muscovite state, so that the myth of Russian patrimony requires that Kievan Rus' and the East Slavs be derived from a proto-Russian people rather than from independent origins. Controversial figures in the debate have included the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934) and, more recently, the dissident Ukrainian archaeologist Mykhailo Braichevs'kyi (b. 1924).

Equally contentious, and of indubitable symbolic significance, has been the question of the Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654), at which time, in

the official Soviet version, the Ukraine was "reunified" with Russia through an official treaty between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich. Contention over the treaty involves the question of whether it is to be interpreted merely as a military alliance between independent states against Poland, or as permanent accords of incorporation.

A third problem has been the nature of the Zaporozhian Sich. The extreme sensitivity of the Soviet regime to the Cossacks undoubtedly stems from the latter's reputation of having been rebellious, untameable, and probably unwilling subjects of the Tsar, valuing their independence above all else. This popular image clearly conflicts with the myth that the Ukrainians historically were eager for "reunification" with Russia.

The fourth major concern of Ukrainian historiography that is relevant to the modern quest for authenticity in culture is the revolution in the Ukraine, 1918-1922. The question is of cultural importance because of the symbolic significance of the Ukraine's early "national communists" — Kosior, Chubar, Skrypnyk and others — and cultural figures, such as Mykola Khvylovyi (1883-1933), who are associated with them.

Historiography, then, is a field in which the Party perceives it has a great stake in defending the myths on which its legitimacy rests. Historical journals and historical writings have not only the force of science behind them but, under censorship conditions as well, the implicit authority of the Party. In the propagation of the "friendship of peoples" myth, much of history had to be rewritten to reflect the new interpretation. Therefore, it can be assumed that writers take their cues from historiographers when they wish to be ideologically above reproach.

SOCIALIST REALISM AND NATIONAL CULTURAL REVIVAL

Because our concern is with the "national" as opposed to the strictly artistic in Ukrainian culture, much of the liberation from the restrictions of Zhdanovism that followed the 20th Party Congress is not of central relevance. Two considerations, however, force us to consider the rebellion of writers and artists against the confines of socialist realism relevant to the problem of assertion of ethnic identity under conditions of official pressure to assimilate. The first is that art must
draw upon human experience; while the experience of industrialization in the Soviet Union could have provided rich opportunities for the portrayal of the common national moral, ethical, and spiritual experience and associated conflicts, it has in fact been limited to superficial themes stressing optimism and social virtue. Secondly, socialist realism, where it has drawn on folk themes, has tended to emphasize Russian folk themes rather than the folklore of non-Russian societies.

Socialist realism, as it was interpreted during the Stalin era, is a heroic romanticism, portraying an idealized future, and picturing an ideal reality from which meaningful conflict is absent. The result has been art that is bombastic in style, celebrating youth, optimism, and work.

Art which is expected to serve propagandistic ends is bound to be reduced to a low level of sophistication, and this has frustrated Soviet artists of talent. Creative and experimental artists, even when their work is not expressly hostile to the state, have been subject to official harassment and censure.

The reason is that works of art and literature, even when they are manifestly non-political, are concrete manifestations of some myth, and in this sense they are political symbols. A state concerned with restricting symbolic expression to a single mythic structure which it believes bolsters its legitimacy or otherwise serves its ends will therefore seek to control artistic expression. The task of socialist realism, then, is to depict reality as conforming to the myth of proletarian internationalism.

Ukrainian art and literature at the end of the Stalin era, therefore, suffered not only from the gray lifelessness of socialist realism, but also from the near complete removal of all national themes other than those elements of Slavic culture that it shared with Russia. The re-emergence of art and literature during the “thaw” was characterized not only by creative and stylistic experimentation, but also by a felt need to search for and find some basis of national authenticity, based on a variously felt and vaguely defined national myth: cultural and folkloristic themes that are valued above all because they are uniquely Ukrainian. Ukrainians, too, felt that the internationalist demands of socialist realism were an insufficient framework for the expression of human spirituality. The most explicit statement of this is that of Ievhen Sverstiuk:
Today, everyone . . . understands that the point is not the poetization of a Cathedral of all mankind, but above all its quite concrete embodiment in oneself, the elaboration of one's own individuality as a part of one's own nation, as a reliable foothold for cultural and spiritual life.7

The Ukrainian cultural revival in the "thaw" period followed developments in the RSFSR, in that there were efforts in the direction of honest literary criticism, a number of significant rehabilitations, and a concern with experimentation and influences from the West. There was, however, an added concern with national elements of art and literature that was absent from the cultural scene in Moscow.

The revival of distinctly Ukrainian literature can properly be said to have begun with the rehabilitation of Volodymyr Sosiura's patriotic poem "Love the Ukraine." The poem, a lyrical elegy with predominantly landscape imagery, had been written in 1944 and tolerated for some years, until it came under scathing criticism in 1951. The poem was reappraised in Kommunist in 1956 and found to be innocent of the charges brought against it.8 Writings began appearing that expressed or inspired Ukrainian pride. Criticism of the Stalinist style in art and literature appeared both in RSFSR and in the Ukraine.9 Ivan Dzyuba and Ivan Svitlychnyi, later to figure heavily in the Young Writers Movement and later still as dissidents, were frequent contributors of this style of straightforward criticism, their writings and reviews appearing in the liberal journals Vitchyzna and Dnipro, as well as in Literaturna hazeta. Maksym Ryl's'kyi, an establishment writer of considerable esteem, who was later to defend the Young Writers and their views, also had an early voice in the advocacy of art for art's sake.

Accompanying and no doubt in part accounting for the sudden surge of conscientious literature and literary criticism in this period was the influence of Eastern Europe and the West.10 Several eminent Ukrainian cultural figures, including, among others, Viktor Nekrasov,

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10 Viktor Nekrasov believes that contacts with Poland, France, and Italy were among the most important stimuli of the Ukrainian cultural renaissance in the 1950s. Personal interview, Paris, June 27, 1976.
travelled extensively in Eastern and Western Europe, and were undoubtedly influenced by the more open and experimental artistic atmosphere that prevailed there, and brought these influences back with them. In the aftermath of the Hungarian uprising, and because of large Ukrainian populations in Poland and Czechoslovakia with ties to the West Ukraine, such influences were looked upon by the regime with as much alarm as influences from the "bourgeois West." Another source of concern to the regime was the increasing availability in the Ukraine of works by émigré Ukrainians.

A final development that was both a symptom of and a contributor to the Ukrainian cultural revival was the rehabilitation of Ukrainian writers and artists of the 1920s and 1930s who had been purged by Stalin for "nationalist deviations." These rehabilitations are important because they were often used by advocates of greater cultural expression to justify engaging in many of the activities for which the rehabilitated individuals had originally been purged. The issues raised in debates over rehabilitations also set the agenda for controversy over cultural expression in the years to come: more latitude to seek greater national authenticity in art and literature, demands for more extensive use of national personnel in the performing arts, more latitude for the use of folk themes, and recognition of the independent roots of Ukrainian culture.

Important early rehabilitations included those of Oleksandr Oles'-Kandyba (1878-1944), the dramatist Mykola Kulish (1892-1942), and Les' Kurbas (1887-1942), the director of the famed BereziV stage group. These rehabilitations were complicated by the controversial and unsuccessful effort to rehabilitate Khvylovyi, who subsequently came to symbolize unacceptable nationalism in Ukrainian culture.

One of the most important rehabilitations for its effect of setting the tone of demands for national authenticity was that of Oleksandr Dovzhenko (1894-1956), a Ukrainian film-maker and prose writer with an international reputation. Dovzhenko's early and later films and

11 This was the father of the OUN-Melnyk leader known as "Ol'zhych," who perished at the hands of the Nazis in 1944 at Sachsenhausen.

12 Dovzhenko has been censured by the Party for his silent films of Ukrainian life. Because of his world reputation, he was pardoned by Stalin and allowed to work on Party-commissioned films. He returned to the Ukraine in 1952 and began work on his last film, The Poem of the Sea. He was permitted after Stalin's death to publish his memoirs, The Enchanted Desna, in Ukrainian in Dnipro, No. 4 (1956). In 1958, his film The Earth was rated at the Brussels Film Festival as one of the twelve best films of world cinematography.
memoirs emphasized landscape imagery and themes of love, endurance, and death. His concern was, by his own admission, with the "eternal verity" of the Ukrainian land and culture, and he was anxious to portray the Ukrainian language on the screen as the vernacular, rather than formal, stilted "textbook" Ukrainian.

More than any other rehabilitated cultural figure, Dovzhenko became a symbol of the revitalization and reauthentication of Ukrainian culture. Typically, he was exploited both by the regime and by advocates of national expression. The potency of Dovzhenko as a symbol was constantly fed by reference to his international stature.

Several Ukrainian composers were also rehabilitated during this period. Music in particular is a rich field for folk and national themes. Russian composers since Glinka and Tchaikovsky have traditionally turned to Russian folksongs as themes for their compositions, and still do. Ukrainian composers who turn to Ukrainian folk music for themes, however, are frequently accused of "bourgeois nationalism," and socialist realism in music means, more than emphasis on the optimistic and the upbeat, the avoidance of non-Russian folk themes.

The period was marked as well by increasing calls for the right to existence of an independent, authentically unique Ukrainian culture. These demands were of three general types, apart from the question of language: 1) for recognition of the mutual (and not merely one-sided) influence of Russian and Ukrainian culture on each other; 2) for greater exploitation of Ukrainian historical and cultural themes in the arts; and 3) for the training and utilization of native Ukrainian personnel in the performing arts.

The common element underlying all of these is the theme of authenticity, which derives from the myth of the nation as the repository of moral values. Culture is the examination and depiction — whether for the purpose of criticism or edification — of that which is considered of enduring value in the human experience. These demands arise out of a desire for the recognition of the value of the Ukrainian national patrimony, in part for its intrinsic worth and in part in protest against what is perceived as a claim for the universal validity of the Russian heritage.

The thesis that Ukrainian culture, and literature in particular, as well as that of all the other minority nationalities, developed under the influence of Russian literature became increasingly a leading tenet in
Soviet criticism after World War II and is directly related to the "friendship of peoples" myth. The most widely quoted example of this thesis of the Russian formative influence is the debt that Shevchenko is said to have owed to the Russian writers Chernyshevskii, Belinskii, and Dobroliubov,\(^\text{13}\) despite the fact that, as John Kolasky has pointed out, these writers were still children when Shevchenko published his *Kobzar* in 1847.\(^\text{14}\)

Demands for the culturally authentic treatment of Ukrainian themes were expressed in all branches of the arts. We need examine only one branch, cinema, to illustrate the patterns of politicization.

Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, there were calls for films dealing with Ukrainian historical themes, particularly the Zaporozhian Cossacks, as well as for movies that would accurately reflect the vernacular. One persistent problem has been that native Ukrainian scenario writers familiar with authentic Ukrainian culture have been at a premium; most scenario writers have been either Russians, or Russified Ukrainians trained in Moscow.

The most outspoken demand for authenticity in cinema was that of the Ukrainian film director Mykola Makarenko. Entitled "Looking at the Roots," his article covers all the demands listed above as characteristic of the movement toward national authenticity and, in addition, accuses film directors and scenario writers of being unaware of the culture and daily life of the people they portray.\(^\text{15}\)

Makarenko's article was debated and criticized in the Presidium of the Association of Cinematographic Workers of the Ukraine. Makarenko's critics, particularly Oleksandr Levada, *de facto* ideological guardian of Ukrainian cinema and, at that time, deputy chairman of the Association's *orgburo*, urged that the blame be put "where it belongs" — on the poor qualifications of directors, on the excessive emphasis on national peculiarities, and on the failure to be guided by "the compass of Leninist nationalities policy."\(^\text{16}\) In another article, Levada criticized Makarenko's demands for authenticity in terms of nationalities policy, arguing in effect that the pursuit of

\(^{13}\text{See, for example, I. K. Bilodid, *Rosiis'ka mova — mova mizhnatsional'noho spilkuvannya narodiv SRSR* (Kiev: Akademiia Nauk URSR, 1962), p. 11.}\n
\(^{15}\text{Sovetskaia Ukraina, No. 1 (January, 1961), pp. 109-35.}\n
\(^{16}\text{Radians'ka k"ultura, April 20, 1961, p. 2.}\)
national authenticity as an end in itself is not a legitimate concern of Soviet art. Levada then denied outright that Ukrainian culture has been denationalized,17 drawing here on one of the most potent mythemes of the myth of proletarian internationalism, that the Soviet regime enabled minority nationalities to develop their own languages and cultures. Because there is a grain of truth to it, this mytheme permits assimilationists to disarm their critics with near impunity by urging that their arguments are groundless.

THE AMBIGUITY OF NATIONAL SYMBOLS: ESTABLISHMENT INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE DISSIDENT MOVEMENT

It is the ambiguity of national symbols themselves and the different degrees to which Ukrainian intellectuals have publicly articulated their attachment to such symbols that makes it impossible to draw an analytical distinction between an “establishment” and an ”opposition” in the Ukrainian context before about 1965.

Under the Brezhnev regime, mass arrests intensified, and it became important for Ukrainian intellectuals to take an unambiguous stand on one side or the other. After 1965, we can speak of the opposition as those individuals who either: a) were arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise harassed by the state (this is a definition by the regime of the individual as in opposition); or b) circulated their writings in illegal channels of communication, or samvydav (thereby, the individual defines himself as in opposition).

This artificial distinction, however, camouflages the extent of shared values and symbols between opposition and establishment intellectuals, and de facto community of interest between political elites interested in decisional autonomy and cultural elites interested in expanded cultural expression. It also glosses over the developmental character of the crystallization of nationalist dissent. Virtually all of the individuals identifiable as nationalist dissenters, non-conformist as they may have been, were certainly, in their own and in their fellows' eyes, members of the cultural establishment up to 1965, and few failed to try to publicize their views through legitimate channels before resorting to samvydav.

17 Komunist Ukrainy, No. 6 (June, 1961), pp. 61-67.
Although most establishment intellectuals seem to be unambiguous in their outward hostility to ideas that hint of ideological unorthodoxy, there have been a few whose views have been liberal enough to place them on the borderline. Foremost among these have been Maksym Ryl’s’kyi (1895-1964), outspoken in his early defense of the Young Writers; Viktor Nekrasov (b. 1911), a Russian writer native to Kiev and now living in Paris;18 and Oles’ Honchar (b. 1918), whose novel Sobor we discuss below. Two writers, Ivan Drach (b. 1936)19 and Mykola Kholodnyi,20 appear to have been on both sides, later recanting their views.

The so-called “Young Writers” of the late 1950s and early 1960s divided the Ukrainian Writers’ Union, but less along the lines of generation than aesthetically and ideologically. That establishment writers such as Ryl’s’kyi and Nekrasov frequently came to their defense is evidence of at least some shared viewpoints, and many of the values of the Young Writers, particularly as they pertained to the preservation of the Ukrainian language, were reflected in oblique protests on the part of establishment intellectuals at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s at Writers’ Union Congresses.21

The most outstanding of the Young Writers were the poetess Lina Kostenko (b. 1930), the poet Mykola Vinhranovs’kyi (b. 1930), the physician-poet Vitalii Korotych (b. 1936), the poet and short story writer Ievhen Hutsalo (b. 1937), the novelist Volodymyr Drozd, and Drach.22 Equally outstanding and somewhat more controversial were

18 See, for example, Nekrasov’s appreciation of Mikhail Bulgakov’s novel of the revolution in the Ukraine, The White Guard (Published in the West by Fontana Modern Novels, 1971), in Novyi mir, No. 8 (1967), pp. 132-42.
22 For surveys of the works of these and other Young Writers, see “The Birth of Ukrainian Opposition Prose,” Radio Liberty Daily Information Bulletin, August 24, 1962, and Jaroslaw Pelenski, “Recent Ukrainian Writing,” Survey, No. 59 (April, 1966), pp. 102-112.
the literary critics Ivan Svitlychnyi (b. 1929), Ievhen Sverstiuk (b. 1928), and Ivan Dzyuba (b. 1931). Older writers who in style, orientation, and outspokenness were close enough to the Young Writers to be considered a part of them in spite of the generation differences included Borys Antonenko-Davydovych (b. 1899) and Andrii Malyshko (b. 1912).

For several years, the Party took an attitude of rather guarded indulgence of the Young Writers. Although severe and concerted criticism did not begin until 1963, some criticism began as early as 1960, coming not from ideological organs but from older establishment intellectuals who may have felt somewhat threatened by the popularity of the Young Writers. This is especially apparent, for example, in criticisms by the extreme pro-Russian establishment poet Pavlo Tychyna (1891-1967), appointed in 1962 by the Writers’ Union Presidium to act as ideological watchdog over the Young Writers. Tychyna upbraided the Young Writers for their precocious disrespect, likening them to “cubs,” and to “birds just learning to fly.” Early attacks on the Young Writers frequently were accompanied by attacks on the “liberal journals” — Vitchyzna, Zhovten, Dnipro, and Prapor — that published their works.

At a Plenum of August 9-11, 1962, the Party finally came to grips with the problem presented by the Young Writers. Central Committee Secretary for Ideological Affairs A. D. Skaba launched a scathing criticism of the Ukrainian intelligentsia for their “tendencies to idealize the past” and for fostering hostility to Russians. He accused the Young Writers of flirting openly with Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, as well as with “decadent Western artistic notions,” and reproached older writers for failing to counter the rebelliousness of the young and, in some cases, for openly defending them. The Plenum marked the end of regime patience with the Young Writers and the beginning of harsh criticism led by ideological officials.

23 Radians’ka Ukraїna, December 27, 1963, p. 3.
24 See, for example, Komunist Ukrainy, No. 12 (1958), 81-87; Radians’ka Ukraїna, April 28, 1960, p. 1; Radians’ka Ukraїna, April 30, 1960, p. 1; Literaturna hazeta, June 25, 1961, p. 4; Vitchyzna, No. 9 (September, 1961), 205-210 — a very informative self-criticism; Literaturna Ukraїna, February 16, 1962, pp. 1-2.
Those representatives of the Young Writers who did not capitulate to the criticism of the Party in 1962-63 came later to style themselves as the “Shestydesiatnyky” (“people of the sixties”). The label is symbolic in itself, for in Soviet historiography, the radical intelligentsia of the 1860s — the intellectual precursors of the revolution — are so styled. The name, therefore, symbolizes the historical role of the intelligentsia in active opposition to the regime.

The importance of the Shestydesiatnyky is that they represent the first kernel of a deliberate and committed, as well as self-identified, kernel of opposition among the mobilized and Soviet-educated generation of Ukrainians. They form the core and the origin of the overt opposition that emerged when they were driven “underground” by the mass arrests under the Brezhnev regime; their orientations, values, and the symbols to which they were attached became the issues and orientations of the modern Ukrainian nationalist opposition later. If the intellectual bases of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) opposition during and after World War II were to be found in a version of “integral nationalism” acquired by diffusion from Central Europe in the interwar period, the ideology of modern Ukrainian nationalism is a “humanist,” demotic nationalism, almost an idealized internationalism, which grew out of the intellectual concerns of the Young Writers and the Shestydesiatnyky.

The most important of the Shestydesiatnyky was Vasyl Symonenko (1935-1963), for three reasons: a) he was the first to have specifically tied the humanistic and esthetic concerns of the Young Writers to nationalist aspirations; b) the events following his death were the immediate catalyst of the 1965-66 wave of arrests which forced the Shestydesiatnyky into opposition; and c) he became a symbolic rallying point to unite the opposition. Like Shevchenko, he became the focus of symbolic struggle by January 1965, as the regime vainly attempted to foster an official Symonenko cult in order to co-opt his popularity and neutralize the nationalistic content of the symbol. Because of Symonenko’s importance as a symbol, we shall examine him and the events after his death in some detail.

Born to peasant parents in Poltava oblast, Symonenko worked after graduation from Kiev University as a newspaperman in Cherkasy, writing poetry in his spare time. Having published only one volume of
poetry (*Tysha i Hrim: Silence and Thunder*) in 1962, he died of cancer on December 13, 1963, at the age of 29. Symonenko's prohibited works, including poems and his *Diary*, have been published *in toto* in Ukrainian *samvydav*.

Symonenko's poetry is dominated by images of the Ukraine, and is not Aesopic in its open nationalism:

> My nation exists, my nation will always exist!  
> No one will scratch out my nation!  
> All renegades and strays will disappear,  
> And so will the horders of conquerers-invaders . . .  
> My nation exists! In its hot veins  
> Cossack blood pulses and hums.

Subsequent eulogies by Sverstiuk and Svitlychnyi attest to the degree that the Young Writers were impressed by Symonenko's outspokenness, and both emphasized that he had laid down an example of "moral courage" and that everyone had an obligation to follow that example in the struggle for national dignity. The fact that Symonenko died of a disease, not from persecution, and in fact had not been persecuted at all, except by the censor, did not prevent his followers from making him into the symbol of a martyr to the cause of Ukrainian national liberation. Such a symbol appears in retrospect to have been necessary to lend unity and coherence to what was in fact an *ad hoc* group. The *Shestydesiatnyky* never identified with the OUN, attesting to the regime's success in making that particular symbol very unattractive, and they were too young as well to identify with the national communists of the pre-war years. Symonenko's appeal as a martyr and a rallying symbol faded with time, of course, and he was replaced in that role toward the end of the decade by Valentyn Moroz.

Ivan Dzyuba delivered an oration at a posthumous celebration of Symonenko's birthday in the Republican Building of Literature in

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26 His second collection, *Bereh chekan' (The Shore of Expectations)* was published in the West by *Prolog* (1965), and again in 1973 by *Suchasnist* (New York). Another collection, *Zemne tiazhinnia (The Gravitation of the Earth)* was published posthumously in the Soviet Union in 1964.

27 See *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* No. 4 (Paris & Baltimore: P. I. U. F & Smoloskyp, 1971), pp. 76-110. The issue also includes tributes to Symonenko by Dzyuba (pp. 123-34), Sverstiuk (pp. 116-22), and Svitlychnyi (pp. 111-15), as well as an anonymous biography of Symonenko (pp. 71-75).

28 Ibid., p. 128.

29 Ibid., pp. 111-22.
Kiev, which alerted the literary and ideological establishment of the potency of Symonenko as an anti-regime symbol. Dzyuba openly asserted that Symonenko had been “first and foremost a poet of the national idea.” Dzyuba then explained that there were periods in history when poets and writers became stale because they were forced by history to dwell on the national idea. The present epoch, however, is one of the kind that “does not squeeze out but catalyzes all other universal human ideas.”

Finally, in what, given the context, could only have been interpreted as a public call for resistance, Dzyuba summarized the “moral lesson” of Symonenko:

People are not waiting for anything as much as they are waiting for the living example of heroic public conduct. People need this example because they need the assurance that even today such heroic action is possible, and that today it is not fruitless. . . . Therefore, today, perhaps more than ever it is possible and necessary to fight.

SPIRITUALITY AS THE NATIONAL MORAL PATRIMONY

A fundamental assumption of the myth of national moral patrimony is that the nation is the ultimate repository and embodiment of all human spiritual values. Judging from samvydav writings, the underlying thrust of the Ukrainian cultural revival is the feeling on the part of many intellectuals that de-nationalization deprives a people not only of cultural forms and language, but by doing so, in the manner in which it is done, it deprives a people of the vehicle for the expression of their spirituality — of the medium through which ideas, traditions, and interpretations which are valued over and above their everyday utility give meaning to and provide zones of comfortable stability for life. This medium for the expression of spirituality is the national culture.

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30 Ibid., p. 127.
31 Ibid., p. 128.
32 Ibid., p. 130. For lack of space, we are not discussing here the controversy over the publication abroad of Symonenko’s Diary, nor the Dobosh affair or the persecution of Dzyuba in the 1970s. On these examples of deliberate evocation of xenophobia by the regime, see the author’s “Ukrainian Dissent: Symbolic Politics and Sociodemographic Aspects,” Part II, The Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer, 1978).
Valentyn Moroz thus maintains that "devaluation of the word" is the main moral problem left over from the Stalin era; stereotyped phraseology, epithets, superlatives, and the like reached such a pitch that any criteria for judging reality or spiritual reality disappeared. No one, he writes, believed in any reality, and emotions disappeared; the only emotions expressed were those "tickled out" by official propaganda. "Devaluation of the word," he continues, led to the disintegration of all values; aim, ideal, heroism, etc., were replaced by nihilism. For the Ukraine, as well as for the other nations of the USSR, the concepts "nation," "patriotism," "native language," "motherland," and the like were similarly devalued.33

The premise that the national culture is a repository of spiritual values underlay early calls for authenticity in Ukrainian culture, and became increasingly explicit as an element of symbols relating to authenticity. The most sensational public exposition of this thesis, however, came in a novel written not by a dissident but by Oles' Honchar, then and (after a short hiatus) now Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Writers' Union.

It is undeniable that Honchar's allegorical novel Sobor (The Cathedral)34 was the most significant literary event in post-war Ukraine, because it was written by an establishment intellectual and at first accepted by the establishment, because of the depth of thought it displays, and for the reaction it produced.

The novel concerns a young Ukrainian patriot, Ivan Bahlai, who is eventually killed in the struggle to save an ancient Cossack cathedral which is being torn down by the state in the fictional town of "Zachiplianka" on the Dnipro River. The town is clearly modelled on Dnipropetrovsk — one of the most Russified cities in the Ukraine — and the cathedral is a symbol of Ukrainian culture, being, following the novel's symbolism, dismantled through the Russification policies of the Soviet regime.

Of exceptional literary quality, the novel was initially highly

praised, first in the Dnipropetrovsk papers Zoria and Prapor iunosti,\textsuperscript{35} and later by the establishment critic Leonid Novychenko in the All-Union Literaturnaia gazeta.\textsuperscript{36} It was also favorably reviewed in Warsaw's Ukrainian language newspaper Nasha kultura.\textsuperscript{37}

Later, however, the novel came under severe attack as ideologically faulty: it glorified the Cossack past, it wrongly opposed workers to bureaucrats, it was not "party-minded," and, as evidence that the novel's symbolism had not escaped the critics, it had a "very dubious subtext."\textsuperscript{38}

The turnabout came as the result of a conference of the secretaries of the local Party organization in Dnipropetrovsk. The Faculty of History and Philosophy at Dnipropetrovsk University — of which Honchar is a graduate — was forbidden to celebrate Honchar's 50th birthday, and a public campaign against the novel was begun with a series of letters, allegedly from Dnipropetrovsk workers, protesting Honchar's negative treatment of the working class.\textsuperscript{39} There are reports that at least a dozen Dnipropetrovsk journalists who came to the public defense of Sobor received sanctions ranging from reprimand to dismissal from the Party.\textsuperscript{40} It is also reported that the campaign against the novel touched off student riots in Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv.\textsuperscript{41}

The aftermath of the campaign produced a remarkable document in the summer of 1968. An anonymous letter, signed only "the Creative Youth of Dnipropetrovsk," was sent to Shelest, Shcherbitsky, Ovcharenko, and Writers' Union Secretary D. Pavlychko. The lengthy letter protested not only the campaign against Sobor and its defenders but also Russification of culture and education in Dnipropetrovsk and other large cities of the East Ukraine, and also detailed a number of

\textsuperscript{35} Reported in Khronika tekushchikh sobytii, No. 7, pp. 23-24, and No. 10, pp. 30, 39.
\textsuperscript{36} March 20, 1968, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{37} No. 5 (May, 1968), p. 2.
\textsuperscript{38} See criticism by M. Iurchuk and F. Lebedenko, Radians'ka kul'tura, April 26, 1968, p. 3, and M. Shamota, Radians'ka Ukraina, May 16, 1968, p. 3. The critics and journals which had earlier praised the novel were also criticized.
\textsuperscript{40} Posev (West Germany), No. 9 (September, 1969), p. 10.
\textsuperscript{41} "Russification and Socialist Legality. . . ."
scandals and petty larcenies among some members of the Dnipropetrovsk Party organization, suggesting that local Party members must have at least talked to the writers of the letter about these matters.

In 1970, Ievhen Sverstiuk wrote and circulated in samvydav channels an essay, "Sobor u ryshtovanni" ("Cathedral in Scaffolding"), loosely centered around the symbolic theme of Honchar's novel. The essay is a defense of the view that spiritual values must be centered in national culture. The type of civic personality created by the conditions of Stalinism, Sverstiuk wrote, is an irresponsible and opportunistic one, and this has facilitated the erosion of the nation as a repository of values. When neither the ideology nor proletarian internationalism are capable of providing enduring values, the only source of such values is the national tradition as it is embodied in the past. Not only the vehicle but the content of human spirituality is the national tradition. For Sverstiuk, the intention and the effect of government-sponsored denationalization is to reinforce what we have called the myth of Russian primacy:

On the basis of such spiritual pauperization it has become possible to introduce into the school programs and textbooks arguments about the beneficial influence of the Russian culture on the Ukrainian one after the "reunification" [Treaty of Pereiaslav] and to root in dogma the provincial and imitative character of the Ukrainian culture.

Finally, as far as "idealization of the past" is concerned, Sverstiuk argues that it is the artificial "friendship of peoples" myth which, in the strictest sense, "idealizes" the past. Addressing his words to a certain Mazurkevych, who had criticized the intelligentsia for idealization of the Cossack republic, he writes that the real question is not "idealization," but "was there or was there not in fact a [Christian] Cossack republic?"

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43 Ievhen Sverstiuk, Sobor u ryshtovanni (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1970).

44 Ibid., p. 33.

45 Ibid., p. 41


47 Sobor u ryshtovanni, p. 46
SYMBOLS OF THE NATIONAL PATRIMONY IN POPULAR CULTURE

Aside from the arts, there are a number of elemental symbols of national identity, and, generically, many of these are common to ethnic communities throughout the world: architectural forms, languages, folk music, folk arts, and legendary men. Such symbols serve to differentiate the group from others, lend the group a sense of pride in their own genius, and perpetuate the national identity. In the Soviet Union, when such symbols are entrenched in the national culture, the regime often has not tried to obliterate them but rather to co-opt them and lend them a new, Soviet content. When this is successful, the reverence and emotion attached to the symbol will, presumably, be transferred to the regime. We have no way of judging the success of these efforts in the popular mind so long as survey research on such questions is prohibited in the Soviet Union. We can only examine the public dialogue that has taken place between spokesmen for the regime and the nationalist intellectuals over the content of national symbols.

We shall briefly examine the manipulation of three such entrenched symbols: the legendary Ukrainian writer Taras Shevchenko, the issue of the preservation of monuments of antiquity, and Ukrainian folk choral societies.

**Taras Shevchenko**

Shevchenko (1814-1861) is without question the foremost literary symbol of the pride and dignity of Ukrainians. Only Ivan Franko (1856-1916), Lesia Ukrainka (Larysa Kosach-Kvitka) (1871-1913), and the historian Hrushevsky even approach his stature in this regard. Born a serf, his freedom was purchased in 1838, and he enrolled in the St. Petersburg Academy of Fine Arts. He published his first book of realist poetry, *Kobzar*, in 1847, and later, for his poetic protests against serfdom and against Russification, he was exiled to Siberia. Freed in 1858, he was prohibited from living in the Ukraine, and died in St. Petersburg.

The Soviet regime has interpreted Shevchenko as a “revolutionary democrat,” emphasizing that his protests against Russification of the Ukraine were aimed at Tsarist policies, not against the Russian people, for whom it is alleged he had a great love. He is often said to
have been influenced by Russian revolutionary writers and to have been opposed to Ukrainian nationalism.

This interpretation began in the late 1930s, at the same time that Russian history began to be reevaluated in the light of Russian patriotism; prior to that time, Shevchenko had been officially considered to be a "bourgeois democrat and ideologist of petty bourgeois peasantry, with nationalist and religious remnants."^48

The latest round of controversy over the interpretation of Shevchenko began in the preparations for the celebration of the 150th anniversary of his birth in 1964. An incident involving a stained glass window for the vestibule of Kiev University demonstrates the subtlety of the Shevchenko symbol.

Four young artists, Liudmyla Semykina, Panas Zalyvakha, Halyna Sevruk, and Alla Hors'ka,^49 were commissioned to create the window. When completed, it depicted an angry, gaunt Shevchenko holding in one arm a battered, maltreated woman symbolizing, apparently, the Ukraine, and in the other hand a book, held high. The window bore the following inscription:

I shall glorify these small dumb slaves,
I shall put the word on guard beside them.

(Vozvelychu malykh otykh rabiv nimykh,
Ia na storozhi kolo ikh postavliu slovo.)

There were immediate objections to the window, and the Decorative-Monumental Art Section of the Artists' Union met in Kiev in April 1964 to determine the disposition of the project. A piecemeal transcript of the meeting was circulated in samvydav.^50 Criticism of the window


^49 Alla Hors'ka and Panas Zalyvakha subsequently became involved in dissident activities. Zalyvakha is now in a labor camp. Hors'ka was murdered under still mysterious circumstances on November 28, 1970. *Samizdat* sources made a credible argument that the murder was the work of the KGB. See *Ukraïns'kyi visnyk*, No. 4, pp. 14-20.

^50 *Ukraïns'kyi visnyk*, No. 4 pp. 12-14.
proceeded gropingly, various individuals criticizing it on aesthetic grounds: too abstract, too harsh. The most direct criticism, however, was that the window was "ideologically harmful" because of the ambiguous symbolism. The window was later destroyed at night, in what was officially described as an act of vandalism.51

As with everything written abroad about the Ukraine, the Soviet regime is markedly sensitive to the overtly nationalist interpretation placed on Shevchenko by Ukrainians living in the West. The establishment of a monument to Shevchenko in Washington, D. C., in 1964, for example, prompted an angry letter to the émigrés signed by thirty-four Ukrainian cultural figures protesting such "malicious attempts to use the works of this poet against our country."52

Ukrainian samvydav sources allege that beginning in 1964 the regime began deliberately expunging symbols of Shevchenko from popular culture:

A special directive has been issued calling for strict supervision of concerts and other ceremonies honoring Shevchenko, in order to maintain them at a very basic level, lest... the sincere message of the Bard surface and awaken thoughts of the Ukraine, "our own, but vassal land." Many articles and poems about Shevchenko are being excised from newspapers and magazines because censors see in them implied criticism of the colonial status of the Ukraine.53

The Jubilee Celebration of Shevchenko's birthday in March 1964 was a festive but formal occasion, attended by the entire Ukrainian Central Committee Politburo and numerous eminent guests, including Khrushchev. The celebration was marked by the presence of a large number of policemen in anticipation of agitation by the

51 John Kolasky maintains that the window was smashed on the orders of V. A. Boichenko, a secretary of the Kiev obkom, in order to prevent the commission from examining it, and that this occurred on March 9, before the commission met. This is not consistent with the samvydav account, which clearly implies that the commission examined the window in April. See Kolasky, Two Years in Soviet Ukraine, p. 92. A reproduction of a segment of the window appears on the cover of ABN Correspondence, Vol. 22, No. 6 (November-December 1971). I am grateful to Yaroslav Bilinsky for pointing this out to me.

52 Literaturna hazeta, November 29, 1963.

53 "Z pryvodu protsesu nad Pohruzhals’kym," AS 911, SDS Vol XVIII. This document is principally concerned with the May 24, 1964, fire in the Ukrainian library of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, in which 600,000 volumes of Ukrainian archival materials and books were destroyed.
Shestydesiatnyky. This turned out to be unnecessary, as the Shestydesiatnyky largely boycotted the celebration. They gathered instead at the Shevchenko monument in Kiev two months later, on May 22, to celebrate the anniversary of the return of Shevchenko's body from St. Petersburg to Kiev. The import of this act of defiance was that it symbolized the demand for the "return" of Shevchenko's heritage as well as his corpse. May 22 became an annual event, marked sometimes by the reading of Symonenko's poetry and inflammatory speeches against Russification of Ukrainian language and culture. At first the regime attempted to co-opt the event, organizing official festivals marked by the presence of police, komsomol officials, and druzhynnyky, but there was always an unofficial celebration afterwards, which usually led to arrests or extra-judicial harassment.54

Shevchenko continues to be a potent symbol of the Ukrainian nation, and, of course, the Party is partly responsible for this. In efforts to co-opt the symbol, they keep it potent, and this potency, when exploited by the opposition, is added to its intrinsic appeal.

**Monuments and antiquity**

Monuments are symbols of national authenticity insofar as they represent the continuity between a people's contemporary perception of itself and myths of past association and differentiation from other groups. To the extent that they symbolize the myth of common ethnic descent and shared historical experiences, they "authenticate" the national myth.

Beginning in the early 1960s, there was a revival of interest in antiquity in all the Slavic areas of the USSR. In the RSFSR, this took the form of voluntary societies for the preservation and restoration of old cathedrals, churches, and monasteries, which, owing to official hostility to religion, are at best in a state of neglect and often vandalized or else used, for example, as storage depots by state enterprises.55

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54 Nadiia Svitlychna and R. Motruk, for example, were dismissed from their jobs; *Ukraïns'kyi visnyk*, No. 1, p. 77. Three employees of the Kiev Hydroelectric Station received prison terms for distributing leaflets asking citizens to ignore the proscription against observing May 22; see *Ukraïns'kyi visnyk*, No. 1, pp. 26-29. For other accounts relating to the May 22 celebrations, see *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii*, No. 5, p. 19; No. 6, p. 5; No. 8, p. 35; No. 27, p. 17; and No. 28, p. 21.

In the Ukraine, the state acted even more decisively than in the RSFSR to co-opt this interest in antiquity, precisely because of its potentially nationalist overtones. The Voluntary Society for the Preservation of Monuments of History and Culture of the Ukrainian SSR, organized under the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers, has 12,000 primary organizations in enterprises, collective farms, and universities, and a Republic-wide membership of over two million.\(^{56}\) Ukrainian *samvydav* sources report that the Society has been given directives to concentrate on the preservation of "historical-revolutionary" monuments, particularly those relating to Lenin, rather than on churches and monasteries, and that, in 1973, 100 monuments recommended by the Society for state protection, nearly all of them churches, were taken off the list. Those that receive state protection, it is alleged, are not in fact restored but merely have an explanatory plaque attached to them. These sources also list recent incidents of removal of monuments dedicated to Shevchenko, Franko, and even Khmelnytsky and their replacement with memorials to revolutionary figures.\(^{57}\)

The most notable *samvydav* document on the nexus between antiquity and national identity is Moroz's account of the efforts of the Hutsuls, a small mountain people living in the foothills of the Carpathians, to regain ninety-nine relics borrowed in 1963 by the director for use as props in the movie *Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors* and never returned.\(^{58}\) Moroz's essay is significant not only for the plight of the Hutsuls *per se* but for the argument he makes for the necessity of the preservation of traditional culture in a period of modernization. For Moroz, modernity can only be dealt with on the basis of the nation as the modernizing agency, for in the nation alone reside the values that prevent modernization from leading to a spiritually empty "mass culture."

Moroz argues that Soviet nationalities policy must fail, because culture can only be built slowly incrementally: "it can't be built on the


\(^{57}\) *The Ukrainian Herald* Issue 7-8: Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR (Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1976), pp. 151-54.

\(^{58}\) Valentyn Moroz, "Khronika soprotivleniia," (in Russian, 1970). This is one of three articles for which Moroz was serving a fourteen year sentence.
5-year plan, like a canal.”59 For Moroz, there can be no such thing as a “cultural revolution”; revolutions do not create traditions, but rather they destroy them. Finally, any attempt to deprive a people — whatever the size of the entity — of their national identity through depriving them of their culture also deprives them of the only source of dignity and spirituality.60 For Moroz, then, as for Sverstiuk and the other nationalist dissidents, the nation must be preserved, not only for its own sake but because it is the only moral patrimony, and the national culture is the only vehicle of the higher human values.

Choral societies

Folk music, and folk culture in general, is also a symbol of national authenticity; it has been believed for over a century in Russia and other Slavic countries that the simple narod — the folk — particularly the peasantry, is the repository of the eternal human values. The Ukrainian nation that is romanticized and revered by individuals interested in national authenticity as a value is the rural Ukraine.51

Ukrainian folk culture, like the Russian, is rich in songs and dances. The revival of interest in antiquity mentioned above was accompanied by an increased urban interest in folk music. The regime has acted to co-opt this as well, through the establishment of national choral societies associated with enterprises, factories, and universities. These societies are funded by the Council of Ministers and directed by reliable Party members; governance is through the Ministry of Culture. The emphasis is on works by Soviet composers written in the lyrical folk style but not upon traditional folk songs from the oral tradition. The state has at the same time discouraged active ethnological research in folk music, particularly when it has been undertaken independently of Party auspices.

Periodically, establishment intellectuals have urged greater state interest in authentic folk music. The official reason given for refusal to publish folk music and sponsor research in the area is that it is too

59 Ibid., p. 10.
60 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
tiresome, too esoteric for general interest, and economically unfeasible. The \textit{samvydav} account of the fate of the Homin Ethnographic Choral Ensemble, however, strongly suggests that the reason is that authentic folk music is strongly evocative of the myth of national moral patrimony and, as an elemental symbol of national identity, must be co-opted and neutralized, or suppressed.

The Homin ("sound of voices") group began in Kiev in 1968, an offshoot of the older Zhaivoronok ("Lark") Itinerant Student Choir, directed by Valentyna Petriienko (d. 1972) until finally denied premises for rehearsals by the state in 1965. A number of separate groups of young people, many of them former members of Zhaivoronok, had been gathering in private homes to sing folk songs and rehearse for Christmas carolling (\textit{koliaduvannia}). These groups, consolidated under the directorship of the folklorist Leopol'd Iashchenko, began conducting outdoor singouts and soon began to be invited to give performances in various villages outside Kiev. Members of the group included students, factory workers, teachers, and scientists.

At the beginning of 1970, the group was being regularly harassed by the KGB, and accusations that it was a nationalist group began. The accusation was first publicly made by a certain Ruban, \textit{partorg} of the Kiev University Faculty of Journalism; he characterized it as an "underground" organization and demanded the dismissal of Iashchenko from the Composers' Union.

In September 1971, Homin was officially prohibited from holding rehearsals or concerts at their regular meeting place, the Kharchovyk culture palace, and the Kharchovyk's director, Kraseva, invited the group to join the culture palace's own folk ensemble, where they "sing the songs of Soviet composers." Because he failed to heed Kraseva's advice and because a member of the choir had read a poem by Symonenko at the Shevchenko monument on May 22, Iashchenko was dismissed from the Composers' Union.

Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevel' is reported to have urged at a meeting of the \textit{Aυρωπόπ} department that Homin was an

\footnotesize{See, e.g., \textit{Literaturna Ukrăina}, April 11, 1967, p. 3.

\textit{Uкраїна's'kyi visnyk}, No. 6, pp. 116-119.
agent of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" because it "conducts propaganda among the youth by singing folk songs." All of Iashchenko's compositions were removed from radio broadcasts and record stores, and his arrangements of Ukrainian folk songs were expunged from the 1972 edition of Spivaie narodnyi khor (Kiev: Muzychna Ukraina). The ambiguity of national symbols is ironically reflected, however, in the fact, reported in samvydav, that Iashchenko submitted Homin's repertoire to a Republican competition on folk music compositions, not under his own name but under a number as contest rules required, and was awarded four prizes in the first judging. Pressure was put on individual members to leave the choir under threat of sanctions ranging from ostracism to dismissal from employment. Ukrain's'kyi visnyk reports that thirty-eight individuals were so threatened, and five actually dismissed, for participation in the choral group.\textsuperscript{64}

Reprisals are also taken against other groups that display a public interest in folk music outside the sponsorship of the Party. It is reported that an old traditional custom has been revived in Kiev, for example, whereby groups of young people go from home to home on New Year's, singing traditional folk carols (shchedrivky). Twenty such groups were counted in Kiev in 1971, some of whom appeared in traditional dress, including the costume of the Cossack mamai. These groups were arrested on the street on charges of "hooliganism," and reprisals taken against them at their jobs and schools. Similarly, a group of bandura players led by Vasyl Lytvyn was disbanded after an unofficial concert, and its members deprived of the right to live in Kiev.\textsuperscript{65}

CONCLUSION

It is a mistake to equate the myth of national moral patrimony, as it has been articulated inside Soviet Ukraine, with the assumption of "integral nationalism" that a given nation, i.e., one's own, is superior to all others and is mystically destined to "fulfill history" through the

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., pp. 131-34.

\textsuperscript{65} Ukrain's'kyi visnyk, No 4, pp. 149-50.
subjugation or destruction of all other "inferior" species. Perhaps because the OUN and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) are so closely identified with this view, it is singularly lacking in the ideology of modern Ukrainian nationalism.

Modern Ukrainian nationalism, as it has been articulated, is distinguished from wartime integral nationalism in the following ways:

1. The absence of the glorification of youth, vitality, violence, and armed struggle as the expression or culmination of national vitality. Civil disobedience, not terrorism nor mobilization, is the form of action that is espoused.

2. The absence of any appeal to the irrational as a principle. The intellectuals that constitute the Ukrainian nationalist dissent movement are certainly romantics, but, nonetheless, intellectualism and rationalism remain prominent characteristics of their value system.

3. The absence of an exclusivist orientation to civil life. Although the approach to Ukrainian identity is an ethnic one, it is not a racialist one. It is in this sense that the Ukrainian nationalist dissidents, whether Marxist-Leninist, like Dzyuba, or not, like Moroz, have been profoundly affected by their socialization under the Soviet regime; that the Soviet concept of citizenship is a demotic rather than a "root" one has colored the Ukrainian dissenters' concept of ethnic identity.

Historically, cultural revival has preceded or accompanied mass national movements. This does not, however, imply that there is necessarily a revolutionary situation in the Ukraine today. We have no means of assessing the attachment of the masses to the symbols we have discussed; an attachment to national symbols passionate enough to support the willingness to resist when the issue became politicized appears to have been limited to a brave but small proportion of the intelligentsia. This resistance was cruelly crushed in the 1972-73 wave
of repression following the ouster of Shelest. The national myth is tenacious, however, and, historically speaking, repressive regime policies have fanned rather than extinguished the flame of nationalism. It is extremely unlikely that the issue has been finally decided.
The Views of Petro Shelest*

GREY HODNETT

In his thoughtful study of the Shelest era Jaroslaw Pelenski offers an historian's appreciation of Shelest. "Shelest," he says, "can best be compared with Ukrainian Hetmans of the first third of the eighteenth century, such as Ivan Skoropads'kyi (1708-1772), Pavlo Polubotok (1722-1724) and Danylo Apostol (1727-1734), political leaders who attempted to maintain correct relations with the imperial center, on the one hand, and who tried to defend the autonomy of the Ukrainian Hetmanate, its institutions and its special interests, on the other. It is not a coincidence that Shelest was referred to in the Ukrainian intelligentsia circles of Kyiv [Kiev] as malorosiis'kyi polityk (Little Russian politician)."¹ One cannot quarrel with the judgment or with the use of historical analogies. But there is some value in trying to understand Shelest on his own terms — that is to say, in looking closely at what he actually said and the "tendencies" with which he publicly associated himself.²

The argument I shall attempt to support below is that Shelest did identify himself with a particular "national" tendency, although not necessarily a "nationalist" tendency in the chauvinistic sense. (One could argue that Shelest may have been less a "nationalist" than Brezhnev in articulating any exclusivist or hegemonistic ethnic claims.) As we shall see, Shelest did aggressively assert a claim of national equality and reciprocity within a communist "internationalist" framework, and this claim did increasingly diverge from the integrative-Russifying trend in official policy. Yet, as Yaroslav

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Bilinsky has cogently observed, it was not so much Shelest who was diverging from what had been established as Party policy in the post-Stalin period, as Brezhnev and those ideologues (probably led by Suslov) who were tilting toward a form of overt Russian hegemony.

But Shelest also associated himself with a set of positions that had very little theoretical connection with the Ukrainian national question per se. It is this possibility of a political leader adhering to multiple tendencies that has been ignored by most analysts, who have viewed Shelest as a member either of a national group or of a policy group. As I have argued elsewhere, this way of thinking about leaders and groups fails to recognize that “groups” are “network-structured fields of political meaning which cut ‘through’ individuals, not clusters of ‘whole’ people.” For purposes of shorthand reference, we might call this other, non-national tendency in which Shelest participated the “hardline tendency.” No label is fully adequate to describe it, but this conventional term seems more adequate than either “conservative” or “left.” As in the case of his ethnic orientation, it manifested itself in both the domestic and foreign policy arenas.

How “sincere” Shelest was in adopting a hardline stance we cannot really know. Some might argue, perhaps, that the advocacy by his son, Vitalii Shelest, of closer scientific ties with the West lent a certain incongruity to Shelest’s own position. My feeling is that we should take him at his word, unless other evidence refutes this hypothesis. The point is that he did take positions on a number of issues and these positions did have real-life consequences. The positions did, of course, have some obvious political utility for Shelest; they provided the basis for his own political self-defence — the source of his value within the Soviet leadership to those who resisted Brezhnev’s power and policy pretensions, and the bulwark of his ideological self-defence in the Ukraine. At the same time, however, his hardline stance entailed positions on some issues which probably put Shelest out of step with what many must have considered the real “national interests” of the Ukraine.


The All-Union trend

Shelest's position on the nationality question must be understood, first of all, within the context of the dominant All-Union trend in nationality policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. At this time, there was, not to put too fine a point on it, an unmistakable shift toward the outright assertion of Russian hegemony in the Soviet multinational community and the specification of "objective" processes which accelerated tendencies toward ethnic "merging." One is repeatedly struck in reading Brezhnev's speeches of this period (especially those delivered before non-Russian audiences) by how openly, even tactlessly, they insist on the superior moral qualities of Russians as a national group, on the economic and other sacrifices made by the Russians for other Soviet nations, on the unique contribution of Russians in the Great Patriotic War, on the preeminent place of the RSFSR in the USSR, and on the strategic role of the Russian language. These quite calculated statements about the place of the Great Russians and about ethnic fusion processes represent a qualitative departure from the ambiguities of Khrushchev and of the Party Program of 1961. They can be seen both as an expression of Russian interests within the political elite and — on another level of meaning — as a personal appeal by Brezhnev to the Great Russian constituency in national republics and elsewhere in the Soviet Union.

The doctrinal implications of this new line for specific areas of nationality policy were spelled out at the 24th Party Congress and, especially, in Brezhnev's report in December 1972 "On The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." According to this new formulation of the "laws of development" of Soviet nationalities, the homogenizing processes of migration, industrialization, class change, inter-marriage, and common socialization characteristic of the new stage of "developed socialism" had led to the emergence of a new supra-national social entity, the Soviet People (sovetskii narod), whose loyalty to the Soviet system transcended any purely ethnic patriotism. At this stage of development, the Russian language had acquired ever-increasing

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5 For the text see Kommunist, 1972, no. 18, pp. 3-42.
significance both as a lingua franca and as the base for the "enrichment" of non-Russian languages and the "mutual enrichment" of the literatures of all Soviet nationalities. At this stage, too, the former economic inequalities among the republics had been eliminated, while a "single economic organism" had come into being. Both developments justified the subordination of all parochial ethnic or local economic concerns to the interests of the USSR as a whole. By the same token, the "internationalization" of the economy had brought with it an objective tendency for the "exchange of cadres" across republic boundaries to accelerate. Under such conditions, in which the nationality problem had been "solved" there could not be the slightest toleration of attempts to hold back the course of history in ethnic affairs. One might suppose in this context that, if the nationality question had indeed been "solved," there should be no reason for Brezhnev to raise the issue of the emergence of "nationalism" in the republic Party organizations. But, explicitly rejecting this logic, Brezhnev discoursed at length on the danger of nationalist deviation in the Party and the need to combat it.

National relations in general

In reading Shelest's speeches, one is impressed by how carefully they avoided attributing — either directly or by implication — a special role to the Russians. "There are no scales," he says, "on which one can weigh the contribution of a nationality to human progress." Russians are subsumed under the heading of "other fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union." Ukrainians pledge themselves to the "friendship of peoples"; but to the friendship of all the peoples of the Soviet Union in general, not "first of all" to the Great Russians. At a ceremony marking the 25th Anniversary of the Liberation of the Ukraine, Shelest greeted the "entire Ukrainian people," who, "right after the Russians," had built their own Socialist society. In a typical statement dealing with the Second World War, Shelest commented: "In the hour of [its] heaviest sufferings, when the black night of fascist occupation covered the land of the Ukraine, the Russian brothers, all the peoples of the Socialist Fatherland came to its aid. At the same time, the sons

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7 *Pravda Ukrainy*, October 18, 1969, pp. 2-3.
and daughters of our republic selflessly fought at Moscow and Leningrad, hung on until death in the walls of Stalingrad, together with the soldiers of other peoples liberated Orel and Belgorod, Kharkiv and Kiev, the cities and villages of Belorussia and the Baltic." In other words, Shelest by no means denied the contributions of the Russians to the Revolution and Socialism, but he took pains to emphasize the no-less significant contribution of other nationalities, including that of the Ukrainians.

When referring to the developmental tendency of national relations in the USSR, Shelest generally avoided those formulations which indicated the priority of "coming together" over "flourishing," much less those which foresaw the "union" of the nationalities. His preference was for the more traditional (i.e., Stalinist in form, egalitarian in content) formulae. The extent to which he avoided assimilationist symbolism is fully apparent when one searches his speeches for references to the "Soviet People." The two words do occasionally occur, but usually in the conventional sense and not as a concept. And even when they do appear, they are usually closely accompanied in the text by contrapuntal references to "Soviet peoples" in the plural (sovetskie narody, sovetskie liudi). The personality model which Shelest himself seemed to prefer was the older notion of the "new Soviet man," with its connotation of political loyalty and partiinost ["Party-mindedness"] but complete lack of ethnic overtones.

Culture

Shelest's views on national culture are well-known. He expressed great pride in Ukrainian cultural achievements, did not gloss over "Tsarist" oppression, and emphasized reciprocity in cultural exchanges among all the Soviet nationalities. In his famous declaration at the Ukrainian Writers' Congress in 1966, Shelest took a forthright stand in

8 Pravda, April 17, 1970, p.3.
9 As Shcherbitsky later observed, "some bourgeois ideologists even attempt to remove from usage the very phrase 'sovetskii narod.'" (Kommunist Ukrainy, 1973, no. 1, p. 64).
10 For a good example of the use of the plural form, see his electoral speech in Pravda, June 2, 1970, p. 2.
11 See Pravda, April 17, 1970, p. 4.
defence of the purity of the Ukrainian language.\textsuperscript{12} He continued to uphold this position throughout the rest of his tenure of office. Thus, at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (CPU), he called on literary critics to "stand on guard over the expressiveness and purity of our language."\textsuperscript{13} On a number of other occasions he publicly dwelt on the expansion of instruction in Ukrainian language and the extension of the role of Ukrainian as a medium of communication. As he said in 1967: "Thanks to the victory of October the Ukrainian people received the opportunity to study and create in their own language. During these years the Ukrainian language has been considerably enriched and its social role has grown. From the sphere of domestic relations it has shifted to the spheres of state administration, the press, science, culture, schools, \textit{vuzy} [institutions of higher education], all areas of public life.\textsuperscript{14}

Shelest's approach to Ukrainian literature was fully in keeping with his handling of the language issue. In a typical statement, he declared:

The spiritual values which each republic shares with fraternal peoples are returned to it a hundredfold. This is clearly evident from the example of contemporary Ukrainian literature which absorbs artistic experience and aesthetic gains from the verbal masters of many nations and peoples of our country. At the same time Ukrainian writers are making a considerable contribution to the literature of the peoples of the USSR.\textsuperscript{15}

Here, there is no mention of "rearing in internationalism" and no singling out of Russian culture as the Ukrainian inspiration; but there is the usual "at the same time" stress on reciprocity and the contribution which the Ukraine has made to the common weal. Toward the end of his rule, Shelest seems to have been under very great pressure to adjust his posture to the more integrationist currents

\textsuperscript{12} "We must treat our beautiful Ukrainian language with great care and respect. It is our treasure, our great heritage, which all of us, but in the first place you, our writers, must preserve and develop. Novels, short stories and poetry of high ideological content written in our beautiful language on a high artistic level — all are indispensable for further enrichment and development of the national culture and language. Your efforts in this direction always have been and will be supported by the Communist Party." (\textit{Literaturna Ukraina}, November 17, 1966, as translated by Pelenski in "Shelest and His Period . . .," loc. cit., pp. 280-87.)

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Kommunist Ukrainy}, 1971, no. 3, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Literaturnaia gazeta}, July 5, 1967. Also see P. E. Shelest, \textit{Istoricheskoe priznanie molodezhi} (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1968), p. 54.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Pravda}, April 17, 1970, p. 4.
emanating from Moscow and disseminated locally by such Russifying literary figures as Kozachenko in the Writers' Union and Shamota in the Academy of Sciences. One can see his dilemma from the speech he delivered to the Sixth Ukrainian Writers' Congress in May 1971. His response in the speech was largely to intensify the emphasis on "class" consciousness, socialist realism, and partiinosť, but he does bend somewhat on the nationalist issue: ethnic distortions in children's literature are singled out for criticism; Brezhnev is quoted on patriotism; the Russifying formula "national in its form and internationalist in its spirit, Socialist in content" is used to describe Ukrainian literature; and the Writers' Union, its Party organization and various literary journals and publishing houses are attacked — at least in part — for toleration of excessive nationalism.

Shelest's greatest contribution as an "ideologue" to the Soviet Ukrainian national cause, and the source of his greatest notoriety after his removal, was his authorization of the publication in 1970 over his own name of the short outline of Ukrainian history, economic geography and culture evocatively titled O, Ukraine, Our Soviet Land. Directly or by implication, the book tended to stress the historical autonomy of the Ukraine, the unity of the Ukrainian people over the past centuries, the liberating role of the Cossacks, the democratic character of the Zaporozhian Sich, the exploited status of the Ukraine under Tsarist colonialism, the loyalty of Ukrainians to Lenin's cause after the Revolution, and the enormous achievements of the Ukraine and Ukrainians under Communism. In public pronouncements Shelest often dwelt on the "national liberation" aspects of Ukrainian history. Thus, in one article passages appeared which referred to the "struggle of the Ukrainian people for social and national liberation, for Socialism and Communism," and to the Ukrainian people who had "put an end to the injustice of centuries and united all their lands into a single Ukrainian Soviet State."

In a speech at the same time honoring Lenin's 100th anniversary, Shelest declared: "In these years Tsarism reigned in Russia [Rossiia]. Military-

16 For the speech see Kommunist Ukrainy, 1971, no. 6, pp.11-19.
feudal, capitalist, national oppression was realized in most cruelly barbaric manner.”19 And in his historical references, Shelest managed to introduce the reciprocity theme, too. Thus, for instance, acceptance by the Ukrainian Bolsheviks of the Brest Litovsk Treaty is presented as a sacrifice by the Ukraine for the common welfare.20 To avoid the wrong impression, one must hasten to point out that the question in all of Shelest’s historiographical forays was really one of emphasis rather than simple assertion of Ukrainian claims and there were always copious references to the “historic friendship of peoples” and Lenin.

The economy

Although one cannot weigh the factors that contributed to Shelest’s downfall, it is probably safe to assume that his stance on economic issues was at least as important as his position on cultural issues, although less visible. As in the other areas treated above, so in the economic sphere, Shelest always stressed the reciprocity theme. In general discussions of economic questions, he rarely missed the opportunity of pointing up the magnitude of the Ukraine’s contribution to total Soviet GNP and the particularly high share of Ukrainian output in various strategic economic sectors (including those relevant to the military). As he declared to the Soviet elite at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March, 1971: “The Ukraine occupies a large share in All-Union production. There is no branch of industry that does not exert a fundamental influence on the further increase of All-Union production and the satisfaction of the needs of the country.”21 Shelest acknowledged the contribution of other republics (not just the Russian) to Ukrainian economic development; but he insisted on explicitly recognizing the role played by the Ukraine alongside the Russian Republic in promoting growth in the less-developed regions of the USSR, in expanding Soviet foreign trade, and in aiding Third World countries:

20 “Our working class and toiling peasantry consciously accepted heavy sacrifices in the name of saving and strengthening the first proletarian state in the world — the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. Kaiser Germany, as is well known, then seized the Ukraine.” (Pravda, April 17, 1970, p. 3.)
21 Pravda, April 1, 1971, p. 3.
THE VIEWS OF PETRO SHELEST

The material basis for the further coming together of nations in all spheres of social life has been the equalization of the level of economic development of all republics, the unification of their efforts and resources for building a new society. In the course of Socialist industrialization the Party has devoted great attention to elevating the economy of the Ukrainian SSR. At the same time, together with the RSFSR, the Ukraine has rendered every sort of assistance in the industrialization of other Union Republics.

In the family of Soviet sister-republics [N. B.] the Ukraine has overtaken many of the most economically developed countries of the world. The Ukraine fulfills its international duty not only by collaborating with other Soviet republics in Communist construction, but also in actively participating in the foreign economic ties of the USSR with all Socialist states, in rendering many-sided aid to young developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.22

In the investment area, what is most remarkable in the first place about Shelest’s public statements is what he does not talk about. Unlike his successor, Shcherbitsky, Shelest did not — at least to my knowledge — publicly endorse the major investment-devouring development projects in the “East”: oil and gas extraction in West Siberia, hydro-power and energy-intensive industry in Central Asia and Eastern Siberia, the Baikal-Amur Main Line project, new initiatives in the Soviet Far East, etc. With respect to the Ukrainian economy, Shelest appears to have favored maintenance of the traditional structural balances, with modernization of plant and some shifts of emphasis. Thus, at the 24th Congress of the CPU, in the section of his report dealing with machine-building, Shelest stated:

The first priority task is the organization of mass production of mighty energy blocks for atomic electric stations, metallurgical aggregates, the newest means of computer technology, new airplanes, aviation engines, cars, trucks, T-150 tractors and agricultural machines. These questions must constantly be placed under the control of Party obkoms [Provincial Committees], gorkoms [City Committees] and raikoms [District Committees]. They demand special attention from Union Ministries and planning organs.23

22 Ibid., April 17, 1970, p. 3.
23 Kommunist Ukrainy, 1971, no. 3, p. 16
What he particularly wanted to see was the more rapid modernization of the machine-building and steel industries. As he pointedly observed at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "The technical level of the machine-building and radio-electronics industries, the skill of their cadres permit them to manufacture the most complex machines and equipment which do not lag behind the best domestic and world models." Rapid gains could be achieved through renovation of the iron and steel industry. "And yet, in the metallurgical industry of the republic there are still many unsolved problems, in particular in the matter of progressive technology, mechanization of labor-intensive processes, replacement of obsolete machinery. All these problems are there for us to solve in the new Five-Year Plan."  

Shelest saw the fuel and power shortage as a critical weakness in the Ukrainian economy. At the 24th Congress of the CPU, he minced no words about this problem:

But all the same one must note that the level of production of electrical energy still does not fully satisfy the needs of industry, agriculture and communal-household consumers of the republic. The necessary reserve of energy capacities has not been created. Yet, as is well-known, faster tempos of development of electrical energy are an absolute condition for accelerating technical progress and providing for the rhythmic, steady operation of all branches of the economy.

The CC CPU has constantly kept under supervision the stepping-up of capacities of electrical energy, has repeatedly raised these questions with the corresponding Union organs.

It must be said that serious shortcomings exist too in the work of the energy systems. At a number of electric stations, especially those subordinate to the administrations "Donbassenergo" and "Dneproenergo," existing capacities are not being fully utilized, and stoppages of machinery are permitted.

The Ministry of Energy and Electrification must improve the work of electric stations and jointly with construction organizations speed up the expansion of capacities, create conditions for the further increase of electrical supply of industry and agriculture.  

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24 Pravda, April 1, 1971, p. 3.
25 Ibid.
26 Kommunist Ukrainy, 1971, no. 3. p. 11.
At other points in this report, Shelest complained about the slow pace of development of the oil industry in the republic, pointed out the need to proceed more rapidly with atomic power station construction, and called attention to shortages of fuel for household heating.

The source of the power shortage, as economists and most other politicians publicly acknowledged, was the lag in coal production. And Shelest laid the blame for this strategic bottleneck squarely at the door of the All-Union ministries, not of local managers who had failed to raise labor productivity (indeed, he pointed out that the five-year plan \textit{had} been fulfilled in coal production, through a rise in labor productivity). At the 24th Congress of the CPU, he attacked the USSR Gosplan and Ministry of Coal Industry directly for the slowdown of investment in the coal industry — which was a criticism not only of their respective heads N. K. Baibakov and B. F. Bratchenko, but probably of Kosygin as well. He repeated the substance of his criticism at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, with further revelations and broad hints:

It must be said that the stepping-up of capacities in the coal industry in recent years has been implemented at extremely low tempos. Over the past five years construction has begun on only two new mines in the Donbas. The scope and reconstruction of existing mines have been considerably reduced. Somebody [\textit{koe-kto}] tries to assert that the share of gas and oil in the fuel balance is growing and that therefore, supposedly, one may pay less attention to the development of the coal industry. We think that this is incorrect. The requirements of the economy for fuel are growing all the time. This demands that, along with the oil and gas industry, we also develop the coal industry, in particular the Donetsk coal basin.\textsuperscript{27}

The magnitude of the change in policy desired was suggested in a speech he delivered in Donetsk in July 1971, in which he demanded that construction agencies accelerate their coal mine reconstruction and construction work by 50-100\%.\textsuperscript{28}

The final area of economic affairs in which Shelest displayed a nationally-oriented concern was reform of the planning system, even though his preferences in this field may in some respects have been

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Pravda}, April 1, 1971, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., July 13, 1971, p. 2.
closer to Brezhnev's than were those of his competitor, Shcherbitsky. Shelest was proud of the highly-developed state of Ukrainian science and technology. (The manner of his praise — in which he linked technology and "defence" — provides some reason to suppose that he was trying to impress upon a military audience the defence industry significance of the Ukraine.29) And he was especially insistent on the role to be played by the Ukraine in the introduction of computer-based systems of decision-making in economic planning —something that Brezhnev himself had supported since the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966. Shelest had always been circumspect in his references to the "economic reform" of 1965, with its emphasis on profitability and other economic levers.30 But he was quite outspoken on the "scientific-technical revolution" and its planning implications.31 At the 24th Congress of the CPU in 1971, he delivered a number of plugs for Ukrainian work in computer technology and the introduction of "automated systems of administration." Following up on these ideas at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, he advanced a specific proposal:

Automated administration has exceedingly great significance. The CC CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR have set the task of creating in the nearest future an all-state automated system of management of the country. Evidently it is expedient as an experiment to begin work on creating an automated system of administration in one of the union republics in which scientific cadres are available and determinate successes in this affair have been achieved.32

In fact, this proposal was accepted; the Ukraine was chosen as the republic in which the pilot-project of the "automated system of

29 For example, see his comments on the Ukrainian contribution to the Soviet space program in his report to the 24th Congress of the CPU (1971), Kommunist Ukrainy, 1971, no. 3, p. 33.
30 For example, see XXIII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1966), Vol 1, p. 132.
31 As Shelest said in his 1970 electoral speech: "The shortcomings in work of industry, construction and some other branches of the economy testify to the fact that among us insufficient attention in some places [Shcherbitsky's Council of Ministers Presidium?] is still being devoted to problems of scientific-technological progress, of perfecting the forms and methods of leadership of industry and construction. . . . Further improvement of the administration of the economy of the country has exceptional significance. We must strive to see that administration relies more upon science, that progressive principles of management be introduced, that the possibilities provided by automation, computer technology, and the newest methods of organization of labor be effectively utilized." (Pravda, June 2, 1970, p. 2.)
32 Pravda, April 1, 1971, p. 3.
administration” for republics with oblasts would be worked out, while Lithuania would perform the same function for republics without oblasts.

Exactly what political objective Shelest hoped to achieve by supporting computerized planning based upon mathematical models is not clear from his speeches. The key institution involved in effecting this shift in planning was to be the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Cybernetics, headed by the Russian Academician, V. N. Glushkov. Glushkov’s status was not affected by Shelest’s removal, which suggests that there was no necessary connection between computerization and the promotion of narrowly “national” interests. This is the conclusion that would also seem to emerge from the illuminating discussion of this issue by Vsevolod Holubnychy and Aaron Katsenelinboigen.33 One might suppose, however, that the strategic factors involved from Shelest’s standpoint were information and effective participation in policy making. One of the absolute preconditions of a workable cybernetic-based planning system is detailed accurate information on the state of each “sub-system” (e.g., the Ukraine, its regions and functional branches) and the system of a whole. From discussions of territorial (as opposed to branch) planning by Ukrainian economists and Gosplan officials, it is abundantly clear that such information was not (and probably is still not) being gathered.34 To implement computerization, one must simultaneously develop this integrated “data base.” But once such information is at hand, it can be used to prove the point — long asserted by some Western and Soviet economists — that the present utilization of Ukrainian economic resources is not only exploitative, but irrational from the point of view of the Soviet economy as a whole. In other words, the institution of a republic system of “automated plan management” would make it possible to argue “scientifically” in favor of a reduction in Ukrainian “exports” along the lines suggested by Ukrainian economists and against investment priorities which hurt

34 See especially the articles on this subject in Voprosy ekonomiki, 1968, no. 7; Ekonomika sovetskoi Ukrainy, 1969, no. 4; ibid., 1970, no. 8; Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, 1971, no. 2; Ekonomika sovetskoi Ukrainy, 1971, no. 5; ibid., 1971, no. 12; Kommunist Ukrainy, 1976, no. 1.
the Ukraine. Furthermore, a possible effect of the introduction of such a system would be to make the decision-making process affecting the Ukrainian economy more accessible to local influence than under the existing highly centralized system of branch planning.

The Ukraine in the USSR

Shelest was — as they say — a realist, and thus not in the slightest sense an advocate of Ukrainian secession from the USSR. But loyalty to the Soviet federal state did not mean subscribing to a conception of the state which explicitly or implicitly entailed Great Russian domination and effective extinction of autonomous action on the part of the constituent national republics. Shelest rarely missed an opportunity in his public statements to articulate at one point or another his own image of equality in Soviet federalism. There are constant references by him to the "Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic," "the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet state," "Ukrainian Socialist state," "statehood," "our Socialist statehood," and the like. The role of the Ukraine in the United Nations and other international organizations ("almost seventy international organizations and their organs") was also mentioned. Historically, Ukrainian statehood was not based upon a clever political calculation in Moscow, but upon the choice of the Ukrainian people themselves — with all the implications of this act of self-determination:

The triumph of Leninist nationality policy was the birth of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Ukrainian people were one of the first to speak in favor of creation of the USSR — a voluntary union of equal republics, built on the principle of proletarian internationalism, unity of the economic and political organization of society. In such a state, the Soviet peoples saw the sole possibility of successfully defending the conquests of October and building Socialism. Only by uniting their efforts could they achieve in a short period an economic and cultural flourishing unheard of in the history of the entire country and of each republic in particular, and a strengthening of the defensive capacity of the Socialist Fatherland.

By stating here that relations among republics are based upon "proletarian internationalism," Shelest inferentially tended to equate

35 Pravda, April 17, 1970, pp. 3-4.
36 Ibid., p. 4.
federal relations within the Soviet Union itself with relations among the bloc countries.

The CPU and the CPSU

The implication of Shelest’s statements about the Communist Party of the Ukraine also must have bothered those who did not share his vision of a community of equal Soviet nations. Shelest never denied — indeed, he always affirmed — the unified character of the CPSU. But this was a unity in which the national element was preserved, rather than submerged:

The Leninist principles of internationalism also found remarkable expression in the practice of party construction, in which the national Communist parties were formed — integral and indivisible parts, fighting detachments of a single party. Here the peculiarities of development of the revolution in the Soviet republics were wisely taken into account. Il’ich directly led the creation of the Communist Party of the Ukraine. From the very first day of its existence he conducted an unrelenting struggle against class enemies, Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, great-power chauvinism, against various anti-Leninist deviations. In the struggle the Party always managed to elevate to the top the all-state, all-proletariat tasks.37

Ukrainian Social Democratic organizations, Shelest declared, played a key role in the creation of the Bolshevik party.38 In other words, the Ukraine was a charter member of the organization, not simply a passive recipient of party political status. Moreover, the image of this party status in Shelest’s statements was clearly national rather than geographical in character; he regularly referred to the CPU as the party of the “Ukrainian people.” Equally disturbing from the centralist point of view — as we know from later attacks by Malanchuk and others — was Shelest’s general unwillingness to mortgage the future autonomy of the CPU by acknowledging its past “nationalist deviations.” In speeches and articles dealing with the CPU in the 1920s, and 1930s, Shelest consistently managed to avoid references to the “struggle against Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” within the

37 Ibid.
38 See Pravda Ukrainy, April 18, 1970, p. 2.
The contemporary "reflection" of this historical perspective was a strong reluctance even to raise the issue of the political loyalty of Ukrainian cadres and a tendency to treat cadres' questions within a technical rather than "political" — especially ethnic — context.\footnote{For example, see "Pod znamenem leninskoi partii," Kommunist Ukrainy, 1970, no. 4, pp. 8-9.}

**Foreign affairs**

To a lesser extent, Shelest projected his national orientation into the international arena as well. As noted above, Shelest did not ignore the participation of the Ukraine in the UN, however formal this might have been. He also called attention to the international renown of Ukrainian literature and culture. More significantly, he emphasized the role of the Ukraine as an actor in the world revolutionary process. In his words: "The Ukrainian people, together with all the peoples of the Soviet Union, defends the goal of peace, renders support to all fighters against oppression and for freedom and independence and fulfills its international duty with honor."\footnote{Pravda, April 17, 1970, pp. 3-4.} But perhaps the most important way in which Shelest used the world at large for national purposes was to lay upon it the uncomfortable burden of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism." This was central to his defence of the political loyalty of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Shelest’s strategy, and that of his Propaganda Secretary, Ovcharenko, was implicitly to draw the line between loyal and disloyal Ukrainians along the western boundary of the Ukrainian SSR. "Bourgeois nationalism" existed, all right, but beyond the gates — in Munich, Paris, Brussels, New York, Philadelphia, Toronto, Rio, or Adelaide, not in Lviv or Kiev. "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists," the politically-discredited hirelings of foreign intelligence agencies, were attempting to subvert loyal Ukrainians and drive a wedge between the Ukraine and Russia; but from outside the Soviet Union. The real Ukrainian national intelligentsia inside the USSR was overwhelmingly and eternally loyal to the Soviet cause. The extent to which Shelest and Ovcharenko were forced to shift their ground and begin seriously to acknowledge the presence of "nationalism" within the gates during the latter part of 1971 and early 1972 was a good indication of the weakening of Shelest’s position.\footnote{See especially Pravda, August 20, 1971, pp. 2-3.}
SHELEST'S HARDLINE TENDENCY

Shelest's national orientation was accompanied by what I have agreed above to call his "hardline orientation." While the external aspect of Shelest's national orientation was largely a function of its domestic aspects, the reverse tended to be true of the domestic and external aspects of this other orientation. Thus, we must start with Shelest's approach to foreign affairs, seen in the context, first, of Brezhnev's foreign policy in the emerging era of détente.

Brezhnev's foreign policy

The period from the "Prague Spring" through the end of 1973 spans some of the most dramatic developments in the history of post-war Soviet foreign policy, and some of the most "agonizing" decisions as well. The invasion of Czechoslovakia and invocation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" solved the immediate security problem of the Soviet Union but left open the question of how best to bring about the political and economic integration of the "Socialist Commonwealth." Relations with China during these years were poor, and the polemics harsh. The armed confrontation with China in the spring and summer of 1969 led to a build-up of Soviet forces in the East and — it would appear — to a serious discussion of the "options," while competition with the Chinese elsewhere in the world posed once again the perennial question of what the "revolutionary" content of Soviet foreign policy ought to be. In Viet Nam, "US imperialism" was engaging in its own test of Soviet "internationalist" principles. At the same time, it was threatening to bring about a sudden shift in the world balance of power through rapprochement with China, signaled by Secretary Kissinger's dramatic Peking visit in June 1971, and arrangement of the Sino-American summit meeting. In the Middle East, Soviet opportunities to exploit Arab-Israeli hostilities required gambling upon regimes whose volatility far outweighed their commitment to "scientific socialism" and whose inventories of Soviet weapons held the potential of drawing the Soviet Union into conflicts which might exceed the limits of a prudential calculation of national interests.

Against this background, the Soviet leadership, guided by Brezhnev began cautiously pursuing from 1968 onward the "relaxation of tensions" with the West that was to lead to the start of the SALT negotiations in November 1969, the Treaty of Moscow with West Germany in August 1970, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin in
September 1971, the ratification by the Bundestag of the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw in May 1972, Nixon’s visit to Moscow and the signing of the strategic arms and other agreements that same month, the $750,000,000 grain deal with the US in July 1972, the signing of the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in December 1972, the opening of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks in January 1973, Brezhnev’s visit to the US in June 1973, and the first meeting of foreign ministers dealing with the European security and cooperation conference in July 1973. These moves were accompanied by constant efforts by Brezhnev to keep the bloc members (especially East Germany)42 in step, maintain support within the top Soviet leadership for the “Peace Program” and the compromises it involved,43 and disarm doubters at lower levels of the Soviet elite.

Imperialism and revolution

For Shelest, Communist revolution was not simply an abstraction to which one paid lip service but a goal that ought to be the focal point of Soviet foreign policy. A policy based upon revolutionary premises was realistic, because it reflected the new balance of power in the world brought into existence by Soviet military and economic might, the solidarity of the Communist bloc, and the growth of revolutionary movements abroad. “In the new historic conditions,” he said, “Communism has become a reality, the central question of the entire revolutionary movement. The fundamental content of the contemporary epoch consists, in the words of Lenin, in the struggle between ‘two ways, two formations, two economies — the Communist and capitalist.’”44 This dichotomous image of world politics was clearly reflected over the years in Shelest’s views on the imperialist danger and how best to cope with it. Repeatedly, Shelest calls attention to the danger of imperialism, the threat of war, and the need to combat it, not through concessions and compromise but through increased military vigilance and revolutionary activity. As he said in 1968:

43 According to Raymond L. Garthoff, there were at least four meetings of the Politburo to discuss the final terms of the SALT agreement being negotiated during Nixon’s five-day trip to Moscow in May 1972. (“SALT and the Soviet Military,” Problems of Communism, January-February 1975, p. 29.)
In our time, as long as imperialism exists, the danger of war also exists. Therefore each toiler must be ready to become a soldier. Our people live not with thoughts of war, but of peace, and are doing everything to preserve and defend it. The economic and defence might of the USSR, of the world Socialist camp, the lofty vigilance of peoples toward their class enemies, toward the instigators of war are decisive in this great cause.

. . . Imperialism has not lost its aggressiveness, and, although it has more than once suffered terrible defeats, it nevertheless hatches mad ideas of eliminating the first Socialist country in the world — the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.45

This reading of the imperialist danger, Shelest argued, was supported by history. In a very tough speech delivered on the 25th Anniversary of the Liberation of the Ukraine from the "German-Fascists" in October 1969, shortly before the Warsaw Pact called for European security and trade talks, and a month before the first SALT talks opened in Helsinki, Shelest drew the "lessons of the past" for European security.46 "International imperialism," he said, "is attempting to unleash a new world war." The evidence of this aim was everywhere to be seen: in the "aggressive blocs," the arms race, Viet Nam, Angola and Mozambique, Israel, the export of counter-revolution, and suppression of national-liberation movements. In Europe, the US itself maintained 300,000 troops, with nuclear weapons. Shelest warned: "World imperialism is striving to turn capitalist Europe into a strategic platform for attacking the Socialist countries, and first of all the Soviet Union." Although Shelest declared the "Ukrainian people's" support for the Soviet policy of seeking collective security in Europe, he gave this policy an "anti-imperialist" twist and pointed out in his speech that collective security had failed in the interwar period.

In April 1970, shortly after the opening of the four-power negotiations on Berlin and the reconvening of the SALT talks, Shelest presented another long analysis of the international situation, in which he declared:

46 Pravda Ukrainy, October 18, 1969, pp. 2-3. Most of the belligerent passages were excised in the Pravda account of this speech to same day.
Imperialism, said Lenin, means reaction along all lines. And life has fully confirmed this Leninist conclusion. Imperialism means the liquidation of democratic freedoms, the "Fascization" of social-political life, the fusing of monopolies with the state apparatus and the militarists, a colonial and neo-colonial policy — a mankind-hating ideology and the practice of racism.

The imperialists are utilizing the economic and military potential of countries where they still dominate against social progress, against the interests of the broad toiling masses for preparing and unleashing new wars. . . .

History has declared its verdict on imperialism and now the forces called upon to cleanse our planet of the foulness of imperialism are constantly found on the revolutionary attack.

However, this does not mean that one can count on easy victories. Communists well know that a still powerful, experienced and treacherous enemy stands opposed to the revolutionary movement, that it will not voluntarily give up its positions.47

He also offered an analysis of the European security problem, framed in revolutionary, anti-imperialist terms:

Among the many problems being solved by the Communist Party and the Soviet Government in the area of foreign policy, the problem of European security has enormous significance. And this is not accidental, for in Europe, namely, is located the basic knot of contradictions between the world bourgeoisie and the international working class, between Socialism and capitalism. The main inter-imperialist contradictions are developing here too.

The processes taking place in Europe in one or another measure determine the direction and character of the development of events in all regions of the world. This is why European problems have truly world-wide significance, and why European security in truth is considered the key question in world politics.

The Ukrainian people actively supports peace in the entire world. Its lands have experienced both the first and second world wars, which began precisely in Europe. It decisively supports the efforts of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, of fraternal countries, aimed at strengthening peace and cooperation of all European states.

The working class of the developed capitalist countries are making a big contribution to the general struggle against imperialism. [Cites strikes statistics.]. . . .

47 Pravda Ukrainy, April 18, 1970, p. 3.
Our Party has always supported and supports the directive of Lenin that "a struggle against imperialism that is not unbreakably connected with a struggle against opportunism is an empty phrase or a deception." . . .

Conducting an active struggle against imperialism, the working class ever more firmly rallies about it the peasantry, the intelligentsia, youth, all progressive forces. With each day there constantly mature not only the material, but also the political preconditions for Socialist revolutions. [Emphasis added.]

Totally absent from this speech were the modulations which appeared in a major Brezhnev report only five days later: "Realistically thinking circles in the bourgeois countries, who in fact accept the principles of peaceful coexistence, can be assured that they will find in the Soviet Union a partner ready for the development of mutually profitable collaboration. We will continue actively to support putting a stop to the arms race which is so ruinous for our peoples, disarmament, the solution of controversial issues between the states on a reasonable basis, by means of negotiations."48

From approximately the 24th Congress of the CPSU in March 1971, when the elements of what became known as Brezhnev’s "Peace Program" were officially approved, Shelest began to pay lip service to détente, while at the same time still expressing his disagreement. Before the CPSU Congress, at the 24th Congress of the CPU, Shelest referred — as he had not been in the habit of doing — to the "policy of peaceful coexistence," and he also mentioned the call for an all-European security meeting and "relaxation of tensions"; but he continued, on the other hand, to stress the anti-imperialist theme. At the 24th Congress of the CPSU, he almost totally avoided foreign policy; and, in reporting on the Congress later that month to the Kiev Party aktiv ["active" membership], he ignored the "Peace Program" altogether while stressing the world revolutionary movement.49

The censoring of Shelest's statements in the public press also indicated continuing tension. Thus, Pravda did not publish the following passage in Shelest's June electoral speech, which coincided in time with important moderating shifts in the Soviet positions on European security, SALT, and Berlin:

48 Pravda, April 22, 1970, p. 4 ff.
The present international situation is characterized by the growing attack of world revolutionary forces against capitalism. Imperialism, although it is losing one position after another, still tries by all means to extend its existence. It desperately struggles against the forces of social progress in the whole world. The reactionary nature and aggressive strivings most sharply and keenly manifest themselves in the policy of American imperialism, which represents the greatest danger to the entire world. The aggressive actions of the imperialists threaten to ignite the flames of a new world war, which with contemporary armaments could lead to the destruction of the civilization and culture of all humanity. The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government are taking all measures not to permit the unleashing of a new war, to strengthen the defence capability of our country.50

Only a week later, Brezhnev was to preface his defence of Soviet arms control proposals with the following rhetorical question:

One might say — proposals of this type have been advanced more than once by the Soviet state in the past too, but they have not been accepted by the other side. Doesn't this testify to the unreality of disarmament plans, of limitation of the arms race, in a world in which capitalism stills exists, in which the imperialist powers continue to exert not a little influence on the international situation?51

No, Brezhnev replied, it did not. On the one hand, the entire social-political and military balance of power in the world had shifted in favor of the Socialist camp, and on the other hand the impact of armaments expenditures on the economies of the capitalist powers was forcing the latter to negotiate more seriously.

By late 1971 it appeared that Shelest had been compelled to accept Brezhnev's foreign policy line. In a speech before ideological officials on November 10, Shelest actually mentioned "the program of peace and security of peoples worked out by the 24th Congress," the "great significance" of the treaties between West Germany and the Soviet Union and Poland, the Soviet proposal for convening an all-European security meeting, the détente-related foreign trips of Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny, and "peaceful coexistence."52 Yet on May 2,
1972, two weeks after Soviet ratification of the Treaty of Moscow with West Germany, one week after Henry Kissinger's last-minute visit to Moscow and important Soviet concessions on the strategic arms agreement, a week before the signing of the German Traffic Treaty, and three weeks before his own removal from office and Nixon's arrival in Moscow, Shelest declared in his May Day speech in Kiev:

The class battles in the capitalist countries are building up and becoming more acute. The working class, headed by the Communist Party, is conducting fierce battles against the oppression of monopolies, for the political and social-economic rights of the toilers. The world Communist and workers movement is tempered, it develops and is strengthened in the struggle against revisionism and opportunism of various shades.

The Soviet Union unswervingly and constantly implements a Leninist foreign policy course, renders support and aid to the peoples struggling against imperialism and war.

... The imperialists are increasing international tension, are kindling new hotbeds of war.

Our Party, its Leninist Central Committee and the Soviet government are decisively unmasking the treacherous schemes of the imperialists and other instigators of war, are taking all the necessary measures to relax international tensions, are directing the efforts of the Soviet people toward strengthening the economy and defensive might of the Country of Soviets.

Germany

On all counts — military, political and economic — the German question was central to the sort of “relaxation of tensions” sought by Brezhnev, and on its resolution turned the success of broader arms limitation, security, and trade negotiations with the Western European powers and the United States. Shelest, as we have seen above, looked West for danger to the Soviet Union; and there can be little doubt that, apart from the menace of the United States, the threat from West Germany loomed largest in his perception of “imperialism.” His approach here appeared to be influenced partly by doctrinal considerations but also by fear and loathing of Germany and


(capitalist?) Germans, rooted in World War II. There may also have been the secondary political motive of playing down collaboration between Ukrainians and Germans during the war. Throughout most of the period we are looking at, Shelest consistently proffered extreme judgments of West German politics and intentions. At the 23rd Congress of the CPSU in 1966 Shelest stated that revanche had become "government policy" in West Germany, and this remained his position, probably, right up to the bitter end. In an October 1969 report already cited above, commemorating the liberation of the Ukraine and delivered in the presence of a delegation from the USSR Ministry of Defence headed by Marshal Moskalenko, Shelest volunteered a whole series of comments about Germany which Pravda saw fit to excise. These included passages on the sacrifice of soldiers' lives in the war; the failure of collective security in the inter-war period due to "the policy of the western states, who encouraged Hitlerite Germany in its Eastern campaign against the Soviet Union"; the class-war, imperialist character of the German invasion; the non-collaboration of Ukrainians and Germans; the intention to erect obelisks at the two points at which the Red Army re-entered "Ukrainian land" and at which "the last fascist pillager was driven out of our homeland"; the inability of the Germans to achieve a lightning victory over the Soviet Union; the failure of the Germans to "create a general coalition of states against the Soviet Union," and their encounter — on the contrary — with an anti-Hitlerite coalition; and — among still other points — the number of times in the past century the Ukraine had been attacked by "the Kaiser hordes and Hitlerite hordes, Anglo-French armies and White Poles." Referring to the present, he also observed:

In conducting a policy of anti-Communism, of "rolling back" and undermining Socialism, American imperialism places main reliance on strengthening the military-economic potential of West Germany, on the rebirth of militarism and revanchism as the basic anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist force in Europe.

Militarism, revanchism and neo-fascism in West Germany have in fact been raised to the level of state policy. With the active support of the United States of America the Bundeswehr has grown into the most powerful army of Western Europe.

55 XXIII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soiuza, . . ., Vol. 1, p. 139.
armed with contemporary military technology. West German militarists are more and more seizing the key posts in NATO. . . .

[A long paragraph follows on the neo-Nazi party of Adolf von Thadden, or “Adolf-the Second” as he is called.]

The leaders of West Germany [i.e., Brandt’s SPD-led coalition — G. H.] call their foreign policy course a policy of “building bridges.” However, this is not a question of labels, but of the fact that the ruling circles of West Germany are counting on undermining the unity of the Socialist countries, and tearing some of them away from the Socialist camp. . . . [But] In their path stands our mighty, fighting, glorious heroic Soviet army.56

This speech of Shelest’s came right after the electoral victory of Brandt and the SPD, which was hailed by Brezhnev but treated coolly by the German Democratic Republic (GDR or East German) leadership. As Gerhard Wettig has shown, it was precisely at this time — when room for diplomatic maneuver opened up — that the ongoing conflict between the East German and Soviet leaders over Soviet overtures toward West Germany and vice-versa became particularly intense.57 Shelest’s speech at this juncture, as well as later references by him to the German problem, strongly suggests active opposition on his part to Brezhnev’s handling of relations with Bonn, the West Berlin question, East German claims, and American interests in the German issue. We can confidently assume that Ulbricht must have been aware of this soft spot in Brezhnev’s support and attempted to extract maximum advantage from it. But Ulbricht did not last the course; he was replaced by Honecker in early May 1971. With persistent Soviet pressure on the East Germans, intensified after the announcement of

56 Pravda Ukrainy, October 18, 1969, p. 2. (Text compared with Pravda, October 18, 1969.)
57 “As the summer drew to a close, it became increasingly evident that the Soviet Union would welcome an SPD electoral victory and the formation of an SPD-led government. Meanwhile, the GDR continued to attack the Federal Republic in general and the SPD in particular. Thus the result in the elections and the decision to form a coalition government of SPD and FDP met with a positive response from Moscow. Speaking [in] East Berlin on 6 October 1969, Brezhnev praised this development as an undoubted victory for the democratic forces in the Federal Republic and declared that the USSR would welcome a ‘change towards realism in the policies of the Federal Republic’ and would be ready to respond accordingly. Ulbricht, on the other hand, issued a further warning against West German policy, which he still classified as being nothing but aggressive and hostile, even under Social Democratic leadership.” (Wettig, Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp, pp. 55-56.)
Kissinger's Peking trip in July, preliminary agreement was reached by September on the Berlin issue, and Brandt spelled out for Brezhnev later that month in the Crimea what Soviet concessions it would take to gain ratification by the Bundestag of the Treaty of Moscow. At this point, Shelest changed his public position. As head of a low-status "parliamentary" delegation that visited the GDR from October 5 to 12 (which received very little publicity in the Moscow press), Shelest fell fully in line behind Brezhnev's German policy. And he basically repeated his performance in his address to propaganda workers in November. The shift in his position was so sharp that the best interpretation to be placed upon it, I think, is that it represented a command performance and did not express any underlying change of sentiment.

"Zionism"

Most Western analysts have tended to pass over Shelest's posture toward "Zionism," especially in view of the likelihood that his position has been distorted and used in rumor campaigns against him by his political enemies. It is common knowledge that there was a "politics of 'Zionism'" in the Ukraine, especially since the Czechoslovak crisis. It is also clear enough that anti-Semitic attitudes were present in the population at large and among elements of the intelligentsia and that there must have been a strong temptation to

58 For Shelest's main speech in the GDR, see Pravda Ukrainy, October 8, 1971, pp. 1, 3. The text checks with the German version in Neues Deutschland. Shelest's visit was given good coverage in the East German press.

59 See Kommunist Ukrainy, 1971, no. 12, p. 16.

60 The Ukraïns'kyi visnyk states: "Throughout the second half of 1972 and in the first months of 1973 various slanderous rumors were being circulated against Shelest, accusing him of fostering the growth of corruption in the Republic. The following fact is typical of what went on: Two anti-Jewish pogroms were organized by the KGB in March and May of 1972 near the synagogue in Kiev, actions which Shelest's enemies in the CPU leadership and the KGB tried to use for their foul purposes. They spread rumors among the Jewish population that Shelest was the initiator of these pogroms. At the same time, in an attempt to stir up a wave of anti-Semitism among the Ukrainians, the KGB spread the myth that the Jews were allegedly demanding the creation of an autonomous Jewish republic in the Ukraine, at the very time that Jews were actually demanding the right to freely emigrate to Israel and to have their national and cultural needs satisfied. Nevertheless, this time the plans of the chauvinists were thwarted; they failed to drive a wedge between Jews and Ukrainians, to start, in this way, a wave of antagonism between them." (Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R.: The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8 [Baltimore: Smoloskyp, 1976], p. 128.)
exploit these attitudes on the part of various political leaders. We also know, as mentioned earlier, that Jewish demonstrations in some Ukrainian cities had become sufficiently organized by 1971 to assure mass visibility and provoke political as well as police attention. Finally, it has been reported that Shelest himself expressed anti-Semitic sentiments during negotiations with the Czechoslovak leaders in 1968. What these facts and allegations add up to, however, is not so certain.

One can say, on the basis of Shelest's speeches, that he consistently took a hostile stance toward "Zionism" and Israel on the international plane — probably more hostile, if this could be measured, than that of Shcherbitsky. In April 1970 Shelest declared:

International imperialism is doing everything to suppress national-liberation revolutions. It organizes, counter-revolutionary mutinies, supports anti-popular regimes, resorts to military adventures. The crises in the Middle East testify to this. Through the hands of the Israeli aggressors, American imperialism strives to liquidate progressive regimes in the Arab countries, to inflict defeat on the national-liberation movement and establish its rule in this very important region of the world.

A year later he proclaimed:

Zionist organizations display special activeness. Zionism is a reactionary, racist, nationalist ideology, which fully serves imperialism. Zionists, upholding the predatory interests of their masters, have armed themselves with fascist methods of struggle against the progressive movement.

The bosses of international Zionism and the rulers of Israel stop at nothing in order — with the aid of "psychological warfare" — to intensify pressure on world public opinion, by means of slander to draw attention away from Israeli aggression in the Near East and the predatory actions of the United States of America in Indo-China.


62 See Grey Hodnett and Peter J. Potichnyj, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra: Department of Political Science, 1970), p. 79.

63 Pravda Ukrainy, April 18, 1970, p. 3.

And, in a speech delivered in Lviv in October 1971, he linked "Zionism" with "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism":

In recent times, the Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists have gotten together with the Zionists. Forgiving each other old sins, they have declared that they have been "friends" from time immemorial. This unification is not accidental. For international Zionism is the truest servant of the imperialists, and its organizations — such as the "Jewish Defence League" — simply fascist bands.

Thus, the Zionists and the nationalists have one master, and one idea — ferocious hatred for everything Socialist, frantic anti-Communist and anti-Soviet actions.\(^\text{65}\)

The most charitable interpretation that one could place upon such pronouncements, from a domestic standpoint, is that — whatever the underlying motive — they could not help but have stimulated anti-Semitism among Ukrainians and Russians in the Ukraine. One is inclined to suspect, however, that Shelest's vociferous anti-Zionism may — to some extent — have also served the function of offering up a surrogate ideological victim to take the place of domestic "bourgeois nationalism." There is the further possibility that Shelest may have hoped to strike a common chord with that task sector that was probably most critical of him on national grounds — namely, central and local agitprop officials.

But, one must not lose sight of the possibility that Shelest may actually have felt that the "Zionist question" really should be considered within the context of "national liberation." A reading of Shelest's speeches does suggest that he took "national-liberation" quite seriously. As an example of this concern, we might consider the following passage which prefaces an attack on Israel:

"World imperialism," taught Lenin, "must collapse when the revolutionary onslaught of exploited and oppressed workers within each country unites with the revolutionary onslaught of hundreds of millions of mankind who up to now have stood outside of history, have been regarded as its object."

That time has come. The national-liberation, anti-imperialist movement has covered Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions. After the Second World War over seventy new states appeared on the political map of the world. In

\(^{65}\) \textit{Pravda Ukrainy}, October 29, 1971, p. 3.
many countries that won political independence a struggle is developing against the dominance of foreign monopolies, for realizing deep social-economic transformations.66 [Emphasis added.]

To commend the principle of "national liberation" in the Middle East, after all, did not detract from its universalistic implications.

The "Socialist Commonwealth"

Another notion that Shelest took seriously was the "Socialist Commonwealth." He defined this community very much in terms of close relationships among the member countries based upon adherence to a common "class"-based political line. In a speech delivered in Brezhnev's presence in December 1967, he seemed to imply an even closer integration of Communist states when he observed: "The great Lenin saw in the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the model for the future unification of all the forces of Socialism in the struggle against imperialism and enslavement of peoples."67 During the Czechoslovak crisis and "normalization," Shelest without question advocated a "hard" line.68 He continued to support this line vis-à-vis Eastern Europe as a whole through the rest of his term as First Secretary.69 Policy towards Czechoslovakia was one of the few areas in foreign affairs in which Shelest displayed more than routine enthusiasm for Brezhnev's performance.70 Although we can only speculate about the specific reasons for Shelest's position, it might have been the case that he thought that closer integration of the European Communist countries on Soviet terms would redound to the

66 Ibid., April 18, 1970, p. 3.
67 Ibid., December 24, 1967, p. 3.
68 See Hodnett and Potichnyj, The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis, p. 81 ff.
70 In June 1971 Shelest observed: "Recently . . . it befell my lot to be part of the membership of the delegation of the CPSU to the work of the XIV Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, to meet with the Communists and toilers of this country. The speeches of comrade L. I. Brezhnev at this congress and at the meeting of toilers at the "Auto-Prague" Factory were greeted with great enthusiasm. The Communists and toilers gave heartfelt thanks to our Party and the Soviet people for their great assistance in preserving the Socialist conquests of Czechoslovakia. One can say that the healthy nucleus of Czech and Slovak Communists has managed to deliver a decisive blow against the right opportunists, revisionists and, with the aid of the working class, has crushed the anti-Socialist, counter-revolutionary forces." (Pravda Ukrainy, June 8, 1971, p. 2.)
economic benefit of the Ukraine (e.g., higher prices on Ukrainian exports and greater bloc investment in the Ukraine). More significantly, if true, he may also have felt that there would be greater autonomy for the Ukraine in a political-economic structure in which the boundary between the East Europeans states and the Soviet Union was even further blurred than it was at the present.

China

One of the tantalizing features of Shelest's (and of Ovcharenko's) statements on foreign policy is what they say—or, more precisely, do not say—about China. To be sure, one can find several explicit criticisms of China and Mao in Shelest's speeches. Yet it is surprising how often Shelest either failed altogether to hint at criticism of the Chinese or referred ambiguously and unemphatically to "right and 'left' opportunists," "reactionary nationalism, chauvinism or racism," "nationalism and chauvinism," or "all sorts of opportunists and revisionists, chauvinists and nationalists." Here, one might observe the parallel stance of Ulbricht:

According to reports reaching the Federal Republic, certain members of the SED Central Committee had established contact with circles within the Soviet Party apparatus advocating rapprochement with China in place of an East-West settlement in Europe. It could be interpreted as one indication of the accuracy of these reports that Ulbricht, unlike the Party leaders of Poland, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, avoided all anti-Chinese polemics at the XXIV Congress of the CPSU.

Shelest's silence on China should be interpreted cautiously, if only

73 Pravda Ukrainy, October 18, 1969, pp. 2-3.
74 Pravda, April 17, 1970, p. 4.
76 Pravda Ukrainy, June 8, 1971, pp. 1-2.
77 Wettig, Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp, p. 92. Wettig also notes that "Unlike Ulbricht, Honecker and Stoph directed sharp polemics at China during their visit to the USSR for the XXIV Party Congress (see Neues Deutschland, 5 and 6 April 1971)" (p. 103).
because it is not absolutely evident that public criticism of China by top leaders — as opposed to journalists — was not a function assigned primarily to Brezhnev. Whether Shelest actually advocated closer ties with China we simply do not know. Yet, as we have seen, it is very clear that Shelest saw the United States and Germany as the source of military danger to the USSR, and Europe as the cockpit of world conflict. His dichotomous view of the world, which emphasized “class” rather than “national” cleavages in international relations, could well have led him to adopt a more cautious position vis-à-vis the Chinese; and the tendency for anti-Chinese rhetoric to evoke “great power chauvinist” sentiments within the Russian elite may have had the same effect. There is also a possible resource allocation angle: the less the Chinese danger, the less the need to accelerate development that much faster in Siberia, Central Asia, and the Far East, while the greater the “capitalist” danger, the greater the need to invest in the technology and industry of the developed regions of the USSR — and, not least, of the Ukraine.

Domestic hardline positions

The two domestic areas in which Shelest’s hardline stance was most evident were culture and the economy. In the cultural field, Shelest compensated for his national orientation with a strong invocation of the “class” principle. Since he did not use “class” as a code word for Russification, his very employment of the principle without a “subtext” introduced still another element of national equality in cultural affairs, by implying that all national cultures should operate within the same political parameters. To a large extent, the more pressure that was brought to bear upon Shelest in 1970 and 1971 to tighten ideological discipline, the more he responded by calling for greater “class” vigilance and partiinost’. In an “objective” sense, he attempted to trade off stultification for protection of “national” aspects of culture. But one does not need to interpret this behavior simply as cynical hypocrisy. “Ideology” aside, Shelest’s outlook incorporated a healthy dose of conventional Soviet philistinism. The best example is provided by his warnings to youth:

The ideologues of anti-Communism, the organizers of psychological warfare against the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries spread pernicious, decadent literature that mutilates the soul of man, reckless cacophony, “modern” dances, presenting them as the “spiritual values of the West.”
The goal of this is clear — to divert our youth from the active life of society — so that, as they say, everything can go on "without me," so that the business of youth is only to "sing and dance," to lead a "gay" form of life. They palm off on us Western jazz "masterpieces" — music with primitive rhythms, brutal screeches and shouts, or dances accompanied by neuropathological, deformed, anti-aesthetic movements, by vulgar and cynical grimaces. Such "art," if one will excuse the expression, can make a blockhead out of a normal person, can kill everything alive and beautiful in him.\(^7\)\(^8\)

In the economic sphere, Shelest's hardline tendencies were conditioned, it would appear, by the high priority placed on military production — a theme which is reiterated in almost all his speeches. Compared with Shcherbitsky, Shelest had far less to say about the development of light industry. Generally, he was ready to stress what had been achieved in the consumer field. Where deficiencies were acknowledged, he was usually prepared to point to "unutilized reserves" at hand in the Ukraine to increase consumer goods output; in contrast to his approach to heavy industry, he did not call upon Moscow for aid. One side effect of Shelest's indifference to light industry was that he did not talk much about the economic development of the Western Ukraine — the most "national" part of the republic. In keeping with his attitude toward consumer goods, he repeatedly emphasized "moral incentives" and socialist competitions and insisted that "labor and labor alone creates all wealth."\(^7\)\(^9\) He could hardly have been more outspoken on this score when he declared in November 1971:

Frequently some people [koe-kto] in oral and even printed propaganda attempt to resolve important problems very superficially, onesidedly. That which is easier, simpler — we sometimes propagandize. We talk and write a lot about raising the well-being of the people. Indeed, this is a very important and responsible business. But one cannot accept the fact that in some places [koe-gde] it is becoming the style, as it were, to speak exclusively about benefits, about some sort of "horn of plenty" from which goods and blessings pour forth by themselves. These are harmful consumer tendencies. It is well-known that without persistent labor there will be nothing. . . . In propaganda work and in the press very rarely

\(^7\) Istoricheskoe prizvanie molodezhi, p. 157.
\(^8\) Pravda, June 2, 1970, p. 2.
are there reminders of one of the basic demands of socialism: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat." [Emphasis added.]

Not surprisingly, Shelest gave only lukewarm support to the official line of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1971-75) on the need to accelerate consumer goods output and hedged his acknowledgment of the line with references to military production and the "economic potential" of the country. His lack of concern for incentives was also reflected in his whole approach to economic planning through computerization and lack of sympathy for economic levers.

Somewhat paradoxically, Shelest seems to have taken the opposite stand on economic levers in agriculture. As Werner Hahn has shown, Shelest did not appear to have worked up much enthusiasm for Brezhnev's policy of massive investment in agriculture. There is a sharp contrast on this score with Shcherbitsky's references to agriculture, in which he is eager to show that even agricultural disasters prove the wisdom of the Brezhnev line in agriculture. What Shelest emphasized, on the contrary, was the extension of khozrashchet relations in individual branches of agriculture; the elimination of waste of capital, materials and labor; fewer administrative controls; a gradual transition to specialized factory farming; a strong private plot economy; and stricter control, at the same time, over farm income distribution. It is possible, of course, that Shelest's position here might have been influenced by invisible regional income redistribution effects that could have been built into Brezhnev's agricultural investment program. Shelest, for example, conceivably might have seen the Non-Black Earth Zone project on the horizon and resisted it. But we do not know.

80 Kommunist Ukrainy, 1971, no. 12, p. 15.
81 See Shelest's electoral speech in Pravda, June 2, 1970, p. 2; his remarks at the 24th Congress of the CPSU in Pravda, April 1, 1971, p. 3; and his comments shortly before final approval of the plan in Kommunist, 1971, no. 12, pp. 14, 21.
CONCLUSION

Various meanings may be assigned to the Ukrainian purge of 1972-76, when it is viewed from different perspectives. Analyses of the context in which the purge occurred, the style in which it was carried out, Shelest's own policy positions, and the pattern of removal have doubly confirmed some aspects of the purge while pointing to others which show up only from a particular vantage point.

It is clear from all perspectives that the purge in its entirety must be interpreted, first of all, as an initiative of the dominant element in the Soviet leadership aimed at suppressing the expression of non-Russian cultural, economic and political values and at fostering tighter integration of the Ukraine into the "fraternal family of peoples." What was demanded was that Ukrainians subordinate themselves to "All-Union" priorities which objectively reflected a vigorous assertion of Russian hegemony in a traditional system of centralist Communist orthodoxy. This was not simply an anti-Ukrainian campaign, but one facet — albeit a most important one — of a union-wide movement to repress national-self-assertion and tighten political control in the new international climate of "relaxation of tensions."

The purge was, unquestionably, a reaction as well to what was probably interpreted as a potentially dangerous resurgence of Ukrainian "nationalism" that had infected not only the Ukrainian intelligentsia but the Party itself, and that threatened to undermine the foundations of "democratic centralism," "Soviet federalism," and the "planned economy." The handling of the purge — the virtual confinement of Shelest, clandestine appointment of Shcherbitsky, slow release of evidence of central involvement, and slow and ambiguous indictment of Shelest — betrayed a serious concern to avoid provoking any spontaneous outbursts of elite or popular resistance. It is significant that while the Soviet authorities did not hesitate to spell out fairly precisely in public what sins had been committed by the intelligentsia in the cultural sphere, they prevented even the slightest retrospective exposure of concrete details of differences of opinion between Shelest and Moscow over economic or party-organizational matters. In particular, no information whatever was retrospectively revealed about the key issues of Shelest's position on regional investment and Ukrainian "export" obligations. Whether the Party aktiv itself — in which support for Shelest may well have been strong — was privately given such information is quite doubtful.
Although Shelest was certainly accused in camera of aiding and abetting "nationalism," there is a very real question of the accuracy of this indictment. Shelest may have privately shown a personal antipathy to things Russian — we do not know. But the basic principles which he attempted to defend of equality and reciprocity among the Soviet nations and between these nations and others in the Communist "Commonwealth" were no further out of line with the letter of Leninism than were the ill-concealed Great Russian principles of Brezhnev. An appreciation of the delicacy of this problem may have been one of the reasons why, despite everything, Shelest himself was never explicitly labeled a "nationalist" or expelled from the Party. Furthermore, it is apparent that in some respects Shelest could not remotely be termed a "nationalist." The hardline positions he took on economic incentives and rewards, his concentration upon heavy industry and armaments and failure to pay much attention to light industry, his apparent unconcern with West Ukrainian economic development, possibly his resistance to agricultural investment, his hostility to the West, and his support for "revolutionary" movements abroad — were all contrary to what most Ukrainians would probably have defined as "national interests." Like his economic and political "nationalism," this "left opportunism" was also concealed from public scrutiny. In part the silence may be explained by a desire to keep quiet about any disputes over foreign policy. But it also may have reflected unease among Shelest's adversaries over their own political posture. If Shelest was in effect defending what could be called a "rightist" position on some Ukrainian national interests by taking a "leftist" stance on other — primarily foreign policy — issues, his opponents were combining a "leftist" (or neo-Stalinist) position on nationality and cultural issues with a "rightist" position on foreign policy and certain resource allocation issues. Shelest's "hard-lining" ultimately failed to generate sufficient influence among his colleagues in the Politburo to ward off political destruction; but it nevertheless constituted a challenge that was awkward to acknowledge.
Review Article

Ukrainians and Jews*


These two books deal with the turbulent years in the Ukraine's struggle for independence after World War I. Unwittingly, they offer both a study in contrast and a paradox. The first, written almost sixty years ago by a jurist, gives a more balanced history than the later book, whose author is a professional historian. Dr. Friedman, the historian, presents a passionate indictment of the Ukrainian statesman Symon Petliura and an even more passionate vindication of his assassin, Sholom Schwartzbard. Friedman attempts to reconstruct the period through the Schwartzbard trial and falls prey to the flaws of his sources. Margolin, the jurist, limits his discussion to a personal account of the period in form of memoirs and succeeds in presenting a better total picture of the era than does Friedman's more ambitious undertaking.

Arnold Davydovych Margolin wrote his first major book *Ukraina і politika Antanty* in Russian in the summer of 1921, while his memory was still fresh. It was published by Efron in Berlin that year. The reviewed work is a translation that has been commissioned by his daughter, Lubow A. Margolena, some twenty years after her father's death. Publication has been aided by a grant from the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States. In 1905 Margolin wrote a 68-page legal monograph *Aperçu critique des traits fondamentaux du Nouveau Code Pénal Russe*; in 1925, in the United States, he published *The Jews of Eastern Europe*, and in 1946, *From a

* The reviewer would like to thank Professors Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak and Taras Hunczak, who read the article while it was in draft form and offered valuable suggestions. The responsibility for the final version is the reviewer's alone. — Y. B.
REVIEW ARTICLE

Political Diary, 1905-1945, the latter under the imprint of the Columbia University Press. In the preface to the 1921 book, the book under review, Margolin defined his position as follows:

The author of this book was close to the Ukrainian movement, beginning with the fall of 1917. He joined the Ukrainian Social-Federalists in June 1918. Indeed, for a long time before the Second Revolution, he had been in close and friendly contact with several Ukrainian social and political activists, many of whom were to have very important parts in the fate of Ukraine in later years. As one of the founders of the Jewish Territorial Organization in Russia (1906), the author regarded it his duty to combine his work, aimed at creation of a Jewish autonomous state, with participation in the Russian liberation movement and then, after the [desintegration of Imperial] Russia, in the building of the Ukrainian national state.

In the author's view this sort of combination, this synthesis of the national duty of a Jew to his own people and of his civic duty to the state in which he actually lives and has his civic rights is the essence of modern Jewry (p. vii).

Initially, before the Bolshevik Revolution, Margolin was opposed to the independence of the Ukraine; he advocated a federal transformation of the Russian Empire. His views changed, however: he came to see in independent national republics a bulwark against Bolshevism. The underlying concern of Margolin's book is to shed light on some painful aspects of Ukrainian-Jewish relations after World War I, but his memoirs go much farther and paint a fascinating portrait of the revolutionary upheaval and the preceding years.

The years before the Revolution were turbulent indeed. One of the most sensational episodes that is presented modestly, nay, almost offhandedly, is Margolin's experience during the pogrom in Kiev. Since 1904 Margolin had taken part in pogrom cases as well as in agrarian and political trials. This cost him dearly; during the Kiev pogrom his apartment was ransacked and demolished, though it was far from the systematically looted Jewish section. Writes Margolin:

It was proved afterwards that my name was included in the special proscription list of people to be killed and pillaged. That was the revenge of the local Black Hundred (Chernosotentsy) for my work in the Union of Equal Rights for Jews (Soyuz Polnopraviya Yevreyev) and in the Union of Unions (Soyuz Soyuzov). From a safe point I saw the burglars, led by a policeman, break into my flat (p. 3).
This was apparently in the fall of 1905 (the date is unfortunately not supplied).

Margolin suffered from the Tsarist authorities even more when, in August 1911, he was asked by Mendel Beilis's wife to assume the defense of her husband, who had been accused of the enigmatic, allegedly ritual murder of the Christian boy Andriusha Iushchinskii. Margolin was a member of a distinguished defense team (his exact position on the team is, alas, left unclear). He did not limit himself to the traditional role of the legal defense ("advocate") in the Russian Empire, but, rather, as a citizen and a Jew, he pursued a private pre-trial investigation, which led to a Russian woman, a Vera Cheberiak, as one of the prime suspects in the murder. Ostensibly for violating one of the conventions of his profession but more likely for helping to achieve Beilis's acquittal, Margolin was disbarred. He was reinstated as a lawyer after the February Revolution, when a high court found that Margolin's investigation of Iushchinskii's murder was fully legitimate and proper in his effort to "clean [his] people from the slander" (p. 16).

One of Margolin's book's greatest values lies in the insights it provides into the politics of the period. Living in Petrograd, Margolin joined the small All-Russian People's Socialist Party. In February 1918, he returned to Kiev, was elected by secret ballot to the Supreme Court of the democratic Ukrainian National Republic (UNR) on April 2, 1918, despite the fact that his knowledge of the Ukrainian language was then still imperfect, and, in June 1918, joined the centrist Ukrainian Socialist-Federalist Party and was coopted into its central committee. He explains his turn toward the Ukrainian national movement in 1918 by saying that it was the best defense against the progress of Bolshevism (p. 26).

In January 1919, soon after the overthrow of Hetman Skoropadsky and the establishment of the Directory, Margolin was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). He resigned that position March 11, 1919, largely out of protest against the pogroms of February and March of that year, in which some UNR soldiers were involved. But he did not abandon his active participation in the Ukrainian national movement altogether; rather, he became a member of the UNR diplomatic mission to the Paris Peace Conference and represented the Ukraine there. Upon resignation from that mission in July 1919 over baseless accusations from some Ukrainians that he continued to favor the
federalist approach, he took over the post of UNR Ambassador to London, at which position he stayed until the practical downfall of the Directory and the Ukrainian National Republic in December 1920.

Like many nationalist Ukrainians of middle class origins, Margolin held exaggerated expectations for aid from the powers of the Entente, France in particular (p. 61). He was soon to be disappointed; among other things, the French refused to protest, let alone to act, against the pogroms of early 1919 (p. 81). Meeting Clemenceau, Margolin detected a false note in his professed sympathies toward the Ukrainian cause: The "Tiger" was really attempting to build up a strong Greater Poland fortified by the annexation of Ukrainian Galicia (p. 97). The British would show a touching faith in the reactionary White General Denikin (p. 105. ff.). Most instructive, however, was Margolin's session with US Secretary of State Lansing on June 30, 1919:

That meeting . . . was a stunning experience for both of us. Lansing was totally ignorant of the situation. His faith in Kolchak and Denikin was blind. He stated categorically that the Ukrainian government must recognize Kolchak as supreme ruler and commander of all anti-Bolshevist armies. When it came to the Wilsonian principles, which were to be applied in settlement of nationalities of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, Lansing declared that he was aware of only one people of Russia and that a federation, like the United States, was the only way to reconstruct Russia. When I tried to argue that the existence of individual states, as entities, was the prerequisite of their federation, as in the United States, Lansing evaded the point and continued emphatically to call for the recognition of Kolchak.

That was indeed the time when American aid to Kolchak was at its peak. Be that as it may, no one had used such peremptory language with us, either the British or the French. And this was how the Wilsonian principles were actually implemented: Kolchak was supported by the United States, Denikin and Yudenich by England, Galler by France . . . Petliura was not supported by anyone ( pp. 116-17).

The underlying concern of Margolin's book was the strained Ukrainian-Jewish relations. In 1917 the Ukrainian Central Rada had granted far-reaching national autonomy to the Jewish minority in the Ukraine (unfortunately, there is practically nothing on this in Margolin's book; the interested reader is referred to Solomon I. Goldelman's *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine 1917-1920* [Chicago: Ukrainian Research and Information Institute, 1968]). But
in 1919 a series of pogroms broke out. For Margolin the pogroms did not point to the inevitability of Ukrainian-Jewish tension. On the contrary. Pondering the causes of that tension and conflict, Margolin writes early in his book, while commenting on the situation in 1918:

the overall fundamental impression remained as it was, namely: Jews and Ukrainians fighting each other.

The truth was in the split of Jewry into two camps, from the moment of proclamation of the independence of Ukraine. The assimilator Jews obviously had no sympathy and were in opposition to the very idea of Ukrainian independence as a discrete state. The nationally-aware Jewry, on the contrary, particularly Zionists and Territorialists, striving for creation of a Jewish national state, could only sympathize with similar strivings of the Ukrainian people. It was a dire misfortune that the assimilator Jews, a negligible minority of Jewry, were leaders of the Russian groupings. In this capacity they were making appearances at all times and everywhere, as centers of general attention. Leaders of Jewish political parties, on the contrary, operated almost exclusively in their narrowly circumscribed milieu, so that their stance on the Ukrainian problem remained unknown to the general public, or at best not entirely clear.

The common error with regard to the involvement of Jewry in Bolshevism, shared only too often, even by well-educated and thoughtful circles, was due to that particular self-confinement of the Jewish political parties. The entire literate world learned instantly about every appearance of Trotsky. But speeches by leaders of the Jewish national parties, at Jewish meetings and conferences, were rarely heard outside the pale of Jewry (p. 33).

The early proclamations of the Directory (apparently from November 1918), several of which Margolin himself saw posted in the villages, "appealed to the people for order, respect for human life and property. 'Jews are our brothers,' were the words" (p. 54).

What went wrong in early 1919 in Proskurov, Balta, and the other places of frightful pogroms that allegedly were committed by Ukrainian troops acting on orders of their officers? Chapters XXII-XXV in Margolin's book are devoted to that question. If those chapters are somewhat sketchy, that is due to the circumspection of an experienced trial attorney, one who had, moreover, specialized in pogrom cases and who did not have all the desired evidence at his disposal when writing the book.

In essence, Margolin shows that the Directory did not fight the
pogroms with all severity until some five months later, in the summer of 1919. Approximately one hundred Ukrainian soldiers were then executed for participation in anti-Jewish pogroms (p. 197, p. 201 n.). More soldiers were court-martialled and executed for pogrom activities in 1920 (p. 204 ff.). Margolin cautiously explains but by no means excuses the pogroms committed under the Directory. Bad elements had infiltrated the successful anti-Hetman insurrection in late 1918 (p. 199). Petliura did have Otaman Semesenko, whose troops were involved in the Proskurov pogrom, put under arrest, but the popular, frequently wounded otaman was not court-martialled and executed at that particular time for, according to Margolin, “Petliura himself could have been killed by fanatics under the circumstances, by Ukrainian chauvinists who exaggerated and perverted the participation of Jewish youth in Bolshevism as an attempt at Bolshevist insurrection ‘from within’ ” (p. 234). Later he repeats his assessment of Petliura in more general terms:

In my view neither Vynnychenko [a political rival of Petliura — Y. B.] nor Petliura appeared in the least like antisemites. Both were indiscreet in the period of January to March 1919, however, in their snap judgments with regard to Jewish Bolshevism. When the disintegration of the army began, Petliura lost his head and had no will to act resolutely and ruthlessly against the pogromshchiks. Had he acted in this manner, he could have been rejected by a large part of the already antisemitic army, could have been killed perhaps, like the fourteen heroes slain in protecting the city of Lubny from a pogrom. Petliura decided not to take that obvious risk, in his apparent belief in the preeminence of his national ideal. He was afraid to “embroil” himself with the army, which he deemed indispensable for defense from the Bolsheviks (p. 237).

Among the most memorable passages of the book is Margolin’s deeply felt warning against sweeping generalizations and his expression of willingness to defend Ukrainian government leaders in any pogrom trial. He writes:

one must be careful with sweeping generalizations.

Even as all Jews cannot be held responsible for the exploits of Jewish commissars or for the foul actions of Jews who worked in the Bolshevist Chekas, so can the Ukrainian nation disown its own pogromshchik scum. Let it be 200, 300 or 500 thousand pogromshchiks among the Ukrainian people, but the fact cannot be expanded to include the rest of some 30 million or more Ukrainians. Saying that “all Ukrainians are
"pogromshchiks" is the same as saying "all Jews are Bolsheviks" (p. 229).

* * *

In his latest book Karabchevsky tells about his advice to Kerensky to bring Nicholas II to trial in court, adding that he was willing and able to be attorney for the defense. Personally, I would refuse to defend Nicholas II, would decline to defend Denikin too, although I do not regard him as an organizer or an inspirer of pogroms. Nicholas Romanov and Denikin were the carriers of antisemitism, arrant reactionaries.

But I would never decline the defense of those who stood at the head of the Ukrainian movement (p. 241).

Margolin's memoirs constitute an honest and moving document of the times, though they cannot be considered a definitive historical analysis of the period. They fully deserve a wider audience, which this English translation provides. (The Russian original, published almost two generations ago, is held only by major research libraries.) This is not to say that the translator, Dr. V. P. Sokoloff, and the publisher, Dr. Lubow A. Margolena, have not made any minor slips. The smooth translation, admirable as it may be in general, is occasionally a bit too smooth, as when the Ukrainian party of Khliboroby is rendered the Comgrowers Party on pages 176 and 187: "agriculturalists" would have been a rougher but more accurate translation. Once the translator slips in a Russicism, for example, when he lets Gruzia (Georgia) stand on pages 154 and 184 and then into a Ukrainianism: the Radianskaia System on page 182, in the chapter heading (Radians'ka is the Ukrainian word for "Soviet"). The reviewer also noted unhappily that the 19th-century Russian dissident thinker Herzen had been transliterated Gertsen (p. 1), the Ukrainian historian Hrushevsky had become Grushevskij (pp. 32, 42), and the Polish general Haller, who had fought Galician Ukrainians with arms supplied by the French, had been turned into Galler (p. 97). The book regrettably does not include a general index, only an index of persons whose first names (or initials) have been omitted. The page references in the index are not always accurate: e. g., the American Jewish lawyer (Louis) Marshall is mentioned on page 90, not 89 as in the index.

But all these quibbles do not detract from the eloquence and wisdom of Margolin's message: if there is ever to be a free democratic federation after the downfall of the Russian Empire, the new
federation must grow from the bottom up, must reflect the freely expressed wishes of the non-Russian peoples. It must not be imposed from the top down. This conviction enabled a Jewish lawyer from Kiev to offer his authority and his skills to the emerging Ukrainian national movement. He remained faithful to it until his untimely death in 1956.

Dr. Saul S. Friedman has been identified by the publisher as Associate Professor of Near Eastern and Jewish History at Youngstown State University, Youngstown, Ohio, and as the author of another book entitled No Haven for the Oppressed: Official U. S. Policy toward European Jewish Refugees, 1938-1945 (Wayne State University Press, 1973). In 1978 Dr. Friedman published Incident at Massena: The Blood Libel in America (Stein & Day). In his research for the book under review — Pogromchik — Dr. Friedman was aided by the staff of YIVO Institute for Jewish Research in New York. Mr. Zosa Szajkowski, who had opened the Tcherikover archives to him in 1973, was particularly helpful.

The subject of the book is passionate one and the author has decided to present it in the most dramatic way possible. The result is that we have a very readable but not necessarily a very persuasive book. The title of the book in itself is emotive: Pogromchik is the somewhat simplified form of the Russian word pogromshchik. It refers to the assassinated Symon Petliura, who in the judgment of advocate Dr. Margolin was not an anti-Semite and did not bear any direct guilt for the pogroms.

To set the tone of the book and to disclose his approach, Friedman cites a paragraph from The New York Times of April 7, 1919, passing on the information on pogroms received by The Jewish Morning Journal and then goes back in history much farther than the frequently cited but not quite so frequently analyzed massacres of Jews under Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the mid-17th century (an early analysis is that by Jewish historian S. M. Dubnow, History of the Jews in Russia and Poland from the Earliest Times until the Present Day [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1916], Vol. I, pp. 139-53, esp. pp. 141-42 — Friedman is familiar with Dubnow to whom he refers on page 21, note 2, but does not reproduce Dubnow's analysis of the reasons for those pogroms; see also the more recent scholarly article by Bernard D. Weinryb, "The Hebrew Chronicles on Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack-Polish War," Harvard
Dr. Friedman goes back to the Middle Ages:

The history of the Ukraine has been blood-stained since 1096, when the first medieval charge of ritual murder was brought against Jews of the region by monks of the Pechera monastery. Subsequently, one of the oldest Ukrainian sources, the Ipatiev Chronicle, relates how in 1113 hundreds of Jews were killed in Kiev, a result of exuberance generated by the Crusades. In the time of Ivan the Terrible, many more "Judaizers," Jews and sympathizers who apparently threatened the true faith of Christianity, were ducked under the ice of the Lena, the Volga, and the Dnieper Rivers (pp. 1-2).

How many readers would stop to think that the Lena flows in Siberia, and the Volga in Central and South Russia, not in the Ukraine, and that Ivan the Terrible did not consider himself Ukrainian?

The anti-Jewish violence in the late 19th and the first decade of the 20th century was led by the infamous Russian Black Hundreds operating in the Ukraine, writes Dr. Friedman. He immediately hastens to add: "But Jews maintained that much of the trouble stemmed from an anti-Semitism which was endemic to the Ukraine, a pathological hatred which Jews claimed illiterate peasants 'suckled with their mother's milk' " (p. 3). This is a sweeping generalization indeed, Margolin would have said, and one that is obviously not subject to proof. The entire first chapter is designed to evoke in the readers a revulsion against Ukrainian nationalist pogromshchiks. The author, however, lumps together all pogroms that have ever been committed in the Ukraine by Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians alike, which an experienced lawyer addressing a discriminating jury would never have done.

Nonetheless, for all their limitations, some parts of the book are both interesting and informative because its subject matter (the trial of Petliura's assassin Sholom Schwartzbard before the Assize Court in Paris, October 18-26, 1927) forces the author to deal with evidence for the defense and for the prosecution, that is both favorable and unfavorable to Schwartzbard. One of the most intriguing aspects of the trial was whether Petliura had been in the immediate vicinity of Proskurov when that pogrom took place February 15, 1919 — "generally, Ukrainians and most Jews agreed" (p. 155) that he had been elsewhere.

Petliura's assassin, Schwartzbard, was a model citizen in France, but
the prosecution has brought out — and Dr. Friedman has acknowledged — that his past was somewhat colorful. Before 1905 (the author does not say when), young Schwartzbard had joined a Marxist group, which, according to the author, "called itself Funk [Yiddish for 'Spark,' linked in some way with Lenin's Russian journal of the same name, Iskra (— S. S. F.)]" (p. 55). Membership in such a group would have almost entitled Schwartzbard to call himself an Old Bolshevik. But, after dropping a tantalizing hint, the author does not follow it up.

Schwartzbard joined another Marxist circle, then a local Jewish defense force. He fled Russia and travelled through Austria Hungary. In Vienna he was arrested and sentenced to four months at hard labor for being a vagabond (p. 117). Austrian authorities charged him "with attempted burglary not once but twice" (p. 118). He made his way into Italy, then to France, joined the French Foreign Legion, fought bravely, was wounded and decorated. Shortly after the war some of his relatives perished in the pogrom in Balta (Southern Ukraine).

Meanwhile, in 1917 Schwartzbard had returned to Russia; in his own words, he wanted "to defend the Revolution" (p. 119). He was a leader of the so-called Group Rochelle, a unit affiliated with the Red Army "which fought from the Dniester to the Donets until the middle of 1920" (ibid.). Even the Jewish Telegraph Agency had written: "After the Bolshevik Revolution, he [Schwartzbard] went to Russia where he joined the Red Army . . ." (ibid.). At the trial, however, Schwartzbard vehemently denied having ever served in the Red Army.

The plot started thickening when the prosecution tried to link the assassin to the Soviet secret service. One of the more effective Ukrainian witnesses, the former UNR Foreign Minister Alexander Shulgin, asserted bluntly: "Schwartzbard has lied. He is not the avenger of the Jews but an agent of the Cheka. He was sent on the order of Moscow" (p. 191). The prosecution even produced a twenty-page letter from one Elie Dobkovsky, a Jew, who claimed to have been commissioned by the Soviet secret police to organize espionage and terror in Europe and more specifically to assassinate Petliura working through the "anarchist Schwartzbard, the maximalist Volodine, and . . . the . . . [turncoat] Norich" (p. 178).

For some obscure reason, Dobkovsky was never called to testify in person. Volodine, the mysterious fellow-traveller of the Bolshevik Revolution, was also not called as a witness. Volodine pretended to be a friend of the Ukrainian general Shapoval, and on the day of the
assassination he made several nearly frantic appearances at Shapoval's house. Despite all these facts, which Dr. Friedman mentions, he concludes that the "whole idea of the Soviet plot to eliminate leading anti-Bolsheviks was ludicrous" (p. 182).

This reviewer does not share the author's blithe certainty. There are simply too many loose ends in the materials of the trial and in the author's reconstruction. Paris appears to have been a favorite ground for Soviet agents, at least a few years later, in the 1930s. Early in 1930, General Koutiepov, the leader of the Tsarist veterans, was mysteriously kidnapped, and September 22, 1937, his successor, General Eugene Miller disappeared, too. Miller's right-hand man General Skoblin, who fled soon after the kidnapping, turned out to be a double agent, working for both the Soviet and the Nazi secret services — see the early account by W. G. Krivitsky, *I Was Stalin's Agent* (London: The Right Book Club, 1940), pp. 260-62. Petliura, let us recall, was assassinated in Paris in May 1926, by a high-strung individual with past Marxist, Anarchist, and outright Bolshevik connections. Besides Dobkovsky's statements there is some additional but inconclusive, hearsay evidence collected by Taras Hunczak in his article "A Reappraisal of Symon Petliura and Ukrainian-Jewish Relations, 1917-1921," *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 31, no. 3 (July 1969), p. 164, note 4. Allen W. Dulles, the former head of the CIA, wrote that "in Paris in 1926 the Soviet Security murdered General Petliura," in his "The Craft of Intelligence," *Encyclopedia Britannica: Book of the Year 1963*, p. 20 (when the article was expanded into a book, however, Dulles qualified his earlier statement as follows: "In Paris in 1926 General Petliura, the exiled leader of the Ukrainian nationalists, was murdered; some say it was by the [Soviet] security service, others claim it was personal vengeance" [*The Craft of Intelligence* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 87]). More interesting is the testimony by former KGB officer Peter S. Deriabin who claimed to "have heard it said in the Émigré Department of State Security that Petliura was assassinated by Soviet State Security" — see "Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 89th Congress, First Session," *Murder International, Inc.: Murder and Kidnapping as an Instrument of the Soviet Policy* (Washington, D. C., 1965), pp. 54, 60, 62, 64. The only safe conclusion that would appear from the evidence presented by Dr. Friedman is that the prosecution could not prove a Bolshevik conspiracy to the satisfaction of the French jury.
but that the likelihood of such cannot be dismissed.

The Schwartzbard trial had become a *cause célèbre*: the Ukrainian exiles rallied behind Petliura, predominant Jewish opinion behind his assassin. In Friedman's *bon mot*, Schwartzbard Defense Committees had sprung up “from Shanghai to Chicago” (p. 264). Shocked by the accounts of the pogroms, impressed by the parade of witnesses for the defense, and, above all, disdainful of the defeated *and weak* Ukrainians (no Jewish avenger tried to assassinate the White Russian General Denikin, who, according to Margolin, was, together with Nicholas II, the carrier of anti-Semitism, “an arrant reactionary”), the French jury acquitted Schwartzbard after deliberating for only twenty-five minutes.

The author entitles this dramatic chapter “The Verdict of Civilization.” He quotes with strong approval a telegram to that effect from the Jewish Congregation in, of all places, Moscow. The author does, however, admit that “in the United States, most observers did not see the Schwartzbard trial as a triumph of enlightened conscience” (p. 348); “The American Jewish Congress decided to withdraw an invitation which had been sent to [Schwartzbard’s defense attorney] Henri Torrès to speak at its convention” (p. 349). The “venerable” (Friedman’s word) *Jewish Chronicle* of London eloquently condemned Schwartzbard and his supporters in the Jewish community (pp. 350-51).

To quote from the summation by French Civil Prosecutor (Counsel for the Civil Parties) Willm: “So be it. Each race, each people chooses its national heroes” (p. 310). The author at least has chosen Sholom Schwartzbard, the self-proclaimed avenger of his race. This is an honest position; to each, his own. What troubles this reviewer, however, are not so much Dr. Friedman’s open declarations of sympathies and antipathies as a few selective lapses of memory in his presentation.

Not surprisingly, the author dismisses “a handful of Jews, including Israel Zangwill, Mark Vishnitzer, and Arnold Margolin” who dared to virtually exonerate Petliura, blaming the pogroms on the anarchy rampant in 1919 (p. 77). In a footnote, Margolin is attacked even further through a statement by the Jewish historian Tcherikover. Then, at least by implication, the writer Israel Zangwill, the historian and journalist Dr. Mark Vishnitzer, and Margolin himself are tarred and feathered by a certain Sjakowski [Zosa Szajkowski? — Y. B.] — with Dr. Friedman’s approval — as *Yiddishe meshorsim*, or Jewish
lackeys and servants (p. 91, note 26). To put it mildly, this is a somewhat idiosyncratic assessment of persons who do have a certain standing in Jewish history. That assessment, for instance, is not shared by the editors of the *Encyclopedia Judeica*, who in Vol. 11, cols. 960-61 give Dr. Margolin a relatively brief, yet factual and respectful coverage.

Even more idiosyncratically controversial is Friedman's futile attempt to expunge from memory Dr. Margolin's role in the Jewish community in the Ukraine before he joined the Ukrainian government. (The author has read Dr. Margolin's books, including the one reviewed above.) For instance, when the author introduces Dr. Heinrich B. Sliosberg, a de facto witness against Petliura, as "one of the most renowned jurists of Tsarist Russia," he does not fail to add: "He had been with the defense in several important anti-Jewish trials, including the Beiliss Ritual Murder case" (p. 265, emphasis added by reviewer). But though the author refers to Dr. Arnold D. Margolin at least a dozen times throughout the book, nowhere does he even hint that Margolin had established his reputation in Jewish circles as a defense attorney in pogrom cases, including the Beilis case (see on this, *Encyclopedia Judeica*, Vol. 11, col. 960). This reviewer would have thought that what is good for Dr. Sliosberg should also be good for Dr. Margolin, unless — possibly — the author had developed a case of selective amnesia.

The author, furthermore, cites the statement of Louis Marshall, of the American Jewish Committee, on November 19, 1926, in which he warned against making a national hero out of Schwartzbard and against attempts "to justify the murder which was committed as a private punishment for the alleged wrongs" (p. 314). It is well known that the American Jewish Committee remained cool towards Schwartzbard. It is also an open secret that some credit for Louis Marshall's and the Committee's stand belongs to Margolin, who had first met Marshall in 1919, in Paris (Margolin's book, p. 90).

Finally, after World War II a few Ukrainian-American scholars have written on Petliura and on Ukrainian-Jewish relations. One of the most noteworthy contributions is that by historian Taras Hunczak, in *Jewish Social Studies*, loc. cit., pp. 163-83. His article elicited a rather spirited rebuttal from Dr. Friedman's mentor and benefactor Zosa Szajkowski (same issue, pp. 184-213), which led to a reply by Dr. Hunczak (*Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. 32, no. 3 [July 1970], pp. 246-53)
and a counter-reply by Zosa Szajkowski (ibid., pp. 253-63). Altogether, that article, rebuttal, reply, and counter-reply took sixty-nine large-size printed pages. But nowhere in Dr. Friedman’s long book is there a single reference to this major, if somewhat angry, scholarly exchange. His silence is truly deafening!

Perhaps the time has come, fifty-sixty years after the events, for a group of Ukrainian and Jewish scholars to analyze the period dispassionately, sine ira et studio. Some questions are overdue and cry out for a definitive treatment. For instance, what was the scope of involvement and the degree of Petliura’s guilt in the pogroms of 1919, if any at all? Did or did not Sholom Schwartzbard act by himself? All the archives in the West must be opened for search by qualified scholars, which was not done in the 1960s. It would have to be a long and painstaking undertaking; a jury of historians would certainly take more than twenty-five minutes to reach their verdict. Possibly the time for such a dispassionate undertaking is not yet ripe; much of the evidence may still be locked up in Soviet archives.

Meanwhile, the two books under review stand as two challenges: one — Margolin’s memoirs — somewhat sketchy on facts but infused with the calm wisdom of an experienced jurist and diplomat; and the other — Friedman’s reconstruction of the Schwartzbard trial — seemingly full of facts, but victim of the same passions that vitiated the trial fifty-odd years ago. Who will take up the challenge and when?

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

Genuine détente between the United States and the Soviet Union will remain seriously flawed and limited as long as the Soviet rulers maintain an oppressive internal regime — this is the declared underlying thesis of this book (p. ix). The thesis is not fully investigated by asking, for instance, how often détente in modern history has broken down between authoritarian and democratic states compared to democratic states amongst themselves. Only the arguments of a number of Soviet dissenters are presented, along with a thorough description of the Soviet "democratic movement," a term which never gets defined in a non-circular way. The term seems to embrace a wide range of dissidents, from Leninist Medvedev to Tsarist Solzhenitsyn, as long as they are located in Moscow. Non-Russian dissenters (mainly Moroz and Dzyuba) are reviewed in six pages (pp. 112-17) quite sympathetically, but as representatives of "national" rather than "democratic" dissent. Partial overlap between the two categories is considered only in the case of Jews (p. 106), as if non-Russians were not to be expected to ponder democratic issues beyond national rights (which could also be satisfied by Romanian-style "national Stalinism"). In the case of a clearly non-parochial manifesto signed anonymously by "Estonian technical intelligentsia," Barghoorn suggests purely Russian authorship and uses "Estonian" in quotation marks (pp. 28-29). Yet non-Russian republics and languages at times offer a favorable terrain for democratic pursuits. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights apparently has not been published in the USSR in Russian (p. 96), it has been published in Estonian, as part of a 8,000-copy book by Uustal (1970) on the United Nations.

The section on "Problems and Proposed Solutions" presents an excellent 50-page summary and evaluation of the dissenters' widely diverse views on détente, focusing on Galanskov, Sakharov, Amalrik, Solzhenitsyn, and Medvedev. Roy Medvedev's analysis stands out among moralizing manifestos, because he alone has displayed "a keen awareness of the constraints, requiring concessions on both sides" (p. 73 ). In a crass Western way, he marshals practical arguments showing how détente is an important precondition for Soviet democratization, without pretending that one automatically brings the other. Not making democratization a precondition of détente does not mean, for Medvedev, that the West should exclude intelligent negotiation regarding details (p. 81). In contrast, Solzhenitsyn's and even Sakharov's pleas to the West to refuse détente-without-democratization have the lofty ring of official Soviet declarations of goals, with no means of implementation indicated apart from superior brute military force. Not surprisingly, these dissenters have been openly attacked, and their works are available only in restricted Party libraries, while Medvedev is given the "non-person" treatment (p. 81) — his ideas could affect Soviet establishment members.
BOOK REVIEWS

Barghoorn documents extensively why the "Kremlin regards suppression of dissent at home as a necessary concomitant of 'detente' abroad" (p. 119). Throughout the early 1970s, they seemed to succeed in quarantining Soviet society from penetration by unsettling "bourgeois" concepts of freedom while reaping many benefits from what they called a relaxation of tension (p. 152). In conclusion, Barghoorn urges more forthright U. S. official stand on Soviet human rights than was taken by the Ford administration. But he is well aware of constraints on government policy in the nuclear age. Therefore, he stresses even more the need to act on "society-to-society" level, e. g., through Amnesty International and through professional, ethnic, and religious associations (pp. 177-79).

The book's style conjures up the image of a dictaphone-to-typeset rush with minimal polishing. Quasi-archeological skills are sometimes needed to excavate the meaning from the resulting insertional layers, such as in the following:

Some key dissenters, whose overall perspective had been, one might say, pragmatic — though underlying their protest was a strong moral impulse — came (Sakharov is a case in point) to adopt an attitude of stoicism in the face of adversity (p. 18).

There is an index, and extensive references.

REIN TAAGEPERA


The events in Poland in the summer of 1980 make every good book on Eastern Europe more than welcome. Addressed primarily to non-academics — intelligent laymen and government officials — this is a vigorous plea to support the struggle for human rights in Eastern Europe, written by two English publicists and politicians. Tufton Beamish (since 1974, Lord Chelwood) was a Conservative M. P. for twenty-nine years. He is the author of three other books. One of them — Must Night Fall? (1950) — is a description of the methods used by the Soviet Government to establish its overlordship of Eastern Poland after World War II. During the war, Lord Chelwood, to quote from the book's dustjacket, "came to know and admire the Poles when his Regiment, the Fifth Fusiliers, fought besides them in North Africa and Italy." In 1979 that admiration remains undiminished. His co-author is Guy Hadley, a distinguished BBC Foreign Correspondent (1945-1958), member of the Conservative Research Department (1958-1968), and Assistant Director of the Institute for Study of International Organisation at the University of Sussex (1968-1971). He, too, has authored three other books, including a survey of the relations between the United States and Western Europe, Transatlantic Partnership and Problems (1974). Edward Crankshaw, the eminent British
diplomat and Sovietologist, has contributed an excellent foreword (pp. 7-9). The book includes a list of "main sources" on pages 256-57 — too brief, alas, to be really useful — and two appendixes that are very serviceable: extracts relating to Human Rights and Self-Determination from the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference (pp. 258-68) and the full text of the Czechoslovak "Charter 77" (pp. 269-73). The index (pp. 277-85) is good, and the endpaper maps on Central and East European boundaries in 1989 and 1979 are highly suggestive.

The academic reader whose greatest delight is burrowing into footnotes will be disappointed; there is not a single note in 254 pages of text. This is a great pity sometimes; not only is it impossible to trace some of Lenin's brutal sayings (e.g., that on page 14), but it is also very difficult to document some post-Leninist pearls, such as the diagnosis of Nadezhda Gaidar's "psychic disease" that was made by an obedient Soviet psychiatrist: "She is suffering from nervous exhaustion due to her search for justice" (pp. 224-25). A pedantic reviewer may also note occasional factual slips and errors of interpretation. For instance, on page 21 it is said: "Articles 18A and 19B [of the 1936 Soviet Constitution] also gave [the Union Republics] the right to establish direct relations, and conclude direct agreements with foreign states; and to organise their own military forces. All these rights are confirmed in the new Soviet Constitution . . . [of 1977]" [italics in original]. This is not quite so. In Article 80 the new Soviet Constitution dropped the attribute "direct" in allowing that foreign relations be conducted by Union Republics. It also completely eliminated the Republics' right to form their military formations. Furthermore, that latter right had been contained in Article 18B of the 1936 Constitution, not Article 19B. In their chapter on Poland, the authors take over the official pre-1944 Polish interpretation: Poland was again partitioned in September 1939; besides some three million Jews there had been — in the interwar period — "smaller" Ukrainian, German, and Belorussian minorities (pp. 42, 44). In reality, so-called "East Poland" was an ethnically mixed territory, in which according to — admittedly adjusted — Polish census figures of 1931 there lived about 4.7 million Ukrainians (see on this, Lew Shankowsky, "The Effects of the Soviet Nationality Policy in the light of the 1959 Census and Other Statistical Data," Prologue [New York], Vol. 5, no. 1 [Spring-Summer 1961], pp. 27-87 passim). In general, though the Polish chapter is very well written and even better titled ("Poles Apart"), it must be admitted that Jacques Rupnik's essay on "Dissent in Poland, 1968-78: the End of Revisionism and the Rebirth of the Civil Society," which is based on some of the same sources and has been included in the new book edited by Rudolf L. Tókés, Opposition in Eastern Europe (London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 60-112, is somewhat more informative, even on the interrelationship between the Helsinki Final Act and dissent, which is one of the sub-themes of the Beamish-Hadley book. (See especially p. 78 ff. in the Tókés volume.)

What, then, are the strong points of the book under review? Paradoxically, it may constitute a better introduction to the essence of the passionate dissent movements in Eastern Europe than a more scholarly, better documented, and hence, more qualified academic analysis. For most of the dissenters, with the
possible exception of the 1977 Chartists in Czechoslovakia, neither speak nor write in footnotes; they occupy shipyards and then issue sweeping demands (as the Polish workers did in the summer of 1980) or they burn down a Party building and tear up part of the main railroad line (as they did in 1976). When confronted with a very cool, dispassionate, and minutely intellectual analysis of East European and Soviet politics, readers who are more familiar with the American and British systems of government often miss the forest for all those trees. The book under review is a pleasure to read in that it is one of the exceedingly few works which dare to call a spade a spade and, in doing so, describe the whole forest.

The tone of the book is admirably set by Edward Crankshaw’s opening sentences in the foreword: “Most people by now have at least a working idea of the Soviet government attitude towards human rights. This might be described diplomatically as uncomprehendingly negative, but I find it simpler and truer to call it vile” (p. 7). In their introduction the authors write:

Our purpose in this book is to describe the struggle for human rights and self-determination in the Communist satellite states of Eastern Europe, rather than in the Soviet Union itself. In varying degrees, these formerly independent nations have historical and cultural links with Western Europe and at least an awareness of all that is meant by “political freedom,” even if only Czechoslovakia had been a fully fledged democracy. On the other hand, the Russian concept of human rights has been debased by a long tradition of autocratic rule. Moreover, some of the Communist satellite regimes have become more sensitive to the conflict between their national economic interests and those of the Soviet Union, and so less willing to toe the Soviet line than they were under Stalin and Khrushchev. Taken together, these elements constitute the Kremlin’s dilemma in having to strike a balance between harsh repression in the Soviet empire of Eastern Europe, or tolerating some gradual and limited reforms which might put Russian domination at risk (p. 11).

The contrast between the freedom-loving Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians on the one hand and the submissive “Russians” is a little overdrawn; later the authors admit that there is a “small number” of “isolated . . . Russian dissenters,” such as Dr. Valentin Turchin, Vladimir Bukovsky, and, of course, Academician Sakharov (p. 22 ff.), and they also see a parallel between the claims to self-determination of the East European satellite states and those “by national minorities such as the Ukrainians, Georgians, and Armenians” (p. 20). Throughout the book, however, the authors continue to differentiate between the problems of defending human rights in the Socialist states of Eastern Europe, which they regard as more tractable, and defending those in the Soviet Union itself, for which they do not care to offer an explicit remedy. It would seem to me that, in the long run, such a differentiated approach makes less and less sense, but this is a question of political and diplomatic judgment.

Readers of the Annals are particularly referred to the last chapter on “Morality and Reality,” which is a thoughtful and marvelously understated critique of British and American foreign policy in the area of human rights. According to the authors, massive violations of human rights contribute to
international instability and thus endanger peace in Eastern and Central Europe. They are justly critical of the large-scale technological and industrial-productive assistance to the Soviet Union and its East European allies or satellites that has been extended by the West without a quid pro quo in greater respect for human rights, especially the modest human rights promised in the Helsinki Final Act. They advocate economic sanctions. But, in doing so, they themselves may, perhaps, be excessively modest. They write:

We are not suggesting that Western trade with the Soviet bloc should be curtailed or used to put pressure on Communist governments to make major changes in their internal political systems to conform with Western democratic practice. That would be futile and even counter-productive. It would stand no chance of acceptance and might only draw the satellites closer to Moscow, whereas the main Western purpose should be to reduce that dependence.

We do feel, however, that the Soviet Union in particular, and the satellite regimes to a lesser extent, are sufficiently dependent on Western economic assistance for this to be used selectively as a means of inducing them to fulfill their pledges on human rights at Helsinki. Admittedly, such a policy calls for a co-ordination of Western attitudes which is not easily achieved, but it might be applied bilaterally and such action by the United States would certainly carry great weight. In return for the benefits they derive from Western trade and credits, the Communist countries might be asked to honour their commitments at Helsinki by removing controls on emigration, relaxing censorship, lifting restrictions on Western journalists, and ceasing to interfere with communications between Helsinki monitoring groups and the West by post and telephone (p.247).

Surely, without asking that the Communist rulers fire their secret police chiefs and possibly even abdicate themselves, the Western government ought — at the very least — insist that the supporters of Charter 77 be released from jail, and not simply that the Communist governments cease “to interfere with communications between Helsinki monitoring groups and the West by post and telephone.” The same applies, *a fortiori*, to Brezhnev’s jailing of the vast majority of the members of the Soviet Helsinki monitoring groups.

In summary, despite some weaknesses (its lack of detailed documentation, occasional errors of fact and judgment), this is a good, well-written book on an important subject. It calls on Western governments to go beyond individual and collective finger-shaking when faced with massive violations of internationally promised and guaranteed human rights. Shaking a finger may soothe one’s conscience — but not for long. Soon it is recognized for what it really is: a gesture of supreme, demoralizing futility.

Y. B.

Sidney Bloch, Lecturer in Psychiatry at Oxford University, and Peter Reddaway, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at London School of Economics, deserve special recognition for their book, *Psychiatric Terror*. This outstanding publication is the result of several years of painstaking investigation by the authors. It appeared shortly before the Congress of the World Psychiatric Association held in Honolulu in 1977 and had a significant impact on its outcome. This book provides systematic and incontestable evidence of the corruption of the medical profession in the USSR, induced by its totalitarian regime.

In the introduction of the book, Vladimir Bukovsky calls it “a kind of encyclopedia, and indispensable source for all those interested in the problem of psychiatric abuse.” Indeed, *Psychiatric Terror* not only contains ample documentation of the misuse of psychiatry for political purposes by the Soviet regime, but also provides specific data on 210 Soviet dissidents who, although not mentally ill, were ruled incompetent to stand trial by the courts and subsequently confined to either “ordinary” or “special” psychiatric hospitals. The book also contains a separate list of fifty-four persons who were placed in psychiatric hospitals, but the authors did not have sufficient information to determine with reasonable confidence the nature of their dissent. In the opinion of the authors, there were probably hundreds of other dissidents on whom no information was available. It might be of interest to the Ukrainian reader that, of the groups listed, the Ukrainian dissidents had the highest incidence of placement in the “special psychiatric hospitals” when compared with other national groups.

After admitting the vulnerability of psychiatry because of its “ill-defined boundaries,” the authors review the evolution of Soviet psychiatry, documenting its inferiority when compared to Western standards and stressing the fact that the positions of authority in the health field in the USSR are held by persons with primarily political rather than professional qualifications. While in the West in recent years there has been a dramatic decrease of psychiatric beds with a concomitant emphasis on outpatient treatment, in the Soviet Union there has been just the opposite tendency. The systematic use of psychiatric hospitals to quell dissent in the USSR started in the 1960s as a result of the rise of dissent. The authors describe the increasing opposition to the misuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union and abroad and the impact of the *Bukovsky Papers*. Although the Western psychiatrists failed to bring up the issue of psychiatric abuse at the Congress of the World Psychiatric Association held in Mexico City in 1971, the issue did not die but was brought into the limelight by both Soviet dissidents and psychiatric associations in the West.

An interesting part of the book is the description of differences between the laws dealing with the mentally ill in the Soviet Union and in the West. In the Soviet Union, the accused is virtually deprived of any rights, as is well illustrated with the case of Pyotr Grigorenko. In the West, the accused has
rights of adequate representation and appeal of decision. The book gives us a
description of dehumanizing conditions existing in psychiatric hospitals,
particularly in the "special" ones, illustrated extensively with the case of
Leonid Plyushch. There is interesting information on the rather small "core"
group of leading governmental psychiatrists, headed by Professor
Snezhnevsky, who are accommodating themselves to the needs of the
Communist Party, remaining immune to persecution for their psychiatric
abuses.

Based on data available, the authors feel that, at any given time, there are
some 350 dissidents in the special psychiatric hospitals and many more in the
ordinary ones. While categorizing the victims of psychiatric hospitalization
into various groups, the authors discuss the National Dissidents, involving
primarily Ukrainians and Lithuanians who resist the Russification process.
The underground Ukrainian Herald and several of the victims of psychiatric
terror in the Ukraine are mentioned. There is an interesting observation that
relatively few Jews and Germans are being placed in psychiatric hospitals,
apparently because of strong support abroad.

From the psychiatric view, one has to agree with the conclusion of the
authors that there was no basis for the diagnosis of schizophrenia in any of the
cases submitted by Bukovsky and Gluzman or on other dissidents where
information was available. It is a fact that persons affected with schizophrenia
display disorganization of thinking, blunting of emotions, detachment from
reality, often hallucinations and delusions, and a changed, often peculiar
behavior. The change in the patient's personality is noticed, of course, first by
his family, his friends, and his co-workers. His condition adversely affects his
relationship with people and his work performance. When we review the data
on dissidents available to us or have the opportunity to know them personally,
we find that their thinking is clear and logical, they relate very well to their
families and friends, there is no evidence of personality changes, and their
performance on the job is good, in some cases outstanding. As a rule, the
psychiatric reports on the dissidents are done in a very incompetent and
unprofessional way. They show no documentation of any schizophrenic
manifestations, and most of the questions asked by the psychiatrists relate to
the "patient's" dissident activities. There is not only no justification of the
psychiatric diagnoses, but there is no basis whatsoever for the involuntary
hospitalizations, since none of the patients have displayed any dangerous
tendencies towards themselves or others. They were considered by the courts to
be a "danger to society" because they dared to criticize certain activities of the
government or because they openly manifested their religious beliefs.

The psychiatric "treatment" in the mental hospitals, especially in the
"special" ones, cannot be compared even to the worst conditions in the "snake
pits" or "bedlams" which existed in the West in past centuries. The Soviet
physicians, who took the Hippocratic Oath, swearing to hold the patients' benefit in their hearts, are resorting to torturing them with painful injections
and overdoses of psychotropic drugs which create agonizing side effects. This
is being done without the benefit of medication, which could easily eliminate
such side effects. The obvious purpose of such "treatment" is to break and
It is interesting to learn how the psychiatrists in such hospitals deal with the families of the confined dissidents. While in the West frequent visits by relatives are encouraged in order to speed up the patients' recovery, in the USSR the families are harassed, discouraged from coming, and even encouraged to abandon their hospitalized spouses and relatives. We find that, after release from the hospital, "patients," instead of getting support from professionals and authorities to prevent recurrence of the illness, continue to be intimidated, harassed, and deprived of their means of livelihood.

There is another point in which the Ukrainian reader would be interested. Contrary to many publications dealing with the Soviet Union which have appeared in the West, the authors of the book clearly differentiate Ukrainians and other nationalities from Russians and display a full understanding of the issues involved.

_Psychiatric Terror_ is a must, not only for the psychiatrists and members of related professions, but also for any person concerned with the preservation of personal freedom and human dignity.

Oleh M. Wolansky, M. D.


The two works by one of the internationally best known Soviet dissenters, General Piotr G. Grigorenko — the former professor at the famous Frunze Academy, the Soviet West Point — were published in mid-'70s shortly before his visit to the USA and the subsequent revocation of his Soviet citizenship, which in practice was tantamount to a permanent banishment from his homeland.

Even though General Grigorenko made a number of new statements and declarations in his numerous public appearances in the USA and had additional articles published here and in other western countries following his forced emigration in late 1977, the earlier writings contained in these two works are still an important source for the study of Soviet dissent of the 1960s and '70s in general and P. G. Grigorenko's part in it in particular.

The articles, memoranda, letters, and personal reminiscences which make up the two volumes are not simply autobiographical notes and sketches, even though the General's personal experiences and recollections are a very basic
element in these writings. Thus, in his lengthy review of A. M. Nekrich’s book 22 June 1941, Grigorenko impresses us with his sophisticated professional knowledge of modern history and military strategy and mercilessly exposes the Soviet concealment of their debacle in the first stages of Hitler’s invasion of the country. Similarly, his discussion of Soviet courts, the power of the KGB, or the use of special psychiatric hospitals as penal institutions also provides us with invaluable insights into the Soviet system, the analysis of which in his writings goes much deeper than his personal involvement with these institutions.

It should be noted here that Grigorenko tries to paint in these essays a broad picture of cynicism, lawlessness, cowardice, and callous unprofessionalism among the Soviet psychiatrists, law enforcement officers, and judges who dealt with him at various times by supplementing his personal experiences with those of other victims of Soviet repression. In doing this, Grigorenko supplies us with many interesting details and penetrating insights, and he does this in a most courageous and responsible way, citing exact dates, names, and specific statements and explaining the behavior of various Soviet officials — happy to give credit for even limited humaneness and fairness to those who displayed it but compelled to indict those who became obedient and soulless tools of the Soviet machinery of lawlessness and repression.

On the basis of his background, training, and experience, Piotr G. Grigorenko may be viewed as the “Soviet man.” In spite of this, he acknowledges his Ukrainian ethnic background, and recently he has gone even further by publicly upholding the “Ukrainian people’s right to a separate and independent national statehood.” True, originally, when he was a rising Red Army officer, this “Soviet man” took the theoretical principles of Marxism-Leninism quite seriously, upheld the Socialist legality, and believed in the Bolshevik morality, even though he must have been quite aware what was really going on in the country under Stalin. But those were the days when one could pay with one’s life for some silly or careless remark, not to mention for any overt criticism of the regime.

Unlike so many Soviet Party apparatchiks, army officers, or state officials of the later period, however, who, without blinking an eye, under the guise of “proletarian internationalism” would unabashedly promote Great Russian chauvinism in order to ingratiate themselves with the new Soviet leadership headed by Khrushchev (the non-Russians were expected to do this, too), Piotr Grigorenko proved himself to be a genuine internationalist truly and deeply concerned about human rights and human dignity everywhere. As such, he had no difficulty in reconciling the love for his native Ukraine with his concern for the fate of the Crimean Tatars and his closeness to the Russian language, culture, and the Russian people, among whom he spent most of his adult life.

This broad position in defense of human rights, taken by Grigorenko earlier and retained until the present, did not prevent him, once he was forced by the Soviet authorities to remain permanently in exile, from expressing more clearly and forcefully his support of the Ukrainian struggle for national self-assertion and independence, but he did not view this position as being in any
conflict with his decision to join the editorial board of the well known Russian journal Kontinent.

It should not surprise anyone that such a "delicate stance," which the General himself never regarded as being inconsistent, produced criticism among certain segments of both Ukrainian and Russian political circles abroad. What it does, however, is to underscore again Grigorenko's strength and independence, his being above all a man of principle. These two earlier works of Grigorenko, even though they are somewhat dated now, are a faithful mirror of the soul of a giant of a man whose truthfulness, honesty, and intellectual integrity will have to be acknowledged sooner or later even by those who may not agree with his views at this point.

OLEH S. FEDYSHYN


The first reaction that reading this book elicits is to question the propriety of the volume's subtitle. Whatever it is, this book is not a study in revolution. More accurately, it contains fourteen studies which are connected with each other by consecutive chapter numberings but, on the whole, lack chronological or thematic unity. Admittedly, these studies are very valuable and interesting in most cases. Their authors are recognized scholars, many of whom have published on this period of Ukrainian history elsewhere, and, even when they summarize or "autoplagiarize" their more detailed monographs, they do so elegantly and gracefully. The reader can pick his or her favorites and will certainly not be disappointed by the results. Anybody who has or, to be more precise, had, some ten or twelve years ago when this book was first conceived, a valid claim to be considered an expert on 1917-1921 is here. Thus, in order of appearance, we first find Wolodymyr Stojko writing on "Ukrainian National Aspirations and the Russian Provisional Government," Ihor Kamenetsky on Hrushevsky and the Central Rada, Taras Hunczak on the Hetmanate, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak on the Directory, and Yaroslav Bilinsky on the Communist take-over of Ukraine. (Incidentally, this volume, like the other publications of the Harvard Institute, places "the" before Ukraine. In this reader's view, this is no more justified than would be to write "the Spain.") These authors are followed by Jurij Borys on the political parties in Ukraine and John S. Reshetar on the Communist Party and its role in the Ukrainian revolution. Ivan L. Rudnytsky writes on the Fourth Universal and its ideological antecedents, and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw on the Church during the Ukrainian revolution. The topic of religion is followed by Arthur E. Adams's chapter titled "The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie," and Frank Sysyn's discussion of Nestor Makhno. The volume concludes with three chapters on external aspects of the Ukrainian revolution:
Oleh Fedysyn's "The Germans and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, 1914-1917," George A. Brinkley's "Allied Policy and French Intervention in Ukraine, 1917-1920," and, finally, Constantine Warvariv's "America and the Ukrainian National Cause." Some essays, as is indicated by their very titles, duplicate each other (Bilinsky, Reshetar, Borys); some unexplainably appear toward the end of the book when logically and chronologically they should have opened it: surely it makes little sense to have the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in such a location. One might argue, on the contrary, that the Ukrainian revolution began in 1914, precisely as the Union publicly declared its existence and program.

But then, what do we mean when we speak about the Ukrainian revolution? Many years ago Ivan L. Rudnytsky argued that it is necessary to consider the Polish-Ukrainian struggle or more broadly, the Western-Ukrainian dimension of the events of World War I and its aftermath, if one is to avoid treating the Ukrainian Revolution as a part of the Russian revolution and civil war. (See his "Reply," in Treadgold, ed., The Development of the USSR, Seattle and London, 1964, p. 272.) It is evident, however, that the volume under review does exactly what Rudnytsky thinks should not be done. It does not matter that the Editor, in his preface, mentions the need to publish a second volume devoted to West Ukraine; what does matter is that the revolution examined here is expressly a local version, an offshoot of the events in St. Petersburg that preceded it: the book opens with a discussion of the Russian Provisional Government's relations with the Ukrainians.

In resolving the definitional and conceptual problems connected with the Ukrainian events, it might help to place the Ukrainian phenomenon in some broader framework. First of all, the Ukrainian revolution was unlike the Russian revolution (that of March and that of November 1917) in that it did not seek to replace the government of an already existing independent state. The Ukrainian revolution was a national or nationalist revolution whose goal was to win independence for a nation lacking it. Accordingly, the Ukrainians should be seen along with the Poles, the Czechs, and the Slovaks, to name three of Ukraine's neighbors who also experienced their national revolutions about the same time. There were, of course, many other national revolutions in Europe during and after the Great War; their outcome was the emergence of the independent states of Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia, the unification of Romania, and so on.

Just as the Poles, the Czechs, and the Slovaks associate the beginning of their respective national revolutions with the work of Piłsudski and his Legion in 1914 (as well as with the action led by Dmowski on the other side of the barricade) in the Polish case, and that of Masaryk and Kramář — also in 1914-1915 — in the Czech case, so the Ukrainians may view 1914 as the terminus a quo of their revolution. Two parallel actions are relevant here: the already mentioned Union for the Liberation, and the actions of the Galician leadership, including the formation of the Sich Riflemen. When one remembers that the Russian army occupied Galicia in 1914, that thousands of west Ukrainians were moved east thereafter and accordingly were there in March 1917, that the Sich Riflemen entered the ex-Russian territory in 1916,
etc., — it becomes quite obvious that the Ukrainian revolution embraced both parts of Ukraine, albeit in different ways.

It has been noticed that social or socialist revolutions broke out at the end of the First World War in those countries that lost: Russia in 1917, Germany, Austria, and Hungary in 1918. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict — ideologically disguised as one of socialism versus nationalism — was not unprecedented. Just as the Russians were trying to conquer the newly emancipated Ukraine by arguing that they were bringing to Ukraine a socialist, proletarian revolution, a regime of the workers and peasants, so the Hungarian Communists were trying in 1919 to do the same in Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine. Had Communist Hungary managed to survive within the historic limits of the Crown of St. Stephen (it did want to do just that), we would have had an Autonomous Soviet Republic of Slovakia within the Hungarian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. We may well imagine that a Communist Germany would have appealed to the Polish peasants of Poznan and the miners of Silesia to fight against the reactionary, bourgeois-nationalist regime in Warsaw, and so on. These things did not come to pass, however. It is clear that the Slovaks did not free themselves from Hungarian tutelage through their own efforts; Hungary was forced to yield by the victorious Allies. Nor did the Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians, to mention another case, owe their success exclusively or primarily to their own efforts. International politics played a major role in the formation of the political map of Europe after the war and revolution. It did so also in the Ukrainian case. The volume under review does contain chapters on those matters, to be precise, on discrete aspects of Ukraine's foreign policies and international situation. What is badly needed is a work of synthesis. Such a work would cover all aspects of Ukraine's foreign relations and would draw upon the important work done in recent years by Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian scholars alike. (Among the latter, let us mention the book by Krzysztof Lewandowski on the Ukrainian question in Czechoslovak foreign policy, 1918-1932, and the studies on Eastern Galicia as an international problem by Zofia Zaks.)

Ukraine's international affairs have traditionally been written about by eager patriots determined to prove that the Ukrainian state had attained wide international recognition. Even in this volume we find references to the alleged diplomatic recognition of the Ukrainian state by France and Britain. Instead of splitting hairs on whether this or that power recognized Ukraine de facto or de jure or in some other manner, it would be more fruitful to investigate in depth such questions as the attitude toward the Ukrainian question of diverse business groups in the West, political parties, ideological currents, the Catholic Church, even that of the Freemasonry. (See on this last topic the article by Ludwik Hass in Dzieje Najnowsze, No. 1, 1980. Hass discusses the relations between the Ukrainian Freemasons and those of France in 1917-19, with special attention to the problem of the Vatican's involvement in the Ukrainian problem.) Not the least among those non-traditional aspects of diplomatic history should be the study of the Ukrainian diaspora's impact on the fate of Ukraine. Why did the immigrants to the U. S. from Galicia prove so ineffectual in helping their country, while those from Transcarpathia were able to make of their own narrower homeland an international issue? Is it not
ironic that the supposedly most backward part of Ukraine was the only one to win an international recognition of its autonomous status in the peace treaties?

Clearly, the revolution of 1917-1921 requires a comprehensive and comparative treatment if historical research is to yield new insights. But this requirement of comprehensiveness and comparative method applies also to the pre-1917 period as the background of the revolutionary era. Here, too, the Ukrainian movement can be understood better in comparison with others.

The Czech historian Miroslav Hroch has suggested that the national movements of the so-called "small nations" (he means not so much those nations that are small in size as those lacking their own traditional ruling classes) pass through three phases: phase A, when the nation is a subject of scholarly, academic concern; phase B, when national agitation reaches the masses but is limited to cultural and educational matters; and phase C, one of political struggle for emancipation, autonomy or independence. According to Hroch, the Czechs had passed from phase A in the 1820s and moved on to phase C in 1848. (Hroch's scheme was presented in English in Czech National Renascence in the Nineteenth Century, ed. by Peter Brock and Gordon Skilling, Toronto, 1970.) Taking a cue from Hroch, we might say that the Ukrainian national movement under Russia was forcibly prevented from developing in to phase B (the Ems ukase of 1876). Consequently, when war came in 1914, the Ukrainians had had behind them less than ten years of more or less (rather less) normal development in such matters as the press, popular culture, education, and so on. In fact, there was no Ukrainian-language school in the entire Russian Empire in 1914, nor was Ukrainian taught as a subject in Russian schools. These facts are generally known, but somehow they are ignored when one discusses the level of the national consciousness of the masses in 1917 or the forms of their political mobilization. There is a tradition in Ukrainian historiography and politics of debating the question of whose fault it was that Ukraine did not retain independence: the leaders or the masses, especially the peasants. This question is clearly on the minds of some contributors to this book, too. In fact, it appears that the Ukrainian peasantry was more nationally conscious than some of its critics would concede; the fatal weakness of the Ukrainian camp lay in the cities, which were anti-Ukrainian. In this regard, in 1917 the Ukrainians were weaker in Kiev than the Czechs had been in Prague in 1848. Much more work needs to be done on the question of popular base and popular support of Ukrainian nationalism in 1917-1921. One might mention the book of Mikhail Frenkin on the Russian army in 1917-1918 (see the review by Israel' Kleiner in Suchasnist', July-August 1979) and Steven L. Guthier's study of the 1917 election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly (Slavic Review, March 1979) as two examples suggesting that the Ukrainians were not as underdeveloped as is often thought. Speaking more generally, scholars researching the Ukrainian revolution might take into account the more recent work done in the West on the Russian revolution, for example the studies of Alexander Rabinowitch, John Keep, or William Rosenberg, and also that on the revolutions in the West. In the latter case, the most obvious reference would be to the influential work of Charles Tilly and his associates and students. The Ukrainian revolution, too, should be studied
in new ways, with new questions, new methods, and new sources. We know what decrees the Central Rada and its successors issued, but we know very little about what happened outside Kiev. (Indeed, the city of Kiev itself was controlled by anti-Ukrainian political forces precisely when the Rada was issuing its universality.) The stamps Ukraine printed are very nice, but it would be good to know whether many people placed them on the envelope when they mailed their letters. More seriously, the problem of the political, economic, and cultural diversity of the Ukrainian territory, which quite clearly was broken up into several major zones, calls for further study. A beginning has been made in the area of party history (the Bolsheviks were split into "Kievans," "Katerynoslavans," etc.), but more needs to be done. Among the sources that so far have been either ignored or underutilized one might mention local newspapers and various newsheets, handbills, and posters, as well as the local electoral returns (particularly for the workers Soviets, city dumas) and from the elections to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. One also wonders how much valuable material there is to be found in the Yiddish-language press of the time. One could go on . . . .

In conclusion, this book is of a genuine value as a collection of discrete monographic studies. Let us hope that it will have many readers and that it will serve as a point of departure for a new series of investigations. There is no doubt that the Ukrainian revolution remains a central theme in modern Ukrainian history.

ROMAN SZPORLUK


This volume was published in September 1976 under the editorship of M. K. Ivasiuta and five other prominent Soviet specialists on West Ukraine. The collection is divided into three sections. The first concerns the measures of the Communist Party and Soviet government regarding kolkhoz [collective farm] construction in the western oblasts of Ukraine and consists of official decisions and decrees. Chapter Two covers the first "socialist transformation" in the villages and the commencement of collective farm building in the prewar 1939-1941 period. The third and largest section concerns the collectivization of agriculture and its completion from 1944 to 1950.

The history contains much previously unpublished material, mainly taken from Ukrainian Party archives and those of the various Communist Party committees. This primary source material is supplemented by topical extracts from local newspapers. These latter are somewhat less valuable than the documents, as much of their contents can be found in other publications, such as Pravda Ukrainy and Izvestiia.

The collection is a great disappointment in terms of the enhancement of
historical knowledge concerning the problems of collectivization in this region. Although historians and economists of the Ukraine may welcome its publication, it cannot be said to represent any major change in the Soviet interpretation of events. Numerous significant events are omitted, and, at times, it is blatantly misleading in its portrayal of collective farm construction and party work in West Ukraine.

This becomes evident from the introduction in which Ivasiuta distorts the historical background. For example, he describes the Communist Party of West Ukraine (KPZU) as an organisation which "untiringly spread Marxist-Leninist study amongst the masses," yet totally omits to mention Stalin's persecution of the KPZU throughout the thirties and his dissolution of it in July 1938. Further, the strong resistance movement led by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is said to have been created by German fascists, an historical fabrication utilized with monotonous frequency by Soviet historians to negate the extent and nature of anti-Soviet feeling in West Ukraine.

Similarly, the introduction makes the claim that Spring 1948 saw a mass movement of West Ukrainian peasants to collective farms. Yet the collection itself provides not the slightest evidence of this. The only figures given relate to January 1, 1949, when, according to official figures, 53.6% of peasant households had joined kolhosp. In fact, in the summer of 1948, other Soviet sources give only 5.4% of households as being collectivized in the former Galician and Volhynian regions. Moreover, although the documents contain a plethora of figures, no overall chronological picture of the progress of collectivization is given for the whole of West Ukraine. By concentrating on a few very specific areas, the Soviets manage to blur the general picture.

In the collection, certain oblasts are neglected. Only one document relates specifically to Izmail oblast, although this area was neither ethnically Ukrainian nor an integral part of West Ukraine. Less excusable is the paucity of materials relating to Drohobych oblast, where collectivization is known to have been difficult. It would have been helpful to have more information about the outlying territories of Chernivtsi and Zakarpats'ka provinces. Of the 299 documents and materials, a total of 74 relate to the Lviv region, the area most fully covered in historical works relating to collectivization in West Ukraine.

The proceedings of party conferences, oblast councils of kolhosp chairmen, and oblast and raion committees are covered in great detail and provide welcome relief from the more pedantic decrees. However, these frequently concern relatively unimportant regions. For example, Document 245 (p. 410) gives an extremely long and involved report of the secretary of Korets'ky raikom, Rivne oblast, to the raion electoral-report meetings about the "completion of collectivization." Thus, the historian using the collection as his research basis is likely to be overwhelmed by minor details which make it difficult to obtain a lucid general view of the process in West Ukraine.

This attention to insignificant information has enabled the editors to omit the rigorous party measures imposed to accelerate the very slow rate of collectivization in West Ukraine in 1948-1949 and to combat UPA resistance.
The oblast party conferences of January 1949, which resulted in the dismissal of the first secretaries of Rivne, Lviv and Stanislaviv oblasts, are left out. There is no mention either of the crucial visit of Khrushchev and the Ukrainian Politburo to selected raions of Stanislaviv oblast in the period November 1949 to January 1950 and, in fact, no materials relating to problems in this oblast after July 1949 until the decision concerning the course of collectivization of April 1, 1950 (Document 251, p. 425).

In essence, the collection represents the official Soviet history of collectivization in West Ukraine. Soviet aid for the restoration of areas damaged by the Germans is referred to in thirteen documents, and what is termed the “class struggle of 1944-1945” is referred to in numerous decisions. The establishment of the zemel’na hromada [“agricultural association”], which was the forerunner of the collective farm, is comprehensively covered in Document 19, and regional examples are given in Documents 147 and 156. The bulk of the third section is concerned with the formation of collective farms and the results of the agricultural years as discussed by the oblast party committees. Other points mentioned are the formation of party cadres, the excursions of November 1948 to farms in East Ukraine, and the consolidation of newly-formed kolhosp. The collection ends with a succession of reports about the successes of the 1950 agricultural year from January and February 1951.

The non-Soviet historian will search in vain for some semblance of the real situation in West Ukrainian agriculture in the 1940s. Reports excluded are those on the drought of 1946, which saw a great influx of starving peasants from the collectivized East Ukraine, the purge of party officials in 1947, the installation of MVD garrisons in every village, deportations of peasants (particularly in the winter of 1948), and UPA attacks on specific collective and state farms, Machine-Tractor Stations, and village soviets. Nevertheless, for the researcher, the history provides a useful supplement to other works on West Ukraine, such as the UPA journal Do Zbroï, which documents the precise location of anti-Soviet forces. By comparison with this and other émigré sources, it is possible to understand why it took seven years to collectivize this region.

David R. Marples


This volume, edited by Professor Kamenetsky, is a collection of fourteen articles penned by Soviet specialists. The work is timely and represents the first Series in Issue Studies (USSR and East Europe) sponsored by the Association for the Study of the Nationalities (USSR and East Europe). Kamenetsky states that “the main purpose of this symposium is to trace the correlation between
the objectives of Marxism-Leninism and the condition of national and human rights in the multi-national state of the USSR" (p. 17). Furthermore, the editor hopes this volume can help increase awareness of the need to secure human rights in this part of the world.

The basic division of the book can be seen as three-fold. Section I includes articles (by Ihor Kamenetsky and Jurij Borys) which deal with modernization and nationalism from a historical and theoretical-philosophical perspective. The selections in Section II are either broadly concerned with Soviet dissent (Peter Vanneman, Oleh Fedysyn) or the Russian dissidents (Yaroslav Bilinsky) since the death of Stalin. The papers in Sections III-V treat modernization, nationalism, and/or human rights relative to a particular nationality, group of nationalities, or “minority group” — coverage includes the Balts (Thomas Remeikis), Belorussians (Stephan Horak), Ukrainians (Vasyl Markus, Yaroslav Bilinsky), Central Asian Muslims (Michael Rywkin), Khakassians (Rein Taagepera and Ralph Michelsen), Jews (Zvi Gitelman), and Crimean Tatars (Peter Potichnyj). While much could be said about each contribution, space limitations permit no more than a brief review of several.

Fedysyn offers an excellent discussion and analysis of the impact of “Khrushchevian liberalization” on the emergence of the Soviet dissident movement. The author correctly highlights the historic reform-repression cycle which has characterized Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. While building a case underscoring the importance of Khrushchev’s liberalization, Fedysyn is careful to qualify his argument and cites individual cases of dissident persecution (General Grigorenko). While Khrushchev certainly stands tall as a reformer, Fedysyn may be stretching terminology when he calls Khrushchev “one of the important dissenters of the post-Stalin period” (p. 70). Khrushchev’s place in the ruling Soviet establishment would seem to make his designation as a “dissenter” questionable.

The clear definition of concepts can be a painstaking and problematic task, yet it is one which is indispensable. Bilinsky does well to involve the reader in the definitional problem in his article entitled “Russian Dissenters and the Nationality Question.” He notes possible alternative designations — “Russian,” “All-Union,” or “All-Russian” dissentsers — for his sample of dissidents and admirably confesses that no designation is wholly satisfactory. Settling on the designation “Russian dissenters,” Bilinsky finds their views on the nationality question range from those “quite satisfied with the current Russian hegemony” to “those who call for real self-determination of the non-Russian nations” (p. 86). Vanneman, on the other hand, fails to spell out clearly what and whom he includes when he writes about the “Civil Liberties Movement” (p. 56) and “Russian Civil Liberties Movement” (p. 57), and this detracts from an otherwise good discussion.

Remeikis’s article is an impressive comparative and analytical treatment of the impact of modernization on the national identity of the Balts. The author concludes that the impact of modernization “is not even and is by no means unidirectional” (p.134). In his paper, Horak ably fills a lacuna in the scholarship on Belorussian modernization, nationalism, and dissent and displays a fine handling of socio-historical analysis. He offers a good
discussion on source materials and takes pains to caution the reader about data 
estimates, incompleteness, and interpretation.

Among the most interesting and stimulating articles, and sure to be 
controversial, is the Taagepera and Michelsen paper comparing Soviet and 
American minority practices through the Khakassian and Navajo cases. The 
authors argue that each minority would face advantages and disadvantages if it 
were under the other system to the extent that "a choice between the two 
systems would be hard" (p. 213). The authors judge "the Soviets to have a 
comparatively good record in preserving the secular aspects of native cultures 
and in supplying primary education in the native language" (p. 212). This 
assessment gives undue weight to the korenizatsiia concession stage and 
minimizes the underlying and primary objective of Soviet nationality policy — 
winning over local support on the road to Russian domination and 
Russification. Taagepera and Michelsen unfavorably compare "likely" 
Khakassian membership in the USSR Supreme Soviet, which they feel is 
symbolically important though "passive," with the absence of Navajo from 
"even among the back-benchers in the US Congress" (p. 211). The real power, 
accountability, and symbolic weight of membership in the US Congress 
sufficiently exceeds that of membership in the USSR Supreme Soviet to strain 
the comparison. In some ways a comparison using the Central Committee of 
the CPSU and the US Congress might have been more appropriate and 
revealing. Finally, the authors fail to explain the reasons for the relative 
change in populations wherein the Khakassians "more numerous than the 
Navajo until 1940, . . . are only half as numerous" (p. 209) today and integrate 
that potentially significant fact into their systemic comparison and evaluation.

Potichnyj presents a sound analysis of the Crimean Tatar "problem" 
employing a historical perspective. In hopes of returning to their homeland, 
the Crimean Tatars, writes Potichnyj, have "gone further than all other non-
Russian groups in giving mass expression to their national demands" (p. 238). 
Further, he rightly points out that the solidarity of Ukrainian and other 
dissidents, particularly non-Russian, to the Crimean Tatar cause "raises 
implicitly the prospect of common opposition to the regime" (p. 239).

It is unfortunate that the Lewytskyj article is not translated from German. 
While a publication or other deadline may have been pressing, an English 
translation of the article (or at a bare minimum an English synopsis) is in order 
fully to justify its inclusion.

The numerous strengths and important contributions of the volume far 
outweigh its few and minor shortcomings. This book is a stimulating, solid, 
and valuable work and one which is indispensable reading for Soviet 
specialists and those interested in Soviet affairs.

JAROSŁAW Bilocerkowycz
As interest in the Soviet nationalities question has grown during the late 1960s and the 1970s, so also has the volume of pertinent publications. The present Katz volume, prepared initially under contract with the United States Information Agency, is in some respects reminiscent in its "handbook" approach of the earlier American governmental sponsored area handbooks of the 1960s. The particular format seems to impose certain structural constraints on such works, making them much more descriptive than analytic. The reviewed volume also, interestingly, falls temporally between two somewhat different encompassing endeavors, which are, however, more analytic: George Schöpflin, editor, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A Handbook (New York: Praeger, 1970); and George Simmonds, editor, Nationalism in the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Era of Brezhnev and Kosygin (Detroit: University of Detroit Press, 1977). In any case, it is important to note at the outset that Katz and his collaborators have produced a valuable reference work for those interested in the study of the Soviet Union.

Perhaps the most noticeable shortcoming of the whole volume is the lack of a strong introductory essay. We are, of course, long past the time when edited works in the social sciences contained brilliant introductory pieces which provided both an integration of the individual chapters and were simultaneously critical, analytic surveys of a specific sub-area of a discipline. Nostalgia aside, consider here in contrast the 5-page piece in the Katz volume by the distinguished senior Russian/Soviet scholar, Richard Pipes, "Introduction: the Nationality Problem," and John A. Armstrong's 47-page "The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship," the first substantive chapter in Erich Golhagen's edited Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

The Pipes mini-essay, while making a few significant points, is neither an adequate introduction to the present volume nor to the study of the Soviet nationalities problem in general. It neither asks nor answers major crucial questions. Ethnic assertiveness is today accepted as a global phenomenon. What has caused it? After all, macro theorists writing both from the Marxist and Western modernization perspective have told us that ethnicity was to disappear. It has not. Are the same underlying factors operating in the Soviet Union as elsewhere? Are the same issues and social forces at play with all Soviet nationalities? Why are the Russians migrating to some areas and not to others? What about demographic processes as a general independent variable for analyzing the Soviet nationality question? What has determined differences in the channels of ethnic assertiveness? Why is religion a nationality issue with some Soviet ethnic groups and not others? Do native Communist cadres provide any pay-offs for their people? How have official policies in this area affected ethnic processes in reality? Soviet nationality study has progressed to the point where the questions can at least be asked, if not yet adequately answered. Or, are the editors of the volume trying to tell us that the matter cannot be studied systematically at all at a generalizing level?

No interesting analytic questions are asked perhaps because of the
geographical and cultural-affinity basis with which the editors have grouped the Soviet nationalities. While the path chosen may be interesting from the viewpoint of a taxonomic exercise, there are no inherent intellectual rewards to be gleaned from this. Alternate, analytically more fruitful approaches are available. For example, consider the categorization advanced in the Armstrong piece in the Goldhagen book, or the use of relative levels of modernization. Have the Azerbaidzhanis really anything in common with the Armenians and Georgians except territorial proximity in the region called the Transcaucasia?

The preceding may seem to some to be a charge that the Handbook has a tendency to be intellectually boring and lacking in analytic imagination, but it should not be taken as contradictory for me to find much praise for the volume. It is without question the best compendium — truly a summary handbook — on the major Soviet nationalities. It is a reasonably good and handy reference work. It provides the interested party with a quick glimpse at each group and a brief bibliography for further inquiry. Furthermore, the imposition of a fixed internal order on chapters does have its merits, the possibility for some intergroup comparisons. All chapters cover "general information" (territory, economy, history, demography, culture, external relations), "media" (language data, local media, educational institutions, culture and scientific institutions), and "national attitudes" (review of factors forming national attitudes, basic views of scholars on national attitudes, and recent manifestations of nationalism).

The chapters are, however, of varied quality in spite of a fixed format. This probably reflects two unrelated factors — the quality of existing secondary sources in combination with access to primary ones, and the quality of the contributors as specialists on the given group. The former should really tell us, as Soviet area specialists, something about the state of the field. The persistent fascination of Sovietologists with centralized power and formal policy, and things Russian, has left us with a great vacuum of information on how the "other half," or the non-Russian part, of the USSR lives, and, in fact, how the Soviet Union really functions. Our knowledge of nationality issues in the USSR is still severely delimited because we produce many people in "Russian studies" and exceedingly few for the study of the other half, whether in terms of language or substantive expertise.

Given the fixed format of chapters, the expected variance in author quality is planed down, but still noticeable. The better chapters are those written by specialists with established reputations: Roman Szporluk on the Ukraine, Rein Taagepera on Estonia, Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone on Tadzhikistan, and Stephen Fischer-Galati on Moldavia. The 29-table special composite appendix is simultaneously valuable and puzzling. Tables 1 through 23 summarize major types of demographic, cultural, social and economic data and are therefore handy for reference purposes. Tables 24-29 are the puzzling ones. Exactly what does an "index of national political vitality" (Table 24) mean or show? Why are population growth, nationality as percentage of republic population, concentration of nationality in its titular republic, percentage who declared the national language as native, and weight of nationality in the CPSU the proper indicators for such an index? The same questions may be
legitimately asked about the other composite indexes as well. Bordering on the absurd is the one called "Composite index: overall development of Soviet nationalities" (Table 28), which throws together a whole host of indicators, ranging from population growth, to weight of the nationality in the CPSU, to saving per capita, to students per population, to doctors per capita. One cannot be against indexes in principle here. After all, there is quite a bit of merit in cycles of empirical testing and theoretical integration in scholarship. But the hodgepodge composite indexes make no inherent conceptual sense at all.

Perhaps the greatest value of the whole volume then is not for the subject specialist — although we, too, may readily benefit from the book as a reference guide — but for the governmental official who needs quick access to information without a study in depth. Indeed, the book can be used readily by most literate readers because it is reasonably well and clearly written, and here undoubtedly the editors deserve quite a bit of the credit. But we now need to move on to detailed studies of each of the nationalities and the Soviet republics and toward theoretical integration of the material, both at the USSR and global levels.

TÖNU PARMING


As the title suggests, the contributions in this volume attempt to assess the post-World War II position of the Ukrainian republic within the USSR economy. As the editor states in the Preface, the unifying theme is the question "How has the Ukraine fared as a part of the USSR?" (p. ix). Answering such a counter-factual question is difficult in the best of circumstances, and Soviet data limitations confound the difficulties and preclude any definitive conclusions. Although the assessment is ambiguous, the material contained in most of the chapters makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the Soviet and Ukrainian economies.

Except for the "Overview" by Holland Hunter and the concluding remarks by Peter Wiles, the chapters were initially presented at an AAASS/Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute sponsored conference in 1975 and subsequently revised. The rewriting allowed the authors to refer to the other papers when appropriate and enhances the book’s continuity. The coherence of the book is also enhanced by its structure: the first six chapters (following Hunter) focus upon the economy of the Ukraine itself, including comparisons to the overall Soviet economy; the next three deal with the economic relationships between the Ukraine and the USSR. These nine contributions survey and analyze Ukrainian economic organizational structure (I. Koropeckyj), growth (Stanley Cohn), personal income (Gertrude Schroeder), water pollution (Craig ZumBrunnen), manpower (Douglas Whitehouse and David Bronson), natural
resources (Leslie Dienes), the 1966 input-output table (James Gillula), trade with the USSR/rest of the world (V. Bandera), and net tax transfers to the USSR central government (Z. Melnyk).

The editor believes “that the reader [of these chapters] can reach but one conclusion: that the political status of the Ukraine has inhibited the growth of its economy and of the welfare of its citizens” (p. ix). The contributions by Bandera and Melnyk provide the bulk of the evidence supporting this conclusion. Citing his estimate published in 1973, Bandera concludes that Ukrainian exports exceeded imports by 8 billion rubles in 1966. This constitutes 20% of Ukrainian national product (Soviet definition). This trade imbalance depresses the Ukrainian standard of living relative to what it would have been if imports had been higher. But this evidence by itself is inconclusive. First, the estimated imbalance considerably exceeds the imbalance of 1.5 billion rubles found by Gillula when reconstructing the input-output table; the discrepancy is not resolved. Second, Schroeder finds that Ukrainian income and total retail sales per capita were “slightly” below the USSR average; the Ukraine ranked sixth among the 15 republics according to both of these measures. This suggests that living standards were not depressed as much as Bandera’s estimate implies. Thirdly, since the imbalance equals Ukrainian sales to others less purchases from others, the Ukrainian trade imbalance implies an increase in Ukrainian financial resources; the excess income is saved and lent to other regions. A similar process occurs in market economies, of course, as evidenced by the net lending of the northeast region of the United States to other regions. However, in a market economy these lending decisions are made voluntarily, which is not the case in the Soviet Union. To the extent that the saving and lending are forced, they do constitute a transfer of resources out of the Ukraine. But Gillula’s estimate of the trade imbalance (using a more reliable technique) indicates the forced saving and lending were not large. Bandera’s chapter thus does not support the conclusion that the Ukraine was “exploited” during 1966.

The central government may also reallocate resources from one region to another by taxing one region relatively heavily, as has been the case for the northeastern United States. Melnyk’s chapter analyzes the drain of resources from the Ukraine caused by the structure of taxes and expenditures. He finds that during 1959-1970 the transfer of taxes less expenditures out of the Ukraine was 90 billion rubles (or 7.56/yr.). This may be compared to his estimate of total Ukrainian investment of 101 billion rubles or to reported Ukrainian national product of 454 billion rubles. The drain on the Ukraine was thus quite large (although Wiles shows that Melnyk overestimates the drain by 7 billion rubles).

However, the existence of a large drain does not imply that the Ukraine has been exploited, since the meaning of exploitation in this context is not clear. The northeastern United States has also been exploited in the same sense as the Ukraine has, as Cohn points out, although the political processes differ in the two instances. Moreover, just as Ukrainians feel they have a just grievance, so does New York State, viz. Senator Moynihan. Indeed, New York City periodically threatens to secede from New York State. May the same be also true of Kiev?
The difficulty, of course, is that the central government has reallocated resources in an effort to equalize regional standards of living. As Cohn shows, this reallocation has not resulted in an appreciably slower than average rate of economic growth. Moreover, by all of the usual measures of economic development, this book indicates that the Ukraine ranks near the average. The complaint is that things could have been better. This complaint in Yugoslavia eventually severely circumscribed the central government's regional reallocation of resources. Which course is proper depends on one's tastes (among other things). It would be interesting to compare the drain on the Ukraine with that borne by the Baltic republics and the European part of the RSFSR. If the cost of the regional reallocation of resources to the Ukraine exceeds the cost to the areas which have a higher standard of living, then one would suspect the process is discriminatory and perverse.

Nonetheless, the diversion of resources to other regions (eastern RSFSR and Central Asia) does reduce Ukrainian national product. It would not reduce USSR national product if the resources were more productive elsewhere, but whether or not this was the case is notoriously difficult to determine, since it is impossible to ascertain the increment in output obtainable from these resources. Although Dienes and ZumBrunnen show that the Ukraine's resource base (energy and water) has reached the point of rapidly diminishing returns, Ukrainian specialization in light manufacturing rather than steel might be advantageous. Thus, the appropriateness of the drain imposed by Moscow depends in part upon whether one takes the Ukrainian or Moscow point of view.

Finally, the ambiguities inherent in any counter-factual argument also prevent definitive conclusions. For example, Wiles considers the possibility of the Ukraine having become an independent country (capitalist or Communist) in 1920. But would either variety have survived Hitler as an independent country? Wiles thinks not. While "what-might-have-been" questions are very interesting, it helps if the alternative historical course is reasonably plausible.∗

JAMES R. THORNTON


The appearance of this analytical and annotated bibliography will undoubtedly stimulate and greatly facilitate the study of the complex phenomenon of dissent in Ukraine. With the exception of Michael Browne's authoritative bibliography "'Unpublished' Works" appended to his book

∗ See also Letter to the Editor by I. S. Koropeckyj, this issue.
The bibliography is divided into four sections: primary sources and Soviet secondary sources; select secondary works; appendix; and index. The first section contains the bulk of the material (1041 entries) and is arranged alphabetically by author and subject. The title of each entry was transliterated according to a slightly modified form of the Library of Congress system from the title of the original document, except for a relatively small number of titles which were not accessible to the compilers. These entries are marked with an asterisk and transcribed from *Arkhiiv Samizdata: Register of Documents*, edited by Albert Boiter (3rd rev. ed., Munich: Radio Liberty, 1975). The English translation of the title, date written (if known), as well as the language of the original document are indicated. Complete references to all Ukrainian, English, and Russian versions are provided. This analytical approach is a blessing to the linguistically limited reader, to whom a considerable amount of dissident writings from Ukraine will now be more readily accessible.

The geographic scope of the bibliography is the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, which is defined as "the territorial entity recognized by the United Nations." Hence, it is not limited to Ukrainian dissident literature but includes samvydav* documents of national minorities living within the borders of Ukraine, primarily Russians and Jews. The sole exception is the subject of Crimean Tatar dissent which was excluded because of the compilers' conviction:

In excluding Crimean Tatar dissident materials, we adhere to the position taken by most Ukrainian dissidents, who maintain that the Crimea was never an integral part of the Ukrainian SSR and who wholeheartedly support the aspirations of the Crimean Tatars to restore the autonomy of their former republic, liquidated by Stalin in 1944 and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. (p. xx)

The form of samvydav literature varies considerably: letters, petitions, appeals, manifestos, reviews, reports, etc. Its content is equally diverse. The single most important source of the bibliographic material was the journal *Ukrains'kyi visnyk** (Ukrainian Herald), whose very appearance in the month of January, 1970 was a turning point in the Ukrainian dissident movement and its relationship to Russian colleagues. The All-Union, Russian-language, *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events) proved no longer adequate for Ukrainian purposes. In fact, an editorial in one of the issues of *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* expressed reservations about the former's policy of treating dissident movements in other republics as mere appendages to the detailed coverage of events in Russia and consequently

* Literally, self-publishing. The Russian term for it is samizdat.

** The last issue to appear was No. 7-8 (Spring 1974). Since February 1978 another publication has been circulating in Ukraine: *Informatsiinyi Biuleten' ukrains'koï hromads'koï hrupy spryannya vykonanniu Helsinki'vykh uhod* (Informational Bulletin of the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords). Two issues of this periodical have appeared [as of December 1978].
distorting the actual situation in the USSR. The succinct but informative annotations reveal that the situation outside Russia is considerably worse, particularly in Ukraine, where during a single wave of arrests in 1972 hundreds of people were arrested for “nationalist” activity and where trials of dissidents are notorious for their secrecy, breaches of legality, and harshness of sentences.

The majority of documents deal with some form of opposition to Russification, against which all Ukrainian dissidents, irrespective of their age, occupation, or political ideology, are united. This opposition to Russification can assume various forms. An intellectual like Ivan Dzyuba might write a treatise on the subject (No. 195). A teacher might protest the Russification of the higher institutions of learning (No. 425). Mothers might protest the use of Russian in nursery schools and kindergartens (No. 932). A group of citizens might disseminate pamphlets urging the people to resist Russification (No. 724). An ardent patriot like Vasyl’ Makukha might immolate himself as an extreme act of protest against Moscow’s policy of linguicide which threatens the Ukrainian national identity (Nos. 501-03). Ukrainian dissidents consider this threat imminent because a considerable Russian and Russified segment of the population of Ukraine aids and abets the Soviet government’s nationalities policy of Russification. Most Russians residing in Ukraine have not only not bothered to learn Ukrainian but insist on the use of Russian as the official “international” language. Their anti-Ukrainian acts are sanctioned and unpunished. Among the numerous recorded manifestations of Russian chauvinism, two are particularly noteworthy for their excesses: the desecration of Shevchenko’s monument (No. 915) and arson in the largest library of Ukraine, the State Library of the Academy of Sciences, which destroyed some 600,000 priceless and unique Ukrainian historical documents (No. 32).

Other documents are of a more political nature. The political activity recorded may range from organizing groups to discuss the possibility of realizing the constitutional right of the Ukrainian SSR to secede from the USSR (No. 358) to joint petitions by political prisoners of different nationalities demanding the restoration of the sovereignty of the non-Russian republics (No. 691). Reading “nationalistic” books and singing “nationalistic” songs (No. 947) or hoisting the blue and yellow flag of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (1917-1920) (No. 840) may also qualify since they are prosecuted by the state as political acts.

The bibliography contains many references to concentration camps and psychiatric prison hospitals. This is not surprising since Ukrainian political prisoners constitute at least 50 per cent, and by some accounts an overwhelming majority, of the camp and prison population. Documents on this subject usually deal with strikes to protest against the working and living conditions or expatriation to Russia where most of the camps are located. Documentation on psychiatric abuse for political ends is prominent. This notorious practice has been expertly treated in two recent publications: Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychiatry Is Used to Suppress Dissent by
Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway (New York: Basic Books, 1977) * and the memoirs of the former victim of Soviet psychiatry, Ukrainian dissident Leonid [Plyushch], *Dans le carnival de l'histoire* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1977) which will soon be available in an English edition. **Plyushch’s ordeal at the hands of the Soviet psychiatrists is covered primarily by entries No. 654-84. The cases of historian Valentyn Moroz and journalist Vacheslav Chornovil, both outstanding victims of Soviet justice, also occupy large segments of this bibliography. Perhaps the most tragic case recorded is that of the son of the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Roman Shukhevych (alias Taras Chuprynka), Iurii Shukhevych (b. 1933), who has been paying for the sins of his father since the age of fifteen.

This bibliography is also an excellent reference source on current Soviet Ukrainian literature. This phenomenon is due to the fact that censorship in Ukraine is particularly stringent and efforts to suppress the development of Ukrainian culture are exceptionally strenuous. Consequently, the best and most innovative literature circulates in samvydav, outside of the state-controlled publishing monopoly with its requisite of socialist realism. In addition to unpublished material, the most outstanding officially published works, whose authors have fallen into disfavor with the authorities, inevitably find their way into samvydav. This has been increasingly the case since the Ukrainian cultural renaissance, headed by a group of writers, mostly poets, called shestydesiatnyky (“generation of the sixties”), was crushed in the late 1960s. In the reviewer’s opinion, these officially published works which are on the Soviet index merit a separate bibliography.

In this bibliography the finest poetry is represented by Vasyl’ Symonenko, Ihor Kalynets, and Lina Kostenko; prose by Anatolii Shewchuk and Mykhailo Osadchyi; literary criticism by Ievhen Sverstiuk, Ivan Dzyuba, and Ivan Svitlychnyi; and children’s literature and science fiction by Oles Berdnyk. Since the elite among the Ukrainian creative intelligentsia are serving long terms in labor camps or have otherwise been silenced, the loss to Ukrainian culture can never be fully estimated. It can only be compared to the mass liquidation of Ukrainian writers by Stalin in the 1930s (See George S. N. Luckyj, *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine, 1917-1934*, New York: University of Columbia Press, 1956). The Stalinist parallel is even more applicable because punishment by expulsion — a tribute to the modern times and Western opinion — has so far eluded Ukrainian literati.

Any scepticism about Moscow’s design to single out Ukrainian creative intelligentsia for extinction is dispelled by the presence in the West of a large contingent of Russian writers who are now at liberty to create and enrich Russian culture. Surely, if destruction of Ukrainian culture was not Moscow’s objective, a harmless lyric poet like Ihor Kalynets, who has the potential of becoming the leading poet of his day, would not be serving a nine-year sentence in a hard labor camp, but sharing instead the fate of his Russian colleagues.

The presence and nature of samvydav documents (i.e., published in the West)

* Reviewed in this issue — Editor.

are further indicators of the political climate in Ukraine. Among the sampling included are such innocuous documents as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s address at the unveiling of the monument to Shevchenko in Washington, D. C., on June 27, 1964. (No. 757) and excerpts from the introduction by Emmanuel Rais to the book *La nouvelle vague littéraire en Ukraine* (Paris: P. I. U. F. 1967) (No. 758).

In addition to the aforementioned documents on the Ukrainian national movement, there are many references to religious movements of the Orthodox, Catholics, and Baptists, as well as to the efforts of Jews to emigrate to Israel. Jews, like Ukrainians, are not immune to charges of “bourgeois nationalism.” A typical case cited is that of Ihor Holts, who was given three years for proposing a toast in honor of Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War (1967) (No. 270).

The second section of the bibliography contains the remaining 201 entries and is intended to complement the information on dissent provided by the primary sources. The entries are arranged by subject: memoirs of former Soviet dissidents; history and politics; religion; demography and geography; Ukrainian-Jewish relations; education, publishing, and communications policy; literature; economics; and the interrelationship between the People’s Republic of China and dissent in the Ukrainian SSR. The appendix contains the English translation of the texts of Article 62: Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda and Article 187-1: Dissemination of Deliberately False Fabrications Which Discredit the Soviet State and Soviet System from the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR, under which dissidents are, as a rule, prosecuted.

The bibliography is technically well executed and is relatively free from all the flaws to which such undertakings are often susceptible. The reviewer was surprised not to find a reference to *Religion and Atheism in the U. S. S. R. and Eastern Europe*, edited by Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975) and to notice a more serious omission of a reference to the English translation of Mykhailo Braichevskyi’s *Pryiednannia chy vozz’iednannia?: Krytychni zauwahy z pryvodu odnii Kontseptsii*, namely, *Annexation or Reunification?: Critical Notes on One Conception*, translated and edited by George P. Kulchycky (München: Ukrainisches Institut für Bildungspolitik, 1974), which should have appeared under entry No. 116. In view of the statement on the exclusion of Crimean Tatar dissident material, inclusion of entries Nos. 236 and 1094 seems somewhat contradictory. The reviewer highly recommends this invaluable bibliography. It is indispensable to students of Ukrainian affairs and to all those who are interested in the human rights movement in the Soviet Union.

**LEYSA JONES**


This volume comprises papers and comments of the McMaster Conference on Contemporary Ukraine, held at the McMaster University in Hamilton,
Canada, October 25-26, 1974. At the conference itself twelve topics were considered, and thirty-seven specialists spoke, either as paper givers or as commentators. One paper, the dinner address on Sovie: foreign policy, and two comments were not published in this volume. However, two other comments were developed into full fledged papers.

The McMaster conference intended to be international in terms of its participants, among whom were Americans, Canadians, and one European scholar. The organizers also invited scholars from the Soviet Ukraine but the invitation was ignored. The active participants (speakers, discussants, and session chairmen) were almost evenly divided between persons of Ukrainian background and non-Ukrainians.

The editor has grouped the topics into six sections, two dealing with economics and resources, two with the analysis of demographic and ethnic conditions, one with politics, and one with the status and prospects of Ukrainian studies in the West. A highly interesting paper on cybernetics in the Ukraine by the late V. Holubnychy, with equally enlightening comments by A. J. Katsenelboigen, has been squeezed into the section on economics. The late A. Simirenko’s short paper on current sociological research in the Ukraine hardly warrants introduction of a special section: sociology and demography. A collective paper on the growth of the Ukrainian population in Russia and the USSR since 1897, by R. Lewis, R. Rowland, and R. Clem correctly analyzes the population trends in the last seventy years, yet it contains a few questionable conclusions. How can one propose an explanation that the influx of Russians to the Ukrainian cities is due to “the relatively low education level of the Ukrainian populace” (p. 158), when at the same time precisely scientific and professional cadres are induced to leave the Ukraine and look for jobs elsewhere? That proposition could have been valid for the 1920s or, in some areas, immediately after World War II. The section on minorities (non-Ukrainian nationalities) comprises only one well-documented, yet somewhat incomplete, paper on Ukrainian Jews, by Zvi Gitelman. Another paper which supposedly was to treat Russians in the Ukraine fits poorly the section in which it was placed: R. Szporluk rather investigates, in general, Russo-Ukrainian relationships under the Soviets relevant to the Ukrainian identity and its prospects.

A substantial contribution to the understanding of the Ukraine in the 1970s is found in three key papers of the conference (in addition to one authored by R. Szporluk) dealing with political issues: The Communist Party of the Ukraine (CPU), politics of governmental and party cadres, leading personalities, and the rise and fall of Petro Shelest.

Y. Bilinsky traces in his well-researched paper the inter-party politics of the CPU since 1966, demonstrating that the CPU has experienced a high membership growth since 1956, unparalleled in the CPSU. The author implies that this was an effort by local leaders to ascertain Ukrainian presence in the otherwise Russian-dominated party and to press Ukrainian demands vis-à-vis the center (one in ten adult Russians in the Ukraine, but only one in seventeen Ukrainians, is in the Party). As a reaction, in 1972-1973 a “corrective purge” was launched in the CPU, which, however, affected only the leading posts...
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(demotions, transfers). True, the principal casualty of the purge was Shelest himself. Bilinsky labels him as Khrushchev's man while his successor as first secretary of the CC CPU is considered as Brezhnev's protégé. Personalities of the leading Party and governmental organs are anatomized by B. Lewyzkyj with proper (to him) statistical and biographical data and methods.

J. Pelenski, even more than Bilinsky, devotes his inquiry to Shelest, as a person and shelestivshchyna [Shelest's rule] as a phenomenon. The author convincingly proves the case that Shelest's removal from the leading posts in the CPSU and in the Ukraine was due not so much to his "hawkish" position as to his autonomist aspirations in the Ukraine, along with his readiness to accommodate some Ukrainian national aspirations. Shelest was willing to promote limited Ukrainization, defended economic interests of the Ukraine (the Republic's self-sufficiency), and aspired to make the Ukraine into a "model republic" in terms of development. Pelenski terms Shelest's politics as the "revival of controlled Ukrainian autonomism" compared with the efforts of Ukrainian hetmans in the 18th century after the fall of Mazeppa. Other assumptions, for instance, that Shcherbitsky initially found a sympathetic ear among the Ukrainian intelligentsia of liberal orientation (p. 295) or that Shelest had a predecessor in his favoritism of local cadres in the person of the purged Kirichenko, lack substantiation and hard evidence, remaining just provocative hypotheses.

R. Szporluk investigates in the best paper of the volume the degree of Ukrainian identity among diverse groups, mainly in urban and rural but also in particular regional settings. He assesses the strength of the Russian element and uncertainties of Russianized Ukrainians. The fact of the matter is that even these categories of the Ukraine's population should not easily be denied some Ukrainian identity. It is true that the Eastern regions (Donets-Dnipro) and the South (especially Crimea) are most Russianized; however, they are not actually Russian. Even some Russian-language press in the Ukraine should rather be termed, according to the author, as "Russian-medium Ukrainian press." Szporluk further assesses the modernizing role of national and regional capitals, e.g., Kyiv (Kiev) and Lviv, in the present search for national identity, and proposes to redefine the Ukrainian nationality concept from the ethnic-linguistic one into "territorial Ukrainian identity" — which has better chances of overcoming the present limitations of national development. Thus, this provocative paper clearly falls into the political category.

J. Hazard's paper intends to explore institutional and functional aspects of the Union-republic relations and to tackle the difficult problem of the nature of the Soviet-Ukrainian statehood. A number of pertinent questions are raised, such as the right of secession, sovereignty, convergence, federalism, and the future constitution (at the time of the Conference, the draft was not yet published), but some of those questions are not adequately answered. Yet, Hazard is right in not anticipating major institutional changes in Soviet federalism. Because of the limited sources used, both Soviet and Western, Hazard's treatment of certain issues sometimes approaches vagueness and superficiality. A few statements are just incorrect; for instance, Stalin did not dissolve, during the great purges, the Polish, Ukrainian, and Belorussian
Parties in the USSR (such is the meaning of a statement on page 224), but the West Ukrainian, West Belorussian, and Polish Communist Parties in Poland proper. One could hardly attribute the revival of national feelings in the Ukraine in the late 1940s to the Kaganovich policy of reprisals. There were certainly other motives for this (World War II effects, consequences of Ukrainian activities in the German occupied Ukraine, and the incorporation of Western regions to the Ukrainian republic). W. Tarnopolsky promptly corrects in his comments Hazard's view that the formation of the Soviet federation is due to Ukrainian Communism; according to Tarnopolsky, the federation owes its emergence equally, if not more, to Ukrainian nationalism.

Julian Birch, in his contribution on the nature and sources of dissidence in the Ukraine, attempts to present a comprehensive picture of all manifestations of dissent in that republic: national, religious, civil rights-oriented, and economy-motivated dissent, as well as the resistance among ethnic minorities of the Ukraine. But the author does not succeed in presenting equitably all the forms of dissent, with the exceptions of Ukrainian "nationalist," Jewish, and Baptist (iniziatywnyky). The well-documented resistance of the Uniate Catholics is only superficially covered; along with Hungarian and Crimean Tatar minorities, the Poles (mostly as religious Roman Catholic dissenters), Moldavians, Greeks of the Ukraine, etc., have their grievances.

Birch's inventory of "sources" of Ukrainian dissent has notable shortcomings. One is surprised to learn that there is a "Hutsul" source of national dissent, stemming from a separate "nationality"; it is the author's complete misreading of V. Moroz's essay "The Chronicle of Resistance." Rather, what happened in Kosmach was a typical Ukrainian cultural and socio-religious resistance of a distinct regional group, however, within the scope of Ukrainian national ideology. The author has uncritically relied on R. Boiter's ill-conceived Radio Liberty research paper on this matter. Incidentally, the Hutsuls as a regional group number not 300,000 but somewhere between 160,000 and 175,000; in Transcarpathia, they live in Rakhivsky raion (not Rakovsky!).

There are other shortcomings in Birch's dissent typology; this reviewer questions his characterization of the intellectual and cultural dissent in major cities of the republic as "the resurrection of a rural, pre-industrial, ethnic/cultural heritage in an urban environment" (p. 310). If someone reads only this in the works of Dzyuba, Sverstiuk, Osadchy, or, for that matter, even in Honchar's Sobor, then this is a blatant misrepresentation of these writers.

One important "source" of dissent, the programmatic and human linkage between the present Ukrainian dissent and the post-World War II nationalist movement, is not mentioned at all, and yet it can be well demonstrated. There are other factual errors: the number of 643,000 Russians in Dnipropetrovsk out of the population of 863,000 (p. 325) is surprising; Chornovil and Osadchy are not West Ukrainian-born, as the footnote (p. 324) implies; also, the Rev. V. Romaniuk, a dissident priest, is not from Chernivtsi but from the Hutsul region.

Two major papers on the resources, non-renewable, forestry and agriculture,
are important and serious studies in their own right but do not contribute much on the economic trends and policies in the 1970s.

The concluding section of the volume on the Ukrainian studies in the West features short remarks by J. Reshetar, J. Armstrong, O. Pritsak, and the late C. Bida. With the exception of two first presentations, they do not offer original and suggestive ideas. The Ukrainian scholarly community in the West ought to ponder seriously the well-intended comments by J. Armstrong: "Ukrainian communities in the West run a grave risk of talking only to themselves." Armstrong urges his colleagues in the field of Ukrainian studies to apply present-day methods in their inquiry and to use language common to modern social sciences.

In general, this volume is a welcome addition to the field of growing knowledge about contemporary Ukraine. Unfortunately, it remains just a collection of the papers and proceedings of the conference instead of becoming a topical volume on such a challenging subject. The editor could have done more basic editorial work in unifying all contributions, possibly by writing a concluding general chapter. The uniformity in the spelling of geographical names using the Ukrainian version (Kyiv, Kryvyi Rih) is laudable (in a few cases there was not consistency: Lugansk, Efimovka, Dniepr along with Dnipro). Also the footnoting, regardless of the editor's leaning in favor of "licentia autoris" should have been uniformly edited and better checked. It is unfortunate that the volume contains so many printing errors (five on page 288).

Finally, a word of explanation for a book review on a publication which appeared five years ago. Simply, because it is a substantial contribution and because it deserves the attention of specialists and the enlightened public in things Ukrainian both as a reference work and as a thought-provoking attempt to analyze complex issues of today's Ukraine, although the book, because of its origin and editing, is not always easy to read. This belated review suggests another conference and another volume on the Ukraine in the Eighties.

VASYL MARKUS


The appearance of the first issue of the Soviet Ukrainian-language
underground journal *Ukraїnskyi visnyk* (*The Ukrainian Herald*) in January 1970 provided the defenders of Ukrainian culture and national rights in the USSR with a new medium and observers of the Soviet system with a new source of vital information on conditions in Ukraine. The three issues of *The Herald* now available to the English-language reader offer a great variety of new factual data, documentation, political commentary, and observations that are perceptive as well as poignant. Their appearance in the Ukrainian SSR in January 1971, March 1972, and April 1974 was accompanied by, and was a response to, the growing repression directed against articulate and nationally conscious Ukrainian intellectuals and their supporters by Soviet authorities.

*The Herald* not only provides news that is unobtainable in the official Soviet media but also chronicles the tribulations of the courageous and dedicated defenders of the Ukrainian language and culture and of human rights who have suffered greatly at the hands of the KGB officials. The reader is told of innumerable instances in which individual Ukrainians lost their employment (in the land of “no unemployment”) and students were expelled from institutes and universities. There are accounts of police searches, KGB interrogations (with examples of the kinds of questions asked), the banning of Ukrainian poetry readings and literary gatherings, the wanton destruction of cultural monuments, the burning of churches in Western Ukraine under suspicious circumstances, the burning of churches in Western Ukraine under suspicious circumstances, allegedly by arsonists, and the denial of official permission to rebuild the damaged structures. There are numerous accounts of the frequent instances of intolerant attitudes, chauvinism, and Ukrainophobia expressed by members of the privileged and vocal Russian minority living in Ukraine. Indicative of the kinds of harassment and repression that Ukrainians experience daily is the description of the difficulties placed in the way of the Homin amateur choir in Kiev, that was finally disbanded in September 1971 and the Zhaivoronok student choir, so feared by Soviet officials because of its New Year’s carolling.

Issue IV of *The Herald* contains information on the highly suspicious circumstances surrounding the murder in November 1970 of the artist Alla Horska, who participated in the creation of the Taras Shevchenko stained glass window, removed from the University of Kiev, which bore the poet’s name and was allegedly destroyed. An account of her funeral and the texts of eulogies tell us much about this talented and dedicated woman whose life was taken so tragically and prematurely. Alla Horska was murdered ten days after the second trial of Valentyn Moroz, which is given much attention in Issue IV. This issue also contains the diary of the poet Vasyl Symonenko (so revealing of the travails of the Soviet writer) as well as some of his proscribed poems, artfully translated by Vera Rich. The texts of speeches on Symonenko given by Ivan Svitlychnyi, Yevhen Sverstiuk and Ivan Dzyuba tell us much about the poet.

Issue VI of *The Herald* has several distinctive features. Nearly one-fourth of it is devoted to the second half of Viacheslav Chornovil’s “What Bohdan Stenchuk Defends and How He Does It” — a point-by-point refutation and demolition of the pseudonymous Soviet attempt to reply to Ivan Dzyuba’s *Internationalism or Russification?* Probably the most revealing portion of Issue VI deals with the deplorable condition of Ukrainian-language schools
and provides specific information on Kiev schools in terms of enrollments, languages used, and the fact that the Russian schools have better buildings. The reader encounters a number of trenchant observations that describe the Ukrainian condition. Thus, the author of "Whose Mother Is Dearer?" observes:

Someone is always hovering over Ukrainians, lest they become too interested in their own history ("at the expense of Russian history"), lest they cultivate "an unhealthy interest" in their proto-origins, lest they become too fond of their native language and become too concerned about its purity and evolution. Let it stand, they say, like a half-ruined church. As it manages to survive, so let it survive, for we have freedom here. But don't you dare try to restore it yourselves, and may God protect you from the idea of allowing people to enter it and to pray. (p. 84).

There is Valentyn Moroz's assertion: "Whoever considers as anti-Soviet a document directed against chauvinism, Stalinism and lawlessness, in effect, equates Soviet rule with chauvinism, Stalinism and lawlessness." (pp. 89-90).

Issue VI also includes the remarkable poem said to have been written by Anatolii Lupynis and recited by him on May 22, 1971, during a spontaneous demonstration held before the Shevchenko monument in Kiev. The poem forcefully describes the Ukraine's plight and, in the tradition of Shevchenko's own "Epistle" (Poslaniie) of 1845, denounces the baseness of those who serve the occupying power and betray their own people. For daring to call on Ukrainians to "smash into bits this coffin fashioned for you" (p. 151), Lupynis was arrested within a few days and imprisoned in a psychiatric facility.

The increasingly repressive Soviet response to the demands of Ukrainians for equality with Russians in turn led to more outspoken statements on behalf of Ukrainian rights evidenced in the tone of Issues VI and VII-VIII. Issue VII-VIII appeared in the spring of 1974 following a two-year hiatus. Internal evidence suggests that it may have originated in Western Ukraine, although it also contains much news and commentary on Eastern Ukrainian developments. It is avowedly anti-Soviet and more militant and refers to the Soviet Union as a "fascist empire" and a "colonial regime" and to "Russian imperialistic chauvinists." It includes two articles not previously circulated in samvydav. The shorter article by "Maksym Sahaydak" deals with détente, which is described as "one-sided cooperation" that enables the reactionary Soviet regime to obtain foreign economic assistance and to survive and be more repressive by increasing its military power. The shortsightedness of the "American monopolies" will simply increase US defense costs. The Herald warns that the USSR is "an unreliable partner" and that, without the democratization of the Soviet Union, the US "will once again find itself in the role of one who puts a knife in the hands of a robber and, by doing so, becomes an accomplice in a crime against humanity, and will itself become a victim of its own shortsighted policy" (VII-VIII, pp. 32-33).

The bulk of Issue VII-VIII is devoted to documenting the charge that the Kremlin is pursuing a policy of ethnocide of the Ukrainian people. Demographic data are examined in the context of the 1932-33 famine, the
purges, and the mass deportations. It is asked why Ukrainians number only 40 million and not 60 million. The increase in the size of the Russian minority in the Ukraine is said to be an "artificial growth achieved through immigration" and Russification a deliberate policy and not a spontaneous phenomenon. In attacking the hypocrisy of the Kremlin leaders, The Herald points out that Ukrainians living in Soviet Moldavia "number 507,000, considerably more than the number of Russians (414,000), but all schools except those which are Moldavian are exclusively Russian" (p. 119). It attacks the special brand of Russian logic by which a Ukrainian who resides outside the Ukrainian SSR is supposed to lose his nationality, while the Russian living in the Ukraine retains his nationality.

There is far too much factual detail in The Herald regarding conditions in Soviet Ukraine to be conveyed in a review, however lengthy. There is also an unverified report (in Issue VII-VIII) on the circumstances surrounding the removal of Petro Shelest, who is depicted as "the head of the liberal-minded cadres" within the Communist Party of Ukraine and said to have been the victim of a plot led by Shcherbitsky and three obkom secretaries backed by Moscow. There is the revealing account by Chornovil of the August 1965 speech of [Ukrainian SSR] Minister of Higher Education Dadenkov, delivered to a conference of deans (see The Herald VI, pp. 35-38), calling for the predominant use of the Ukrainian language in the Republic's institutes and universities. Although Dadenkov's effort was aborted, one wonders whether it may not have been prompted by Sviatoslav Karavansky's protest of February 24, 1965, addressed to the Prosecutor (see The Chornovil Papers, pp. 170-74).

A distinctive feature of Issues VII-VIII (or at least its section "The General Pogrom") is that it is addressed not only to Ukrainians but to foreign readers and to UN Secretary-General Waldheim with the request that the General Assembly take up "the question of the liquidation of Soviet Russian colonialism" (p. 160). The Herald has no illusions that the Soviet regime will readily abandon its "colonial and chauvinistic policies," and it recognizes that the UN has given its silent approval to evil. Yet it seeks "world-wide indictment" of "a state in which scores of nations are being oppressed and made victims of physical and spiritual genocide." Such an indictment would provide moral support, but the Ukrainians must still struggle. Although The Herald is not pleasant reading, its authors do not despair, and they warn the Russians, in the words of Ukrainian philologist O. Potebnia, that "a nationality devoured by another nationality, after an immeasurable loss of its strength, will still, in the end, bring the latter one to disintegration" (VII-VIII, p. 120).

The Herald, as represented in the three issues, can be said to have evolved from a "chronicle of resistance" to an articulate and forceful manifestation of the nation's conscience.

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.
Book Notes


The first item noted is an indispensable and very attractive selection of documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. The publisher is the Washington-based Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee, composed of Ukrainian-American sympathizers of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, of which Dr. Andrew Zwarun is president. The brief introduction is by Dr. Nina Strokata-Karavansky, one of the charter members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in Kiev. The coverage of the volume is smaller than that of the preceding Ukrainian edition (*Ukrains'kyi pravozakhysnyi rukh: Dokumenty i materiialy kyiv's'koï Ukraïns'koï Hromads'koï Hrupy spryiannia ykonomanniu Hel'sinks'kykh Uhod*, same publisher, 1978). Retained have been all the documents of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in Kiev from 1976 and 1977 that have been available in the West, as well as the verdict from the Rudenko and Tykhyi trial of June-July 1977 (Rudenko and Tykhyi were the first Helsinki Group members in the entire USSR to be tried and sentenced). Added have been two later documents issued by the Ukrainian Helsinki Group members in the entire USSR to be tried and sentenced). Added have been two later documents issued by the Ukrainian Helsinki Group: “An Appeal to the UN Commission on Human Rights . . .,” of November 7-December 5, 1978, and “To the Helsinki Groups of the USSR and the USA, to Groups in Defense of Rights in Poland and Czechoslovakia,” of October 6, 1979. The interesting “Appeal to the Participants of the Madrid Conference Called to Review the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act” by the Helsinki Guarantees for Ukraine Committee of Washington, D. C., dated September 1980, has also been added. Excised from the 1980 English edition have been some valuable related materials (e. g., a few letters by Rudenko, several documents of the Moscow Helsinki Group) that had been included in the 1978 Ukrainian edition. Neither edition includes a number of documents that the Ukrainian Helsinki Group issued in 1978 and 1979 (e. g., its so-called Informational Bulletins).

Like the preceding Ukrainian edition, this collection of documents is, on the
whole, very well done. Readers new to the subject will welcome in particular the lengthy biographical notes on all members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group (pp. 251-65). Specialists might cavil, however, at two omissions: the ethnic background or "nationality" — in the Soviet sense — of two more recent members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. Vladimir Malinkovich (Volodymyr Malynkovych), M.D., is Russian, and Josef Zisels, an engineer, is Jewish. For a deeper understanding of dissent in the Ukraine this is significant, particularly since both Dr. Malinkovich and Mr. Zisels share the political views of the ethnically Ukrainian members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group.

The second item noted here is a newsletter published by the External Representation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, edited by Mrs. Nadia Svitlychny. It is printed by exiled members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group who are now in the United States (the head of this group is former Soviet Major-General Petro Hryhorenko [Piotr Grigorenko]). The information is up-to-date and reliable, and the frequency of publication is truly admirable — let us hope that it will keep up. The manner of presentation is very useful. Each issue contains brief and individually numbered news items, bibliographies of primary and secondary sources published in the Ukrainian and English press, brief file cards on the victims of persecution, and an index of names. In the bibliographical section all Ukrainian titles are translated, and frequently the source of information is supplied as well. The file cards supply — insofar as the information is available — symbols indicating the manner of persecution (e.g., E for exile, blank for imprisonment in jail or camp, etc.); the reason for such persecution; the full names of the victims, including their patronymics; their profession; the date and place of arrest; the article(s) of the code under which they have been prosecuted; the time and place of trial; the address of the penal camp; the date of expected release; the victim's state of health; and, finally, data on their families, together with their addresses.

Occasional slips-ups do occur: for instance, item no. 2 in the English bibliography in issue 7 (p. 18 of the English edition) evidently refers to the Philadelphia Inquirer of July 2, 1980 (the word Philadelphia has been omitted), and the following item on the same page refers to The Times (The London Times is apparently meant — something that ought to be made clear to the casual American reader). But all in all, this is a most useful newsletter, very well done.

Y. B.


The author writes in his introduction: "Quite simply, what I do is repeatedly to see whether certain theoretical propositions culled from the general literature on Soviet politics and from writing about republic affairs can be reconciled with relationships discovered in the data" (p. 17). Simple the book is not. The theoretical propositions include: the levels of development-
modernization explanation, the job performance explanation, the systemic factors explanation (political control, bureaucratization, campaigns, role matching, task and organization differentiation), the personal factor explanation, the ethnic coordination explanation (suppression of nationalist deviation, preemption of nationalism, public relations, native capability).

Hodnett's data base is as vast as all the incumbents in forty-nine positions in all fifteen Soviet republics from 1955 to 1972. In a preliminary form, that base was published in Grey Hodnett and Val Ogareff, Leaders of the Soviet Republics 1955-1972: A Guide to Posts and Occupants (Department of Political Science, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1973; 454 pp.) — one of the most useful handbooks ever to appear on Soviet politics. The method can be fully appreciated only by scholars who have been trained in quantitative analysis. Increasingly, however, both officials and academic students can follow such an analysis. The quantitative method is also becoming the mainstream of American political science.

To conclude: This is a thorough and sophisticated book written by an academic scholar and government analyst who is unusually sensitive to the nuances of Soviet nationality problems. It also raises the study of Soviet nationalities another notch, into the world of computer-assisted data analysis.

Y. B.


A valuable collection of papers that were originally presented at the Eleventh Annual McMaster Conference, devoted to Communist and East European Affairs, in October 1977, which was jointly organized by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta and the Interdepartmental Committee on Communist and East European Affairs of McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. Contributions are by: Volodymyr N. Bandera, George G. Grabowicz, Andrzej Kaminski, Vasyl Markus, Jaroslav Pelenski, Orest Subtelny, Frank E. Sysyn, and Roman Szporluk, from the United States; Adam Bromke, Peter J. Potichnyj (introduction), Ivan L. Rudnytsky, and Yevhen Shtendera, of Canada; John Basarab and Borys Lewytskyj, of West Germany; Josef Lewandowski, of Sweden; Józef Łobodowski, of Spain; Georges H. Mond, of France; and Hugh Seton-Watson, of England.

Y. B.
LETTER TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Thornton’s review of the volume edited by me requires some clarification.

1. My statement that the political status of the Ukraine has inhibited the growth of its economy and of the welfare of its population does not rest on Bandera’s and Melnyk’s calculations of the exports of funds from the Ukraine alone. Additional reasons for this situation were discussed by various contributors to the volume and were summarized by me on page 55. They are: almost a complete lack of any powers by the Kiev government and, as a result, the constant subordination of the Ukraine’s interest to those of Moscow; underemployment and unemployment of labor and the permanent loss of the most important resource — young population groups — to other Soviet regions; inefficient utilization of natural resources, including the destruction of environment; inadequate provision for the development of fuel and energy sources; and the application of politics rather than economics to the external trade of the Ukraine.

2. Soviet statistics are notoriously inadequate, particularly for macro-economic estimates, and I do not think that either Bandera or Gillula ** would claim that his particular estimate of the extent of funds transfer from the Ukraine is the only correct. Moreover, they use different concepts: while the former attempts to estimate the balance of payments, the latter is concerned

* It is unusual to publish a rebuttal of a book review in the same issue in which the review has appeared. Given the fact that, alas, the ANNALS have not been appearing very frequently, an exception has been made. Professor Thornton has seen this rebuttal. — The Editor.

** In his recent work, James W. Gillula estimates that during the 1960-75 period, between 11 and 14 percent annually of the net material product (revised for incidence of turnover tax) of the Ukraine was transferred to other regions of the USSR. See “The Economic Interdependence of Soviet Republics,” in U S Congress (96th Congress, 1st session), Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change*, Vol. 1 (October 10, 1979), p. 634.
with the balance of trade in commodities alone. The possible amplitude of such estimates is given in Melnyk's Table 10.7.

3. Even disregarding ethnic considerations — a rather simplistic approach in the multinational state — comparing the Northeast of the United States with the Ukraine is facetious. In case of transfer of private funds from the Northeast to other regions of the United States, their owners earn a return on such an investment, and eventually their loan is repaid. In case of budgetary transfers, the citizens, through their elected representatives, have to approve this transaction. These conditions are hardly applicable to the USSR.

4. The comparison of interregional resource productivity, especially in the USSR, is undoubtedly not a precise science. But to doubt that the transfer of investable funds from the relatively well developed Ukraine with its mild climate to backward Siberia or Central Asia with their harsh climate and enormous distances is detrimental to the maximization of growth for the entire USSR, at least at the present stage, is to ignore a great deal of evidence presented in the East as well as in the West.

5. Finally and most intriguing is Thornton's concept of economics. The mainstream economists claim that the objective of economic life is to maximize the growth rate and consequently the population's welfare in view of the available resources and technology. To claim that the Ukraine should not pursue this objective, but be satisfied with having a growth rate and standard of living close to the average for the USSR, is like advocating that the United States economy forget about using its resources efficiently and content itself with the standard of living equal to the world's average.

I. S. KOROPECKYJ
Chronicle

During the period from January 1977 to November 1980, the following conferences were held and lectures were delivered at the plenary sessions of the Academy:

March 26, 1977
Conference commemorating the fifth anniversary of the death of Wolodymyr Mijakowskyj
- William Omelchenko: Opening Address
- Oksana Radysh: "Reminiscenses about My Father"
- Alexander Nedilko: Read W. Mijakowskyj's paper on Mykhailo Drahomanov
- Halyna Bilous: Reminiscences

April 24, 1977
Grand Conference commemorating the 100th birthday and 20th anniversary of the death of Arnold Davydovych Margolin
- William Omelchenko: Opening Address
- Lubow Margolena-Hansen: "The Young Arnold Davydovych"
- Antin Batiuk: "My Friendship with A. D. Margolin"
- Yaroslav Bilinsky: "Politics in the Ukrainian SSR after the Downfall of Shelest — A Return to Stalinism?"

October 2, 1977
Conference commemorating the 100th birthday and 50th anniversary of the death of Danylo Shcherbakivsky, Ukrainian academician (ethnographer, historian of Ukrainian art, archeologist, professor, curator of the social-historical section of the All-Ukrainian Museum of History of Shevchenko in Kiev)
- William Omelchenko: Opening Address
- Vadim Pavlovsky: "D. Shcherbakivsky's Life and Activities"
- Natalia Pazuniak: "Reasons for the Tragic Death of D. Shcherbakivsky"
- Lubov Drashevska: "Contemporary Voices about D. Shcherbakivsky"
December 11, 1977
- Neonila Kordysh-Holovko: "Significance of the New Type Trypillian Statuette from D. Shcherbakivsky's Excavations near Serezliivka"
- Valerian Revutsky: "Titan of the Museum Cause"

March 5, 1978
- George Y. Shevelov: "Slavic Languages: Aspects of Similarities and Differences"
Conference dedicated to the 60th anniversary of Ukrainian independence.
- William Omelchenko: Opening Address
- Roman Ilnytskyj: "The Causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War at the Juncture of 1917-18"
- Anna Procyk: "The Party of People's Freedom and the Ukrainian Revolution"
- Michael Woskobijnyk: "What Brought About the Defeat of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in 1917-1920?"

April 2, 1978
- William Omelchenko: Opening Remarks
- Roman Szporluk: "Ethno-Demographic Processes in the Ukraine and Their Political Significance"

November 12, 1978
- George Y. Shevelov: "To be a Ukrainian Scholar: Vasyl' Simovych"

December 3, 1978
Conference in honor of Dmytro Chyzhevs'kyi.
- George Y. Shevelov: Opening Address
- Bohdan Rubchak: "Dmytro Chyzhevs'kyi as Historian of Ukrainian Literature"
- Wassyl Rudko: "The Philosophy of Dmytro Chyzhevs'kyi"

May 13, 1979
Conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of Symon Petliura, the Head of the Directory of the Ukrainian People's Republic.
- William Omelchenko: Opening Address
- Yaroslav Bilinsky: "Symon Petliura as Statesman"
- Taras Hunczak: "Symon Petliura and His Times"
- Olha Kyrychenko: A reading from the writings of Symon Petliura
June 17, 1979
Conference in honor of the writer Lyudmyla Kovalenko-Ivchenko (held jointly with the Union of Ukrainian Orthodox Sisterhoods).

- Hryhory Kostiuk: Opening Address
- Laryssa Onyshkevych: "The Literary Creativity of Lyudmyla Kovalenko"
- Oleksandra Selepyna: "Memories of Lyudmyla Kovalenko-Ivchenko in the History of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church"
- Olha Kyrychenko and Laryssa Kukrytska: A reading from the works of Lyudmyla Kovalenko

November 4, 1979
Conference in honor of Mykhailo Drai-Khmara (held jointly with the Shevchenko Scientific Society).

- George Y. Shevelov: Opening Address
- Hryhory Kostiuk: "The Literary Criticism of M. Drai-Khmara"
- Wasyl Lew: "The Poetry of M. Drai-Khmara"
- Oksana Drai-Khmara Asher: "Memories of My Father"
- Marusia Kukrytska and Volodymyr Lysniak: Readings from the poetry and diary of M. Drai-Khmara
- Jaroslaw Padoch: Closing Remarks

December 9, 1979
Conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of Volodymyr Doroshenko (held jointly with the Shevchenko Society).

- Wasyl Lew: Opening Address
- Bohdan Romanenchuk: "Volodymyr Doroshenko as Literary Critic and Historian of Literature"
- Ivan Korowycky: "The Literary Critic's First Steps"
- Edward Kasinec: "Some Observations on Bibliographic Activity in Galicia and the Emigration"
- Mira Harmash: "Memories of my Father"
- Anna Kobrynsky: "Volodymyr Doroshenko as Bibliographer of the L'viv-based Shevchenko Scientific Society"
- Oleh Fedyshyn: Closing Remarks
May 17, 1980
Conference commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US

- Yaroslav Bilinsky: Opening Remarks
- Omeljan Pritsak: "What Is Ukrainian History?"
- George Y. Shevelov: "Observations on the Works of H. Skovoroda"
- Yaroslav Bilinsky: "The Ukrainian Helsinki Group"
- William Omelchenko: "Thirty Years of the Academy's Work"
- Lina Beluts: Readings from the works of T. Shevchenko, L. Kostenko, and V. Symonenko
- Juliana Osinchuk: Piano recital

The following conferences were held and lectures were delivered at the Academy in the period from 1977 through November 2, 1980, under the auspices of individual Divisions, Sections, and Commissions:

**Technical and Physico-Chemical-Mathematical Division**

May 15, 1977
- William Omelchenko: Opening Remarks
- Vitalij Garber, Assistant Administrator for Field Operations, U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration: "Development of Research in the Field of Modern Energy"

October 14, 1979
Conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of Albert Einstein.
- V. Petryshyn: Opening Address
- Eugene Lashchyk: "The Philosophical World View of Einstein"
- O. Tretiak: "Einstein as Engineer"
- Olexa Bilaniuk: "Einstein — The Key to Understanding the Universe"

**Ancient History Section**

November 20, 1977
- Alexander Dombrowsky: "Ancient Roots of Byzantine Spiritualism"

March 23, 1980  • Alexander Dombrowsky: "Whence Came the Land of Rus?"

Archaeological and Anthropological Section

October 19, 1980  • Yuri Shumovsky: "The Search for the First Man on the Basis of Recent Scientific Research"

Biological-Medical Section

November 6, 1977  • Roman Osinchuk, M. D.: Opening Remarks
  • Oleh Wolansky, M. D.: "The Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union"

November 12, 1977  Conference with the Shevchenko Scientific Society
  • A. Archimovych: "The Role of Individual Grain Cultures As Related to World Grain Production"
  • O. Wolansky, M. D.: "Soviet Psychiatry — Servant of the Government"
  • P. Szumowski (Paris): "The Interaction of Sex Hormones in the Structural Development and Secretory Activity of Accessory Glands"
  • S. Krasheninnikov: "The Result of the Scientific Research on 'Balantidium coli'"
  • K. Archimovych: "Observations on Temperature Differences in Ripening Tomato Fruits"
  • O. Kononenko: "Feeding Livestock with Sugar-Cane"
  • H. Haharyn: "Organization and Development of the Myronivska Research Station and Its Achievements with Selection of Winter Wheat"
  • M. Stefaniv: "Alpha and Beta Obstructions in Therapy of the Cardio-Vascular System"

March 25, 1979  • Roman Osinchuk, M. D.: Opening Address, "Technology, Medicine, and Human Health"
  • Myroslaw Dragan, M. D.: "The Division of Antigens among the Blood Groups of Ukrainians"
  • Mykhaylo Stefaniv, M. D.: "The Influence of Blood Flow on the Formation of Arteriosclerosis"
October 28, 1979

Conference conducted jointly with the Chemical-Biological-Medical Section of the Shevchenko Scientific Society

- Juri Truchly, M. D.: "Degenerative Changes in Joints"
- Alexander Archimovych: "Changes in World Grain Production and the USSR's Contribution to World Production"
- Edward Zharsky: "The Isospices of the Ukraine"
- Fedir Welykokhatko: "Continuity in the Creation of Natural Species"
- Lubov Margolena: "Contemporary Terrorism and Its Possible Sociological and Biological Causes"
- Ivan Hromyk: "The Sterile Form (A Mutation) of Peas"
- Hryhorij Haharyn: "Selectional and Planting Work with Grain Cultures at the Bila Tserkva Selectional Station"
- Theodore Zalucky: "Medicines of the Future"
- Roman Osinchuk: "The Technology, Medicine, and Human Health"
- George W. Lucyszyn: "The Influence of the Chemical Poisoning of a Dog's Liver on Blood Enzymes"; "Hematological Changes Following the Chemical Poisoning of a Dog's Liver"

Economic Section

December 29, 1977

Conference in memory of Vsevolod S. Holubnychy (1928-1977), his life and work

- Iwan S. Koropeckyj, Chairman

Participants:
- Volodymyr Bandera
- Yaroslav Bilinsky
- Vasyl Hryshko
- Volodar Lysko
- Lewko Maystrenko

October 21, 1979

- Iwan S. Koropeckyj: Opening Remarks
• Fedor Kushnirsky: “Selected Problems of the Economy of the Ukraine To-day,” (lecture co-sponsored by the Shevchenko Scientific Society)

**Fine Arts Section**

January 30, 1977 Panel discussion: “Where is Our Place in Art?”
Participants:
• Sviatoslav Hordynsky
• Arkadia Olenska-Petryshyn
• Maryna Antonovych-Rudnytska
• Iryna Petrenko-Fedyshyn
Moderator — Jakiv Hnizdovsky

**Historical Section**

February 20, 1977
• William Omelchenko: Opening Remarks
• Mykola Kushnirenko: “Orthodoxy in Zakarpattia”

May 1, 1977
• William Omelchenko: Opening Remarks
• Oleh Pidhayny: “The Development of the Study of East European History in North America”

April 16, 1978
• William Omelchenko: Opening Remarks
• John Sweet: “Fedir Matushev’s’kyi: His Life and Civic Political Work”

February 11, 1979
• John Sweet: “The Ukrainian Consul Petro Tverdovs’kyi, 1918-1919”

May 4, 1980
Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky: “A Forgotten Forerunner of Ukrainian Nationalism: Franciszek Duchniński and His ‘Turanska’ Theory”

May 11, 1980
• John Sweet: “T. Olesiyuk — A Political and Civic Activist and Researcher of the Demography of the Ukraine”

October 12, 1980
• Stephen Rapawy: “The National Composition of the Population and Linguistic Changes in the Ukraine on the Basis of the Most Recent Census”

November 2, 1980
• Yaroslav Bilinsky: Opening Remarks
THE ANNALS OF THE UKRAINI AN ACADEMY

Oleh Fedysyn: "The Polish Revolution: Causes, Problems, and Prognoses"

Literary and Philological Section

May 22, 1977

- Vitalij Keis: "Faust and Hamlet — Prototypes of Modern Man"

February 19, 1978

- Hryhory Kostiuk: Opening Remarks
- Ivan Novosivsky: "Olha Kobylyanska in the Memoirs of Her Contemporaries"

March 6, 1978

- Hryhory Kostiuk: Opening Remarks
- Ivan Novosivsky: "Reflections on Shevchenko Among the Bessarabian-Moldavians and in the Bessarabian Press, 1854-1916"

March 18, 1978

- Hryhory Kostiuk: Opening Remarks
- Oksana Asher: "Five Invincible Poets"
- Olha Shuhan: A reading from the poetry of M. Drai-Khmara

April 1, 1979

- Jurij Lawrinenko: Opening Remarks
- Edward Kasinec: "Iurii Mezhenko as Bibliographer"

March 30, 1980

- George Y. Shevelov: Opening Remarks
- John Fizer: "The Encoded Presence of General Esthetic Categories in the Works of Shevchenko"

Commission for the Preservation of the Literary Heritage of Volodymyr Vynnychenko

February 27, 1977

Conference commemorating the 17th anniversary of the death of Rosalia Iakivna Vynnychenko
- Hryhory Kostiuk, Head of Commission: "A Woman Worthy of Much Gratitude From the World of Ukrainian Scholarship"
- Film on the Life of V. Vynnychenko and his wife at "Zakutka" (France)

April 3, 1977

- Hryhory Kostiuk: "The Vynnychenko Period (An Attempt to Formulate the Basic Problems Concerning Vynnychenko Studies)"
December 18, 1977

- Melanie Czajkowskyj: "The Question of V. Vynnychenko’s Mission to Moscow and Kharkiv in 1920"

December 17, 1978

- Hryhory Kostiuk: "The Difficulties with and Achievements of Working in V. Vynnychenko’s Archive"

April 26-27, 1980

Conference commemorating the 130th anniversary of the birth of Volodymyr Vynnychenko

- George Y. Shevelov: Opening Address
- Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky: "V. Vynnychenko’s Socio-Political World View in Light of His Publicistic Writings"
- Roman Ilnytskyj: "Vynnychenko as Politician in the Central Rada and Directory (1917-1919)"
- Danylo Struk: "Vynnychenko’s Moral Laboratory"
- Wolodymyr Smyrniw: "Technological Foresight in Vynnychenko’s Novel Soniashna mashyna"
- Petro Odarchenko: "Vynnychenko and the Student Youth of the 1920s"
- Taras Hunczak: "V. Vynnychenko and S. Petliura"
- Gregory Luzhnytsky: "Vynnychenko’s Dramas and the Modern Theatre of O. Zaharov in L’viv"
- Bohdan Rubchak: "Vynnychenko’s Drama Mizh dvokh syl and M. Kulish’s Patetychna sonata"
- Leonid Rudnytsky: "Vynnychenko on the German Stage"
- Domenico DiMarco: "Emma Grammatica and V. Vynnychenko: Vynnychenko on the Italian Stage"
- Valerian Revutsky: "Vynnychenko and Somerset Maugham: Analogies and Observations"
- Hryhory Kostiuk: Closing Remarks

Commission for the Study of Post-Revolutionary Ukraine and the Soviet Union

February 13, 1977

- Vsevolod Holubnychy: Opening Remarks
Roman Ilnytskyj: “The Ukrainization Laws of the 1920s and Their Impact on the State Administration and Education”

**Summer Seminars**

Summer seminars of the Ukrainian Academy began in 1974 and have been held every summer since then. The seminars are held in August in Hunter, N. Y. They last one week, and their format comprises lectures and discussion sessions. The lecture series are given by invited scholars, usually two at each seminar. The average number of registered participants each year was about 35 (with a low of 29 and a high of 47).

August 15-19, 1977
- Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky: “Currents in the Ukrainian Political Thought”
- Bohdan Rubchak: “Ukrainian Emigré Literature”

August 7-11, 1978
- Omeljan Pritsak: “Ukrainian Intellectual History of the 19th and 20th Centuries”
- Marko Carynnyk: “Dovzhenko and the Ukrainian Film Art.” Four of Dovzhenko’s films were shown and analyzed during this seminar

August 20-24, 1979
- Borys Lewytzkyj: “Political and Economic History of the Ukrainian SSR, 1953-79”
- Frank Sysyn: “The Period of Khmelnytsky — Analysis of a Revolution”

August 18-22, 1980
- Hryhory Kostiuk: “Vynnychenko’s Literary Heritage”
- Leonid Plyushch: “National-bolshevism — A New Form of Russian Imperialism”

All of the above seminars were organized by the Philadelphia Branch of the Ukrainian Academy (Renata Holod and Oleh Tretiak, Tyt and Sofia Hewryk, Evhen and Vira Lashchyk, Olexa Bilaniuk).

**Popular Talks and Travelogs**

June 4, 1977
- Jaroslav Turkalo: “Impressions from Travels to Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1975”

Talk illustrated with slides
October 30, 1977  • Bohdan Osadchuk, well-known West European journalist and lecturer at the Berlin Free University: “The Ukrainian Question on the European Forum”

Social Meetings

October 8, 1977  Meeting in honor of Iwan Zamsha, on the occasion of his 82nd birthday, 55th anniversary of his teaching activities, and 25th anniversary of devoted work at the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US

• William Omelchenko: Opening Address

Greetings and reminiscences from participants. Iwan Zamsha expressed his gratitude for the celebration and shared his reminiscences

December 4, 1977  Meeting in honor of Alexander Nedilko, devoted worker of the Academy Museum-Archives and Library, on the occasion of his 75th birthday

The following conferences were held and lectures were delivered from December 1976 to November 1980 under the auspices of the individual Branches of the Academy:

[See also under Summer Seminars]

June 12, 1977  • Atanas Figol: “Leonid Plyushch”

December 13, 1978  • Nadia Svitlychna: “Human Rights in the Ukrainian SSR”

November 30, 1979  • Lev Shekhtman: “Contemporary Ukrainian Theater”

Branch of the Academy in Washington, D. C.

December 17, 1976  Conference commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of Academician S. O. Iefremov

• Petro Odarchenko: “The Life and Scholarly Activity of Academician S. O. Iefremov”

• Mykola Stepanenko: “S. O. Iefremov as a Citizen and a Publicist”

January 16, 1977  Lecture (held jointly with the Ukrainian Engineers’ Society of America, Washington Metropolitan Branch, and the Branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society)
• M. Yarymovych: "The Energy Problem in the United States"

March 11, 1977
Conference dedicated to Taras Shevchenko (held jointly with the Branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society)
• Petro Odarchenko: "T. H. Shevchenko and P. A. Hrabovskyi"

March 13, 1977
Celebration in honor of Taras Shevchenko (held jointly with the Branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and the Ukrainian Association of Washington, D. C.)
• D. M. Corbett: "Taras Shevchenko and Contemporary Ukraine"

December 11, 1977
Lecture in memory of A. D. Margolin
• C. W. Warvariv: "A. D. Margolin — His Life and Work"

December 15, 1977
Session in memory of I. P. Dubrovskyj
• M. I. Dubrovska: "A Thorny Path: The Life and Work of I. P. Dubrovskyj"

February 19, 1978
Conference dedicated to Taras Shevchenko (held jointly with the Branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society)
• Petro Odarchenko: "The Latest Soviet Edition of Shevchenko's Kobzar"

November 5, 1978
Petro Odarchenko: "The Poetic Work of Volodymyr Yaniv"

December 10, 1978
Literary Evening in memory of M. Khvylovy
• Hryhory Kostiuk: "M. Khvylovy — His Life and Literary Work"
• Iosyp Hirniak: "Reminiscences about Khvylovy" (tape-recorded)
• M. Harasowska: Reading from Khvylovy's Arabesque
• O. Kobec: "Reminiscences about Khvylovy" (read by O. O. Voronyn)

March 11, 1979
Conference dedicated to Taras Shevchenko (held jointly with the Branch of the Shevchenko Scientific Society)
• Petro Odarchenko: "Shevchenko and the Contemporary Resistance Movement in the Ukraine"

December 9, 1979

Literary Evening commemorating the 100th anniversary of the birth of H. O. Chuprynka

• Petro Odarchenko: "The Life and the Work of Hryhory Chuprynka"

• M. Dubrovska and U. Sos: Reading of Chuprynka's poems

March 23 1980

Literary Evening of Sviatoslav Karavansky

• Petro Odarchenko: "The Poetry of S. I. Karavansky"

• Lina Beluts, Tamara Warvariv, and Sviatoslav Karavansky: Reading from Karavansky's works

• Larisa Pastuchiv: Rendition of Karavansky's translation of Shakespeare's Sonnet 14, set to a composition of her own, accompanied on a bandura

• Marta Kichorowsky, Sofia Nakonechna and Larisa Pastuchiv: Rendition of Karavansky's "Lullaby" accompanied on a bandura (music by Petro Budny)

May 14, 1980

Author's Evening with poet Yar Slavutych

• Mikola Francuzenko: "The Poetry of Yar Slavutych"

• Petro Odarchenko: "Yar Slavutych as a Scholar"

• Yar Slavutych: Readings from his own works

October 5, 1980

Literary Evening commemorating the 50th anniversary of the death of Olena Pchilka

• Petro Odarchenko: "The Life and Literary Work of Olena Pchilka, Together with My Own Reminiscences About Her"

• Mykola Francuzenko and Halyna Kozar: Reading of Olena Pchilka's poems and extracts from her prose

October 19, 1980

• Oksana Solovey: "Impression from a Recent Trip to China," travelogue illustrated with numerous slides

Compiled by Prof. William Omelchenko
Members’ Participation in International and National Scholarly Congresses, Seminars, and Similar Events*

January 1977
In Washington, D. C., at a conference sponsored by the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Foreign Demographic Section, John A. Armstrong was a discussant on “Trends in Central Asian Demography”

January 27, 1977
In Washington, D. C., at the American Council for World Freedom, John A. Armstrong gave a lecture on “US and USSR after Détente”

March 24, 1977
In Washington, D. C., at the Kennan Institute, John A. Armstrong presented paper “The Westward Expansion of the USSR”

April 28-30, 1977

May 18, 1977
In Warsaw, Poland, at the Institute of History, Warsaw University, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak gave a seminar presentation on women’s history

June, 1977
In Cambridge, Mass., at the Second Annual Meeting of the Permanent Conference on Ukrainian Studies, of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Larissa M. L. Zaleska Onyshkevych presented paper “Vynnychenko’s Disharmony in Terms of the Tenets of Existentialism”

June 8-10, 1977

June 27, 1977
In Chicago, Ill., at the Scientific Congress of the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America, Roman Osinchuk presented paper “Diagnostic and Statistical Data and Consequences of Blood Hypertension”

*Exclusively based on materials submitted by members of the Academy.
July, 1977  

July 28-31, 1977  
In Koenigstein/Taunus, the German Federal Republic, at the 27th International Catholic Congress “Kirche in Not” [“The Church in Danger”], Theodore Mackiw was a panelist

August 12, 1977  

August 19, 1977  
In Shanghai, People’s Republic of China, at a meeting of the Shanghai Physical Society, Olexa Myron Bilaniuk gave lecture “Nuclear Configurations via Nuclear Spectroscopy”

September 4, 1977  
In Washington, D. C., at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, John A. Armstrong chaired panel on “Soviet Nationalities”

September 11-16, 1977  
In Oberwolfach, the German Federal Republic, at the International Conference on Nonlinear Functional Analysis, W. V. Petryshyn presented paper “Existence of Nonzero Fixed Points for Noncompact Mappings in Wedges and Cones”

September 19-23, 1977  

September 30, 1977  
In Valley Forge, Pa., at the Eleventh Conference on European Problems, John A. Armstrong presented paper “Ethnicity and Freedom: The Moral Dimension”

October 13-16, 1977  

October 20-22, 1977

In Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, at the McMaster University and Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Conference on "Poland and Ukraine": Yaroslav Bilinsky discussed three papers on economic and cultural Polish-Ukrainian relations; Martha Bohachevska-Chomiak was an invited participant; Jaroslaw Pelenski presented paper "Russia, Poland and Ukraine: Historical and Political Perspectives"; and Ivan L. Rudnytsky presented paper "Polish-Ukrainian Relations: The Burden of History"

November, 1977


November 16-19, 1977

In College Park, Md., at the University of Maryland Conference "Women and Power: Dimensions of Women's Historical Experience," Martha Bohachevska-Chomiak presented paper "Ukrainian Women's Movement: Between Feminism and Nationalism"

November 19, 1977

In Cleveland, Ohio, at the John Carroll University Conference on "Soviet Violations of Human Rights: Case Study: Ukraine," Yaroslav Bilinsky presented paper "Political Aspirations of Dissenters in the Ukraine"

December 28, 1977

In Chicago, Ill., at the National Conference of the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages, Larissa M. L. Zaleska Onyshkevych presented paper "Was There an Easter in Kulish's Sonata Pathétique?"

March 1978

In Brooklyn, N. Y., at the Fourth Brooklyn College Conference on Society in Change, Jaroslaw Pelenski presented paper "Eighteenth-Century Popular Unrest in Eastern Europe: The Haidamak Insurrections, 1734-68"

March 1-3 1978

In Hershey, Pa., at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting
of the Northeastern Section of the Geological Society of America, Ivan Oleksyshyn presented paper “Fossil Plants from the Anthracite Coal Fields of Eastern Pennsylvania and their Stratigraphic Value”

March 8-14, 1978

In Iasi, Romania, at the Romanian-American Seminar on Operator Theory, W. V. Petryshyn presented paper “Solvability of Semilinear Elliptic BV Problems at Resonance via the A-proper Mapping Theory”

April, 1978

In Notre Dame, Ind., at the National Endowment for Humanities Reunion in Notre Dame University, Eugene Lashchyk presented paper “Bridging Some Rationality Gaps by Analogical Arguments”

April 8, 1978

In Jersey City, N. J., at the Spring Meeting of the American Catholic Historical Association, at Seton Hall University, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak was a discussant on the panel “Reform and the Churches of Eastern Europe in the Age of Enlightened Despotism”

April 9, 1978

In Washington, D. C., at meeting of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, John A. Armstrong gave lecture on “Significance of Heightened Soviet Anti-Semitism”

May, 1978

In Chicago, Ill., at the Jubilee Congress of the Ukrainian Historical Association, Alexander Dombrowsky presented paper on the early historical conditions during the emergence of Kievan Rus’

May 6, 1978


May 8 — June 16, 1978

In Rabat, Morocco, at the Nuclear Physics Laboratory of the University of Rabat, Olexa Myron Bilaniuk presented two seminar series (in French): (1) “Nuclear Reactions as a Tool for Determining Configurations of Nuclei” and (2) “Gravitons, Quarks, Tachyons: Problems at the Frontiers of Physics”; Bilaniuk was Visiting Fulbright Professor

May 28-30, 1978

In London, Ontario, Canada, the Canadian Congress of Learned Societies was attended by Theodore Mackiw
May 29-31, 1978
In London, Ontario, Canada, at the Ukrainian Historical Conference, jointly sponsored by the University of Western Ontario, the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, and the Ukrainian Historical Association: Oleh S. Fedyshyn presented paper “The Ukrainian Factor in the Russian Revolution and Civil War”; Ivan L. Rudnytsky presented paper “Problems of Terminology and Periodization in Ukrainian History”; and Lubomyr R. Wynar presented paper “The present State of Ukrainian Historical Studies in the Soviet Union”

June, 1978
In Washington, D. C., at the Kennan Institute, John A. Armstrong was a discussant on “Increasing Russian Nationalism”

June, 1978
In Berlin, Germany, at the Fourth International Conference on Early Russian History, at the Free University of Berlin, Jaroslav Pelenski presented paper “State and Society in Muscovite Russia and the Mongol-Turkic System in the Sixteenth Century”

June 1-3, 1978

July 2, 1978
In Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada, at the Scientific Congress of the Ukrainian Medical Association of North America, Roman Osinchuk presented paper “Percussion of the Abdomen”

July 20-23, 1978
In Koenigstein/Taunus, the German Federal Republic, the 28th International Catholic Congress “Kirche in Not” was attended by Theodore Mackiw

August 28, 1978
In Düsseldorf, the German Federal Republic, at the Sixth World Congress of Philosophy, Eugene Lashchyk defended the thesis “Scientific Change Can Be Rationally Justified”

September, 1978
In Düsseldorf, the German Federal Republic, at the International Congress of Slavists and Germanists, Jurij Bojko-Blochyn presented paper “Goethe in Ukrainian Literature”
September 10, 1978  In Cleveland, Ohio, at the East Central States Regional Conference on Soviet Jewry, John A. Armstrong gave lecture on “Two Perspectives on Soviet Jewry”

October, 1978  In Columbus, Ohio, at “East European Heritage: A Symposium” held at Ohio State University, Lubomyr R. Wynar presented paper “The Objectives of the Center for the Study of Ethnic Publications”

October 10-12, 1978  In Boston, Mass., at the National Institute of Education Conference on the Educational and Occupational Needs of White Ethnic Women, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak was an invited participant

October 12-15, 1978  In Columbus, Ohio, at the Tenth National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Larissa M. L. Zaleska Onyshkevych presented paper “Symbolist Imagery in [Dovzhenko’s] Zvenyhora”; the panel “The Art of Dovzhenko (on the Fiftieth Anniversary of His Film Trilogy)” had been organized by Onyshkevych

October 22, 1978  In Ann Arbor, Mich., at a meeting of the Social Science History Association, John A. Armstrong discussed “European and American Elites in Administration”


October 26-28, 1978  In Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, at the Conference on Women in Eastern Europe and the USSR, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak presented paper “Feminism, Socialism, and Nationalism in the Austrian Empire”

October 27, 1978  In Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, at a Seminar of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak presented paper “Kobrynska’s Social Views”

November, 1978  In Washington, D.C., at the Kennan Institute, John A. Armstrong presented paper “Socializing for Modernization in a Multi-Ethnic Elite”

November 24-26, 1978  In New York, N. Y., at the Scientific Conference Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine and the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in the USA: Hryhorij Haharyn presented paper "National Treasury of the Plant Resources of the Ukraine"; Ivan Oleksyshyn presented paper "Coal, Its Origin and Distribution, Especially in Ukraine and in the United States of America"; and Roman Osinchuk presented papers on "Prostaglandins" and "The Ukrainian Metropolitan Sheptytsky Hospital in Lviv".

December 14, 1978  In Philadelphia, Pa., at the Metropolitan Sheptytsky Conference sponsored by the Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome, Philadelphia Branch, Roman Osinchuk presented paper "Metropolitan Sheptytsky and Ukrainian Medical World".

January 23, 1979  In Cincinnati, Ohio, at the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council John A. Armstrong gave lecture on "The Struggle for Soviet Jewry Today in the Perspective of US-USSR Relations".

March 1-3, 1979  In College Park, Md., at the University of Maryland Conference on "Assessment of Quality of Master's Programs" Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak was a participant.

March 16, 1979  In Ottawa, Canada, at Carleton University, Yaroslav Bilinsky gave public lecture on "The Concept of the Soviet People and Its Implications for Brezhnev's Nationality Policy".

May, 1979  In Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada, at a meeting of the Canadian Association of Slavists, I. S. Koropeckij presented paper on the history of Russian-Ukrainian economic relations.

May 5, 1979  In Milwaukee, Wis., at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Conference on Ethnic Problems John A. Armstrong was a discussant on "East European Perspectives toward Ancestral Homelands".

May 9, 1979  In East Lansing, Mich., at the Michigan State University Conference on Soviet Politics, John A. Armstrong was a discussant on "Kremlinology".

May 25-27, 1979  In Cambridge, Mass., at the Fourth Annual Meeting
of the Permanent Conference in Ukrainian Studies, of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, Ivan L. Rudnytsky presented paper "The Foreign Policy Concepts of Ukrainian Political Thinkers of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries"

May, 1979

In Wildbad Kreuth, the German Federal Republic, at the Twelfth International Conference on European Problems, John A. Armstrong was a discussant on Soviet-US relations

May, 1979

In Warsaw, Poland, in a seminar at the Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences, Jaroslaw Pelenski presented paper "Russia, Poland, and Ukraine: Historical and Political Perspectives"

May 27-June 1, 1979

In Poznań, Poland, at the Third Conference of Polish and American Historians, devoted to the theme "Nation/Nationality — State — Society," Jaroslaw Pelenski presented paper "Poland-Lithuania (1454-1573): Nobility Democracy or Tripartite Mixed Government?"; Pelenski was also the American coordinator and principal investigator of the conference

June, 1979

In Dallas, Texas, at the Annual Convention of the American Library Association, Lubomyr R. Wynar presented paper "Ethnicity and Librarianship: Special Issues and Current Problems"

July 5, 1979

In Koenigstein/Taunus, the German Federal Republic, at the Komensky World Congress, Theodore Mackiw presented paper "The Role of Komensky and Skovoroda as Educators in Their Times"

July 20-22, 1979

In Koenigstein/Taunus, the German Federal Republic, the 29th International Catholic Congress "Kirche in Not" was attended by Theodore Mackiw

August 13, 1979

In Moscow, USSR, at the Congress of the International Political Science Association, John A. Armstrong presented paper "Administrative Elites in Multiethnic Politics"

September 3, 1979

In Washington, D. C., at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Yaroslav Bilinsky discussed paper "Ethnic Representation in Soviet Leadership over Time"
October 9, 1979
In Racine, Wis., at the Johnson Foundation Symposium on Soviet Society, John A. Armstrong was a discussant.

October 10-13, 1979
In New Haven, Conn., at the Eleventh National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Yaroslav Bilinsky discussed papers on Party politics within the USSR, and Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak presented paper “Socialism and Feminism in Galicia.”

November, 1979

December, 1979

December, 1979
In New York, N. Y., at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Bibliography of History, Lubomyr R. Wynar participated in the discussion on the present state of historical bibliography in the US.

January-July, 1980
In Orsay, France, as Visiting Scientist at the Institute of Nuclear Physics of the Universite de Paris-Sud, Olexa Myron Bilaniuk participated in a series of colloquia on “Nuclear Reactions at High Energies.”

January 25-28, 1980
In New York, at the International Conference on “The Origins of Intracellular Organelles in the Eukaryotic Cell,” sponsored by the New York Academy of Sciences, Christina Spolsky presented paper (with Thomas Uzell, as senior author) on “Two Data Sets: Alternative Explanations and Interpretations.”

May, 1980
In Muenster, The German Federal Republic, at the Westfaelische Wilhelm University, Theodore Mackiw gave lecture (in German) on “Anglo-Russian Relationship during the Great Northern War, 1700-21.”
May 19-28, 1980 In Washington, D. C., and other places in the US, Ivan Oleksyshyn participated in the Ninth International Congress of Carboniferous Stratigraphy and Geology; the Congress named him among the 99 most active members selected from 20 countries in the field of Carboniferous flora; Oleksyshyn is a constant participant in the International Working Group on Carboniferous and Permian Compression Floras


June 2-20, 1980 In Sherbrooke, Quebec, Canada, at the International Summer School on the Fixed Point Theory, W. V. Petryshyn presented paper “Fixed Point and Surjectivity Theorems via the A-proper Mapping Theory with Applications to Differential Equations”


July 30-August 3, 1980 In Koenigstein/Taunus, the German Federal Republic, the 30th International Catholic Congress “Kirche in Not” was attended by Theodore Mackiw
August 7, 1980
In College Park, Md., in the National Endowment for Humanities Seminar at the University of Maryland, Eugene Lashchyk presented paper "Einstein and the Problem of Theory Choice".

September 20, 1980

September 30 - October 4, 1980

October, 1980

October 6-7, 1980
In Munich, the German Federal Republic, at the Conference on Polish-Ukrainian Relations at the Ukrainian Free University, Jaroslaw Pelenski presented paper "Russia, Poland, and Ukraine: The Present State of Affairs and the Prospects for the Future".
October 18, 1980  In Myrtle Beach, S. C., at the Thirteenth International Conference on European Problems, John A. Armstrong chaired session on “Soviet Foreign Policy”


Compiled by Yaroslav Bilinsky,
assisted by Prof. William Omelchenko
Obituaries

IWAN ZAMSHA
(1895 — 1978)

Professor Iwan Zamsha, economist and at one time an active participant in the cooperative movement in the Ukraine, died on November 15, 1978. From 1952 almost until the day of his death, he continuously worked as the secretary of the Academy's Executive Board, as well as being in charge of finances and publishing activities.

Zamsha was born on October 8, 1895, in Rozkishna village in a peasant family in the Kiev gubernia [province]. He graduated from a junior secondary school in the town of Stavyshche. He went to Manchuria in 1912, intending to continue his education while earning a living. In 1916 Zamsha was drafted into the Army, and in 1917, after the February Revolution, he participated actively in the Ukrainization of military units in Rostov-on-Don and in the town of Gori (Caucasus). He was a member of the Transcausian Ukrainian Council.

In 1918 Zamsha came to Kiev and worked in the cooperative organizations which flourished in the years of the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920, and in the early 1920s. In 1922 he became the deputy chief and then the chief of the financial department of Vukopspilka (the All-Ukrainian Union of Consumer Cooperatives) in Kiev. While working full time, he pursued his studies at the Ukrainian Institute of Cooperative Studies, from which he graduated in 1923. He immediately started to lecture there and became a research associate. In 1926-30 he became a research associate at the Institute for Research of Cooperative Movement, in Kiev.

In his research he concentrated on the analysis of economics of consumers' cooperatives and cooperative industrial enterprises. He published several papers in the Institute's periodicals, such as: "The Building Up of Ukrainian Cooperatives" and "The Organization of Cooperatives' Accounting in Vukopspilka."

On October 15, 1930, the day of mass arrests in Kiev, Zamsha was also arrested. He was released after three months' imprisonment, arrested again in March 1931, and remained in prison until late 1931.

From 1932 to 1941 Zamsha was teaching, mostly accounting, at the institutions of higher learning in Kiev. From 1934 to 1938 he headed the Planning-Economics Department at the Kiev Institute for Preparation of Economists and Engineering-Technical Personnel, of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry.

During the German occupation of the Ukraine, Zamsha worked as a member of the board and the chief of the financial department of Vukopspilka.
After the end of the war, Zamsha made his residence in West Germany and participated in the activities of Ukrainian émigrés there. From 1945 to 1949 he worked as the deputy chief, and then as the chief, of the financial department of the Ukrainian Central Relief Committee in Germany. In 1945 he was one of the founders of the Ukrainian Higher School of Economics in Munich, where he was a professor and the head of the Planning-Economics Department until late 1951.

Early in 1952 Zamsha came to the USA and settled in New York City. He immediately started to work at the Academy and took charge of its finances, publishing activities, and secretarial work. At that time the Academy received grants for its publishing work from the Ford Foundation. Since 1961, however, the Academy has had to rely only on the support of the Ukrainian-American community. Zamsha was in charge of fund raising. Since Volodymyr P. Timoshenko, head of the Academy Economics and Law Section, lived until his death (1965) in California, Zamsha, beginning with 1952, was his deputy and managed the work of the section. He did the same after Boris Martos became the section's head. Zamsha organized scholarly conferences and succeeded in bringing several economists of the younger generation to participate in the Academy's work.

The Academy absorbed almost all Zamsha's time and energy; very little was left for scholarly work. However, at the Academy conferences Zamsha did present several papers: "The Use of Soviet Sources in the Study of Economics" and "Ukrainian Cooperatives 1917-1920" (1952), "Tuhan-Baranovsky in the Ukraine in 1917-1919" (1965), "On the Occasion of the 50th anniversary of Founding the Centres of Ukrainian Cooperative Organizations" (1969). He also participated in the Conference on Academic Freedom in the USSR, arranged in New York in 1954 by the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the USSR, where he spoke on "Academic Freedom and Economic Science in the USSR." His paper was published in the collection Academic Freedom Under the Soviet Regime, 1954, Institute for the Study of the USSR.

Iwan Zamsha's most important contribution to Ukrainian culture is his shouldering of the load of the everyday activities of the Academy for twenty-six years, especially his participation in publishing a number of works of historical value.

LUBC V DRASHEVSKA

ALEX SIMIRENKO
(1931-1979):
AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT

Alex Simirenko, Professor of Sociology at Pennsylvania State University, was born in Kiev, Ukraine, in 1931. He died April 27, 1979, after a protracted illness. Simirenko was very well known and deeply respected in his profession.

Alex Simirenko came to the United States in 1950. After a short stay in
Philadelphia, he moved with his mother to Minneapolis where he matriculated at the University of Minnesota. Originally, to follow in his father's and grandfather's footsteps, he was to study horticulture, but after a prolonged illness he discovered his interest in sociology and returned to the University to obtain in it a B. A. (1957), M. A. (1958), and Ph. D (1961). He studied with Don Martindale, a very influential professor who has trained a significant number of outstanding American sociologists.

Alex Simirenko's first intellectual interest was in the study of the changes of ethnic communities from generation to generation. His doctoral thesis, later published in a revised form under the title of *Pilgrims, Colonists and Frontiersmen*, shows the early direction that his sociological thought took. This was a study of the "Russian" community in Minneapolis. Although identified by outsiders and by the majority of the community members themselves as Russian, the community consisted of Carpatho-Rusyn immigrants who came to the United States from the Carpathian Mountain region in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and their descendants.

What interested Simirenko was the question of what happens to an ethnic community like the one in Minneapolis with the coming of new generations. Does the community disintegrate when the members of its new generations move in the stratification system of the society at large? The prevalent theory at the time was that of W. Lloyd Warner, which assumed that each ethnic group starts on the road toward acculturation to the American values and toward socio-economic advancement as soon as it settles in an American city and, unless it is marked by some racial characteristics, within a generation or so it is doomed to be lost within the larger society. Acculturation and economic advancement were seen to be closely linked, so that, when members of an ethnic community advanced in the economic structure of society at large, they would divest themselves of their ethnic background.

Simirenko could see that the problem was not that simple. His reading of Max Weber, H. Gerth, and C. W. Mills suggested to him that both the majority community and the minority ethnic community may monopolize access to certain values or advantages for their members by denying them to members of other ethnic groups. Thus, indeed, there may be status advantages to retaining membership in an ethnic group. His reading of Weber also suggested that members of ethnic communities, through acquiring skills by which advantages are obtained in the majority community (society at large), may pass, as it were, tests through which they can be admitted to that community even if, as a rule, it is relatively closed to outsiders. This, however, according to Simirenko, is probably possible only to the second-generation members of the ethnic community.

Yet, Simirenko's observation of ethnic communities and probably his own personal experience showed that one cannot speak of the second generation of the ethnic community as if all its members were simply in the process of divesting themselves of their ethnic background and becoming members of the society at large. Some were; some were not. Indeed, Simirenko himself, who came to the United States as an older teen-age boy, after entering university studies far away from his family and from the larger settlements of his own
ethnic group, could be said to represent those who ventured outside the boundaries of their community. Yet his identity with this community remained important to him. If anything, this situation probably gave him a more objective perspective from which to view and analyze ethnic communities.

It is in this regard that Karl Mannheim's theories became useful and very important to Simirenko's thinking. In particular, Simirenko focussed on Mannheim's theory of generations, but the basic assumptions of Mannheim's general sociology of knowledge seem to have left a lasting influence. Mannheim maintained that to understand social process and change it is necessary to distinguish between generation location, generation as actuality, and generation units. Generation location refers to the purely biological fact of being within the same generation by the accident of birth. Generation as actuality, however, refers to the historical fact of people who may be of the same generation location but who participate in different concrete historical "common destinies." In turn, the same actual generation can be subdivided into a number of generation units, or groups who work up the material of their common social and intellectual experience in different specific ways. These generation units tend to polarize into the dominant and the opposed types, depending on how they approach and try to answer the problems of their common historical experience and on how they are able to rise in the social status scale of the actual generation.

Simirenko applied this distinction to the Minneapolis community. He came up with three generational units: the "old" immigrants, the "first" actual generation, whom he labels "the pilgrims"; and two generational units of the "second" actual generation (the children of the first generation), "the colonists" and "the frontiersmen." The colonists were those of the second generation who were oriented toward remaining in the ethnic community; the frontiersmen, those who have made a break with their ethnic community and aimed to seek their individual fortunes within the society at large.

Simirenko's interviews showed that indeed there was an improvement in the economic position of the members of the ethnic community as one moved from the pilgrims to the colonists and the frontiersmen. Similarly, there was an improvement in their style of life and the general status, a greater participation in the political life and decision-making of the general American community, and a general increase in acculturation to the values and culture of the American society. His data, however, also showed that the frontiersmen still enjoyed and acted to retain prestige in the ethnic community and their influence and power in the ethnic community did not decrease.

In interpreting the results of his study, Simirenko was somewhat baffled by what appeared as inconsistencies in data on the frontiersmen. Against the Warnerian simple idea of assimilation of the second generation, he did show that the problem is not that simple, that one cannot speak univocally of the second generation. Yet, it appears that he still expected that, with those generational units who actively move into society at large, the links with the ethnic community would break down. It was almost ten years later, when Simirenko went back to his original study to write an article showing the
usefulness of Mannheim's theory, that he concluded that members of the second generations — in particular the colonists — were quite capable to assimilate themselves into the society at large but that they chose not to do so in order not to sacrifice other values which they cherished more than economic advancement.

In about the mid-1960s Simirenko shifted his scholarly interest to an area which ostensibly had little to do with ethnic communities and ethnic generations in the United States. This was the field of Soviet studies. In part, the reason for this shift might have been that he was drafted into this field by those in Soviet studies who knew that Simirenko was of Ukrainian background and knew Russian and could give sociological commentary on a field in which there were still not very many sociologists. It was, however, natural for Simirenko to delve into this area with great interest. After all, before coming to the United States, nineteen years of his early life were connected with the Ukraine and the Ukrainian community. The prestige which the Simirenko family enjoyed in the Ukraine, going back to his Cossack ancestors in the eighteenth century, was something that he was always proud of, and the memory of the tragic death of his distinguished father at the hands of the NKVD remained always in his consciousness.

Simirenko's work in the Soviet area took two main directions: the study of the development of the Soviet sociology and social thought in general; and an analysis of the structure and functioning of the Soviet society. In a sense, the former was a prelude to the latter. Originally, Simirenko divided the development of sociology in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union into five periods: period of proto-sociology (1782-1870); pioneering period (1870-1885); classical period (1885-1924); period of decline (1924-1956); and period of revival (1956 on). His interest was mostly in the period of revival and particularly in the conditions which made its development possible from 1956 on and the phases it had been going through since that time. Simirenko pointed out that the first condition and the first phase of development was establishing credibility. This meant, first and most importantly, establishing political reliability which could be achieved only when sociology was tied to the programs and directives of the Communist Party. This, as Simirenko has also shown in his later work, has been the only way in which any new or different social or cultural practice could be institutionalized in the Soviet society. The price, however, which sociologists had to pay for this was the solemn declaration of loyalty to the principles of Marxism which every sociologist had to make in every piece of his writings and the duty to criticize Western sociological theories demanded of all sociologists in any of their encounters with or references to Western writings.

Furthermore, sociology could be developed only if it could show its visible practical usefulness. Under these conditions, Soviet sociology slowly developed a methodological consciousness and went through a phase of "cautious empiricism" with such notable publications as G. V. Osipov's edited work Sociology in the U. S. S. R.. Simirenko drew attention to a number of works which were straightforward research reports with minimum ideological commentary. These were studies which covered such varied topics as the budgets and expenditures of Soviet families, social relations in
religious sects, work relations in industry, leisure practices of Soviet men, ecology of a Caucasian town, changing structure of professions, cultural tastes of workers, and the like. Yet, in the sixties, this was still done only by a few dozen sociologists.

Simirenko's style of characterizing Soviet sociology was to select a piece of work which he considered to be most representative or the best in a specific area and to discuss it in detail. This he did, in an attempt to show the Soviet sociologists' conception of industrial society by discussing the work of M. B. Mitin and V. S. Semenov and in an attempt to show what he felt was the best empirical work in Ukrainian sociology by discussing I. V. Arutunian's study of a Ukrainian village.

Towards the end of the 1960s, Simirenko was cautiously optimistic about the future of Soviet sociology and social sciences in general. He felt that sociology could develop into its own under conditions of ideological tolerance. He felt that since 1964 a kind of limited ideological tolerance was evident in Soviet scholarship in general and that the fight against Stalinist dogmatism had been extended to other more “sacred” areas of Soviet Marxism. Yet, he admitted that the prospects for a rapid development and cultivation of ideological tolerance in the Soviet Union were not very good. Tolerance, he felt, could be cultivated only under special conditions which the Soviet scholars themselves could neither create nor control. Only with the passing of the older generation could one expect Soviet sociologists to examine freely the problems of generational conflict, anti-Semitism, the cult of personality, etc. Ultimately, Simirenko felt, changes in Soviet society and the world at large had to occur before tolerance could prevail.

In the mid or later 1970s, Simirenko modified his earlier views of the development of sociology in the Soviet Union. The optimism he had in the 1960s for its development as an independent scholarly discipline turned to skepticism and pessimism. What is interesting and of basic significance to our understanding of Simirenko's way of thinking is that, while some Western interpreters saw a sign of growth of sociology in the Soviet Union into an independent discipline with the appearance in 1974 of the Soviet journal Sociological Research, Simirenko perceived the contrary, an end of the effort to establish sociology as an intellectual discipline.

This conclusion derived from an insight and understanding of the structure and workings of the Soviet society which emerged in his thought and writings somewhere in the late sixties and early seventies. It also represented a maturing of Simirenko's ideas. Although he charted the phases of the development of Soviet sociology and social thought, his real intellectual interest was elsewhere. It consisted of an attempt to understand sociology as socially organized knowledge. The key to its development or its demise was to be found in the way all forms of knowledge were institutionally organized and connected with the social and political structure of society itself. Thus, his interest in the growth of Soviet sociology was guided by the perspective of the sociology of knowledge.

But the perspective of sociology of knowledge was not only the principle by which the growth of sociology or social thought was to be understood. It was
also the principle by which the structure and workings of the Soviet society itself were to be studied. For Simirenko, this principle derived in part from Max Weber's idea that modern society shows a general drift towards greater rationalization. This has meant a progressive tendency to specialize knowledge into institutionally defined areas of expertise and then organize and run society by application of this expert knowledge to everyday life. The rationalization process, therefore, leads to professionalization.

The crux of Simirenko's application of this theory, however, consisted in showing that this process of professionalization in the Soviet Union has not meant the same thing as the process of professionalization in Western societies. In the West, professionalization of public life has meant that persons choosing politics as a vocation are transformed into professional arbitrators but not the decision makers. Politicians in the West are expected to serve and follow their constituents rather than to determine their constituents' lives.

In contrast, in the Soviet Union, professionalization has meant, first and foremost, professionalization of politics. Politicians have become professionals. On the basis of their competence, politicians are expected to decide on and establish societal goals and set policies and direction for all individuals in society to follow. Politicians have neither constituents nor citizens; rather, they have clients. The model of professionalization is the doctor-patient relationship, in which the patient gives complete trust to the doctor because of his own lack of expert knowledge. Analogously, in the Soviet Union, the politician, because he is an “expert,” can only be approved by the “client,” but not elected, since the “client” cannot be assumed to have the expert knowledge to choose between the politicians. Simirenko points out that, in terms of this ideology of professional politics, it is incomprehensible to a professional politician that a country which does not permit a soda jerk to fill a prescription will at the same time permit used-car salesmen to influence its foreign and domestic policies. The professional politician is expected to know what is best for society. He, therefore, must submit to a vision of a good society held in common with other professional politicians. Thus, he must follow an “ethic of ultimate ends” which recognizes a single specific value and subordinates all other potential values to its attainment.

It is for this reason that Simirenko concluded that professionalization of sociology in the Soviet Union is sociology's own demise. In the West, professionalization may mean acquiring individual expertise and safeguarding it against political or other intrusion. In the Soviet Union, however, professionalization of any discipline means linking it with the Party and justifying its objectives in view of the Party's goals. Therefore, argued Simirenko, professionalization of sociology in the Soviet Union means eliminating what is the very nature of sociology, i.e., its efforts for value-neutrality and objectivity.

Simirenko went on to develop further his idea of professional politics as a key to understanding the Soviet society. According to him, constant propaganda and agitation is necessary in the Soviet Union in order to elicit the “clients'” compliance with the politicians' actions. Thus, the professional politicians rule by “ersatz charisma,” i.e., by constantly manipulating the
charismatic symbols for the population. The extremes of the general educational level of the population present a dual threat to the expertise and power of the politicians. On the one hand, raising the educational levels of clients is a prerequisite to eliciting normative compliance; it inculcates a belief in science and legitimizes the "scientization of politics." On the other hand, a higher level of general education produces an intelligentsia which is able to judge the professional politicians' performance. Enrolling members of the intelligentsia into the Party has been one way of providing insurance against this threat. Another way has been to transform all potential interest groups in society from vertical to horizontal structures. This has been achieved not by elimination of inequality but by systematic regulation of inequality. According to this process, for example, base salaries for specific industries and occupations may be standardized throughout all the regions and republics of the Soviet Union, but the conditions of life and the availability of goods vary substantially from one region to another, from one city to another, etc. In this manner, the buying power of money of various potential interest groups comes to be controlled without creating dissatisfaction which derives from unequal rewards.

According to Simirenko, multiple nationalities and nationalisms present perhaps the greatest threat to professionalized politics, but they are a challenge which the Soviet politicians as yet have not been able to meet.

Simirenko has developed several other aspects of this theory of professionalized politics in the Soviet Union, such as the problem of structural tensions produced by these politics within society. He has also given a typology of dissent in the Soviet Union. When reading his works on this subject, however, one keeps asking several questions. Why has professionalized politics developed in the Soviet Union in the first place? Why has the process of rationalization of modern life in the Soviet Union not developed in the same way as it has in the West? Simirenko has never explicitly taken up these questions. Implicitly, however, he does suggest an answer. In one of his articles he draws a contrast between American society and Soviet society. The differences between the two, according to him, are ultimately the differences of two ideologies, interest ideology, which encompasses capitalism, democracy, and anarchism, and professional ideology which encompasses Communism, Socialism, Fascism, and Nazism. The former perceives the social order as a result of pursuit of individual interests, protected and cultivated within a variety of organized often competing groups; the latter sees social order as coming about as a result of the conscious work of professional ideologues, i.e., people for whom ideology itself is a profession. In other words, the differences between the two societies are due to two different intellectual responses to the course of the historical process.

And here we have come full circle; the differences between these two societal units can be accounted for by the same general principle as the differences between two generational units which were the main concern of Simirenko's early work. What have appeared to be two completely different lines of research, assimilation of ethnic generations and Soviet society, are in fact joined by the same basic strategy of explanation. This is the logical bridge between two disparate areas of intellectual pursuit.
Perhaps this is also a psychological bridge between two phases of Simirenko's life, his boyhood, from his birthplace in Kiev, Ukraine, to Augsburg, Germany, as child of a refugee family in a Displaced Persons camp, and his adulthood as an immigrant in the United States, away from close relatives, in hospital for a long period of time, with daily pain from chronic asthma, yet with a strong determination to establish a family and be committed to a spouse. Indeed, the only way to bridge disparate phases of one's life is to approach them intellectually — to understand them.

Towards the end of his life, Simirenko returned to the study of ethnic groups. He administered a questionnaire to a sample of East European students at Pennsylvania State University, where he was Professor of Sociology. This time, however, he was not interested so much in ethnic community disintegration as in retention of ethnic consciousness and ethnic identity. The questionnaires were completed, but unfortunately he was never able to finish his work.

Simirenko left a legacy of four books, about twenty-seven articles, seventeen papers presented at scholarly conferences, and thirty-one book reviews. His articles were rarely long, but always clear, written in a crisp, straightforward, almost classical style.

WSEVOLOD W. ISAJIW

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W. W. I.

DAMIAN HORNIAKTEVYCH
(1892 — 1980)

Damian Horniatkevych, a painter and an art historian, died on March 3, 1980, in Kerhonkson, N. Y. He was an indefatigable, enthusiastic Full Member of our Academy and continuously worked for over twenty years in the capacity of Vice-President of the Academy and Head of its Fine Arts Group.

Damian Horniatkevych was born November 13, 1892, in the town of Liško, Boikiv region in Galicia. He studied at the Academy of Fine Arts in Cracow, Poland, and graduated in 1928. His art professors were Theodor Axentowicz and Stanislaw Kamocki; he studied art history with Professor Lukijan Ridl. These studies moved him to investigate some remnants of Medieval Ukrainian art in Cracow, namely frescoes from 1470 executed by Ukrainian artists in the Jagellonian Chapel of The Holy Cross in the Wawel cathedral. Horniatkevych made copies of these frescoes for the Ukrainian National Museum in Lviv. The director of this Museum, Ilarion Swiencickyj, induced him to study the remnants of other ancient Ukrainian frescoes in Lublin, Sandomierz, Suprasl, and Wislica. He described the results of his work in his first publication: Slidamy nashoi kultury na zemliakh Pol'shchi (Following the Traces of Our Culture on Polish Terrains), in the monthly Postup, Lviv. 1922-1924.

In the year 1922, while still the student of the Art Academy, Damian
Horniatkevych was commissioned to execute some art works in a chapel at the Monastery of Nazarene Sisters in Cracow.

After graduation from Cracow Academy, in 1925 Horniatkevych studied portrait painting at the workshop of Konrad Beringer in Dresden and, after that, landscape painting with Walter Pittner in Munich.

Back in Galicia, Horniatkevych worked mostly in portrait painting. At the same time, he studied Ukrainian folk art in Galicia and among the Hutzuls, paying special attention to pysanky (ornamented Easter eggs, of which he collected a large number), as well as to embroideries and wood carvings. This studies provided material for his article: “Rolia zhinky v povstanni Ukraïns’koho narodnoho mystetstva” (“The Role of Woman in the Emerging of Ukrainian Folk Art), in Nova Khata, Lviv, 1930.

In the years 1931-39 Horniatkevych worked in religious art. He decorated with religious paintings churches in Nastasiv near Ternopil (in 1931-32), a church in Uhniv near Rava-Ruska (in 1933-36), in Memyriv near Lviv, and in Vorobliachyn (in 1937-39).

When Soviet troops occupied the Western Ukraine in 1939, Horniatkevych fled to Cracow, where he wrote articles on art history and related topics for the local Ukrainian daily Krakivs’ki Visti and other publications. Shortly before the end of the war Horniatkevych moved to Höchstedt in Bavaria, where he met many Ukrainian émigrés-scholars. When the war ended, they all moved to a DP camp in Augsburg. There Horniatkevych could again engage in painting.

Horniatkevych painted mainly landscapes and architecture. Typical of his artistic personality was his attention to details; he attached to them the same importance as to the whole. At present, many painters spend much time experimenting, trying to invent new ways of expressing themselves. Horniatkevych did not waste his time in fruitless seeking, nor did he identify himself with any of the modern artistic trends. He firmly followed the familiar and tried way of Realism. However, in his paintings, especially in the landscapes, he had his special way of emphasizing certain colors; this gave his landscapes a peculiar characteristic tonality and offers evidence of a condensed scale of intense vision.

In November 1945 Ukrainian émigrés-scholars founded the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in Augsburg. Horniatkevych actively participated in this undertaking and was elected Learned Secretary of the Fine Arts Group. He resumed his writing and prepared ten articles on folk arts for Volume I of the Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva (Ukrainian Encyclopedia), originated in 1949 in Munich by the Shevchenko Scientific Society; he also participated in art exhibitions of Ukrainian painters in Germany.

Horniatkevych came to the United States in 1949. The first meeting of members of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US took place on April 15, 1950, and Horniatkevych was elected a member of the Board. In November 1950 he became the head of the Fine Arts Group of the Academy and later was elected a Vice-President of the Academy. He kept these positions until 1970, when poor health forced him to retire.
During these twenty years Damian Horniatkevych organized numerous conferences related to Fine Arts, delivered many papers on Ukrainian art and Ukrainian artists, and organized several art exhibitions in the Academy. He also exhibited specimens from his own rich collection of Ukrainian folk art, which he managed to save and to bring with him to this country.

In 1964 the Academy celebrated forty years of the artistic and scientific activities of Damian Horniatkevych. A retrospective exhibition of his paintings and drawings as well as his publications was organized.

Mr. Horniatkevych actively participated in the life of the Ukrainian society in the US. He was a member of the Society of Ukrainian Artists in America, was engaged in the work of the Board for the Erection of the Taras Shevchenko Monument in Washington, D. C., and lectured for many years on Ukrainian arts at the School of Ukrainian Studies in Newark, N. J. He was elected a Full Member of Shevchenko Scientific Society in America and was an honorary member of several Ukrainian professional societies.

Damian Horniatkevych had to earn his living as a common worker at various factories; thus, he could not dedicate much time to creative art work. However, he published many articles and essays concerning the history of Ukrainian arts, biographies of Ukrainian painters, studies of Ukrainian folk arts, etc. Among his more important work of this period are articles on folk wood carving, ceramics, and rugs in the book Ukrainian Arts, New York, 1952, a series of articles — “Ukraïns’ki mysttsi v avtobiohrafiiakh” (“Ukrainian Artist in their Autobiographies”) in Vyzvol’nyi Shliakh, London, 1957-58, the book Taras Schewtschenko als Maler (Taras Shevchenko as a Painter), Munich, 1964, and others.

Severe illness prevented Damian Horniatkevych from completing several more works he had started to write. He spent his last years in Kerhonkson, N. Y., and died there.

V. PAVLOVSKY

EUGENE PYZIUR
(1917 — 1980)*

Eugene Pyziur, professor of political science at St. Louis University and full member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in New York, died in St. Louis, Missouri, on March 13, 1980. He actively participated in the Academy's work, especially in the 1950s. His death means the loss of an eminent specialist in political theory, particularly as applied to Eastern Europe.

Eugene Pyziur was born into the family of a priest at Belzec (Ukraine) April 16, 1917. Upon graduation from the Gymnasium in Sokal, which he attended

* Translated by the volume Editor.
from 1927-35, he studied law at the universities of Lviv (1936-39) and Vienna (1941-44). In 1949 he finished his legal studies by obtaining a Doctor Juris degree from the Ukrainian Free University, in Munich. His dissertation on civil law, which he had begun in Vienna, was entitled Die Unterschrift im Tatbestande des schriftlichen Rechtsgeschäfites nach dem BGB. It should also be noted that in 1947-48 he was editor-in-chief of the Students'kyi Visnyk [Students' Herald], the paper of the Central Ukrainian Students' Organization. This latter activity provided him with concrete experience in community work; however, it remained merely an episode. His true energy came to the fore only on the American continent (from 1950 on), when everything had to be started anew.

The early 1950s in the United States meant for Pyziur — as for many others — a feverish search for orientation in an environment that was altogether different. In 1952-53 he was a student at Columbia University, in the Department of Public Law and Government, concentrating on political philosophy and Russian and Soviet studies. His European study of law became only a background, an element of his intellectual maturity and scope. It is characteristic that, despite the hard living conditions, Pyziur's drive to scholarly achievement erupted as never before. He found an outlet in public lectures at the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US: “The Ukrainian problem in World War I and the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine” (September 1952) and “Soviet nationalities policy after Stalin’s death” (October 1953). Even more characteristic is his writing of a longer study in Ukrainian in 1951 “Novyi fragment sovets'koï agrarnoï polityky — ukrupnennia kolhospiv” [A new fragment of Soviet agricultural policy — the establishment of large collective farms], which was printed in the Academy's Literary-Scientific Symposium, 1952, pp. 223-68. The study was based on Soviet newspaper and journal articles, where the news about the forthcoming establishment of large collective farms was presented only very sparsely and in veiled form. It clearly reveals Pyziur as a researcher — conscientious collector and organizer of facts, cautious in his conclusions.

Sovietology and even “Kremlinology” have always been areas of interest for Eugene Pyziur. Running ahead somewhat, let us draw attention to an outstanding example of his “Kremlinology.” This is his paper entitled “How Krushchev’s fall reveals the Kremlin’s political crisis (An address . . . to [the] University Forum of St. Louis University).” This document goes back to May 1965, a Ukrainian version of it was printed in Suchasnist, April 1966. Here the author shows himself already a master of political analysis.

But let us return to the earlier years. In 1954 Pyziur finished his studies at Columbia University. He obtained an M. A. degree, on the strength of his thesis “The Doctrine of Anarchism of Michael A. Bakunin,” which he had written in a seminar, under the guidance of the late Professor Franz L. Neumann. This monograph about Bakunin met with a lucky fate: in 1955 the late Professor Roman Smal-Stocki accepted it for publication as the inaugural issue of the ”Marquette Slavic Studies” series published by the Marquette University Press in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The small book of a heretofore unknown author received favorable and even very laudatory reviews in international
professional journals in America and in Europe. In 1968 the Henry Regnery Company of Chicago accepted it for republication in its prestigious reprint series of Gateway Editions.

For the sixtieth anniversary of Dmitry Čiževsky, Pyziur wrote the sketch “Dmytro Ivanových Chyzhevs’ky [Čiževsky],” which was published in Ukrains’ki Visti in Neu-Ulm, Germany, and also came out as a separate brochure in 1955. The sketch is written without any pretentiousness: the reader is struck by Pyziur’s ability to collect facts even in a field different from his own and — with his infinite patience — to paint a single coherent portrait.

But all this was not the author’s chief concern: the main direction of his research was soon revealed. In January 1958 Pyziur gave at the Academy in New York a paper on “Bohdan Oleksandrovych Kistiakovsky: an introduction to his political theory.” Fortunately, the expanded lecture was published in the Ukrains’ka Literaturna Hazeta [Ukrainian Literary Gazette] in Munich (March-April 1958). Even today the reader is impressed by the immensity of the material utilized by the author, by his persistent search for leading thoughts, and by his intellectual breadth. In this reviewer’s opinion, the lecture was of seminal importance. Not only did it constitute a “first introduction” to Kistiakovsky, but it opened the way onto the vast terrain of the study of the liberal-constitutional movement in the territory of Imperial Russia. It also served as an introduction to Drahomaralov. Through Kistiakovsky, Pyziur opened a path to a field that would claim his attention in the subsequent years, when he had reached full intellectual maturity. Measured in terms of intellectual vitality and achievement, those years were probably his best.

From 1957-58 Eugene Pyziur continued his studies in the Department of Political Science, Notre Dame University, at Notre Dame, Indiana. Again he concentrated on comparative government, political philosophy, and Russian and Soviet studies. It was at Notre Dame that he wrote the dissertation Some problems of Russian constitutional doctrine of the “Sixties,” most of it written under the supervision of Professor Ferdinand A. Hermens. He defended his dissertation and received a Ph. D. degree in 1961. That year marked the beginning of his own academic career. In the fall of 1961 he was appointed Assistant Professor at St. Louis University, in St. Louis, Missouri. He taught two courses in comparative government (Major Governments of Western Europe, and Government and Politics in the Soviet Union) and led graduate seminars on Major Trends of Russian Political and Social Thought in the 19th Century, Elements of Communist Ideology, and Nationality and Nationalism.

It is worth considering Pyziur’s dissertation at some length. Unfortunately, we did not have it in front of us when writing this obituary; only the author’s abstract and table of contents were available. Wrote Pyziur: “This dissertation is a part of a study which deals with the rise of constitutionalism in Imperial Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century.” He continued: “The summation of the theoretical problems connected with the introduction and realization of the representative system in Russia comprises the content of the Russian constitutional doctrine, the main topic of my dissertation. However, its exposition is preceded by a rather elaborate presentation of a series of
problems, which leads to the proper understanding of the constitutional doctrine, and which often demanded re-examination from a different point of view than that previously held." This describes the contents of the introductory chapters. However, two-thirds of the work is devoted to the analysis of the thought and the political struggle of two eminent pioneers of the liberal constitutional movement: those of Count Petr Vladimirovich Dolgorukov (1817-68) and Boris Nikolaevich Chicherin (1828-1904).

The dissertation was not published, which is a great loss for the scholarly study of that period. About its high quality there cannot be any doubt. We have also published articles by Eugene Pyziur from the 1960s which give an exact impression of his stature in those years. To them belongs the article — in Ukrainian — on "The constitutional program and theory of Mykhailo Drahanov" in Lysty do Pryiateliv [Letters to Friends], 1966, nos. 8-10; "Bismarck's Appraisal of Russian Liberalism as Prussian Envoy in St. Petersburg," Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol. 10, no. 3 (1968); and, as a third example, "Mikhail N. Katkov: Advocate of English Liberalism in Russia," in The Slavonic and East European Review, July 1967. In all these articles there is evident an absolute mastery of the material, an unemotional logic of research, and an ever more brilliant sense of historical perspective.

It is not easy to explain why the dissertation did not appear in print. Pyziur was able to see his goals clearly and to realize them step by step. The possibility should not be excluded that he wanted to expand his dissertation far beyond the 1860s (he had called his dissertation only "a part of a study"). Given the state of his health, such a delay was risky. Other explanations may, however, be adduced, too. In the second half of the 1960s Pyziur was heavily engaged in the work of the W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute in Philadelphia. He served as editor-in-chief of Lypynsky's works and archival materials (letters, etc.). It is difficult to establish today with any degree of certainty how much he accomplished in that new line of work. Available fragments, however, permit us to conclude that he put a lot of effort into that position. It was truly pioneer work, in a virgin field. Unfortunately, a long smoldering conflict broke out between the Institute's administration and Pyziur, which paralyzed his work. In August 1975 Pyziur announced in the press that he was leaving the Institute.

This is not the place to enter into the substance of the conflict between Pyziur and the Lypynsky Institute. We consider it important that, upon having joined the Institute and thus returned to a Ukrainian set of topics, he put in a major effort which — through no fault of his — bore little fruit and that has, by and large, been lost to scholarship. That such a major effort had been made is easy to document. In the summer of 1969 Pyziur gave an address at a conference organized by the Institute in Philadelphia, in which he laid out the direction of his future research. A little later he gave another lecture on Lypynsky at a similar forum in Newark, N. J. In November-December 1972 Pyziur delivered lectures on Lypynsky at several sessions of the Ukrainian Studies Seminar at Harvard University. December 3, 1972, he spoke on "Conservative Ideology in General and Its Fate in the Ukraine" at the so-called Congress of Free Ukrainian Political Thought in New York. From this we see
how systematically he prepared himself for understanding the heritage and the historical figure of Lypynsky.

So far it is difficult to establish how many items from Pyziur’s manuscript archives bear on Lypynsky. Occasionally, typewritten papers circulate among his friends. One of them, rather long and written in English, is entitled “Lypynsky’s Idea of Nation.” The paper, which he wrote on a very difficult and as yet uncharted topic, has the character of a laboratory study as has, incidentally, everything that Eugene Pyziur has written on Lypynsky and the topic of conservatism. It is a tragedy that neither time nor circumstances have allowed the pioneering efforts of this thinker and researcher to develop into something great.

The treatise on Lypynsky’s theory of nation reminds us somewhat of the seminars on “Nation and Nationality” that Eugene Pyziur would conduct in St. Louis. There he referred, among other sources, to the book by the late Volodymyr Starosolsky Teoriiia natsii [Theory of Nation]. Of fundamental importance in his theoretical research, however, was a book which was also basic to the thinking of Starosolsky, viz. Ferdinand Toennies’s Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. Among Pyziur’s friends there is circulating a typewritten copy of his study in English “Some Aspects of the Relationship of Democracy to the Nation.” The reader is surprised to find the close connection and mutual interdependence which the author reveals between the nation and democracy. It is even more surprising to find how Pyziur is able to inject logically into the paper the old concept of Gemeinschaft [community] and Gesellschaft [society] and to shed light on various aspects of contemporary democracy.

This volume of the Annals contains Pyziur’s essay on the relationship of some ideas of Edmund Burke and Taras Shevchenko. This essay sounds a little different from Pyziur’s other works on the idea of nation: we get the impression that he has dispensed with all bookish apparatus so that he can talk with us freely about something that concerns all of us a great deal.

WASSYL RUDKO

LEV OLEKSANDROVYCH OKINSHEVYCH
(1898-1980)*

Lev Olesandrovych Okinshevych, the renowned Ukrainian historian, died on November 7, 1980, in a suburb of Washington, D. C. He was the author of numerous scholarly works and a member of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the US and of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

Okinshevych was born on January 25 (February 6, new style), 1898, in St. Petersburg. His father, a jurist by profession, was a Belorussian from Gomel District in Mogilev Gubernia, who had studied at Chernihiv Gymnasium and at Odessa University. Lev Olesandrovych’s mother, Ielyzaveta, née Yaresh, had

* Translated by the Assistant Copy Editor.
a Czech father who completed his studies at Moscow University and taught Latin at the Pavlo Halahan College in Kiev.

Several years after his birth, Okinshevych's parents moved to Kiev. At first Lev Olesandrovych studied in the Kiev Gymnasium; in 1912 he entered the Pavlo Halahan College on a scholarship. In 1916 he began studying law at Kiev University. One year later, in 1917, he graduated from the Kiev Military School and was shipped to the Romanian front with the rank of ensign. For several months in 1920 he taught political economy in a school associated with the Kiev military hospital.

In 1921, while still a law student at the Kiev Institute of National Economy, Okinshevych passed the requisite examination in the history of the law of Rus' and was appointed by Academician M. Vasylenko to the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Commission for the Study of Western Rus' and Ukrainian Law. In 1922 he finished his law studies with the diploma of a candidate of Law. From 1921 to 1933 he worked as a scholarly associate of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences and for several years served as secretary of the commission on Western Rus' and Ukrainian Law.

From 1925 to 1928, Okinshevych also did post-graduate work in Kiev at the Scientific-Research Department of the History of the Ukraine, the director of which was Academician M. S. Hrushevsky.

While working as a scholarly associate of the Academy of Sciences from 1924 to 1929, Lev Olesandrovych was active in the "Young Academy" group. Other members of the group were Professor O. K. Doroshkevych, O. Iu. Hermaize, S. P. Pasternak, Academician M. P. Kravchuk, and others.

In 1933 Okinshevych was appointed professor of history at the Nizhyn Pedagogical Institute. In December 1933, however, he was removed from that post as a "class enemy." For the next three years, 1934-1936, he worked at the "Pribalkhashstroi" construction site in Kazakhstan as a legal consultant. In 1937-1938 he worked in Viazma, Smolensk Oblast, and in 1938-1941 in Smolensk itself as a legal consultant to various institutions. After the outbreak of World War II, he was evacuated to Rostov on the Don, where on September 1, 1941, he was mobilized into the Red Army. On September 11 he was taken prisoner by the Germans but, along with other non-uniformed personnel, was freed soon thereafter in the village of Zhurivka (Iahotyn Raion, Poltava Oblast).

Okinshevych reached Kiev on foot at the end of September 1941. At first he worked as a legal consultant to the city administration's Department of Education. He was then appointed professor and dean of the Department of Law at Kiev University, where he continued working until the Germans shut down the institution. For some time thereafter he headed the "Science and Technology" section in a local newspaper but decided to drop this job after several months in order to work as an associate at the Scientific-Research Institute of Local Lore in Kiev, where he stayed until the spring of 1943. Afterwards he was placed in charge of the Cassational Court in Vasyl'kiv district of Kiev Oblast.

In 1943 Okinshevych was evacuated, at first to Stanislaviv, where he worked
in the city library, then to Lviv and Krynytsia, and finally to a camp in Heidebrach in Upper Silesia. Eventually, he received permission to move to Czechoslovakia, where his mother had been born. In the middle of 1944 Lev Olesandrovyvych found work in Prague at the Ukrainian Museum of the Liberation Struggle and became a professor at the Ukrainian Free University. In 1945, he was evacuated to Germany along with the entire university staff. There, from 1945 to 1949, he served as professor and dean of the Department of Law at the Ukrainian Free University in Munich.

In 1949 Okinshevych moved to the United States. At first he worked as a porter in various New York hospitals; later, in 1951, he received a special Ford Foundation scholarship to do scholarly work for the Research Program on the USSR. In 1954 he was hired by the Library of Congress, where he worked for 15 years — until 1969. There he classified books, organized the subject catalogue, translated Ukrainian- and other Slavic-language works into English, and compiled various kinds of bibliographies.

Although Okinshevych was in very poor health in recent years, he continued with his scholarly work. On November 7, 1980, he died.

II. Professor L. O. Okinshevych's Scholarly Activity.


Okinshevych's works were printed in other scholarly publications as well, in particular *Ukraine* (1924-1932), the official journal of the Historical Section of the All-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The fourth issue (1924) of *Ukraine* contained his historical and legal analysis of “The Council of the Starshyna [Officers] in the Hetmanate.” Issue 1-2, from 1927, carried his bibliographical survey, “The Study of the History of Ukrainian Law.” In 1927 the Belorussian-language journal *Polym'ia*, No. 1, ran his article on “The Cossacks in Belorussia.”

The suppression of Ukrainian scholarship in the 1930s made it impossible to continue with one’s scholarly work, and Okinshevych was no exception. It was only in 1943, while working at the Kiev Scientific-Research Institute of Local Lore, that he could resume his work and write a study of “The History of Zemstvos in the Ukraine and Russia.” The piece was submitted to the University of Königsberg but apparently never published.

L. O. Okinshevych fully resumed his scholarly activity in the second half of


While in the United States, L. O. Okinshevych wrote a number of other studies in Ukrainian, Belorussian, and English. Among his Belorussian articles is “Tsyivilizatsiinye asnovy belaruskaga historychnaga pralesu,” Zapisy Belaruskogo Instytutu Nauky i Mastatstva, No. 2, 1953. His English-language works include:

3. Arbitration in the Soviet Union, New York, 1954. (Under the name Leo A. Yaresh)

Professor L. O. Oksinshevych’s primary field of study was the history of Ukrainian law. His seminal works, Tsentral’ni ustanovy Ukraïny-Het’manshchyny 17-18 stolit’ (2 vols., 1929-1930, 526 pp.) and Znachne viis’kove tovarystvo v Ukraïni-Het’manshchyni XVII-XVIII st. (Munich, 1948, 230 pp.), are important contributions to the study of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Ukraine. He began researching these works in the 1920s in the archives of Kiev, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, and Moscow. Both studies are rich in facts and grounded in objectivity. The second of them describes and analyzes the great changes that occurred between the Khmelnyskyy era (1648) and the third and fourth decades of the 18th century. The descendants of the renowneć
Cossack starshyna [officers] and of the distinguished military nobility of the times of Khmelnytsky, wrote Lev Olesandrovych, "traded their sabers for snuff-boxes, the starshyna-hetman councils for gatherings of friends and family with 'quadrilles' and other dances, their command of troops and regiments of Cossacks for the command of troops of servants who toiled under the loads of the corvée. Thus had the times changed: the ancestors of the distinguished association, those brave fighters for the Ukraine, can no longer be compared with the eighteenth century Ukrainian aristocracy, a new and privileged native superior estate, which largely reconciled itself to the loss of its independence, while continually drawing closer to the aristocracy of Russia." (p. 79)

In his lifetime Lev Oleksandrovych Okinshevych published over 100 scholarly works, articles, high-school text books, bibliographies, etc. His works will never lose their scholarly value, because they are based on original research and are characterized by scholarly objectivity and a profound knowledge of the times under analysis.

As a person, Lev Oleksandrovych Okinshevych distinguished himself by his modesty and immense assiduousness. The conditions of his life did not always encourage scholarly activity. Instead of working in his profession, he often had to spend valuable time earning a living as a legal consultant, librarian, and even as a porter in New York's hospitals. But, in spite of these obstacles, Lev Oleksandrovych proved industrious enough to leave behind a large and valuable scholarly corpus and thereby make an important contribution to Ukrainian and Belorussian culture.

Vichna pam'iat' [eternal memory] to this excellent scholar and wonderful human being!

PETRO ODARCHENKO


Orders may be placed with the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, Inc., 206 West 100 Street, New York, New York 10025